Modern Hindu Exegesis of Mahayana Doctrine

·期刊原文
Modern Hindu Exegesis of Mahayana Doctrine
By Agehananda Bharati
Philosophy East & West
V. 12 (1962)
pp. 19-28
Copyright 1962 by University of Hawaii Press

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p.19

IN PRESENT-DAY Sanskrit writing in the Vedaanta and other Braahma.nical traditions, there seems to be an increasing awareness of the value per se of heretical doctrines and arguments. Whereas Jaina scholastic writing has not so far attracted much attention of Hindu scholars in this century, Buddhism has. Widening contact with the Buddhist world and with Buddhist thought is no doubt the most important factor here, and such occasions as the Buddha Jayanti celebrated in India five years ago add to the desire to resume the discourse with the Buddhist teachings which has long been dormant.

My own feeling is that the popular notions prevalent in India, sponsored and probably believed by Indian and non-Indian spokesmen of Asia's basic cultural unity, and preached with some vehemence by Indian national leaders, including the late Mahatma Gandhi, have irritated serious Hindu scholastics. In particular, the idea that the Buddha was, after all, a theist who concealed his eventual beliefs in a sort of heuristic fashion, which is being espoused by influential and good-willed persons of little doctrinary knowledge, has upset quite a few Hindu scholars, especially of the orthodox type.[1]

As a high-level paradigm, I shall present an account of the relevant sections in two modern commentaries on the Bhaamatii, which is itself the outstanding medieval commentary on `Sa^mkara's Brahma-suutra-bhaa.syam. These two commentaries, the succinct Prakaa`sa and the elaborate Vikaasa, were writ-

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1. See,for example, M.K.Gandhi's statement:"I have heard it contended times without number and I have read in books also claiming to express the spirit of Buddhism, that Buddha did not believe in God. In my humble opinion such a belief contradicts the very central fact of Buddha's teaching. It seems to me that the confusion has arisen over his rejection, and just rejection, of all the base things that passed in his generation under the name of God. . . . He, therefore, reinstated God in the right place and dethroned the usurper who for the time being seemed to occupy that White Throne. . . . He unhesitatingly said that the Law was God Himself. God's laws are eternal and unalterable and not separable from God Himself. It is an indispensable condition of His very perfection. Hence the great confusion that Buddha disbelieved in God and simply believed in the moral law." Quoted in Mahatma Gandhi and Swami Vivekananda, "Buddha's Denial of God and the Self," The Indo-Asian Culture, V, No. 2 (October, 1956), 140 f. Also, Mahadev Desai, With Gandhiji in Ceylon (Madras: Ganesan & Co., 1928), p. 58. See also my article "Gandhi and Buddhist Atheism," Gandhi Marg, V, No. 2 (April, 1961), 125 ff.

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ten by Pandit Lak.smiinaatha Jhaa ("Baccaajhaa"), one-time Head of the Department of Indian Philosophy at the Sa^msk.rta Mahaavidyaalaya at Banaras, and published by the Pandit himself, aided by a personal fund of the then Governor of Uttar Pradesh. The two commentaries cover the catu.hsuutrii only, i.e., the first four verses of the Suutra, as has been customary with Vedaanta commentators. To my knowledge, at least in this century, no commentary on the complete Baadaraaya.na Suutra has been written. It is the orthodox view, moreover, that the entire subject-matter of this `Sruti is contained and condensed in the catu.hsuutrii, the rest being but elaboration (vistaara). This, of course, ties in with the traditional tendency to deal with a subject in a telescopic fashion ever more succinctly or otherwise to state it in ever-increasing complexity within the same treatise.

