Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition[*]

·期刊原文

Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition[*]

By Carsun Chang

Philosophy East & West

V. 10 (1960) pp. 35-49

Copyright 1960 by University of Hawaii Press

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p.35

MENCIUS (372-289 B.C.?) lived in the period of the Warring Kingdoms (403-222 B.C.), when different schools of thought were in full bloom. Mencius even at that early date was aware of the existing abuses made of language. In his answer to his disciple Kung-sun Chou's question, "What do you mean by saying that you understand whatever words you hear?" Mencius replied,

When words are one-sided, I know how the mind of the speaker is clouded over. When words are extravagant, I know how the mind is fallen and sunk. When words are all-depraved, I know how the mind has departed from principle. When words are evasive, I know how the mind is at its wit's end.[1]

Language is the vehicle of communication. Often, however, ambiguities and verbosities arise. From time to time, a review of philosophical language is necessary to test whether a term used conforms with reality. A Chinese proverb says that a term is merely the guest, reality the host; in other words, the latter is more important. A term becomes meaningless when it does not correspond with reality.

It is right that the school of logical positivism should stress the importance of linguistic analysis. In this respect, it is reminiscent of Francis Bacon, who made a survey of the sources of error in philosophy. He called meaningless terms idols. The logical positivists' analysis of word usage, however, at times carries them beyond mere language analysis. For example, they speak of the elimination of metaphysics and the rejection of moral philosophy. This is definitely encroaching upon the field of philosophy. Professor Feigl's article "Critique of Intuition According to Scientific Empiricism" is just such a case. In this article, Feigl draws attention to the ambiguous meanings of the term

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"intuition," there being seven usages of this term. He concludes by denying intuition a genuine knowledge claim.

Intuition,. being immediate insight of the mind, is obviously different from the scientific method of observation, experimentation, and verification. This is not to say that it is opposed to human experiences. Experience shows that an ethical or metaphysical judgment can be formulated only after data have been gathered by observation and by reflection on these data; this kind of judgment is built upon the sense of right and wrong, the logical principles of consistency and non-contradiction, and the intelligibility of the universe. Formulation of judgment thus has a psychological, logical, ethical, and metaphysical background, without which a theory cannot be stated in a clear form. This is the ground for the existence and validity of ethical and metaphysical theories.

With this as an introduction, I shall now turn to the subject of intuition proper. It is the purpose of this paper to show that since antiquity--long before scientific empiricism was known--the East attained conclusions which are truths. Logically, they must have attained knowledge or truth by some method other than scientific empiricism, and this other method, as we shall see, is intuition. I shall concentrate my discussion on intuition as it is employed in China.

I. MENCIUS: FOUNDER OF THE INTUITIVE SCHOOL

Mencius, founder of the intuitive movement, advocates that man, as a rational being, is endowed with four dispositions: jen, i, li, chih.[a] Jen, as it is written in Chinese, consists of two characters: "man" and "two." This disposition thus denotes the relationship of man to man. I is the disposition which enables a person to distinguish between right and wrong. Li is decency or modesty, from which ceremony originates. Chih is knowing what a particular object is, and the ability to distinguish one thing from another. These four dispositions are the categories for value-judgments. They ate not fully developed in a child; when they are developed, one may form moral or cognitive judgments on the basis of these dispositions. Mencius illustrates his theory that man is endowed with the four dispositions from birth by the following example of a child failing into a well, and the rescuer's psychological reaction:

When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: even nowadays, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so: not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's 　

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parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike of the reputation of having been unmoved by such a thing. [Passage continued below.]

Mencius observes that the rescuer's reaction is spontaneous and has no other motive. He goes on to say that the four dispositions named above are innate and should be developed:

From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is inherent in man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is inherent in man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is inherent in man, and that the feeling of approving and disapproving is inherent in man.

The feeling of commiseration is the principle of jen (benevolence). The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of i (righteousness). The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of li (propriety). The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of chih (knowledge).

