Environmental problematics in the Buddhist context

·期刊原文

Environmental problematics in the Buddhist context

By Kenneth K. Inada

Philosophy East and West

Volume 37, no.2(April 1987) P.135-149

(C) by the University of Hawaii Press
.

P.135

In this century, metaphorically speaking, we have
witnessed the shrinking of the world to a
considerable degree. As rational and concerned
beings, it is incumbent upon us to understand the
full implications of this shrinkage. The nature of
the shrinkage has many dimensions, depending on the
perspectives that are drawn, but for our purposes we
may point to two principal modes of perceptions, the
conceptual and the ontological, both of which are
nonexclusivistic and mutually binding.

On the conceptual side, we may assert that the
world is seen in terms of a single entity or
concept, that all the lands and peoples of the world
and their activities have now come within the
sweeping purview of man. On the ontological side,
the realm of existence is experienced sensually and
physically in terms of which experience a unique
nature is felt and in which all the connections and
relationships become the basis of what we call
reality. In brief, one side is mental (conceptual)
and the other corporeal (sensed). Indeed, knowledge
attendant to both modes of perception has rapidly
advanced and increased due to the marvels of science
and technology, and we live literally in an era of
instant phenomena, even beyond the confines of the
earth, although we must ever be watchful of any
scientific lag that may accrue to cause a disruption
in our lives. All this is well and good, but the
crucial question remains: Are we really at home with
the world? Or, turning inward, are we at home with
our own existence? Do we really know the real nature
of the human condition, the involvement of man with
his surroundings, and, were we to know some measure
of it, can we properly and successfully relate
ourselves to the world at large? The answer may not
be had easily, and may not even be forthcoming; this
state of apprehension is indicative of the plight in
which we presently find ourselves.

Martin Buber once remarked that man not only is
born in the world but with the world. His philosophy
of "I and Thou" precluded any dichotomy or
separation between the two components. More
recently, Paul Weiss has candidly observed:

A philosophy which cannot get beyond personal
commitments or a common language, no matter how
carefully it speaks or how closely it adheres to
current theories, is radically defective. And it
will remain so, I think, if it is unable to allow
one to affirm that there are animals, birds, trees,
hills, rivers, a sun and a moon, even when there are
no men, or when they say nothing abaout these.(1)

These remarks were probably intended for the
narrow positivists, analysts, and linguists, but
they also address broadly all who have a limited
vision of things and who are unable to account for
the holistic nature of things beyond their own
existence. Conceptually and ontologically, there is
no denial today that the total existential realm can
be accommodated and related so as to develop a full
philosophy of nature, and yet the situation is such
that we still lag behind by

P.136

persisting in our narrow, self-imposed and
tradition-bound modes of perception. How then can we
best move out of this restrictive mode? This I
believe is the question that faces us today, and,
without facing it, we may not be able to gather our
resources for understanding the makings of an
environmental ethics. It is here that I wish to
discuss what Buddhist thought can contribute to
alleviate the situation and to develop the proper
holistic mode of perception: a synoptic vision with
a penetrative quality.

The program before us is formidable, and we can
only touch upon the initial conceptual stance and
relate it vitally to the so-called ontological
concreteness of things. By the term, "ontological,"
I do not refer to any entity, thing, or object which
has a separate or independent state of existence or
makes reference to substance-oriented philosophy;
rather, this refers to the inherently intuitive feel
of the total nature of one's existence, something
akin to Heidegger's existential being-in-the-world
concept. It can be said that the so-called elements
of being that we so casually speak of do not in and
of themselves describe being itself. This was the
basic premise of early Buddhist thought, including
that of the historical Buddha, I believe, but it was
made prominent later on by Naagaarjuna in his major
work, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa (Verses in Reference
to the Fundamental Middle Doctrine). Systematically
castigating all forms of self-existence (svabhaava)
or inherently existent nature, Naagaarjuna finally
exhibited the fact that enlightened existence is
completely shorn of the conventionally and
ontologically oriented elements of being. In short,
he got rid of all so-called elemental ontologies but
at the same time he attempted to intimate that a
unique form of reality, tattva or "thatness" of
being, still remains unblemished in the dynamic flow
of existence. In this sense, the usual pluralistic
ontologies that we attach ourselves to in order to
perceive things or life in general were "replaced"
by a kind of dynamic, formless ontology. This is not
at all to be cryptic, nor is it to move into some
indescribable transcendent realm. Naagaarjuna moved,
in short, from ordinary ontologies to a supreme form
of ontology, and, in this specific vein, I have
referred to him as a Supreme Ontologist, much to the
displeasure and puzzlement of a few scholars.

