Maintaining ethno-religious harmony in Singapore

·期刊原文
Maintaining ethno-religious harmony in Singapore
Khun Eng Kuah
Journal of Contemporary Asia
Vol.28 No.1
March 1998
pp.103-121
COPYRIGHT @ 1998 Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers (Philippines)

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The march towards the twenty first century, the end of the cold war
and the changing socioeconomic conditions experienced by most
nation-states have brought about a world that is vastly different
from that of the nineteenth century where Weber and Marx first
sighted the significance of religion. Yet, despite changes in
religion, religious secularisation and the emergence of civil
religion, religion continues to exert great impact on the people.
Today in Asia, America, Europe, Africa and Latin America, there is a
strong resurgence in numerous religious movements for a variety of
reasons. In Latin America and parts of Asia, there is the emergence
of Christian-based Liberation Theology. In Eastern Europe, the
Croatians and Serbians are engaged in an ethno-religious war.
Elsewhere as in the Middle East and Asia, a strong religious,
fundamentalist movement have taken place.
In all these movements, the crux of the action is a self-renewal
process - of one's position and identity in a world that is
increasingly compressed in time and space. Rapid modernization has
brought about communication and technologies that allowed each
nation to have instant contact with the others. Diffusion of
cultural values, popular cultures, attitudes (predominantly American
and European), technological transfer and economic welfare, have
resulted in a level of cultural homogenisation among nations. In
Asia, this has been so. In Singapore, this is even more acute,
especially with its information open door policy and its secular
liberal education.
The rise of pan-religious movements across Asia and the
Middle-Eastern countries have set a trend for a renewed awareness
and sensitivity towards the needs to participate in these movements.
The pan-Islamic Dakwah Movement have galvanised forces among the
Islamic states, including Malaysia and Indonesia. Likewise, the
Hindu Revivalist Movement have set the Indian communities throughout
the Asian region in motion and the Buddhist Revivalism, brought
about by the formation of the World Buddhist Council, has penetrated
these countries as well. These movement have lend weight to
countries which are suffering from a decline in membership and are
facing competition from Christian evangelists.
One view argues that religious revivalism can be seen as (1) a
counter-movement to rationalisation, that is, against the
"demystification of the world," (2) an attempt to overcome the
pressures of modernisation; (3) a type of anti-imperialist,
anti-hegenionical movement; and (4) an expression of renewal
generated from within a given religion (Evers and Siddique, 1993:
2). Here, revivalism is seen as "an attempt to restructure the past
in a form relevant to contemporary concerns" (ibid: 2).
Others view this in the form of religious fundamentalism which
involves "innovation in scriptural interpretation, a less stringent
application of religious codes, secularism, liberalism and
rationality: in short, the adaptation of religious ideas and
practices to modern culture" (Caplan, 1987:9). This trend is to cope
with the impacts of modernity of the society. On the other hand,
fundamentalism further pushes the modernising trend by legitimising
the move.
Like elsewhere, in recent years, there has also been a general
revival of the main non-proselytizing religions in Singapore. The
Islamic Dakwah, the Hindu Revival and Buddhist Fundamentalist
movements have gathered momentum since the late seventies, in part,
in response to the active proselytizing Christian evangelical
movements.
This article explores the introduction of a White Paper and
subsequently an Act on the Maintenance of the Religious Harmony and
the rationale behind it. It examines the strength of the state,
through this Act, in redefining the roles of religion and the
boundary that its leaders could function within.
Religious Sensitivity in a Multi-Ethnic Singapore
In a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore, religion and
religious affiliations have been taken to coincide with ethnicity.
The official categorization has led to the perpetuation of the
stereotypical images of Chinese as practising "Buddhism or Daoism,"
the Indians as "Hindus," Malays as "Muslims" unless they stated
otherwise. Only the Christians do not fit his ethnic mould. Part of
the reason lies in its association with colonialism and in recent
years, its association with modernism. Christianity therefore is
seen to cut across the ethnic boundaries. This view is reinforced by
the positive correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation
where 72.5% of the Chinese population are Buddhists and Daoists;
99.4% of the Malays are Muslims and 56.6% of Indians are Hindus. In
addition, 10.6% of Chinese, 0.3% Malays and 12.4% Indians are
Christians (Census of Population, 1980). Of the three ethnic groups,
the religious boundary of the Malays can be seen as the least
elastic with the smallest number of converts while the Chinese and
the Indians registered a much higher percentage of conversion. Part
of the challenge of these ethnic communities is to arrest the flow
to other faiths, essentially Christianity.
In Singapore, Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam have traditionally
abstained from systematically proselytizing the individuals. They
each spread in their own time and gradually encompassing the
like-minded communities. Identity between religious belief and
community membership has remained unbroken among these communities.
In a way, this has also created a stable relationship among the
major ethnic communities in Singapore where religion continues to be
a focus of ethnic culture and identity.
The Singapore State, since independence, has been cautious with the
religious sensitivities of its ethnic composition. It monitors
closely the development and activities of the various religious
groups to ensure that the ethno-religious fabric remains
undisturbed. In this respect, it established policies and laws to
protect the ethno-religious framework of the Singapore society.
The Policy of Multi-Religiosity
When the PAP government inherited a multi-ethnic population, the
dice has already been casted. For the sake of social and political
stability, the PAP government has adopted a policy of muti-racialism
and multi-religiosity. At the first session of the first Parliament
of an independent Singapore in December 1965, the newly appointed
government spelt out the following policy:
... one of the cornerstones of the policy of the Government is a
multi-racial Singapore. We are a nation comprising people of various
races
who constitute her citizens, and our citizens are equal regardless
of
differences of race, language, culture and religion.
Whilst a multi-racial secular society is an ideal espoused by many,
it is
a dire necessity for our survival in the midst of turmoil and the
pressure
of big power conflict...(Vasil cited in Ling, 1989: 692).
Literally, the multi-racial Singapore society expected its citizenry
to "intermingle and interact with each other in a spirit of
tolerance, understanding and mutual appreciation" (ibid: 693). The
state would facilitate and need be, intervene to ensure that such
attitude becomes the prevailing norm of the nation. The Singapore
state is a secular and religiously neutral state and therefore does
not take the side of either majority or minority religions. And it
deals with problems of a religious nature in a bureaucratic manner.
As early as 1949, the Inter-Religious Organisation was formed in
Singapore. This was:
... an association of individuals in Singapore professing the
different
faiths prevailing in the island. Since 1949 it has worked
assiduously yet
unobtrusively in Singapore to create a climate of religious
understanding
and cooperation in order that religion should be a source of
national unity
rather than disunity (ibid: 695).
To ensure that each religious group functioned within its own
boundary, the government has never failed to use appropriate
occasions to remind the religious leaders and the religion of their
responsibility to the wider community at large. On one occasion,
addressing the conference organised by the Tamil Muslim Union in
1966, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his hope that:
the leaden of the Muslim community would always interpret Islamic
doctrine
in a way that would be to the benefit of its followers and the
general good
of the community (ibid: 694).
Implicit in Lee's statement was the hope that the interpretation of
the Islamic doctrine would also express the values espoused by the
state, i.e. multi-racialism, multi-religious tolerance, forbearance
and togetherness (ibid: 694). Likewise, Encik Rahim Ishak, the then
Minister of State for Education, a Muslim himself, urged the Islamic
leaders to shoulder wider responsibility and of the "abundant
opportunities that existed in the Republic for Muslims to improve
themselves educationally and economically" (ibid: 694). The state
has, since independence, acknowledged that the Malays as a minority
group has to be treated sensitively. The Administration of Muslim
Law was enacted and came into effect in 1966. Around the same time,
the Council of Muslim Religion, Majlis Ugama Islam (MUIS) was
established officially in 1968 to "assist Muslim organisations in
Singapore to regulate their affairs and to administer the Muslim
Law" (ibid: 694).
The Buddhists were also reminded of their social responsibility when
Lee addressed a Buddhist convention in 1967. He told the
congregation:
Let us face up to this problem of multi-culture, multi-religions and

