Dharmakiirtis refutation of theism

·期刊原文

Dharmakiirti's refutation of theism

By Roger Jackson

Philosophy East and West

36:4 Oct. 1986 p. 315-348

p. 315

I. INTRODUCTION

Indian civilization, no less than that of the West,
is haunted by the concept of God, and Indian
philosophical writing, no less than the works of
Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, or Hume, has as one of its
important concerns the existence or nonexistence of
an omniscient, eternal, independent, benevolent being
who creates and/or designs the cosmos. Despite Lin
Yutang's description of India as a nation
"intoxicated with God,"(1) Indian skepticism about
such a being goes back very far indeed,(2) and
explicit arguments against theism find an important
place in the writings of Buddhism, Jainism, and
Miimaa.msaa (as they must have in the lost writings
of Caarvaaka) , while God's importance or even
existence for early Saa.mkhya, Nyaaya, and Vai`se.sika
is at best moot.(3) Indeed, the only Indian philosophical
systems that are explicitly theistic are Vedaanta,
Yoga, and later, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika. It undoubtedly
is due to the overwhelming preference for Vedaanta
among modern exponents of Indian philosophy that
Indian tradition so often is presented through
theistically-shaded lenses, and it is not incorrect
to assert that, in general, Indian civilization has
become more theistic during the same period in which
the West has become less so. Still, this should not
blind us to the fact that as recently as five hundred
years ago thinkers like the Jaina Gu.naratna were
adducing sharp and original arguments against
theistic assertions, and that even today the
unanimity of Indian belief in God may not be as
thoroughgoing as most swamis and scholars would have
us believe.(4)

As might be expected, arguments for the existence or
nonexistence of the being variously called puru.sa,
brahman, paramaatman, or ii`svara, or by the name of
one or another sectarian deity, increased in
sophistication as methods of philosophical discussion
grew more complex and precise. Sometime around the
middle of the first millennium A.D. a philosophical
watershed was reached wherein the various Indian
schools arrived at least at a broad consensus on the
criteria for valid and invalid formal inferences,
anumaana, and proper and improper argumentative
modes, tarka. In principle, at least, this permitted
intersystemic debate on the basis of commonly
accepted "logical" canons, and thus prompted the hope
that arguments on fundamental philosophical issues
might indeed be capable of resolution. In general,
before the development of these canons, Indian
philosophical arguments that were not simply dogmatic
were analogical or dialectical in form; arguments
after the canons were developed still employed
illustrative analogies and dialectical dilemmas, but
within the much more carefully articulated framework
of what is sometimes called the Indian "syllogism."

Among those contributing greatly to the development
of generally acceptable
------------------------
Roger Jackson is an Assistant Professor of Religious
Studies at Fairfie[d University, Connecticut. This
paper was originally presented at the seventh
conference of the international Association of
Buddhist Studies, Bologna, Italy, July, 1985.

p. 316

logical canons was the seventh-century Buddhist
aacaarya Dharmakiirti, who developed the seminal
insights of his great predecessor, Dignaaga, into an
epistemological and logical system that itself drew
the attention of countless commentators (not to
mention opponents(5)) and has served as the basis of
epistemology and logic in the Tibetan Buddhist
tradition right up to the present. The majority of
Dharmakiirti's writings(6) are concerned with
epistemological and logical questions, but he was not
uninterested in matters of religious and metaphysical
doctrine, for the chapter titled "Pramaa.nasiddhi,"
or "Establishment of Authoritativeness, " in his
masterwork, the Pramaa.navaarttika, (7) is devoted
almost entirely to a rational justification of
Buddhist religious doctrines, such as the
authoritativeness of the Buddha, the reality of past
and future lives, and the validity of the Four Noble
Truths. In the course of demonstrating these
doctrines, Dharmakiirti attacks the positions of a
variety of non-Buddhist opponents, including the
Lokaayatas(=Caarvaakas), Saa.mkhyas, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas,
Miimaa.msakas, and Jainas. Although earlier Buddhist
writers had criticized non-Buddhist systems, and
Bhaavaviveka had subjected them to systematic
scrutiny nearly a century earlier in his
Tarkajvaalaa, Dharmakiirti was the first Buddhist to
criticize non-Buddhist doctrines with fully developed
methods of inference and argumentation at his
disposal.

Among the non-Buddhist doctrines criticized by
Dharmakiirti in the "Pramaa.nasiddhi" chapter of the
Pramaa.navaarttika was the assertion that an
omniscient, permanent, independent entity, II`svara,
is the creator of the cosmos. Although George
Chemparathy remarks that "the systematic and
thoroughgoing attack on the I`svara doctrine by
Dharmakiirti" gave a great impetus to the
theist-atheist controversy, (8) and Gopimohan
Bhattacharyya notes that the "time-honored
cosmological [sic] argument was for the first time
subjected to scathing criticism by Dharmakiirti, `the
central figure around whom all the creative minds in
India revolved', " (9) Dharmakiirti's arguments
themselves, pivotal as they may have been, have
received surprisingly little attention; most writers
on Buddhist atheism have focused either on the
arguments of such earlier sources as the Paali
Nikaayas, Naagaarjuna, A`svaghosa, and Vasubandhu, or
the later, extended discussions in `Saantarak.sita's
Tattvasa.mgraha and the Pa~njikaa upon it by
Kamala`siila. The earlier arguments are less
systematic than Dharmakiirti's, and the later ones
are largely based on the discussion of ii`svara in
the Pramaa.navaarttika, so it seems desirable to
examine these crucial arguments, for without an
understanding of them, our picture of the Indian
theist-atheist controversy will be incomplete. This
essay will sketch the pre-Dharmakiirti development of
theism, outline earlier Buddhist refutations of it,
contextualize and analyze Dharmakiirti's arguments in
some detail, note some of the directions taken in the
theist-atheist debate after Dharmakiirti, and
conclude by examining problems inherent in attempting
to "decide" the debate and compare it to similar
debates in the Western tradition.

p. 317

II. PHILOSOPHICAL THEISM BEFORE DHARMAKIIRTI

Indian speculation about the cosmos, of course, goes
back as far as the later sections of the.Rgveda,
where the first cause is said to be, for example,
vi`svakarman ("the all-maker"),(10) or puru.sa ("the
person") , (11) or prajaapati ("the lord of
creatures"), (12) or tadekam ("the one") .(13) The
divine power, or supreme puru.sa, first is referred
to as ii`svara ("the lord") in the Atharvaveda,(14)
while the Braa.hma.nas and AAra.nyakas continue Vedic
speculations regarding prajaapati and vi`svakarman
and introduce the concepts of brahman and
brahmaa.(15) In most of these accounts, the
discussion of the first cause is couched in
mythological narrative; little real attempt is made
to justify the concepts philosophically, though
lurking in the background are unstated assumptions
about limiting principles and simplicity of
explanation. Discussions of the first cause in the
various Upani.sads focus on the concept of brahman
(also referred to as aatman or paramaatman), whose
reality as the source and (most often) the substance
of the cosmos is inferred usually through a reductive
process that moves from change to permanence,
multiplicity to unity, complexity to simplicity,
materiality to spirituality, and grossness to
subtlety.(16) The earlier, more "monistic" Upani.sads
tend to regard brahman as an impersonal principle
that simply becomes the cosmos (while at the same
time remaining in some way transcendent to it); in
later Upani.sads, such as the `Svetaa`svatara,
brahman is personalized--at least to the point where
it has a creative aspect that is responsible for
originating the cosmos and that can be addressed as
"lord" (ii`sa, ii`svara), or "deity" (deva),(17) or
even as Rudra. The `Svetaa`svatara actually lists
non-Vedic explanations of the cosmos, such as
svabhaava (nature), kaala (time), niyata (fate),
yad.rcchaa (chance), and so forth, but it rejects
them out of hand, simply asserting that brahman,
rather than any of these, is the true explanatory
principle.(18) The Bhagavadgiitaa further
personalizes the first cause by identifying its
ultimate nature with the divine person of
Vi.s.nu,(19) but, again, the fact is asserted rather
than argued, and the appeal is aimed more at the
imagination and emotions than at rationality.

It is only with the development of the classical
dar`sanas in the last centuries B.C. or the first
centuries A.D. that theism, widespread as it had
become religiously, began to receive philosophical
justification. If we take the term "theism" in the
broad sense in which I am using it--comprising any
theory that attributes the creation and/or ordering
of the cosmos to one source, whether personal or
impersonal--then there are three dar`sanas that can
be said to be "theistic": Vedaanta, Yoga, and Nyaaya.

The Brahmaasuutras of Baadaraaya.na did not receive
their most important advaita commentaries until
Gau.dapaada and `Sa^nkara, both of whom probably
postdate Dharmakiirti,(20) but the suutras themselves
have as one of their central concerns to establish
that brahman is the source and substance of the
cosmos.(21) Brahman is asserted to be that on which
the world is dependent,(22) the material cause of all

p. 318

effects.(23) Baadaraaya.na's arguments rest primarily
on scriptural statements that would not carry much
force for a Buddhist, since the latter admits neither
the validity of the Vedas nor the existence of an
independent `sabdapramaa.na. This Vedaantin
disinclination to proffer inferentially based
arguments for its theistic beliefs is seen clearly in
later commentators such as `Sa^nkara, who denies that
brahman's origination of the cosmos ever can be
established inferentially, since brahman is
imperceptible and inferences must be perceptually
based, (24) and Raamaanuja, who refutes various
rational arguments for theism so as to pave the way
for knowledge of God through scripture and
devotion.(25)

The Yogasuutra of Pata~njali quite specifically
asserts the existence of a "supreme puru.sa, "
ii`svara, who is unaffected by affliction, action, or
fruition, is omniscient, the eternal teacher, and the
object of the syllable o.m, and devotion to whom is
one way to achieve samaadhi.(26) The Yoga tradition
generally is more concerned with psychological than
philosophical matters, and its literature is far from
being replete with rational discussions of the
existence or nonexistence of ii`svara, but
Pata~njali's fourth-century commentator, Vyaasa, does
interpret the assertion that in ii`svara "the seed of
the omniscient is not exceeded" as meaning that
iisvara's knowledge and preeminence are knowledge and
preeminence other than which none greater can be
conceived.(27) If different degrees of knowledge or
preeminence be admitted, then a supreme instance of
these is not inconceivable-- and that supreme
instance is ii`svara. It ought to be noted that the
ii`svara of Yoga is not a creator-God like that of
Vedaanta. Yoga arises within the context of
Saa.mkhya, according to which the cosmos is simply a
transformation of insentient nature, prak.rti, from
which individual puru.sas--and the supreme
puru.sa--ever are utterly separate.

Lying midway conceptually between the immanent
brahman of Vedaanta and the detached, inactive
supreme puru.sa of Yoga is the ii`svara of Nyaaya,
who is neither the material cause of the cosmos (like
brahman), nor utterly noncausal (like the supreme
puru.sa) , but, rather, the world's shaper and
arranger--its efficient cause, as it were. It is
Nyaaya (or, later, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika) alone among
Indian philosophical schools that seriously proposed
to offer proof of the existence and creative activity
of ii`svara. Ironically, the passage in Gautama's
Nyaayasuutra that became the basis of later
theological elaboration(28) is not unambiguously
theistic--a number of scholars believe that, quite to
the contrary, its discussion of the relation between
ii`svara and the results of human action is intended
as a criticism of theism, that is, that if ii`svara
is posited, then human action is pointless.(29) Be
that as it may, by the time of Vaatsyaayana's
Nyaavabhaa.sya (fifth century(30)), the moot passage
in Gautama is interpreted as a demonstration that
ii`svara is the cause of all effects, and that human
action could not have results without the action of
ii`svara. Vaatsyaayana goes on to define ii`svara as
belonging in general to the category (padaartha) of
substance (dravya) , and in particular to the
substance that is self (aatman), of which it is a
special instance, powerful, meritorious, benevolent,
and in control of both karman and the material
elements.(31)

p. 319

Pra`satapaada (sixth century) advanced the discussion
still further in his Padaarthadharmasa.mgraha by
arguing that ii`svara is necessary as the conscious
impeller of the unseen (ad.r.s.ta) force that
regulates karman, and as that which impels atoms to
movement and combination at the end of the universe's
dormancy (pralaya).(32)

The last important pre-Dharmakiirti Naiyaayika
(although by now it is possible to speak of
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika) was Uddyotakara, who probably
flourished in the period between Dignaaga and
Dharmakiirti (late sixth or early seventh century).
In his Nyaayavaarttika, he goes beyond arguing for
ii`svara on grounds peculiar to Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika
and seeks to establish his existence on more general
grounds. II`svara, Uddyotakara asserts, is the
instrumental cause (nimittakaara.na) of things,
because he assists beings in reaping the fruits of
their actions. ii`svara further is necessary as an
adjunct to material results, because all results must
be preceded by conscious action, as a hatchet
requires a wielder in order to function, or the flow
of milk to a calf requires the cow's intention.
Further, although II`svara is a permanent, unaltering
entity, he can cause impermanent entities, because we
see that, for example, spun yarn, though unmoving, is
the cause of a movable garment. II`svara is not the
creator of the eternal atoms that comprise the
material world; his "creation," therefore, is neither
ex nihilo nor out of himself. Rather, he fashions the
preexistent "material" into a cosmos in response to
the necessary fruition of the dharma and adharma of
beings. Finally, ii`svara's power and consciousness
are eternal, omnipresent, and unlimited, for events
throughout the entire extent of space and time
require a conscious agent as their instrumental
cause; since that cause, ii`svara, can effect all
results, his power is unlimited, and since he is
conscious effector of all results, he must, by
definition, be omniscient.(33)

III. PRE-DHARMAKIIRTI BUDDHIST ATTACKS ON THEISM

Beginning with the great eleventh-century defender
of theism, Udayana,(34) any number of Hindu writers
have attempted to argue that Buddhism, with its
worship of an omniscient tathaagata, actually is
crypto-theism. The word "theism" undoubtedly can be
twisted in such a way that certain aspects of
Mahaayaana theory and practice fall under the term,
but it is equally clear that theism in the sense in
which I am using it--as the assertion of an
omniscient, permanent, independent, unique cause of
the cosmos--is rejected throughout the length and
breadth of the Indian Buddhist tradition.
Dharmakiirti's antitheistic arguments may have taken
the Buddhist critique to a new level of
sophistication, but he had behind him a millennium of
refutations, with many of which he undoubtedly was
familiar, and which ought to be borne in mind when we
consider his discussion.