Since all men have these four principles in themselves, let them know to give them all their development and completion, and the issue will be like that of a fire which has begun to burn, or that of a spring which has begun to find vent.[2]

While Mencius placed emphasis on the four innate dispositions of man, he also knew full well that man's character depends much on his upbringing and education, that is, on external factors. The following remarks reveal this:

In good years most children are good, while in bad years most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are thus different. The abandonment is owing to the circumstances by which they allow their mind to be snared and drowned in evil.

There now is barley.--Let it be sown and covered up; the ground being the same, and the time of sowing likewise the same, it grows rapidly, and, when the full time is come, it is all found to be ripe. Although there may be inequalities of produce, owing to the difference of the soil, as rich or poor, to the unequal nourishment afforded by rain and dew, and to the different ways in which man has performed his work in reference to it.

Thus all things which are the same in kind are like to one another--why should we doubt in regard to man, as if he were a solitary exception to this? The sage and we ate the same in kind.[3]

The following is a quotation stating Mencius' theory of intuitive knowledge:

The ability possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is intuitive ability, and the knowledge possessed by them without the exercise of thought is intuitive knowledge.

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Children carried in arms a11 know to love their parents, and, when they are grown a little, they all know to love their elder brothers.

Filial affection for parents is the working of jen. Respect for elders is the working of i. There is no other reason for those feelings, they belong to all under Heaven.[4]

Mencius was also very emphatic on the nature of right and wrong. According to him, this is self-evident. He said:

I like fish and I also like bear's paws [this is a type of delicacy]. If I cannot have the two together, I will let the fish go, and take the bear's paws. So, I like life and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go and choose righteousness.[5]

A Chinese discussion of moral obligation, that is, of right or wrong, concentrates on the discussion of the moral duties of each individual person in his station of life. It is thus more personal as contrasted with the Western discussion of what is good, or what are happiness and pleasure, which seeks a theoretical and objective basis. Mencius goes on to say:

I like life, indeed, but there is that which I like more than life, and, therefore, I will not seek to possess it by any improper means. I dislike death, indeed, but there is that which I dislike more than death, and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger.

If among the things which man likes there were nothing which he likes more than life, why should he not use every means by which he could preserve it? If among the things which man dislikes there were nothing which he disliked more than death, why should he not do everything by which he could avoid danger? When by certain things they might avoid danger, they will not do them.

Therefore, men have that which they like more than life, and that which they dislike more than death.[6]

According to Mencius, right, good, or morality is thus self-evident to mankind. Man should take care not to lose it. He gives an example showing that a man cannot but choose what is right:

Here are a small basket of rice and a platter of soup, and the case is one in which the getting of them will preserve life and the want of them will bring death; if they are offered with an insulting voice, even a tramp will not receive them, or, if you first tread upon them, even a beggar will not stoop to them.[7]

Mencius' intuitive theory, we see, is based on several factors: human dispositions, common approval or a communality of minds, and decisions made during the course of one's life. This intuition, therefore, is not identical with　

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immediate insight, though the latter, being known to and being grasped by oneself, is clearly a part of the whole process. Despite the inclusion of these other factors which have an objective basis, I believe Feigl would still discard it simply because immediate insight constitutes an important part of this theory of what intuition is.

Feigl says that scientific empiricism is typically Western. He also knows that the intuitive school exists in Western philosophy, and so he adds parenthetically that it also exists in Occidental philosophy. Feigl, I assume, must have in mind Plate's Phaedrus, in which Plate maintains that knowledge depends upon the philosophic soul's pre-existent intuition, or Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, which claims that every science must rest upon principles which are not inferred but are immediately recognized.

