Hsiung Shih-lis[b] Theory of Causation

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Hsiung Shih-lis[b] Theory of Causation

　Liu [a] , Shu-hsien

Philosophy East and West

V.19 (1969) P399~407

Copyright 1969 By University Press of Hawaii

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I. INTRODUCTORY NOTES

Hsiung Shih-li (1885-) [1] is an original contemporary Chinese thinker. Though no one accepts his philosophical system as such, his influence upon those who are attempting to reconstruct Chinese, especially Confucian, philosophy has become more and more felt in recent years. Wing-tsit Chan [c] goes so far as to say that "he has influenced more young Chinese philosophers than any other contemporary Chinese philosopher." [2] In his early days he studied Buddhist philosophy, primarily Wei-shih [d] (Consciousness-Only doctrine), under the celebrated lay Buddhist scholar Ou-yang Ching-wu [e] at the Chinese Institute of Buddhism at Nanking. However, he soon became dissatisfied and turned to the I Ching [f] . He named his own philosophy New Consciousness-Only doctrine, which is negatively a criticism of the old Consciousness-Only doctrine, and positively a constructive philosophy based upon essentially Confucian philosophical insights with elements added from his lifelong study of Bud­dhism. In his analysis of the problem of causation he follows the usual proce­dure in presenting the theory of causation of the Wei-shih school first, then stating a series of objections to this position, and finally setting forth his own theory as a synthesis of Confucianism and Buddhism.

II. HSIUNG SHIH-LI'S EXPOSITION OF THE WEI-SHIH THEORY OF CAUSATION

Hsiung sees that within the Buddhist tradition there are several theories of causation which are subject to different and sometimes even contradictory interpretations. He simplifies the problem by concentrating his discussions upon the Wei-shih theory of causation as presented in Ch'eng 'wei-shih lun [g] (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, or Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only), following mainly K'uei-chi's [h] interpretation. [3] According

Shu-hsien Liu is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University. This paper was read on March 22, 1968 at the twentieth annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Philadelphia, Pa.

[1] For a short account of Hsiung Shih-li's life and works see Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 763-772; also the same author, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York:Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 33-43, 126-135. Though 0. Briere, in his Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy 1898-1950 (London: George Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1956) also mentions briefly Hsiung's thoughts (see pp. 48-50), his comments are often misleading and cannot withstand critical examination.

[2] Chan, Source Book, p. 765.

[3] Ch'eng wei-shih lun was written by Hsüan-tsang [i] (a.d. 596-664), who-brought back with him from India Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātratātriṁśikā [Treatise in Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only] along with ten different commentaries on this work. According to Hsiung, Hsüan-tsang originally intended to translate them all, but was persuaded by his pupil K'uei-chi to write a new commentary as a synthesis of these varied interpreta­tions followiner mainlv the lines of Dharmapala. The end result was the Ch'eng wei-shih

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to this theory causes are to be: distinguished into four different types: (1) yin yüan" [m] , or cause proper; (2) teng wu-chien yüan [n] , or the preceding moment;

(3) suo-yüan yüan [o] , or object; (4) tseng-shang yüan [p] , or the predominating condition. [4] Let us examine each of them in greater detail.

(1) According to Hsiung's account the Wei-shih school asserts that yin yüan or a cause proper must have the following characteristics: (a) it must be a real cause with energy to produce an effect; (b) it must produce an effect distinct from its own being; (c) it must produce its effect in terms of its own" force without mediation. Hence a cause proper not only creates but also determines its effect. According to Hsiung, though certain Hīnayāna schools talked about six causes, none of them can fulfill the strict definition of a cause proper as described above; rather, they are merely variants of the predomi­nating condition, which is only a supplementary form of cause. Therefore the theory of cause proper is a product unique to the Wei-shih school [5] ,

