A refutation of the Sāṁkhya theory in the Yogācārabhūmi

·期刊原文

A refutation of the Sāṁkhya theory in the Yogācārabhūmi

By Mikogami, Esho

Philosophy East & West

V. 19 (1969) pp. 443-447

Copyright 1969 by University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, USA

p. 443

Recent studies have shown the great importance of Buddhist theories in the general evolution of Indian speculation. As far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, the doctrines of Yogācāra Buddhism occupy an important place-The Yogācārabhūmi is the masterpiece of Asaṅga, one of the eminent scholars of the Yogācāra school. In this work Asaṅga has refuted his opponent's views, which are divided into sixteen items.

Three of the items concern the Sāṁkhya theory ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya, a great scholar of Sāṁkhya, who lived in the fourth century A.D.1 In this paper, it is my aim to clarify the item which Asaṅga entitles

"Refutation of the theory which states that the effect appears from its cause."

It is not easy to clarify this debate for several reasons. The opponent's views are ambiguous and the argument itself is not clear- The standpoint of Asaṅga in regard to these polemic items is also ambiguous. Moreover, al­though portions of Asaṅga's standpoint can be clearly seen, we are confronted with fragments from which it is difficult to deduce a coherent standpoint of his thought as a whole. Under these circumstances, however, an attempt to clarify this debate is necessary, at least as a stage in the study of the theory of knowledge in the Yogācārabhūmi ,for this debate leads to the establishment of a criterion for determining which parts represent the standpoint of the Yogācārabhūmi and which parts represent that of the Sāṁkhya.

The theory which states that an effect appears from its cause is known in India by the name hetuphalābhivyaktivāda. This theory is closely connected with the theory which states that an effect preexists in its cause, generally known as satkāryavāda, but called hetuphalasadvāda in the Yogācārabhūmi . With regard to the theory of causation, the Sāṁkhya holds that the production of an effect only means an actual transformation (pariṇāma) of the cause, that the effect exists in the cause in a potential form, and that just a little loosening of the obstructions which stand in the way of the appearance of the effect will produce the desired effect.

Asaṅga's argument reads as follows;2 (1) Here, one who holds the theory which states that effect appears from cause should be criticized.

Do you mean that the obstruction (āuara ṇa')to the appearance of effect exists when a cause which has the obstruction (āvaraṇa-kāraṇa') to the appearance of effect exists, or when it does not exist ?

Esho Mikogami is a Lecturer of Studies in Buddism, Ryukokii University, Kyoto, Japan.

1 Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Note on Vārṣagṇya and the Yogācārabhūmi ," Iiido-Iranian Journal VI (1962), 137-140; G. Oberhammer, "The Authorship of the ṣaṣtitantram,11 Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens und archiv für indische philosophic ^WZKSO) IV (1960), 71-91; "Die Erkentnislehre

des Kiassischen Sāṁkhya Systems Von Erich Frauwallner," WZKSO II (1958), 84-129; Esho Mikogami, "A Refutation of the Theory of Paramānu in the Yogācārabhūmi, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XV, no. 2 (1967), 261-264.

2 My own free translation from Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi, ed. V. Bhatacharya (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1957), pp. 120-122.

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If you say it does not exist, then there is a contradiction that the appear­ance of effect is obstructed although the cause which has the obstruction to the appearance of effect is absent.

If you say it exists, then there is a contradiction that the cause bound with its effect is not obstructed although the cause which has the obstruction exists. Just as when water in a pot is covered by darkness, the pot is also covered by it.

If you say the cause bound with its effect is also obstructed by the cause which has the obstruction, then there is a contradiction that the cause bound with its effect cannot appear although its effect which exists in the cause appears.

(2) Is the nature of existence the cause which has the obstruction or is the nature of effect the cause which has the obstruction ?

If you say the nature of effect is the cause which has the obstruction, then there is a contradiction that that which exists never appears although its cause exists.

