Chu Hsis Ethical Rationalism

·期刊原文

Chu Hsi's Ethical Rationalism

By Siu-Chi Huang

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

V. 5 (1978) pp. 175-193

Copyright 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Co.

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p.175

I
Chu Hsi[a] (1130-1200) has been duly recognised as "the supreme synthetic mind in all Chinese history," comparable to such Western thinkers as Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, and Herbert Spencer.[1] It is remarkable to note that he was able to achieve a number of syntheses, notably two as follows: First, the synthesis of the personal morality brought into public attention by Confucius[b] (551-479 B.C.) and his followers in the Chou dynasty (1122?-256 B.C., the earliest creative period of Chinese moral philosophy) with the authoritative morality of Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) Confucianism as represented by Tung Chung-shu[c] (179?-104? B.C.). The Neo-Confucianism of the Sung dynasty (962-1280) is in a sense a reaction against the Han Confucians, for the latter were primarily engaged in the collection of the ancient texts and in patching various systems together, not in creative work. Thus, in the eye of Chu Hsi and the other Neo-Confucians, the Han Confucians, being satisfied with the insights of their predecessors, were not intellectually challenging enough to compete with the many ideas of novelty of Buddhism - a foreign ideology which was officially introduced into China in about the first century and became an influential intellectual and moral force in the subsequent ten centuries. Chu Hsi, following the footsteps of his predecessors in the early Sung period, went beyond the scholarly pursuits of the Han scholars in his attempt to revive and reinterpret the ancient Confucian moral ideas and ideals in the light of new situations and needs, as he saw them. In so doing, he brought about a new version of Confucianism.

The second phase of Chu Hsi's synthesis is that of the humanistic morality of Confucianism with the non-humanistic morality of Buddhism and, to a certain extent, of Taoism. While being critical of the basic metaphysical pre-suppositions of Buddhism, Chu Hsi was not hesitant in availing himself of certain Buddhist ideas, as can be found in his voluminous writings. It seems not inappropriate to say that Chu Hsi's philosophical activity is an attempt to Confucianize the Buddhist metaphysics on the one hand and to Buddhistize the Confucian morality on the other - an attempt which is somewhat similar

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to Thomas Aquinas' Aristotelianization of the Christian religion on the one hand and Christianization of the Aristotelian philosophy on the other. Although before him a number of his forerunners (to whom Chu Hsi properly acknowledged his debts)[2] had made significant contributions to the revival of the Confucian ethics, it is he who single-handedly brought together the various philosophical elements into a system characteristic of his own point of view.

Undoubtedly, Chu Hsi accepted the ethical and moral objectives of the early Confucians who were mainly concerned with the task of recommending and specifying what one's life goals in terms of one's relations to others ought to be. In order to make the teachings as contained in the Confucian classics more understandable to his contemporaries, Chu Hsi had devoted much of his lifetime to producing painstaking commentaries on them, including the Four Books,[d] the Book of Changes,[e] and the Book of Poetry.[f] Such an undertaking was so appreciated and valued that all his works became the standard texts for the subsequent seven centuries until recent times. But, to be sure, his original contribution to the history of Chinese philosophy lies in his primary concern with the rational justification of the Confucian morality, which he believed should be reinstituted publicly and officially. It would seem the main difference between the ethics of the early Confucians and that of Chu Hsi is the latter's emphasis on the problem of method as contrasted with the former's on the content of life ideals. Thus, his moral philosophy has been referred to as rationalism, which should be understood as an approach used by Chu Hsi to justify rationally his Confucian ethical and moral convictions.[3] The problem of 'How can one determine what one ought to do?' needs, for Chu Hsi, to be dealt with, rather than that of 'What is the good?' simply because the latter was convincingly expounded by the early Confucians, particularly by Mencius[g] (372?-289? B.C.). This shift to a concentration on methodology is clearly indicated in Chu Hsi's doctrine of Chih-chih ko-wu,[h] i.e., extension of knowledge through the investigation of things. As he writes:

We must investigate the li[i] or principle of wu or things to the utmost, then we can clearly see the right and wrong. If a thing is right, we ought to do it; if wrong, we ought not. One ought to know what is right and what is wrong.[4]

The expression ko-wu first appeared in the Great Learning (Ta Hsueh)[j] as the beginning of the eight-step process for personal and social morality,[5] but it was not given special attention until first by Ch'eng I [k] (1033-1107) and then

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by Chu Hsi. A thing or wu , according to Ch'eng and Chu, includes three categories: (1) A thing connotes an event of the past as recorded in history, and the study of historical events is an indispensable method of acquiring moral knowledge.[6] (2) A thing or wu means any perceptual object in the world of nature, as "every blade of grass and every shrub possesses li and should be investigated."[7] (3) A thing or wu also implies any current human affair; "We must investigate the li in things and affairs we deal with; when we listen to others, we investigate it in conversation. When handling affairs, we investigate in the affairs themselves."[8] A thing, in this third sense, indicates the study of what is the right way in dealing with such practical affairs as being humane to others, and the like. All these three senses of wu are, however, directed to their ethical and moral implications, as we shall discuss in sections II and III.

