Causality: Eternal or Momentary?

·期刊原文

Causality: Eternal or Momentary?

By Winston L. King

Philosophy East & West

V. 13 No. 2 (1963) pp. 117-135

Copyright 1963 by University of Hawaii Press

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THIS PAPER Will concern itself with two variant types of causal theory found in Indian philosophy in the eighth and ninth centuries. One of these is Hindu, that of `Sa^mkara, the great commentator of Vedaanta. The other is that of two Buddhist dialectical logicians, `Saantarak.sita and his disciple-commentator Kamala`siila, who in their general position are somewhere in the "idealist" Yogaacaara and "nihilist" Maadhyamika vicinity.

One of the interesting features of the two positions is their sharp difference on some points and yet a curious likeness in others. No doubt their common-though-differently-interpreted heritage from Indian philosophical-religious thought--for Buddhism is a Hindu heresy--accounts for this in general. In particular, it is sometimes suggested[1] that `Saantarak.sita-Kamala`siila may well have influenced the method of `Sa^mkara's exposition and perhaps his thought. At any rate, he was accused of being a crypto-Buddhist despite his attempts to confute the Buddhist position.[2]

D. H. H. Ingalls[3] has construed this confusing likeness-and-difference relation in the following way: `Sa^mkara's version of the Vedaanta proceeds from his basic conviction of the sole reality of the Cosmic Self (Brahman) toward the unreality of the phenomenal world. The Buddhists, on the other hand, begin with their characteristic emphasis upon the evanescence of the phenomenal world and move on from there toward a denial of all substantiality, both in the phenomenal order and in selfhood. Thus, when `Sa^mkara "arrives" at his emphasis on the unreality of the phenomenal world, he speaks much as a Buddhist. But obviously the two denials of phenomenal reality are from opposed viewpoints.

The point of the encounter to be taken up here, as noted above, is in respect to causal theory. This is a crucial point, since, so far as the Vedaanta

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and Buddhism are concerned, it bears on the basic nature of the world order in which we find ourselves; and, more importantly for both, has to do directly and specifically with the human prospects for salvation, i.e., how one reaches his liberating Absolute, "substantial" Brahman, and qualitative, experiential Nirvaa.na, respectively. For, in the causal process, particularly for the Buddhist, is found the key to liberation.

Roughly and generally, the two positions may be set forth thus. `Sa^mkara's fundamental operational base for all his thought is his conviction that Brahman, the Cosmic Self or Supreme Consciousness, is the only true reality. Even the evanescent phenomenal world must be somehow related to Brahman, therefore, for only as Brahman is somehow "in" it can there be a world, however illusory. Hence his preoccupation with the "non-difference" of cause and effect, with its implications of an unchanging basal "substance." The Buddhist position is one of emphasis upon the radical discontinuity of phenomena, the insistence upon the non-identity of cause and effect, and is an unremitting war against all substance theory or implication. But in the end there is a curious static quality about both systems. So far as religious implications are concerned, the Vedaantist finds Buddhist discontinuity a chaos allowing of no definite salvational topography or dependable lines of cause and effect; while the Buddhist is perturbed by the block-universe fixity of Vedaantist substances, including selves, which allows for no saving self-reconstruction. Yet their ultimate liberating Absolutes (Brahman and Nirvaa.na) ate in most ways indistinguishable from each other.

The writings used as a basis for this study are as follows: `Sa^mkara's commentaries on the Brahma Suutra[4] and the B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad:[5] and the Tattvasa^ngraha of `Saantarak.sita, combined with Kamala`siila's commentary thereon.[6] Sometimes the general `Sa^mkaran Vedaantist position will be referred to in tote as `SV and the Buddhist position of our two authors as `SK. The method of development will be to set forth descriptively the two causal theories in turn, and then in the third section discuss points at issue between them.

I
We may begin by noting again `Sa^mkara's basic conviction of the sole reality of Brahman, This must never be forgotten in anything which `Sa^m-

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kara says, for his only concern, whatever he discusses, is to establish the truth of this conviction and chart the way to realize its liberating power. (This is really his only concern with causality at all.) As to the ultimate nature of Brahman, nothing descriptive can be said. It is the Absolute; and to attribute qualities to it is to deny its absoluteness. Sometimes it is spoken of as sat-cit-aananda (Being-Knowledge-Bliss) in one indissoluble distinctionless unity. Yet, even such language is dubious and tends to reduce ultimate Brahman to something less.

Nevertheless, there exists in some sense a phenomenal world-order also, one of distinction, of manyness, even though in the final analysis it is an illusory dream-fiction. And, if Brahman is truly the only reality it must in some way be related to this phenomenal world-order. For, as noted above, even the phenomenal order possesses its ephemeral illusory being only by sharing somehow in the being of Brahman. Hence, the problem of problems for `Sa^mkara (and Advaita) is to relate Brahman to "its" world, unity to multiplicity, non-acting being to acting being, purity to impurity, bliss to agony, knowledge to ignorance.

