Morality or beyond

·期刊原文
Morality or beyond:
The Neo-Confucian confrontation with Mahaayaana Buddhism
By Charles Wei-hsun Fu(a)
Philosophy east and west
vol.23, no.3(1973)
p 375-396
(c) bye the University press of Hawaii

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P.375
I
Confucianism can be characterized as a philosophical
system of morality, humanistically designed to
orient man's life toward the ultimate goal of "inner
sagehood and outer kingliness" or "sublime
transcendence right in everyday ethicosocial
practice." To maintain the self-consistency and
self-sufficiency of their moral tradition, the
orthodox Confucianists since Mencius have tried hard
to resist the force of all heterodox doctrines
(yi-tuan(b) ) , notably Taoist philosophy and
Mahaayaana Buddhism, both of which have exerted
tremendous influences upon the reshaping of the
Confucian tradition. In this article I shall
critically examine the Neo-Confucian confrontation
with Mahaayaana Buddhism in China. This is perhaps
the most interesting and significant case of
ideological "love and hate" in the whole history of
Chinese philosophy and religion.

It is a very striking fact that almost all the
leading Neo-Confucianists confessed that they had
been engaged, seriously or not, in Buddhist studies
for many years before they made a prodigal's return
to the Confucian path. Chou Tun-yi(c) (1017-1073),
the forerunner of Neo-Confucian thought, was often
said to be "a poor Zen fellow"; and his personal
affiliation with Zen monks such as Ch'ang-tsung(d)
or Fo-yin Liao-yuan(e) is undeniable.(1) Among the
orthodox Neo-Confucianists he alone did not
participate in any refutation of Buddhist thought.
Chang Tsai(f) (1020-1077) , who first led the
Neo-Confucian attack against Buddhism, studied
Buddhist and Taoist works extensively when young,
then finally realized that "My Way is
self-sufficient, why should I seek other things?"(2)
Ch'eng Yi(g) (1033-1107) said of his brother that
"he [Ch'eng Hao(h) (1032-1085)] drifted among the
various schools of thought and went in and out of
the Taoist and Buddhist schools for almost ten
years. Finally he returned to the Six Classics and
only then did he find the Way."(3) The greatest
Neo-Confucian synthesizer, Chu Hsi(i) (1130-1200),
admitted in his letter to Chiang Yuan-shih(j) that
he had been attracted by Buddhism and Taoism for
more than ten years and "begin to find the main
direction I should take after my acquaintance in
recent years with those who know the Way."(4) And
both Lu Hsiang-shan(k) (1139-1193) and Wang
Yang-ming(l) (1472-1529), the two greatest leaders
of the Mind school, were often accused by other
Neo-Confucianists that their teachings were too
Zennist. Wang, in

--------------
Charles Wei-hsun Fu is Assistant Professor,
Department of Religion, Temple University,
Philadelphia.

1 Daijo Tokiwa, Shina ni okeru bukkyo to jukyo
dokyo(bg) [Buddhism in relation to Confucianism
and Taoism in China] (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1930), p.
205.
2 Chang Tzu ch'uan-shu(bh) [Complete works of Master
Chang] (Taipei: Chunghua Book Co., 1968), 15:11A.

3 Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 519 (hereafter cited as Source Book).

4 Chu Tzu ta-ch'uan(bi) [Complete literary works of
Master Chu] (Taipei: Chunghua Book Co., 1966],
38:34A.

P.376

particular, was said to love reciting the Platform
Suutra of the Sixth Patriarch. And according to Ch'en
Chien(m), "Yang-ming's lectures throughout his life
were based on his great esteem for both Bodhidharma
and Hui-neng(n)."(5) Wang's followers even went so
astray as to create "mad Zen" (k'udng-ch'an(o)). In
general, when Neo-Confucian philosophers criticized
each other, they often identified their opponents
with the Buddhists, the typical example being Chu
Hsi's vehement attack, in his later period, against
Lu Hsiang-shan's doctrine as simply Zen. In any
case, the Neo-Confucianists' study of or affinity
with Mahaayaana Buddhism clearly reflects a hard
inner struggle they passed through toward the
original Confucian tradition, which had been
overshadowed by Buddhism for nearly seven centuries.