Mention should be made at the outset that Chu Hsi's main concern is not so much with the investigation of things per se as with the li that underlies all things, a significant point which was initiated by Chang Tsai[l] (1020-1077), Ch'eng Hao[m] (1032-1085) and Ch'eng I. The philosophical significance of the concept li or principle, also translated as reason or order, in the Sung Neo-Confucianism is such that it has been labeled as the School of Principle (li hsueh[n]).[9] By li Chu Hsi had in mind two important aspects, namely, as an underlying principle of the universe on the one hand and a moral order on the other. Although both meanings are to be found in the writings of the early Sung Neo-Confucians. Chang Tsai and Ch'eng I whose emphasis was on the first, metaphysical sense, and Ch'eng Hao whose was on the second, moral sense, it is Chu Hsi who elaborated and synthesized the two views in his comprehensive system.[10]

Metaphysically, the li for Chu Hsi is not a thing as such, but that which makes a thing a thing, animate or inanimate. For example, what makes a piece of stone stone, not something else, is the li inherent in it; what makes a man man, not animal or a non-living thing, again, is the li inherent in him. To quote Chu Hsi's own words, "The fact that the yang and yin[o] modes and the five elements (wu hsing)[p] do not get mixed up and lose their order of operation is owing to li."[11] This li, though inherent and manifested in every corporeal thing and every affair in the world, is metaphysically-cosmologically one and incorporeal. In other words, this li prior to its being known is transcendent, but becomes immanent after its being known when things as objects known become part of the subject-knower. Unquestionably, Chu Hsi's assertion of

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li as principle underlying all the multitude of things in the universe is fundamentally aimed at a dual objective, namely, to reject the Buddhist metaphysical nihilism in view of its denial of the cosmic reality and at the same time to provide a rational justification for affirming that all things in existence as seen are not only real but directed by one guiding universal principle. The metaphysical implication of li has been compared to Aristotle's 'form.'[12] Both thinkers would agree that universals cannot exist independently of particulars; li and ch'i[q] [13] for Chu Hsi, just as form and matter for Aristotle, are metaphysically inseparable from one another.

But Chu Hsi's li connotes more than the metaphysical implications of Aristotle's form. Hence, we now come to the second, narrower but more important, sense of li which is, according to Chu Hsi, an ethical principle, as "Li is absolutely pure and perfectly good."[14] Li is not merely an abstract principle understandable to us through our investigation of things, but a moral order or an ethical standard of right and wrong. In this sense, as Chu Hsi writes, it is identified with Tao:[r]

Tao obtains its name simply from li inherent in all phenomena.[15]
Tao derives its name from the fact that it is the li of right conduct in everyday life for all men. that it is like a road upon which countless numbers of people should travel . . . : it is not what the Taoists and Buddhists describe as empty, formless, still, non-existent, and having no relation to man. It is maintained that Tao is far removed from us, so vast as to be out of touch with our needs, and that we are not called upon to investigate it? Then I say that Tao is present in everything - in the relations between sovereign and subject, and between father and son, in sitting down and rising up, in activity and rest, and is in everywhere with its unchangeable, clear principle, which cannot fail for a single instant.[16]

The passage above indicates that Chu Hsi was dissatisfied with the prevailing view of Tao described by the Buddhists as non-existent and by the Taoists as something purely transcendent, abstract and remote from men. For him, the Tao or Way connotes the way of the cosmos and, more significantly, the way of human relations. And to say that proper human relations should be done in accordance with Tao is the same as saying that they should be done in accordance with li. Chu Hsi realized, however, how difficult it is to put the Tao into practice; as he observed, "During the past fifteen hundred years,... the Tao that had been transmitted by Yao, Shun and Three Kings, the Duke of Chou, and Confucius has never been practised even for one day."[17] The failure of putting the Tao into operation in the world is caused by the fact that men have not really understood what it is. Therefore, to extend the knowledge of li is for Chu Hsi the same as to extend the knowledge of Tao, or simply of Tao-li.