multi-languages. Alone in Southeast Asia, we are a state without an
established church (ibid: 695).
In the seventies, the fervour of nationalism and national identity
was in the forefront on many of the Southeast Asian states. Malaysia
and Indonesia have established a national ideology encapsulating
Islam as the official religion. (In the case of Malaysia, it is the
National Ideology and in Indonesia, known as Pancasila). In
Singapore, nation-building was one of the top priority during this
period. However, the state continued its policy of religious
neutrally. Prime Minister Lee continued to reaffirm this state
policy and reminded the general population that "religion in a
secular state like Singapore must never become a source of friction
and animosity between the different religious groups" (ibid: 695).
He urged the Buddhists, when addressing the Thirty-fifth Anniversary
of the (Singapore) Buddhist Union to "grow in strength, and help
make Singapore a more tolerant and a harmonious nation despite our
many different religions" (ibid: 695).
The PAP government has adopted a very consistent policy since 1965
in regards to its multi-religious policy. The Maria Hertogh
incident(1) has further proven the government to be correct, that
any slackening in vigilance in religious affairs among the ethnic
groups could result in sectarian violence. It has also convinced the
government that the only way to prevent sectarian strife from
destroying the fragile ethno-religious fabric of the nation is to
spell out clearly the roles and responsibilities of each religion
and their organisations in Singapore.
In the early eighties, the recognition by the state, hence
legitimation, of the religious contribution to moral values in
Singapore (through the moral education programme in school), has
encouraged the main religions to adopt a higher public profile. This
together with the global trend in religious revivalism, have led to
aggressive proselytization by some Christian evangelical groups and
Dakwah members. The latter has led to conflict of interests and
dissatisfaction at both the interreligious and intra-religious
levels. The established Buddhist-Daoist, Islamic and Hindu
communities were dissatisfied with the proselytisation carried out
by Christian evangelists. Likewise, some Muslims saw the Dakwah
members and movement a threat to their Islamic practice. The
Buddhists and Hindus were also forced to respond to this intense
religious competition.
Amidst all these rivalries and competition for membership, the state
responded with the introduction of the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act, henceforth known as the Act, to prevent such tensions
from becoming overt violence. This swift and decisive action was to
prevent a repeat of the 1969 Racial Riot where clashes between the
Malays and Chinese were grounded with religious overtones.
White Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony (The Paper)
When addressing the Parliament in January 1989, the President
stressed the importance of maintaining religious harmony in a
multi-religious Singapore.
Religious Tolerance and Moderation. Religious harmony is as
important to us
as racial harmony. Singapore is a secular state, and the supreme
source of
political authority is the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees

freedom of religion. However, in Singapore racial distinctions
accentuate
religious ones. Religious polarization will cause sectarian strife.
We can
only enjoy harmonious and easy racial relationship if we practise
religious
tolerance and moderation (The Act: 1).
The Religious Harmony Act, came into effect in March 1992, allows
the government to take action against the various religious groups
which violate the act, i. e. serve restraining orders on leaders and
members of a religion who threaten Singapore's religious harmony by
their words or actions, and those who conduct political and
subversive activities under the guise of religion (The Paper: 9-10).

