Di^nnaagas theory of immaterialism

·期刊原文

Di^nnaaga's theory of immaterialism

By D. J. Kalupahana

Philosophy East & West

V. 20:2 (1970) pp. 121-128

Copyright 1970 by University of Hawaii Press

Hawaii, USA

p. 121

The teachings of the Buddha, as known to us from the earliest records preserved in the Pali Nikaayas and the Chinese AAgamas, have, during the course of time, lent themselves to different interpretations. During the first few centuries we find the emergence of different schools of thought ranging from realism to extreme forms of idealism, all of them tracing their origin to the Buddha and claiming to be the most authentic interpretation of the Buddha-word.

The last of the major schools of thought to appear was the school of idealism known as Vij~naanavaada or Yogaacaara. One of the most illustrious personalities who is credited with having systematized the teachings of this school is Vasubandhu. His monumental work, the Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi [1] -- consisting of two parts: the Vi^m`satikaa, which is devoted to a refutation of the realistic theories, and the Tri^m`sikaa, where the tenets of the idealistic school are clearly set out -- represents the locus classicus for the study of the idealistic school of Buddhism. He was followed by an equally illustrious personality, Di^nnaaga, who propounded a completely new form of idealism. But, unfortunately, the reputation of Vasubandhu hindered a fair assessment of the contribution of Di^nnaaga; so much so that the scholars who examined his works were interested only in his logical theories rather than in the theory of reality presented by him. In this connection a very short but extremely important treatise, the Aalambanapariik.saa of Di^nnaaga, deserves our special attention. [2] This work, in its original form, has been lost, and it is preserved only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. It consists of eight `slokas to which Di^nnaaga himself supplied a commentary. Two more important commentaries were written, one by Dharmapaala and the other by Viniitadeva, the original texts of which are both lost. In the present paper we propose to examine the nature of the arguments adduced by Di^nnaaga in favor of the kind of idealism he was advocating in the Aalambanapariik.saa and to assess the value of his contribution.

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1. Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, Vi^m`satikaa et Tri^m`sikaa, avec le commentaire de Sthiramati, ed. S. Levi (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honors Champion, 1925). The Chinese version of the Tri^m`sikaa together with the commentary as explained by Hsüan Tsang has been translated into French by L. de la Vallée Poussin; see Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928-29).

2. This text has been restored into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese versions and published together with an English translation. See Aalambanapariik.saa and v.rtti by Di^nnaaga with the commentary of Dharmapaala, restored into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami Sastri (Adyar: The Adyar Library, 1942). The present study is entirely based on the edition given by Professor Sastri. Other editions are: Tibetan and Chinese texts with a French translation, "Examen de l'objet de la connaissance," by S. Yamaguchi in collaboration with Meyer, Journal Asiatique 214 (1929), 1-65; Tibetan text and German translation by Erich Frauwallner, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 37 (1930), 174-194.

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There is no doubt that the problems connected with the nature of perception and of the physical world gave rise in Buddhism to divergent systems of thought. Early Buddhism, as represented in the Pali Nikaayas and the Chinese AAgamas, seems to have advocated a kind of phenomenalism when it emphasized the fact that conceptions, theories, or any kind of speculation regarding the nature of the external world cannot be based on anything that transcends sense perception or sense data (a~n~natra phassaa). [3] In one of the suutras, the sense organs and the sense objects are considered to be "everything" (sabba^m), and it is said that to speculate on the nature of reality depending on data available through sources other than these would be to go beyond experience (avisaya). [4]

But during the period of the Abhidharma we find speculation pivoting around the problem of mind and matter, and with the emergence of the atomic theories a form of naive realism came to dominate the philosophical atmosphere. The acceptance of the theory of atoms created innumerable problems, especially with regard to the theory of perception, and at this time we find different schools arising within the fold of Buddhism. The question as to whether the external object composed of atoms is directly perceived or not was one of the burning questions which engaged the attention of thinkers during this time. While the Sarvaastivaadins upheld the view that the external object is directly perceived (realism), the school of Buddhists known as the Sautraantikas admitted that it is only inferred from the impression left by the momentary object (representationism). The latter view deprived physical objects of much of the reality ascribed to them by the former. This led to a twofold development, one, represented by the Maadhyamikas, that the nature of the external object is completely unknown and that no predication can be made of it (transcendentalism), and the other represented by the Yogaacaarins, who maintained that nothing exists outside thought (idealism).