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So much for the moralization of li and its identification with Tao. Chu Hsi further identifies li with hsing[s] or nature, on which he has this to say:

The Tao is identical with the nature of man and things and the nature is identical with the way.
'The nature is the same as the principle or li' [Ch'eng I said]. In relation to the mind, it is called hsing, and in relation to events, it is called li.
The term Tao is used in the universal sense; the term hsing is used in the particular sense.
The Tao is the li as we find it in the external world; the hsing is the li as we find it in ourselves.
The li of life is the hsing.[18]

The statements above simply indicate that with the concept hsing, the objective reality of li and Tao is categorized in relation to human nature. That is to say, the li as something transcendent and abstract has now become immanent and inherent in man as his concrete nature.

Another concept, which is closely related to, though different from, hsing and the most important one in Chu Hsi's ethical rationalism, is that of hsin.[t] To explain the term hsin, Chu Hsi is fond of quoting Chang Tsai's famous saying, "the mind is that which unites the nature and the feelings or ch'ing"[u];[19] and the "name of mind is derived from the union of nature and consciousness"[20] The main idea implied here is that mind is not the same as nature but lies between nature on the one hand and feelings or consciousness on the other. To cite Chu Hsi's own illustration: "Hsin or mind is like the seed-corn; Li or principle of life contained in it is hsing or nature; the putting forth of life on the part of ch'i is ch'ing or feelings."[21] Both hsing and hsin, the two main moral concepts, will be discussed in some detail in section III. Suffice it here to summarize the relation of the terms mentioned above in the following diagram as found in Chu Hsi's moral metaphysics:

[x]

[v][22]

　 [w] [x] [y]

p.180

II
Between the good and the right, the two key words of ethics, Chu Hsi's emphasis is on the right rather than the good. As has been mentioned above, the early Confucian view of the good was accepted by him as the most desirable over the other two views prevailing in his time, namely, that of the Taoists and of the Buddhists. While the Taoists hold that the good is discoverable in the world of nature, this view, being separated from the world of human values, is non-ethically oriented and, therefore, not acceptable to Chu Hsi. He condemned the Buddhist view of the good as even worse than that of the Taoists on the basis that the good, according to the former, is to escape from the world and human society as the inevitable alternative implied in its metaphysics. It is the early Confucians who discovered that the good is in nature as well as in man, which was first taught by Confucius and made explicit by Mencius. Not only is each of these two realms good and real, but the world of human values is so closely related to that of nature that together they form an organic whole. Being a learned student of all philosophical schools, including Taoism and Buddhism, Chu Hsi was in the position to exalt the Confucian prescription of what the good is as the most constructive, instructive, universally applicable, and morally relevant to any age. Thus he repeatedly reminds his reader that the Confucian view of the good of man is to become a chun tzu,[z] a morally superior man, who aspires not only to be in accord with nature, as "the wise delights in water, and the good man delights in mountain,"[23] but also to be in harmonious relations with his fellowmen. The current task, as Chu Hsi saw it, is to determine not so much what one ought to be as what one ought to do and how to do it, so as to achieve the good that the ancient sages had already discovered. The 'right,' 'duty,' 'obligation,' and 'responsibility,' which should not be ignored by anyone who seeks after the good, are all implied in Chu Hsi's extensive knowledge of the li, on which his reconstruction of the Confucian morality is based.

We have mentioned above (p. 04) the three meanings of wu or thing. Now we shall discuss how Chu Hsi argues that to investigate the li underlying each of three aspects of wu - that of historical events, of perceptual objects, and of current affairs - is essential in determining what is the right thing for one to do. First, to appeal to history has always been one of the characteristics of methodology emphasized by Chinese thinkers. This is first evidenced in the

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teachings of Confucius who claimed to be only "a transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients."[24] Chu Hsi is no exception. The fact that he dedicated himself to the study and exposition of the ancient texts is proof of his appeal to the tradition as authority. Without any hesitation, he joined the early Sung Neo-Confucians in attacking the Buddhists (the Ch'anists, in this case) on the ground that they have deliberately ignored scriptural studies necessary and useful for moral purposes. Contrary to the Ch'an Buddhist attitude toward written words, Chu Hsi would strongly argue that there is no thought or philosophy except in historical context and that to study what has happened in the past is to enlighten us in understanding why such events happened as they did. Probably he would agree with Hegel that history is the manifestation of the Spirit, the li for Chu Hsi, and that all human events which have occurred can be explained in terms of their interrelation to it. However, what one can learn from the study of history is not this or that particular event itself, but the li or principle that underlies every single occurrence. And Chu Hsi would go a step further to insist that history has provided not merely an explanation of what had happened (in terms of the dialectical process for Hegel), but a guideline by which to determine whether a course of action has been rightfully chosen and done in the past on the one hand and what ought to be done in the future on the other.