Vaacaspati had been arguing in a virtual vacuum, as there were hardly any Buddhists around him or anywhere nearby whose views he was challenging following the Aacaarya's example[2] and who could have made the proper rejoinders. The matter is quite different with the Vedaanta "siddhaantin" (orthodox thinker) of our day. There is a chair for Buddhist philosophy ( bauddha-dar`sana-vibhaaga) at Jhaa's institute, and there are two chairs at other schools in Banaras,[3] in addition to the Muulagandhakuu.tivihaara, which is situated at Sarnath, within rickshaw-distance from the Mahaavidyaalaya, and which is inhabited by many learned bhikkhus from the Theravaada countries. Though Jhaa did not read Tibetan or Chinese, he was most certainly exposed to scholars who did, which I gathered from his remark in the course of a conversation in 1953, when he referred to certain topics of Buddhist doctrine as "well established in commentaries of bhik.sus writing in other languages" (vaide`sa-bhaa.saasu .tiikaa-kaaraa.naa^m granthe.su suni`scitaani). At least, he must have been well aware of the importance of Buddhist writings of non-Indian provenance.

The passage on which the Prakaa`sa and the Vikaasa are here commenting is the Bhaamatii on the first suutra, i.e., "the erroneousness of the assumption of an ego for those who take consciousness as the foundation is established on account of its apparent permanence and of its impermanence in different acts of cognition" (vij~naanaalambanatve'py aha^mpratyayasya bhraantatva^m tad-avastham eva, tasya sthira-vastu-nirbhaasatvaad asthiratvaac ca vij~naanaanaam).

Although this is strictly the view of but one school, viz., the pure idealists

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2. It is by no means certain whether `Sa^mkara himself (8th century) had any live "puurvapak.sa"-Buddhist to contend with in his challenging of Buddhist doctrine.

3. The chair on Tibetan and Buddhist Philosophy at the Varanasi Sanskrit University (the former Government Sanskrit College), which is held by Professor H. V. Guenther, was not yet in existence, however, at the time when Jhaa published his commentaries.

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of the Vij~naanavaada,[4] Jhaa takes it as the occasion to bring in all the four main Mahaayaana schools.

In his long preface, Jhaa makes an elaborate statement of the teachings of these schools, pre-empting to an extent his treatment in the actual Prakaa`sa and Vikaasa, which is considerably shorter and which repeats much of what the introduction has said. His formulation of the main Mahaayaana doctrines is, on the whole, candid and objective, and, apart from such mildly facetious and infrequent interjections as "bhadante bhavanta.h" ("Reverend sir, you"), he does not share the traditional acerbity of style when dealing with Buddhist doctrine. His statement runs over eighteen pages in the introduction and covers another five pages of the commentary proper.

At the outset, he epitomizes the four Mahaayaana schools in short aphorisms of the type that has been in vogue among .tiikaakaaras (sub-commentators) at least since Madhusuudana; he does so both in the introduction and--with minor changes--in the Prakaa`sa:[5] "The Maadhyamika says everything is void; the Yogaacaara says external objects are void; the Sautraantika holds that external objects can be inferred; the Vaibhaa.sika claims external objects can be directly perceived" (tatra maadhyamika.h sarva`suunyavaadii, yogaacaaro baahyaartha`suunyavaadii, sautraantiko baahyaarthaanumeyatvavaadii, vaibhaa.siko baahyaartha-pratyak.savaadii). Even in this initial definition, Jhaa exhibits subtler acquaintance with the schools than most Hindu scholars, who tend to ignore the difference between the Sautraantika and Vaibhaa.sika schools.[6]

Although Jhaa lists metaphysical problems accruing from the discussed teachings-particularly in his evaluating conclusions--it is evident that his main concern is epistemological. His metaphysical argument seems directed against the line taken by Bhaavaviveka. He does not mention that teacher, but an excellent study published recently[7] shows that Bhaavaviveka sounds a familiar note; his statement of the Vedaantin's position as puurvapak.sa (view of an opponent) reads almost like an obverted counterpart of Jhaa's commentaries.[8]

As a Vedaantic epistemologist, Jhaa's chief criticism is directed against the

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4. I am fully aware of the inadequacy of "idealism" as a label for Yogaacaara; but, if an epistemological distinction of all schools of thought into either realism or idealism is permissible, then this school is certainly "idealistic."

