Heidegger and Buddhism

·期刊原文

Heidegger and Buddhism

Takeshi Umehara

Philosophy East and West Vol. 20:3

July 1970 p.271-281

(c) by The University Press of Hawaii

P.271

I

The modern world has seemingly undertaken a serious
experiment with regard to whether or not a man can
live without any god or religion.
"God is dead," said Nietzsche. This was the
destiny of modern European civilization because of
science and technology.
Ren‚ Descartes is said to be the founder of
modern European philosophy. According to Hegel,
Descartes is truly an originator of modern philosophy
as long as modern philosophy claims "thought" as its
principle. After he doubted everything, Descartes
reached a "thinking ego" whose existence cannot be
doubted. This "thinking ego," that is, reason or
intellect, was the starting point of his philosophy.
It was not only the starting point of the Cartesian
philosophy, but of the whole modern philosophy or
civilization, insofar as it demands the sundering of
mind from nature and a subsequent mechanical
conception of nature, and implicitly affirmed the
need for, and right of, man to control this nature
for his own purposes.
Now this event in modern civilization is no
longer confined to the European world. European
civilization, particularly its science and
technology, conquered the whole world by its rich
productivity and powerful weapons. There is no
country in the world which is not affected by Western
science and technology. Thus the fate of the European
civilization has become the fate of the whole world.
However, as Nietzsche saw, a formidable atheism
is inherent in the early stage of modern
civilization. "God is not simply dead, but we killed
Him." God became useless to man when man developed a
complete trust in his own reason and set about to
exert an absolute control over the material world at
his own will. God is dead, and man and material
nature took over the position of God.
Dostoevsky, a prophet of historical destiny like
Nietzsche, speaks through the mouth of Ivan: "There
is neither God nor immortality. As there is neither
God, nor immortality, man is allowed to do
everything." He means that there is no morality
without God. Karamazov asked his son Ivan: "Have we
been deceived by priests for such a long time if
there is neither God nor immortality (as you say)?"
Ivan answered, "There would not be our civilization
if there were neither God nor immortality." As Ivan
says, all civilizations heretofore have been founded
on religion. However, contrary to Ivan's words, a
civilization is now about to be formed without God
and immortality.
It is time for us to ask with Dostoevsky: Can man
secure his existence in a civilization without God?
Will the day come when mankind must pay its debt for
indulging in a fantasy? Or will the day of reckoning
never come since that day would at once be the day of
the total collapse of civilization?
In the past century Japan has made the utmost
effort to adopt the European

p.272

civilization of science and technology, but without
accepting Christianity. At the same time we stopped
giving sincere concern to Buddhism or Confucianism.
In other words, we did not import god (religion) from
outside and at the same time we killed our own gods
(religions) in the name of modern civilization. By
killing the gods, Japan achieved her modernization.
As the result of such modernization Japan achieved
one of the highest gross national products in the
world. However, with this material prosperity, a
monstrous vanity begins to pervade the atmosphere in
our society. We have no god to believe in. We have
become the most godless people in the world and we
have no inspiring motivations but impulses for
material goods and sex.
However, can any man of the West laugh at such
economic animals? Was it not the European who taught
the non-European people to kill their gods? If this
is the case, we were more diligent in killing gods
than were our teachers. In the terms of an old
Japanese expression, we are the students who excel
their teachers.
The death of gods, the collapse of values, the
liberation of instincts, and the consequent disorder
are now forming a critical situation in the present
world. In this situation, we cannot but deal with the
problem as to whether or not mankind can survive
without any god. This seems to be the most important
and critical problem in the present world.
There may be three possible answers to the
problem:
[1] that man can survive without god and should
become a kind of god himself (Marx, Nietzsche,
Sartre, Camus, etc.);
[2] that man must have a god and a new rebirth is
possible for man by regaining his old beliefs in god
(Berdyaev, Dawson, D. T. Suzuki, etc.);
[3] that god is necessary, but he should not be
the god of the past, and thus a new god must be
sought, though mankind has not yet met him.