`Sa^mkara's basic device for doing this is the concept of material causality, though, as we shall see, he is somewhat inconsistent and irregular in the use of his analogies. His variability in this respect may be accounted for by the difficulties intrinsic in the concept when applied to the metaphysical situation as he sees it. Yet, his basic conviction of one changeless, distinctionless reality (Brahman) drives him inevitably to material-causal imagery, even though he often implies or uses other concepts and observes that none of the ordinary causal concepts which are applicable to the phenomenal world apply to the Brahman-world relation.[7]

Let us, then, observe `Sa^mkara's conception of material causality. The making of jugs from clay and ornaments from gold ore or the production of curds from milk provide good examples. Thus, clay as material cause underlies, and is more basic than, all of its modifications such as jugs. One effect or modification may take the place of another, but that does not destroy the basic clay-substance present through all of them.[8] "It is in the presence of the clay only that a pot is seen to exist."[9] The effects of a material cause, or its modifications, are found "potentially" in the cause--curds in milk, earrings in gold ore, jugs in lumps of clay. Or, in the same way, rice and barley are potentially in the earth as their material cause.[10] And to "know" a mate-

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rial cause, such as clay in jugs, is to "know" all things of clayey or earthy substance.[11]

What, then, of the forces or factors ("accidental causes") that bring potentiality into actuality? With `Sa^mkara, they play a subordinate role. Thus, the curd-potentiality of milk is "merely accelerated by heat, etc."[12] Heat (and other accidental causes) only brings out the true nature of the original substance.[13] In a manner of speaking, material causes such as clay and gold lie dormantly "expecting" accidental causes to "excite" their activity.[14]

With this agrees the generalized `SV language about the relation of cause and effect. The effect "is but only a particular special condition of the cause."[15] It is held that "cause and its effects are non-different from each other."[16] Another (and favorite `SV) example of this is the waves and foam which are non-different from their cause, the ocean of water, even though separate as modifications.[17] A man is not different men by virtue of taking different positions from time to time.[18] It may be noted in passing that it is, of course, this substantial and enduring causal concept that `SK most vigorously attack.

Such, then, is the `SV version of material causality. It represents a continuing identity of substance in the "cause" and "effect" conditions of the item in question. The accidental causes work upon or modify this basic material. Now, how does this apply, if it does even by analogy, to Brahman's relation to the phenomenal world? And here we come to the nub of `Sa^mkara's conceptual difficulties and to instances of inconsistency. For certainly substantial clay is much more recognizably like its "effects" than the distinctionless Absolute is like its supposed modifications in the phenomenal world.

Brahman must indeed be placed beyond all desire to create, for such desire would introduce a "tormentor and tormented" tension into Brahman's distinctionless oneness.[19] Hence, in this context the creative potency, perhaps as both accidental and material causes, is placed outside Brahman in maayaa. Maayaa, of course, is the world-, individual-producing result of nescience

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(avidyaa). Brahman is held to be "always in association with the great maayaa,"[20] and there are those in later Vedaanta who attributed to maayaa the substance of the world, i.e., its material causality.[21] Yet, the flavor of such passages as the last one seems often to be that of the imposition by avidyaa of its illusory categories, much in the manner of accidental causes, upon the basic "substance" of Brahman, the "material" cause, as false being-concepts parasitically living on true being.

In other passages, `Sa^mkara suggests a more active role for Brahman. Its "causal" relation to the world is analogous to an inactive magnet, which induces" activity without itself being active. "So the Self of all, omniscient and omnipotent, may, even though He Himself is without any such tendency, still induce such activity in everything."[22] Later in this passage it is suggested that Brahman as intelligence is indeed the prime causal factor. Or, to use a somewhat different vocabulary, Brahman is like the sun and moon, which remain themselves unaffected by the reflections which they "cause" in a pool of water,[23] or like a crystal unaffected essentially by a red color reflected into it by a nearby cotton pad.[24] Yet, again Brahman is said to "participate in limiting adjuncts," whose source is avidyaa.[25] But it must be repeated that Brahman, though "participating," is not thereby changed or affected in its essential nature. It is a kind of "general causality" like the rain which helps "cause" rice and barley growth. But rice and barley (types of sentient individuals) both have "their own different individual actions as the cause" of their diversity, and, of course, of their sins and sufferings.[26] Now and again the stock textual answer that puts the creative impulse onto second-level, or conditioned, Sagu.na Brahman, in the form of Ii`svara or God, is accepted. Such creation is that of sportive play.

It must be said that `Sa^mkara, even when speaking of ultimate Brahman, wishes somehow to keep the creative initiative with this "One without a second," the Real within the real. Negatively, Brahman is "eternally free, has no duties either to perform anything beneficial or not to perform anything unbeneficial"[27]-which leaves it free from "coercion" by maayaa Brahman--here called the Lord in somewhat anthropomorphic language--may choose to work or not to work.[28] In other words, maayaa is not coeval with

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Brahman in the ultimate sense; avidyaa cannot force Brahman into world-making.