While I will not go into detail regarding the intuitionists of the West, it would be unfair not to mention the names of some modern and contemporary British intuitionists. G. E. Moore's philosophy is quite different from that of Mencius, but Mencius certainly could endorse Moore's words that anything that is intrinsically good has a "characteristic such that, when a state of affairs possesses it, then the fact that an action, which an agent could do, would produce that state of affairs, is favorably relevant to the hypothesis that the agent ought to do that action."[8] This actually is another version of Mencius'
theory of intuitive knowledge and intuitive ability.

Besides Moore, the names of A. C. Ewing, H. A. Prichard, E. F. Carritt, C. D. Broad, and W. D. Ross must be mentioned. The latter four are known as deontologists, because they stress the meaning of right and duty. However, they hold the same theory that right and duty are unique and intuitively known. Chinese intuitionism is thus confirmed by some contemporary Western philosophers.

II. CH'AN BUDDHISM

After Mencius, Chinese philosophy came to a period of stagnation. Buddhism took advantage of this opportunity to popularize itself in China. Translation of Sanskrit Buddhist texts was the main work after the introduction of Buddhism into China in the first century B.C. Many centuries elapsed before the doctrine penetrated into the minds of the Chinese. The Ch'an[b] (Meditation) Buddhist school started in the fifth century A.D. This school held that everyone possesses Buddhahood. Evidently, this is a Buddhist counterpart of Mencius' thesis that everyone can become a sage, as did Emperors Yao and

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Shun. Under the able leadership of Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch of the Chan school, the view of the innate goodness of human nature gained hold. Mencius' theory, under this impetus, was revived. Confucianism and Buddhism now merged and continued in the same direction. Hui-neng's views on intuitive knowledge appealed to the Chan monks; through the latter, it was spread among Confucian scholars.

A brief history of the development of the Chan school will be useful here. The Chan school was founded by Bodhidharma, who came to China about A.D. 470-475. His message to the Chinese is as follows:

There is a special transmission which goes beyond the scriptures;
There is no use in setting it down in writing;
Better appeal directly to the mind of men.
When one sees one's nature, Buddhahood will be attained.[9]

One of his disciples, Hui-k'o, went to Bodhidharma saying: "I have no peace of mind. May I ask you how I may attain this peace of mind?" Bodhi-dharma replied: "Bring out your mind here before me. I shall pacify it." "But it is impossible for me to bring out my mind." "Then I have pacified your mind."[10]

This kind of apparently abstruse utterance tells us that mind is in oneself, and can be known only to oneself. Others can do nothing. Bodhidharma's teaching is that one should pacify one's own mind. Mind's work is self-knowing and self-evident. It can never be physically shown or objectively or logically proved.

As the school gained influence, dominating other Buddhist schools, it gave stimulus to the Confucians, who began to read the Chan writings and seemed to be fond of them. Most of the Tang (618-907) statesmen, scholars, and poets were closely associated with the Chan monks. Han Yu[c] (768-824), a literary man, sent a memorial to Emperor Hsien Tsung as a protest against the welcome of Sirira of the Buddha. He also wrote an essay, Yuan Tao[d] ("Inquiry on Tao"). In this essay, he defended the Confucian way of world-and-life affirmation. Han Yu himself had a friend who was a Chanist, namely, the monk Tai-tien.[e] To another friend he said: "Your story that I am converted to Buddhism is mere gossip. When I was in Ch'ao-chou, I met an old monk called Ta-tien (a Ch'an disciple of the monk Shih-t'ou, A.D. 700-790), who was intelligent and well-versed in philosophy. Since I am living in exile in a remote place, and can find no person with whom to discuss things, I invited him to come to the city and stay about two weeks. Tai-tien

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is a man who looks with contempt upon the world and who has his own convictions about truth. He is not one whit disturbed by what is going on in the world."[11] Han Yu, an antagonist of Buddhism, shows an appreciation of the Chan monk's attitude toward the world. The poet Po Chu-i[f] (772-846), following Han Yu, also made friends with the Chan monks; he wrote eight songs on the mind-theory of the Chan monk Nein-kung.[g]

1.