II

I propose to discuss the philosophy of Martin
Heidegger in terms of the third viewpoint stated
above. He is neither a proponent for returning to
Christianity like Berdyaev or Dawson, nor an atheist
like Marx or Sartre.
God is dead, and a new god has not yet revealed
himself. In order to receive a new god, Heidegger
must first prepare a place for him. In order to
prepare the place we should find the place where the
old god had revealed himself. The place where the old
god had revealed himself is the place for the new
god. In Heidegger's philosophy the key issue is
whether or not he has discovered the place where the
old god had revealed himself and whether or not he
has prepared the place for the new god.(1)
_____________________________________________________

(1) Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Brief ber den
Humanismus," in Wegmarken (Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1949).

p.273

The expression "the place for god," whatever it
may mean, is apt to be thought of by a European
within the boundary of his own world. However, if we
deal with the above issue beyond the boundary of the
European world, we must consider the fact that there
existed many religions as well as many gods. Needless
to say, there have been not only monotheistic
religions but polytheistic religions as well. In
contrast to the monotheism of Europe the native
religions of Japan are regarded as polytheistic.
This polytheism might be criticized by Christianity as
not being a true religion, but this does not mean
that Buddhism or Confucianism cannot deal with the
issue of the place for a new god.
We can speculate on the problem proposed by
Heidegger beyond the European cultural boundary by
developing the above-mentioned questions raised for
his philosophy as follows: Is it the case that the
place for god argued for by Heidegger is not only
appropriate for Christianity, but that it is also an
appropriate place for the god in any other religion?
Here I should like to refer this question only to
Buddhism. Our question is whether the place for god
thought by Heidegger can be a right place from the
viewpoint of Buddhism.
I do not intend here to explicate Heidegger's
philosophy in detail. It will be more appropriate for
a man whose cultural background is similar to
Heidegger's to do that. It is highly questionable if
a man of a different cultural background can grasp
the exact meaning of Heidegger's philosophy. It is
quite possible that I misunderstand Heidegger's
philosophy. However, what I intend to do is not to
discuss his philosophy directly, but to discuss my
own thought as it is inspired by Heidegger.
The central issue of Heidegger's philosophy has
always been "What is being?" "Being" had been
regarded as self-evident in the European tradition of
thought. But Heidegger throws doubt on "being" when
thought of as self-evident.
What is being? Being is not simply that which
exists. A notebook exists here and a table exists
there. But they are not being itself. The distinction
between "being itself" and "beings" Heidegger calls
the ontological difference. He maintains that all
traditional metaphysics and ontology have ignored
this difference by regarding "beings" as "being
itself."
It is necessary to clarify the very meaning of
"being itself" as distinguished from "beings."
Heidegger thinks that the meaning of "being itself"
is to be disclosed through an actual being whose mode
of existence is distinctly superior to all other
modes of existence. What is this actual being? It is
one whose mode of existence is superior in the sense
that it has awareness of its own existence. Heidegger
thinks such actual being is man (Dasein). Thus,
Heidegger claims that we must examine the meaning of
Dasein, that is, human existence. in order to reach
being itself (Sein). What is the meaning of

p.274

human existence? Heidegger seeks the meaning of
Dasein in terms of time. What he means by "time" is
neither time objectively conceived nor time
subjectively perceived.
According to Heidegger, "time" means "finitude."
"Finitude" means "being unto death." This is to say,
Dasein is temporal and man, being temporal, is
finite, that is, a being unto death. His criticism of
ontology since Plate is made from the standpoint of
conceiving human existence in terms of finitude, that
is, death. In the tradition of European ontology,
being is sought after through that which exists (das
Seiende), but not through the existence of man
(Dasein).Things which exist are projected in such a
way that they are simply stared at (begafft) by man.
When man becomes the subject who absentmindedly
stares at the world, things look as if they are
simply existing before us. Heidegger calls such an
existence Vorhandensein.
Heidegger thinks that such a manner of conceiving
things is due to the ordinariness of Dasein. Man
ordinarily forgets his death which is his essence and
lives with this or that thing. Living in this manner,
he conceives of being in terms of the function of
things.
In contrast to this understanding of existence,
Heidegger opens the way to an existential
understanding of being. It is a way of understanding
which reaches being itself through Dasein as the
finite being, that is, the being unto death.
Heidegger in his Being and Time refers to this task
of understanding as fundamental ontology. He tried to
develop this fundamental ontology by adopting the
methodology of Husserl's phenomenology, but he came
to realize that it is impossible to develop his new
way of understanding being within a phenomenology
whose theme was the analysis of subjectconsciousness.
The "turn" or "reversal" in his thinking (Kehre)
seems to begin from this realization, but I will not
inquire into this any further.
Now what I wish to ask is: What significance does
Heidegger's philosophy of being have for the present
historical situation of the Eastern as well as the
Western world? It should be noted first of all that,
even though the ontology in which being is sought not
through things but through finite human existence
might be thought of as unique in the Western world,
it is familiar to Orientals, especially to Buddhists.
We Japanese are brought up with the following words
from Buddhism: "All living beings are mortal and all
forms are to disappear." This is an ontological view
which grasps not only human being but all other
living beings in terms of death. This might be said,
in Heidegger's terms, to be the ontological view
which grasps being through human being which is
finite, that is, being unto death. Further, our
question is related to Heidegger's criticism that
European ontology lacks the concept of death. As a
non-European I cannot but notice that a distinctive
characteristic in the European history of thought is
its concern with death. I notice the two great deaths
which have the utmost significance in themselves. The