The Paali Nikaayas contain a number of explicit
rejections of theism, and some important implicit
ones, as well. In the Brahmajaalasutta, one of the
sixty-two views discussed by the Buddha is the claim
that brahmaa is the creator of the

p. 320

cosmos; this claim is rejected on the grounds that it
is based on a mistaken inference: at the beginning of
a world cycle, brahmaa' is the first being to arise.
Lonely, he wishes for other beings as companions, and
they appear. He concludes that he has created them,
but is mistaken, for by the Buddhist explanation the
beings simply are arising due to their own
karman--karman, rather than the will of a deity,
being the true creative force in the cosmos.(35)

A second explicit rejection, made on the grounds of
theodicy, or the "problem of evil," occurs at a
number of places in the Nikaayas,(36) where it is
claimed that the postulation of a God as creator of
the cosmos and the regulator of karman undermines
human moral responsibility, while at the same time
vitiating claims that the God can be benevolent,
since evils are his creation, too. Other explicit
critiques include mockery of the "omnisicient" brahmaa
for his ignorance regarding the sphere wherein all
elements cease,(37) and skepticism regarding the claims
of some brahmins to have seen brahmaa face-to-face.(38)

For the later Buddhist philosophical tradition,
however, the most important early arguments are perhaps
the implicit ones: those many passages in the Nikaayas
where the concept of a permanent attaa or aatman is
rejected, principally on the grounds that no
permanent entity is or can be encountered in
experience or justified by reason. It really is
Buddhism's emphasis on universal impermanence that is
at the root of its aversion to the concept of God, as
became evident in the sorts of refutations offered in
the post-nikaaya period (when the attributes of the
creator, identified by the Buddhists as ii`svara,
perhaps had become more clearly defined).

Poussin remarks that Buddhist refutations of ii`svara
"ont le tort de se repeter."(39) It is true that
certain points are stressed again and again, but the
arguments do vary; indeed, their uniformity is more
in style than substance: virtually all are couched in
the form of logical dilemmas, in which the
predication of this or that attribute of ii`svara is
shown to lead to unacceptable conclusions, no matter
how it is qualified. Post-nikaaya, pre-Dharmakiirti
arguments are thus broadly "logical," without being
specifically inferential.

One of the earliest post-nikaaya rejections of ii`s-
vara is found in the Buddhacaarita of A`svagho.sa
(first-second century A.D.), where at one place the
rhetorical question is posed: If ii`svara is the
creator, then what point is there in human
effort?(40) In a second passage, the Buddha is quoted
as pointing out that if ii`svara, the cause, is
perfect and unchanging, then the cosmos that is his
effect must be perfect and unchanging, which it
manifestly is not. Further, if it be argued that
ii`svara creates with a purpose in mind, then he has
not achieved all purposes, and his perfection is
limited; whereas if he creates without a purpose,
then he must be regarded as no more sensible than a
madman or a child.(41)

A number of works attributed to Naagaarjuna--generally
believed to belong to the same period as
A`svagho.sa--reject the concept of ii`svara. The
Suh.rllekha mentions in passing that ii`svara is nor
to be accepted as the cause of the aggregates.(42)
The Catu.hstava argues that ii`svara must either
originate from another

p. 321

entity, in which case his uncreatedness is violated,
or be self-originated, which is impossible, since an
entity cannot at the same time be both the agent and
object of an action.(43) The Bodhicittavivara.na
notes that (a) if ii`svara is alleged to be
permanent, then he cannot create, either
simultaneously or gradually (since results are
impermanent, and so cannot have a permanent cause);
(b) if he is said to be efficient, then he must
create the universe unaided all at once (since
efficiency requires the immediate generation of a
result); (c) if he requires assistance in creation,
then he is not truly eternal or efficient; and (d) if
he is alleged to be an entity (bhaava), then he
cannot be permanent, since entities are observed to
be impermanent.(44) Finally, the Vi.s.norekakart.rtva-
niraakara.nam, (45) which is entirely devoted to a
refutation of ii`svara, argues that (a) he cannot
create the existent, since it already exists, nor the
nonexistent, since it cannot come to be; and (b) he
cannot be self-originated, as that is a contradictory
concept; or other-originated, for that would entail
an infinite regress of creators, even one of whom
exist before ii`svara, thereby vitiating his status
as creator.(46)

Arguments against the concept of ii`svara also are
found in the AAbhidharmika literature of succeeding
centuries. The great compendium of Sarvaastivaadin
thought, the Mahaavibhaa.sa, notes that (a) if
ii`svara is the cause of everything, then he must
create everything at once (since efficiency implies
immediate causation); (b) if he requires help, then
he is not the sole cause; (c) if he is
undifferentiated and eternal, so must his effects be
(since effect must resemble cause); and (d) since
effects are known to be impermanent, their alleged
permanent cause, ii`svara, has no more "existence"
than space.(47)

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako`sa and Abhidharmako`sa-
bhaa.sya reject ii`svara at a number of places, most
extensively in the Bha.sya to II,, 64d, which asserts
that the various dharmas do not arise from a unique
cause like ii`svara, because dharmas are successive
and ii`svara is not. Among the points made by
Vasubandhu in his dialogue with a theist are that (a)
if ii`svara is said to will the successive generation
of dharmas, then he must have multiple desires; if he
is single, he must have a single desire, hence create
dharmas all at once; (b) if ii`svara requires
assistance, then he is not the unique cause, and his
assistant causes would require further assistant
causes, in infinite regress; (c) if ii`svara wills
the creation of some dharmas in the present and some
later, then he must be incapable of creating the
later dharmas now, and if he cannot create them now,
he cannot in the future, since his nature does not
change; and (d) if the observed causes of various
effects are said to be auxiliaries to ii`svara's
causation, then it must be asked whether ii`svara can
prevent the effects from arising--he cannot, and
therefore is both impotent and irrelevant, for the
observed impermanent causes are perfectly adequate
explanations for effects.(48) Vasubandhu also argues
that since karmic results are multiple, their cause
cannot be single,(49) and that, similarly, suffering
cannot be originated by a cause that is single,
nonsuccessive, or guided by intelligence.(50)

Among Mahaayaana AAbhidharmika texts that include
refutations of ii`svara, we

p. 322

will mention only the Yogaacaarabhuumi of Asa^nga,
which argues that (a) if ii`svara has a reason for
creation, then that reason is the real cause, whereas
if he has none, then he cannot be motivated to become
a cause; (b) if ii`svara is immanent in the cosmos,
then he cannot stand outside as its creator, whereas
if he is not immanent in it, then he has no relation
to it, and so cannot create it; (c) if ii`svara
creates intending some purpose, then it must be
admitted that there is a purpose he has not yet
fulfilled; and (d) if creation depends on ii`svara's
will alone, then everything must arise
simultaneously, while if it depends on an ii`svara
who is assisted, then he is not the unique cause.(51)

One final pre-Dharmakiirti text worthy of brief
mention is the Tarkajvaalaa of Bhaavaviveka, or
Bhavya (sixth century) , whose discussion of
ii`svara(52) shows at least a rudimentary awareness
of attempts to prove ii`svara inferentially and of
the pitfalls entailed by those attempts. Bhaavaviveka
recites a number of the standard refutations, noting
that the multiple events we observe in the world
cannot be asserted to arise from a unique cause, but
rather must be explained as proceeding from a
multiplicity of karmic conditions, and that ii`svara
cannot be held to be any more real than a sky-flower
or a barren woman's son. He does note that one
possible argument for ii`svara is the syllogism, "The
eye and so forth exist as accompanied (that is,
caused) by a maker, because they are arranged like a
pot." To this Bhaavaviveka's response is that the
syllogism is invalid because it proves what is
already proven for the Buddhist, namely, that events
have causes--for the Buddhist, however, the causes
are multiple (karman, the elements, parents, and so
forth), not a single arranger. A second syllogism,
namely, "II`svara is the maker of the eye and so
forth because he is permanent, unique and
unproduced, " is rejected as unproved (asiddha)
because of the absence of any corroborative example
of such an entity. Finally, the syllogism, "(The eye
and so forth have) ii`svara (as a maker preceding
them) because (they are shaped), just as a pot has a
potter as its maker," is rejected on the grounds that
a potter is (a) embodied and (b) impermanent, neither
of which is applicable to ii`svara.(53)

IV. DHARMAKIIRTI'S CRITIQUE OF THEISM: CONTEXT

As noted in the introduction, Dharmakiirti's refutation
of theism is found in the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter of
his Pramaa.navaarttika. The Pramaa.navaarttika is
loosely constructed as a commentary on Dignaaga's
Pramaa.nasamuccaya, and the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter--
regarded as the first by modern editors and the
second by the Tibetan tradition(54)--is itself an
elaborate gloss on just one verse of the
Pramaa.nasamuccaya, the first, wherein Dignaaga
salutes the Buddha as One Who Has Become
Authoritative (pramaa.nabhuuta), One Who Desires to
Benefit the World (jagaddhitai.sin), the Teacher
(`saast.r), the Sugata, and the Savior (taayin). The
basic purpose of the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter is to
demonstrate the Buddha's authoritativeness for those
who desire spiritual liberation, through demonstrating
that it is reasonable to regard him as the Benevolent
One, the Teacher, the Sugata, and the Savior.(55)
These, in turn, are proven through a series of
extended philosophical

p. 323

arguments, the most important of which revolve around
(a) defining authoritativeness and giving negative
and positive examples of beings who embody it, (b)
proving that positive mental qualities such as
benevolence can be developed infinitely, through
demonstrating that the mind-body relation is an
interactionist dualism that permits the existence of
past and future lives, and (c) showing that the Four
Noble Truths taught by the Buddha are in fact true,
and, especially, that acceptance or rejection of a
self (aatman) is the key to sa.msaara and nirvaa.na.
As the nineteenth-century Tibetan commentator Mi pham
notes, the proof of past and future lives paves the
way for proving that the Buddha has the causes for
being regarded as authoritative, while the proof that
the Four Noble Truths are true shows us the reason
why he is authoritative.(56)

It is in the first general division of the chapter,
that which defines and exemplifies authoritativeness,
that the rejection of ii`svara is to be found. After
defining pramaa.na (authoritativeness) in the first
six verses(57) as uncontradicted, fresh cognition,
Dharmakiirti asserts in verse 7 that the Buddha
fulfills this definition. Before demonstrating
generally (as he will in verses 29-33) that the
Buddha is authoritative because he knows what is to
be rejected and what accepted (heyopadeya) by those
intent on liberation, Dharmakiirti provides a
"nonaccordant example" for his definition of
authoritativeness. This, of course, is ii`svara,
whose authoritativeness, creatorship, and existence
are rejected in verses 8-28. The argument can be
broken down into three general sections: (1) verses
8-9 reject ii`svara's authoritativeness; (2) verses
10-20 are a refutation of a theistic syllogism
purporting to prove that worldly effects must have a
conscious cause, and that cause is ii`svara; and (3)
verses 21-28 question the possibility that ii`svara
could be a causal agent, through a comparison between
the characteristics attributed to ii`svara and the
reality of the causal process. We will consider each
of these arguments in turn, relying primarily upon
Dharmakiirti's own words. Where necessary, we will
turn for interpretive help to one of the greatest of
Tibetan Pramaa.navaarttika commentators, rGyal tshab
dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), (58) and, on occasion,
to Dharmakiirti's own disciple, Devendrabuddhi (or
-mati).(59)

V. DHARMAKIIRTI'S REJECTION OF I`SVARA'S AUTHORITATIVENESS

Dharmakiirti already has established (in verses
3b-4b) that authoritativeness is cognitive (dhii), an
act of consciousness. Can one then posit the
authoritativeness of a being whose nature is
permanent (nitya)?