The eyes of the mind look at the objects outside the mind.
Why are the objects here? Why ate they gone?
Meditating once and twice and more, the true or the false becomes known to the mind.

2.

Though the true is existent, it can be obscured by the false.
After the true is distinguished from the false, awakening is attained.
Without departing from the world, which is false being, the true voidness [i.e., the other world] is seen.

3.

When truth is maintained, nothing false can arise.
The original nature of the six senses is calm water; it is the samaadhi (concentration), which is beyond life and death.

4.

When samaadhi is attained, it is anchored.
Yet samaadhi must be complemented by wisdom; then there will be no state of fixedness.
Like a pearl which goes around a plate:
The plate is samaadhi, while the pearl is wisdom.

5.

When samaadhi and wisdom go together, there is enlightenment.
It can penetrate all objects of the world, and nothing can escape its survey.
It works like a great round mirror, and there is only right response without being perturbed.

6.

Where there is wisdom, there is real enlightenment and no becloudedness;
Where there is enlightenment, there is complete apprehension and no barrier.
Where there is no barrier, one knows how to adapt oneself.

7.

As complete apprehension varies with circumstances, it must be changed according to need.
No state is everlasting, it adjusts itself according to one's own wisdom.
It is only the Great Karu.na (Love) which causes the One to complete the All.

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8.

When the sufferings of all are freed,
The great Karu.na can be abandoned;
The sufferings should not be taken as real;
The Karu.na can also be considered as false among the sentient.
Who then is the real savior or the saved?[12]

Chinese Chan Buddhism, which began with Bodhidharma, was active for a period of five centuries before the revival of Confucianism during the Sung Dynasty (960-1279).

The essential principles of Chan Buddhism are: (1) To make the mind master; (2) To have immediate insight from the mind. These two principles contributed very much to the revival of Neo-Confucianism and especially to the rise of the School of Mind during the Sung Dynasty.

The Sung Confucians were not unanimous in this way of thinking. There were two schools: the School of Mind (hsin-hsueh),[h] which believes in restoring the original mind, and the School of Reason (li-hsueh),[i] which believes in the acquisition of more knowledge from the external world. Lu Chiu-yuan[j] (Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-1193) and Yang Chien[k] (1140-1226) are names connected with hsin-hsueh, while Cheng I[l] (1033-1107), Chu Hsi[m] (1130-1200),and their followers profess their belief in li-hsueh. Their common feature is that the knowledge of what is right comes from the mind.

III. THE INTUITIVE SCHOOL DURING THE
SUNG AND MING PERIODS

Lu Chiu-yuan was the pioneer of the School of Mind during the Sung Dynasty. Wang Yang-ming[n] (1472-1529) succeeded Lu's work during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). I shall give a brief summary of their contributions.
Lu used to say, "Go to the original mind." His philosophy is based on the
following three principles:

1. To establish what is fundamental or great. He learned this principle from Mencius. It consists in the recognition of mind and in the elimination of the desires of the senses. Lu Chiu-yuan agrees with Mencius that, if one submits oneself to the authority of the mind, one has the innate ability to discover what is right for oneself because one's nature is perfect or complete from one's birth.

2. To eliminate desire. Though a man is complete in himself, yet he is

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often confused. Why? Because he is excited by sensation, desire, and passion, or because he becomes prejudiced as a result of his likes and dislikes.

3. Not to consider knowledge-seeking as of prime importance. Lu was convinced of the supremacy of mind. Based on this conviction, he depreciated the view that mind should seek more knowledge from outside. In a letter to his disciple, Tseng Chai-chih,[o] he clarified his point:

Reason is a natural gift from Heaven; it is not imported from outside. Reason is the master. As long as the master is there, nothing can seduce you, and no false theory can bring you to a state of uncertainty. On the other hand, if reason is not so bright, there will be no master. The result is that one is likely to become extravagant in his theories, and will depend more on such external sources as books than on one's own mind, which should be the master. The natural gift from Heaven will then become a guest. Thus, the host is turned into a guest, and the guest into a host; the positions of host and guest will be reversed. Those who trust such external sources as books lead them-selves into confusion.[13]

This letter obviously is a condemnation of Chu Hsi, the advocate of the School of Reason.

