Japanese rationalism, Maadhyamika, and some uses of formalism

·期刊原文

Japanese rationalism, Maadhyamika, and some uses of formalism

By Douglas Dunsmore Daye

Philosophy East & West

V. 24 (1974) pp. 363-368

Copyright 1974 by University of Hawaii Press

Hawaii, USA

p. 363

There are three main aspects of Sueki's paper on which I wish to comment. The first aspect is the relationships between the concepts of rationalism, ideal language expressions (formalism), and Sueki's interpretation of Japanese rationalism. The second aspect is Sueki's interpretation and use of concepts indirectly taken from the Buddhist Maadhyamika school such as "emptiness" (`suunyataa), substancelessness (svabhaava), and "mutual dependence" (pratiitya-samutpaada hereafter, p.s.). The third aspect is his use of ideal language expressions and the justification of formalism in this context. Time permitting, other topics might well have been chosen, for example, duality and relativity, the concept of "nature," and the Buddhist versus Confucian influence.

Sueki begins his article by saying that "Japan has never had any logic and that her philosophy has always been irrational ... and although she once imported Indian formal logic ... it remained undeveloped. Nonetheless it is still wrong to hold that all of Japanese philosophy is irrational." [1] He then offers us an exposition of the thought of the influential Japanese economist Sontoku Ninomiya, which constitutes a counterexample to the above thesis. The following three questions may be asked; Does Japanese thought exhibit a lack of rationality and thereby necessitate this somewhat defensive counterexample? Second, is the absence of a tradition of formal logic a sufficient condition for concluding that a given historical tradition is irrational? Third, does a set of formalized expressions, correctly translated from the ordinary language exposition of a historical tradition, constitute either a sufficient or necessary condition for concluding that a given historical tradition is rational? Here we see the need for some definition of "rationality," which Sueki nowhere gives us.

I am not a specialist in Japanese thought; however, viewing the intricate and subtle development of ideas native to Japan and those imported from both China and India, it is inconceivable to me that the whole complex of Japanese intellectual history (or philosophy) could be considered "irrational."

First, Mr. Sueki does not state, but seems to presuppose, that a consistent act of related ideas is a necessary condition for rationality. This is certainly a reasonable assumption. Second, he also appears to presuppose that the ability to translate these ideas into ideal language formulae constitutes the sole sufficient condition for attributing the term "rational" to a given historical tradition. This I question and do deny.

Regarding the second question, it seems self-evident that the absence of a tradition of formal logic is likewise neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for concluding that a given tradition is irrational. As a counterexample, witness Confucius, Han Fei Tzu, and Mao Tse-Tung. [2]

The third question, however, brings us to the more complex question of the relationship between formal, ideal-language expressions and concepts embedded in the medium of various natural languages. Let me state my opinion

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at the outset that the majority of logicians would not wish to presuppose that the methods by which individuals (and ethnic cultural traditions) habitually draw conclusions can be consistently and completely expressed by any combination of the ideal language systems existent today. In other words, I presuppose that all ideal language systems of expressions, within which it is so elegantly clear the degree to which the evidence supports the conclusion, remain the ideal, not the reality, to which rationality must aspire in the mundane world. Logicians and epistemologists would not hold, I believe, that the expression of a set of related concepts in a formalized language is the sole sufficient condition for pronouncing a tradition "rational." Stated quite simply, I think Sueki is flogging a dead, but "rational" horse. [3]

I now wish to compare the Buddhist metaphysical and ontological presuppositions as utilized by Ninomiya and Sueki with their Indian background. Sueki considers four interrelated concepts, namely, substancelessness, emptiness, mutual dependence, and relativity-duality. In comparing their uses of these terms, I shall attempt to differentiate levels or orders of abstraction uncautiously collapsed by Sueki. In particular, I shall focus on the derivation of the ethical obligation of "mutual aid of thanks" from the ontological concept of dependent coorigination (p.s.).

Perhaps the basic metaphysical presupposition Sueki deals with is that of mutually dependent causality. I take it here that he refers to the Buddhist concept of dependent coorigination (p.s.). Since he states that emptiness and mutually dependent origination are interrelated, I also take it that his particular interpretation of p.s. was correctly derived from the Maadhyamika Kaarikaas (ca. 250 A.D. = MK). Naagaarjuna's interpretation of the metaphysical pre-suppositions about substance and interdependent causation (p.s.) emerges in the MK in such statements as "no existents (bhaava) ever occur anywhere which have arisen from themselves, from others, from both, or without a cause." [4] The general interpretation seems to be that the specific individual characteristics of any entity is dependent upon the totality of causes and conditions (hetu and pratyaya) present at any given moment (k.sana) of "its" perception. Sueki's concept of "substancelessness" seems to refer to the Maadhyamika denial of the concept of own-being (svabhaava, of the Lokaayatas and Saa^mkhya dar`sanas). It is important to note that in the MK the concept of own-being (svabhaava) is contrasted with an ordinary language concept of substance. By definition, own-being is a second-order metaphysical postulate which is not subject to causation; it exists through its own agency rather than being caused from the agency of another. By denying own-being, the Buddhists suggest that there is no possibility of a metaphysical/ontological absolute, knowable by conventional means (samv.rtisatya), which is independent of phenomenal causation. That is, phenomena are empty (`suunya) of noncausal ontological absolutes.