(8-9a:)
There is no permanent authoritative (being),
Because authoritativeness cognizes (functioning) entities;
Because, since objects of knowledge are impermanent,
That (which cognizes them) is unstable;
Because that which is generated consecutively
Cannot be accepted as generated from a permanent (cause);
(And because) it is unsuitable that (a permanent cause)
depend on conditions.(60)

p. 324

Note that the explicit object of refutation here is
simply a permanent authoritative cognition, which
could define not only ii`svara, but such other
non-Buddhist concepts as aatman, puru.sa, and so
forth. In fact, the term ii`svara does not appear
until verse 28. Still, ii`svara is probably the
primary object of refutation throughout this
discussion, for (a) ii`svara is the only "permanent
authority" mentioned anywhere in the verses, (b)
ii`svara is clearly indicated as the object of
refutation by Dharmakiirti's commentators, and (c)
ii`svara had been singled out by pre-Dharmakiirti
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas as a permanent being who was the
creator of all effects, hence, by definition,
authoritative regarding all effects (omnisicient).

Taking ii`svara as the permanent authoritative being
who is being rejected, then, we see that Dharmakiirti's
argument is as follows. That which any authoritative
cognition cognizes are the functioning entities
(vastu) that are what is "real" in the world.
Functioning entities are known to be impermanent,
that is, to exist only momentarily. Any entity,
therefore, actually is a succession of momentary
events, each following the other with inconceivable
rapidity, and constituting a "thing" only insofar as
there is a certain similarity from one moment to the
next. Since it is objects that (conventionally, at
least) generate cognitions, a cognition of an object
only can arise where an object exists. If an object
exists only for a moment, its cognition must be
similarly momentary, generated successively. Indeed,
a permanent authority said to cognize all entities
only could cognize them simultaneously, for it does
not change from one moment to the next. This would
mean that all objects in fact exist simultaneously,
which manifestly is not so. If it is maintained that
ii`svara himself remains permanent, but that his
cognitions are impermanent in accordance with the
succession of objects, then at least two consequences
ensue: (a) ii`svara is being qualified with
contradictory properties (permanence and
impermanence) and (b) he is being accepted as
dependent on conditions (the succession of objects),
which a permanent being cannot be.(61)

It ought to be noted, before we continue, that Dha-
makiirti's argument here presupposes the validity of
the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, whereby
"existence" only is predicated of efficient
(arthakriya) entities, and efficiency only can be
predicated of momentary entities--since an entity
that is not inherently and instantly destructible
cannot be destroyed, hence is immutable, and what is
immutable cannot interact with what is successive, as
entities manifestly are. Buddhist arguments for
momentariness were highly controversial,(62) being
open to criticism for (a) vitiating causality by
denying continuity and (b) begging the question by
defining existence in such a way (as a particular
type of efficacity) that only momentary entities
could fulfill the definition. It is not my intention
to enter into these fundamental arguments here, but
simply to point out that the debate between
Dharmakiirti and his opponents is not necessarily
self-contained, but constantly opens out onto the
broader metaphysical issues dividing them (and these
issues, in turn, are inextricably intertwined with
questions of the religious psychologies of different
traditions(63) ).

p. 325

To continue, having shown that a permanent authori-
tative cognizer is a contradictory concept, Dharmakiirti
goes on to reject the notion that ii`svara could
be regarded as impermanent:

(9b:)
Because (a permanent cognizer)has not been helped in
any way,
There cannot be an impermanent authoritative (being).
(64)

According to rGyal tshab, who follows Praj~naakaragupta
here, (65) "Because (a permanent cognizer) has not
been helped in any way" is intended as a proof that
ii`svara cannot be impermanent (hence a cognizer,
since cognizers must be impermanent), for ii`svara is
said to be self-sufficient and eternally liberated,
while what is impermanent may or may not exist, may
suffer or be liberated, in accordance with helping or
hindering conditions. Thus, even if ii`svara is defined
as impermanent, other characteristics attributed to
him vitiate that definition.(66) As rGyal tshab
rightly notes, Devendrabuddhi takes the line in
question as further proof that a permanent
authoritative cognition is impossible; indeed, he
takes it as the reason why a permanent cognizer
cannot depend on conditions, that is, because he
cannot be helped in any way (being, by definition,
permanent and self-sufficient).(67) If ii`svara's not
being helped is taken in this way, as further proof
that he cannot be a permanent cognizer, then the
line, "There cannot be an impermanent authoritative
(being)," stands alone, as a simple assertion that a
being defined as permanent simply cannot be
impermanent--although impermanence is the nature of
objects, and so of cognitions, too.

VI. DHARMAKIIRTI'S REFUTATION OF A THEISTIC SYLLOGISM

Dharmakiirti next addresses himself to a specific
formal inference that is alleged to prove the
existence of a creator. First, he sets out the
syllogism:

(10a:)
(Because of) intermittence, particular shape,
Efficiency, etc., (a creator exists).(68)

The unnamed opponent here may be the
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, for, to our knowledge, of all the
Hindu theistic schools, only the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika
had, by Dharmakiirti's time, sought to justify the
creatorship of ii`svara through formal inference.
Furthermore, the syllogism here phrased in rather
skeletal form by Dharmakiirti bears a close
similarity to the arguments proffered by Uddyotakara,
who insisted that worldly results required a
conscious motivator, like a hatchet, whose fashioning
and use both point to the intervention of a conscious
agent.(69) The syllogism also recalls Bhaavaviveka's
unnamed opponent, who argued that all results require
a creator because they have a specific arrangement,
like a pot, whose arrangement informs us of the
existence of a potter.(70)

Commentarial glosses on Dharmakiirti's
presentation of the theistic syllogism make it clear
that, in fact, three different reasons are being
offered as probative of

p. 326

a creator. rGyal tshab, thus, restates the syllogism
more fully as follows:
"Worldly environs, bodies and enjoyments are preceded
by the mind of a maker, (a) because they act
intermittently, like a hatchet, (b) because they have
a particular shape, like a pot and (c) because they
are efficient (in fulfilling beings' aims), like a
battle-axe." From these and other such statements, it
is proven that (abodes, bodies and possessions) have
a maker whose mind has preceded them, and also that
that (maker) is ii`svara.(71)

The argument from intermittence makes the claim that
because entities sometimes function and sometimes do
not, their existence must be due to action by a
conscious agent. The argument from particular shape
makes the claim that, quite simply, design implies a
designer, and there is a design to entities, so there
must be a designer. The argument from efficiency
makes the claim that the observed efficiency of
entities requires that they be preceded by an
efficient maker who foresaw the purposes they could
fulfill. Dharmakiirti does not turn to the arguments
from intermittence and efficiency until later in his
discussion, where he will reject them as part of his
refutation of the causal agency attributed to
ii`svara. He will address himself first and in most
detail to the argument from particular shape.

Dharmakiirti's first move in refuting the syllogism,
however, is to state generally the problems it entails:

(10b:)
(Here,) either (a) the assertion is already proven,
or (b) the example is uncertain,
Or (c) the statement issues in doubt.(72)

According to rGyal tshab, (a) the assertion is
already proven because the syllogism simply states
that "environs, bodies and enjoyments are preceded by
the mind of a maker," and this general concomitance
will be accepted by the Buddhist, too, since,
according to the Buddhist, environs, bodies, and
enjoyments are preceded by mental karman, hence by
"the mind of a maker." One of the requisites for
posing a formal inference is that it seek to prove
something not proven before, so the theistic
syllogism is, in its general form, redundant.
Furthermore, if ii`svara in particular is posited as
the conscious creator, then (b) the example is
uncertain, because all three examples--the hatchet,
the pot, and the battle-axe--are impermanent
entities, which must, therefore, be made or employed
by impermanent beings, whereas the entity to whose
existence they are supposed to point, ii`svara, is
permanent. The examples, thus, may be probative of
impermanent causes, but not of a permanent one.
Finally, (c) the statement issues in doubt, because
even if environs, bodies, and enjoyments are preceded
by a maker, there is no guarantee that that maker is
ii`svara, for ii`svara is simply one possible
explanation for the way things are--and not a very
promising one, given that, for example, the entities
whose explanation is sought are impermanent and
intermittent, while ii`svara is permanent, and so
cannot be intermittent.(73)

Dharmakiirti now turns to an analysis of the argument
from particular shape,

p. 327

that is, that environs, bodies, and enjoyments have
preceding them the mind of a maker(ii`svara), because
they have particular shape, like a pot, or a mansion:

(11:)
(If) shape, etc., are proved such as to be
Positively and negatively related to a designer,
An inference from that (shape to that designer)
Is reasonable.(74)

Much of the force of this statement is derived by
implication. According to rGyal tshab, the main point
is this: if, and only if, environs, bodies, and
enjoyments are shaped just as a pot is, can we infer
that they are preceded by a single conscious
designer, as a pot is. "Shaped as a pot is" can have
two different meanings here: the arrangement of the
material of the pot, and the process whereby that
arrangement was achieved. By either interpretation,
"particular shape is found to be a reason that is
unproven in the subject ("environs, bodies, and
enjoyments") . First of all, it is perfectly
self-evident that environs, bodies, and enjoyments do
not have the same shape as a pot (or a mansion), and
so we cannot necessarily infer that they have a maker
in the same way that a pot does, for it is entirely
possible that different particular types of shapes
may have different particular types of causes
generating them. Indeed, a Buddhist will argue that
such things as environs, bodies, and enjoyments
actually have preceding them a multiplicity of mental
karmans, not a single creator-designer. Secondly, the
mere fact that a particular shape, a pot, arises from
a single conscious designer does not mean that
different shapes or different types of shapes need
necessarily arise in the same way; again, the
Buddhist will posit mental karmans as the cause and
will claim that, although consciousness may be
involved in producing karmic effects, conscious
design is not. Thus, unless the theist wants to
claim, absurdly, that all entities are shaped just as
a pot is, he cannot make inferences about them that
are based on the particular circumstances of the
pot.(75)

Dharmakiirti turns now from an examination of "part-
icular shape" to "shape in general," to see whether
it may be probative:

(12:)
(A quality) is proven in an entity by a particular (reason),
(But that) a term similar (to the reason is probative)
because of its (alleged) nondifference (from the reason)
Cannot reasonably be inferred;
(That would be) like (inferring) fire from a grey
substance.(76)

Here, the theist's problem is that if he tries to
claim the term "shape" in general (rather than the
particular shape of, for example, a pot) as
probative, he has provided a reason that is too
general, and thus unproven in the subject. Granted,
we legitimately apply the term "shaped" to environs,
bodies, and enjoyments, but whereas we are able to
infer that a pot or a mansion has preceding it the
mind of some person, because we have observed
positive and negative concomitance

p. 328

between these objects and a maker, we have not
observed such concomitance in the case of, for
example, the particular realms into which we are
born, the bodies we have, and the environment that we
share, with its mountains, seas, and forests. Thus, a
particular designer is proven in the cases of some
particular shapes, but one cannot generalize from
this that any object to which the word "shaped"
applies necessarily must have a similar designer, for
the sources of the shapes of differing shaped objects
may very well differ. Thus, just as the term "grey
substance" (of which smoke is only one type) is too
general to be the basis of a legitimate inference of
the presence of fire in a particular place, so the
term "shape" alone is too general to be the basis of
a legitimate inference that all shaped objects must
arise in the same way that some shaped objects
do.(77)

Dharmakiirti draws out the extreme consequences
entailed by the probative value of "shape" by pointing
out that:

(13:)
If that is not the case, then a potter
May be proven to have made an ant-hill,
Because it has some (similarity) to the shape
Of clay in a pot, etc.(78)

The example is an interesting one, because it can be
read as refuting the probative value of either a
particular shape or the general term "shape," the
particular aspects of shape analyzed in the two
preceding verses. First, an anthill--at least of the
Indian variety--has the same shape as a pot. We
ought, therefore, to conclude on the basis of this
similarity that it was made by a potter, whereas we
know quite well that it was made by ants. Thus, a
similarity in shape does not imply a necessary
similarity in origin. Second, even if an anthill were
nor shaped like a pot, the general fact that it is
"shaped" has no probative value for the theistic
syllogism. Indeed, if anything, the anthill is a
counter-example to the pot, since it is an instance
of a shaped object, yet it is one that we know by
observation to be positively and negatively
concomitant with causes that are (a) multiple rather
than single and (b) very possibly unconscious rather
than conscious.(79) In short, then, the term "shape"
cannot be probative, because specific inquiries into
its meaning and relevance show that a particular
shape (for example, a pot) cannot be probative
because not all objects have that particular shape,
while shape in general cannot be probative because
different shapes may arise under different
circumstances, as an anthill arises in a different
manner from a pot.