p.275

two deaths are, needless to say, those of Socrates
and Jesus Christ. Despite Heidegger's criticism, I
should say that these deaths were certainly the
highlights of the European history of thought.
But what does it mean that these two deaths
constitute the most significant events in European
spiritual civilization? In the history of the East
there are no deaths of the utmost spiritual
significance. In Buddhism, the death of Buddha had,
to be sure, the utmost significance, but in
Confucianism there is no such concern with death.
Confucius said: "I have not yet known life, how can I
know death?" We see the decisive significance in the
deaths of Jesus, Socrates, and Buddha, but we do not
see any significance in the death of Confucius.
Death does not necessarily have the utmost
significance in each spiritual civilization.
Therefore, can it be said that the civilization which
has the great deaths as the highlight of its history
also has its roots deeply in death, contrary to
Heidegger's estimate?
The above is not the only thing which amazes us
with regard to European history. What amazes us even
more is the fact that the deaths were either murder
or a kind of suicide. For the Oriental, natural death
is ideal. Man is born from Nature and returns to
Nature. Returning home, returning to the motherly
earth is the ideal of the Orient. The form of death
must be painless. 'Saakyamuni Buddha returns in peace
into Nature after he has lived for eighty years. In
the East the man whose death is not natural is not
qualified to be a saint. In this regard the spiritual
tradition of the West differs from that of the East.
Here a question arises as to why a man who was
murdered can be the most ideal man in the West.
There arises yet another problem. What does the
death of Socrates or Jesus mean in the spiritual
history of the West? The death of Socrates means
neither the mere end of his life, nor a return to
nothingness, in the Buddhist sense. Socrates, facing
death, proved the immortality of the soul. And he
died without fear, as if he were going to another
splendid world. The soul which cognizes the eternal
is also eternal like the eternal Idea. If the soul is
eternal, it does not fade away at death. Facing death
Socrates imagines the realm of the spirit awaiting
his soul. Death here does not mean the returning to
nothingness as in the case of Buddha. Death, for
Socrates, is an assurance of eternal life for man.
In the case of Jesus Christ, his death also does
not mean returning to nothingness. Jesus was the Son
of God. As the Son of God, Jesus is essentially
immortal. His Crucifixion was to atone for the sin of
man. But he was resurrected from death and he will
come again to bring the Kingdom of God. Such death
cannot mean what death truly means. His death is to
mean the proof for eternal life--it is a much more
decisive proof than Socrates' death. Through His
death the atonement for man's sin as well as immortality
of the soul are promised. Jesus is in eternal Heaven
after the Resurrection. Through

p.276

Him man may ascend to eternal Heaven. In other words,
man is promised his eternal life as well as the
coming of the new Kingdom of God. The death of Jesus
promises much more than that of Socrates.
If such is the case, we would think as follows:
The two deaths as the highlights of European
tradition are not death as we understand it. They are
seemingly deaths, but they are in fact proofs for
eternal life. Through those two deaths eternity is
brought into the European world.
When we consider death in this way, we have to
withdraw our previous question raised about
Heidegger's viewpoint that there was no concept of
death in the traditional ontology of the West. His
viewpoint after all seems to be right in grasping the
spiritual tradition of the West, since we can
recognize these deaths as the proofs for eternity.
The deaths were not the death of a finite being in
Heidegger's sense.