Further, there is a striking similarity between Chu Hsi's li and the Hebraic-Christian God in that both concepts are regarded as the ultimate reality which is good and, therefore, the ethical standard of human history. But Chu Hsi would disagree with the Christian view that God reveals himself to mankind through the historical personalities as recorded in the Bible. In contrast to this position, the li or Tao is something men have discovered and, having discovered its greatness and goodness, have chosen to follow as their ethical and moral goal. The natural-rational approach characteristic of Chinese methodology, as contrasted with the mystical-revealed approach of the Christian ethics, is well expressed in the Confucian saying: "It is man who makes the Tao great and not the Tao that can make man great."[25] Chu Hsi's recognition of the value of human experience is evidenced by his stress on the investigation of historical events as essential in understanding how the li or Tao has been enlarged and elevated to the highest capacities by the ancient sages. In short, Chu Hsi's prescription of how to determine what is the right thing to do is, in the first place, to study the history wherein lies the li or reason or principle of all things happened in the past. It is interesting to note

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that the important role of history played in Chinese thought which Chu Hsi had inherited made it possible for him to relate the historical perspective to his moral philosophy. And the efforts made by him in appealing to antiquity proved to be a real success, as Confucianism, notwithstanding with a new face, became once again the most dominant way of thinking and living in China. This new renaissance is largely due to Chu Hsi, who was at once keenly aware of the desperate need for some sort of moral authority and extraordinarily equipped with a profound insight into the value of the rich, though complex, tradition of the past as an indispensable source for moral instruction and inspiration.

In the second place, the investigation of things as objects presupposes that they have independent existence as being perceivable 'out there'. Chu Hsi's interest in wu in this sense is, also, a direct opposition to the Buddhist negation of all existents in the phenomenal world as illusory. Repeatedly he asserts not only that all the multitude of things are real, but also that the li is in everything. As he writes, "From the Supreme Ultimate above to a small thing like a blade of grass, a plant or an insect below, each has its li, i.e., reason for being ...,we must understand them one by one."[26] Again, "One must investigate one thing today and another thing tomorrow. When one has accumulated much knowledge, one will eventually achieve a thorough understanding like a sudden release."[27] Chu Hsi's ontological presupposition of the objective reality of objects existing independently of the awareness of mind may be summarized in a deductive argument: Every particular thing has a li for being; this blade of grass is a thing; therefore, this blade of grass has a li for being. Such an argument, for Chu Hsi, is applicable to everything else in the universe.

Two mutually related questions arise here: First, what is the nature of things existing 'out there'? Second, what is the moral significance of investigating these external things? To answer the first question, Chu Hsi would simply say that things are merely what they are and that there is a principle underlying each of them to make it what it is, not something else. The Lockean distinction of primary qualities and secondary qualities of perceptual objects would not interest him, for his ko wu was not primarily concerned with acquiring pure knowledge or scientific truth for its own sake, but as a means to the ethical-moral end. The task of philosophy, Chu Hsi would insist, is not to deal with the world of facts as such, but to relate it with the world of human values (and he would admit that his scientific　

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adventure was not thorough, for after all he was a philosopher, not a scientist.). In attempting to answer the second question concerning the moral implication and its other related questions (such as what are the qualities or properties in external objects different from those in moral action; how to relate the investigation or cognition of perceptual objects, which as such are amoral, to acts that are judged to be moral or immoral), Chu Hsi is not clear, as will be further pointed out (see below).

In the third place, the term wu means a study of current affairs as well as actual handling of them. This third sense of wu is the implementation of the two senses indicated above. It is an interesting fact that, according to most Chinese thinkers, philosophy as an intellectual or theoretical discipline must be practical, and they, whether classical or contemporary, are found to be professionally engaged in social-political activities. In his biographical account, we are told that Chu Hsi was time and again appointed to governmental service, although he never stayed in one official position for any considerable duration of time. Because of his candid criticisms of those morally corrupted officers in government, he had been dismissed from public posts.[28] But, like other Chinese philosophers in the past, Chu Hsi retired from his active service when external circumstances were not favorable for him to continue and resumed his philosophical pursuits in teaching and writing.

By shu wu, Chu Hsi means much more than just handling affairs in concrete matters, as the term wu connotes two basic moral concepts, hsing or nature and hsin or mind, which are the core of his moral philosophy and must be investigated. To both of these we shall now turn.