It is equally true that there had been a
remarkable influence of Mahaayaana thought on
Neo-Confucianism in almost every respect, such as
metaphysical thinking, theory of human nature, method
of mind-cultivation, linguistic expression in the
colloquial style, or even the structure of private
educational system (in terms of the master-disciple
relations) . The ontological relation between
wu-chi(p) (the Ultimateless) and t'ai-cli(q) (the
Supreme Ultimate) in Chou Tun-yi's metaphysical
system is often likened to that between wu-yen
chen-ju(r) (the Inexpressible Suchness) and yi-yen
chen-ju(s) (the Expressible Suchness) in the
Awakening of Faith in the Mahaayaana. Daijo,
Tokiwa(t) even argues that the very similarity here
reflects Chou's attempt at the harmonization of the
fundamental principles in both Confucianism and
Buddhism.(6) Professor Ryoon Kubota(u) also notes
that Chang Tsai's concept of t'ai-hsu(v) (the Great
Vacuity), which is not mere nothingness but rather
harbors the principle (of being) , seems to be
influenced by the notion of being in the
Vij~naanavaada and the Hua-yen(w) philosophy. And
Chang's division of heavenly nature and material
nature is said to be made by way of the hint he got
from the `Suura.mgama-samaadhi Suutra.(7) In the case
of the Ch'eng brothers, the sentences such as "The
Tao (the metaphysical) is concrete things (the
phenomenal) and concrete things are the Tao" or
"Things are not outside the Tao and the Tao is not
outside things" strongly suggest, in spite of their
Confucian tone, the metaphysical influence of the
doctrine of nonobstructive interpenetration of li(x)
(reality) and shih(y) (phenomena) in Hua-yen
Buddhism. Again, despite his unremitting attack upon
Buddhism, Chu Hsi sometimes borrowed, among other
things, the Hua-yen simile of "the moon reflected in
ten thousand rivers" to illustrate his conception of
the Supreme Ultimate or Heavenly Principle
(t'ien-li(z) ) differentiated into ten thousand
ethicoontological principles inherent
------------------------
5. Quoted in Bunyu Kusumoto, (bj) Oyomei no zenteki
shiso kenkyu(bk) [A study in the Zennistic thought
of Wang Yang-ming] (Nagoya: Nisshindo Shoten,1958),
p. 29.
6. Tokiwa, Shina ni okeru bukkyo, p. 218.
7. Ryoon Kubota, Shina judobutsu koshoshi(bl) [The
interactions of Confucianism, Taoism, and
Buddhism in China] (Tokyo: Daito shuppan-sha,
1943), pp. 219-220.

p. 377

in all things. Wang Yang-ming sometimes compared his
notion of "innate knowledge of the good" to the Zen
notion of the "original face."(8) And his definition
of the substance of the mind in terms of "neither
good nor evil," which puzzled or misled many of his
disciples, was made undoubtedly under the profound
influence of the Mahaayaana conception of the nondual
mind. Furthermore, one can detect some strong
influence of the Mahaayaana idea of the universal
Buddha-nature in the Neo-Confucian identification of
the principle (li) with either (human) nature or the
mind.(9)

Regarding the method and practice of
mind-cultivation, the influence of Zen meditation on
Lu-Wang idealists is unmistakable. Even Ch'eng Yi the
rationalist, whenever he saw a man quietly sitting,
was said to praise him very highly for showing a good
spirit of learning (mind-cultivation).(10) But the
most interesting case is probably that the difference
between the Rationalist school of Ch'eng-Chu and the
Idealist school of Lu-Wang is almost the same as the
difference between the school of gradual
enlightenment and that of sudden enlightenment in
Zen, as was admitted even by the Neo-Confucian
leaders of both camps. For example, when Chu Hsi
likened the process of the investigation of things
and extension of knowledge (for the sake of moral
perfecting) to one's polishing the dusty mirror day
by day until it becomes completely bright, he seemed
to be imitating Shen-hsiu's(aa) "constant polishing
of the mirror lest the dust should collect."(11)
Whereas Wang Yang-ming's words "the mind of the sage
is like a clear mirror.... it responds to all stimuli
as they come and reflects everything"(l2) remind us
of Hui-neng's doctrine of sudden awakening as
expressed in his gaathaa about "the original purity
of the mind." All these examples are sufficient to
expose the complicated ideological relations between
these two traditions that are apparently opposed to
each other.

Interestingly, the more orthodox
Neo-Confucianists learned about Mahaayaana Buddhism,
the more they found a great danger of it
contaminating Confucian humanism. They all realized
that it was quite difficult to distinguish
Confucianism from Mahaayaana Buddhism on the surface;
they, therefore, took much pains to clarify the
differences between the two traditions in terms of
deep structure. And they always taught their
disciples that the Confucian tra-
---------------------------
8. "Original state" in Wing-tsit Chan's translation.
See Wang Yang-ming, Instrucions for Practical
Living, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1963), p.141 (hereafter cited
as Instructions).
9. Ch'eng-Chu rationalists identify nature with the
Principle, while Lu-Wang idealists hold that
"Mind is the Principle."
10. Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu(bm) [Complete works of the
Ch'eng brothers] (Taipei: Chunghua Book Co.,
1966), vol. 2, Wai-shu(bn) [Additional works],
12:9B.
11. Philip B. Yampolsky, trans., The Platform Sutra
of the Sixth Patriarch (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967), p. 130.
12 Wang Yang-ming, Instructions, p. 27.

p. 378

dition was self-sufficient and self-consistent and
that it was unnecessary to study Buddhism at all. As
Chu Hsi said, "It is not necessary to examine the
doctrines of Buddhism and Taoism deeply to understand
them."(13) And Ch'eng Yi's advice to his students may
represent the general negative attitude of the
orthodox Neo-Confucianists toward Buddhism as a
whole:

If one tries to investigate all the Buddhist
doctrines in order to accept or reject them, before
he has done that, he will already have been converted
to be a Buddhist....it is none better to determine,
on the basis of facts, that the Buddhist doctrines
are not in accord with those of the Sage. We already
have in our Way whatever is correct in them. Whatever
is incorrect will of course be rejected. It is simple
and easy to stand firm this way.(14)

Ironically enough, it was mainly through the
challenge and stimulation of Mahaayaana Buddhist
thought, especially the totalistic philosophy of the
Hua-yen school and Zen, that the orthodox
Neo-Confucianists began to realize the necessity of
rediscovering the metaphysico-religious significance
of the fundamental principles existent in early
Confucian classics, and reestablished these
principles as the chief philosophical weapon to
launch forceful attacks against (Mahaayaana) Buddhism
in China.