(2) Teng wu-chien yüan, or the preceding moment, is a supplementary cause that has the following characteristics: (a) it must precede the next moment, and its substance as well as its function must be similar to that of the next moment; (b) it must be continuous with the next moment without interruption—it must not only leave room for but actually must lead toward the next moment; and finally (c) it must inevitably be followed by the next moment. Hence the phenomenal universe appears to be orderly rather than chaotic. Without teng wu-chien yüan no causal relationship will ever be conceived by an intellectual mind.[6]

lun we have today. K'uei-chi (a.d. 632-682) himself wrote Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu-chi [j] [Notes on the Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only]. Without this work it is virtually, impossible for us to get at the real meaning of Hsüan-tsang's Treatise. Cf. Hsiung Shih-li, Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih [k] [A General Explanation of Buddhist Terms and Concepts], 2 vols. (Peking: Peking University Press, 1937), II, 4-7. However, owing to a general lack of interest on the part of the Chinese intellectuals K'uei-chi's, work, along with some other Buddhist texts, was lost and forgotten in China, In 1880 a lay Buddhist scholar, Yang Wen-hui [l] , brought back with him some important Buddhist works from Japan, including K'uei-chi's Notes. It was, however, his pupil Ou-yang who established the Chinese Institute of Buddhism where Hsiung received his Wei-shih training.

[4] Hsiung himself gives us only the Chinese terms of the four causes. See Hsiung Shih-li, Hsin wei-shih luni [q] (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1947), p. 145. Edward J. Thomas noticed that the doctrine of the four causes—cause (hetu), object (ālambana), the preceding moment (anantara), and the predominating condition (adhipati)—can be traced back to the Sarvastivadins. See Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1959), p. 220. However, Hsiung thinks that the Wei-shih theory of causation-is much superior to the Hīnayāna ones because it gives an entirely new interpretation of cause proper. Hence he deals with the Wei-shih formula­tion of the theory only.

[5] Cf. Hsiung, Hsin wei-shih lun, p. 27, and also his Fo-chia'ming-hsiang t'ung-shih, II,72-75
[6] Cf. Hsiung Shih-li, Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih, Ⅱ,75-77

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(3) Suo-yüan yüan, or object, another form of supplementary cause, must have the following characteristics: (a) it must be correlated with a subject as its object; (b) it must determine and also be determined by its correlated subject; (c) it must be the objective portion of the consciousnesses which is strictly correlated with the subjective portion of the consciousnesses. Objects may be direct or indirect, physical or nonphysical. Object as cause is thus a conditioning factor in the formation of our phenomenal knowledge.[7]

(4) Finally, the so-called tseng-shang yüan, or the predominating condition, must have the following characteristics: (a) it must exert a predominating function over its effect; (b) it must either be the sufficient or the necessary condition of its effect; (c) it must remove the conditions that obstruct the coming into being of its effect, and it must create new conditions that lead toward its realization. There are degrees of predominating conditions; that is to say, some predominating conditions may be direct, others indirect.[8]

From the above analysis it becomes clear that from the Wei-shih point of view only a cause proper is in the strict sense a cause; the other three are only causal conditions or occasions, hence only in a secondary sense causes. Tseng-shang yüan or the predominating condition has the widest scope, because in different contexts we may interpret different factors as predominat­ing conditions; sometimes the factors concerned could be very remote ones. . For example, the equilibrium of heavenly bodies may be taken as an indirect , predominating causal condition that enables me, to stand in this room. Hsiung specified that only cause proper is concerned with the metaphysical "world of seeds"; the other three are concerned with the phenomenal world of manifestations.[9] In order to understand the distinction between the two worlds, first we have to give a brief summary of the Wei-shih cosmology as a whole.

From the Wei-shih point of view nothing in the universe is substantial or eternal; everything is a product of aggregates. The phenomenal universe as experienced in daily life is thus not a real world by itself. On the contrary, it is a product of elaborate constructions. The content of the sensible world can be analyzed first of all into the subjective portion and the objective portion of the first five consciousnesses. On the one hand, there are the five sense organs: eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and the body; on the other hand, there are five kinds of sense objects: colors, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches. The five consciousnesses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are the products of the interaction between the sense organs and the sense objects. Moreover, sense organs and sense objects are not to be separated from each other; the relation between the two is that of reciprocal determination. Since both the sense organs and the sense objects are not substantially real by them-

[7] Cf. ibid, II, 78-84.

[8] Cf. ibid, II, 85-87, and Hsin wei-shih lun, pp. 37-40.

[9] Cf. Hsiung, Hsin wei-shih lun, p. 319.