5. Pa.n.dita Lak.smiinaatha Jhaa, Brahmasuutrabha.sya^m catussuutriparyanta^m prakaa`sa-vikasa-.tiikaadvayopeta bhaamatii sahitam (Varanasi: privately published by author, 1952),p. 4.

6. See S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge: University Press, 1951), p. 112 n.

7. V. V. Gokhale, "The Vedaanta Philosophy described by Bhavya in his Maadhyamikah.rdaya," Indo-Iranian Journal, II, No. 3 (1958), 165-180.

8. It seems to me that the aphorismic summary of a system in vogue with almost all commentators later than Sa^mkara has been used by them only for the formulation of the puurvapak.sas' doctrine; the siddhaantin's views are not stated in this succinct manner, except when an older aacaarya is being quoted.

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Buddhist notion of causal efficiency (artha-kriyaa-kaaritva). His reference to the term and its derivatives, however, presupposes its earlier usage, which had been that of the Sautraantikas, namely, a causa efficiens due to the fulfillment of a previously established need, and not its later use as efficacy of producing any action or event, in the manner defined in Ratnakiirti's K.sa.nagarbhasiddhi, which had been in the mind of Hindu critics from the tenth century onward.[9] Naagaarjuna's systematic use of quasicontradictory correlative terms and his conclusion that objects denoted by such terms cannot really (paaramaarthata.h, vastuta.h ) exist, since their individual existences cancel each other, lead to the Maadhyamika axiom that there can be no cause whatever until an effect is present, and that there cannot be any effect unless a cause is shown. This is considered by Jhaa to be totally absurd.

Jhaa's style and the dialectical tools which he uses are provided by the Navya-nyaaya, in which he had been thoroughly trained in true conformity with the Maithili tradition, in which he had received his education.[10] He uses the Maadhyamika's own weapon to lead him ad absurdum--at least, he thinks he does. However, he does not mention the crux of it, i.e., that Naagaarjuna and his school were emphatic that they did not proffer any proposition of their own, their task being to demolish others' propositions, viz., all propositions.

I shall now proceed to show some of Jhaa's main arguments: Are all things, including intellectual notions, subject to immediate decay by the rule of momentariness? If so, then the instrument for stating such a law is invalid, being itself momentary ( traikaalika-artha-kriyaa-kara.na-prasa^nga.h samarthasya kaalak.saye hetvabhaavaat);[11] if they are not, then this would imply the existence of something durable (sthaayin); but, since this is axiomatically impossible with the Buddhists, it would mean that there is an instrument different from the state caused by something preceding it, which, again, cannot be upheld if the notion of artha-kriyatva (a purely pragmatical type of causal efficiency) is to be maintained (na cai.sa vartamaanaartha- kriyaa- kara.na-kaale atiitaagate arthakriye karotiiti bhuuta-bhavi.syat-kaalayor api tad-akara.na-prasa^nga.h ).

His illustration is: "Just as a pot cannot be black and red all over at the same time" (na caikasmin gha.te parata.h `syaama-rakta-ruupayor iva)--thus somewhat freely rendered it would sound close enough to the standard parlance of contemporary British analytic philosophy.[12]

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9. See `S. N. Dasgupta, History, Vol. I, p. 163; also E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie (Salzburg: Otto Muller Verlag, 1953), pp. 386 f.; also, E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958), pp. 76, 118, 391.