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Sueki notes that the "emptiness of all phenomena in the world..." may lead to spiritual awaking and to the justification of obligations between peoples. [5] These are based on the related concepts of substancelessness and the mutual dependence of all things.

However, it is a mistake to assume that the Maadhyamika polemics concerning substance, causation (mutual and dependent coorigination, pa.ticca-samuppaada) and emptiness refer directly to "things" of the conventionally described world. In fact the MK are really a third-order critique, in that they are criticizing their opponents' views and other Buddhist views, of the ontological and epistemic components of everyday "things." There are at least three orders of description operative in the MK. First is the ordinary language level of "things" in the world, for example, trees, stones, and properties of relationships such as anger and love. Second, there are rival metaphysical and epistemological theories which utilize the terms dharma (an element in a phenomenological analysis of first-person epistemic relations, that is, dharma-vicaya) and svabhaava (own-being). Third, there is the third-order capstone reflexive concept of emptiness (`suunyataa). The early Buddhists (Sthaviravaadins and Sarvaastivaadins) held that the third-person epistemological situations commonly misdescribed in "ordinary language" (first-order language) are better described by reference to second-order relationships rather than to their opponents' metaphysical postulates and ordinary language categories. This "better" second-order description, of reality is composed of a finite set of mutually exclusive, totally exhaustive, ontological components of description, that is, dharmas. By postulating these evaluative and ontological categories these pre-Maadhyamika Buddhists offered an alternate descriptive world-view from a first-person epistemological point of view which contrasts with "ordinary" (third person) descriptive language. The Maadhyamikas strove to refute both these second-order dharma-analysis concepts and the rival second-order concepts of own-being (svabhaava) held by members of opposing schools. Therefore to assume, as does Sueki, a similarity between the ordinary language uses of the word "substance" and the second-order concepts of dharmas and own-beings is simply to collapse levels and to make a category mistake. The values and ontologies associated with each are of different descriptive orders of abstraction.

We now turn to a related Maadhyamika third-order concept, that of "emptiness" (`suunyataa). It is said about emptiness that "emptiness too is empty." [6] The third-order concept of emptiness is derivative and dependent upon the two concepts of mutual (casual) dependence and substancelessness. However, in the MK, emptiness (`suunyataa) is said to be a reflexive designation; [7] it is a descriptive device which has no ontological import. In fact, to reify emptiness is again to make a category mistake. [8] `Suunyataa is a third-order context-restricted term. To suggest an analogy, like the zero, alone, emptiness designates

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nothing; in a context (for example, 100 apples) it describes a relationship which in combination with other descriptions it does indirectly refer to the world. However, `suunyataa, like the zero, is a meaningful component of a descriptive system which operates at a level of abstraction at some distance from the conventionally (first order) described world of trees and stones. To oversimplify, with respect to orders of abstraction, emptiness (`suunyataa) is somewhat like the difference between a particular sound and the musical transformation rule that the sound of G flat is identical with F sharp in the well-tempered diatonic scale. Ultimately they may "refer" to the "same thing," but to describe one is not to describe the other. The former is a sound; the latter is a rule about the identification of a "sound." So is it with substancelessness (svabhaava) and emptiness; the former is a second-order description. The latter belongs to the third-order description of the ways in which first- and second-order concepts are evaluated and descriptively manipulated. That "emptiness is empty" means that the term `suunyataa has a restricted epistemic role but not an ontological descriptive role. [9]

Sueki uses the terms emptiness, substancelessness, and mutual dependence (= p.s.) as if they belonged to the same order of description. [10] He states (a) "this mutual aid of thanks" (suijoo) is based on (b) the mutual dependence of all things. Since (c) we are all mutually dependent, we (d) cannot recognize ourselves as human beings if we do not recognize others. [11] Consider that (1) all "things" are not epistemically equal to "all dharmas" (c and b). (2) The nonrecognition of others does not necessitate the nonrecognition of ourselves (or conversely, the recognition of ourselves does not necessitate (entail) the recognition of others. [12] Given (1) it does not seem to follow that mutual dependence (p.s.) entails (a). The mutual dependence of all things (b) does not necessitate (entail) (d) any recognition of anything about any obligations (mutual or otherwise) between non-things, that is, people. The epistemic "is" does not entail a soteriological "ought," unless one presupposes the "derived" obligation. Then, of course, there is no need to try to demonstrate "ought" at all. Simply stated, the description of dharmic epistemic dependence (what is metaphysically/ontologically) does not necessitate the obligation ("ought") of mutual aid between people. They are of different types and orders of justification. Therefore Sueki's use of these three terms is somewhat different than that found in the original texts of the MK.