To maintain this harmony, it is the policy of the government to
prevent and a tacit understanding among the various religions to
refrain from aggressive proselytization and conversion. In the White
Paper on Maintenance of Religious Harmony, the goal is:
to preserve harmony, Singaporeans, whether or not they belong to any

organised religious group, must not cause disharmony, ill-will or
hostility
between different religious or non-religious groups. In particular,
religious groups, in exercising their freedom of religion, should:
a. acknowledge the multi-racial and multi-religious character of our

society, and the sensitivities of other religious groups;
b. emphasise the moral values common to all faiths;
c. respect the right of each individual to hold his own beliefs and
to
accept or not to accept any religion;
d. not allow their members, followers, officials or clergy from
acting
disrespectfully towards other religions or religious groups; and
e. not influence or incite their members to hostility or violence
towards
other groups, whether religious or non-religious (ibid: 5).
The state keeps a close watch on the religious activities of the
various groups. So long as the groups adhere to the guidelines laid
down in the Act, the state have, till recently, refrained from
intervening in the religious affairs and religious groups were given
autonomy in running their activities. Here again, the emphasis is on
religious sensitivity. The government argues that respect and
sensitiveness for other religions are important for the social
stability of the nation-state. The Maria Hertogh case continued to
impact on the government's treatment of religions, reflecting on
their fear of another eruption of ethnic violence if religious
issues were not handled carefully. Added to this is the global trend
towards ethno-religious revivalism and the outburst of violence
among religious sectarian groups in Sri Lanka and ethnic cleansing
among some East European countries, which served as a reminder of
the potentially volatile situation at home. 71be state keeps a close
guard on the religious affairs of its citizenry, forcing the major
religious groups to practice within their own religious boundary.
Religion and Politics
On the one level, the Singapore government viewed the
ethno-religious conflicts in Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia as
examples of the failure of the state to separate religion and
politics in a clear fashion. It was also the weakness of the state
which caved in to the pressures and ethnic chauvinism of one ethnic
group as the Sri-Lanka case illustrated when the majority urban
Buddhist Singhalese were determined to reestablish Sri Lanka as a
Buddhist state. The Tamil minority retaliated with militancy to
protect their own religious interests. The bitter war fought between
the Muslim Serbs and the Christian Croats emerged as a result of the
disintegration of Soviet Union where, without a strong central
government, the original ethnic proclivities reasserted their
territorial claims.
On the other level, the government was determined to prevent any
overt conflicts by monitoring closely the development of religious
activities, especially the influence from overseas. The Christian
Liberation Theology Movement which found its followers from the
underclasses in Latin America and the Philippines were closely
monitored by the state when it started appearing in Singapore.
Likewise, prominent foreign Muslim leaders and scholars expounding
the Dakwah ideology were also subjected to close observation.
Several events in Singapore in the mid-eighties illustrated the
volatile nature and the need for careful treatment of religious
activities. One widely publicised incident was the arrest of several
Catholic priests and lay workers by the government.(2) This action
was criticised by some Singaporeans and given wide foreign media
coverage by foreign journalists.
The incident began in the mid-eighties when a number of Catholic
priests became interested in the discussion of various social issues
surrounding the nation. Most of the priests were already involved in
some kind of welfare work, for example visiting prisons and
preaching to the prisoners. Several of the Catholic priests namely
Fathers Patrick Goh, Edgar D'Souza, Joseph Ho and Arotcarena formed
the Church and Society Group with an objective to discuss social
issues and made known their view to the congregation.(3) Through
various in-house publications, including the Catholic News, the team
sought to discuss various topics including the roles of trade
unions, National Wage Council and rights of workers; the roles of
multinational corporations in Singapore; the amendments to
citizenship laws, the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act, Government
policies on TV3 and foreign workers.
The tone of the publications, according to the state, is an attempt
to appeal to the masses on grounds that they were "victims of
injustice, lies and untruths" (ISD in Act: 16). It upset the
government which prided itself of fair treatment and justice to the
people. To the government, this was an act of irresponsibility and
if Liberation Theology(4) were to be of this nature, then it has no
place in the Singapore society for the government perceived its
motive was to rock the very basic stability of the nation which the
PAP government have so painstakingly created for the past three
decades.
According to a report, to the Catholic priests and lay workers, in
line with the teachings of Liberation Theology, they felt that it
was their responsibility to be involved in social issues and to
create social consciousness among its congregation. The general view
was that the citizens were apathetic, apolitical and at times, too
afraid to speak their mind. They should be encouraged to do so as in
the social liberal societies of the European and American worlds.
Such actions were seen as leftist leanings towards Marxism, hence a
Marxist conspiracy to subvert the existing sociopolitical system.(5)