10. I understand Jhaa is a linear descendant of Raghunaatha `Siroma.ni, author of the Padaar-thatattvaniruupa.nam.

11. Jhaa, op. cit., p. 5.

12. The token "two colours all over at the same time" is frequently used by H. H. Price,

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Unfortunately, Jhaa, like other Hindu critics of Buddhist doctrine, does not seem to realize that the pratiitya-samutpaada (dependent origination of things and events) does not constitute a causal nexus;[13] it is much more similar to an associative chain of the Humean sort. It is possible that the somewhat top-heavy Navya-nyaaya terminology obstructs this all-important recognition. This is one of the weakest parts of Jhaa's arguments. He avers, "Just as dependent origination applies to external objects, it also covers internal objects" (yathaa baahya-pratiitya-samutpaade tathaivaabhyantaraadhyaatmike'pi pratiitya- samutpaade), and from this he infers "as this dependent origination constitutes causality" (yad aya^m pratiitya-samutpaada.h kaara.nam)[14]--Which, Of course, does not follow. It is, however, the classical Vedaantin's attempt at refuting this axiom of the Buddhists.

Jhaa is worried about the concatenation of the teaching of momentariness (k.sanikatva) with that of pratiitya-samutpaada. His arguments for the incompatibility of the two doctrines run over three pages, and there is nothing new in them. Adducing several similes (udaahara.na) in the orthodox style, he repeats the classical critics' charge that the Buddhists' insistence on a radically pragmatic axiom (artha-kriyaa-karitva) implies that there is no guarantee that anything may not arise from anything.

His main complaint, however, is of a pastoral sort, and it is novel in this form. In the first place, he argues, there can be no valid argument of any kind if causes, conceived in any manner whatever, are constantly being destroyed, and, in the second place, such a procedure militates against the redemptive frame and renders all instructions for the religious life futile (aadye nirhetuka-vinaa`saabhyupagama-virodha.h, dvitiiye maargopade`sa-vaiyarthyam).[15]

Next, Jhaa is concerned about the eschatological aspect of the matter: "If there is no permanence even of the experiencing agent, then the very meaning of the term 'experience' is absent; and [in that case] who is it that obtains liberation? For, if mok.sa is a lasting experience or a state of any sort, then the doctrine of momentariness breaks down" (bhoktur api sthairyaanupagame bhogasya bhogaarthatvaanaapatte.h; evam mok.so 'pi kasya? yadi bhoga-mok.sa-kaalasthaayi-sthirena kenacid ubhaya^m praarthyeta tadaa k.sanikatvaabhyu-

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especially in Thinking and Experience (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1953), and by G. Ryle, Concept of Mind (London: Oxford University Press, 1949). It goes without saying that these similarities are incidental, as scholars like Jhaa have not yet read this type of philosophy. Yet, such incidents may help to make Indian philosophy "respectable" in the eyes of modern professional philosophers in the West.

13. My attention was first directed to this important fact, overlooked by most European and Indian Orientalists, by Professor Guenther of Banaras.

14. Jhaa, op cit., p. 7.

15. Ibid., p. 9.

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pagama-virodha.h)?[16] In spite of the emotionally loaded content of the issue, Jhaa's diction is remarkably factual, and it is on purely discursive issues that Jhaa impugns the Buddhist equivalent of mok.sa. In this section, he never uses "nirvaa.na" except when he quotes a Buddhist verse in which the word occurs. It seems that he avoids using "nirvaa.na" on his own, i.e., to connote the monistic consummating experience, as modern pandits usually avoid the opponents' terminology in a dispute with the opponents, using, instead, the equivalent or semantically closest term, of their own particular school. The reason for this may well be a refined semiotic susceptibility-"mok.sa" is just not quite "nirvaa.na"; or else, disputative caution may have reached a point where the scholars avoid the puurvapak.sa's terms, lest they be convicted of misusing it.