And what of the reality of this phenomenal world? Does the fact that Brahman "enters into" (i.e., shares in the increase and decrease of) its own creation,[29] participates in it, that the world is pre-existent in the Creative self,[30] render it substantial in any real sense? Not ultimately. Foam and waves upon the ocean are of the ocean, and reflections in pools and color in crystals have a certain reality, but no ultimate being. They may disappear (Or be withdrawn, to change the figure) into their source without affecting that source, just as a spider draws its web back into itself,[31] as metals are re- absorbed into the earth, or as a magician destroys his empty illusionist effects at will and without remainder, and without change in himself.[32] The phenomenal world of Brahman's modifications does "not exist in the real sense," for "if there were genuine otherness [from Brahman] it could not be known."[33] Yet, the world is not pure nothingness, for Brahman-with-world seems to be somewhat more than Brahman-without-world. Brahman may be said to "increase and decrease" with its limiting adjuncts, i.e., as there are and are not worlds. So, also, the world itself does not completely disappear (the eternality of maayaa?):

The creation, when it comes to be annihilated or dissolved, still retains that residuary potentiality, and this same potentiality is the root-cause of its regeneration, otherwise there would result the predicament of a result occurring without a cause.[34]

And on one occasion `Sa^mkara suggests that there may be a latent self-quality, or sensibility, i.e., Brahman-quality, even in the non-sentient material world itself.[35]

We may now draw our threads together. The forces at work in `Sa^mkara's philosophy of causation are obvious. Fundamental is the primacy of Brahman as the ultimate real, in terms of which `Sa^mkara must relate and describe all else--if only to prove that the ultimate real is the only real. His reverence for the scriptures, traditional Hindu that he is, sometimes impedes his philosophical thrust, however. For therein he finds some anthropomorphic language-in speaking of the "cause" of the world in particular. Hence, he is willing to adapt himself to this language on occasion in considering Ii`svara to be the creator of the world; this usage serves to maintain Brahman, even

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in conditioned form, in its supremacy, if not ultimacy.[35a] Further, he maintains the superiority of Brahman to maayaa in a primordial sense, at least implicity. Maayaa, as an avidyaa-product, logically may seem to be operationally almost as necessary as Brahman to world production; but "in the beginning," or at the highest hierarchical level, Brahman is one without a second. Beside it this poor phenomenal world and maayaa itself are merest illusion.

Yet, the only reality possessed by this world (of evanescent foam, waves, and reflections) is that of Brahman (ocean and sun), which in some sense "causes" the world. How better express this than by the analogy of material causality? The revered scriptural teachings, despite Upani.sadic spiritualizing of their themes, plus `Sa^mkara's own similar efforts, often seem to have an underlying substance-philosophy. And, by analogy at least, substance-philosophy, in the form of material causality, can best serve `Sa^mkara's conviction that Brahman is ultimately all the being that is, the transcendental ground of the phenomenal world. For, as noted above, the illusory being of this world rests upon Brahman-being for even its capacity to be an illusion. Hence, unlike as the essentiality of clayness to pots may seem to be to Brahman's relation to the phenomenal world, there is a basic fittingness of analogy here that `Sa^mkara always reverts to and that accords well with his conviction of the "non-difference" of seemingly diverse causes and effects.

II.
The basic unit of phenomenal existence for `SK is what Stcherbatsky calls the point-instant.[35b] Existent reality is here-newness. What is is somewhere perceptible in space, "here" for observation--though `SK deny that space is a separate and eternal entity. It is "now" In experience. Point-instantaneousness is the mode of experience of reality, and the point-instant is the bearer (potentially) of all true knowledge of that reality as perceived by the senses. For "Sense-perception is free from conceptual content and not erroneous."[36] Yet, also, in mystical noumenal manner, `SK note that " all 'Specific Peculiarity' is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression."[37] And it is of the essence of these entities to be "never really cognised."[38]

It should be stressed that point-instants are clearly only in the temporal

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now. `SK hold there are no such things as "permanent," "enduring," or "eternal" realities. At least, such cannot enter into the dynamism of the causal order, and consequently are so existentially irrelevant as to be unreal. For to be real in the phenomenal sense is to appear; appearance in time-space contexts is the way in which an entity achieves its self-essence.[39] Yet, real appearance is only momentary, and momentary in the strictest sense. The instant at which the reality-point exists, i.e., appears, is knife-edge and needle-point in its newness. There are no parts, previous or future, to such an instant.

Now, if points exist only at instants of no "thickness," we have here a very marked and obvious atomism. And, indeed, `SK accept temporal atomism to the full. Relations, connections, unities are radically denied on every hand. ". . . when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its complete form,"[40] with no hooks, tails, or leftover connections of any sort. "Things of the nature of Individuals cannot become inter-related among themselves" because of differences of time and place and mode of action.[41] Thus, a whirling firebrand gives the impression of a circle of fire, but it is "really" only a chain of instantaneous particular fire-moments.[42] "In fact . .. there is no continuity of the slightest trace of any part of anything at a11."[43]

If all universals and continuities of any sort are non-existent, how can the Buddhist have a theory of causality? The theory can be stated both positively and negatively. Negatively, it may be stated as the flat denial that there can be a permanent or enduring cause, that is, a cause which lasts beyond the knife-edge moment of its appearance and causal efficacy, or one which has existed, even "potentially" or partially, before its moment of appearance-efficacy. To be a cause--indeed to be "existent," for all existents are causes --consists only in momentary appearance. What, then, of the relation or connection of one causal point-instant to the effected point-instant? Perhaps "contact" is the best word to employ.