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selves, they are effects rather than causes in a metaphysical sense. These five consciousnesses have the function of discrimination. However, if we have only the five consciousnesses, it will be impossible for us to have a unified, integrated world. Thus the Wei-shih school further establishes the sixth or the sense-center consciousness (manovijñādna), which has the synthesizing func­tion. According to Hsiung's interpretation of Wei-shih these six conscious­nesses all direct their attention to objects of the phenomenal universe, and have the tendency to erroneously presume these phenomenal objects to be real ontological entities. The origin of this error is to be traced back to the function of the seventh or the thought-center consciousness (manas) This consciousness is the ego-consciousness which clings to the self as a real, substantial, ontological entity. It is because of its tenacious faith in the substantial reality of the self along with its world that we are entangled within the cycle of life and death and suffer from its deep-rooted sorrows. In the final analysis, however, its object is nothing substantial, but is the eighth or the ālaya consciousness, which may also be called the storehouse conscious­ness because of the function it performs. Within the ālaya consciousness are contained the impure and the pure seeds. Therefore both the subjective por­tions and the objective portions of the first seven consciousnesses are in reality nothing but the transformation of the ālaya consciousness. They are manifestations that can be traced back to the function of the seeds contained in the ālaya consciousness as their causes.[10]

The relation between the seeds and the ālaya consciousness is a complicated one. The ālaya consciousness has as its objective portion the seeds, the root of the senses, and the material world. Thus even ālaya consciousness itself is the product of aggregates. It is able to transform itself into the root of the senses as well as the material world. But it is still a manifestation created by the seeds, which are the only real causes in a metaphysical sense. In this particular case, however, the cause and the effect exist simultaneously. There­fore it is possible for the ālaya consciousness to store the seeds within itself.[11]

Next we need to enumerate the characteristics of the seeds. (1) The seeds are individual existents. Each seed is different from the other. This is why we have all the differences in the universe. (2) The seeds are real. However, they are not to be taken as substantial entities like the atoms of Democritus. They maintain their identity in terms of a kind of dynamic equilibrium. A seed is able to maintain its selfsameness just like a human body, which changes every moment yet keeps its identity. If the seeds are truly substantial entities, then there will be no way to account for any creation in the universe. (3) The relation between seeds and manifestations is that the seeds create the manifes-

[10] Cf. Hsiung, Fo-chia ming-hsiang t'ung-shih, II, 12-27.
[11] Cf. Hsiung, Hsin wei-shih lun, pp. 310-315.

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tations. The seeds are always hidden; only the manifestations are manifested. The two worlds are in sharp contrast with each other. (4) Different seeds create different manifestations. They never violate the rules. Hence the universe is orderly, not chaotic. (5) But the relation between seeds and manifestations is also a reciprocal one. The seeds create the manifestations, yet the manifestations have the power to "perfume" the seeds, which again become the causes for further manifestations. The perfumed seeds are thus distinguished from the original seeds. However, Hsiung recognizes that this is a controversial issue within the Wei-shih school and may be subject to different interpretations. (6) The subjective portion and the objective portion of the same consciousness are created by different seeds. Even the mind and its functions are to be traced back to different seeds. Therefore the Wei-shih school is advocating a radical pluralism. (7) There are pure seeds as well as impure seeds. However, from time immemorial the evil seeds have flourished. They seem to form a torrent. Only when the function of the impure seeds contained in the ālaya consciousness is completely stopped can the pure seeds manifest their functions. Then the eighth consciousness will no longer be called ālaya consciousness. This is the state of tathatā [12]

Combining this theory of causation with the theory of the four cases we discussed above, we can easily see that the concept of cause proper applies only to the seeds. Here the cause, that is, the seeds, directly creates the effect, that is, the manifestations, and determines the effect. The other three causes are concerned only with the relationship between manifestations and manifesta­tions. One manifestation may be the preceding moment, or object, or pre­dominating condition of another manifestation. The sciences only study the proximate causes, which are nothing but varied forms of the predominating condition. Only philosophy has penetrating understanding of the nature of real causes.[13]

III. HSIUNG SHIH-LI'S CRITICISMS OF THE WEI-SHIH THEORY OF CAUSATION

After stating what he conceives as the Wei-shih position, Hsiung offers a series of criticisms of this position.