Although we live far removed from the days of
the historical Buddha, the basic doctrines have been
kept remarkably intact, especially in the Theravaada
tradition. With the first rise of the neo-Buddhist
movement, which gradually came to be known as the
Mahaayaana, these doctrines were not abandoned or
destroyed but subjected to a sweeping new and
revolutionary interpretation. Today, we live in an
era where both traditions, Theravaada and
Mahaayaana, have met on relatively neutral ground,
that is, in the non-Asiatic world, to develop yet
another vigorous interpretation of the doctrines.
Not only are the doctrines coming under critical
scrutiny in terms of Western philosophical and
scientific methodology, but the religious
confrontation and dialogue are beginning to take
interesting shapes. This exchange has especially
been initiated from Christian quarters and by those
intellectuals who have sought supplementary

P.137

approaches to life, reflected in the keen interest
in Zen and related meditative disciplines. In this
novel situation, it is quite natural that another
neo-Buddhist movement is subtly emerging from all of
this interaction and that new forms of experiential
data are rapidly appearing on the scene. Perhaps it
would not be remiss to state that the challenge
presented by these developments is a two-way street,
that other non-Buddhist systems are equally being
subjected to a reexamination of their existing
doctrines and to the attendant gradual change.

What we are witnessing today in Buddhism is
analogous to what transpired in China and Japan, for
example, in the creating of their own respective
brands of Buddhism, which came to fruition in China
during the T'ang dynasty and in Japan during the
Kamakura period. Thus the challenge to us today
offers prospects that are most promising. In this
respect, our serious concern with environmental
ethics is forcing us to seek an accommodation with a
long-tested and reliable tradition. We must
therefore meet the challenge with absolute
objectivity, in a spirit of boldness, resolve, and
adventure.

The most representative Buddhist doctrines are
all familiar to us, namely, suffering (du.hkha),
impermanence (anitya), nonself(anaatman), sa.msaara,
nirvaa.na, the middle way (madhyamaa pratipad),
emptiness (`suunyataa) , karman, relational
origination (pratiitya-samutpaada) , wisdom
(praj~naa) , and compassion (karu.naa). A quick
glance at these doctrines will reveal that all focus
on the nature of experiential reality. That is to
say, every doctrine specifically expands on that
nature by revealing either the unenlightened or
enlightened character. Buddhism, of course, took
over this dyadic treatment of man's nature from its
predecessors, Hinduism and Jainism in particular,
but it went beyond to develop its own interpretation
of the suffering of man and the way out. All the
doctrines mentioned above except for nonself, in
their normal definition, are pre-Buddhistic, and yet
close examination will show that each is given a new
twist, a new meaning, as applicable to man's nature.
Still, too many scholars in both East and West have
tended to seek some sort of an identity for or
accommodation to the doctrines and have therefore
linked Buddhism directly, albeit indiscriminately
and unfairly, with Hinduism and Jainism, treating it
as a mere extension, if not an appendage, of these
systems. The linkage still persists in some quarters
today, for old concepts are hard to replace,
especially those burdened by old meanings. No one,
to my knowledge, has gone over the Buddhist
doctrines singly or in toto to bring out the vast
differences that developed as a consequence of the
Buddha's original enlightenment. Usually it is the
other way around; that is, scholars seek to
demonstrate the continuity of these doctrines in the
whole of Indian philosophical and religious
tradition.

Being the children of the intellectual climate
of their times, the Buddha and his immediate
followers had no alternative but to untilize the
existing language to express a new philosophy of
life. It was for them an uphill struggle from the
start, but they persisted and eventually succeeded
despite the linguistic difficulties.They did so
because the doctrines that they expounded expressed
the awesome spirit

P.138

and substance of a new dimension in experiential
reality. And here I would like to emphasize a
principle of being that pervades all the doctrines.
I have already referred to the dyadic nature of the
enlightened and the unenlightened natures, but this
dyadic nature is exhibited in most of the doctrines,
for example, in suffering and nonsuffering,
wholesome and unwholesome natures, permanent and
impermanent natures, and self and nonself. This
observation may seem academic or even pedestrian,
and it could end at this point with an uncritical
acceptance of the dyadic nature. Buddhist doctrines,
however, embody a most unique idea, which, while
allowing the old concepts to remain as they are,
nevertheless revolutionizes them by injecting a new
dimension of being into them.

What, then, is this unique idea? For want of a
better term, I shall refer to it awkwardly as "the
principle of parity of existence" or "the parity
principle of existence" or even "the ontological
parity of reality." Again, we note that Naagaarjuna
crystallized all of Buddhist thought by concluding
in his famous verses that there is no difference
between the realms of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na.(2)
There is still debate over the correct
interpretation of these verses. My interpretation is
that sa.msaara and nirvaa.na fall within the same
realm of existence because of the guiding "parity
principle." That is, the existential elements
relative to sa.msaara and nirvaa.na are one and the
same in form, and their functions have a parity
regardless of unenlightened or enlightened status.
It should be noted that the parity principle was not
discovered by Naagaarjuna or by others in this line;
it was specifically included in the original
teachings of the Buddha. The Buddha said quite
cryptically in reference to the Four Noble Truths:
"He who sees du.hkha sees also the arising of
du.hkha, sees also the cessation of du.hkha, and
sees also the path leading to the cessation of
du.hkha."(3) In the same vein he asserted: "Whatever
is of the nature of arising, all that is of the
nature of cessation."(4) The rising and falling of
activity may be segmented, but these segments find a
common source or ground which does not in itself
differentiate the segments. Indeed, the common
ground of existence is all that each of us has. It
is the alpha and omega of all of life's travails and
of its resolution, if that resolution is forthcoming
at all. In a similar vein, the Majjhima Nikaaya
asserts: "Whoever sees conditioned genesis
(pa.ticcasamuppaada) sees dhamma (truth of
existence); whoever sees dhamma sees conditioned
genesis."(5) Furthermore, in the Itivuttaka, the
Buddha emphatically states: "That monk sees dhamma.
Seeing dhamma he sees me."(6) These statements
indicate an odd identity among the terms used here
and would seem to suggest that some sort of a
mystical unjon is needed in order to understand and
realize the putative equation. Actully, there is
nothing mystical here. In both statements the parity
principle functions to show that the nature or realm
of the terms--dhamma, pa.ticcasamuppaada, and
Buddha--constitutes one and the same function in
their mutually inclusivistic natures.