Jhaa's extended definition of the teaching of the Vij~naanavaadins is the best I have seen in contemporary Hindu writing: "Even if an external object exists, since nothing can be brought into the practical world of proof without a superimposition by the intellect, they say that the whole of the practical world (the vyavahaara) belongs to consciousness" (saty api baahye 'rthe buddhyaaroham antare.na pramaa.naadi-vyavahaaraanavataaraat vij~naanasya eva sarvo 'pi vyavahaara iti vadanti).[17] Note the special use of "anavataara," literally, "not descending." It seems to have become a favorite phrase of the Maithili logicians, and it implies something like "it does not follow."[18]

Jhaa's central argument for the refutation of Vij~naanavaada epistemology is ingenious, but would be easily refuted by the Buddhist dialectician. Jhaa argues that, if consciousness were the only warrant of existence, then there could be no distinguishing criterion between true and false object sentences; then Vi.s.numitra might well be the son of a barren woman, and one might well enjoy the fragrance of a lotus in the sky. The Buddhist dialectician would answer that these analogies are not permissible, since "barren woman" and "the impossibility of being Vi.s.numitra's mother" are tautologies (samaanyokti). Like contemporary Occidental logicians, later Buddhist writers like Dharmakiirti would claim these on purely formal grounds, and not on any epistemological basis such as Jhaa constantly presupposes. Yet, on the whole, Jhaa's confusion of logical (i.e., formal) and epistemological uses of argument is far less conspicuous than with earlier Vedaantic critics of Buddhist doctrine.

Jhaa's most interesting point in the whole disquisition is that a purely

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16. Ibid., p. 10.

17. Ibid., p. 11.

18. Pandit Subhadra Jhaa, in his talks ac Varanasi, used to enjoin: ida^m kasmaad avatarate 'ti sadaa pra.s.tavya^m bho.h (always ask, gentlemen,--"from what does this follow?"). This maxim, Subhadra told me, he had gleaned from his readings in contemporary Occidental philosophy.

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idealistic conception must conflict with the notion of the aalayauij~naana[19] (consciousness-substratum or matrix-consciousness), the most important postulate of the Bodhisattvabhuumii; for, so Jhaa puts it, "Desire-tendencies have to inhere in some sort of personality (sthaayin); these tendencies are said to be supported by the aalayauij~naana; but, as this must also be momentary, it is both redundant and illogical to stipulate it. This criticism unwittingly uses Occam's Razor--there being no equivalent to that excellent maxim in the Indian scholastic tradition"[20] (sthaayinam aa`srayam antare.na sa^mskaaraatmikaa vaasanaa-pi nopapadyata aalayavij~naanasyaapi k.sa.nikatvena prav.rtti-vij~naanasyeva na vaasanaadhikara.natvam sa^mbhavati. . . sthairyaabhyupagame caalayavij~naanasya siddhaantahaani.h). This is an acute piece of analysis, for it seems to me that the aalayauij~naana had been a rather half-hearted postulate from the outset. There must have been a feeling among the Buddhists that some sort of quasi-permanent entity or substitute-entity was desirable as a basis of reference and as a conceptual receptacle of the aggregates, although the doctrine of momentariness (k.sa.navaada) had to be preserved, not permitting any exception. It seems to me that the aalayavij~naana was a dialectical compromise with the aatmavaadins (ontologists who stipulate a self) of all types. Jhaa may have felt this, yet Hindu scholastic sophistication never quite makes this grade: it does not suggest that the opponent "does not really mean it" or "tries to disguise the fact that he himself is not really too happy with his point."

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19. aalaya-vij~naana is a cryptic term in the Yogaacaara system. In his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 106, Franklin Edgerton lists Lamotte's rendition "connaissance-receptacle," quoted from "L'AAlayavij~naana (le Receptacle) dans le Mahaayaanasa.mgraha" in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, III (1935), 169 ff. Edgerton himself tries "basic, fundamental, underlying vij~naana," and quotes Mahaavyutpatti, 2017, where the Tibetan equivalent of aalaya is kun gzhi, "ultimate basis." He says it is sometimes identified with citta and distinguished from manas. In his class talks at Vienna (1947-1948), H. V. Guenther used "Schatzkammerbewusstsein," which sounded like a holdover from the time of the Indological pioneers (Deussen, Muller); such a rendition must have been in Tucci's mind when he used "store-consciousness" (G. Tucci, Theory and Practice of the Ma.n.dala, London: Rider & Co., 1961, p. 41). The same rendition is given by J. Takakusu (The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1949, pp. 83-85 et passim). Both Tucci and Takakusu seem to have been transmitting some obsolete German-model rendition-"aalaya' never means "store (house)" primarily, and I have a feeling that the archaic German rendering was based on the mystery-cum-romance complex from which old German Indology suffered, at the cost of exact, albeit less inspiring, lexicography (cf. Deussen's "Geheimlehre" for "Upani.sad).