In the next six verses (numbers 14-20) Dharmakiirti
digresses in a direction that is more of logical than
theological interest, and I will pass over this
discussion relatively quickly. Against an opponent's
suggestion that the analysis to which he has
subjected the reason in the theistic syllogism is an
instance of kaaryasama, an overly specific refutation
that can rebound upon or have "equal results" for the
refuter, Dharmakiirti points out that kaaryasama
occurs only when a legitimate general reason is
illegitimately undermined by an overly specific

p. 329

analysis of its details,(80) as when the generally
valid inference "A conch-sound is a result, because
it arises from effort" is undermined by posing a
sophistic dilemma whereby a sound cannot arise before
the effort or as a result of a new, unprecedented
effort.(81) The refutation of the theistic reason, on
the other hand, has rested on the principle that a
reason may be probative of a predicate for a
particular class of objects, but that a term
lexically similar but semantically different from
that reason cannot thus be probative; one cannot, for
instance, maintain that words have horns simply
because there exists a term, gotva, that denotes both
"cowness" and "wordness"(82)--any more than one can
maintain that environs, bodies, and enjoyments are
preceded by the mind of a creator, ii`svara, simply
because they have "shape."(83) Dharmakiirti drives
home the consequences of the theistic syllogism by
pointing out that if words alone were probative, then
simply by uttering a word one ought to attain its
object, and all goals would be achieved, and all
syllogisms proved, simply through the manipulation of
words--which, in fact, arise not from the existence
of their referents, but simply from a speaker's or
writer's desire to express them.(84)

This same type of refutation, Dharmakiirti adds, can
be applied to the syllogisms of other schools. For
instance, the Saa.mkhya assertion, "Buddhi is
nonsentient, because it is impermanent," is refuted
on the grounds that the Saa.mkhya is using a reason,
impermanence, that he himself cannot really accept,
since impermanence only is admitted of momentary
entities, which buddhi and the other evolutes of
prak.rti are not. The Jaina assertion, "A tree is
sentient, because it dies when its bark is stripped,"
is refuted on the grounds that the definition of
death being applied by the Jaina is too broad to be
admissible by his opponents, and thus cannot be
adduced.(85) In both cases, words ("impermanence,"
"death") are used improperly, and so the syllogism is
vitiated.

In the next three verses (and a supplemental verse
found in Tibetan but not Sanskrit), Dharmakiirti goes
on to draw from these considerations some general
conclusions about logical reasons. In the first
place, the validity of a reason depends on whether it
is generally relevant to the subject and positively
and negatively concomitant with the predicate. If the
reason is generally correct, then it cannot be
undermined by overly specific critiques, as, for
instance, the fact that "sound is impermanent because
it is a product" cannot be refuted by attempting to
show that sound's relationship to space is
unaccounted for.(86) Further, even if a particular
term is unproven, if the meaning of the term is
proven then the syllogism is valid, as, for instance,
the Buddhist syllogism "Atoms are impermanent because
they have aspects (muurti)" will be accepted for
discussion by a Vai`se.sika, who does not admit the
wording of the reason "have aspects," but can supply
from his own system a term with equivalent meaning,
"is tangible."(87) Conversely, even if a word is
unmistaken, if the meaning is inappropriate, then the
term cannot be probative, for entities are proven
from other entities, not from Words.(88) The Tibetan
version here adds an example illustrating this last
point: one cannot argue that either (a) "A colored
cow is a cow because it is a `goer

p. 330

(jagat)'," or (b) "A baby elephant is an elephant
because it is an `hand-possessor' (hastin)'," for in
each instance the reason is merely an expression used
colloquially to refer to the predicate, a cow or an
elephant; in fact, there are "goers" that are not
cows and "hand-possessors" that are not elephants.(89)
By the same token, there are shapes that presuppose a
single, conscious shaper, but there are shapes that
may not. Hence, the theistic syllogism is invalid.

VII. DHARMAKIIRTI'S REJECTION OF II`SVARA AS CAUSAL AGENT

In the final eight verses of his discussion,
Dharmakiirti directly attacks the idea that ii`svara
can be considered a causal entity, exposing the
logical difficulties involved in the theistic belief
in a permanent creator-God. In the course of his
analysis, he refutes the two other reasons that
formed part of the theistic syllogism, that is, the
argument from intermittence and the argument from
efficiency. He does not refute them in as much detail
as he did the argument from specific shape, but they
are central to his concerns. We will signal those
passages in which they are addressed, since the
refutation of the arguments from intermittence and
efficiency will complete the refutation of the
theistic syllogism posed in verse 10.

Dharmakiirti first attempts to show that the argument
from intermittence entails a logical contradiction:

(21:)
How, if an entity is a cause,
(But is said) sometimes to be
A non-cause, can one assert in any way
That a cause is a non-cause? One cannot so assert.(90)

The argument from intermittence states that the fact
that entities sometimes arise and sometimes do not,
that is, are occasional or intermittent in nature,
requires the postulation of a conscious being that
serves as their cause at those times when they arise,
and that that being is ii`svara. Dharmakiirti points
out, however, that a being that serves as the cause
of intermittent entities must, by definition, be a
noncause, too, since (a) an intermittent entity has
times of nonproduction, when its eventual cause is
actually its noncause, and (b) at the time when the
cause is generating the intermittent entity, there
still are other intermittent entities that it is not
generating, so it serves as the noncause of some
entities at the same time as it serves as the cause
of others. (a) Successive causality and noncausality
poses a problem because the causal entity posited by
the theist, ii`svara, is permanent. He cannot,
therefore, change from moment to moment, and if he is
asserted to be causal, then he must always be causal,
and can never become noncausal, for that would entail
a change in nature, an impossibility for a permanent
entity. (b) Simultaneous causality and noncausality
poses a problem, because ii`svara is a single entity,
yet is being furnished with contradictory qualities
at one and the same time. Contradictory properties
cannot be predicated of a single, partless

p. 331

entity at one and the same time, and if these
properties are reaffirmed, then ii`svara cannot be
single, but must be multiple.(91) II`svara cannot,
thus, be a creator of intermittent entities.(92)

Dharmakiirti next turns to a series of problems
that revolve around the theistic contention that
ii`svara is the actual empowering cause that gives to
the causes we observe the ability--or
efficiency--whereby they yield their results. The
first dilemma entailed by this is that:

(22:)
(If ii`svara is an unseen cause, then) when Caitra is healed
By connection with a weapon or medicine,
Why could not an unconnected post,
Although not cognized, be the cause (of healing)?(93)

Dharmakiirti's attack here is directed at the
postulation of an extra causal entity in situations
where we already can provide an adequate account of
the causal process. For instance, it is to
Dharmakiirti a well-attested fact that a knife wound
can be healed by medicine or by the knife itself, the
latter being an instance of what Nagatomi calls
"homeopathic magic."(94) If we are to posit a further
unseen cause behind the observed causes, then why not
claim that an unseen, irrelevant post be involved in
the process?(95) One invisible entity, Dharmakiirti
implies, is really no more absurd than another, and
the postulation of any such entity tends to make a
mockery of our attempts to understand causality, for
the implication is that anything may be posited as
the cause of any result.

Dharmakiirti presses the attack, pointing out
further problems in the concept of ii`svara:

(23:)
One whose nature does not vary
Is unsuitable as a creator;
Since a permanent (entity) never is absent,
Even if it has the ability (to be a cause), it
is difficult to see.(96)

The first half of the verse is, in a sense, a
reiteration of a fundamental and recurring argument,
namely, that a permanent entity cannot be posited as
the cause of impermanent entities, since (a) the
entity is asserted sometimes to be a noncause, and
its nature cannot change, so it cannot become a
cause;(97)(b) causality is a process that involves
intermittence, and a permanent entity cannot be
intermittent, since intermittence involves a change
in nature; and (c) if a permanent cause is posited,
then causality cannot be an intermittent process, but
must occur all at once, since a permanent cause could
not alter so as to produce entities in a second
moment. The second half of the verse raises still
another basic objection, namely, that if ii`svara is
the unseen cause of every result, then he must be
ubiquitous and can never be absent. A cause, however,
is defined as that in the absence of which a result
does not arise, so an entity that never is absent
cannot meaningfully be described as a cause. Indeed,
whether ii`svara is only intermit-

p. 332

tently present (as argued earlier) or ubiquitous (as
his nature would seem to dictate) seems to have
little actual bearing on our analyses of causality,
which, in fact, turn on the presence or absence of
certain observable factors. One may, if one wishes,
posit an extra entity such as ii`svara as the cause
behind observable causes, but positive and negative
concomitance can only be observed with regard to the
observed causes. Since observed positive and negative
concomitance is an adequate basis for the explication
of any causal situation, the extra
"behind-the-scenes" cause (whether principal or
assistant) must be either redundant or impotent.(98)

There is a further consequence of the postulation
of an invisible cause-behind-the-scenes, namely:

(24:)
When some (cause) exists, some (result) comes to be;
If some cause other than that
Is supposed, then there will be no end
To the causes of any result.(99)

rGyal tshab sums up this point succinctly by
remarking that:

There would follow an infinite regress of causes for
every result, because then it would be acceptable to
think that when some cause assists a result, the
cause of the result is something else, which we do
not see as being able to generate some result.(100)

Once again, then, the postulation of an unseen cause
destabilizes our notion of causality, for the
admission of unseen and unseeable causes opens the
door to an infinity of such causes, which is
tantamount to causal chaos. Here, it ought perhaps to
be added in all fairness that the Buddhist notion of
karman can be subjected to the same general critique
as ii`svara. Karman is certainly neither permanent
nor ubiquitous in the way that ii`svara is, but it is
an unseen causal factor that is operative in
virtually every situation in which sentient beings
are involved. In those instances where other causes
can be adduced, karman is superfluous, unless we
insist that there be a moral explanation for
everything; while in those instances where we do not
have adequate explanations, karman serves somewhat
the way the "God of the gaps" does in Western
theology, that is, as a stop-gap explanation where
observable concomitances have not yet been
established. Karman, like ii`svara, explains so much
that it threatens to explain nothing at all.

In the final four verses of the section, Dharmakiirti
responds to some possible objections to his
arguments, thereby clarifying his notion of the
causal process and ii`svara's unsuitability for
participation in it. The first objection, as supplied
by rGyal tshab, claims that, "... according to you,
when soil, etc., do not generate a sprout, they
cannot change their nature, so there will be no
generation of a sprout." (101) In other words, if
entities cannot change their nature from that of
noncause to cause, then soil, moisture, sunlight, and
the seed itself, which are

p. 333

not at this moment generating a sprout, will never be
able to. Dharmakiirti's response is that:

(25:)
In the generation of a sprout, the soil and other
(conditions)
Do change their nature
And become causes, for when we see that (cultivation)
Is done well, (the harvest) is excellent.(102)

The implicit point here is that it is only a
permanent entity, such as ii`svara, that cannot
become a cause once it has been a noncause; such
causal conditions as soil, moisture, sunlight, and
the seed are all impermanent, momentary entities, so
there is no contradiction in asserting that at one
moment they are noncauses and at another moment they
are causes. Indeed, such must be the case, for we
observe that soil and the other conditions do serve
as noncauses at one time (early in the season) and as
causes at another, later time (harvest).(103)Conversely,
it might be added, the fact that it clearly is the case
that entities can change from noncauses into causes is
a further demonstration of their necessary impermanence,
since a permanent entity could not thus change.