In early Buddhist thought, we also come across
the following cryptic but profound statement:

P.139

Monks, there is a not-born, a not-become, a
not-made, a not-compounded. Monks, if that unborn,
not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, there
would be apparent no escape from this here that is
born, become, made, compounded.

But since, monks, there is an unborn... therefore
the escape from this here is born, become... is
apparent.(7)

The passage gives a clear indication that
reality has two facets lodged in the selfsame ground
of existence. This singular ground of existence is
assertible because of the parity principle. The
Buddha made it clear from the beginning that
experiential reality is in a sense Janus-like--one
side is conventionally bound (compounded,
conditioned) , the other nonconventionally bound
uncompounded, unconditioned); and yet we thrive without
knowing or sensing the presence of both sides in
tandem or in a mutually supportive sense, because we
are predominantly influenced by the one-dimensional,
empirical nature of things.

As we move on to the Mahaayaana tradition, we
also encounter the parity principle in the
Praj~napaaramitaa Suutras, especially in the
condensed Heart Suutra, containing the oft-quoted
"identity" statement with respect to form (ruupa)
and emptiness (`suunyataa)-actually, it is emptiness
related to all five skandhas, which constitute the
basic framework of Buddhist experiential reality.
These are later refined into other elements of being
(dharmas) and consciousnesses (vij~naanas) , for
example, but they all "come home" to the basic
framework. The so-called identity of form and
emptiness is another refinement of the parity found
in the compounded (conditioned) and uncompounded
(unconditioned) nature of things in the advancement
of the functional framework of the Bodhisattva
Ideal, about which we shall have more to say later.

Naagaarjuna, of course, reiterated the parity
principle of existence in a more dramatic and
systematic way by denying substantive treatment of
everything, since all characteristics of that
treatment, from naive perceptions (realism) to
sophisticated conscious plays (conceptualism), are
unaccountable in any shape or form. Moreover, to
account for anything, "something" besides itself is
involved in perception that denies the sole presence
of the thing. The natural reaction to the statement
just made is: "But then, what is that something? Is
it not just another form of a substance or a part of
the substantive treatment? " The questions are
well-put but not well-grounded. Naagaarjuna will not
fall into a dialectical regression. He will not
accept terms that could lead one away from the
experiential reality, the metacenter of total and
dynamic process. Thus he will deny any discourse on
emptiness, which would lead to nihilism, or on
elements, which would lead to substantialism--two of
the extremes avoided by the Buddha himself. In one
famous verse,(8) he identifies relational origination
(pratiityasamutpaada) with emptiness (`suunyataa)
and the middle way (madhyamaa pratipad). Here he is
exhibiting the fact that experiential reality has
three facets, namely, the empirically grounded
relational nature of the rise of all perceptions or
events, the nonempirical "empty" nature in virtue of
the dynamically relational or dependent nature, and
the total or holistic nature of an enlightened way
of life

P.140

commonly known as the middle way. Any discourse on
any thing belongs only to the first facet, the
empirical realm, but there are the other facets with
which to contend. Since we are empirically bound
from the beginning and must start with this
condition, Naagaarjuna concludes the chapter by
asserting thus:

One who rightly discerns relational origination will
indeed rightly discern the universal nature of suffering,
its origination, its cessation and the way to enlightenment.(9)

This verse clearly affirms the centrality of
relational origination, central in the sense that it
permeates our lives form beginning to end as we
dedicate ourselves to confront the universal nature
of suffering and its resolution. Elsewhere(10) I have
discussed the two strains in Buddhist causality,
that is, in reference to relational origination, to
indicate the nature of the parity principle, without
which the understanding of experience would be
unbalanced and would invariably be weighted in favor
of the empirical side.

