Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger

·期刊原文

Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger

and Dogen by Steven Heine

STEVE ODIN

JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 14 (1987)

pp.249-257

COPYYRIHGT @ 1987 BY DIALOGUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, HONOLULU

HAWAII, U.S.A.

.

p.249

Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in
Heidegger and Dogen by Steven Heine is an excellent new study
which makes a significant contribution to our understanding
of Japanese Buddhism and EastWest comparative philosophy.
Grounded in the original German language edition of
Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) as well as the
Japanese language edition of Dogen's Shobogenzo(a) (Treasury
of the True Dharma-Eye) , Heine's work goes far in
successfully realizing its stated aim of establishing a
"framework for philosophical dialogue between Heidegger and
Dogen through an examination of their analyses of the true
nature, structure and meaning of time in terms of a
convergence of existential and ontological dimensions." (p.
ix) The inclusion of a new annotated translation of the
Uji(b) or "Being-Time" chapter of Dogen's Shobogenzo further
adds to the value of Heine's book.
Heine argues that Heidegger and Dogen are uniquely suited
for critical comparative and cross-cultural study not only
because both attempt to overcome the deficiencies of their
respective philosophical traditions on the subject of time,
but also insofar as both thinkers "reorient our understanding
of all phases of existence and experience in terms of time
and temporality,death and dying,finitude and impermanence..."
(p. ix) In Chapter 1 of his work entitled "The Question of
Time" he cites Heidegger's assertion that "our treatment of
the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central
problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of
time..." (p. 14) This fundamental inseparability of being and
time established by Heidegger's work Sein and Zeit is then
related to Dogen's famous Zen Buddhist doctrine of uji or
"being-time." In this context Heine cites Dogen's
proclamation from the "Uji" chapter

P.250

of his Shobogenzo which states: "time itself (ji) already is
none other than being(s) (u); and being(s) are all none other
than time." (p. 28)
In Chapter 2 entitled "The Origin of Derivative Time"
Heine analyzes the attempted overcoming of derivative time in
the thought of both Heidegger and Dogen. Heine develops
Heidegger's analysis accord to which Being in its primordial
sense of "presencing" (Anwesenheit) becomes reduced to the
objectified status of a substantial entity (ousia). (p. 36)
As Heine points out, for Heidegger the "inauthentic"
(uneigentlich) mode of existence is a state of "falling"
(Verfallen) in which Dasein is preoccupied with the present.
(p. 61) In falling, everything primordial and mysterious is
considered obvious and self-evident, and the dynamism of
primordial temporality is reduced to mere derivate time or
clock-time conceived as a series of static now-points.(p. 42)
According to Heidegger's critique of Western philosophy from
Plato to Nietzsche, it is this derivative notion of time as a
succession of substantial "nows" based on an inauthentic
preoccupation with the present which generates false
conceptions of eternalism. Heine next relates Heidegger's
critique of derivative time to Dogen's criticism of what
Japanese Buddhism terms sennigedo(c) or the "Senika heresy,"
which refers to the false eternalization and
substantialization of mujo-bussho(d) or "impermanence-
Buddha-nature." Heine writes: "In 'Bussho' Dogen exposes a
variety of misconceptions permeating Mahayana and Zen
theories and practices that stem from fundamentally
derivative views of being-time. Buddha-nature, he suggests,
is frequently posited as an eternal substance which is actual
yet transcendent of moral causation and the life-death
process..." (p. 58)
In Chapter 3 entitled "Finitude and Impermance" Heine
analyzes how notions of derivative time are finally overcome
through the disclosure of radical contingency pervading all
existence, revealed in terms of Heidegger's notion of
"finitude" (Endlichkeit) and Dogen's interpretation of
"impermanence" (mujo(e)). Heine asserts:

The notion of finitude in Heidegger's understanding of
Being and the interpretion of impermanence in Dogen's
approach to Zen have a parallel role for each thinker's
project in terms of overcoming fixations with substance
and attachments to

p.251

eternalism, and in establishing the basis for a
realization of the dynamism, unity and insubstantiality
of primordial time. (p.71)