(1) Hsiung thinks that the Wei-shih school has betrayed the original Buddhist spirit by hypostatizing the doctrine of dependent origination into a doctrine of seeds' which suggests a structural realism. According to Hsiung, the great merit of the Mādhyamika school lies precisely in its employing dialectical arguments as a means to destroy all sorts of structural realism within and without the Buddhist tradition. The Wei-shih school, however, reverts to the untenable position by erroneously postulating innumerable seeds

[12] Cf. ibid., pp. 315-319.

[13] Cf. ibid., p. 319.69

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as the real causes of the phenomenal universe. Apparently it has not been able to get at truth on the ultimate level and fails to realize the great function of the Principle of Creativity.

(2) The innumerable seeds with disparate qualities postulated by the Wei-shih school lack true unity. According to Hsiung, even the Wei-shih scholars themselves realized this to be a deplorable situation needing to be remedied. This is why they had to postulate the ālaya consciousness to store the seeds. However, ālaya consciousness, in turn, is not one, but many. Every living being has its own ālaya consciousness. The relationship between these indi­vidual ālaya consciousnesses is by no means clear in the Wei-shih framework of thought. The ground is very shaky from Hsiung's critical point of view.

(3) According to Hsiung the Wei-shih philosophy has not only a pluralistic tendency but also a dualistic tendency- It is a dualism between the world of manifestations and the world of seeds; it is also a dualism between the impure and the pure seeds; and finally it is a dualism between the pure seeds and tathatā. From Hsiung's point of view the world of manifestations is un­duly separated from the world of seeds. Again, since the pure seeds and the impure seeds are both ontologically real, the dualism between the two is a final one not to be transcended in any sense. Finally, according to Hsiung, since the Wei-shih school asserts that the cessation of the function of the impure seeds brings about, the function of the pure seeds, the traditional Buddhist doctrine of tathatā becomes superfluous. It is a leftover which is not reconcilable with the Wei-shih doctrine of seeds. Since tathatā can in no way be identified with the pure seeds, it really should have no position in the Wei-shih philosophy; thus the Wei-shih scholars still stick to the old name without giving a satisfactory explanation.[14]

IV. HSIUNG SHIH-LI'S OWN THEORY OF CAUSATION

Once the old Consciousness-Only doctrine has been disposed of, Hsiung is ready to give his own theory of causation.

(1) Hsiung accepts the basic Buddhist insights that there is not a real world that can exist apart from the transformation of consciousness, and also that nothing is substantial or eternal in the phenomenal universe. However, he maintains that the ultimate metaphysical principle must be one,, rather than many, or else it would be extremely difficult to explain the unity of the universe. But this metaphysical principle is one of creativity, in sharp

[14] Cf. Ibid .,pp. 140-149, 321-322. A number of Wei-shih scholars repudiated Hsiung's viewpoints and were engaged in hot disputes with him, but in this particular article I am concerned only with the exposition of Hsiung's ideas, not with the criticism of his ideas. For Hsiung's criticisms of Wei-shih also see Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, pp. 130-135.

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contrast to the Parmenidean One, which is unchanging, eternal, and immutable. The principle of creativity creates incessantly according to the principle of the unity of opposites. Creativity without creating forms would be no creativity at all; forms suggest order and stability. Hence in its process of creation the principle of creativity has a tendency to work against itself and to manifest itself as a world of form and order as if it were constant and stable, even if in reality nothing is stable and constant. Hence in the final analysis the manifestations are the manifestations of the principle just as the waves are the waves of the ocean. It is in a process of "forgetful of being" that people lose sight of the fact that only the principle of creativity is the true metaphysical cause, mistake the phenomenal causes for metaphysical causes, and consequently fall into illusions. Thus it is clear from Hsiung's point of view that only the principle of creativity is the cause proper. The others are merely apparent causes.

(2) Since the principle of creativity by its nature creates incessantly, the preceding moment as a supplementary form of cause holds. Every moment rises and perishes. It always leaves room for and leads toward the next moment. It is only in this way that novelty and new creations are conceivable. Though sense perceptions may fail us, the universe in reality is an evergoing process with never a stagnant moment. We may discover constant associations between the preceding moments and the following moments. Hence this is a creative universe with order predominating in it. Therefore the succession of moments acquires a positive significance in Hsiung's system which one can­not find in the original Buddhist doctrine of karma, since the latter teaches that all phenomenal moments are rooted in an original Ignorance (avidyā).