Let it be repeated that the `SK viewpoint is most insistent that there is absolutely no temporal overflow or splicing of causally connected point-instants. The "cause" is non-existent until it "causes." Then it turns into its effect. Or, to state it more Buddhistically, the effect is the "destruction" of the cause; the two are mutually exclusive, save that they make temporal (and probably spatial) "contact." And the essence of the causal relation is precisely

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this self-destroying succession; only if this is the case, says the Buddhist, does the cause-effect terminology have any meaning.

In this situation, the only existent is moment two of any three moments of the causal series, i.e., the present moment. It is caused by moment one, the past moment; and in turn causes moment three, the future moment; but exists in neither of them, in either part or whole. Interestingly enough, this radically atomistic theory, which denies all connections and relationships save that of temporal (and spatial?) contact, thereby becomes almost completely relational. The only reality is the relation of temporal succession; and every point-instant is both cause and effect at the same time, i.e., it is composed of relationships.

But, of course, for `SK the seeming duality of being cause and effect at once is only one of viewpoint, not of real relation, which is a one-to-one sequence. And to all those who, like `SV, would strengthen and multiply connective tissues in this area, by terms like "productivity," "potentiality," "causal relation," or "operation," `SK would reply: You have not grasped our point. To exist, i.e., to be present in the causal order, implies in the action of existing, both arising and ceasing. One facet is as essential to existence as the other. Destruction is an integral characteristic of existence; being includes non-being in its essence. Arising, or production, has non-being as a presupposition; and experience teaches that everything which arises likewise passes away. "'Destruction'. is not-different from the Thing itself; as the positive Thing is produced from its own cause."[44] `SK go on somewhat ambiguously to warn against the reification of "destruction of things" into an entity, since the term means only "the 'Dissociation of a particular form' and not the negation of its existence"[45]--which sounds suspiciously like the `SV interpretation of causality as only the gradual change of qualities or aspects of an underlying substance, so vigorously denied by `SK elsewhere.[46] This points to some final considerations as to the basic dissimilarities of the two views, but here we need only reiterate the radical intention of `SK. "It is efficiency (for effective action) that constitutes the characteristic of (existing) 'Things.' "[47] "All that the expression 'Being' (Existence) is meant to convey is only the idea of 'capacity for action.' "[48] "The momentary existence of a thing consists merely in its being produced from its cause. If a thing did so exist [beyond its momentariness] it would never cease to exist."[49]

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The italicized phrases mirror the Buddhist feat of Hindu doctrines of permanence, to which we must return later.

In short, `SK's philosophy of causality might be stated simply in terms of invariable temporal succession, nothing more. Thus stated, "causality" means only that A is followed by B is followed by C, ad infinitum--which is also the Buddhist description of existence, of course. But what, then, is A, the causal "unit"? Apparently nothing more than a simplistic point-instant. That is, only point-instants can be causal, because they alone are real. Holistic entities are always suspect for `SK, because compounded entities are the work of the (false) conceptualizing intelligence, and therefore cannot be causal. Any such entity as "milk-with-tendency-to-produce-curds''--often hidden in the apparently simple concept of "milk" by people like `SV--has no real nature; for the real "nature of the Thing itself . . . is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts."[50] (This sounds much like `SV's Brahman, but is here used only to simplify false and composite wholes. ) Nor can the human body be the cause of consciousness, because it is not a whole of a unitary sort.[51] Apparently for `SK, in the physical area, causality works only at the atomic level, though mental states may offer a different problem.

A second observation and question: `SK have no use for "causal potency" or the presence of the effect in the cause, as maintained by `SV. Causes must spring fully formed, in all their perfection as causes, into instantaneous existence. Before causes are causing they are non-existent. "When your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as antagonism."[52] Or, otherwise stated, it is a contradiction in terms, and existentially impossible. For a non-acting cause is not a cause at all. "What is capable of effective action is said to be 'existent,'--other than that it is said to be 'non-existent'; the two cannot exist together in the same substratum. . . ."[53]

What, then, do `SK mean in speaking of "latent causality" as they do? Presumably this: When a mental impression or physical action occurs, it sets in motion various causal chains of a "similar" sort which scatter in their various causally determined paths, combining with other causal chains (of point-instant simples) to produce new complexes when time and place ate right. (For `SK suggest that time and place determine causal conjunction, even though they may not be entities in themselves.[54]) When a cause is said　

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to be "latent," therefore, it is only a way of speaking. It means only the capacity of any given causal unit to join together in a certain way with another unit when time and place make the conjunction possible.