If you say the nature of effect is the cause which has the obstruction, then there is a contradiction that a thing is cause and effect at the same time. Just as a sprout is the effect of a seed and the cause of a stalk. Then there is a contradiction that something is appearing and is nonappearing at the same time.

(3) Do you mean that that which appears is different from cause, or not?

If you say it is not different, then there is a contradiction that that which always appears appears.

If you say it is different, then do you mean that that which appears has cause, or that which appears has no cause ?

If you say that which appears has no cause, then there is a contradiction that a thing appears from no cause. If you say that which appears has cause, then there is a contradiction that that which appears is that which has become effect and that which does not appear at the same time.

(4) Hence, a theory which states that effect appears from cause is not acceptable in the following cases : (i) that the cause which has the obstruction to the appearance of effect exists, or it does not exist; (ii) that the nature of effect is the cause which has the obstruction, or the nature of existence is;

(iii) that that which appears is different from cause, or not.

(5) Therefore anything that does not exist has not the nature of existence and anything that exists has the nature of it. That which does not appear means nonexistence of that which does not exist; that which appears means existence of that which exists.

But I say that even when things exist, the marks of existence are not perceived in the following six cases: (i) remoteness (viprakarṣāt), (ii) the four obstructions (caturbhir āvaraṇakāraṇair āvṛitatvāt), (iii) subtlety (sūkṣmāt), (iv) inattention of mind (cittavikṣepāt), (v) defect of the organs

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(indriyoparamaramopaghātāt) and (vi) not capable of obtaining the idea corresponding to an object (tatpratisaṁyuktajñānāpratilambhāt).

This fifth section is very important in that Asaṅga expresses his thoughts on the theory which states that an effect appears from its cause. The Chinese commentator explains that this portion refers to the established doctrine of the Yogācārabhūmi in which Asaṅga refutes the Sāṁkhya theory as not acceptable.3 In this connection Professor Ui holds a different opinion, in which he points out the interesting fact that the six cases stated above are very similar to the seventh verse of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā.4

The seventh verse reads as follows:

Things remain imperceptible on account of (1) remoteness (atidūrāt), (2) great nearness (sāmīpyāt), (3) defect of the organs (indriyaghātāt), (4) in­attention of the mind (mano 'navasthānāt), (5) subtlety (sankṣmyāt), (6) obstructions (vyavadhānāt), (7) predominance (abhibhavāt), and (8) inter­mixture with like objects (samānābhihārāt) 5

According to Professor Ui, the six cases referred to above were adopted from the Sāṁkhya theory and it is doubtful that this section refers to the doctrine of the Yogācārabhūmi .

Now, there arises the question of whether this section refers to the doctrine of the Yogācārabhūmi or not. Paying due consideration to their contextual meaning in the Yogācārabhūmi , it is very clear that this section does refer to the doctrine of Yogācārabhūmi . Throughout these debates, "I" refers to Asaṅga and 'you' refers to the opponent. In the above sentence, that is, "I say that even when things exist, the marks of existence are not perceived in the following six cases," "I" refers to Asariga and the 'that' clause refers to the opinion of Asaṅga himself.

Thus Professor Ui's point brings us to the problem of whether the ideas of the six cases belong to the Yogācāra or to the Sāṁkhya. In this regard, we may refer to the interpretations on the seventh verse of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā.

The Gauḍapādabhāṣya states: "Now one might urge: the Nature and the Spirit are not perceived; that which is not perceived in this world, does not exist; therefore, the two also do not exist, like a second head or a third hand. To this it is to be said: in this world, things even when existing, are not perceived due to eight causes."6 (Sāṁkhya Kārikā's seventh verse is stated here.)

We can learn from this passage that the seventh verse is designed for the

3 Yugaronki, Taisho Shinshu Daisokyo (Tokyo: Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Kanko Kai, 1927), 42, 344 b-c.