Heine further argues that although Heidegger's notion of
finitude and Dogen's idea of impermanence are quite distinct
in terms of many of the conclusions drawn by each thinker,
both concepts function similarly insofar as they point to the
radical contingency of existence, ontologically revealed
through "nothingness" which pervades man's existential
encounters with vicissitude, anxiety, dying and loss. (p. 71)
In the case of Heidegger, Heine asserts that Dasein's
"authentic" (eigentlich) existence as a Being-in-time is the
ontological-temporal bails for its"existenzial disclosure of
finitude as Being-thrown-unto-death or
Being-towards-the-end." (p. 74) At this point Heine relates
Heidegger's notion of authentic finite existence as
Being-in-time and Being-towards-death to the Zen Buddhist
thought of Dogen, which maintains that 'the fundamental
significance of impermanence is directly and inseparably
related to an ontological/existential realization of the
Buddhist truth of non-self (muga, (f) the thoroughgoing
insubstantiality of human and phenomenal existence)." (p. 75)
Thus Heine concludes: "Heidegger and Dogen share a
concentration on death and dying as the extreme experiential
point for the convergence of the dimensions of existential
decision and ontological disclosure concerning radical
contingency," adding that "death penetrates every moment of
and aspect of life, so that the ways one encounters his dying
becomes normative for his approach toward living." (p. 97)
Finally, in Chapter 4 entitled "Primordial Time" Heine
describes the dynamic existential and ontological unity of
non-substantive temporality as developed by Heidegger in
terms of his notion of "primordial time" (ursprugliche Zeit)
and by Dogen in terms of what he calls the "truth of
being-time" (uji no dori(g)). At the outset of this chapter
Heine writes: The aim of the exposition of primoridal time by
Heidegger and Dogen is to show that true temporality...is
fundamentally and essentially interrelated with and
inseparable from existence." (p. 105) Throughout this
chapter, Heine not only emphasizes the inseparability of
being and time, but also the total dynamism, unity and
nonsubstantiality of pri-

p.252

mordial time for both Heidegger and Dogen. Moreover, he
emphasizes that by means of their respective notions of
primordial time, both Heidegger and Dogen attempt a radical
overcoming of substance and eternalist ontology derived from
linear now-time. However, at this point Heine sharply
distinguished the positions of these two thinkers. He
repeatedly argues that for Heidegger, primordial and
authentic time is futural, based on the resolute
"anticipation" of one's projected possibilities; Dasein's
fallenness is always associated with the present. Although
Dogen refutes the "now" that has been isolated from existence
and from past and future, he ultimately affirms the
simultaneity of all three tenses within the here-and-now of
each dynamic and totalistic moment based on the experience of
genjokoan(h) or "the immediate and complete manifestation of
Zen realization." (pp. 31, 137, 140, 143) On this basis,
Heine further argues: "Thus the central existential
difference between Heidegger and Dogen is that Dogen insists
that the True Man must not await, expect or anticipate the
arrival of the presencing of time because he penetrates
insubstantiality here-and-now." (p. 141)
Although Heine's book succeeds well in its aim at
establishing a framework for philosophical dialogue between
Heidegger and Dogen on the problem of time, many scholars
might seriously question the balance and neutrality of his
dialogue. For in fact, Heine repeatedly employs the Zen
Buddhist thought of Dogen as a standpoint from which to
criticize the limitations of Heidegger's philosophy of time.
For instance, he writes:

It will be shown that whereas Heidegger's analysis of
now-time leads to an emphasis on the priority of future
and past and to an inability to disclose the temporality
of entities, Dogen overcomes the inauthentic static
now-point through disclosure of the all-inclusive
simultaneous passage (kyoryaku) of the three tenses
encompassing all phenomena. (p. 36)

However, some would no doubt argue that Heidegger's account
has not failed to disclose the temporality of existence, but
has in fact brilliantly described the dynamic interplay of
all three tenses in the continuity of primordial time while
yet carefully distinguishing the unique phenome-