We shall now see how Lu Chiu-yuan applies the Chan Buddhist technique, i.e., that mind knows right or wrong by itself, in his dealings with his disciple, Yang Chien. When Yang Chien, a sub-magistrate in the county of Fu-yang, became a pupil of Lu, he asked him, "What is the original mind?" Lu quoted the following sentences from Mencius:

Commiseration is the beginning of jen (benevolence), the feeling of shame is the beginning of i (righteousness), the feeling of modesty is the beginning of li (decency or propriety), the act of approving and disapproving is the beginning of chih (knowledge). [And he concluded:] This is the original mind.[14]

Yang Chien answered: "As a boy I knew these sentences by heart, but I have not understood what is the original mind." Yang repeated the same question many times, but Lu always repeated the same answer. One could not make the other understand what he meant.

Yang Chien, being a judge, gave a verdict in a lawsuit involving the sale of fans. He then came to Lu again and asked the question about the original mind. Lu said, "When you sit as a judge and decide the case, you know which side is right, which side is wrong. This mind, which knows right and wrong, is your original mind."[15] Then Yang was suddenly awakened by this reminder and became convinced that mind is self-knowing and self-evident.

These theories of the Chanists and Lou Chiu-Yuan cannot be condemned

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as mere speculation or nonsense, as the logical positivists are inclined to do. The Chanists and Lou Chiu-Yuan show clearly that in the nature and work of the mind the knobbier and the known coincide. This is similar to what Aristotle calls the intellect. Aristotle observes in the Posterior Analytics that, "while science and the intellect are always true, the intellect is truer than science."[16] Here intellect means intuition. Aristotle places a higher value on intuition than on demonstrated knowledge, i.e., science, because intellect or intuition is the originative source of knowledge.

We come now to the Ming Dynasty. At first, Wang Yang-ming had difficulty understanding the Confucian philosophy, particularly in regard to the principle of "investigation of things." Chu Shi's interpretation is that certain principles, which one must find out by investigation, underlie all things. Wang applied Chu Shi's theory to the bamboo which grew in Wang's garden, trying to find its principle. After much reflection, Wang still did not understand. He fell ill from the strenuous effort to understand. Wang concluded that his anxiety to learn was the cause for his failure to understand. But an idea came to him that, as things and their principles are separate, how can they be identified in one's mind? Then he was sick again from the strain. He then gave up thinking about the theory of investigation of things for a short time.

When he was 38, he was sent away to Lung-ch'ang, a district of Ku-chow Province, as a magistrate. Suddenly he was enlightened in regard to the meaning of the investigation of things. He made such a loud noise that those who slept in the same house were awakened. His understanding was based on the idea that so-called things are nothing but objects in consciousness. As things, when they are known, must go through consciousness, naturally the principles of things can be found out by mind. Wang went through all the classics and found that what is written in the books agreed with his new discovery. Wang's discovery is the same as that of Berkeley: esse est percipi. From this moment on he holds the theory that mind is reason, or knowing is the core of reality. Later, Wang developed his philosophical theory, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Man's mind is the mind of the universe.
2. Man's knowing is the core of reality; that is to say, reality consists in consciousness.
3. The principles of all things are discoverable through knowing, because all things, rather than existing as entities external to us, exist as objects of consciousness.

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4. The universe is an integration of which man is the mind or the center. All men constitute a brotherhood. Physical things have spiritual affinity with mind.
5. If there were no mind or intuitive knowledge, the universe would not operate.
6. Matter or the world of Nature is material for mind to work with.