But again we ask: What connective tissue is there between the atomistically conceived point-instants of causal reality or existence? To the meaning of "contact" between cause and effect--and `SV fears that in the Buddhist scheme any cause might produce any effect whatsoever, and hence chaos--we shall turn in the final section. But here we may note some other factors of continuity hinted at by `SK. There is the suggestion at various places that there is an independent real order of events and qualities which produces order in the perceptions of the beholder. For all differentiation there must be something "in the Idea (or Cognition) itself which appertains specifically to each object envisaged by it."[55] In view of another statement about the "formlessness" of all cognitions as such, the implication is clearly that the external order gives form and order to cognition.[56]

Yet, what is it that the cognizer cognizes in the external world? Point-instants--the true reals--or only partially false conceptualized wholes? There is no clear answer in `SK; the verdict seems mixed. For example: Himalaya does "not differ with time and place" but its atoms "are diverse and momentary."[57] Thus, the point-instant atoms composing Himalaya, even though obviously non-perceptual, are yet held to be the true reals in theory. But the mass, Himalaya, which is what is perceived--though it ought to be a false conceptual whole--continues "permanently." Is, then, the perception of Himalaya false? In any case, we seem to have, contrary to Buddhist principles, perception producing a false conceptual wholeness, an empty eternal form, and conception producing the real, intuitively (?) "perceived" atoms.

Lastly, the question of the relation of the causal and cognitional series must be raised. Are they independently real, or mutually causative or dependent? `SK seem to consider the mental series independently real--unless we consider mental states to include a bodily factor. After denying that body is the continuing cause of cognitions, `SK assert that one conscious state is the "material cause" of the succeeding one, i.e., there is no outside, other-than-cognitional, factor involved.[58] And the situation is the same between rebirths as between conscious moments in one life.[59] So, also, each mental, i.e., personal, series is internal to itself.[60] Just conceivably the body may be

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considered a point-instant factor in the mental series, or mental states include a bodily factor--though this is by no means clear--so that the personal causal series might be a psychosomatic one. In view of the false wholeness of body, however, body-mind wholeness seems even more questionable. Indeed, the mental series more often seems to be in the observer's role, apart from the physical series. Yet, again ambiguously, the mind of the saint can transform his bodily particles into any desired shape or form, according to Buddhist orthodoxy.

The temporal relation of cognition and event, referred to in the `SV context above, is also of interest. In some places, `SK seem to make a clear statement that the event causes its cognition:

... it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things. What does not exist could have no previous potentiality, and it could have no use later on; all causes must exist before (these effects); hence the object caused cannot exist along with its own cognition.[61]

But this then raises the problem far the Buddhist: What is it that is cognized? For, since event-instant does not remain static but immediately changes into its effect, what is known in the resulting cognition is the effect, not the cause. Thus, cognition is always one step behind the causal flow and is false. Indeed, on Buddhist grounds how can it be cognized at all?

Though `SK never speak to this point, implicit here may be that same perception-cum-event, or event-cum-perception, assumption often present in Indian philosophy by which subject-object consciousness is one unitary, simultaneous event. Cognition may not require any time; we may have the occurrence only of "cognized-event." So, also, Stcherbatsky implies with regard to the Buddhist scholar Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmako`sa:

We read in scripture, "Consciousness apprehends." What is consciousness here meant to do?
Nothing at all. It simply appears in coordination with its objective elements, like a result that is homogeneous with its cause.[62]

One other suggestion is to the point. Contemporary Southern Buddhism speaks of the mental point-instants (mental moments) as much more rapidly pulsed than the material point-instants. If there were several moments of consciousness set over against one moment of material occurrence, this would provide a sense of the continuing similarity of apprehension of "enduring" physical forms. Whether the 17 component elements of the one mental instant represent each in itself a unit of awareness, or must be taken to-

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gether to achieve awareness, is not clear. However, presumably even the 17 taken together are shorter in their totality than one physical-event pulsation.

And which order, mental or physical, is the more real? It may be that there is implied only one order with physical and mental poles, as the perceptual situation seems to suggest. However, one passage speaks in phenomenalistic terms in asserting that non-existence means that an event, " (prior to production)... is not found to fulfill the conditions of Cognizability,"[63] i.e., things do not exist unless they are cognizable. (Conceivably, a buddha could know many things not open to human intelligence, of course, thus opening up the possibility of many humanly unverifiable existences.) And another passage seems to suggest an "esse est percipi" doctrine :

... all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of "ideas" bringing the things into existence; like the "burning capacity" of fire; as a matter of fact, they come into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other.[64]

But what are these "things" thus brought into existence by the power of successive cognitions? Obviously not the truly real point-instants which are beyond ordinary perception--though we do have a rough approximation of their rapid changeability in our conscious awareness of change even in perceptual entities. Perhaps the "things" which are brought into existence are these pseudo-realities, point-instants bound together by false conceptualization into specious wholes such as "burning capacity of fire." They may be analogous to the "secondary" qualities of Western philosophy, added to the "primary" ones by the form of human awareness. With regard to these "things," we may have a perceptual realism as suggested in this passage:

It is the form (aspect) of the Thing itself that is held to be "differentiated"; it is in that same form that it exists, and it is in this form that it is perceived.[65]

Or we may wish to go as far as Stcherbatsky does with reference to Vasubandhu :

The question of the reality of an outer world is, strictly speaking, obviated. In a system which denies the existence of a personality, splits everything into a plurality of separate elements, and admits of no real interaction between them, there is no possibility of distinguishing between an external and internal world. The latter does not exist, all elements are equally external towards one another.[66]　