In the highly sophisticated and psychologically
oriented system of Yogaacaaravij~naanavaada, we find
the parity principle in function. The unique
eight-vij~naana theory seems very complex and even
too speculative for the ordinary mind to comprehend,
but, in the final analysis, its function is only to
express the preservation of the holistic nature of
experiential reality in which all forms of
perceptions, images, illusions, and consciousness
take place. The theory starts off with ordinary
perceptions, turbulent (prav.rtti) as they are
because of the graspings for the elements of being,
which must ultimately be transformed (paraav.rtti)
by meditative discipline into the purity of
perceptions, where the final state of enlightenment
is in the recognition of the unique nature of
consciousness-only (vij~naptimaatrataa). For, what
has been discriminated in our perceptions (yad
vikalpyate) is not real; it only seems real to one
who attempts to set up the subject in relation to
the elements of the so-called outer realm of
perception; that is, it is a dichotomous perceptual
relation. But this school denies any self-nature
(svabhaava) that arises in the interaction between
subject and object, just as in Madhyamaka thought,
as there is nothing but illusion in the
discriminatory sense (parikalpita-svabhaava,
abhuuta-parikalpa). Just as in Naagaarjuna, the
concept of emptiness is taken over as an epistemic
foil to prevent further substantive accounting of
perceptual data in the consciousness. As perceptions
actually go on in terms of dependent nature
(paratantra), there is only relational structure and
no elements as such, but, ultimately, the true
experiential reality (parini.s panna-svabhaava) is
realized by the complete incorporation of all
elements of being in a nondiscriminative insight
(nirvikalpaj~naana).(11) This is the final perfected
nature of existence, which is sometimes referred to
as the accomplishment of the middle way by virtue of
consciousness-only; thus we return to the basic
Buddhist doctrines. Throughout the perceptual
process, discriminative and non-discriminative, the
same ground of existence is sustained to present man
with the potentiality for and challenge of excelling
himself so as to reach greater realms of being.

P.141

Having established the presence and function of
the parity principle, our task henceforth should not
be too difficult. As intimated earlier, Buddhist
doctrines were spawned in the ambience of prevailing
doctrines of the various schools of thought, but the
meaning of the Buddhist doctrines was given a fresh
twist that could not be justified or accommodated by
merely resorting to the aid of the prevailing
doctrines. In this sense, the whole of Buddhist
thought took on a neologistic appearance. For
example, the doctrine of nonself (anaatman) can be
singled out as the foremost neologism in Buddhism.
No other school, to my knowledge, uses this term
within its system.

The nonself concept is not really the logical
opposite or the contrary to the aatman concept, to
be sure, for it belongs to an entirely different
category of being, so-called, and to this extent it
remains unanalyzable. It can, however, be sensed in
the dynamic experiential reality within the complex
play of the parity principle, that is, the mutual
function of the empirical (conventional) and
nonempirical (roughly nonconventional) natures. In
these natures, what we see is the empirical side and
what we do not see is the nonempirical, in an
anomalous way. For example, it is said that the
grasping phenomenon (upaadaana) relative to the five
skandhas issues forth in the nature of a self or
subject, while the nongrasping phenomenon indirectly
reveals the subtle, unconditioned nature of nonself.
One side is constructive in the conventional sense,
the other nonconstructive; one side is
deterministic, the other nondeterrministic. These
pairs of terms seem to give the impression of
opposition. I contend, however, that the nonself and
all other doctrines that "depict the other side" of
the empirical nature of things are unique and novel
beyond mere diametrical opposition. For, were they
antithetical to each other, this would prevent any
dialectical movement and preclude their function
within the parity of things. In short, the
antithetical elements do not in and of themselves
produce anything, just as empirics in and of
themselves are inane and thoroughly neutral. The
acts of the so-called individual are holistic
always, and the holistic nature is more than a mere
aggregation of the parts or elements of being. Our
empirically and rationally oriented logic simply
cannot contend with or accommodate such neologistic
concepts as nonself or emptiness.

The salient point here is that, though
paradoxical in treating the "other side" of the
empirical, we are able to speculate on certain
traits that may not be extractable from the
empirical realm but are nevertheless very much in
presence and in force in the experiential reality. I
refer to such traits as openness, extensiveness,
flexibility, dynamicity, change, and continuity.
These traits are seemingly common knowledge to all
of us, and yet we fumble in justifying or analyzing
them with our undaunted empirico-logical tools. I am
sure there will be those who would question or
challenge my postion, but here I must turn the
question around and state that the burden of proof
is on them; that is, they must convincingly prove
the nonpresence of these traits in our ordinary
experience. Historically, even David Hume, working
solely within empirical grounds, was at

P.142

his wit's end in attempting to formulate an adequate
answer concerning the nature of causation or the
continuity of events in serial order.

It might help at this point to return to the
concept of emptiness. The key function of emptiness,
as seen earlier, is to foil any empirical and
epistemic thrusts made by the unwary or biased mind.
Specifically, it serves two purposes: the first to
deny empirics from overpowering the perceptual
process, and second to deny the epistemic wheel to
turn in virtue of the elements based on the empirics
or any speculative elements derived thereof. The
concept has a cathartic function in this respect,
but here I should like to add another dimension to
it. It is that at the point of catharsis, emptiness
issues forth simultaneously in a release and
deliverance from empirical natures--or from
nonempirical natures for that matter. Thus, when
emptiness is realized, the ordinary self with its
pervasive skandhic elements becomes more than
itself, larger than itself--larger in the sense that
all the traits just mentioned are fully manifested
and become truly functional. With emptiness, then,
the empirical and the nonempirical realms go hand in
hand without any dichotomy or interruption.
Consequently, openness, extensiveness, continuity,
and so on are part and parcel of the life process,
and we become cognizant of these traits but at the
same time we know not from whence they spring.