In the history of Western philosophy we find two methods adopted for justifying idealism. [5] One is by the use of metaphysical arguments by means of which one proves the impossibility of accepting matter as an independent reality (Leibniz). According to this argument, the world is revealed as it is by means of reason, not by means of the senses. It is a denial not only of the substantial reality of matter but also of the efficacy or even the possibility of mere sense experience. The other is the use of epistemological arguments

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3. Cf. Sa^myutta Nikaaya, ed. Léon Feer, 6 vols. (London: Pali Text Society, 1960 reprint), 2, 33; Tsa A-han Ching 14.1; Taishoo Shinshu Daizookyoo, ed. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, 55 vols. (Tokyo: The Taishoo Issai-kyo Kanko Kwai, 1924-32), 2, 94; also Ch'ang A-han Ching 12.1 (Taishoo, 1, 76a).

4. Sa^myutta Nikaaya (ed. Feer), 4, 15; Tsa A-han Ching 13.17 (Taishoo, 2, 91a-b); see also my "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism," Philosophy East and West 19, no. 1 (Jan. 1969), 65-67.

5. Cf. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Idealism."

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which are intended to prove that "colour, shapes and sounds that are naturally taken to belong to independently existing material objects, are in fact sensible qualities that cannot exist apart from being perceived" (Berkeley). Here, although the substantial reality of matter is denied, there is no denial of the efficacy or the possibility of sense experience.

The distinguishing feature of the two theories presented by Vasubandhu and Di^nnaaga consists in the adoption of the two types of arguments mentioned above. Comparing the two texts, the Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi of Vasubandhu and the Aalambanapariik.saa of Di^nnaaga, we find that the former employs metaphysical arguments against the acceptance of a substantially real external world, while the latter contains epistemological arguments against the knowability of the reality of matter. These differences seem to have been occasioned by historical circumstances. The Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi represents a systematization of the metaphysical idealism embodied in the early Yogaacaara texts such as the La^nkaavataara Suutra and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc. It is only a systematization, not a fresh evaluation, of the existing form of idealism. The emergence of this form of idealism was facilitated by the activities of the Maadhyamikas, who employed dialectical arguments against the knowability or predicability of the subjective as well as the objective world. Once idealism became a well-established school of thought after Vasubandhu's philosophical activities, then his successors had only to undertake the task of justifying idealism, especially in the face of attacks hurled upon them by the realist schools of thought; hence Di^nnaaga's interest in logic and epistemology. Without taking for granted the idealistic framework which he inherited from his teacher, Di^nnaaga undertook a fresh evaluation of the epistemological basis of idealism which finally led him to develop a new philosophy. This new philosophy was presented in the Aalambanapariik.saa.

The Aalambanapariik.saa begins with a statement and refutation of three of the current theories regarding the nature of the external object. They are the three atomic theories presented by the Vai`se.sika, the Vaibhaa.sika, and the Sautraantika schools. [6]

The Vai`se.sikas believed that the perceptible external object (which is considered to be a whole, avayavin) is composed of atoms (which are like parts, avayava). Both the object (whole) and its causes, the atoms (parts), are real. The object, according to them, is a unity and is directly perceived. Di^nnaaga takes up this theory for examination and without making any attempt to show, as Vasubandhu did in his Vi^m`satikaa, the inherent contradictions in the Vai`se.sika theory of "whole" and "parts," he points out that the atoms (a.nu, parts) are not the causes of the perception (vij~napti) of the object (vi.sa-

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6. See N. Aiyaswami Sastri, "Kwei-Chi's Note on Aalambana (Object-Cause)," Sino-Indian Studies, Liebenthal Festchrift, ed. Kshitis Roy (Santiniketan: Vi`sva-Bhaaratii, 1967), pp. 1-8.