The conflicts of ideology between the government and the Catholic
priests reflected deep seated differences between the pragmatists on
the one hand and the social democrats on the other. Being
rationalists and pragmatists, the government, having gone through
the decolonisation process, the separation from Malaysia and the
struggle for survival during the early years of independence,
finally reaching the present stage of industrialisation, economic
progress and achieving the status of a developed nation, was not
prepared to let a few radical voices destroyed this very fragile
fabric. Otherwise, the three decades of progress could be destroyed
within a matter of months if the radicals managed to incite mass
movement. Also, attempts to bring the various ethnic groups together
and mutually co-exist in harmony by implementing all the multi-ism
policies could also be destroyed overnight. The government has
consistently stressed that the interests of the wider state is
paramount and all other sentiments should be subsumed under it.
While arrest was made to individual members, the government assured
the general population that it was not an attack on the Church
itself. The Church continues to function as before, but religion and
politics needed to be clearly separated.
A second incident underlying the need for the separation of religion
from politics was a series of lectures given by foreign Muslim
theologians which the government regarded as provocative and aimed
at inciting resentment against the government.
In 1973, a lecturer named Imaduddin Abdul Rahim from Indonesia was
invited to deliver a religious talk to the Muslim in Singapore.
During this period, the government was carrying out massive
resettlement schemes for its population. Many villages and rural
population were resettled in new towns. It was a extremely difficult
task to persuade villagers and families to relocate and acceptance
was slowly coming from these people. The speech argued that such
policy would eventually lead to a demolition of mosques and that "in
new housing estates such as Queenstown and Toa Payoh one could see
church steeples piercing the skyline and large non-Muslim prayer
houses around" (The Paper: 16). He further branded "local Muslims
and Malays as stooges' in their own country for failing to fulfil
their obligations" (ibid: 16).
In 1982, another Muslim theologian, Ahmed Hoosen Deedat, in his
speech compared Singapore Muslim with South African Malays and
commented that Singapore Muslims were passive and soft and that they
should be more militant. He criticized that "the early local Muslim
inhabitants of being complacent and failing to convert the Chinese
immigrants, so that the Chinese had taken over power from the
Muslims" (ibid: 17). He was also heard to be making disparaging
remarks on Christianity.
In 1984, a Malaysian religious teacher, Mat Saman bin Mohamed, at a
religious function in Singapore "expressed his disappointment over
the demolition of mosques in areas affected by urban redevelopment,
saying that this was tantamount to the destruction of Allah's house"
(ibid: 17). In 1986, again at the invitation of the Muslims, he was
reported as making a speech asserting that "Singapore belonged to
the Malays as they were natives of the island" (ibid: 17). He
further commented that "Malays had become a minority as a result of
the influx of foreigners to Singapore, and were now subservient to
the non-Malays" (ibid: 17), calling for Malay unity against the
majority race and saying that their plight would be supported by the
Malaysian Malays (ibid: 17).
With the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and chauvinism throughout
the world, it was not surprising that these radical theologians
should expound such views. But it was equally predictable that the
Singapore government would react by banning the three from
re-entering the country again. It should be clear by now that ethnic
sensitivities have been accorded top priority in governmental
policies and been taken very seriously by all concerned. The issues
surrounding Malay identity and Islam continued to be very sensitive
in this part of the world where the Singapore nation state with a
Chinese majority has to co-exist peacefully in a fragile
geopolitical balance with its Indonesian and Malaysian neighbours,
which have a majority Muslim population.(6) Islam is the state
religion of both Indonesian and Malaysia. Besides, the policies of
giving preferential treatment to the Bumiputras in Malaysia have
also caused discontent in some Muslim quarters in Singapore. While
Singapore adopted a policy of meritocracy, it also has to calm down
latent tension and dissatisfaction in the discontented quarters. The
1969 racial riot was simply too high a cost to be repeated again.
The government did not tolerate incitement of any kind from external
forces, neither was it prepared to allow its Muslim population to be
influenced by them. To them, the speeches made by these Muslim
theologians justified the ban on their re-entry.
A third incident concerned the Sikh and Indian communities in
Singapore. The assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi by Sikh extremists
in 1984 brought about increased tension between the two groups in
Singapore. There were four reported cases of assaults on Sikhs, acts
of vandalism on Sikh properties and several threatening phone calls
to Sikh individuals and institutions. Some Indian stall-holders
refused to serve Sikh customers while some Sikhs closed their shops
when they anticipated troubles.
Some Hindu temples and organisations made plans to hold condolence
gatherings for the late Indian prime minister. There was also a
Brahmin temple planning to place a condolence message in the Straits
Times and held prayers for Mrs Gandhi. The government viewed the
activities of the Sikh and Hindu activities with alarm. It acted by
advising against such a display of emotions both in the temple and
in the newspaper as it felt that such actions would only aggravate
the already tense situation between the two communities in
Singapore. It also argued that the politics of India should not be
the concern of the Singapore Indians and Sikhs, so advising calmness
in the treatment of this assassination.
On the part of the Sikh community, since 1984, some Sikh temples
commemorated the storming of the Golden Temple and prayer sessions
were held for those Sikhs who were killed. Speeches were also made,
condemning the Indian Government and urging the Singaporean Sikhs to
assist their Indian counterparts in their struggle for an
independent Sikh state. In 1989, a few Sikh temples held requiems
for the two Sikhs executed by the Indian government for the
assassination of Indira Gandhi. They also placed announcement in the
obituaries column of the Sunday Times, informing the intended prayer
time for these two executed Sikhs. Photographs and newspaper
cuttings were also displayed at the temple. The government reacted
swiftly to this. The Police called up the Sikh leaders and temple
officials, warning against holding further requiems for the two and
not to import foreign politics into Singapore or involve their
religious organisations in politics (ibid: 18).
The government advised the Sikh temples and their members against
providing funds and logistics support to militant Sikh separatist
groups in India and United Kingdom (who were fighting for an
independent Khalistan state in Punjab). While it is difficult to
stop individuals from donating to such cause, the government came
down hard on those temples that allowed its leaders or members to
make emotional appeals to congregation for donations for such cause.