Dharmakiirti next entertains and answers a related
objection:

(26:)
If you say, "Just as object and organ,
Meeting without alteration, cause cognition,
So, too, (ii`svara is a cause without alteration,)" it is
not so.
Because there is alteration (of organ and object) from when
(they have not met).(104)

The objector here evidently is a Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika,
for the account of cognition being offered derives
from the Nyaavasuutra,(105) where it is said that
cognition results from the contact between an organ
and an object. The claim is made that just as organ
and object do not perceptibly change from one moment
to the next, and yet in the first moment there is no
cognition while in the second there is, so ii`svara,
although he does not change, can be a noncause one
moment and--our nonperception notwithstanding--a
cause the next. The Buddhist has two possible
responses, one doctrinal, the other logical. The
doctrinal is that the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika account of
the cognitive process is incorrect, and that there is
a third factor that determines a cognition, namely, a
previous cognition, whose presence or absence and
particular qualities must be posited to explain the
evident fact that--even if organ and object are
admitted not to vary--cognitions do vary.(106)
Alternatively, if the opponent be taken as accepting
the Buddhist postulation of three conditions for
cognition, then the logical objection can be made
that, at the very least, the organ must vary, for
otherwise we could not explain the relative clarity
or dullness of cognitions.(107)

A further logical objection, of course, is simply
that the postulation of an entity's noncausality at
one time and causality at another requires that there
be

p. 334

an alteration, because between a cause and a noncause
there is a difference, a difference that can only be
explained by positing an alteration in nature. Thus,
Dharmakiirti adds:

(27:)
(Factors) that are individually powerless (as causes),
If they do not change their nature,
Will be powerless even when they meet.
Thus, alteration is proved.(108)

In the instance of the organ, object, and cognition,
the three factors are considered individually unable
but collectively able to generate a cognition.
Dharmakiirti's point, however, is that regardless of
whether they are functioning individually or
collectively, the three factors cannot be causally
potent if it is not admitted that their nature
changes--for the simple reason that previously they
have been a noncause, and in order to be efficacious,
they must change in nature so as to become a cause.
Thus, according to rGyal tshab:

...it is proven that the three conditions have
different natures when they have met and when they
have not met, because we see the difference that they
generate or do not generate sense-cognition when they
have met or have not met.(109)

Dharmakiirti concludes his refutation with a
final observation of the incompatibility between the
concept of cause and the concept of ii`svara--here
named for the first time as the object of refutation:

(28:)
Thus, those (factors) that are individually powerless
(But bring about) the existence of the quality (of
the result) when they have met
Are causes; ii`svara, etc.,
Are not (causes), because they do not alter.(110)

Causality, then, is a process entailing not only the
presence or absence of certain factors (whereby, as
we saw, ii`svara could not be considered a cause),
but also the alteration of those factors in such a
way that they change from being noncauses to being
causes. Thus, the generation of a sprout requires (a)
the presence of certain factors that might not be
present, that is, the seeds, soil, moisture,
sunlight, and so forth, and(b) the alteration of the
nature of each of these so that their individual
causal nonefficacity becomes their collective
efficacity. Similarly, a sense-cognition requires (a)
the object, organ, and preceding cognition and (b) an
alteration of each of these such that individual
nonefficacity can become collective efficacity. Now,
this alteration is not some superadded process beyond
the meeting of the conditions, but it must be
specified as part of the causal process, for without
such specification, one might overlook the
ontological difference that is entailed by causality.
Difference, in turn, requires impermanence, for
entities are known sometimes to be causes and
sometimes to be noncauses of particular events, but
it is contradictory that they be both at the

p. 335

same time, while a permanent entity, like ii`svara,
cannot alter its nature, and so it must always be a
noncause or always a cause. If it is always a
noncause, then the discussion is academic; if it is
always a cause, then it must be ubiquitous, and it
cannot be accepted as a cause, because its presence
or absence cannot be observed to make a difference in
the generation of a result.

Before leaving Dharmakiirti, we ought to note that
he adduces one additional argument against ii`svara,
later in the Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter, when he insists
(following the line of reasoning of such predecessors
as Vasubandhu(111) ) that the cause of the various
sufferings experienced by beings cannot be a unique
cause, because the variety among results permits us
only to infer a variety of causes, and because, as
has been demonstrated, a permanent cause cannot be
proven to exist.(112) rGyal tshab, finally, adds his
own version of the argument from evil, at the end of
his discussion of the vital and trivial
characteristics of omniscience that may be attributed
to "authoritative" beings: "If someone who can make
anything because of his knowledge of the sciences is
omniscient, then he also has made the sufferings of
the lower realms...." With this in mind, rGyal tshab
concludes, we should turn not to such a being, but to
"someone who, having accomplished the elimination of
every last fetter, is omniscient regarding how all
objects really exist."(113) The latter sort of being
is one who truly is authoritative for those intent on
liberation, and is, of course, exemplified by the
Buddha, who has not made the world, but knows it, and
knows the way out of it.

VIII. THE THEIST-ATHEIST DEBATE AFTER DHARMAKIIRTI

Dharmakiirti's attack on theism was a stinging one,
but it did not end the debate between theists and
atheists any more than did Hume's critique in the
West. Indeed, as noted earlier, Dharmakiirti's
discussions had the salutary effect of raising the
discussion to a new level of sophistication, and in
the centuries following him the issue was joined not
only by Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas responding to his
attacks, but by still other Buddhists, as well as by
Miimaa.msakas and Jainas. These debates have been
covered well elsewhere,(114) and we have neither the
need nor the space to outline them in detail. We
will, however, survey them briefly.

The Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika response to Dharmakiirti's
critique was far from immediate. Indeed, it was nearly
three centuries after Dharmakiirti, in the Nyaayama~n-
jarii of Jayanta Bha.t.ta, that a counterattack finally
was mounted. In the meantime, further critiques of
theism had been forthcoming, not only from Buddhists,
but from Miimaa.msakas and Jainas, as well. The first
important post-Dharmakiirti Buddhist attack on theism
is that of `Saantideva (eighth century) , who
criticizes a number of non-Buddhist views of
causality in the ninth chapter of his
Bodhicaryaavataara. Among these is the Naiyaayika
claim that ii`svara, a divine, pure, permanent,
single creator, is the source of everything. But,
notes `Saantideva, if ii`svara is identified with the
elements that are accepted as the material causes of
material things, there is a contradiction, because
these elements are neither pure nor permanent nor
single. On the other hand, if he is said

p. 336

to be the creator of the permanent padaarthas that
constitute the world according to Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika,
then there is a problem, because permanent entities
cannot have an origin, while if worldly phenomena are
granted impermanence, then they cannot be accounted
for by a permanent, single entity.(115) The remainder
of `Saantideva's argument recapitulates earlier
Buddhist analyses of the problems entailed by
ii`svara's permanence, his need for assistants, and
his creation with or without a desire to do so.(l16)

A century later, in the Tattvasa.mgraha, `Saantarak.sita
criticized creation theories centering on both
ii`svara and puru.sa(117)--though the characteristics
of puru.sa are not those of the Saa.mkhya puru.sa,
but of the Vedaantin brahman. Together with
Kamala`siila's Pa~njikaa, the Tattvasa.mgraha probably
is the most detailed extant Buddhist critique of
theism. Much of the section on ii`svara recapitulates
and expands upon Dharmakiirti's refutation of the
theistic syllogism, although `Saantarak.sita does add
points of his own. For example, to Aviddhakara.na's
claim that the simultaneous functioning of two senses
must be explained by recourse to a conjunctive
substratum and that, by analogy, so must the
combinations of the world be explained by the concept
of ii`svara, he replies that it is unproven either
that there can be two simultaneously functioning
senses, or that the category of "conjunction"
(sa.myoga) is admissible.(118) `Saantarak.sita also
points out that ii`svara cannot be the source of a
verbal revelation, for the simple reason that he has
no body, hence no mouth, and verbal communication is
dependent on the existence of a mouth.(119) The
critique of puru.sa centers on the dilemma posed by
puru.sa's (a) motives (if he is motivated by another,
he is not self-sufficient; if he is motivated by
compassion, he must create a perfect world, while if
he cannot create a perfect world, he is not powerful;
and if he is motivated by "amusement," then he is
both cruel and dependent on the instrument of
amusement, namely, the cosmos)(120) and (b) potency
(if he is able to create all things, he must do so
immediately, for potency entails immediate
generation).(121)

Attacks on theism also were launched by the two great
theoreticians of Miimaa.msa, Prabhaakara and Kumaarila
(seventh-eighth centuries). Motivated in part by
their idiosyncratic concern to show that the Vedas
are without an author (which ii`svara sometimes was
said to be) , the Miinaa.msakas adduced some
refutations that overlapped those of the Buddhists,
and others that were unique. Of note among the latter
were arguments that raised questions of whether
ii`svara can be said to have a body or not: we know
that creative agency within the world requires a
body. If ii`svara is to be proved by analogy to
worldly creativity, he must have a body, yet he is
claimed by Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika tradition to be
bodiless-- although we know that will alone cannot
generate results: some physical agency is required.
If ii`svara is admitted to have a body, then various
consequences ensue: for instance, if ii`svara has a
body, whence has that body come? If it is from
another creator, then that creator's body must have a
creator, and so on, in infinite regress; if from
himself, then he must have had a body with which to
create that body, which must have had a preceding
body--again, there is an infinite regress.

p. 337

Further, of what could ii`svara's body be made? It
cannot be made of material elements, because they
have not been created yet, while it cannot be
immaterial, because the immaterial cannot be the
cause of the material.(122) Jaina critiques of
theism, as in the eighth-century .Sa.ddar`sanasamuccaya
of Haribhadra, the thirteenth-century Syaadvaadama~njarii
of Mallisena and the fifteenth-century Tarkarahasyadii-
pikaa of Gu.naratna, are easily as sophisticated as
those of the Buddhists and Miimaa.msakas, and open
some interesting areas of discussion, but cannot detain
us here.(123)

As noted above, the first concerted Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika
counterattack is contained in the tenth-century
Nyaavama~njarii of Jayanta Bha.t.ta, who states the
theistic syllogism in the following form: ii`svara
exists because he produces a result (the cosmos) of a
type that presupposes a maker who knows the process
and motive of production, like a potter. Jayanta
considers at least twelve different arguments against
the existence of ii`svara, most of them familiar,
such as the inadequacy of the potter analogy, the
problems entailed by ii`svava's embodiment or
bodilessness, questions of motive, and the
superiority of "impersonal" explanations, such as
karman. Jayanta sets out to demonstrate that his
various opponents' disproofs are themselves riddled
with logical flaws. The assertion, for instance, that
natural objects do not necessarily have a conscious
designer is itself uncertain, and thus cannot be
adduced as a good logical reason refuting the
theistic reason, while the theistic argument by
analogy is valid because in those instances where we
have observed an object's source of design, that
source has been a conscious designer. Thus, all
effects can be deduced to arise from a conscious
designer, including the world itself. Jayanta
reasserts ii`svara's noncorporeality, maintaining
that his will can activate physical results in the
same way that the human will can activate the body;
in either case, an immaterial agency does have
material effects. II`svara's compassion is justified
by explaining that he creates, for example, hell only
as a sort of "holding-cell" for beings until their
karman permits their salvation. Finally, the view,
for example, that "collective" karman rather than a
single designer is the cause of the natural environmt
is rejected on the grounds that human responses to
the environment are too varied (some people love the
mountains, others do not) to enable us to posit such
karmic "cooperation."(124)

Other Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika defenses of theism included
those of Vyoma`siva's tenth-century Vyomavatii, which
reiterates the point that an effect presupposes an
intelligent designer, and reaffirms that the cosmos
presupposes a powerful and omniscient designer,(125)
and Vaacaspatimi`sra's tenth-century Nyaayavaarttika-
taatparya.tiikaa, where it is argued that the law of
parsimony (laaghava) requires that the creation of
the various entities of nature be attributed to one,
rather than a multiplicity of, divinities, and that
such a divinity must be inconceivably powerful and
knowledgeable to be able to effect such a
creation.(126)

The Buddhist position was reaffirmed in the eleventh
century by J~naana`sriimitra, whose II`svaravaada is in
part an expanded commentary on some of

p. 338

Dharmakiirti's discussion, and by J~naana`srii's
disciple, Ratnakiirti, in his II`svarasaadhanaduu.sa.na.
(127) It was in response to J~naana`sriimitra's attack,
described by Chemopathy(128) as the most thorough
since Dharmakiirti, that the last great Nyaaya-
Vai`se.sika defense of theism, Udayana's Nyaayakusu-
maa~njali, was composed. Udayana's work is complex
and sophisticated enough to have been the subject of
a number of scholarly monographs,(129) and I will not
discuss it here, pausing only to note that it
includes detailed attempts to refute other schools'
attacks on ii`svara, and sets out two series of
positive proofs, the first (consisting of nine
proofs) demonstrating ii`svara's existence, and the
second (also nine proofs) demonstrating his
authorship of the Vedas. The first series of
arguments, though a brilliant synthesis, does not add
a great deal to earlier Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika
discussions; the second series is quite original, but
is directed primarily at the Miimaa.msakas, and would
be considered irrelevant by a naastika such as a
Buddhist or Jaina. The Nyaayakusumaa~njali itself
stimulated counterattacks, from the Vedaanta school
of Raamaanuja and, eventually, in the last great
classical work of the theist-atheist debate,
Gu.naratna's Tarkarahasyadiipikaa.(130)

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

By way of conclusion, I want to address myself
briefly to two somewhat broader questions that
naturally emerge from our considerations of the
theological disputes engaged in by Dharmakiirti and
other Indian philosophers. The first question is: To
what degree are the arguments of Dharmakiirti (or,
for that matter, any of his supporters or
antagonists) philosophically conclusive within an
Indian frame of reference? The second question is: To
what degree can these Indian theological discussions
be transposed onto the atheist-antitheist debate as
it has unfolded in the West?