Sueki notes that "Ninomiya thinks that everything in the world has a realition of duality to something other than itself." [13] Here again, as in the MK, we find the ancient Indian idea that the locus of any term ("A"), about which one can speak meaningfully, possesses a logical complement ("~A") which (it is assumed) possesses the ontological status of "A." That is, the early Indians confused the formal relationships of a term ("a" and its logical complement "non-a") with the ontological and referential relationship of that

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term. Examples of this are the MK term "anyathaabhaava (alter-being) and pratidvandvin (counter-twin). [14] This concept of duality, although similar to such paired items as husband and wife, can certainly not be held today to be a logical principle around which ontological descriptions need be organized. That is, the principle that "everything in the world must be dual to some other thing in the world" ignores the distinction between what may be formally true for terms (and their complements) and whatever may happen to be the case in the empirical world. [15]

I shall now turn to the portion or Sueki's paper in which he formally expresses the interrelationships of Ninomiya's thought; namely, formula 1-40. To this I ask one simple question: In the somewhat extensive use of this ideal language exposition of his interpretation of Buddhist ideas, can one justify the use of the prepositional calculus by appealing to a net gain in clarity of exposition? That is, is it possible to say that with the use of a formal language that the degree of rationality exhibited in the relationships between these ideas is greater? And secondly, are the empirical, logical, ontological, and metaphysical relationships significantly clearer than could have been achieved without the use of the calculus? I think not. Surely what is in question here is the extent to which ideal-language analysis, with its necessary and legitimate restrictions of the multiple semantic values of natural language terms, does generate sufficiently and legitimately accurate expressions which describes both what is required for formal argumentation and what is presupposed evaluatively and ontologically in the multiple historical uses of natural language terms.

I am also aware that the use of formal expressions does add an aura of precision and modernity to the exposition of any set of ideas which can be so expressed. If there is disagreement about the truth value of the premises, as noted in my discussion of levels of abstraction and description in the MK, then, a fortiori, the remaining question of the utility of formal expression of these premises becomes a somewhat subordinate question. However, in the context of this conference it is important. On this point I must regretfully conclude and simply state that I find no significant degree of clarity of exposition gained by the uses of the formal expressions. I am in complete agreement with Sueki (part V, line 1) that Ninomiya may be easily recognized as a very rational thinker; but he can be so recognized without the use of this formalism.

In summary I wish to state four points. First, Sueki has given us an excellent and informative paper about the uses of imported Chinese and Indian Buddhist ideas as assimilated and developed by a relatively modern Japanese thinker. He has shown us how these ideas have been modified to accommodate the impact of modern ideas on nineteenth-century Japan. Second, his thesis that Japanese thought is indeed rational, to my mind, has never been in doubt,

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in spite of Nakamura's remarks. Thirdly, it is important (if somewhat pedantic) to point out the differences in interpretation between the related concepts found in the MK and their subsequent interpretation of nineteenth-century Japanese thought. Fourth, Sueki's use of a formal calculus seems to communicate little additional clarity which, to my mind, could not have been communicated, in a quite rational manner, without the use of formalism. However, this is not to say that I have not enjoyed and profited by reading Sueki's article; on the contrary, I have found it extremely interesting to see new uses of old ideas in a modern East-West context. It is only to say that if one does not assume that the formulation of proportions from natural languages into a formal system is a sufficient condition for rationality, then such interesting concepts, important to all interested in East-West philosophy, can be understood quite rationally without resorting to formalism.

NOTES

1. A footnote documenting these opinions would have been extremely fruitful.

2. Although there is yin-ming which is Buddhist Chinese, there is almost no development of a meta-yin-ming, likewise for the latter Mohists.

3. Perhaps Sueki has in mind criticisms of Japanese culture such as those found in, for example, Hajime Nakamura's book, The Way of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968, for example, chapt. 36 "Non-rationalistic Tendencies," pp. 531-576) Without more documentation and discussion these interesting matters lay outside the dimensions of the remainder of Sueki's article. A cultural dimension to the discussion is obviously missing.

4. 1.3, Prasannapadaa, p. 12, v. 1.

5. P. 6, v. i.

6. (MK 13:7-7).

7. Praj~napti, MK 24:18.

8. MK 13-: 7-8.

9. One might use, for example, predicates of predicates to express third-order terms, but I see no great degree of clarity achieved by the use of such mechanisms also available in descriptions within natural language.

10. For example, F36, p. 14.

11. P. 5-6, ii, underlining and identification letters are mine.

12. (s) (o) (~ (Rs Ro))
Where: R DF recognition (a property)
S DF ourselves
O DF others.

13. F 16, p. 10.

14. "When there is no own being, whence might other beings be? For the own being of other-being is called other beings." 15.3, cf. 22.29.

15. A`soka Gangadean of Haverford College noted a crucial point (in subsequent conversation). Sueki's concept of "duality" blurs the distinction between logical contraries and complements. The former are limited to types by general semantical rules; the latter are not limited in such a manner. Although "true-false, clean and unclean" are clearly limited to certain types, Sueki's "husband-wife duality" is not clearly limited in the same way. It is this latter use of "duality" that provides the basis for his "duality" of body and mind.