II

We may now ask: On what philosophical ground can
the orthodox Confucianists justify the legitimacy of
their refutation of all non-Confucian systems of
thought as heterodoxy (yi-tuan)? (15) Although no
Confucian philosophers have ever speculated
systematically on this problem of justification,
there are, I think, three fundamental principles of
the Confucian tradition that are complementary to one
another and which the orthodox Neo-Confucianists have
reconstructed and used as the necessary, if not
exhaustive, criteria for their judging or rejecting
the truth claims made by any other
philosophico-religious system. These fundamental
principles are: (1) the principle of jen-yi(ab) (jen
manifested in gradational love), (2) the principle of
sublime transcendence (kao-ming(ac)), and (3) the
principle of the Mean in everyday moral practice
(chung-yung(ad)).

The principle of jen (human-kindness) and yi(ae)
(righteousness) is the alpha and omega of Confucian
morality. Confucius did not give a conclusive
definition of jen as an all-pervading virtue, but it
is at least implied by his various answers that jen
is what constitutes the necessary and sufficient
moral
------------------------
13. Source Book, p. 646.
14. Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch'ien, eds., Reflections on
Things at Hand, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 285.
15. The word first appeared in the Analects of
Confucius, though the implication of Confucius'
words "It is indeed harmful to study heterodox
doctrines" (2:16) is not all clear as far as the
meaning of "hetered oxg" is concerned.

p. 379

nature of man; it is moral perfection as such. And it
is Mencius' great contribution to develop a theory of
human nature as originally good, by identifying jen
with man's moral endowment. Further, he explores a
new dimension of Confucian morality by building yi
into the context of jen. By making explicit
Confucius' idea that the essential difference between
the (morally) superior man and the inferior man
consists in the distinction between yi and profit,
Mencius regards yi as the natural extension of jen
appropriately practiced in different moral
situations. It should be noted emphatically here that
yi as situational "ought" also implies gradational
love. The Five Constant Relations Mencius
established, or the eight steps toward the
realization of the ideal of jen or summum bonum
specified in the Great Learning, are two significant
examples to exhibit the nature of the principle of
gradational love as against Yang Chu's(af) egoistic
principle of "everyone for himself" or Mo Tzu's(ag)
principle of mutual love without distinctions. The
principle of jen-yi was thus used by Mencius as the
fundamental criterion for his refutation of all
non-Confucian doctrines at that time.(16)

In their reconstruction of the principle of
jen-yi, the orthodox Neo-Confucianists add two
important points by way of Mahaayaana influence. The
first point is that, beginning with Chang Tsai, all
of them extend the moral notion of jen to cover the
entire universe; jen (human-kindness -->
universal-kindness) now becomes the
ethico-ontological principle of universal love. The
new ideal of life is, according to the
Neo-Confucianists, to "form one body with the
universe," especially emphasized by Ch'eng Hao, Lu
Hsiang-shan, and Wang Yang-ming.(l7) The second point
is that the Neo-Confucianists, Ch'eng Yi and Chu Hsi
in particular, assume in their interpretation of
Chang Tsai's "Western Inscription" the
ethico-ontological truth of "Principle is one but
manifestations are many" (li-yi fen-shu(ah)), by
means of which they reaffirm the principle of jen-yi
in terms of the harmonious unity of substance
(universal love of all things) and function
(gradational love beginning with filial piety).(18)
The orthodox Neo-Confucianists are now able to use
this principle
---------------------
16 From the moral point of view, Mencius was
particularly against Yang Chu's egoism and Mo
Tzu's mutual love without distinctions. See Source
Book, p. 72.
17 I have two points in mind in my rendering jen into
English as "human-kindness" in early Confucianism
and "universal-kindness" in Neo-Confucianism: (1)
as a noun, "human-kindness" and "universal-kindness"
can express well the ideas of "we are of the same,
human kind" and "we (men, animals, and all other
things in the entire universe) are of the same,
universal kind" (or "we all form one body--the
body of heaven-and-earth"); (2) as an adjective,
"human-kind" and "universal-kind" can be used in
the expressions such as "Confucius was human-kind
to other men (in the moral sense) " and "Wang
Yang-ming was universal-kind even to trees and
flowers (in the ethico-ontological sense)."
18 See Source Book, p. 499 and pp. 550-551. Ch'eng
Yi says clearly: "To make no distinction in human
relations and to be deluded in universal love to
the extreme of recognizing no special relationship
with the father, is to do violent injury to
righteousness," p. 551.

P. 380

of jen-yi ontologized as the first philosophical
weapon to open up their moral criticism of Buddhism
in general.