S. N. Dasgupta paraphrases "repository of all experiences" (A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952, Vol. II, p. 22). E. Frauwallner renders it "Grunderkennen" (Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958, pp. 328, 352).By far the most helpful paraphrase (and there can be only a paraphrase, not a morpheme-translation, of a term like this) is H. V. Guenther's more recent "an existent substratum to the phenomenon of sa^msaara and nirvaa.na" (in Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1957, pp. 12 ff. et passim).

20. Lak.smiinaatha Jhaa, op. cit., p.12. (Free translation.)

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The Pandit's lenience toward the `Suunyavaadin is obvious. Advaitic writers feel either favorably inclined toward the Maadhyamikas--T. R. V. Murti being the best example of this[21]--or they are particularly vindictive against it. Both of these alternative reactions are due to the doctrinary similarity between the Vedaanta and the Maadhyamika--a similarity not only hailed by well-meaning and not-too-well-informed enthusiasts for Asian cultural unity but also admitted by serious Vedaantic scholars. For the negative reaction toward Maadhyamika dialectic, Mahaamahopaadhyaya Giridhari Sharma was a powerful example. The popular view, however, is that there is little difference between Hinduism and Buddhism in general, and none whatever between the Vedaanta and the `Suunyavaada. Seth J. K. Birla, the builder of several Hindu and Buddhist shrines in India, and the most earnest Marwari protagonist of the Hindu renaissance, told me, "The differences are negligible, and Vedaanta and `Suunyavaada are one and the same."

At the ill-fated Kumbhamela at Allahabad in February, 1954, His Holiness Jagadguru `Sa^mkaraacaarya Bhaaratii K.r.s.na Tiirtha, the late Patriarch of the Govardhana Pii.tha, Puri, made a novel evaluation of the charge against `Sa^mkara by his contemporary Hindu opponents as being a crypto-Buddhist ("prachanna Bauddha)! Vedaantins tend to feel embarrassed about this allegation, which may add to their strong feelings about Maadhyamika doctrine, Swami Bhaaratii K.r.s.na Tiirtha utilized this very charge for the benefit of the Advaita-vaada, saying, "The basic sameness of `Suunyavaada and of Advaitavaada becomes quite clear from the [relevant] narratives. The contemporaneous scholars who opposed Advaitavaada used to charge the preceptor with being a crypto-Buddhist. From this you can infer that it is only thoroughbred scholars on both sides who can tell the difference. The power of the Upani.sadic tradition is thus evident from both Hindu and Buddhist doctrines."[22]

Now, Lak.smiinaatha Jhaa claims that the Advaitin would have no quarrel with the Maadhyamika if the latter held that the void was of the essence of a non-differentiated knower; yet, this is not so, as the resemblance is forfeited on the authority of a passage in the Maa.n.duukya-kaarikaa which he quotes fully

"kramate na hi buddhasya j~naana.m dharme.su taapina.h,
sarve dharmaas tathaa j~naana.m naitad buddhena bhaa.sitam"[23]

and Jhaa paraphrases j~naana-j~neya-j~naat.r-bheda-`suunya^m paramaartha-tattvam

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21. T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1955.

22. Speech by H. H. The Jagadura `Sa^mkaraacaarya Svami Bhaaratii K.r.s.na Tiirtha at the Kumbhamela at Allahabad, February 8, 1954.