Religion and Subversion
Another area of controversy was how different groups of people
viewed actions as being politically subversive. The so-called
Vincent Cheng and Marxist Conspiracy incident,(7) which attracted
international media coverage and attention of human rights groups,
fully illustrated the fear of the government, and the difficulties
in defining what constitutes social consciousness and what
constitutes subversion. Cheng and his cohorts were arrested under
the Internal Security Act and imprisoned without being given a
trial. Subsequently, most have been released after they publicly
confessed to their activities and admitted their mistakes.
To the government, Vincent Cheng and his cohorts were engaged in
activities that aimed at destabilising the country. He was seen to
be using Christianity (specifically Liberation Theology) and the
Church to advance the Communist cause (ISB in the Paper: 18).(8) He
was seen to embark "on a systematic plan to infiltrate, subvert and
control various Catholic and student organisations, including the
Justice and Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, and Catholic
student societies in the National University of Singapore and
Singapore Polytechnic. He planned to build a united front of
pressure groups for confrontation with the government" (ibid: 18).
The Internal Security Branch further reported that "under the aegis
of the Justice and Peace Commission, he organised talks, seminars
and workshop to arouse feelings of disaffection with society and the
urge for revolutionary change. He was seen to manipulate Church
publications like the Highlights and Dossier to subtly propagate
Marxist and leftist ideas, and to politicise his readers who
included priests and lay Catholics. Some of the articles were
perceived by the government as adopting familiar Communist arguments
to denounce the existing system as "exploitative," "unjust" and
"repressive" (ibid: 18). In an extracted confession and broadcasted
to the public via the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, Cheng was
seen to be making the following remark:
I would foresee that the building up of pressure groups would
develop to a stage where they would come into open confrontation
with the government. This confrontation ... would start off with
peaceful protests, public man petitions, which could lead further to

more mass events like mass rallies, mass demonstrations, strikes,
where more people are mobilised. And leading to public disorder
and maybe even rioting, bloodshed" (FEER, 27 Oct. 1987: 23).
The link between Cheng and the exiled radical student leader of the
seventies, Tan Wah Piow (and in 1985 stripped of Singapore
citizenship under a new law), led the government to conclude that
there was some kind of Communist conspiracy plot in the brewing
(ibid: 22-25).
In a highly critical article, Haas (1989) charged that the Singapore
government has confused political freedom with subversion and
leftish leanings with Communism, that there was no basis to prove
that Cheng and his cohorts were Marxists nor were there any plot to
overthrow the government. Haas also argued that the government's
theory of "Nip in the bud" was a dangerous way of viewing social
events. He said "to analogize politics to the biological determinism
of a bud opening into a flower or the growth of cancer is to espouse
an organismic theory of politics, long discredited .... (Haas, 1989:
68). He further argued that to wrest without trial under the
Internal Security Act goes against the very grain of what the PAP
government had fought for in the fifties against the British
colonial rule. In 1955 when the British colonial administrators
enacted the Internal Security Act, Lee Kuan Yew spoke against it:
If it is not totalitarian to arrest a man and detain him when you
cannot charge him with any offence against any written law -- if
that is not what we have always cried out against in fascist
states -- then what is it?... If we are to survive as a free
democracy, then we must be prepared, in principle, to concede
to our enemies... as much [sic) constitutional right as you
concede yourself... We say we dislike communism because, under that
form of government, they have arbitrary powers of arrest and
detention without trial....
... to curtail a fundamental liberty, and the most fundamental
of them all -- freedom from arrest and punishment without
having violated a specific provision of the law and being
convicted for it.. But no man should be deprived of his
liberty (Haas, 1989: 70).
The case of Vincent Cheng, his involvement in Liberation Theology
and his activities have once again draw attention to the
difficulties inherent in the political structure, of the ruler and
the ruled. It has also touched upon the inherent differences between
politics and academic discourses. The hardline approach taken by the
government by invoking the Internal Security Act in arresting
Vincent Cheng and his groups was seen by many critics as tantamount
to the "storm in a teacup" syndrome. But the government's critique
on bystanders are that they are not in the forefront of
decision-making and are ultimately not responsible for the actual
course of events. Given the course of history, the government, in
the final analysis, would prefer to err on the side of caution.
The Ikhwan, Muslim Brotherhood was also considered to have
subversive intention, hence undesirable in Singapore. The Internal
Security Branch reported that:
A few Muslim activists have also attempted to carry out subversive
activities under the guise of conducting religious activities. In
mid-1978, a university graduate formed a clandestine group of
extremists called "Ikhwan" or Muslim Brotherhood, with the long-term

aim of establishing an Islamic state, by armed means if necessary.
The group comprised 21 members, mostly recruited from religious
classes conducted by a Malaysian religious teacher then living in
Singapore.
Ikhwan planned to recruit pre-university students and undergraduates