4 Hakuju Ui, Yugaron Kenkyu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958), pp. 227-228.

5 See Sāṁkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Gauḍapādabhāṣya, ed. with trans. by T, G. Mainkar (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1964), pp. 21-22.

6 Ibid.

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arguments defending the existence, though unmanifested (avyakta), of the Nature (pradhāna) and the Spirit (puruṣa).

One is unexpectedly surprised when one examines the portion in which Asaṅga expresses his critical thought on the theory of the Sāṁkhya—which states that an effect appears from its cause—and compares it with the passage in the Gauḍapādabhāṣya.

The Yogācārabhūmi reads: "Therefore anything that does not exist has not the nature of existence and anything that exists has the nature of it. That which does not appear means non-existence of that which does not exist; that which appears means existence of that which exists." This rather ambiguous passage means: If a thing exists, it appears to an observer, but if a thing does not exist, it does not appear to an observer; that the object does not appear to an observer means that the object does not exist, and that the object appears to an observer means that the object exists.

The above section precisely corresponds to the criticism of the opponent who rejects the existence of the Nature and the Spirit in the Gauḍapādabhāṣya.

Nevertheless, the statement in the Yogācārabhūmi, "But I say that even when things exist, the marks of existence are not perceived in the following six cases," refers to the established doctrine of the Yogācārabhūmi. But in the case of the Gauḍapādabhāṣya, the statement corresponding to it refers to the answer of the Sāṁkhya to the opponent.

According to the Yogācārabhūmi, this section refers to the established doc­trine of the Yogācārabhūmi in which Asaṅga denies the existence of a thing which does not appear. On the contrary, according to the Gauḍapādabhāṣya, this section refers to the arguments defending the theory which admits the existence of a thing which does not appear.

If this section concerning the six cases belongs to the Sāṁkhya, the refuta­tion of the Sāṁkhya theory in the Yogācārabhūmi will become meaningless. On the other hand, unless we presume that this section belongs to the Sāṁkhya, we cannot understand the passage from the Gauḍapādabhāṣya as quoted above.

To solve this puzzle, we may refer to a different description from the standpoint of the Sāṁkhya in the Yuktidīpikā. It is as follows:7 "If it is understood that all things beyond the senses are perceived by a kind of inference (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa), then it follows that these things which are im­perceptible by another instrument are also perceived by it." (This remark is then followed by the seventh verse of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā and its interpreta­tion from the standpoint of the opponent.) "Therefore, it is not reasonable that all things beyond senses are things which are perceived by inference."

7 See Yuktidīpikā, ed. Pulinbehari Chakravarti (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1938), pp. 51-52.

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To refute the opponent's criticism, it goes on to say: "If there is anything imperceptible by another instrument, then it can be perceived by a kind of inference (sāmānyato dṛṣṭa). (After this is placed the interpretation of the seventh verse of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā from the standpoint of the Sāṁkhya.)

This shows us the following facts: The seventh verse was used by the opponent to refute the Sāṁkhya theory. But with the passage of time the Sāṁkhya adopted the opponent's view to cover the weak point in the Sāṁkhya theory.

Let us note the fact that Asaṅga refuted the Sāṁkhya theory ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya and not the theory of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā. "Under these circum­stances, the section in question refers to the established doctrine of the Yogācārabhūmi.

The examination of this debate leads us to the following conclusions. The standpoint of the Yogācārabhūmi is that anything that exists is perceived and anything that does not exist is not perceived. There are six exceptional cases. Asaṅga criticizes the Sāṁkhya theory which states that the effect appears from the cause, by pointing out the fact that things which appear exist and things which do not appear do not exist. Therefore, this Sāṁkhya theory becomes contradictory because it holds the view that the effect which appears exists and the cause which does not appear also exists.

The Sāṁkhya's opinion on this polemic is as follows : The effect that appears exists and the cause that does not appear exists, because we can see the eight cases in which even though things exist they do not appear to an observer. But it must be pointed out that the eight cases in the Sāṁkhya theory were adopted at a later time.