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In conclusion of this section, it is of interest to note that just as the `SV tradition believes that it saves man by positing an unchangeable order of Selfhood, that of Brahman-Aatman, so the `SK view holds, in precise opposition, that the doctrine of momentariness presents man's only hope for salvation. To the latter, permanent Self (or selves) means that man, even the universe itself, would be a prisoner of its present state, for all change would be unreal. Contrarily, the doctrine that no two moments in the causal series are bridged over by any connective identity, but only held together by "contact, is a doctrine of hope built into the very nature of things themselves. In fact, it suggests not only a theory of causality, but a methodology of salvation: The insertion of discrimination's knife edge between two consecutive moments, recognizing their absolute difference from each other, is a means of cutting that causal chain of successive impressions called variously "sameness," "identity," "self." This knife edge of insight may expand its tiny crevice into an eternal boundless here-newness that dissipates all deterministic succession that binds man to his present unsaved selfhood, and may free him ultimately from existence itself. Or, if the causal series be conceived as a two-dimensional linear progression, a third-dimensional, quite other, direction can be taken. Thus, by the very recognition and appropriation of the inmost atomistic nature of causal relations, their power can be escaped.

III.
How, then, shall we summarize and characterize the basic conflict of viewpoints between `SV and `SK? The `SV objection to `SK Buddhism can be stated as follows: Momentariness, in which there is only something called "contact" between cause and effect, temporal-spatial contiguity, is insufficient to guarantee the integrity of the cause-effect relation. That is, one could not guarantee that any one result rather than any other would follow from a given cause.

Such a "universe" would be one of intellectual and moral chaos for `SV. Indeed, there could not be an organized universe wherein lotuses might indiscriminately produce elephants as well as lotuses, or what have you. And how can man follow any enduring or certain course of action leading to salvation in such chaos? There must be some similarity, permanence, or partial identity which passes on from cause to effect, or is present in both, to provide the necessary continuity.

Not so, say `SK. You have misunderstood our argument. You make our causal contact into causal gap, from which anything may come. But we hold

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to the binding character of the contact between causal moments in the causal series. "Contact" is not a thing in itself, to be sure, but it does guarantee the passage of the appropriate cause into the appropriate effect. Lotuses do not produce elephants in our world, either. Location in time and space and perhaps the factor of similarity (see below, p. 133) are of sufficient strength to provide the necessary continuity for a phenomenal world.

`SK, in their turn, mercilessly attack the concept of a "permanent," i.e., continuously acting, cause mercilessly. For `SK, anything that endures beyond one moment, any point that lasts more than an instant, is for all practical purposes eternal. For, if it crosses one temporal divide unchanged, it is no longer part of the temporal series, but, like featureless, ineffective, eternal space, is beyond and above the series. And perhaps we have here a key to understanding the fundamental quality of the `SV-`SK controversy. `SV is essentially space-substance oriented, but `SK are essentially time-succession oriented. Hence, they clash at almost all points. The space-substance orientation of `SV appears at every turn. Substance, the root of the material-causality concept, is, of course, spatial; certainly it does not belong to the
realm of restless temporal succession. Indeed, Brahman, the ultimate reality, is often spoken of as manifest in, or like, eternal space. Furthermore, logical relations are always more fundamental to `SV than temporal ones. Perhaps in some sense `SK are correct when they accuse `SV's permanent causality of being productive of a non-temporal synchronous universe in which all change is sheer illusion.

`SK Buddhism is, of course, precisely the opposite. It feels keenly the existential reality of time and embodies it in its philosophy at every point. `SK do, indeed, deny the concept of time as a thing--because it would then be a static eternal non-entity---but only the better to embody "real" time integrally in theory and practice:

On account of their [i.e., qualified states'] coming into existence in succession ... the whole phenomenon is regulated by Time, not by the conditions of any Quality [67]

And, of course, in consonance with time as being of the essence of causal change, `SK look everywhere for discontinuities, difference within sameness, evanescence, and irregularities. Indeed, the only type of causality which makes any sense to them is precisely the arising-and-perishing, the changing-into-effect, efficient cause.

For `SK, whatever has the semblance of eternally unchanging space or substance is also non-existent, or at least does not affect existence in the

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slightest. It is an empty concept having no effective role in the dynamic temporal order of experience and perception. And so, for `SK, a "permanent cause" is a contradiction in terms:

For us, eternal things cannot produce any effects, because "consecutive" and "concurrent" action are mutually contradictory; and if objects are consecutive, there must be the same consecutiveness in their cognitions also. . . .

... only non-eternal things can be productive causes; as it is these alone which go on unceasingly changing their sequential character--of being present now and past at the next moment.[68]

Indeed, say `SK, if causes were "permanent," i.e., in continuing or continuous activity, the total universe would be temporally static, produced all at once. For, when a "cause" is present, the "effect" must come at once:

That which is itself devoid of birth [i.e., two-moment eternal things] cannot be the cause of anything.... Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously.[69]

Were this the case, all change would be illusory. Man would be already saved, the universe completely perfect, consisting of eternal, "non-existent" Brahman.