III

Now I should like to proceed to discuss Buddhism.
However, we must admit the difficulty or even
impossibility of presenting a thorough explication of
Buddhism. It is much more difficult to talk about
Buddhism in general than about Christianity in
general. The reason is that there is not a single
Bible but many Bibles in Buddhism. Buddhist suutras
had been written in the name of 'Saakyamuni Buddha
several hundred years after his death. These texts
went to China without being systematically arranged,
and innumerable commentaries were written on them.
In addition Buddhist suutras were written in China,
and once they were completed in China, it became
impossible to distinguish them from those originating
in India. Thus all suutras became regarded as the
teachings of 'Saakyamuni Buddha himself. In such a
situation the most important work for monks in China
was to search for the true teachings of Buddha among
innumerable texts. Kumaarajiiva (A.D. 350-409)
discovered a pattern among them and thus brought
about a solution to this problem. He worked on the
translation of Mahaayaana suutras in Ch'ang-an and at
the same time originated, in the beginning of the
fifth century, the Chinese Buddhistic studies which
were carried on thereafter.
Dr. D. T. Suzuki introduced Zen Buddhism to the
West. He thought Zen to be the most excellent school
in Mahaayaana Buddhism. His works taught a way of
learning Zen in the West and even in Japan herself.
Westerners have the preconception, before their visit
to Japan, that Japanese culture is influenced totally
by Zen. But contrary to their expectation, Zen does
not have so pervasive an influence in Japanese
culture. It is quite questionable whether the core of
Japanese culture is Zen. Mahaayaana Buddhism is not
necessarily represented by Zen. Even in Japanese
Buddhism, Zen is merely a part of it.

p.277

And the Zen introduced by Suzuki to the West is that
of the Lin-chi school (Rinzai Zen).(2)
Although it is very difficult to grasp Buddhism
as a whole, I will try to depict the characteristics
of Buddhism just as Heidegger tried to grasp the
characteristics of the metaphysics of the West as a
whole.
Buddhism can be said to grasp beings in terms of
death or finitude. For example, let us consider the
doctrine of the four noble truths. The truths are as
follows:
1. The truth that suffering exists.
2. The truth that suffering has a cause.
3. The truth that the cause can be removed.
4. The truth that there are eight practices by
which the cause of suffering can be removed.
Let us begin with the first truth. Human being is
conceived in terms of "suffering" (du.hkha). This
means that man is subject to four sufferings, namely,
birth, aging, disease, and death. Among these four
death is the severest suffering. Buddha himself
emphasized the suffering of death. Man is mortal and
therefore his existence is suffering. Here one might
notice that human existence is conceived in terms of
death or finitude.
With regard to the second truth, Buddha speaks
about the cause of suffering. It is attachment to or
craving for existence. Suffering is caused by man's
attachment to something for which he craves.
Man must be freed from such sufferings. The third
truth teaches us to eliminate the cause of suffering.
And in order to eliminate suffering, there are eight
practices which must be followed.
'Saakyamuni Buddha grasps human existence in
terms of death. How to eliminate the suffering of
death' Buddha does not see the solution in the
immortality of the soul or in eternal life in the
Socratic or Christian sense. Buddha regards such
doctrines as dogmatic. They meant to him nothing but
an escape from the utter finitude of human existence.
The attachment to existence which is latent inman is
the most decisive cause of fear of death. Man will
attain freedom and purity through emancipation from
the suffering of death, that is, through deliverance
from the attachment to his own existence. We find
many portraits of 'Saakyamuni Buddha entering
nirvaa.na, in other words, at his death. In these
pictures he is surrounded by many disciples, people,
and animals. Not only men but even animals grieve
over the death of Buddha. But the Buddha, who is
about to die, is in a state of serenity.
_____________________________________________________

(2) See my Bi to Shuukyo(-) no Hakken [The Rediscovery
of Traditional Beauty and Religion] (Tokyo, 1967)
and especially the article "Critical Studies of
Suzuki's and Watsuji's Views on Japanese
Culture," in which I point out in detail the
inadequacy of Suzuki's analysis of some aspects
of Japanese culture.