Since in the eyes of Neo-Confucian leaders,
Buddhism (as well as Taoism) always has a strong
tendency to transcend or escape from human morality,
their first attack upon Buddhism is, of course, that
the latter completely destroys the moral way of the
sages. Lu Hsiang-shan, who strictly followed the
Mencian line of moral reasoning, often said: "We see
that the distinction between the Confucianists and
the Buddhists as one for public-spiritedness and
righteousness and the other for selfishness and
profit is perfectly clear and that they are
absolutely incompatible."(19) Lu's words here
typically reflect the orthodox Neo-Confucianists'
total depreciation of Buddhist transcendentalism.
They unanimously accused the Buddhists of their
lofty escape from human relations and ethicosocial
obligations in the secular world. The Buddhists are
too selfish because they "desert their parents and
family, completely destory human relations, and live
alone in the mountains and forests."(20) "If
everyone becomes a Buddhist, then there will be no
human relations, and nobody will take of this
world."(21) The selfish escape of the Buddhists from
this world is made out of their dread of the cycle
of life-and-death (sa.msaara) as well as of their
disdain for the ocean of suffering (du.hkha). They
set up the false doctrines of karmic retribution,
sa.msaaric world-systems, and numerous hells to
deceive "people with low intelligence so they will
be scared and do good."(22) Ch'eng Hao said that
because the Buddhist mind is the mind of profit, the
Buddhists are always talkative about how to rid
themselves of the wheel of life-and-death, while the
Confucian sages regard this as a matter of one's
natural lot, originally assigned by Heaven (Nature),
and therefore have nothing to fear and would not
discuss it.(23) In short, the lofty escapism of the
Buddhists is totally against the principle of jen-yi
and should be rejected as heterodox. In his
comparison of Taoism and Buddhism Chu Hsi said:
"Chuang Tzu and Lao Tzu still did not completely
destroy moral principles. In the case of [orthodox]
Buddhism, human relations are already destroyed.
When it comes to Zen, however, from the very start
it wipes out all moral principles completely. Looked
at this way, Zen has done the greatest harm."(24)
In connection with their moral criticism of the
Buddhist abandonment of the Confucian way of jen and
yi, Neo-Confucian philosophers deeply expressed
their metaphysical disagreement with the
"negativistic" Weltanschauung of Buddhism in
general. To meet the challenge of Mahaayaana
metaphysics, they

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19 Source Book, p. 576.

20 Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 1, Yi-shu(bo)
[Surviving works], 1:2B.

21 Ibid., 2A:9A.

P.381

enriched the unsystematized metaphysical thinking of
early Confucianism manifested by the principle of
sublime transcendence, then used it as the chief
metaphysical criterion to refute the Mahaayaana (and
Taoist) philosophy of nothingness which, they
thought, tended to deny the reality of the world and
human life. But here again they considered
Mahaayaana Buddhism more harmful and dangerous than
Taoism. Chu Hsi, for instance, said that in Taoism
there is still Being after all; in Buddhism,
however, everything is completely reduced to
Nonbeing, for heaven and earth are considered as
illusory and the Four Elements (earth, water, fire,
and wind) as unreal.(25) Ch'eng Yi also said that
Zen Buddhists' withdrawal from the world is just
like a man's closing his eyes without seeing his own
nose--yet the nose is still there!(26)

The principle of sublime transcendence is
peculiar to the Confucian tradition, which does not
first set up a metaphysical or religious foundation
and then derive an ethical conclusion from it. On
the contrary, it establishes at the beginning the
moral teaching of jen and yi, based on the Mencian
intuitive belief in the original goodness of man as
distinguishable from beasts, and then develops in
the vertical (transcendental) direction what Mou
Tsung-san(ai) calls "moral metaphysics"(27) as a
natural offshoot of Confucian morality. A man of
moral excellence (jen) who, like Mencius, finds "all
things are already complete in myself" and
accumulates a full amount of "magnificent moral
energy" (hao-jan chih-ch'i(aj) ) throughout his
tao-body, can transcend his "little self" and the
mundane world to become a "citizen of Heaven,"
thereby reaching the highest sphere of man, the
sphere of Heaven-and-Earth. A citizen of Heaven is
not a man who escapes into what Chuang Tzu calls the
"Not-Even-Anything Village" or the "field of
Broad-and-Boundless,"(28) but is rather a man who
"seeks to reach the greatest height and brilliancy
and follows the path of the Mean."(29) In other
words, this sublime transcendence is not to be
divorced from the Confucian Mean of everyday moral
practice (chung-yung) , which is the third
fundamental principle.(30) Both the
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25 Chu Tzu yu-lei(bp) [Classified conversations of
Chu Hsi] (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book Co., 1970, 2d
ed.), 126:5B, vol. 8, p. 4826.

26 Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 1, Yi-shu, 3:4B.

27 See Mou Tsung-san, Hsin-t'i yu hsing-t'i(bq)
[Mind and human nature] (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book
Co., 1968), vol. 1, pp. 8-9.

28 Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of
Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), p. 35.