III
On the investigation of hsing or nature and hsin or mind, we find the following pertinent passages:

[The meaning of] ko wu includes: when speaking of hsing, one ought to investigate why it is called hsing; when speaking of hsin, one ought to investigate why it is called hsin. Now speaking of ko wu, when one opens one's eye in the morning, without seeking anything outside, there are already these four 'things' - jen[aa] or human heartedness, yi[ab] or righteousness, li[ac] or propriety, and chih[ad] or wisdom. As soon as the door is open, these four are right inside the door.... What makes a man man is simply due to these four 'things' or wu.[29]

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What Chu Hsi attempts to say here is, first of all, that while both hsing and hsin are essential aspects of wu to be investigated, they are basically not the same, as mistakenly regarded so by the Buddhists, as he argues.

According to Taoism and Buddhism, the hsing was pre-existent as an empty shell from which subsequently these four principles [jen, y,. li, chih ] were derived .... They maintain that hsing in itself is but the shell which contains within it these four principles.[30]
They [ the Buddhists] conceive of hsin as a bright mirror, which is regarded as nature or reality . . .. But it is mere consciousness or hsin. and has nothing to do with hsing. [31]

Chu Hsi's main point of criticism is that the Buddhists' having made such a grave error of identifying hsing and hsin is a logical result of their misconception of reality, which is ontologically real but is fallaciously viewed by them as non-existent.[32] He therefore reminded his students that they should especially keep this in mind in their devotion to the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things.[33] It would seem not inappropriate to mention here that Chu Hsi would criticize the Wittgensteinian view suggested in the Philosophical Investigations on the analogy of nature and mind as committing the same mistake, although on semantic rather than metaphysical grounds.

In the Mencius the two notions, hsing and hsin, are articulately emphasized as key ones for moral instruction. Mencius, however, never explicitly explains the relation of them, nor does he make a clear distinction between them. For he was primarily concerned with his arguments for the original goodness of man's hsing in terms of the fourfold aspect of hsin (commiseration. shame and dislike, reverence and respect, approval or disapproval), which any human being is by nature in possession of. Man is a moral being, asserted Mencius, not an amoral being as held by his contemporary Kao Tzu.[ae] The Mencian theory, that is, that hsing as being originally good is inseparable from man's being endowed with a moral sense to discriminate between right and wrong, seems to imply that both hsing and hsin connote the same thing. And yet, on the other hand, while to guard against losing one's hsin is frequently mentioned in the Mencius, the fact that the author never speaks of losing one's hsing suggests that they are not synonymous. Further, in spite of the fact that the relation of hsing and hsin was the most important problem of the early Sung Neo-Confucians, none of Chu Hsi's contemporaries offered any explicit explanation, except for Chang Tsai, who initiated the suggestive statement that "hsin is that which unites hsing and ch'ing" but made no clear exposition of their relation and distinction.

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One can hardly overestimate Chu Hsi's insight in focussing as the center of the early Confucian moral philosophy that its strength lies in laying a sound metaphysical and cosmological foundation, which he used as basis to formulate his own meta-ethical system. To quote his own words:

Of all the philosophers, the nearest to the truth are those of our Confucian school, who teach that hsing in its original essence is nothing else than the substance of jen, yi, li,chih.[34]
The relation of individual nature to reality: Li is heaven's substance.... hsing is what is received by man, and ch'ing is hsing in operation.[35]

This very core of the Confucian morality now reinforced by Chu Hsi is the claim that the four moral concepts - jen, yi, li, chih - are based on a value-oriented presupposition of reality, which is not only ontologically real as contrasted to the Buddhist denial of it, but also good and akin to man, not indifferent or remote as implied in the Tao-te-ching.[af] [36]

Here we are reminded of Kant's postulate of the a priori concept of God as essential to morality. without which moral duty is devoid of a foundation and is, therefore, meaningless. Chu Hsi would, indeed, agree with Kant that to, argue for a value in reality as a metaphysically indispensable basis of ethics is both experientially legitimate and logically valid. And what touches the heart of Confucian moral philosophy, now fully developed by Chu Hsi, is that the good and the real are indistinguishable. To investigate the hsing is to acquire an understanding of the universal essence of man who, as any human being including one's own self, is endowed with good seeds for moral growth and full development of one's whole being. The birth of a human being is to be regarded as a joyous event, neither a suffering as viewed by the Buddhists nor merely a natural. indifferent occurrence as held by the Taoists. Further, Chu Hsi would point out that the Christian theological doctrine of man as originally a sinner is logically inconsistent and would insist that the Confucian view of man as a moral being by nature is ontologically and ethically consistent.