This summary shows how Wang defined his fundamental concepts, and how his thought-structure is built: "What is called reason is an integrative system. That in which reason is condensed is called human nature. The master of this condensation is mind. When mind works with a directive effort, it is will. When it works in a state of intelligence, distinctness, and clarity, it is cognition. The objects which appear in consciousness are things."[17] This quotation is only a nuclear part of his thought; to understand him fully we must study him fully.

Wang's premise is the intelligibility of the world. Intuitive knowledge or knowing is the key, and it is not restricted to men and women, but in a wider sense extends to all animate beings and even to inanimate objects. "Man's intuitive knowledge," says Wang, "is shared by grass and trees, stones and tiles. Grass and trees [suggestive of botany] and stones and tiles [suggestive of physics] could not function if they did not possess the capacity to know. The universe itself would be incapable of running or operating, if it were not for man's intuitive knowledge."[18]

Elsewhere our philosopher comments: "Intelligibility fills the universe. Man, imprisoned in his physical body, is sometimes separated from intelligibility. Nevertheless, his intuitive knowledge is the controlling power of the cosmos and of the gods. If there were no intellect in the universe, who would study the mysteries of the heavens? If there were no human intellect on earth, who would study the mysteries of the heavens? If there were no human intellect on earth, who would study the profundities of terra Firma? If the spirits had no knowledge of mankind, how could they reveal themselves in fortune and misfortune? Heaven, earth, and deities would be non-existent if they were separated from the human intellect. On the other hand, if man's intellect were divorced from heaven, earth, and deities, how could it exercise its functions?"[19]

The gist of some of Wang's statements is that, because animals and grains are nourishment for men, and because herb and mineral medicines cure dis-

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ease, there must be a spiritual affinity between the biological and physical worlds, on the one hand, and mankind, on the other. That intelligibility exists at the core of the universe was our philosopher's prime conviction. At this core man is intimately related to the supersensible world above and the world of Nature below. The universe is a unity with man at its center.

The following dialogue between Wang and a disciple tells us more clearly about his understanding of the universe as a whole:

Somebody asked: "With regard to the unity of the human mind and the manifoldness of things, we have an example in the human body, because it is an organism maintained by the circulation of the blood and the operation of the nervous system. Therefore, the body is called a unity. But as man A is different from man B, and as animals and plants are even farther apart from man because of their difference, how can all constitute a unity?"
Wang answered: "You must look to the responses in your mind. It is not only that animals and plants constitute a unity with you, the universe forms a unity with you. Even the spirits form a unity with you."
Wang asked his disciple: "What is the mind of the universe?"
And the disciple answered: "I heard some time ago that man is the mind of the universe."
The disciple then asked: "Why is man called mind?"
Wang replied: "Mind means nothing but intelligence. What fills the whole world is intelligibility. As a man is built up by his physical body, he is intercepted and isolated from the whole. Intelligence is the master of the universe and the spirits. Without intelligence how can the height of the heavens be surveyed? Without intelligence how can the profundity of the earth be studied? Without intelligence how can fortune and misfortune be revealed by the spirits? If heaven, earth, spirits, and the manifoldness of things were separated from intelligence, all of them would lose their existence. If my intelligence were separated from the universe, the spirits, and the manifoldness of things, it would lose its existence, too. This is why I say that they [my intelligence, the spirits, and the manifoldness of things] together constitute an integration from which none of them can be divorced."[20]

This dialogue tells us how Wang looked at this fundamental problem. He means to say that intelligibility is reality. Intelligibility has two terms: at one end, it is mind, which knows; and, at the other end, it is the universe, which is known. Neither has any substantiality without the other, nor can it mean anything to mankind. Therefore, Wang said: "The eye of man by itself is not sufficient unto itself. It must have the shapes and the colors of the manifold things as its objects. The eat has no substantiality by itself, but must have all kinds of sounds in the universe to listen to. The nose has no substantiality by itself, but must perceive the smells of the world. The mouth cannot do otherwise than taste whatever is tasteful. The mind is to know right and