29 Source Book, p. 110.
30 The principle of the Mean has two dimensions: (1)
its external dimension refers to the Confucian
"timely Mean" (shih-chung(br) ) appropriately
practiced in all kinds of moral situations, as is
shown in Confucius' words "To overstep is as same
as to fall short" or in "the principle of
measuring square" of the Great Learning; (2) its
internal dimension appears in the first chapter
of the Doctrine of the Mean, according to which
what is essentially important in the process of
perfecting one's moral nature is not simply that
one is able to take a timely (morally fitting)
action in everyday moral

P.382

principle of sublime transcendence and the principle
of the Mean are thus inseparably united to form a
very unique characteristic of the Confucian
tradition in terms of metaphysical thinking, theory
of human nature, as well as self-cultivation. Since
it is based on this combined principle of "sublime
transcendence right in the Mean of everyday moral
practice" as well as on the principle of jen-yi,
both early Confucianists and Neo-Confucianists think
that they are able to refute all heterodox systems
of thought as either lofty escapism or utilitarian
pragmatism.(31) The former is too farsighted, while
the latter too shortsighted.

The principle of sublime transcendence, which is
implicit in the Book of Mencius, the Doctrine of the
Mean, as well as in the Classic of Changes, is
reconstructed by the orthodox Neo-Confucianists by
way of the influence of Mahaayaana metaphysics,
especially the Hua-yen "round" (all-perfect)
doctrine of the four Dharmadhaatus and the
Tathaagatagarbha thought in, for example, the
Awakening of Faith. Although the reconstructive work
began with Chou Tun-yi's Explanation of the Diagram
of the Supreme Ultimate, he had no particular
intention of demonstrating the supremacy of the
moral metaphysics of Confucianism as against
Mahaayaana transcendentalism. Chang Tsai, however,
was deeply involved in the metaphysical
confrontation of Neo-Confucianism with Mahaayaana
Buddhism. He contrasted his own philosophy of
ch'i(ak) (ether) with the Buddhist philosophy of
emptiness and concluded that "those Buddhists who
believe in annihilation (nirvaa.na) expect departure
without return"(32) and know nothing about the real
nature of life and death, while the Confucianists
regard the coming of death as simply one's return to
the Great Vacuity--the original substance of
ch'i--from which one came. "Whether integrated or
disintegrated, it is my body just the same. One is
qualified to discuss the nature of man when he
realizes that death is not annihilation."(33) What
is really wrong with Buddhist metaphysics is, Chang
Tsai argues, that it "never studies exhaustively the
principle (li), but considers everything to be the
result of subjective illusion."(34) The Buddhists
would never be able to understand Heavenly sequence
or orderliness, which

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practice, but rather (in a deeper sense) that the
state of one's moral mind always maintains
equilibrium and harmony through constant sincere
search within oneself. The Neo-Confucianists even
extend the notion of the Mean to their theory of
human nature. Ch'eng Hao, for example, says: "The
human mind (in essence) is the same as that of
plants and trees, birds and animals. It is only that
man receives at birth the Mean of Heaven and Earth
(balanced material force)," Source Book, p. 527. 31
Two examples of lofty escapism, from the Confucian
point of view, are Buddhism and Taoism; while
utilitarian pragmatism is found in the Legalist
school of ancient China or some nonorthodox
Neo-Confucianists like Ch'en Liang and Yeh Shih in
the Sung dynasty.

32 Chang Tzu ch'uan-shu, 2:2A.
33 Source Book, p. 501.

P.383

is the principle of change, manifested in "the
successive movements of yin and yang which cover the
entire universe, penetrate day and night, and form
the standard of the great Mean in the three
ultimates of heaven, earth, and man."(35) As a
monist of ch'i, however, Chang Tsai touched on the
notion of Principle only sketchily. It was through
the Ch'eng brothers and Chu hsi that the
metaphysical significance of the Principle was fully
developed.

Ch'eng Hao is noted for his self-realization of
the Heavenly Principle, which naturally operates in
the perpetual production and reproduction of myriad
things. Lacking this Heavenly Principle in their
metaphysics, he contended, "the Buddhists do not
understand yin and yang, day and night, life and
death, or past and present. How can it be said that
their metaphysics is the same as that of the
Sage?"(36) But he did not trouble himself to give a
thorough ontological explication of the Heavenly
Principle, because he was primarily concerned with
how to attain to the harmonious unity of Heaven
(Nature) and man.

The Neo-Confucian metaphysical criticism of
Mahaayaana transcendentalism reached its peak in the
dualistic rationalism of Ch'eng Yi and Chu Hsi. Both
believe that through our exhaustive investigation of
myriad things we can discover in them specific real
principles or reasons of being, all of which are but
the ontological differentiations of the one and the
same Heavenly Principle or, in Chu Hsi's case,
Supreme Ultimate. In the unceasing process of the
production and reproduction of myriad things, we
find the interaction of yin and yang and the
successive movements of the five elements in due
order, all of which are but the cosmological
manifestations of the Heavenly Principle. Following
the famous statement in the Appended Remarks to the
Classic of Changes, "What is above shapes
(metaphysical) is called Tao (the Way), and what is
within shapes (phenomenal) is called concrete
things, "(37) Ch'eng-Chu rationalists regard the
Heavenly Principle or Supreme Ultimate as the
metaphysical Tao, and yin-yang, five elements, and
all concrete things as phenomenal differentiations
of ch'i, materializing the Heavenly Principle into
innumerable forms of things in the universe.