In principle, the various Indian philosophers who
argued back and forth about the existence of ii`svara
accepted a common set of rules for their discussions,
and so deciding who was right and who was wrong ought
to be a simple matter of seeing who begs the fewest
questions and who constructs syllogisms with the most
care. Such decisions only can be simple, however, if
(a) the rational structures devised for discussion
are themselves foolproof and (b) the disputants do
not import any idiosyncratic doctrinal notions into
intersystemic discussions. In point of fact, however,
(a) the reliability of formal inference--either in
principle or, at least, for deciding metaphysical
questions--was attacked even from within the Indian
tradition, by such thinkers as Naagaarjuna,
`Sa^nkara, Jayaraa`si and Purandara, who claimed
either that the positing and structuring of
pramaa.nas could not themselves be supported by any
pramaa.na without begging the question, or that
inference, even if accepted as provisionally valid,
could not inform us on matters forever beyond
perceptual ken. Further, (b) very real differences in
the ways in which different schools approached
philosophical problems tended invariably to color
even the most carefully "depersonalized" of

p. 339

arguments. Indeed, I think that discussions of the
existence or nonexistence of ii`svara serve as a good
example of the inevitability of such coloration.

If we strip away the almost bewildering variety
of arguments we have reviewed, we find at bottom two
basic issues on which--to take our two main
antagonists--the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas and Buddhists
have disagreed: (1) the existence of a permanent
entity and its relation to the impermanent and (2)
the requirement that causal action entail a conscious
agent. Many complex philosophical discussions turn on
these two issues, yet it might be argued that the
attitudes toward each entertained by each of the
schools is, in fact, prephilosophical, and thus not
essentiaIly amenable to revision on the basis of
rational considerations.

(1) The permanence-impermanence issue is one that
goes very far back and very deep in the Indian
tradition. Much of the religious and philosophical
search that produced both the Upani.sads and Buddhism
was geared toward the discovery of an immutable state
that was free from the vicissitudes of sa.msaara, yet
in searching for and explicating this state, Hindu
and Buddhist schools arrived at very different
conclusions. Hindu schools, of which
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika is one, concluded on the basis of
religious experience and logic that the impermanent
entities we see around us must in some way be
subsumed or limited by an eternal substance that
provides their continuity, the continuity that we
know to be the basis of order in the cosmos.
Buddhists, on the other hand, concluded on the basis
of their empirical and logical explorations that
there is not, nor could there possibly be, a
permanent substance, for such a substance can neither
change itself nor interact with the impermanent.
Thus, the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika (or Vedaantin)
insistence on the necessity of permanence to explain
continuity, and the Buddhist insistence on the
necessity of impermanence to explain change are
deep-seated and seemingly irreconcilable positions,
and, much like a Kantian antinomy, each seems
logically to exclude the other and yet, when taken
alone, to lead to insuperable difficulties. To the
degree that the dispute over permanence and
impermanence is one of the core issues in discussions
of ii`svara, those discussions may be impossible to
resolve.

(2) The question whether cause-and-effect requires
a conscious agent also seems rooted in
prephilosophical decisions that commit the
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas and Buddhists to irreconcilable
positions. Here, I think the problem may be the
source for the model of causality that each school
constructs. Buddhist meditation and Buddhist logic
tend to be radically depersonalized, that is, to
deconstruct personal notions into impersonal
processes much like those we observe among
nonsentient entities. Thus, causality is not even a
"personal" process on the level of the sentient
individual, who actually is a nexus of impersonal
forces, some material and some mental; and, needless
to say, nonsentient entities do not require a
personal agent, either. The Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas, on
the other hand--their "atomism" notwithstanding--tend
to draw their model of causality from human

p. 340

activities: movement of the body is preceded
(usually) by a conscious intention, a pot by a
potter, a house by an architect and builders. By
analogy, then, we conclude that other objects in
nature--whose sources we do not know--must also arise
through personal agency, and so, by extension, must
the overall arrangement of the world; an agent
responsible for the overall arrangement of the world
must be a vastly powerful and knowledgeable being,
such as ii`svara. Once again, the antagonists seem to
have arrived at completely antithetical positions by
beginning from different places, and it is difficult
to see where a common ground could be found.

Thus, Indian arguments over the existence or
nonexistence of ii`svara have their inherent
fascinations, and yet we must remain aware that they
may not be finally soluble, for the simple reason
that, despite their agreement on the meanings of many
terms, the disputants have vastly different
approaches to some basic problems, and this disparity
of approaches threatens to render the arguments on
which they are based forever inconclusive.

Let us turn, then, to the second general question
with which we began this section, that of the
applicability of the Indian discussion to the Western
debate over the existence of God. One must, needless
to say, be very cautious in entertaining such
comparisons, for concepts that seem identical in two
different cultural-philosophical traditions more
often than not are revealed on closer examination to
be quite different, both in denotation and
connotation. Certainly, the frequent translation of
ii`svara as "God" seems at first blush to be
legitimate, for are not the basic characteristics of
ii`svara--permanence, omniscience, independence,
creatorship, compassion--very much like the
attributes of the Christian God? A closer
examination, however, reveals that there are
considerable differences between the Christian God
and most of the Indian models. The brahman of most
Vedaantin schools, for instance, transforms itself
into the world, is the world's material cause,
whereas the Christian God does not become the world,
but, rather, creates it ex nihilo, and remains
forever transcendent to it. The paramapuru.sa that is
ii`svara in the Yoga system does not create the
world, or arrange it, or relate to it in any way,
whereas the Christian God does all three. The
ii`svara of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika does not create the
eternal padaarthas that constitute the world,
although he does arrange them into the cosmos that we
know, whereas the Christian God creates both the "raw
material" and the arrangement of the cosmos.

These considerations,in turn, must be weighed when
we decide whether or not to describe the Nyaaya-
Vai`se.sika syllogism rejected by Dharmakiirti as
simply an Indian version of the "argument from design"
(or teleological argument) for God's existence.(131)
The Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas, after all, were talking about
one type of "God," while the God asserted by, for example,
Aquinas and Newton and rejected by, for example, Hume
are, in fact, very different; furthermore, the arguments
arise in different contexts and are conducted in different
philosophical languages.

p. 341

All these points are well taken, but they do not
totally undermine the comparison. To begin with, the
"languages" of Indian and Western philosophy are
different, but that does not mean that there is not a
fair degree of translatability across traditions: the
inductive and deductive processes generally accepted
to be the basis of sound reasoning are found in both,
as are many of the same notions of the types of flaws
that may vitiate arguments. Secondly, even if there
are differences between ii`svara and God, they are
not so great as to obviate all comparison between
their roles and the arguments for their existence.
The argument from design, after all, simply attempts
to show generally that the order we perceive in the
cosmos presupposes a single conscious designer and/or
sustainer of that order. It really is a secondary
matter (pace Kant) whether the being responsible for
the cosmic order creates ex nihilo or arranges
preexistent raw material; in either case, it is not
mode of ordering that is at issue, but the existence
of a single eternal being who is the conscious agent
of that ordering.

Thus, I think it is fair to call the Nyaaya-Vai`se.-
sika syllogism rejected by Dharmakiirti an "Indian
argument from design, " just as I think it is
relarively fair to call ii`svara "God." Therefore, T
think that the sorts of arguments proffered by
Dharmakiirti and his opponents can be of interest to
Western theologians. The precise ways in which the
Indian arguments overlap or deviate from the Western
ones must be the topic of another study, as must
detailed considerations of whether the Indian
tradition has arguments that could serve either
theists or antitheists in the West.(132) Hume, Kant,
and others have given fairly thorough treatment to
the problem of conscious agency, and it is my
suspicion that it is on the permanence-impermanence
issue that the Indian tradition may have the most to
contribute. The Buddhist critique of a God believed
to be immutable seems to me an acute one, and the
price of accepting God's mutability a high one, that
is, his susceptibility to conditions, hence loss of
omnipotence. There are: of course, currents in modern
Christianity, represented by, for example,
Hartshorne, or Kazantzakis (in his The Saviors of
God), that do not require the omnipotence of God, and
admit his dependence on his creatures for the
fulfillment of his ends. These would escape the
objections raised against a permanent, independent
God, though whether they could evade criticisms aimed
at the concept of divine teleology (especially those
regarding the admissibility of extraneous causes), I
am not so certain. It also is my suspicion, alas,
that cross-cultural debates may in the end be no more
conclusive than intra-cultural ones have been, and
that the arguments, if examined carefully enough,
will be seen to rest on prephilosophical choices and
assumptions that cannot really be questioned, and yet
which vitiate the certainty to which philosophers
forever aspire.

This final note of uncertainty can, if we permit
it, grow into a more general uncertainty about the
"order" we perceive and discover in the cosmos, an
order, incidentally, that was assumed by both theists
and atheists in India, their only disagreement being
over how to account for it. Is it not, in fact,
possible that this order simply is not there, that it
actually is conceived and invented rather than

p. 342

perceived and discovered? This is the possibility
entertained in a modern masterwork from Bologna,
Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose. At the end, the
monk-detective protagonist, William of Baskerville,
bemoans to the book's young narrator, Adso, that his
"solution" of a series of crimes has been purely
accidental, and implies thereby a sort of "argument
from no-design":

"I arrived at (the killer) pursuing the plan of a
perverse and rational mind, and there was no plan,
or, rather, there began a sequence of causes, and
concauses, and causes contradicting one another,
which proceeded on their own, creating relations that
did not stem from any plan. Where is all my wisdom,
then? I behaved stubbornly, pursuing a semblance of
order, when I should have known well that there is no
order in the universe."

"But in imagining an erroneous order you still
found something...."

"What you say is very fine, Adso, and I thank
you. The order that our mind imagines is like a net,
or like a ladder, built to attain something. But
afterward you must throw the ladder away, because you
discover that, even if it was useful, it was
meaningless...."

"You have no reason to reproach yourself: you did
your best."

"A human best, which is very little. It's hard to
accept the idea that there cannot be an order in the
universe because it would offend the free will of God
and His omnipotence. So the freedom of God is our
condemnation, or at least the condemnation of our
pride."

I dared, for the first and last time in my life,
to express a theological conclusion: "But how can a
necessary being exist totally polluted with the
possible? What difference is there, then, between God
and primogenial chaos? Isn't affirming God's absolute
omnipotence and His absolute freedom with regard to
His own choices tantamount to demonstrating that God
does not exist?"

William looked at me without betraying any
feeling in his features, and he said, "How could a
learned man go on communicating his learning if he
answered yes to your question?"(133)

NOTES

1. Lin Yutang, ed., The Wisdom of China and India
(New York: Modern Library, 1942), p. 11.
2. Compare such "skeptical" Vedic passages as. Rg
(.Rgveda) II, 12, 5; IV, 18, 12; and VIII, 100, 3;
and their discussion in Depibrasad Chattopadhyaya,
Indian Atheism (Calcutta: Manisha, 1969), pp.
32-43. Chattopadhyaya's book, while occasionally
straining for evidence that one or another
ambiguous passage is atheistic, presents overall a
compelling picture of the pervasiveness of atheism
in Indian philosophical (if not religious)
3. Compare Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism, chaps. 9
and 16.
4. Compare, for example, ibid., chap. 14; and
Narendranath Bhattacharyya, Jain Philosophy:
Historical Outline (New Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal, 1976), pp. 93-108.
5. Compare, for example, Nagin J. Shah, Akala^nka's
Criticism of Dharmakiirti's Philosophy: A Study,
L. D. Series no. 11 (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of
Indology, 1967); and D. N. Shastri, Critique of
Indian Realism: A Study of the Conflict Between
the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist Dignaga
School (Agra: Agra University, 1964).
6. The Tibetans attribute seven works to him:
Pramaa.navaarttika (hereafter cited as PV) ,
Pramaa.navini`scaya, Nyaayabindu, Hetubindu,
Sambandhapariiki.saa, Samtaanaantarasiddhi and
Vadanyaaya. Only the PV and Nyaayabindu are completely
extant in Sanskrit; the others exist in Tibetan
translation. For a list of editions and translations,
compare A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, 2d ed. (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1980) ,pp. 539-540.