p.278

Even the trace of a smile is perceived on his lips.
The Buddha's smile does not mean only satisfaction
that he has done all that he had to do. His teaching
itself is to emancipate one from death and this
emancipation is now serenely taking place in his own
death.
The notion of "beings" might have determined the
ontology of the West as Heidegger pointed out, but it
is certainly not the case in Buddhism. In Buddhism
"nothingness" ('Suunya) is regarded as far more
important than "beings." This is not because the
Buddhist prefers "nothingness" as a subject matter
for theoretical inquiry;rather it is because he
conceives man's existence in terms of death. Human
existence is handed over into nothingness or
nonbeing.
In the past century Japan has brought in
philosophy as well as science from the West. Kitaro(-)
Nishida (1870-1945), a close friend of D. T. Suzuki,
established his own Buddhist-like philosophy while he
studied European philosophy. Nishida systematized a
philosophy of "absolute dialectics" and was
profoundly influenced by Hegel's philosophy of
"absolute mind." But in Nishida's philosophy the
absolute is not being but nothingness or nonbeing, as
is the case in Buddhistic thinking. Beings, as long
as they are beings, must be determined; hence they
are unfree. Buddhism claims that the truly absolute
and the truly free must be nothingness.
However, we should notice that Nishida dealt with
"nothingness" within a logical scheme as Hegel did,
while the thought of nothingness in Buddhism is
related to ontological issues whose definite
implication was the problem of death. Man is mortal;
hence the essence of his being is nothingness or
nonbeing.
Death is the central point of inquiry into man's
being. For all schools of Buddhism death is that
through which man is conceived from beginning to end.
The greatest Zen master of the thirteenth century,
Do(-)gen, quotes from Naagaarjuna's words, as follows:
"The mind which introspects transiency of all
sentient beings in this world is named Bodhi
mind."(3) Here he means that the Bodhi mind is based
on the mind that knows the finitude of man's being.
The very self-awareness of the finitude of being
makes man free from attachment to fame, money, and
sex. In short, Do(-)gen means that there is no path
for man in Buddhism without his awareness of transiency.
From such a thought he develops a unique theory of
time.

As to the problem of so-called being and time, time
itself is a being. All beings are times. A
sixteen-foot golden Buddha is a time. Because it is a
time, time is golden light. Three-headed eight-handed
Asura is a time. Because it is a time, the
relationship of oneness holds between the "image" and
the "present 24 hours." Even though a time of 24
hours has not yet been measured, it is said to be 24
hours. Since a day's having 24 hours has been obvious
to man for
_____________________________________________________

(3) Cf. Do(-)gen. Fukanzazengi [Invitation to Zaren].

p.279

a long time, man neither questions the present 24
hours nor has any attachment to the present 24 hours.
But though man neither questions nor has attachment,
this does not mean that he is enlightened. Since,
needless to say, men's questions and attachments to
unknown things and beings are not constant, previous
questions and attachments are not necessarily equal
to the present ones. A question and attachment are a
time.(4)

According to Dogen, not only man but beings in
general are temporal beings. Time changes itself from
being to nonbeing. In this sense time is finite. But
without this very time there can be no beings
including man's being. If this is the case, this
present time is itself absolute. Beings can be Buddha
in a definite time, or "Asura" in another definite
time, or something else in each definite time. Each
is absolute being in each appearance. Each being has
its absolute present.
A man once crossed a river and passed a hill. And
now he lives in a splendid house. He thinks that the
time he lives in the house is present and the time he
crossed the river and passed the hill are past. But
this is not right. The time when he crossed the river
is the absolute present and the time when he now
lives in the house is also the absolute present. Each
time is itself independent, namely, absolute present.
For Dogen all beings are in absolute present, and
this awareness of absolute present as the ground of
beings is satori (enlightenment). Thus man can be
free from changes. It is impossible for man to derive
the proof of eternity from the belief in the
unchanging and eternal subsistence of changing time.
Contrary to this, man will find the proof of eternity
by throwing himself into this present and that
present and by living up his whole existence in this
present. Flowers bloom. Here is an absolute present.
Flowers fall. Here again is an absolute present. When
man moves his eyebrow and opens his eyes with
surprise, here is an absolute present. When he does
not move his eyebrow and does not open his eyes with
surprise, there is also an absolute present. Beings
exist as they are. This is what Do(-)gen's view on
being and time means.
Here is another passage from Do(-)gen. "If Buddha
is there in birth and death as such, then there is
no birth and death. Again, if Buddha is not there in
birth and death as such, then there is no
attachment.... Enlighten yourself that birth and
death are Nirvana as they are. Birth and death are
not such things to be weary of and Nirvana is not
such a thing to be craved for. Here man transcends
birth and death."(5)
This finite being (man) enters nirvaa.na as he
is. Man should not attach himself to this finite
life, because such attachment is derived from his
belief that this finite life is something to be
maintained. At the same time man should not deny this
finite life, because such denial is after all the
negative
_____________________________________________________