But is this apparently contradictory opposition as radical as it seems? Some of it appears to be a matter of emphasis, or even of mere semantics. Obviously `SV is synthetic, holistic, stability-seeking, afraid of flux. Hence, the regularities and "permanencies" of experience-consciousness and the external world--are insisted upon. They are seen as necessary to any order of thought and life, and as manifestations of an eternal identity. Therefore, `SV give to identity and continuity dynamic causal force. Yet `SV do not wish entirely to destroy change and difference. Indeed, `SV criticized the Saa^mkhya for not having sufficient dynamism in its ontological scheme to produce the phenomenal world. And all of the `SV language of magicianship, ignorance, maayaa, limiting adjuncts of self and Self, indicate an awareness of change and evanescence, paradoxically all the more emphasized because of Brahman's eternal unchangeability.

So, also, there is a desire for sameness-in-difference, some continuity, in `SK as well as `SV. As noted above (p. 127), the physical form (perceptual or conceptual) of Himalaya does achieve some sort of permanence, even though its constituent atoms are constantly changing. Point-instants-in-themselves give reality to the phenomenal order and present a basis for the perceived succession and quality of that order. And the category of "simi-

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larity" of successive states slips into the discussion of the mental or cognitional series with regard to memory. Thus:

Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity;--yet, in reality, their nature is entirely different. That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything.[70]

Thus is "similarity" called in to save at least the mental series from that chaos of disconnection feared by `SV. To be sure, the definition of similarity as "similar in form, through the presence of some similarity," seems quite circular. The intention of `SK is quite clear, however: each remembrance is the "material cause" of the succeeding one, tied to it by "similarity," which is not a separate entity but a loose and often inaccurate relation which covers "real" diversity with the cloak of pseudo-likeness. Yet, it does cover that atomistic difference in an apparently important, even essential, way, since it is the reason "why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity" in the recognitional series. Indeed, in this personal cognitional chain of causal moments (the "self"),the chain is perpetuated by the "successive production of more and more specialized 'moments' by a specially vivid apprehension."[71] And what can be more tightly linked than the successive stages of one's own karmic history and identity? And perhaps, if, as Stcherbatsky puts it, the causal series is indistinguishably inner-outer all at once, the series governed by specially vivid apprehensions of similarity (and difference) may be the movement of reality itself.

This should lead us to a somewhat closer inspection of the restless temporal dynamism of `SK momentariness. Is it as atomistic and as dynamic as it seems? In fact, a considerable static element can be discerned in it. For example, there is no such thing as physical motion in `SK dynamism. The circle described by the whirling torch is not motion of anything through space, but a succession of different fire-particles or fire-states at successively different positions. No particle moves from one place to another. `SK are very specific with regard to non-motion:

When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot it cannot subsequently get at any other spot ...; all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence. . . [72]

So, also, this implies that there is no movement from one time to another, no passing through successive instants. For point and instant cease together,

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at once in the same place and time. Otherwise, there would be two-moment eternal persistence of substance. Thus:

At the moment of its existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such is unable to pass over to the other place ... it is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space.[73]

Thus, the only Buddhist dynamism of which we can speak within the causal order is dynamism in place and stationary time. The point-instant is self-contained, finding its own grave in the place and moment of its first and only existence. So, also, "doers" and "actions" are unreal. "Doer" is only a karmic chain, and even thus conceived is only a mere concept.[74]

This raises a final question of evaluation. In the long run, despite all the spirited dispute between the `SK and `SV traditions, are not their ultimate universes much alike? For both of them the phenomenal world is unreal, whether as seen by `SV as mere foam upon the changeless deep of Brahman, or by `SK as an endless series of point-instants firmly anchored in their places and times. Is not the integrity of the causal order as real sabotaged by both, as Naagaarjuna realized? Indeed, why the strong Buddhist distinction between empty eternal forms and dynamic causal instants? When we remember that "existence" for the Buddhist means only the evanescent causal order, which he seeks to escape with as great ardor as the Hindu Advaitist, has he really insulted the eternal realities by calling them non-existent; or is he giving them a mark of highest esteem? Is not his Nirvaa.na as empty, as eternal, and as non-active as Brahman? In fact, if one should cut Brahman's creative connection with the world, Brahman and Nirvaa.na would not be far apart conceptually. And perhaps only with difficulty can the outsider distinguish between the experiences of union with Brahman and the "going out of self" in Nirvaa.na.

Two concluding statements will vividly indicate the measure of `SV-`SK likeness in this context. The first is from `SV:

The whole universe of action, its factors and results [i.e., cause and effect], beginning with the Undifferentiated, comes within the category of ignorance.[75]

And, of course, for `SV, ignorance means the unreality of maayaa.

From `SK, the philosophers of dynamic change, comes this:

If it had been held by us that there is really a Doer and Experiencer, then the doctrine of the "Perpetual Flux" might have involved the anomaly of "the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done";--as a matter of fact, however,

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the view held by us is that the Universe is mere Idea, and that there is nothing done or experienced by anyone.[76]

Now, it is true that the latter comment is primarily spoken against the doctrine of soul. And so one might say that it is only soul whose unreality is here in question, not that of causal sequence. But in the end there is little difference. The mind's cognitional order is not clearly distinguishable from the physical phenomenal order. The whole realm of "existence" in the Buddhist world is but a restless, tormented dream that someone--identity unspecified--is having. But, as soon as the dreamer is released into changeless Nirvaa.na, as changelessly undifferentiated as Brahman, for him all existence and causal order will disappear.