The Principle is all-complete in itself,
ontologically prior to ch'i, and eternally
subsistent; it is, however, inseparable from ch'i as
far as the formation of things is concerned.
Applying their metaphysical assumption "Principle is
one but its manifestations are many" to human
nature, Ch'eng-Chu rationalists maintain that human
nature is twofold: moral (heavenly) nature and
physical nature. The principles of humanity,
righteousness, propriety, and Wisdom--all of which
are differentiated principles of the Supreme
Ultimate--constitute the moral or heavenly nature in
its original state. When this nature

------------
35 Ibid., 2:2B.
36 Source Book, p. 542.
37 My translation. See also Source Book, p. 267.

P.384

is implanted in ch'i, it becomes physical nature
differentiated in terms of clear/turbid,
pure/impure, etc. Hence, different capacities,
talents, feelings, desires, etc., are discernible in
different men--the best kind of men being those
receiving the Mean (perfect balance) of ch'i.
Further, they adapted Chang Tsai's theory of "the
mind unifying nature and passions" and regarded the
mind as a kind of receptacle in which all moral
principles identical with the tranquil heavenly
nature are fully "stored" and human desires and
feelings activated. When human desires increase, the
heavenly principle decreases; when the latter
increases, the former decrease. The attainment to
sagehood now means the total transformation of
physical nature into the original nature of
heaven-and-earth.

Thus, from the standpoint of their moral
metaphysics of li-ch'i(al) duality, (1) the mind is
full of moral principles and is not empty, (2) the
nature is (real) principle, and (3) there is the
ultimate heavenly principle manifested in the
production and reproduction of myriad things.
Through their reconstruction of the principle of
sublime transcendence in this manner, both Ch'eng Yi
and Chu Hsi make a clear distinction between
Confucianism and Buddhism in terms of real/unreal or
right/wrong principles. They often quoted the famous
line in the Classic of Odes "The hawk flies up to
heaven and the fishes leap in the deep"(38) to
illustrate the creative operations of the Heavenly
Principle in the entire universe. The Buddhists,
they would say, could never understand the deep
metaphysical meaning of this line as well as of
Confucius' words "Like this stream, everything is
flowing on ceaselessly, day and night," because they
find no real principle behind the transient
stream-of-life (anitya). They could not understand
either that human nature is real, for nature is to
them unreal or empty (suunya) also. As Chu Hsi said,
"We Confucianists regard nature as real, while the
Buddhists regard it as empty."(39) He made it clear
that the essential difference between Confucianism
and Buddhism is not merely moral, but rather
metaphysical in a deeper sense. That the principle
of sublime transcendence sometimes functions as a
more important criterion than does the principle of
jen-yi in Chu Hsi's criticism of Buddhism can be
easily detected from the following passage:

Lu Hsiang-shan says that the Buddhists and the
Confucianists share the same view and that the only
difference lies in the distinction between
righteousness and profit. I think this is wrong. If
what Lu says were right, we Confucianists and the
Buddhists would then maintain the one and same
doctrine. If this were the case, can there be any
difference at all even in terms of the righteousness
/profit distinction? The truth is that the
fundamental point is different: We Confucianists say
all principles are real while they say all
principles are empty.(40)

-------------------
38 Ibid., p. 100.
39 Chu Tzu yu-lei, vol. 1, p. 102.
40 Ibid., vol.7, p. 4766.

P.385

While Ch'eng-Chu rationalists hold the view that
nature is Principle, the idealists Lu Hsiang-shan
and Wang Yang-ming, both faithful followers of
Mencius, insist that "the mind is Principle." They
flatly reject any principle existing apart from the
mind and explore more deeply the metaphysical
dimension of Mencius' (moral) mind as originally
good to such an extent that the mind of jen-yi is
now identified with the mind of heaven-and-earth
(universe). Like Mencius, Lu-Wang idealists teach
that everyone can become a sage if he constantly and
naturally nourishes his moral endowments to the
utmost. Wang even asserts that the innate knowledge
of the good constitutes the ontological substance of
the mind, which transcends both good and evil (in
the relative sense). In spite of their tendency to
be affiliated with Zen, both Lu and Wang are quite
clear about the fundamental difference between them
and Zen Buddhists; to them as well as to other
orthodox Neo-Confucianists, the sublime
transcendence of Confucianism is never divorced from
the Mean in everyday moral practice. Lu is therefore
able to say that "Moral Principles inherent in the
human mind are endowed by Heaven and cannot be wiped
out" and that "The affairs within the universe are
my own affairs, and my own affairs are the affairs
within the universe."(41) From this standpoint of
moral idealism, Lu would not accept any Zen doctrine
of no-mind (wu-hsin).(am) As he says, "Man is not
wood or stone, how can he have no mind?"(42) In the
case of Wang Yang-ming, his "Zennist" conception of
the substance of the mind as "neither good nor evil"
may have caused much misunderstanding, but he never
deviated from the Confucian principle of sublime
transcendence right in everyday moral practice, as
evidenced by the following conversation with his
disciples:

Someone said, "The Buddhists also devote themselves
to the nourishing of the mind, but fundamentally
they are incapable of governing the world. Why?"