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ya, whole), because the nature of the atoms is not reflected in consciousness, just as the nature of the visual organ is not reflected in consciousness. [7] His argument is that although the atoms are considered as causes of consciousness (of the object), they do not possess the form reflected in consciousness, because the atoms themselves, by definition, have no form and are imperceptible. The criticism is thus based on the imperceptibility of the atoms which, therefore, cannot be considered as causes of consciousness.

The next theory criticized by Di^nnaaga is that of the Vaibhaa.sikas, who believed that the external object is an aggregate (sa^mghaata) of atoms representing a multiplicity (aneka) and not a unity (eka). [8] Criticizing this view, Di^nnaaga says: "That object which produces the consciousness endowed with the image of the object, that indeed is suitable to be considered as the object, because that alone is spoken of as the productive cause of consciousness. But the aggregate of atoms is not so." [9] The reason given is that the perception of the aggregate of atoms is like the perception of a double moon. [10] The double moon is perceived on account of the defects in the sense organ of a person. The perception of the double moon arises although there exists no object corresponding to the double moon. Similarly, the aggregate of atoms does not exist in substance (dravyato) and therefore cannot be the cause of the consciousness of the aggregate of atoms. Thus they are not the real objects. Here too, when Vasubandhu was trying to show the metaphysical problems arising from a theory of the aggregate of atoms, Di^nnaaga emphasized the epistemological difficulties connected with such a theory. [11]

Finally Di^nnaaga takes up the Sautraantika theory which says that the combined form (sa~ncitaakaara) of the atoms is the cause of consciousness. Explaining this theory further, Di^nnaaga says: "All objects are possessed of many forms. They are perceived in one or the other of these forms. This quality, namely, the (possession of) different forms, is found in the atoms too. Thus, in the atoms, there is the aspect which produces a consciousness reflecting the combined form of the atoms." [12] Di^nnaaga criticizes this theory by pointing

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7. Aalambanapariik.saav.rtti, p. 3.

8. Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, pp. 6-7.

9. Aalambanapariik.saav.rtti, p. 4: yo 'rtha.h svaavabhaasivij~naptim utpaadayati sa hy aalambana.m yujyate, yata.h sa eva hy utpattipratyaya ucyate, sa^mghatas tu naivam.

10. Ibid.

11. Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, p. 6 ff, Viniitadeva's comments on these two atomic theories are very illuminating. He gives reasons as to why both these theories are not satisfactory. It is pointed out that although the first theory accounts for the causality (hetutva) of the object of perception, it does not satisfactorily explain the form (aakaara) of the object of perception, because the atoms which go to constitute the object are formless. In the case of the second theory, although the form of the object is accounted for by the recognition of the aggregate, yet causality of the object is not explained because there is no real substance which may be taken as the cause of the perceived aggregate, like the absence of any substance in a double moon. (Cf. Aalambanapariik.saa, p. 44.)

12. Aalambanapariik.saav.rtti, p. 4: sarvo 'rtho bahvaakaara.h ata.h tatra kenacid aakaare.na pratyak.sa i.syate, paramaa.nu.sv apy asti sa~ncitaabhaj~naanotpattikaara.nabhaava.h. Viniitadeva points out that this theory overcomes the defects found in each of the two theories mentioned earlier, because both causality and form, the two aspects of the object (aalambanasya dvibhaaga) which are necessary to prove its existence (astitva), are accounted for in this theory. (See Yamaguchi and Meyer, "Examen de l'objet de la connaissance," p. 32.)

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out that if the differences in the form of the objects, as for example between a pot and a cup, are also to be found in the atoms which constitute them, then only would there be differences in the consciousness produced by these objects. But it is agreed by all the atomists that the atoms which exist in substance are absolutely identical in their dimensions. Therefore, the difference in form cannot be with regard to the atoms. It would be only in the perceivable object which has only empirical reality. Moreover, if one removes one by one the atoms of the pot, etc., the consciousness which reflects the image of the pot, etc., will immediately disappear.