When Naagaarjuna, for example, says that he
cannot be criticized because he does not maintain a
position,(12) he is actually invoking the parity
principle to indicate that he is not going to be a
party to the empirico-logical game, since there is
much more to experiential reality than playing a
futile game.(13) He is not able to spell out what is
"beyond" because to do so would be to cater to the
opponent's methodology and his scheme of things. In
short, Naagaarjuna had to avoid the circular,
tautological nature that inheres in a scheme once a
methodology is introduced and accepted. Truth of
existence or the Dharma has an unrestricted
character, and no amount of theorizing can bring it
down to a manipulable level. This is not to deny the
strength of a conceptual scheme. It would be
prudent, however, to heed the cautious advice of
early Mahaayaanists and the later, more dramatic
Zennists: "the concept of emptiness itself must also
be emptied." This is the only way to prevent an
infinite regress into nothingness or toward the
sustenance of something. This brings us to the
middle way concept.

The middle way has no middle, it is often said.
This is, of course, a true statement, for should it
have a middle, then automatically it would have the
two extremes. The middle way does not lend itself to
a dialectical process, either, because all forms of
dialectical function involve an interaction of the
poles or extremes. It would be permissible for the
interaction of entities, physical and otherwise, but
that would at once prevent the realization of the
Supremely Ontological way which possesses neither
boundaries nor limits. The middle way, it is said,
is "equatable"(14) to relational origination and
emptiness. And relational origination in turn is
"equatable'' to the Dharma and the Buddha, the
enlightened nature of things. To be enlightened,
using the illustration of a light,

P.143

is to illuminate in the ten (all or full) directions
and to open up and accommodate every element within
the ambience of existence. This would be the kind of
freedom realizable in nirvaa.na, where all forms of
ontological attachments have been dissolved.

The central thrust of a recent book by Keiji
Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, is to address
specifically the nature of ontological parity. For
emptiness is now discussed in terms of
"being-sive-nothingness, " which emphasizes the
transcendence of duality, wherein being is being and
nothingness is nothingness.(15) Nishitani goes on to
assert: "It is here that emptiness, as a standpoint
of absolute nonattachment liberated from this double
confinement, comes to the fore" and that "being and
emptiness are seen as copresent from the start and
structually inseparable from one another."(16) He
elaborates that emptiness is "the point at which
everything around us becomes manifest in its own
suchn
(17)

The above assertions are in line with what I
have referred to as the parity principle of
existence. They lend support to my view of the
nature of emptiness as pivotal to experiential
extensiveness. Without emptiness as a key ingredient
in experiential reality, experiences cannot move
forward or outward to incorporate all elements
within the realm. This is another way of describing
the temporal and spatial natures of the experiential
reality, that is, the vertical and horizontal
characteristics of reality in process. This is not
to "homogenize" the elements in virtue of emptiness
or suchness but rather to understand the
undifferentiable aspect of experience which makes
way for the absorption and incorporation of those
elements without this incorporation being subjected
to the usual ontologization and abstractive process.
Seen from another point of view, unless such a
nature is present in experience, experience itself
will forever be dictated by the phenomena of
attachment and nonattachment relative to those
elements. Eventually, it would be reduced to a
narrow mechanical process bereft of such human
traits as altruism, sympathy, and love. These traits
are made possible because the nature of emptiness
opens up experiential reality by shunting off those
impetuous empirical elements, preventing them from
arising, and simultaneously ties up the whole realm
of existence in the presence of those very elements.
Things are thus what they are because they are
perceived as being under the aegis of suchness or
emptiness. In this sense, emptiness is a unifying
principle without which the whole experiential
process would not be what it is. By this statement I
am also suggesting that emptiness is not only in the
preserve of the enlightened person but that it could
function even within the common or ordinary
experiences of the unenlightened, although its
nature is uncognized for the most part. Emptiness,
then, not only gives character to the experiential
reality but also stimulates the smooth, open flow of
that reality. And thus it has been established that
emptiness becomes the basis of all forward, and
outward as well as inward, activities and thereby
engenders the truly social basis of experience.
Emptiness is then the key to all human contacts, not
only with fellow human beings but with all beings,
sentient and insentient, in the whole realm of
nature.