IV
The last and most important aspect of ko wu is the investigation of hsin or mind, the analysis of which is the main contribution of Chu Hsi. What he attempts to do in terms of hsin is to clarify in his meta-ethical system certain moral issues (virtue, obligation, right action. etc.) in relation to it, and to

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determine whether there is such a thing (or wu) as moral knowledge and if so how to acquire it. As has been indicated above, for Mencius a natural man has the seeds of the four virtuous principles,[37] all of which are universally imparted in him, whosoever he is, just as is one's taste for food and sense for beauty, which come naturally.[38] Mencius is, however, more concerned with his arguments for the natural goodness of man in the universal sense than with the rational justification of a particular moral action and judgment. Hence, his often quoted statement that "all things are complete within us"[39] is indicative of his mystical-intuitive approach in that morality is to be cultivated and realized within the individual. While Chu Hsi attempts to buttress Mencius' doctrine of the original goodness of human nature as the metaphysical foundation of morality, he goes a step further to provide a rational exposition of moral action and judgment in terms of hsin, in which the moral significance of ko wu lies and through which the realm of ISNESS and that of OUGHTNESS are brought together. And the distinction between hsing and hsin is given further clarification. As he writes:

Hsing is the seat of consciousness;
hsin is that which has consciousness.[40]

Obviously for Chu Hsi. while hsing and hsin are two closely related 'things,' they are, however, different from each other. They are inseparably related in that the former is the substance and essence of man who is also a cognitive being with consciousness. That is to say, hsing is what man is in terms of its universalization and therefore belongs to the real of isness; hsin is what makes a man himself, a sage or vice versa, in terms of its individualization, and the relation of one's oughtness to isness rests with it. By nature all men, whosoever and in whatever capacities, are in possession of a moral sense, but its actual realization in a particular situation depends on whether one as a cognitive being is conscious of, or rather investigates, it, thus fulfilling one's oughtness in light of one's isness.

The wu Chu Hsi deals with here is of course man's hsin, not inanimate things, which are merely perceptual objects and whose meaningfulness depends on other than objects as such. Men are more than mere objects; they are both objects and subjects. As an object, a person is not an isolated single entity, but in multiple relations with others. As a subject with cognitive capacity, he is conscious of something, and the cognitive power of one's hsin is such that it is conscious of even the smallest blade of grass.[41] But the some-

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thing that he is conscious of includes his own person and his relation to others, and accordingly he ought not only to recognize his being in such a particular relational context but to bring about proper relationship. If one, for example, is a son, then one ought to recognize his being so. Since there is the li or principle of being a son, that principle is of course filial piety. And the more one investigates the principle of 'things' as objects (be they brothers, parents, friends), the better one will understand them and one's relation to them and accordingly ought to act according to their respective capacities. Oughtness is therefore derived from isness.

One question may arise as to whether Chu Hsi commits the so-called "naturalistic fallacy'' of deriving moral judgments from factual ones. To be sure, Chu Hsi would never agree with the utilitarian that since man by nature desires happiness he therefore ought to seek happiness which is desirable, and he would argue that what is naturally desired is not always axiologically desirable. What he attempts to show is: if X is related to Y, X ought to be cognizant of such a relation to Y and act in accordance with it. Since X is always related to others in a number of relational capacities, X ought to perform his various duties accordingly. Whether or not his argument for the distinction between hsing as a priori universal moral notion and hsin as a synthetic notion bringing together facts and values is convincing, it should be remembered that his main concern here is to articulate his two convictions: namely, that, speaking universally, man is a decent being and that, speaking individually, he ought to hold on to his original essence and pursue the good even if he fails to live up to it.

Further, concerning moral judgments in terms of good or bad, right or wrong, Chu Hsi makes it quite clear that they are to be determined by hsin, not hsing. For, according to him:

Hsing is passive (ching[ag]) ch'ing or feelings is active (rung[ah]), and hsin is both active and passive. Hsin is the most intellectual.[42]

The statements above explain why Chu Hsi finds Chang Tsai's saying that hsin is that which comprises both hsing and ch'ing enlightening and fitting into his own system. For hsing is that which is received by man and therefore passive. Again, a blade of grass is inherent with being itself, not something else; a boat is inherent with being a boat sailing on water, not on land; likewise, at birth a human being is inherent with being a human, not a blade of grass or a boat, and his original nature is good and common to all human kind.

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The passivity of hsing is, however, concretely manifested in the four feelings, which are active. While hsing in its original state is passive and ch'ing as concrete manifestation is active, hsin for Chu Hsi is neither merely one nor the other, but both passive and active. That it is passive referred only to its original state, one with the Mind of Heaven (tao hsin), and active in that hsin is to mould the virtues of hsing and ch'ing.[43] In short, hsin is the determining factor as to whether one's moral action is actively directed upward, i.e., in harmony with the Mind of Heaven, or downward, i.e, led astray by one's selfish desires: and accordingly moral judgments can be made.