p.253

nological characteristics of each tense in a way not
sufficiently articulated in Dogen's analysis. Thus, in order
to balance his discussion it seems incumbent upon Heine to
consider how one might also criticize Dogen from the
standpoint of Heidegger's analysis.
Perhaps my most serious criticism of Heine's analysis is
that although it provides an excellent description of the
"continuity" central to Dogen's idea of uji or "being-time,"
it completely fails to underscore the radical discontinuity
which this theory also involves. In his account of Dogen's
theory of being-time Heine emphasizes that the immediate
experience of nikon(i) or "right here-and-now" does not give
rise to the Senika heresy of eternalizing Buddha-nature or
substantializing the 'now" since it is counter-balanced by
the notion of kyoryaku(j) -comprehended as "totalistic
passage" in the sense of "experiential continuity." In
Heine's words: "Dogen further avoids any confusion of nikon
with a newly derivative eternalism by stressing the temporal
depth and experiential breath of the right-now in terms of
the notion of experiential continuity or totalistic passage
(kyoryaku)." (p. 129) Elsewhere in his text, Heine refers to
this notion of kyoryaku or "experiential continuity" as
denoting the idea of "continuous passage" (p.127) or the
"continuity of time" (p.181). Along with the consciousness of
nikon or "right here-and-now," it is this awareness of
kyoryaku or "continuous passage" which constitutes the
primordial experience of being-time according to Heine's
analysis of Dogen. Although Heine's explication of being-time
in terms of what herms of what he calls "the dual notions of
nikon and kyoryaku" (p.143) is in itself illuminating, it
wholly neglects the radical discontinuity which many scholars
regard as primary in Dogen's concept of mujo or impermanence
and uji or being-time. For instance, in his work entitled
Dogen Kigen-Mystical Realist, Hee-jin Kim emphasizes that
there is an 'ultimacy of discontinuity" in Dogen's Zen
Buddhist theory of being-time.(1) As Kim explains, for Dogen
each discontinuous "dharma-position" (ju-hoi(k)) constitutes
the whole of "being-time" (uji) as an "absolute now" (nikon),
comprehended as the self-actualization of the total presence
of the Buddha-nature. Kim further elaborates:

p.254

This is a radical rejection of the flow of time, or the
stream of consciousness, or any other conception of time
based on the idea of continuity or duration. That is,
time is absolutely discrete and discontinuous. This
characteristic is primary in Dogen's thought.(2)

Moreover, this "ultimacy of discontinuity" at the base of
Dogen's Zen Buddhist thought further raises a question as to
the adequacy of a Heideggerean interpretation of uji or
being-time. For in fact, Heidegger phenomenologically
describes primordial time as being purely "ecstatic" (ek-
static) and "continuous" (kontinuierlich) . Accordingly,
throughout his analysis of Heidegger's thought, Heine
repeatedly emphasizes this uninterrupted "continuity"
(Kontinuitat) or "ecstatic-horizonal" unity of primordial
time along with the undivided "continuity of Dasein." (pp.
116-118) To give just one example, Heine states: "Temporality
is the ekstatikon pure and simple by whith Dasein views
itself as temporalhistorical unity and individualized
continuity of finite transcendence, rather than as a
collection of isolated yet serially connected time units."
(pp. 116-17) Yet, neither in Heidegger nor in Heine's account
of Heidegger can one discover anything comparable to the
"ultimacy of discontinuity" in Dogen's theory of being-time.
In a chapter of his book Zen and Western Thought entitled
"Dogen on Buddha-Nature," Abe Masao also emphasizes this
radical discontinuity of being-time in Dogen's theory of
mujo-bussho or "impermanenceBuddha-nature," writing: "Dogen
denies continuity of time and emphasizes the independence of
each point of time... "(3) He adds: "Only by the realization
of the complete discontinuity of time and of the independent
moment... does time become real time."(4) Yet, in Dogen's
concept of uji or being-time, primordial temporality is not
merely discontinuous, since it also flows continuously as is
denoted by the concept of kyoryaku (continuous passage). For
this reason Abe further asserts: "However, in spite of the
complete discontinuity of time and independent moment, time
flows. This is kyoryaku, i.e., seriatim passage..."(5) Hence,
for Dogen there is a profound sense in which being-time is
both discontinuous and continuous. In this context,I would
argue

p.255

that Dogen's theory of being-time is best comprehended from
the stand-point of Japan's foremost 20th century speculative
philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), who argues that the
unity of time is itself a "continuity of discontinuity"
(hirenzoku no renzoku) .(1) Thus, in his work entitled
Tetsugaku no kompon mondai.(Fundamental Problems of Philo-
sophy)Nishida writes:

As I have said before, the unity of the individual cannot
be thought of as simply a continuity, rather, it must be
a continuity of discontinuity, so as to constitute the
unity of independent beings with every step. Each moment
of time passes into the next moment by negating itself,
hence establishing the unity of time.(6)