P.144

This brings us to the Mahaayaana ideality of
existence--the Bodhisattva Ideal. In the Heart
Suutra, the opening lines assert strongly that the
Bodhisattva in his deep meditative mood saw the
realm of experience, the five skandhas, as totally
empty. This vision came, of course, from the
absolutely objective perception of things in their
completeness and wholeness. The Bodhisattva, of
course is a philosophic myth that depicts the
perfected individual who "delays" his entrance into
nirvaa.na because he is cognizant of the fact that
he and others are related or involved in such a way
that there is openness on the one hand and
extensiveness on the other. It is the perfect model
of social concern and action, somewhat akin to what
Western religionists allude to as the spirit of
ultimate concern. It is at once the perfect model of
environmental concern, whereby the social and
environmental natures of things are treated
together, not in terms of contiguity but in terms of
the continuity of reality. This is an area which
needs to be explored and worked on seriously, since
ordinary minds are incapable of comprehending the
continuity and coexistent nature of reality; indeed,
the two realms of man and environment are taken to
be so vastly different that indifference and even
alienation may be the normal response to a raising
of this issue. Opponents might not entertain such
notions as intimacy, interpenetration, and mutual
identifiability and would thus roundly reject them,
not knowing that the so-called "ontological
blinders" are self-imposed.

From the Buddhist side, the story is different.
There is no problem in accepting such concepts as
identity, coexistence, and interpenetration. The
Bodhisattva's principal features are based on these
concepts, and his unique character has been
described as incorporating both wisdom (praj~naa)
and compassion (karu.naa) . I cannot emphasize
strongly enough the fact that these features are,
through and through, instances of the parity
principle in action, and that acts of wisdom and
compassion, though distinct in their own ways, find
a common ground of existence. That is to say, each
act of wisdom is a manifestation of compassion and,
vice versa, each act of compassion is a
manifestation of wisdom, and so, in the final
analysis, both features collapse into the holistic
ground of experiential reality, which is the truly
enlightened nature of existence. In the two modes of
perception discussed earlier, we may discern certain
parallel features, respectively, in terms of the
conceptual mode (roughly, the "wisdom" side) and the
ontological mode (roughly the "compassionate" side),
but, from the standpoint of action, both are one and
the same in a "self-surpassing oneness," as Nolan P.
Jacobson has persuasively argued.(18)

The acts of the Bodhisattva are, then, a graphic
exemplification of an experiential reality of a free
and open nature, where the conceptual and
ontological modes of perception are no longer
distinct and different but, rather, mutually
supportive and identifiable. This is what we
normally refer to as the infrastructural nature of
things, and, in Avata.msaka or Hua-yen thought, it
refers to the dynamic and mutually identifiable and
penetrative nature of things. Where the Indian
Buddhists were highly metaphysical in describing the
Bodhisattva's life

P.145

and perception of the world, as depicted, for
example, in the Avata.mska Suutra, the Chinese
Buddhists were more down-to-earth and practical in
their application of that perception of the world,
as seen in the various Ch'an (Zen) texts. In all
instances, however, there is an emphasis on the
continuous and harmonious relationship that exists
within the myriad realms of existence, that is,
realms that are both allegedly internal and external
to the experiencing reality of things--indeed, a
relationship that is conversant with both realms,
although the terms internal and external are
arbitrary, and strictly and ultimately metaphysical.
As depicted in the Hua-yen realm of dharmas
(dharmadhaatu) , the final complete realm that
transcends all specifics and principles of being is
at once the realm of ordinary, everyday phenomena,
where everything is everything just as it is,
without distinction, description, or analysis.
Things are what they are because of the total
interpenetration of all elements (dharmas), but
simultaneously they arise by virtue of relational
origination, which involves all elements without
drawing boundaries, limits, or distinctions. This,
in short, is the enlightened view of the mountains
as mountains, as the Zennist would affirm.

It was mentioned earlier that the Supremely
Ontological has no boundaries or limits. It is now
apparent, I believe, that the boundless, unlimited
nature refers to the Bodhisattva's experiential
nature of things and that experience is "thus and
so" (tathataa) by virtue of its openness in all
directions. Thus, I have used the graphic phrase,
"open ontology," which is merely another way of
asserting the Supremely Ontological.(19) Again, this
state of dynamic being is potentially realizable,
but, for the most part, we are in ignorance of it
because we are victims of the empirics which
captivate or lure us into forming the basis for the
usual conceptual and ontological modes of
perception.

We should now examine the nature of ignorance.
The normal understanding of this concept is
naturally on the purely mental or intellectual
plane; that is, one is said to be ignorant when one
does not comprehend matters concerning the empirics.
Nonempirics--for example, an idea of an empirical
datum--may of course fall into the realm of
ignorance. This type of understanding is not only
naive but contagious. It is naive in the sense that
it covers only the "surface" elements of total being
and thereby skirts the very foundation of their
existence. It is contagious in the sense that it is
easily adapted and perpetuated due to the persistent
attachment to empirics or nonempirics, as the case
may be. Consequently, ignorance in the form of not
knowing the fullness of being is perpetuated. In
more technical terms, "avidyaa" is literally the
"no-vision" (without insight; a + vidyaa) of true
reality. In this respect the Buddhist interpretation
provides a novel twist, compared with the orthodox
or traditional Indian views, and I am inclined to
expand on it as the "unciarity of true nature of
being," which is the antithesis of the Supremely
Ontological. The "unclarity of true nature of being"
can be perceived from another standpoint as the
"ontological unclarity of being, " a somewhat
roundabout way of pointing at the obstacle-ridden
state of being that surrounds and obstructs true
experiential reality. In sum, then, the

P.146

nature of Buddhist ignorance is to be a warning
against the temptation to construct or condition
experiential reality in terms of the empirics and
projected nonempirics of existence. However, on a
more positive note, there is a "flip side" to this
damaging egoistic tendency in man, that is, an
openly resilient and expansive nature, which
undergirds the very elements to which we are so
attached. In accordance with my own terminology, we
should then be disciplining our conceptual and
ontological modes of perception so that a glimpse,
if not the whole open vision, of the Supremely
Ontological can be developed into a true
experiential reality.