by setting up religious discussion groups in their respective
school and institutions. They were to be trained as writers and
religious teachers in order to disseminate revolutionary ideas
and sow disaffection among the Muslims. Led by the Ikhwan, the
Muslims would then demand that the Government implement Islamic
laws similar to those in Saudi Arabia or Iran. If the Government
refused, the Ikhwan would spearhead an armed uprising.
By September 79, the Ikhwan had managed to penetrate the Malay
language societies of the then Ngee Ann Technical College and
the Singapore Polytechnic, and to take over a moribund Muslim
organisation, the Pertubohan Muslimin Singapura (PERMUSI), as a
front for their clandestine activities (ISD in Act: 19).
In this case, the Singapore government has invoked the ISA to arrest
five leading Ikhwan members while others were given warning. The
religious adviser from Malaysia was expelled and prohibited from
entering Singapore. The government reassured the Muslim population
that the arrest was targeted at individuals whose intention was to
subvert the state, but not at Islam per se. Islamic militancy has
now become the hallmark of many Islamic Jihad groups throughout the
world and any seed for the germination of such a movement in
Singapore would not be viewed kindly at all.
The separation of politics and religion was henceforth spelled out
clearly in the Act. Thus the White Paper states that;
Religious groups must not get themselves involved in the political
process. Conversely, no group can be allowed to exploit religious
issues or manipulate religious organisations, whether to excite
disaffection or to win political support. It does not matter if the
purpose of these actions is to achieve religious ideals or to
promote secular objectives. In a multi-religious society, if one
group violates this taboo, others will follow suit, and the outcome
will be militancy and conflict.
We will spell out these group rules clearly and unequivocally. All
political and religious groups must understand these ground
rules, mid abide by than scrupulously. If we violate them, even
the best intentions, our political stability will be imperilled
(The Paper. 1).
Inter and Intra-Religious Tensions
Part of the reason why this Act was introduced was the perception,
hence fear, of the state over the implications of uncontrolled
religious activities which would tore the basic social structural
fabric of Singapore society. Hence, it viewed the recent heightened
religious fervour in this light:
In recent years, there has been a definite increase in religious
fervour, missionary zeal, and assertiveness among the Christians,
Muslims, Buddhists and other religious groups in Singapore.
Competition for followers and converts is becoming sharper and
more intense. More Singaporeans of many religions are inclining
towards strongly held exclusive beliefs, rather than the relaxed,
tolerant acceptance of and coexistence with other faiths.
This trend is part of a world-wide religious revival affecting
many countries, including the US and the Middle East. Its causes
lie beyond Singapore, and are not within our control. But in
Singapore this trend increases the possibility of friction and
misunderstanding among the different religious groups. Religion
is a deeply felt matter, and when religious sensitivities are
offended emotions are quickly aroused. It takes only a few
incidents to inflame passions, kindle violence, and destroy the
good record of religious harmony built up in recent decades.
The Maria Hertogh riots were a classic example (ibid: 3).
We therefore cannot assume that religious harmony will persist
indefinitely as a matter of course. Conscious efforts are
necessary to maintain it, especially by religious leaders and
groups. So long as Singaporean understand that they have to
live and let live, and show respect and tolerance for other
faiths, harmony should prevail. Religious groups should
not exceed these limits, for example
by denigrating other faiths, or by insensitively trying
to convert those belonging to other religions. If they do,
these other groups will feel attacked and threatened, and must
respond by mobilising themselves to protect their interests,
if necessary militantly. Similarly, if any religious group
used its religious authority to pursue secular political
objectives, other religions too must follow suit. Tensions
will build up, and there will be trouble for all.
Two vital conditions must therefore be observed to maintain
harmony. Firstly, followers of the different religions must
exercise moderation and tolerance, and do nothing to cause
religious enmity or hatred. Secondly, religion and politics
must be kept rigorously separated (ibid: 4).
Aggressive and Insensitive Proselytisation
Various reports commissioned by the government regarding religious
activities in Singapore have concluded that there is an increasing
trend towards aggressive proselytisation among different religious
groups.(9) This coincided with numerous complaints received by
various government bodies over aggressive evangelism, carried out
mostly by some Protestant churches and organisations. The Internal
Security Branch reported on the following:
University students have been harassed by over-zealous Christian
students. These student-preachers tried to convert fellow students
who felt depressed after failing their examinations. In hospitals,
some doctors and medical students have tried to convert critically
ill patients to Christianity on their death beds, without regards
for their vulnerabilities or for the sensitivities of their
relatives (ISB in the Paper 13).
It also reported on the inter and intra-religious tensions among the
various religious groups as a result of proselytisation where each
group tried to convert others to their faith. The following comments
were extracted from their report:
Christians and Hindus
The complaints by other religious groups are more serious.
Hindus have been perturbed by aggressive Christian
proselytisation. In August 1986, officials and devotees of
a Hindu temple found posters announcing a forthcoming
Christian seminar pasted at the entrance of their temple.
The Hindus also objected when Christian missionaries
distributed pamphlets to devotees going into temples in
Serangoon Road (ibid: 13).
Christians and Muslims
The Muslims are extremely sensitive to any attempt to convert
them to other faiths. They reacted indignantly when some
Christian groups stepped up evangelical activities in 1986.
A few groups distributed pamphlets in Malays that used the
word "Allah" for God. The Muslims accused these groups of
harassing and misleading them, since to them the word
"Allah" was specific to Islam. Some Muslims also received
extracts from an unidentified book containing inflammatory
remarks -- did Islam was a "cruel" and "devilish" religion
which encouraged "the killing of Christians" (ibid: 13).
Burial of Muslim Converts
There have also been disputes over the funerals of non-Muslims
who had converted to Islam. Two cases in July 1988 and
January 1989 involved Chinese converts. One belonged
to a Christian, and the other to a Buddhist family. The
families wanted to cremate the bodies according to
their respective Christian and Buddhist rites. But a Muslim
organisation applied for court orders to claim the bodies
and bury them according to Islamic rites. This naturally
upset the families, who considered themselves as next of
kin entitled under the law to decide on funeral arrangements.
Fortunately, these two disputes were settled amicably out of
court after government officials mediated (ibid: 14).
Intra-religious Tensions
a) Muslims and Ahmadis
There is a long-standing dispute between orthodox local Muslim
organisations and their Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission. In
the mid-1980s, when the Ahmadis called their new building at
Onan Road a mosque, local Muslim organisations protested. In
early 1989, the Ahmadiyya mission deposited literature in
letter-boxes, including boxes belonging to Muslim residents.
Some orthodox Muslim were enraged, and expressed grave concern
that the pamphlets would mislead and confuse Muslim youths.
Meanwhile, the Ahmadis continued to assert that they were true
Muslims, and mounted a propaganda campaign to refute allegations
that they were a deviant sect (ibid: 14).
b) Hindu
In October 89, Hindu sect, the Shiv Mandir, burnt an effigy of
Ravana, a Hindu mythological king, during a religious festival.
The Shiv Mandir claimed that the ritual was an ancient practice
marking Lord Ramachandra's triumph over the demon king
Ravana and symbolised the triumph of good over evil. Tamil
Hindus were incensed by the ceremony. Some saw it as an
Aryan attempt to humiliate and belittle the Dravidians,
for Ramachandra was an Aryan while Ravana a Dravidian. A few
asserted that Ravana was not a demon king. They wanted to
stage a protest demonstration at the Shiv Mandir function
and threatened to burn the effigy of Lord Ramachandra in
retaliation (ibid: 14-15).
c) Christians
Some Protestants have distributed pamphlets and booklets
denigrating the Roman Catholic Church and the Pope. Some
of these materials described the Pope as a Communist,
and even as the anti-Christ. The Catholic Church publication,
the Catholic News, has responded by condemning these attempts
by "fundamental Christian groups to confuse Catholics." Some
Protestant groups have also criticised other denominations,
including Charismatics and Ecumenists, in their publications
(ibid: 15).
In all these cases, it involved complaints to the government
departments which took action to mediate the tensions among the
groups concerned. In all cases, the leaders of these religious
groups were summoned to the Internal Security Department and warned
against instituting activities that would cause misunderstanding and
conflict. In all cases, the groups involved halted their activities.