As may be evident from the foregoing account, Di^nnaaga's criticism of the atomic theories of the realist schools was intended to show the problems inherent in the realist theory of perception. Unlike Vasubandhu, who employed dialectical arguments to deny the reality of the external world, Di^nnaaga was only interested in demonstrating the epistemological problems involved in asserting the perceptibility of matter. Having exposed the untenability of the realistic views on the nature of perception and the external world, on the basis of epistemological facts, Di^nnaaga, in the last three stanzas of the Aalambanapariik.saa, sets out his own view of the external object. While criticizing the materiality of the object of perception, he seems to emphasize its externality. According to him, it is consciousness itself which appears in the form of an external object and it is this external object which serves as the object-condition (aalambanapratyaya). From time immemorial this objective aspect (vi.sayaruupa) and the force which transforms consciousness into the subject-object relationship, that is, the sense organ, continue to be mutually conditioned. Therefore, according to Di^nnaaga, this subject-object discrimination (generally called vikalpa) carries more reality than the material external object, which has no reality whatsoever. [13] Here there is no denial of the validity of sense perception. What is denied is only the materiality of the object of perception. Thus Di^nnaaga's idealism may be properly described as immaterialism.

As shown above, the Aalambanapariik.saa embodies the ontological speculations of Di^nnaaga. Treatises such as Pramaa.nasamuccaya contain his logical theories. But A. B. Keith found it difficult to reconcile Di^nnaaga's ontological speculations with his logical theories. Keith pointed out that Di^nnaaga, while being an idealist, adopted a Sautraantika point of view -- "that is recognizing the reality of an external world, known to us by inference only from the content

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13. Madhyaantavibhaagabhaa.sya, ed. G. Nagao (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), pp. 18,44.

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of our experience." [14] He further says: "As a philosopher Di^nnaaga appears a champion of Vij~naanavaada idealism, but his work on logic is interesting, because it is inspired by other than epistemological and metaphysical considerations; from his logical works, so far as known from Dharmakiirti, it would be impossible to learn precisely his conception of reality." [15]

The difficulty of reconciling the ontological speculations of Di^nnaaga with his logical theories appears to us to be a result of the misunderstanding of the nature of idealism advocated by Di^nnaaga. We quite agree with Chandradhar Sharma when he maintains that "this confusion between the original Vij~naanavaada of La^nkaavataara, Asa^nga and Vasubandhu and the later development of it by these writers [i.e., Di^nnaaga, Dharmakiirti, `Saantarak.sita, and Kamala`siila] ... has begot many worse confusions and has been mainly responsible for giving rise to many misunderstandings." [16]

The idealism found in the La^nkaavataara and later systematized by Asa^nga and Vasubandhu is an "absolute idealism" and does not recognize the validity or even the possibility of mere sense experience. According to Vasubandhu's Vi^m`satikaa, [17] even "the knowledge of those who perceive the thought processes of others (paracittavidaa^m j~naanam)," in spite of the fact that it has been included under the category of highest knowledge (abhij~naa) in early Buddhism, is not valid because in it there is a recognition of a discrimination between "one's own mind" (svacitta) and "other's mind" (paracitta). The highest knowledge is nondiscriminative and nondual (advaya) and is developed by the Buddhas in their trances (yoga). Thus this extreme form of idealism came to be designated as Yogaacaara.

The kind of idealism advocated by Di^nnaaga is different from this. Sharma uses the term svatantravij~naanavaada to refer to this school. Describing the objective of this school, he says: "It wants to combine the metaphysical Idealism of Vij~naanavaada with the logical and epistemological Critical Realism of the Sautraantika School. We may call it as the Logical School of Buddhism." [18] This, in our opinion, does not represent a fair assessment of Di^nnaaga's idealism. More than being a bridge between the absolute idealism of Vasubandhu and the critical realism of the Sautraantikas, Di^nnaaga's theory appears to us to be a fresh analysis of the epistemological problems which

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14. Cf. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923), p. 308.

15. Ibid., p. 305. Tucci, in a footnote to one of his articles, "Notes on the Nyaaya-prave`sa by Sa^nkarasvaamin" (The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 3d ser. [Apr. 1931], 381, n. 1) referred to this same problem and promised a solution in a future article; unfortunately, we have not been able to lay our hands on such an article, if it has been published.

16. Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedaanta (Benaras: Nand Kishore and Bros., 1952), p. 77, n. 1.

17. Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi (ed. S. Levi), p. 10.

18. Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedaanta, p. 77; see also pp. 78-79.