This discussion has come to the point where we
may draw some conclusions in reference to man and
his environment within the Buddhist context.

1. In describing man's place in the environment,
we should not treat man or the environment as
independent of each other. This is the major premise
upon which all concerns for the environment must
begin. Although this is a simple premise, it is most
difficult to abide by because of man's selfish and
aggressive nature, whether that nature is inherent
or learned. And there are abundant examples of man's
depletion and destruction of our natural resources.

2. In order to stop this wanton depletion and
destruction, we must have a new understanding and,
most importantly, a new vision of things. Here the
original insight of the historical Buddha could come
into play. Rather than taking off on some
metaphysical flight to explain experience, the
Buddha concentrated on man's experiential nature and
came up with a startling insight: a vision of the
open unity, clarity, and continuity of existence. To
involve man's nature is, then, to involve at once
his more extensive and unlimited relationship to his
surroundings. In other words, man is not alone but
thoroughly relational, and the grounds for a
relational nature must be found within man's own
nature and not in something external, to which he
must react on a one-to-one basis. Still, there are
those who would argue that man is by nature an
independent and non-relational creature, except on
occasions where it serves his egoistic desires to
relate with others, as Thomas Hobbes has so cogently
contended.(20)

3. The clue to understanding the relational bind
is discovered by seeking a way through man's own
nature and uncovering the possibility of an
unhindered continuous relationship or, more
technically, the existential continuum, or what I
prefer to describe more precisely as an open and
freely flowing extensive ontology. The Buddha's
enlightenment showed the way to the coterminous and
coextensive relationality of man and nature; that
is, any act by man, however insignificant it may be
within the total context of things, reverberates
through the realm that is greater than himself. This
possibility is crystalized in the parity principle
of existence. This is where the sa.msaaric nature of
things is not alienated form the nirvaa.nic content,
nor is the nirvaa.nic content aloof from the
sa.msaaric nature of things. Enlightenment or
nirvaa.na is at once the confirmation and revelation
of the parity principle in function.

P.147

4. In the Mahaayaana tradition, there has been a
further development of the parity principle through
a focus on the epistemic nature of things; that is,
the dichotomous nature of perception is made
apparent, and it is asserted that the real
foundation of it is the nature of emptiness.
Paradoxically, it is emptiness which gives substance
to the perceptual elements themselves and which
serves as the ground for the relational function.
The alternative, as we are so accustomed to do with
indifference, would be to give primacy to the
perceptual elements and thereby fall prey to some
forms of realism, empiricism, conceptualism,
phenomenalism, and so on, all of which would only
multiply and complicate the problems that attend the
experiential process. The Buddha stood fast with the
doctrine of the middle way and did not budge one way
or the other with any theory concerning the elements
and structural mechanics of the perceptual process.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It should be apparent by now that the problematics
in environmental concerns and the establishment of
an ethical basis for existence are really the
problematics relative to man's understanding of his
own experiential process. Man's own constitutive
nature in the process is the key to an understanding
of the relationality of the total ambience,
extending it as far as one would like it to go.
There are no boundaries or limits in this respect,
for the mutuality of man and the environment in
which he finds his place is continuous and kept
intact at all times.

The damage already done to our environment
undoubtedly will have serious consequences to our
own well-being now and in the future. There is no
turning back the environment clock. The mutuality of
man and his environment is ever dynamic and the
tension between them will inevitably become apparent
in signs of"wear and tear" on both sides. We must do
our best to slow down the deteriorating conditions,
and, if it is at all possible, work judiciously
toward the ideal of a healthy balance between the
two. The important point is that it is still within
man's means to do something about the problem.
Science and technology are man's province, and he is
still the master of both. Yet, there must be an
enlightened approach to solving the problem through
reason; at the same time, reason must reach down, so
to speak, to become a part of the very basis of
man's constitutional makeup in order to help
alleviate the situation. This may sound mystical
again, but from a Buddhist standpoint, reason is
still a relatively small, though vital, component of
existence; thus it must not be kept apart from
existence but instead must be integrated within the
larger experiential nature of things. It should not,
in short, stand in the way of the experienial
process. This is the Buddhist approach, and, I must
admit, it is not easy to comprehend either its
implications or the function of its various
doctrines, which emerge from the proper
understanding of the experiential process, the
relational origination of things. We certainly need
to reexamine and refocus this process in order
actively to be involved in the setting of goals in
environmental ethics. Short of this kind of
involvement, the Buddhist way will fall on deaf
"empirical" ears and be taken

P.148

as a mere conceptual fantasy. As is often said,
Buddhist concepts are nonconceptualizable in the
final analysis. But this raises the disturbing
possibility that the concepts could remain dormant
by default.