V
In conclusion. the key concept hsin analyzed by Chu Hsi as a cognitive and passive-active faculty in man, with which morality rests, suggests a fourfold dimension in terms of ko wu that ought to be the aim. While following the Mencian view of man in his original state being endowed with potentiality of becoming a sage. the actualization of being so is determined by hsin, not hsing. Here Chu Hsi unmistakably takes the idealist position that it is man's mind which is the controlling factor of moral knowledge and action. And he even goes as far as to refer to the original Chinese character hsin in support of his argument for its being the basic concept of morality.[44]

Since hsin is the determinant of every individual's moral character, the first thing that Chu Hsi advocates, as has been mentioned above, is that morality ought to be retrospective, namely, to investigate what was done by the sages in the past as beneficial and enlightening and, therefore, necessary for moral education. Such a view of looking back to past experiences has repeatedly been accused of being backward, and the criticism is not altogether unjustifiable, for obvious reasons. But one can hardly ignore Chu Hsi's earnest efforts to show the coordination of the early Confucian moral teachings, which are considered relevant to deal with contemporary moral issues. For man, after all, is a child of his culture, and being brought up with a certain set of moral beliefs, he has nothing to lose by looking back to the wisdom manifested by the sages of old. Being confronted with metaphysical and moral challenges, which were regarded as urgent moral issues, Chu Hsi's cherishing of ancient wisdom and his emphasis on the retrospective aspect of morality are historically and ethically significant.

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But Chu Hsi is by no means a slavish follower of the past. Hence, the second dimension of morality is that it ought to be reflective, namely, to investigate what has been given with a critical mind. Chu Hsi often warned his students that what is recorded in history books is not always correct, and that one needs to investigate even the least significant thing until one's doubt is completely resolved. One can find this critical-reflective attitude explicitly expressed in his writings, with little reservation in giving his own interpretations of the ancient classics and reasons for doing so.[45] The fact that Chu Hsi made an extensive rearrangement of the Great Learning speaks well for himself and suggests that he would be the last person to blindly accept the conventional moral code. One ought, he would urge, to acquire such a frame of attitude in moral pursuits towards not only that which was given in the past but also that which prevails at present, that he would avoid getting bewildered when confronted with views contradictory to his own. Here, again, Chu Hsi makes it clear that the realization of one's essence rests with the deliberation of hsin reflectively in a particular moral situation. The reflective dimension of morality makes it possible for one to guard against taking for granted the validity of any moral rules and ideas as merely prescribed. And it is this second dimension, not the first, that in actuality makes one oneself, not someone else, thus succeeding, or failing for that matter, in one's fulfillment of moral obligation.

The third dimension of morality in relation to the activity of hsin is that it ought to be prospective, namely, to look outward and forward through acquiring a wide, far-reaching perspective. This is precisely what ko wu as especially emphasized by Chu Hsi is aimed at. The fact that life undergoes all sorts of complex relationships makes morality constantly problematical, and there is indeed no royal road to achieve moral excellence. Hence, one must take a slow painstaking process by investigating all things, one at a time, in the hope that the cumulative result will be the eventual realization of one's quest.[46] Once again, the pertinent question concerning the moral significance of investigating external objects arises (see above, p. 00). Although no explicit answer can be found in Chu Hsi's writings, one can, however, infer that the broader and deeper one investigates all things the better understanding and knowledge one gains. When one has exhaustively investigated the principles of as many things at work around him, the net result will enable one to determine one's proper attitude towards not just the qualities/properties of external objects but more importantly those of moral actions. Since all things (be

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they plants, animals, or human beings) are in possession of underlying principles for their being so, each in its own way, they are intrinsically valuable. But men alone, in addition to being intrinsically valuable, are the only 'things' that are able to value all things, including themselves. This is solely because of their given hsing, characteristic of their own kind, accompanied by hsin, which has the capacity to be cognizant not only of that which belongs to the realm of isness but also of oughtness.

All three dimensions briefly summarized above are obviously directed toward external 'things' - be they perceptual objects, human beings, or human relationships - and Chu Hsi has been criticized, particularly by the Lu-Wang[ai] School,[47] on the ground that he overemphasized the externality of morality at the neglect of that which is within. However, Chu Hsi later seemed to be aware of the inner dimension of morality, which should also be given due attention, namely, that morality ought to be introspective in terms of looking into one's own mind. As in the Biographical Annals,[aj] we read:

If in daily life, one cultivates one's hsin and the spirit of ching[ak] or reverence, and refuses to allow selfish desires to disturb one's mental tranquillity, then one's hsin will be clear as a mirror and still as water before manifestation, and at the time of manifesting itself will always be attuned to the Tao.[48]

Hsin now becomes an object. not just a subject as Chu Hsi formerly held.[49] In brief, his ko wu in relation to one's moral duty now includes the investigation of one's own hsin. which in the last analysis is the captain of personal and public morality.