p. 343

7. Complete editions include: Dwarikas Shastri, ed.,
Pramaa.navaarttika of Acharya Dharmakiirti, with
the Commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathaanandin
(Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968) ; and Y. Miyasaka,
ed., Pramaa.navaarttika-Kaarikaa (Sanskrit and
Tibetan) , in Acta Indologica 2 (1971-1972), 3
(1973-1975), and 4 (1977). Various parts of the
Svaarthaanumaana chapter have been translated;
compare Warder, Indian Buddhism, and Leonard
Zwilling, Dharmakiirti on Apoha (Unpublished
diss., University of Wisconsin, 1976) . The
Pramaa.nasiddhi chapter (PS) was translated by
Masatoshi Nagatomi in A Study of Dharmakiirti's
Pramaa.navaarttika: An English Translation and
Annotation of the Pramaa.navaarttika, Book I
(Unpublished diss., Harvard University, 1957). I
translated rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen's tibetan
commentary on the PS chapter as part II of my
dissertation, Is Enlightenment Possible? An
Analysis of Some Arguments in the Buddhist
Philosophical Tradition, With Special Attention to
the Pramaa.nasiddhi Chapter of Dharmakiirti's
Pramaa.navaarttika (Unpublished diss., University
of Wisconsin, 1983). This annotated translation,
revised, will be issued in 1986 as Mind, Body,
Selflessness, Freedom: Dharmakiirti's Defense of
the Buddhist World-View as Expounded in rGyal
tshab's "Elucidating the Path to Enlightenment
According to the `Pramaa.navaarttika' " (London:
Wisdom Publications).
8. George Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology:
An Introduction to Udayana's Nyaayakusumaa~njali,
Publications of the DeNobili Research Library,
vol. 1 (Vienna, 1972), p. 28.
9. Gopimohan Bhattacharyya, Studies in
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika Theism, Calcutta Sanskrit
College Research Series, no. 14 (Calcutta:
Sanskrit College, 1961), p. 44.
10. .Rgveda, X, 82, trans., for example, by
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, in
Radhakrishnan and Moore, eds., A Source Book in
Indian Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 18.
11. .Rgveda, X, 90, in Source Book, p. 19.
12. .Rgveda, X, 121, in Source Book, pp. 24-25.
13. .Rgveda, X, 129, in Source Book, pp. 23-24.
14. Atharvaveda VII, 102, 1 and XIX, 6, 4. Compare
Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of
Hinduism (San Francisco, California: Harper & Row,
1977), p. 120; and M. D. Sastri, "History of the
Word II`svara and Its Idea," All India Oriental
Conference VII (Baroda), pp. 492 ff:
15. Cf. David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central
Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu, Hawaii:
University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 17-18.
Kalupahana's summary of pre-Buddhist causation
theories is a good one.
16. Compare, for example, B.rhadaaraa.nyaka II, 1,
2-13, and 20; III, 6, in Source Book, pp. 79,
85-86.
17. Compare, `Svetaa`svatara III, 7-10; TV, 1, 1, and
so forth, in Source Book, pp. 90-91.
18.`Svetaa`svatara I, 2, in Source Book, p. 89.
19.Bhagavadgiitaa X, 21; XI, 9-35, in Source Book,
p. 136, 138-141.
20.Ibid., p. 506; Surendranath Dasgupta, A History
of Indian Philosophy (Reprint, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1975), vol. 1, p. 418. Dasgupta notes
(pp. 420-421) that most of the early commentators
on the Brahmasuutras were quasidualistic
Vai.s.navas. Compare also Hajime Nakamura, A
History of Early Vedaanta Philosophy, trans.
Trevor Leggett and others, Religions of Asia
Series, no. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983),
section IV.
21.Brahmasuutras (hereafter cited as BS) I, i, 2, in
Source Book, p. 511.
22.BS I, iv, 3, in Source Book, p. 515. `Sa^nkara's
comments here, and at II, i, 6 (ibid., p. 522)
indicate that this may be a variant of the
cosmological argument, with the existence of the
cosmos as a whole pointing to the existence of a
cause on which it is contingent.
23.BS I, iv, 23, in Source Book, p. 521.
24.Commentary to BS I, iv, 23, in Source Book.
25.Cf., e.g., Ninian Smart, Doctrine and Argument in
Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1964), pp. 156-158.
26.Yogasuutra (hereafter cited as YS) 23-28, in
Source Book, pp. 458-459.
27.YS 25 and Bhaa.sya, in Source Book, p. 458;
Smart(p. 157) argues that this is a modified form
of the ontological argument.
28.Nyaayasuutra (hereafter cited as NS) IV, 1,
19-21, trans., eg., by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya,
Nyaaya Philosophy (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past
and Present, 1973), IV, pp. 21-26.
29.Compare, for example, Chattopadhyaya, chap. 16;
and Karl H. Potter, ed., Encyclopedia of

p. 344

Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and
Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika
up to Ga^nge`sa (Princeton, New jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1977), p. 100.
30.Compare Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 239.
31.Compare Gangopadhyaya, Nyaava Philosophy, and
Potter, Encyclopedia, p. 263.
32.Padaarthadharmasa.mgraha 40; compare Potter,
Encyclopedia, p. 285.
33.Nyaayavaarttika IV, 1, 19-21,summarized by Potter,
Encyclopedia, pp. 331-333.
34.Nyaayakusumaa~njali, I, 3; compare, for example,
Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism p. 21; Potter,
Encyclopedia, p. 558.
35.Diighanikaaya (hereafter cited as D) I, 17;
compare, for example, Kalupahana, Causality, pp.
20-21; and Helmuth von Glasenapp, Buddhism--A
Non-Theistic Religion, trans. Irmgard Schloegl
(New York: George Braziller, 1966), pp. 40-41,
144.
36.For example, Majjhimanikaaya II, 222; A^nguttara
I, 173; Jaataka V, 238, and so forth; compare, for
example, Kalupahana, Causality, p. 22; Glasenapp,
Buddhism, pp. 39-40.
37.D II, 11, 81-83; compare Glasenapp, Buddhism, p.
146.
38.D II, 13, 14-20; compare Glasenapp, Buddhism, pp.
146-148. On Nikaaya discussions of God, compare
also Gunapala Dharmasiri, A Buddhist Critique of
the Christian Concept of God (Colombo: Lake House
Investments, 1974), passim.
39.Louis de la Vallee Poussin,
Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1928), I, p. 30.
40.Buddhacarita IX, 63; compare E. H. Johnston, The
Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha (Reprint,
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), II, p. 136.
41.Buddhacarita XVI, 18 ff.; compare, for example,
Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism, p. 103.
42.Suh.rillekha 50; compare, for example, Geshe
Lobsang Tharchin and Artemus B. Engle, Nagarjuna's
Letter (Dharamasala: Library of Tibetan Works and
Archives, 1979), pp. 84-86.
43.Catu.hstava II, 33-34; compare Chr. Lindtner,
Nagarjuniana, Indiske Studier 4 (Copenhagen:
Akademisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 150-151.
44.Bodhicittavivara.na 7-9; compare Lindtner, pp.
186-189.
45.Lindtner, in Nagarjuniana (p. 16), maintains that
its attribution to Naagaarjuna is "most probably"
false.
46.Compare George Chemparathy, "Two Early Buddhist
Refutations of II`svara as the Creator of the
Universe, " Wiener Zeitschrift fur Kunst und
Orientalische Studien, 22-23, pp. 89-94, 97-99;
and Th. Stcherbatsky, Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky,
trans. H. C. Gupta, ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya,
Soviet Indology Series no. 2 (Calcutta: Indian
Studies Past and Present, 1969), pp. 1-16.
47.Mahaavibhaa.sa, TTXXVII, 993b, summarized in
Nakamura, History, pp. 147-151.
48.Abhidharmako`sa (hereafter cited as AK ) and
-bhaasya II, 64d; compare Louis de la Vallee
Poussin, L'Abhidharmako`sa de Vasubandhu
(hereafter cited as AV ) (Paris: Paul Geuthner,
1923-1931), I, pp. 313-315.
49. AK IV, 1.
50.AK VII, 13a; AV VII, pp. 38-39. These
characteristics are the last three of the four
aspects of the truth of origination, namely,
samudaya, prabhava and pratyaya.
51.Yogaacaarabhuumi, pp. 144-5; compare Chemparathy,
"Two Early Buddhist Refutations," pp. 86-89,94-96.
52.Bhavya, Madhyamaka-h.rdaya-v.ritti-tarkajvala,
III, 9, in Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed., The Tibetan
Tripi.taka, Peking Edition (hereafter cited as PTT
) (Tokyo, Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research
Institute, 1957) , no. 5256, vol. 96, pp.
49/3/6-50/2/2/.
53.Ibid., pp. 49/5/2-7.
54.For a discussion of this much mooted point,
compare Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic (Reprint,
New York: Dover, 1962) , 1, pp. 38-39; and
Masatoshi Nagatomi, "The Framework of the
Pramanavarttika, Book I," Journal of the American
Oriental Society 79 (1959): 263, note 1.
55.For a discussion of the way in which these
epithets structure the chapter, compare Nagatomi,
"The Framework, " and compare also Ernst
Steinkellner, "The spiritual Place of the
Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism, " Nanto
Bukkyo 49 (1982): 1-18.
56.Mi pham, Tshad ma rnam `grel gyi gzhung gsal por
bshad pa legs bshad snang ba'i gter (Blockprint,
Dehradun: Nyingma Monastery, n.d.), p. 257.
57.I am following Miyasaka's numbering here. Shastri
numbers two introductory verses that

p. 345

Miyasaka does not, so the Shastri number is found
by adding 2 to the Miyasaka number. Compare
previous note 7, for references.
58. rGyal tshab rje, Rnam-Agrel-Thar-Lam-Gsal-Byed
(hereafter cited as GT) (Sarnath: Tibetan
Monastery, 1974), vol. i, pp. 238-248. The section
on ii`svara is, according to rGyal tshab (p. 239),
part of Dharmakiirti's attempt to show the meaning
of the word "became" (bhuuta) authoritative: a
permanent entity like ii`svara always has been
authoritative, and so cannot "become" so.
59. The PV pa~njikaa, or -v.rtti (hereafter cited as
PVV) is extant only in Tibetan: PTT no. 5717(b),
vol. 130; and sDe dge no. 4217. found at, for
example, The Nyingma Edition of the sDe-dge bka '-
'gyur and bsTan-'gyur (Oakland, California: Dharma
Press, 1981), vol. 94, fols. 732-746, pp. 184-188.
The section on ii`svara is at the end of chapter
11 and the beginning of chap. 12.
60.nitya.m pramaa.na.m naivaasti pramaa.nyaad
vastusa^ngate.h / j~neyaanityatayaa tasyaa
adhrauvyat kramajanmana.h // nityaad
utpattivi`sle.saad apek.saya ayogata.h / (tshad ma
rtag pa nyid yod min / dngos yod rtogs pa tshad
phyiir dang / shes bya mi rtag pa nyid kyis / de
ni mi brtan nyid phyir ro / rim bzhin skye ba can
dag ni // rtag las skye ba mi `thad phyir / ltos
pa mi rung pa yi phyir /).
61.GT, pp. 239-240; Jackson, Is Enlightenment
Possible? pp. 564-566.
62. Compare, for example, Shah, chap. 2; and D. N.
Shastri, passim.
63.Compare the concluding section for remarks on
this issue.
64.katha~ncin nopakaaryatvaad anitye'py
apramaa.nata- // (rnam 'gas phan gdags bya min
phyir / mi rtag na yang tshad med nyid //).
65. Praj~naakaragupta, Pramaa.navaarttika-bhaa.sya or
Vaarttikaala^nkaara of Praj~naakaragupta, ed.
Rahula Sankrityayana (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal
Research Institute, 1953), p. 34.
66. GT, p. 240; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 566.
67. PVV, Nyingma sDe-dGe, vol. 94, fols. 733-734, p.
185.
68. sthitvaa prav.rttisa.msthaanavi`se.saarthakriyaadisu
/ sdod 'jug dbyibs kyi khyad par dang / don byed
pa la sogs pa dag /). Cf Tattvasa.mgraha (TS) 46
(for full references, compare note 117 following).
69. Preceding, p. 6. Prof. Karl Potter has disagreed
with me that the syllogism being refuted is
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, noting (a) that no such exact
syllogism is found in Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works and
(b) that no later Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works
specifically defended the tradition against
Dharmakiirti's attacks. Prof. Potter has suggested
that Dharmakiirti's opponent may, in fact, be a
lost Saa.mkhya work. This may well be, but it must
be argued from silence, and it seems to me that
(a) while the syllogism refuted by Dharmakiirti is
not precisely like those found in
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works, there is a significant
overlap and (b) later Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika works may
not have specifically addressed Dharmakiirti's
objections because by the time they were written,
Dharmakiirti's arguments perhaps had been
overshadowed by those of Saantarak.sita,
Kamala`siila and J~naama`srii. Prof. Potter also
has pointed out--and in this I quite agree with
him--that Dharmakiirti's opponent may be
unidentifiable for the simple reason that
Dharmakiirti has distorted the theistic position
in recasting it for discussion. Thus, the
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas may have been the intended
target, but not recognized for their own position
as restated by Dharmakiirti. Alternatively,
Dharmakiirti may be combining the ideas of more
than one theistic school into the syllogism.
70.Preceding, p. 10.
71.GT, p. 241; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 567. This
does not depart substantially from the
interpretation of Devendrabuddhi, who differs only
in describing that which must be created as
bodies, environs, and products, and cites as an
example of "particular shape" not a pot, but a
mansion, PVV, fol. 734, p. 185.
72.i.s.tasiddhir asiddhir vaa d.r.s.taante sa.m`sayo
'thavaa // ('dod pa grub pa 'am dpe ma grub / yang
na the tshom za ba yin //).
73.GT, p. 241; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 567-568.
74.siddha.m yaad.rg adhi.s.thaat.rbhaavaabhaavaanuv.rttimat/
sa.mnive`saadi tad yukta.m tasmaad yad anumiiyate
// (byin rlabs yod med rjes 'jug can / dbyibs sogs
ci 'dra rab grub pa / de las rjes su dpog gang yin
/ de ni rigs pa nyid yin no //).
75.GT, pp. 241-242; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 569;
compare TS 63.
76.vastubhede prasiddhasya `sabdasaamaanyaad
abhedina.h/ no yuktaanumiti.h paa.n.dudravya~divad
dhutaa`sane // (tha dad ngos la rab grub pa / sgra
mtshungs tha dad med pa'i phyir / rjes dpog rigs
pa ma yin te / skye bo'i rdzas las me bzhin no
//).
77. GT, p. 242; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 570.