Nishida specifically refutes the position held by
conventional Western substance philosophy which conceives of
time as a series of discrete now-points, i.e., as a mere
"discontinuity" (hirenzoku(m)),yet, he also repudiates the
concept of time as pure duration or "continuity" (renzoku(n))
as held by such philosophers as Bergson, Husserl or
Heidegger. Instead, the unity of time constituting the true
self can only be described as a "discontinuous continuity,"
or as it were, a "continuity of discontinuity." From this
perspective Nishida further argues that the discontinuous
continuity of temporal experience results in a heightened
existential awareness of death and nothingness at every
moment: "For the individual to be connected to the following
moment as the continuity of discontinuity it is necessary
that one die at this moment and enter into nothingness."(7)
In the West, this Japanese Buddhist view of primoridal
time as discontinuous continuity has received its clearest
articulation by the process thought of Alfred North Whitehead.
In his earliest philosophical text entitled An Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge Whitehead,
like Heidegger, rigorously protests against the standpoint of
conventional substance philosophy and scientific materialism
which regards time as a series of discrete now-points,
arguing that "we do not perceive isolated facts,but a
continuity of existence."(8) However,in a

p.256

later work entitled Science and the Modern World, Whitehead
makes a radical shift from temporal continuity to "temporal
atomicity," now arguing that the notion of "discontinuous
existence"(9) introduced by recent quantum theory has
prompted him to completely revise his description of physical
reality. Whitehead's so-called "epochal" theory of time as a
discontinuous continuity finally culminates in Process and
Reality, wherein he argues that due to the discontinuity or
quantum characteristic of each becoming and perishing
occasion, temporal passage involves not a "continuity of
becoming," but a "becoming of continuity."(10) In other
words, there is a new "creation of continuity" within each
discontinuous occasion of temporal experience. Moreover, for
Whitehead this discontinuous continuity of temporal passage
is the basis for an existential awareness of death at every
moment, namely, a tragic sense of time as "perpetually
perishing."(11) For this reason I would argue that
Whitehead's process cosmology provides what is possibly the
most adequate Western categoreal scheme by which to cognize
the theory of time as a "continuity of discontinuity"
developed by both Dogen and Nishida in Japan. Indeed, in a
footnote Heine himself remarks that "Whiteheadian process
philosophy of the harmonious and dynamic universe of
prehensive events and developing organisms perhaps poses a
significant challenge to Heidegger's Dasein-oriented approach
to the question of time." (p. 164) In this context, I have
considered the extent to which Whitehead's process thought
provides a serious alternative to Heidegger's philosophy as a
Western hermeneutic capable of interpreting Dogen's theory of
uji or being-time in Japanese Zen Buddhism. Nonetheless,
Heine's work Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time
in Heidegger and Dogen makes an important advance towards
formulating a cross-cultural framework aimed at overcoming
all substance and eternalist ontology derived from static
now-time, while also establishing a basis for the
dynamism,unity and nonsubstantiality of primordial time. On
this basis, Heine's book can be strongly recommended to
anyone interested in the fields of Japanese Buddhism,
Heidegger's existentialism or East-West comparative studies.

p.257

NOTES

1. Hee-Jin Kim, Dogen Kigen-Mystical Realist (Tucson,
Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1975), p.213.
2. Ibid, p.202.
3. Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, ed. W.R.LaFIeur
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii press, 1985). See Chapter
2 entitled Dogen on Buddha Nature," p.63.
4. Ibid., p.64.
5. Ibid., p.65.
6. Kitaro Nishida, Tetsugaku no kompon mondai (Fundamental
Problems of philosophy) from Nishida Kitaro Zenshu (The
complete Works of Nishida Kitaro), 10 vols. (2nd ed.,
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), vol.VII, p.268.
7. Ibid., p.295.
8. Alfred North Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1919; second edition, 1924), pp.7-8.
9. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New
York: Macmillan, second edition, The Free press, 1967),
p.135.
10. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York:
Macmillan. 1929 corrected edition, ed. by David Ray
Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. The Free press, 1978),
p. 35.
11. Ibid, p. 340. For Whitehead, as for NIshida Kitaro, this
"discontinuity" of all microcosmic-macrocosmic quantum
events is crucial not only for its radical existential
implications, but also because it is the ground of
creativity, novelty and freedom in each becoming and
perishing occasion of temporal experience.

GLOSSARY OF JAPANESE TERMS

a 正法眼藏 h 现成公案
b 有时 i 而今
c 先尼外道 j 经历
d 无常佛性 k 住法位
e 无常 l 非连续连续
f 无我 m 非连续
g 有时道理 n 连续