The recent rising tide of religious fervour among all religious
groups have meant that groups and individuals dike were swept along
with the whirlwind, which created its own momentum. The state was
determined that this whirlwind force would not get out of control.
The White Paper spelled out further on this issue:
Many religions enjoin their followers to proselytise others who have

not embraced the same faith, in order to propagate the religion.
Christian refer to this as "bearing witness," while Muslims engage
in dakwah activities. This liberty to proselytise is pan of the
freedom of religion protected by the Constitution. However, in
Singapore it must be exercised very sensitively. It is one thing
to preach to a person who is interested in converting to a new
faith. It is another to try to convert a person of a different
religion by denigrating his religion, especially if he has no
desire to be converted. In such cases, the potential for giving
offence is great. For this reason, the Government has always
discouraged Christian groups from aggressively evangelising among
the Malay Muslim community in Singapore.
Harm can be done even without the direct contact of proselytization.

Each religion has its own comprehensive doctrines and theology.
Some faiths, for example Buddhism, readily accept other religions
and practices, but others, including both Christianity and Islam,
are by their nature exclusive. Each religious group, in instructing
its own followers, will naturally need to point out where its
doctrines differ from other religions, and indeed from other
branches of the same religion, and why it regards the others as
being
mistaken. While it is legitimate, it is possible to go too far.
An unrestrained preacher pouring forth blood and thunder and
denouncing the followers of other faiths as misguided infidels
and lost souls may cause great umbrage to entire communities. If
they then retaliate with equal virulence, or worse escalate the
quarrel by attacking the persons and desecrating the places of
worship of the opposing faithful, the tolerance and mutual
trust which forms the basis of Singapore society will be
permanently destroyed.
The futures of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism as world
religions are secure regardless of how many Christians, Muslims,
Hindus or Buddhists there may be among Singaporeans. However, if
any religious group in Singapore seeks to increase the number of
its converts drastically, at the expense of the other faiths
or attempts to establish a dominant or exclusive position for
itself, it will be strenuously resisted by the other groups. This
is a fact of life in Singapore which has to be faced squarely
(The Paper. 4-5).
Another area which the Act specifically seeks to contain is the use
of religion for political causes. This was in response to the
emerging Liberation Theology Movements found in certain section of
the Christian churches and the Fundamental Islamic Movement which
led to the arrest of some Christian clergy and lay Christians and
the expulsion of some Muslim theologians in the mid-eighties. The
Paper states that:
... religious leaders and members of religious groups should
refrain from promoting any political party or cause under the
cloak of religion. The leaders should not incite their faithful
to defy, challenge or actively oppose secular Government policies,
much less mobilise their followers or their organisations for
subversive purposes....
Members of religious groups may, of course, participate in the
democratic political process as individual citizens. They may
campaign for or against the Government or any political party.
But they must not do so as leaders of their religious constituency.
Religious leaders are in a particularly delicate position. An
Archbishop, Pastor, Abbot, or Mufti is a religious personage,
whether or not be puts on his robes or mounts his pulpit. It is
not to be expected that every religious leader will always agree
with every policy of the Government. But whatever their political
views, they should express them circumspectively. They should
not use their religious authority to sway their followers, much
less actively incite them to oppose the Government (ibid: 6).
The Paper also stipulated that the views of the sacred and the
profane might differ vastly, especially on issues which to the
Government are legitimate concerns for public policy, but which to
some faiths pose moral and religious questions. But issues such as
these should be left to the individuals to decide.
Many Christians, particularly Catholics, consider abortion
to be morally wrong. The Government's policy is to allow
women wanting abortions to get one. However, whether or
not a pregnant woman wants to undergo an abortion, and
whether or not a doctor or nurse wants to carry out abortions,
are clearly issues of conscience, to be decided by each
person for himself or herself. On such issues, religious groups
may and do properly take positions and preach to their followers.
Jehovah's Witnesses believe that their religion forbids them
to do any form of National Service. Under the law this is
criminal conduct, not conscientious objection. Followers of
this sect who refuse to obey call up orders are court martial
and serve jail sentences.
Some Christian groups consider radical social action, as
practised in Latin America or the Philippines, to be a vital
part of Christian faith. Whether or not this is the practise
elsewhere, if para-religious social action groups become an
active political force in Singapore, they will cause heightened
political and religious tensions (ibid: 7).
In formulating the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, the purpose
"is to establish working rules by which many faiths can accept
fundamental differences between them, and coexist peacefully in
Singapore" (emphasis-mine) (ibid: 7).
Under this Act, the government is empowered to take actions it deems
as appropriate to prevent religious disharmony. Individuals engaged
in the following conduct could be prosecuted in the court and be
subjected to fine or imprisonment:
a. Causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility or
prejudicing the maintenance of harmony between different religious
groups;
b. carrying out activities to promote a political cause, or a
cause of any political society while, under the guise of,
propagating
or practising any religious belief;
c. carrying out subversive activities under the guise of
propagating or practising any religious belief; or
d. exciting disaffection against the President or the Government.
The Orders has power to prohibit the individual from:
a. addressing any congregation, or group or worshipper on any
subject specified in the order,
b. Printing, publishing, distributing or contributing to
any publication produced by that religious group;
c. holding office in any editorial board or committee of any
publication produced by that group (ibid: 9-11).