(4) Do(-)gen, Sh(¡Ã+o)b(¡Ã+o)genz(¡Ã+o), chapter
"Uji" [Being and Time].

(5) Ibid., chapter "Sh(¡Ã+o)ji" [Birth and Death].

p.280

attachment to this finite life. Neither being weary
of this life nor craving nirvaa.na leads man to
enlightenment. Do(-)gen does not believe in the
immortality of the soul. Buddhism does not seek
Buddha apart from this "birth and death." Freedom is
within this "birth and death," namely, this finite
life.
¡ In Japanese history Do(-)gen is not the only thinker
who bases his thought on the awareness of such
finitude. Kuukai (774-835), the founder of
Shingonshuu, and Saicho (762-822), the founder of
Tendai-shuu, start their thinking from the awareness
of transiency, namely, the finiteness and emptiness
of man's being and the universe. The same can be said
about H(¡Ã+o)nen (1133-1212), the founder of Jodo-shuu, and
Shinran (1173-1262), the founder of Jodo Shin-shuu,
who are contemporaries of Do(-)gen. But they came up with
an approach that is different from Do(-)gen's.
Man is finite. This world is impure. Man should
detach himself from this short and impure human
world, and should seek to enter the eternal and pure
land. As far as we live in this world, however, we
cannot enter that eternal and pure land. Man can
enter the Amida pure land after death. Man can go to
the pure land by virtue of calling "Namuamidabutsu."
This thought of the Pure Land school developed
further in Shinran's faith. In Shinran's faith the
pure land is not sought after death, but rather in
this a ctual world and by man's faith in Amida.
It seems certain that the approaches to death
differ in the different schools in Buddhism, but
their point of departure is the same, namely, the
self-awareness of death or finiteness. This is the
case not only in Buddhism, but in the whole culture
and art of Japan. The thought of death retains great
significance in Japanese art. Japanese dramas can be
said to be the dramas of death. For example, in N(¡Ã+o)
plays, the dead are often heroes who reappear in this
world. The Kabuki plays often show how man will die a
magnificent death whatever the causes of the death
may be.

IV

In conclusion, it seems to me that Heidegger proposes
a new philosophical problem to the entire world in
two ways. It is in one sense an inquiry into the
foundation of the novel spiritual situation where
nihilism is latent within the European scientific
civilization, a civilization which nonetheless has
succeeded in unifying the whole world. But this
civilization lacks a spiritual foundation. In
exposing European scientific civilization to total
criticism, Heidegger is perhaps one of the first
thinkers of the West to provide a place of dialogue
and confrontation between the European principle and
the non-European principle.
Heidegger proposes a new philosophical problem in
a different way through his criticism of the notion
of finiteness or death in the traditional ontology of

p.281

the West. Here he reveals himself as a prophet who
sees the destiny of beings in death. Being a prophet
of the destiny of death, he is again a severe critic
of the modern civilization of the West. Since
Descartes modern philosophy has not dealt with the
problem of death which had in fact been considered in
the philosophy of Plate and Christianity.
History is consequently viewed as characterized
by progress and development in the West. For
Japanese, however, history does not necessarily mean
progress and development, but rather it has meant
"decay." For example, Confucius views history as the
continuous process of decay since the reign of the
ancient sacred emperor. Buddhism also views history
as decaying from the age of "Right Dharma" to the age
of the "Closing of Dharma."
How man should think of death from now on and
what the destiny of "man unto death" in a godless
world might be are questions to be asked by the
people of the whole world. These questions should be
dealt with in the continuing dialogue between
thinkers of the East and the West, and through this
dialogue the answers might be found. Martin Heidegger
is a great philosopher in having opened a new age of
such dialogue.