23. Maa.n.duukya-kaarikaa IV. 99.

24. Lak.smiinaatha Jhaa, op. cit., pp. 15 f.

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advayam etan na buddhena bhaa.sitam-iti bhaa.syam[24] ("A non-dual absolute essence void of the distinction between knowledge, the known object, and the knower, such is not the teaching of the Buddha)." Jhaa does not indicate, however, whether he thinks Gau.dapaada to be a Vedaantin or a Buddhist. Less than a generation ago, Hindu scholars would have indignantly rejected the suggestion that `Sa^mkara's para^mguru (one's own guru's guru) might have been a Buddhist, but today quite a few pandits are considering the possibility, such change of attitude being a sequel of inter-religious contacts on
the scholastic level.

Jhaa then proceeds, "If people think that `Suunyavaada and Advaitavaada are identical, this is not so--due to the ascertaining of the respective tenets (siddhaanta-paruh~naanaat);"in `Suunyavaada the Void itself is non-existent together with the ten million times fourfold congeries of the universe [i.e., the phenomenal totum]; whereas in Advaitavaada, although the phenomenal totum is indeed void, its true essence is self-luminous [i.e., existent in the ontic sense]" (`suunyavaadinaa^m ko.ti-catu.s.taya-`suunyam apy asaty eva paryavasati advaitinaa^m tattv^am tu svetara-sattvaadi-ko.ticatu.s.taya-`suunyam api svaprakaa`saatmaka^m sadrupam eva).[25]

Jhaa's final criticism is, again, in the classical Vedaantic tradition in diction and content: "if there is total voidness, then what is the locus of phenomenal existence whereof it is a manifestation? Hence, the doctrine of total voidness conflicts with everything, and, since it denies a foundation for anything, it has to be rejected (sarva`suunyatve ka.h sa^mv.rter a`saya.h yasyaivam avabhaasa.h; tata.h sarva`suunyavaada.h sarvaviruddha eva ity evam adhi.s.thaa.naabhaavaad evaa-'paak.rtam ).[26]

I do not know if Jhaa was aware that his final statement is grist on the Maadhyamika's mill; indeed, Naagaarjuna and Candrakiirti want to be in conflict with every statement, because the denial of any proposition whatsoever by leading it ad absurdum is the job of the Maadhyamika dialectician. However, if Jhaa was aware of this, then "sarvaviruddha" (totally contradictory) would simply suggest "not amenable to any accepted way of arguing."

In a marginal remark, Jhaa suggests that, according to the `Suunyavaadins, one should cling neither to `suunya nor to positive existence of any sort; but, since both of them are imaginary, it is really irrelevant whether one clings to the one or the other. Again, this is precisely the point of view taken by the Vajraaya.na and Sahajayaana schools of Buddhist Tantrism, which emphasize the notion of asamprati.s.thita nirvaa.na, i.e., the nirvaa.na which is the intuition of the complete oneness of sa^msaara and nirvaa.na. With less emphasis, this

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25. Ibid., p. 26.

26. Ibid.

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notion is well anchored in the Maadhyamika-kaarikaas, but it seems that Jhaa did not pay much attention to it.

A modern philosophical analysis of Jhaa's refutation of some important Mahaayaana doctrines in his Prakaa`sa and Vikaasa would have to be conducted along these lines: Jhaa misconstrues the semantic level of the key terms of the opponents' doctrine. He applies his discursive apparatus of argumentation when he deals with non-discursive categories. The predication of being, non-being, both being-and-non-being, etc., is not any sort of discursive procedure, in spite of its highly discursive appearance; it is a persuasive procedure in a rather subtle way. Buddhist teachers applied the same dysemantical method against the Hindu scholastics. Both have been using discursive apparatus against the other's non-discursive tenets; yet, they do not use it, or want others to use it, where their own non-discursive notions are concerned. It is hard to see why the Vedaantic Brahman should be any more or less discursive a term than the Buddhist `Suunya. However, this doubt is itself of a discursive kind--to the degree that doubts can be discursive at all.