(3) The object as a supplementary cause also receives new interpretations from Hsiung's point of view. The objects in the phenomenal universe, though not substantially real, are not to be taken as entirely illusory. Hsiung seems to teach a philosophy of "as if" that asserts that the principle of creativity in its functional aspect has to manifest itself in an orderly phenomenal universe. Neither the objects nor the subjects are ontologically substantial or eternal. As causal occasions they mutually condition and even determine each other. Life's sorrows begin when one hypostatizes what is merely phenomenal into something substantial and eternal. Hence the phenomenal world is real to the extent that there is a constant correlation between the objective portion and the subjective portion of the consciousnesses, but unreal to the extent that these are erroneously taken as interactions between substantial ontological entities.

(4) Finally, from a phenomenal point of view, since each subject, and each object as well, has to manifest itself in some way as a center of action, the predominating condition as a supplementary cause also holds. According to Hsiung, all the sciences are studying the predominating conditions from a

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phenomenal point of view. Only philosophy is capable of revealing the metaphysical principle of creativity. Consequently, science and philosophy cannot possibly contradict each other, in that the sciences are studying the functional aspect whereas philosophy is studying the ontological aspect of the same reality. Only when the sciences claim to do the work of metaphysics do they fall into their own disgrace.

Hence Hsiung concludes by pointing out that if we start out with the reality of phenomenal existents, it would be impossible for us to discover the metaphysical truth. Only if we are ready to sweep off phenomena altogether from the very beginning can we uncover the principle of creativity that works incessantly both within ourselves and the world at large.[15]

Hsiung thus converts Buddhist doctrines to Confucian ends, and he revives the concepts of "closing" (ho [r] ) and "opening" (p’i [s] ) that are in the Book of Changes. Let us hear his own explanations:

We must realize that original substance has neither physical form nor character, is not physically obstructed by anything, is absolute, whole, pure, strong, and vigorous. However, in the functioning of the original substance to become many manifestations, it is inevitable that there is what we called closing. This closing possesses a tendency to become physical forms and con­crete stuff. In other words, through the process of closing individual concrete things obtain their physical form. As perpetual transformation manifests itself as a tendency to close, it almost has to be completely materialized as if it were not going to preserve its own nature. This may be said to be a reaction.

However, as the tendency to close arises, there is another tendency arising simultaneously. It rises with perpetual transformation as the basis. It is firm, self-sufficient, and would not change itself to a process of closing. That is to say, this tendency operates in the midst of closing but is its own master, thus showing its absolute firmness and causes the process of closing to follow its own operation. This tendency—strong, vigorous and not materialized—is called opening.....

The tendency to close is integrative and tends to form physical things. On the basis of what it is, we temporarily call closing "matter" or "the operation of matter." The tendency to open is strong and vigorous, operating in the midst of closing but makes it follow itself. On the basis of what it is, we temporarily call opening "mind," or "the operation of mind."[16]

It is in terms of the interaction of the function of closing and the function of opening that everything is the case. This is a sketch of the main ideas of Hsiung Shih-li's metaphysical theory of causation.[17]

[15] Cf. Hsiung, Hsin wei-shih lun, chaps. III, IV, pp. 26-91.

[16] Hsin wei-shih lun, pp. 56-59; quoted in Chan, Source Book, p. 766.

[17] Since this article purports to give an exposition of only one aspect of Hsiung’s comprehensive philosophical system, it does not pretend to give a complete picture of Hshmg's metaphysical system. The latter will be a future topic of study.

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V. CONCLUSION

Whether Hsiung's interpretations of the Wei-shih philosophy are sound, his criticisms valid, or his own theory of causation defensible, are questions requiring further investigation; but it cannot be denied that this is a serious attempt to synthesize Confucianism with Buddhism. In so doing Hsiung reveals his unmistakable Chinese mentality by advocating the principle of creativity and the principle of unity between substance (principle) and function (manifestations). Both these ideas can be traced back to the philosophy of the Book of Changes and the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming [t] (1472-1529) in the Ming dynasty.[18]

[18] Though some have compared his philosophy with that of Bergson, Hsiung himself rejects this comparison because, as he sees it, Bergson based his philosophy on new discoveries in the biological sciences while Hsiung is talking at another level of truth. See Hsin wei-shih lun, p. 352. .