p. 346

78. anyathaa kumbhakaare.na m.rdvikaarasya kasyacit /
gha.taade.h kara.naat sidhyed valmiikasyapi
tatk.rti.h // (de lta min na rdza mkhan gyis /
bum pa la sogs 'jim pa yi / rnam 'gyur 'ga' zhig
byed pa'i phyir / grog mkhar yang des byas grub
'gyur //).
79. GT, p. 242; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 570;
compare TS 65.
80. "When a general result is probative / Because it
is concomitant with the predicate, /(Then,) when
one (over-)differentiates the relator, / That
differentiation is asserted to be the flaw called
kaaryasama." saadhyenaanugamaat kaarye
saamaanyenaapi saadhane/sambandhibhedaad
bhedoktido.sa.h kaaryasamo mata.h // (bsgrub bya'i
rjes 'gro phyir 'bras bu / spyis kyang sgrub par
byed pa la / 'bral ba can nyid the dad phyir /
tha dad skyon brjod 'bras mtshungs 'dod //)
(verse 14).
81. GT, pp. 242-243; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp.
570-573.
82. "(Although) one proves (a thesis) in regard to a
particular class, / It is not reasonable to prove
(a similar thesis) just from seeing / That there
is a general term (that is similar to the
reason); as if / Words could be horned because
(there is a term, ) gotva." jaatyantare
prasiddhasya `sabdasaamaanyadar`sanaat/ na yukta.m
saadhana.m gotvaac ccha`saadiinaa.m vi.saa.nivat//
(rigs kyi khyad par la grub pa / sgra yi spyi ni
mthong pa las / sgrub byed mi rigs ngag la sogs /
go nyid phyir na rva can bzhin //) (verse 15).
83. GT, p. 244; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 573.
84. "Because(words) are controlled by a desire to
express, / There is nothing for which there is
not a word; / If one attained (objects) through
the existence (or words for them), / All people
should attain all objects."
vivak.saaparatantratvaan na `sabdaa.h santi kutra
vaa / tadbhaavaad arthasiddhau tu sarva.m
sarvasya sidhyati // (brjod par 'dod pa'i gzhan
dbang phyir / sgra rnams gang la 'ang med ma min
/ de yod pas ni don grub na / thams cad kyis ni
thams cad grub //) (verse 16). See GT, p. 244;
Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 573-574.
85. "Through this (approach) one can also investigate
(and refute) such Saa.mkhya (and Jaina syllogisms
as, respectively,) / `Buddhi is non-sentient,
because it is impermanent,' / And '(A tree) is
sentient, because it dies/ When its bark is
stripped."' etena kaapilaadiinaam acaitenyaadi
cintita.m / anityaade`s ca caitanya.m mara.naat
tvagapohata.h // ('dis ni ser skya la sogs kyi /
mi rtag sogs phyir yang sems med / sogs dang
shung pa bshus na ni / 'chi phyir sems ldan dpyad
pa yin //) (verse 17). GT, p. 244; Jackson,
Enlightenment, p. 574.
86. "If a general entitative (reason) is unproven,
(then the syllogism is invalid,) / Whereas if the
(general reason) is proven, then even if
particular (details) / Are unproven, (the
syllogism) is not invalidated, / As (whether or
not) sound "depends on space" (does not affect
the permanence or impermanence of sound) .
"vastusvaruupe 'siddhe 'yam nyaaya.h siddhe
vi`se.sa.na.m /abaadhakam asiddhaav apy
aakaa`saa`srayavad dhvane.h // dngos po 'i ngo bo
ma grub na / tshul 'di grub na ma grub kyang /
khyad par gnod byed ma yin te / sgra yi nam kha'
la brten bzhin //) (verse 18). GT, pp. 244-245;
Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 574-575.
87. "Even if a word is unproven, if the entity/ Is
proven, then (the reason) will be proven, as /
The Buddhists explain to the Aulukyas / "(Atoms
are impermanent, because) they are physical."
asiddhaav api `sabdasya siddhe vastuni sidhyati /
auluukyasya yathaa bauddhenokta.m
muurtyaadisaadhana.m // (sgra ma grub kyang dngos
po ni / grub na grub par 'gyur te dper / 'ug pa
da la sangs rgy as pas / lus sogs sgrub byed
bshad pa bzhin //) (verse 19). GT, pp. 245-247;
Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 575-577.
88. "if the (entity) is mistaken, / Then even if the
word is unmistaken, / The proof must be known as
flawed, / Because an entity is (only) proven from
an entity." tasyaiva vyabhicaaraadau `sabde'py
avyabhicaari.ni / do.savat saadhana.m j~neya.m
vastuno vastusiddhita.h // (de nyid 'krul la sogs
yin na / sgra ni 'khrul pa med na yang / sgrub
byed skyon Idan shes bya ste / dngos las dngos po
grub phyir ro // (verse 20). GT, p. 247; Jackson,
Enlightenment, p. 577. Note the strong element
of"realism" here: though the connection between
words and entities may be tenuous, it still is
assumed by Dharmakiirti that there is a definite
and discernible nature to entities, which may
serve as the foundation for valid reasoning.
89. "'Because it is a "goer"' and 'because it is
"hand-possessing"' /(As reasons) proving (a
colored cow) is a cow and (an elephant calf) is
an elephant / Are not (validly) asserted, for
these are verbal expressions / That are merely
common (sayings)." "'gro ba 'i phyir dang lag
Idan phyir / rva can glang po zhes sgrub byed /
'di yi sgra yi brjod bya ni / grags pa yin gyis
brjod 'dod min // (verse 20a). G T, p. 247;
Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 577-578.
90. yathaa tat kaara.na.m vastu tathaiva
tadakaara.na.m / yadaa tat kaara.na.m kena mata.m
ne.s.tam

p. 347

akaara.nam // (ji ltar dngos de rhyu yin pa / de
lta de nyid gang gi tshe / rgyu min gang gis de
ni rgyur / 'dod la rgyu ma yin mi 'dod //).
91. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 578-579.
92. Compare preceding, p. 16, alternative (c).
93. `saastrau.sadhaabhisa.mbandhaac caitrasya
vra.naroha.ne / asa.mbaddhasya ki.m sthaano.h
kaara.natva.m na kalpyate // (mtshon dang sman
sogs 'brel ba las / nag pa 'i rma dang 'drubs yin
na / 'brel med sdong dum ci yi phyir / rgyu nyid
du ni rtog mi byed //).
94. Nagatomi, A Study of Dharmakiirti's Pramaa.navaar-
ttika, p. 33.
95. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 579. rGyal
tshab probably was unfamiliar with the instance
of"homeopathic magic" cited by Dharmakiirti, and
glosses the verse as having the weapon inflict
the wound and the medicine heal it.
Devendrabuddhi (fol. 742, lines 6-7) supports the
reading we have given. Incidentally, an instance
of homeopathic magic is cited in Dante's Inferno
(XXXI, 4-6), where the poet recalls the lance of
Achilles and his father, which could both wound
and heal.
96. svabhaavabhedana vinaa vyaapaaro 'pi na yujyate /
nityasyaavyatirekitvaat saamarthyan ca duran-
voya.m//(rang bzhin khyad par med par ni/byed par
yang ni mi rung ngo/rtag la ldog pa med pa'i phyir/
nus pa nyid kyang rtog par dka' //).
97. GT, p. 247; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 579.
98. Ibid.
99. ye.su satsu bhavaty eva yat tebhyo 'nyasya
kalpane / taddhetutvena sarvatra hetuunaam
anavasthiti.h // (gang dag yod no gang 'gyur
nyid / de dag las gzhan de yi rgyu / rtog pa yin
na thams cad la / rgyu rnams thug pa med par
'gyur //).
100.GT, pp. 247-248; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp.
579-580.
101.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 580.
102.svabhaavapari.naamena hetur a^nkurajanmani /
bhuumyaadis tasya sa.mskaare tadvi`se.sasya
dar`sanaat // (myu gu skyed la sa la sogs / rang
bzhin yongs su gyur nas ni / rgyu yin de legs
byas pa na / de yi khyad par mthong phyir ro //).
103.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 580.
104.yathaa vi`se.sena vinaa vi.sayendriyasa.mhati.h
/buddher hetus tatheda.m cen na tatraapi vi`se.sata.h
(gal te ji ltar yul dbang po /tshogs pa khyad med
b1o rgyu yin/ de ltar 'di yin zhe na min/ de las
khyad par yod phyir ro//).
105.NS, I, 1,4.
106.This is the import of Devendrabuddhi's reading
at PVV, fol. 745, line 2, p. 188.
107.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 580.
108.p.rtak p.rtag a`saktaanaa.m svabhaavaati`saye
'sati / sa.mhataav apy asaamarthya.m syaat siddho
'ti`sayas tata.h // (so so so sor nus med rnams /
rang bzhin khyad par med pas na / tshogs kyang
nus pa med 'gyur bas / de phyir khyad par grub pa
yin //).
109.GT, p. 248; Jackson, Enlightenment, pp. 580-581.
Emphasis mine.
110.tasmaat p.rtag a`sakte.su ye.su sa.mbhaavyate
gu.na.h / sa.mhatau hetutaa tesaa.m ne`svaraader
abhedata.h // (de phyir so sor gang nus med /
tshogs na yon tan srid 'gyur ba / de dag rgyu yin
dbang phyug sogs / ma yin khyad par med phyir ro
//).
111.Compare preceding, p. 9.
112.Verse 183; GT, p. 219; Jackson, Enlightenment,
pp. 713-714. The verse is found in the discussion
of the aspect of origination (samudaya) of the
truth of origination.
113.GT, p. 251, Jackson, Enlightenment, p. 586.
114.Compare, for example, the writings of
Chattopadhyaya, N. Bhattacharyya, and Potter
mentioned in this article (preceding, notes 2, 4,
and 29).
115.Bodhicaryaavataara IX, 118-123. It ought to be
noted that `Saantideva is misrepresenting the
Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika view, whereby II`svara is not
the creator of the padaarthas, but their
arranger.
116.Ibid., IX, 124-125.
117.II`svara is rejected at TS 46-93, puru.sa at TS
153-170. Compare Ganganatha Jha, trans., The
Tattvasamgraha of `Saantarak.sita with the
Commentary of Kamala`siila (Baroda: Oriental
Institute, 1937), vol. 1, pp. 68-101, 132-139.
118.TS 47-48 and 56-60; Jha, Tattvasamgraha, pp.
69-71 and 75-79.
119.TS 85; Jha, Tattvasamgraha, p. 92

p. 348

120.TS 155-161, Jha, Tattvasamgraha, pp. 133-135.
121.TS 162-167; Jha, Tattvasamgraha, pp. 135-137.
122.Compare Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism, chap.
15, for a good summary of Miimaa.msaka arguments.
123.For references, compare preceding, note 4.
124.Nyaayama~njarii 125-133; summarized in Potter,
pp. 371-373.
125.Vyomavatii 40; summarized in Potter,
Encyclopedia, pp. 435-436.
126.Nyaayavaarttikataatparya.tiikaa IV, 1, 21;
summarized in Potter, Encyclopedia, pp. 481-482.
127.The works of both J~naana`sriimitra and
Ratnakiirti have been edited by Anantalal Thakur
in the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series (Patna:
Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959
and 1957, respectively).
128.Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology, p. 28.
I have not as yet studied J~naana`sriimitra's or
Ratnakiirti's arguments.
129.Compare preceding, notes 8 and 9.
130.Compare preceding, note 4.
131.Indeed, there is not even agreement on whether
the syllogism corresponds to the argument from
design: G. Bhattacharyya (p. 44) calls it the
"cosmological argument," while Potter (p. 102)
considers it "cosmoteleological." In fact, the
syllogism refuted by Dharmakiirti--which seeks to
prove that entities are preceded by a conscious
designer because of intermittence, particular
shape, and efficiency--seems most like the
argument from design, while the later syllogism
proposed by Jayanta--in which the existence of
ii`svara follows from the world's being an
effect--seems a bit more "cosmological"--although
the focus there still is on the analogical appeal
to design.
132.The most concerted attack on Western theism by a
Buddhist is that of Dharmasiri (preceding, note
38), who does not, however, often directly relate
Buddhist arguments to Western ones, but, rather,
criticizes modern Western arguments directly,
interspersing his discussion with passages from
and reflections upon the Theravaadin tradition.
Theravaada does not develop a rational a-theology
to anywhere near the degree that the Sanskritic
"Pramaa.na" tradition does.
133.Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. William
Weaver (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983),
pp. 492-493.