No doubt, if all dreamers were released, the total order would dissolve into that same Nirvaa.na, the only true Real. There remains then only the question as to whether the superior importance given to the ever-changing order of causal succession by the Buddhist, within the realm of ignorance, is a better psychological means of escaping the changefulness of that realm than the Hindu alternative of the realization of an Eternal Identity amid illusory phenomenal succession.

NOTES
1. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), Vol. II, pp. 172-173.

2. Ibid., Vol. I (1922), pp. 493-494.

3. "`Sa^mkara's Arguments against the Buddhists," Philosophy East and West, III, No. 4 (January, 1954), 291-306.

4. Brahma-Suutra-Shaankara-Bhaashya, V. M. Apte, trans. (Bombay: G. R. Bhatkal, 1960).

5. B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, with commentary by `Sa^mkaaracaaraya. Swaamii Maadhavaananda, trans. (Alma; Himalayan: Advaita Ashram, 1950).

6. The Tattvasa^ngraha of `Saantarak.sita, with commentary of Kamala`siila. Vols. I, II. Ganganther Ha, trans. Volumes I, II. Gawked Oriental Series, Vols. LXXX and LXXXIII. (Abroad: Oriental Institute, 1937, 1939).

7. Brahma-Suutra, I. iv. 27, com

8. B.radar.Naka Upani.sad, I. i. 4.

9. Brahma-`Suutra, Suutra, II. i. 15, com.

10. Ibid., I. iv. 25, com.

11. Ibid., I. iv. 23, com.; II. i. 14, com.

12. Ibid., II. i. 24, com.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., I. iv. 23. Dr. Karl Potter writes that the term "expect" is in his opinion an exaggeration. It should be further noted in this general connection that in I. iv. 23-27 and II. i. 24-25 it is repeatedly asserted that Brahman is both material and accidental (efficient) cause of the world, i.e., containing within itself the power to modify itself (accidental causal potency) as well as being the material (or substantial?) cause of the world.

15. Ibid., II. ii. 17, com.

16. Ibid., II. i. 14, com.

17. Ibid., II. i. 13, com.

18. Ibid., II. i. 18, com.

19. Ibid., II. i. 10, com.

20. Ibid., II. ii. 4, com.

21. Dasgupta, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 11.

22. Brahma-Suutra, II. ii. 3, com.

23. B.radar.Naka Upani.sad, II. 4. 13.

24. Ibid., II. 1. 20.

25. Brahma-Suutra, III. ii. 20, 21, com.

26. Ibid., II. i. 34.

27. Ibid., II. i. 22, com.

28. Ibid., 11. ii. 5, com.

29. Ibid., II. i. 13, com.

30. Ibid., II. i. 7, com.

31. Ibid., I. iv. 27, com.

32. Ibid., II. i. 9, com.

33. B.radar.Naka Up^Annie.sad, II. 4. 6.

34. Brahma-Suutra, I. iii* 30, com.

35. Ibid., II. i. 4, com.

35a. "Supremacy" is used here to refer to a qualified or lesser form of ultimate, suitable for the phenomenal-world context.

35b. Buddhist Logic, Indo-Iranian Reprints ('S-Grabenhage: Mouton and Co., 1958),Vol. I, Part II, chap. 1.

36. Tattvasa^ngraha, Text No. 1214. Italics mine.

37. Ibid., 734.

38. Ibid., 870 and com.

39. Ibid., 32, corn.

40. Ibid., 441-443, com.

41. Ibid., 873-874.

42. Ibid., 1254-1256.

43. Ibid., 540, com.

44. Ibid., 358.

45. Ibid., 382.

46. Ibid., 31-45, passim.

47. Ibid., 415-416.

48. Ibid., 727-729.

49. Ibid., 688.

50. Ibid., 30.

51. Ibid., 1886, com.

52. Ibid., 441-443, com.

53. Ibid., 1675-1677.

54. Ibid., 115-116.

55. Ibid., 1181-1183.

56. Ibid., 533-535, com.

57. Ibid., 875.

58. Ibid., 1886-1915, passim.

59. Ibid., 1897.

60. Ibid., 1893-1896.

61. Ibid., 468, corn. Cf. ibid., 149-150, 473-474.

62. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta: S. Gupta, 1961), p. 48. Italics mine.

63. Tattvasa^ngraha, 31, com.

64. Ibid., 438, com.

65. Ibid., 1674.

66. Stcherbatsky, op. cit., p. 49.

67. Tattvasa^ngraha, 675-676, com.

68. Ibid., 76 and com.

69. Ibid., 87, com.

70. Ibid., 438, com.

71. Ibid., 543, com.

72. Ibid., 692, com.

73. Ibid., 696-697, com.

74. Ibid., 504.

75. B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, I. iii. 2.

76. Tattvasa^ngraha,538-539, com.