The teacher said, "In nourishing the mind, we
Confucianists have never departed from things and
events. By merely following the natural principles
of things we accomplish our task. On the other hand,
the Buddhists insist on getting away from things and
events completely and viewing the mind as an
illusion, gradually entering into a life of
emptiness and silence, and seeming to have nothing
to do with the world at all. This is why they are
incapable of governing the world."(43)

Thus, both Lu-Wang idealists and Ch'eng-Chu
rationalists use the same Confucian principle of
sublime transcendence right in the Mean of everyday
moral practice as the principal weapon in their
attack against Mahaayaana conception of no-mind and
human nature. And their attack here leads them
further to the disagreement with Zen Buddhists on
the method and practice of

----------------
41 Source Book, p. 580.
42 Lu Hsiang-shan ch'uan-chi(bs) [Complete works of
Lu Hsiang-shan] (Taipei: World Book Co., 1959),
vol. 1, p. 95.
43 Wang Yang-ming, Instructions, p. 220.

P.386

mind-cultivation. First, they criticize the latter
that they only engage in quiet sitting-in-meditation
(tso-ch'an(an)), without being able to practice
ching(ao) (earnest attentive-mindedness or
nonattached one-mindedness), or nourish the mind so
as to penetrate both activity and tranquility. The
Buddhists are sometimes accused of being "never
righteous [enough] to square the external, though
one-minded [enough] to straighten the internal."(44)
From the Neo-Confucian point of view, the real Mean
consists in the Way to unite both the internal
(complete equilibrium before activity) and the
external (perfect harmony in activity). "It is not
difficult to sit quietly alone; but it is difficult
to stay in the public place and respond to the world
affairs."(45) Further, instead of nonabiding
samaadhi (concentration) in Zen, the
Neo-Confucianists recommend the combined practice of
chih(ap) (proper abiding) and ting(aq) (composure)
in our handling of daily affairs.(46) Chu Hsi says
that the Buddhists know only how to keep the
substance of the tranquil mind, which cannot
function properly in everyday activities; whereas
the Confucianists always find the real substance of
the mind right in its everyday moral functioning. In
short, substance and function in Buddhist (Zen)
doctrine of the mind are divorced from each other,
while in the Confucian tradition, both substance and
function of the (moral) mind are harmoniously
united.

The conclusion the orthodox Neo-Confucianists
reach after their critical examination of Buddhist
Weltanschauung and Lebensanschauung, as well as of
Buddhist theory of the mind and method of
mind-cultivation, is that there is nothing
worthwhile to learn from Buddhism. "It is more
rewarding to read just the ken-kua(ar) ("stilling"
hexagram) in the Classic of Changes than the whole
Avata^msaka Suutra."(47)

III

One might wonder what is left in Mahaayaana Buddhism
to defend against the Neo-Confucian devastating
attacks I have just discussed.(48) The truth seems

----------------
44 Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 1, Yi-shu, 4:4B.

45 Op. cit., 7:2A.

46 Both chih and ting are first mentioned in the
Great Learning. See Source Book, p. 86. For the
Confucian meaning of ting, see ibid., p. 88.
47 Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 1, Yi-shu, 6:2A.

48 There are a number of Buddhist apologetic works
against Neo-Confucian criticism, such as Li
Ch'un-fu's(bt) Ming-tao chi-shuo(bu) ,
Hsin-t'ai's(bv) Fo-fa chin-t'ang pien(bw), and
T'u Lung's(bx) Fo-fa chin-t'ang lu(by). The main
purpose of these works, except T'u Lung's, is to
attempt a syncretic unity of Buddhism and
Confucianism (and Taoism). As Kubota notes, only
T'u Lung really engaged himself in the direct
confrontation with Neo-Confucianism and defended
Buddhist truth to the last minute. See Kubota's
Shina judobutsu sankyo shiron(bz) [A historical
treatise of the three teachings of Confucianism,
Taoism, and Buddhism in China] (Tokyo: Toyo
Bunko, 1930), p. 660. Since none of the above
Buddhist authors did have, it seems to me, a
complete understanding of Maahaayana philosophy,
I shall present my own philosophical
clarification of Mahaayaana Buddhism.

P.387

to me, however, that Neo-Confucian criticism of
(Mahaayaana) Buddhism is based on a very superficial
understanding, or, in some cases, a total distortion
of the original meanings of Buddhist doctrines,
especially Mahaayaana doctrines. While the
Neo-Confucianists overexaggerate the escapist
tendency in Buddhism, they completely ignore,
intentionally or not, almost all essential ideas of
Mahaayaana Buddhism, such as the doctrine of twofold
truth, the bodhisattva ideal, the notion of the
universal Buddha-nature, and above all the central
principle of (Mahaayaana) Buddhism, namely, the
Middle Way (madhyamaa pratipad) .(49) Chu Hsi's
statement, "The very best of Buddhist doctrines is
actually a plagarization of the Taoist teachings of
Chuang Tzu and Lieh Tzu....and the words of Zen
Buddhists originally came from the leftovers of the
pure conversations (ch'ing-t'an(as) ) of the
Neo-Taoists, " is just one typical example of
Neo-Confucian prejudice against Buddhism in
general.(50)

