Early Advaita Vedaanta and Buddhism

·期刊原文

Early Advaita Vedaanta and Buddhism: The Mahaayaana Context of the Gau.dapaadiiya-Kaarikaa

By Richard King

Reviewed by Arvind Sharma

Philosophy East & West

V. 48 No. 4 (October 1998) pp. 661-663

Copyright 1998 by University of Hawaii Press

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The Gau.dapaadiiya-Kaarikaa (GK) is widely regarded as one of the earliest statements of what subsequently became the well-known school of Advaita Vedaanta. Scholarship in this century has been active on three main issues surrounding it: (1) when it was composed and by whom, (2) whether it is a unitary or a composite work, and (3) to what extent it has been influenced by Buddhism. The three issues are obviously interrelated, but each deserves recognition in its own right. Richard King's Early Advaita Vedaanta and Buddhism bears on all three, identifying the last as its gravitational center of interest.

The author's conclusions are that the text "is pre-`Sa^nkarite since it shows no evidence of any influences in the post-sixth-century era" and in all probability is not from the hand of Gau.dapaada (p. 36); that it is a composite work; and that "all four prakara.nas display evidence of Buddhist influence" (p. 236). It is in identifying the nature of the influences on the text that the author makes a distinct advance. He specifies the nature of these influences textually in terms of each prakara.na (p. 236), and also tries to spell them out in terms of the two main philosophical schools of Mahaayaana Buddhism in India--the Madhyamaka and the Yogaacaara.

King's analysis of how Madhyamaka Buddhism and Advaita Vedaanta turn in different directions while arriving at the same crossroads is particularly lucid. The crossroads are the "inconsistencies of the common sense notions of duality and change" (p. 126), succinctly identified by Bradley as follows: "something, A, changes, and therefore it cannot be permanent. On the other hand, if A is not permanent, what is it that changes?" (p. 129).

[In this debate] over the status of object (A) and its various modes or states of manifestation (X', X2, X3, etc.) the Buddhist accepts the empirical efficacy of changes in states but does not accept the independent reality of the possessor of these states (A). This is the doctrine of the no-self which rejects such

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notions as mentally fabricated reifications (prapannca). In Advaita Vedaanta (A) is accepted and it is the manifested states that are denied ultimate reality since reality cannot change. Thus, both the Madhyamaka and Gau.dapaadian Advaita derive their positions from the logical dichotomy between an entity and change.... [B]oth as it were grasp separate "horns" of the dilemma.... (pp. 130-131)

The clear recognition of this distinction enables the author to be more precise in pinpointing both the Buddhist influence and its limitation in the context of Advaita Vedaanta, as when it is pointed out that the Gau.dapaadian doctrine of non-origination (ajativaada) "is dependent upon the Madhyamaka understanding of the non-arising (anutpaada) of dharmas" (p. 237). The author admits the conclusion is not novel but it acquires clear content in his hands, when he explains:

Both the Gau.dapaadian doctrine of non-origination and the text's belief that it is not in conflict with any other view are drawn from an absolutistic (mis)reading of Naagaarjuna's arguments in the MMK. The GK takes Naagaarjuna's rejection of all views (d.r.s.ti) as incipient forms of absolutism and adopts it for its own purposes. All views, the authors of the GK argue, entail an unoriginated absolute. This is seen as the final vindication of ajaativaada. (p. 237)

At the same time, the limitation is suggested by the fact "that the prima facie similarity of Advaita and Mahaayaana ideas, in actuality, reflects their direct incommensurability" (p. 238). So far as Madhyamaka Mahaayaana is concerned, the two schools of Advaita and Madhyamaka "reach a philosophical impasse precisely over the question of 'Svabhaava: Ni.hsvabhaava' " (p. 237).

Turning next to Yogaacaara Buddhism: the "discussions of the equality of dream and waking states" and "the doctrine of non-duality (advaya) of consciousness -- i.e. the denial of the validity of subject-object divisions in experience" are identified as "Yogaacaara-inspired themes" (p. 236). Indeed, it is asserted that "the ontological denial of origination (ajaati-vaada) on the one hand and the epistemological denial of subject-object duality (advaya-vaada) on the other, found in the Gau.dapaadiiya-Kaarikaa" are dependent upon the "Madhyamaka in the case of the former and the Yogaacaara in the case of the latter" (p. 203).

Not only are the streams of influence clearly identified in terms of the two schools, but it is also suggested that there are even other influences at work not noticed earlier on account of the "philosophically narrow and historically misleading assumption that the Madhyamaka and Yogaacaara schools are the only Mahaayaana influences" (p. 240) on the text under review. According to the author, this "reflects an inadequate grasp of the absolutistic: non-absolutistic divide between Advaita Vedaanta and scholastic Mahaayaana on the one hand, and a failure to appreciate the diversity of Mahaayaana (encompassing absolutistic

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approaches also) on the other" (p. 240), especially as "certain pre-Gau.dapaadian texts of the Mahaayaana tradition ... appear at times to uphold a form of ontological absolutism akin to the doctrines."

It is difficult to claim conclusiveness in such contested matters, but the nuanced arguments are here presented with admirable philosophical and historical sophistication and in the light of previous and existing scholarship in the field. This book, which also has a translation of the MK appended to it, is therefore to be highly commended.

Occasionally, however, hints of over-enthusiasm seep through like a slow water leak. For instance, the writer holds the author(s) of the GK guilty of the "imposition of an absolutistic ontology onto the mainstream (non-absolutistic) philosophical texts of the Mahaayaana and Yogaacaara schools" (p. 241). Would it not be more accurate to accuse the author(s) of the GK of deriving an absolutistic ontology from the aforementioned texts rather than imposing it on them? In fact, is any kind of accusation really in order? Does the GK claim to present the Buddhist point of view? One may accuse it of using Buddhist grist for its Advaita mill, but Advaita does the same to the Vedic texts. The quest for truth in Hinduism is notoriously source-blind. Christianity appropriates the basic scripture of Judaism, imparts to it its own spin, and then proceeds to use it against Judaism. Christianity could then be accused of imposing its own interpretation on Judaism, but this is a far cry from what the author of the GK is doing with Buddhist ideas. The point, briefly, is that a preoccupation with historical influences may blind one to the existential obviousness of certain procedures. For instance, Natalia Isayeva wondered during the course of an international seminar on Dharma held in July 1997 at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study in Shimla, India, whether the differences in the texture of the four prakara.nas in the GK may not reflect the existential differences in the four states of consciousness dealt with in the GK. -- Worth a thought?