Establishing a Stable Tension -- Presidential Council for Religious
Harmony
A meditating body, the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony,
would be set up "to consider and report on matters affecting the
maintenance of religious harmony, which are referred to it by the
Government or Parliament. It will also consider Prohibition Orders
issued by the Minister" (ibid: 11). The Presidential Council for
Religious Council, provided for by the Religious Harmony Act, was
established in August 1992 with representatives from the main
religious bodies in Singapore. They include one representative from
the Buddhists, Muslims, Roman Catholics, Christian Protestants,
Hindus and Sikhs communities. Included in this is the former Chief
Justice who is the chairperson and two lay representatives.
The main objective of the Council is to ensure religious harmony
among the various communities. The functions of the Council include
the following: (1) to consider and report to the minister on matters
affecting the maintenance of religious harmony which are referred to
it by the minister or Parliament; (2) to consider and make
recommendations on restraining orders referred to it by the
minister; (3) the council could also advise the President whether he
should confirm restraining orders imposed by the minister, (4) it
could also summon those under restraining orders to hear their views
(ST, 2 August 1992: 1).
In a way, this Council would serve as a bridge between the state on
the one hand and the religious organisations and public on the
other. In creating this Council, the state has in fact passed over
the responsibility of the maintenance of religious harmony to the
people themselves. The leaders of each religion would ensure that
those under their care would fall in line and that tension and
violence would not break out. In short, self imposed restraints
become important. While not denying that tensions would always
remain in situations of intense competition and rivalry, the idea is
to established a stable tension among the religious groups.
Enshrined in the Constitution of Singapore is the clause pertaining
to the freedom of workship. And the Religious Harmony Act spelled
precisely what this freedom of worship means. At the individual
level, the individuals could choose whatever they want to workship.
They could also encourage family members, friends and colleagues to
participate but not coerced and forced them to join. The line
dividing the act of persuasion and coercion is very thin. If there
is no complaints, then it is the act of persuasion. But if there is
dissatisfaction and complaints, it becomes coercion. But when a
group engages all its members to go out and persuade others, whom
they do not know, particularly those in public places, it is
coercion. And within the law, they could be stopped from this act of
proselytisation.
Religious competition can be seen as a healthy sign. It prevents the
various religious groups from becoming complacent. In a way, it
forces these groups to be vigilant and to cater to the needs of
their adherents. The demands of the adherents would set in motion
the internal dynamics which would usher in changes and development.
Alternatively, it could revert back to orthodoxy. In the case of
Singapore, the two forces of change and a return to orthodoxy are in
action. The availability of these varieties of religions allowed the
lay people to shop the one that suits their needs most. However,
each group is not allowed to dominate through the use of force, or
intense and unscrupulous acts of proselytisation. The Act thus
intends to define and maintain the religious boundary of these
groups. So long as all the players adhered to the rules of the
games, the maintenance of a stable tension would be upheld and is
beneficial to all. The Singapore State, with its visionary
leadership and efficient bureaucracy, once again, is able to
dominate and set the agenda.
Conclusion
To the state, there is a clear cut separation between religion and
the secular institutions. Any activity that fall outside the realm
of religion should be treated as such. By introducing the
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, it is sending a message to its
citizenry to confine its religious pursuit within the known
religious boundary. Any other non-related and non-religious
activities within the religious boundary would not be acceptable to
the state. The Singapore state has once again pre-empted and taken
immediate actions in their dealing of religious affairs.
Furthermore, by establishing the Presidential Council for Religious
Harmony and recruiting the religious leaders from the mainstream
religious groups as members of the council, the state is, in fact,
placed not only the responsibility of religious activities but the
maintenance of religious harmony among the major religious and
ethnic groups squarely on the shoulders of these religious leaders.
In short, these religious institutions inter alia their leaders are
now accountable to the state for their own conduct as well as the
religious well being of other groups.
Notes:
(1.) The Maria Hertogh Riot Incident involved the case of a Dutch
Eurasian girl. Baptized in 1937 after her birth, she was given away
in 1943 when her parents were arrested by the Japanese. She was
adopted and raised as a Muslim by a Malay family. In 1948 her
parents discovered her whereabout and brought out a lawsuit for
custody of her. But Maria Hertogh was returned to her foster parents
in 1950 and was rushed into marriage. A further court hearing
removed her from her Malay husband. All the while, there was
heightened ethno-religious tension between the two groups, resulting
in a riot. For a further discussion, see Clutterbuck, R., 1973:
72-73.
(2.) For a discussion on this, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 4
June 1987; 2 July 1987; 22 October 1987, 17 December 1997.
(3.) See Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1987, p. 9.
(4.) For a discussion on the origin of Liberation Theology, see
Smith, C., The Emergence of Liberation Theology, (Chicago: Chicago
University Press. 1991).
(5.) See Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 October 1987, pp. 22-24.
(6.) In 1993, there were comments by the Indonesian government
questioning the loyalty of its Chinese population over the issue of
their increased investment in the People's Republic of China,
instead of investing in Indonesia.
(7.) For a critical analysis of this, see Haas, M., "The Politics of
Singapore in the 1980s," in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 19,
No. 1, pp. 48-77.
(8.) This was a report filed by the Internal Security Branch (ISB)
and included in the annex of the White Paper.
(9.) See Tong, C. IC, 1988 and 1989; Kuo, E. C. Y., Quah, J. S. T.
and Tong, C. K., 1988, and Quah, J. S. T., 1987.
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