Finally, there are environmentalists at work
today who are producing much valuable work. For
example, I was fascinated by a recent book by
Kenneth E. Boulding, The World as a Total
System.(21) In it the author discusses the various
types of systems perceived by man, with a
considerable amount of detailed analysis on each
system, including the world as a physical system, a
biological system, a social system, an economic
system, a political system, a communications system,
and an evaluative system. The author's argument is
quite persuasive in its systemic style and
methodology, but I have misgivings: the conceptions
of these various systems, however effective and
profoundly applicable they may be to our society,
fail to relate to the very basis of man's own
perceptual and constitutional makeup. To this
extent, the whole work is limited to being another
noble attempt at coming to grips with a conceptual
world structure and the problems attendant upon it.
It does not deal specifically with the whys and
wherefores of the systems themselves. In
consequence, we are left with substantial and
pertinent data, while we are still searching for a
philosophy which harmoniously blends man and all of
nature.

NOTES

1. John B. Cobb, Jr., and Franklin I. Gamwell,
eds., Existence and Actuality: Conversations with
Charles Hartshorne (Chicago, Illinois: University of
Chicago Press, 1984), p. 116.

2. Naagaarjuna, Nuulamadhyamakakaarikaa, XXV,
19, 20.

3. Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New
York: Grove Press, 1974), p. 27.

4. Ibid., p.31.

5. I. B. Horner, trans., The Middle Length
Sayings (Majjhima-nikaaya) , 1, The First Fifty
Discourses (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1954), p.
237.

6. F. L. Woodward, trans., The Minor Anthologies
of the Pali Canon, part 2, Itivuttaka: As it Was
Said (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, 1948), p. 181.

7. Ibid., part 1, Udaana: Verses of Uplift, p.
98.

8. Naagaarjuna, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, XXIV,
18.

9. Ibid., XXIV, 40.

10. Kenneth K. Inada, "Two Strains in Buddhist
Causality," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12 (1985):
49-56.

11. For a brief analysis of the eight-vij~naana
theory, see D. T. Suzuki, Studies in the
La^nkaavataara Suutra (London: George Routledge &
Sons, Ltd., 1930), pp. 169-201. See also Tri.m`sikaa
(Thirty verses), verses 20, 21, 22.

12. Naagaarjuna, Vigrahavyaavartanii, 29.

13. This may remind the reader of Wittgenstein's
frustration, expressed in his preface to the
Philosophical Investigations, that he could not
bring the stray aphoristic notes together into a
unified system and has left that work for others to
do. For his part, he did his best to leave us with
an insightful system of thought--however unfinished
it may have been; indeed, that may well be his
greatest gift. From the Buddhist point of view, I
suspect that he was hinting at the reality of things
along Buddhist lines, but ultimately he could not
find an opening for a solution to the linguistic
game because he could not rise above the game in an
interpenetrative sense. He simply could not grasp
either the nature of emptiness in the Buddhist sense
or the parity principle that functions all along in
the experiential nature of things--language, logic,
and empirics included.

P.149

14. I am tempted to substitute other rarely used
terms such as isomorphism or homomorphism. The
similarity or parallel is there, but, again, one
must be extremely careful, for one may be treading
on thin ice when making such substitutions. At best,
all terms are direction posts or symbols of the
reality intended.

15. Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness,
trans. with an introduction by Jan van Bragt
(Berkeley, California: University of California
Press, 1982), p. 97.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 90.

18. Nolan P. Jacobson. Buddhism & the
Contemporary World: Change and Self-correction
(Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1983). See especially the last chapter on
"The Self-surpassing Oneness," pp. 151-163.

19. It should be made clear that Supremely
Ontological or Supreme Ontology, though capitalized,
is not a metaphysical principle. It is not the First
or Final Cause with a sweeping deductive
connotation, as seen in many religious doctrines. It
is radically supreme in its openness and resiliency,
but such features are neither definable nor
describable by resorting to a so-called object
language. But where all forms of objective
conditions are removed or detached, there will
emerge instantly in its natural (neutral) habitat
the pure, bright, full Ontological nature. The
search for the riddle of existence must start
somewhere, to be sure, but I am inclined to believe
that the Buddha's solution focuses on this key area:
the problematics and dynamics of the
conceptual-ontological modes framed within the
potentially wider and open texture of experiential
reality.

20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael
Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962). See
especially part 1, where he develops his theory of
man's nature and the necessity for a covenant.

21. Kenneth E. Boulding, The World as a Total
System (Beverly Hills, California: Sage
Publications, Inc., 1985) . Previously, Boulding
published a brilliant work, Ecodynamics: A New
Theory of Societal Evolution (Sage Publications,
Inc., 1978, 1981), which has had a great impact on
environmental concerns and developments. This
present work of his is an extension of the earlier
one.