NOTES

1. See Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, Vol. 2, 1956), p. 458.

2. J. Percy Bruce, Chu Hsi and His Masters (London: Probsthain & Co., 1928), especially Part 1, pp. 1-58; also, Chin-ssu Lu.[al] translated by W. T. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand - The Neo-Confucian Anthology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), especially Introduction.

3. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Vol. 2, 1953), Ch. XIII, pp. 533-566;W. T. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), PP 588-654; Carson Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought (New York: Bookman Associates, Vol. I, 1957), pp. 243-284.

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4. Chu-tzu yu-lei[am] (Conversations of Chu Hsi), 15, 2.

5. The eight steps given in the Great Learning, one of the four Confucian Classics, are investigation of things, extension of knowledge, sincerity of thoughts, rectification of minds, cultivation of persons, regulation of families, government of states, and peace of the world.

6. Chin-ssu lu, III, 25.

7. Ibid., III, 12.

8. Yu-lei,12,5.

9. For a historical account of the concept of li, see W. T. Chan, "The Evolution of Neo-Confucian Concept Li as Principle," in the Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, New Series IV, No. 2, February 1964, pp. 123-148.

10. See A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers (London: Lund Humphries, 1958), Part I, chs. 1, 4 and 5.

11. Chu-tzu wen-chi[an] (Collected Writings of Chu Hsi), 49, 2.

12. Cf. Carson Chang, op. cit., pp. 260-264.

13. For a discussion of the concept ch'i, see my article on "Chang Tsai's Concept of Ch'i, " Philosophy East and West. Vol. XVIII, No. 4, October 1968, pp. 247-260.

14. Wen-chi, 49, 8.

15. Chu-tzu ch'uan-shu,[ao] (Complete Works of Chu Hsi), 46, 2. For an English translation of chapters 42-48 from the Works, see J. Percy Bruce, The Philosophy of Human Nature (London: Probsthain & Co., 1922).

16. Ibid., 46, 6.

17. Wen-chi, 36, 22.

18. Ch'uan-shu, 42, 1.

19. Sung Yuan Hsueh-an [ap] (Writings of the Sung and Yuan Dynasties), 48, 14.

20. Ch'uan-shu, 44, 2.

21. Ibid., 45, 2.

22. For a discussion of T'ai-chi and its relation to li. see my article on "The Concept of T'ai-chi in Sung Neo-Confucian Philosophy," Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4, 1974, pp.275-294.

23. Analects, VI, 21.

24. Ibid., VII, 1.

25. Ibid., XV, 28.

26. Yu-lei, 15, 13-4.

27. Ibid., 5.

28. See Chu-tzu nien-pu (Biographical Annals of Chu Hsi).

29. Yu-lei, 15, 2.

30. Ch'uan-shu, 42, 2.

31. Yu-lei 126, 2.

32. Ibid., 126, 6.

33. Ibid., 126, 9.

34. Ch'uan-Shu, 42, 2.

35. Ibid.,42,1.

36. Ibid., 46, 1.

37. Mencius, II, 1, 6.

38. Ibid., VI, l, 7.

39. Ibid., VII, 1, 4.

40. Ch'uan-shu, 44, 1.　

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41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 45, 1.

44. Ibid., 46, 1.

45. For a brief discussion on this point, see Hu Shih, "The Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy," The Chinese Mind. ed. by Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1967), pp. 116-130.

46. Chin-ssu lu, III, 9.

47. For a criticism of Chu Hsi's rationalistic approach, see my Lu Hsiang-shan - A Twelfth Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher (New Haven: American Oriental Society 1944), pp. 87-97.

48. Nien-pu, 1, 2.

49. Ch'uan-shu. 44. 1

Chinese Glossary
a 朱熹 n 理学
b 孔子 o 阳阴
c 董仲舒 p 五行
d 四书 q 气
e 易经 r 道
f 诗经 s 性
g 孟子 t 心
h 致知格物 u 情
i 理 v 太极
j 大学 w 气质之性
k 程颐 x 道心,人心
l 张载 y 人欲
m 程颢 z 君子

p.193

aa 仁 ai 陆象山,王阳明
ab 义 aj 朱子年谱
ac 礼 ak 敬
ad 智 al 近思录
ae 告子 am 朱子语录
af 道德经 an 朱子文集
ag 静 ao 朱子全书
ah 动 ap 宋元学案