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wrong concerning the challenges and the responses which happen between things and itself."[21]

Wang means that the nature of the world depends on knowing and that without intelligibility, or mind, there would be only darkness of outlook or chaos of perception. Therefore he said: "Liang-chih,[p] or intuitive knowledge, is the spirituality of the universal creation. This spirituality creates heaven, earth, and the spirits. It is the highest, the Absolute. If a man is quite conscious of liang-chih, he feels so happy that he cannot help but dance with his hands and feet."[22]

Wang considers that liang-chih is like the sun in brilliance and power; it knows what is right and what is wrong; it embodies the categorical imperatives. But liang-chih, or mind, must be kept pure and unselfish lest it manifest in the human mind like the sun darkened by the clouds. Spirituality is reality, but the grasp of reality depends on a pure and unselfish mind. Wang liked to quote from the Doctrine of the Mean. For instance: "It is said in the Book of Poetry that the hawk flies up to heaven, fish leap in the sea. This is an allusion to how the way is seen from above and from below."[23] Birds are flying in high heaven and fish are swimming in the sea, and the implication is that much mystery lies beyond. It is intelligible that the whole universe is an integration.

In this passage, as well as in others which I have quoted, Wang sounds like a philosophical mystic; incidentally, he is echoed clearly in the words of Giordano Bruno. Indeed, this statement of Bruno's might have been written by Wang: "It is not reasonable to believe that any part of the world is without a soul life, sensation, and organic structure. From this Infinite All, full of beauty and splendor, from the vast worlds which circle above us to the sparkling dust beyond, the conclusion is drawn that there are an infinity of creatures, or a vast multitude, which, each in its degree, mirrors forth the splendor, wisdom and excellence of the divine beauty."[24]

Wang's intuitive knowledge is not merely knowledge, but is the light that makes things truly visible and understandable. A Cambridge Platonist, John Smith, said: "It is but a thin, airy knowledge that is got by mere speculation, which is ushered in by syllogisms and demonstrations; but that which springs forth from true goodness brings a divine light into the soul, as is more clear and convincing than any demonstration. The reason why, notwithstanding all our acute reasons and subtle disputes, truth prevails no more in the world

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is that we so often disjoin truth and true goodness, which in themselves can never be disunited."[25]

This joining together of truth and goodness is simply the definition of liang-chih, and one which Wang himself would have wished he had originated. To Wang, goodness and the light of truth are the reality of the universe.

No doubt the whole of Wang's philosophy will be rejected by Feigl as meaningless, because it is metaphysics. I shall refer to G. E. Moore again, who says that things that are good have an "ought-implying characteristic." While Moore limits this "oughtness" to moral conduct, Wang applies it to the whole universe, including the physical and the biological fields. Thus Wang speaks of an affinity between nourishments, herbs, mineral medicines, and mankind.

CONCLUSION

According to the official program of logical positivism, its aims ate set out as follows: first, to provide a secure foundation for the sciences, and, second, to demonstrate the meaninglessness of metaphysics. The method used to realize these aims is the logical analysis of all concepts and propositions. They stress two fundamental doctrines: (1) that propositions of existential import must have an empirical reference, and (2) that the empirical can be conclusively shown by logical analysis.

Logical positivism originated in Vienna, and then went to England. Its emphasis on empiricism and analysis was received with sympathy by Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, because both the Vienna circle and the British philosophers are inclined toward anti-metaphysics. Assuming that their views are the only right ones, naturally the question arises: "Are the truths arrived at by intuition mere meaningless statements?" If this is the case, many truths arrived at in the West and in the East, such as that one should lead a moral life, or that one should speak the truth, ate all meaningless and should be discarded, because none of these truths can be verified empirically. I hold that whether a proposition is meaningful or meaningless is a question of the philosophy of language. The language employed in connection with reality should be studied and clarified first. Such a comprehensive question cannot be dealt with here. However, the words of W.M. Urban, the author of the book Language and Reality, should be cited for those who are interested in this aspect:

The chief point, however, at which the linguistic issue appears is in the position of logical positivism, more especially with regard to metaphysics. As is well known, this

p.49

form of positivism, like its progenitors, is characterized primarily by the wholesale elimination of large regions of so-called knowledge from the realm of actual knowledge and the reinterpretation of such knowledge as remains, namely, scientific, in a fashion not wholly acceptable to scientists themselves. The fields eliminated are those of morals, religion, art, and, above all, metaphysics. These are relegated to the sphere of feeling and emotional expression. The view of science maintained is that it is merely descriptive and that all "metaphysical" propositions are meaningless here also.[26]

Urban sees that according to logical positivism, of which Feigl is an outstanding representative, all the truths in the fields of morals, religion, art, and metaphysics would have to be eliminated. If this is the case, the whole Oriental heritage, which has been built on the teachings of Jesus Christ, Buddha `Saakyamuni, Confucius, and Mencius would also have to be discarded. Would this be a gain or a loss to mankind? Whatever position the logical positivists may give to intuition as a knowledge claim, if such a position is adopted, civilization will collapse. Mankind cannot live on scientific knowledge alone without a morality and a metaphysics addressed to the individual conscience.

a. 仁义礼智 l. 程颐
b. 禅 k. 杨简
c. 韩愈 m. 朱熹
d. 原道 n. 王阳明
e. 大癫 o. 曾宅之
f. 白居易 p. 良知
g. 凝公 q. 韩昌黎集
h. 心学 r. 景德传灯录
i. 理学 s. 象山先生集
j. 陆九渊陆象山 t. 传习录

NOTES

* Herbert Feigl. "Critique of Intuition According to Scientific Empiricism," Philosophy East and West, VIII, Nos. 1 and 2 (April-July. 1958), 1-16.

1. Book of Mencius, Book. IIB.17, in James Legge, trans.. The Chinese Classics, Vol. II (2d ed. rev., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895).

2. Ibid.. Book IIA.vi.3-7.

3. Ibid., Book VIA.vii.1-3.

4. Legge. op. cit., Book VIIA.xv.l-3.

5. Ibid., Book VIA.x.7.

6. Ibid., Book VIA.x.2-5.

7. Ibid., Book VIA.x.6

8. Paul A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press,1942), pp. 603 ff.

9. Carsun Chang, the Development of Neo-Confucian Thought (New York: Bookman Associates. 1957). p. 135, footnote 1.

10. Ibid.

11. Han Yu, Han Chang-li chi[q] ("Collected Works"), chap. 18.

12. Keitoku Dentoroku (Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu[r]) ("The Record of the Transmission of the Lamp"), The Tripitaka, J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, eds.. Vol. 51, Bk. XXIX (Tokyo: The Taisho Issai-kyo Kanko Kwai, 1928), pp. 454-455.

13. Lu Chiu-yuan. Hsiang-shan hsien-sheng chi[s] ("Collected Works"), Book I. Letter to Tseng Chai-chih.

14. Ibid., Book XXXVI, Chronology.

15. Loc. cit.

16. Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 186.

17. Wang Yang-ming: Chuan-hsi lu[t] ("Collected Works''), letter to Lo Chin-shun. Book II. Su-up PEI-yak ed. (Shanghai: Chung Uh Book Co., n.d.), p. 28.

18. Ibid., Book II, p. 13*

19. Ibid., Book III, p. 26.

20. Ibid., Book III, p. 26.

21. Ibid., Book III, p. 14.

22. Loc. cit.

23. Ibid., p.15.

24. Arthur Kenyan Rogers, A Student's History of Philosophy (3rd ed., New York: The Macmillan Co.. 1937), p. 212.

25. B. Wiley. The Seventeenth Century Background (New York: Doubleday Co.. 1953).

26. Wilbur Marshall Urban, Language and Reality(London: George Allen & Unwind Ltd., 1951),p. 35.