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ultimately led him to the acceptance of a theory of immaterialism rather than a theory of absolute idealism. It is true that Di^nnaaga started as a disciple of Vasubandhu and that he belonged to the idealist school. But it is not true to say, as Keith does, that Di^nnaaga was not inspired by epistemological considerations when presenting his conception of reality. While being an adherent of the idealistic school, Di^nnaaga seems to have been compelled to give serious thought to the epistemological problems, especially because it was during this time that the Nyaaya school was systematizing its own logical theories. His analysis of the epistemological problems ultimately led him to the acceptance of a kind of nonabsolutist idealism, which made him appear like a Sautraantika, although he may not have been actually an adherent of the Sautraantika school like his teacher Vasubandhu. Or it may be even that before Di^nnaaga, the Sautraantikas were the only school with idealistic leanings as opposed to the absolute idealism of Vij~naanavaada, and that when Di^nnaaga propounded for the first time a theory of immaterialism, this was confused with the standpoint of the Sautraantikas.

It was pointed out that while Vasubandhu denied not only the substantial reality of matter, but also the efficacy and even the possibility of mere sense experience, Di^nnaaga only denied the substantial reality of matter, but not the efficacy or the possibility of sense experience. This difference in the treatment of sense perception is also reflected in their definitions of perception. While Vasubandhu, following Asa^nga, defined true perception (pratyak.sa) as "devoid of mental construction" (kalpanaapo.dha) and "nonillusive" (abhraanta), Di^nnaaga accepted only the first part of this definition and dropped the second. [19] Di^nnaaga's reluctance to define perception as "nonillusive" (abhraanta) seems to be rather significant. As Stcherbatsky has pointed out, "the term 'illusion' is not univocal. There are different kinds of illusions. There is a transcendental illusion (mukhyavibhrama) according to which all empirical knowledge is a kind of illusion, and there is a kind of empirical illusion (pratibhaa.sikii bhraanti) which affects only some exceptional cases of wrong cognition." [20] The Yogaacaara school considered empirical knowledge as illusory from the standpoint of the higher form of perception attained by the yogin. But the importance of Di^nnaaga's definition lies in the fact that he has thought of evaluating sense perception on its own merit, not in relation to another higher form of perception. This may be why he was reluctant to emphasize the illusory aspect of perception in his definition of it. Thus he attached more importance to sense perception than was accorded to it by the early adherents of the idealist school. Yet the problems connected with the direct perception

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19. See G. Tucci, "Bhaamaha and Di^nnaaga," The Indian Antiquary [Bombay] 59 (1930), 143.

20. Buddhist Logic, 2 vols. (Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 1930), 1, 153.

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of external objects naturally led Di^nnaaga to adopt a theory of immaterialism. Consequently, the contradiction which Keith saw in Di^nnaaga's ontological views on the one hand and his logical theories on the other would not obtain if we are to understand his philosophy as a kind of immaterialism rather than as a form of absolute idealism.

In an attempt to justify Di^nnaaga's idealism, Keith says: "It is not enough to make a man a realist in metaphysics, because in a logical treatise he speaks of an element as fact (artha), external (baahya), or having a distinct character (svalak.sa.na)." [21] Furthermore, explaining Di^nnaaga's theory of perception, Keith points out that "he distinguished sharply between the element of sensation and imagination; each idea requires both sensation and the activity of the imagination to give any result; the mere percept is inexpressible..." [22] What is important to note here is that the sensation which may be described as an element of fact (artha) and as external (baahya) is not denied by Di^nnaaga. His denial pertains only to the materiality, not to the externality of the object, and the question whether Di^nnaaga is a realist or not does not arise. Moreover, it is significant to note that the metaphysical concepts which characterized the early Yogaacaara philosophy, concepts such as aalayavij~naana, do not find a place in the new form of idealism advocated by Di^nnaaga and his followers.

Thus it may be possible to conclude that Di^nnaaga, realizing the problems inherent in a realist as well as an idealist theory of perception, attempted a fresh analysis of these problems which induced him to give up the absolute form of idealism advocated by his predecessors and to propound, for the first time in the history of Indian thought, a theory of immaterialism based entirely on epistemological facts.

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21. Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, p. 308.

22. Ibid., pp. 305-306.