First, the Neo-Confucian accusation of Buddhism
that it invents the myth of sa.msaaric
world-systems, karmic retribution, the Pure Land
(sukhaavatii) and numerous hells, etc., to scare
people or make a selfish escape from this world is
pointless. Buddhism is never a system of pure
objective truth about the reality of the world and
man. It does not even have any fixed "absolute
truth" (paramaarthasatya) of its own. In Buddhism,
particularly Mahaayaana, truth is no more than
upaayakau`salya (skillful, pedagogical device) for
the sake of enlightenment (nirvaa.na).(51) From the
Mahaayaana point of view, truth makes sense only if
one remains ignorant (avidyaa); as soon as one is
awakened to one's "original face" so to speak, the
so-called truth will silently slip away. Only in
this light can we appreciate well the nature of the
Four Noble Truths announced by the historical
Buddha. Whether Theravaada Buddhists agree, all
Mahaayaana philosophers since Naagaarjuna are firmly
convinced that the Four Noble Truths are at best
conventional truth (sa^mv.rtisatya) and should not
be taken for granted. The essential point here is
that, in Mahaayaana philosophy at least, there is
always an inseparable relation between (1) states of
mind (perspectives or standpoints), (2) levels of
truths (judgments or statements), and (3) degrees of
reality (ontological nature of things), the

---------------
49 I have done my best to check all primary sources
of Neo-Confucianism, but find, to my great
surprise, none of the orthodox Neo-Confucianists
who ever mentioned the term "Middle Way."
50 Chu Tzu ta-ch'uan, vol. 12, Shih-shih lun(ca) [On
Buddhism], II.
51 Buddhist truth is often likened to a raft (for
crossing over to the "other shore"), a fish trap
(of no use after all fish needed are caught), or
a finger (pointing to the moon). The following
expression from the Saddharmapu.n.dariika is
perhaps most illustrative of the nature of
upaaya: "Although the Tathagata has not entered
Nirvana, he makes a show of entering Nirvana, for
the sake of those who have to be educated," in
Edward Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts through the
Ages (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1954), p. 142. For
a full discussion of upaaya, see Bhikshu
Sangharakshita, A Survey of Buddhism (Bangalore:
Indian Institute of World Culture, 1957), pp.
210-220.

P.388

states of mind being always the Archimedean
point.(52) In other words, all degrees of reality
[things --> dharmas (experiential factors of
existence) --> sarvadharma`suunyataa (emptiness of
all dharmas) --> bhuutatathataa (suchness or as-it-
is-ness) ] described by Mahaayaana Buddhists
presuppose the respective levels of truth, which
again presuppose the respective points of view in
accordance with the respective higher or lower
states of mind. The famous Mahaayaana maxim "The
triple world is unreal and is created by the mind
only" emphasized by the Avata^msaka Suutra should be
understood in this sense.

Thus, Buddhist statements such as "Life is
du.hkha (suffering or imperfection)," "All events in
the wheel-of-life are relationally co-originated
(pratiityasamutpaada)," or "There is a way toward
the cessation of du.hkha (nirodha) " cannot be
naively accepted as eternal truth. For example, the
Second Noble Truth about the relational
co-origination of all things in terms of the
beginningless chain of twelve links (nidaanas) could
have at least two hermeneutic versions: if we take
what I would call the "vertical" (literal) version
accepted by popular Buddhists, then karmic
retribution or rebirth would have to be factually
true; if we take the "horizontal" (experiential)
version in terms of the process of existential
Erleben (lived-experience), then the problem of
karmic retribution in three successive lives or
rebirth would turn out to be very unessential or
insignificant. As Edward Conze notes, the
"horizontal" version could be more archaic than the
"vertical" one.(53) As far as the ultimate goal of
Buddhism--the creation of a perfectly enlightened
mind--is concerned, whether or not there is rebirth
is therefore beside the issue. Without understanding
the "pragmatic" nature of (Mahaayaana) Buddhist
truth about rebirth, hells, and all other
supranatural elements, the Neo-Confucian first
attack upon (Mahaayaana) Buddhism completely misses
the real target.

Another important attack the Neo-Confucianists
launch is that Mahaayaana Buddhism regards the world
and man as ontologically unreal and that it sets up
a vacuous metaphysical principle to support its
negativistic Weltan-

-----------------
52 It should be stressed in this connection that
there is always an inseparable relation between
theory and practice, objective truth and
subjective realization, philosophy and religion,
in Buddhism.

53 Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 157. Cf.
also Kenneth K. Inada, "Buddhist Naturalism and
the Myth of Rebirth," International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 1, no. 1 (1970). Inada
makes a very strong claim here that "the concept
of rebirth is naturalistic and ontologically
oriented. Its use is strictly limited to the
momentary becoming process in man in this life.
The myth of rebirth is applicable to the
microscopic life-process, the infinite-small
moment to moment existence. Any reference to an
after-death process would simply be absurd and
result in a contradiction of terms," p. 52.

P.389

schauung and Lebensanschauung. This criticism again
only exposes the Neo-Confucianists' own ignorance of
Mahaayaana metaphysics grounded in the Middle Way.
The greatest contribution of Mahaayaana philosophers
is that they present the ultimate question about the
Absolute in terms of things-as-they-really -are
(yathaabhuutam) seen (personally realized) by the
historical Buddha and try to solve this question by
applying the principle of the Middle Way from
beginning to end. They ask: Suppose, hypothetically,
we are all enlightened as the Buddha himself sub
specie aeternitatis, then what sort of
transcendental wisdom (praj~naa) can we share with
him? And what is the Absolute or Ultimate Reality
"intuited" by a man of perfect wisdom? It is in
order to answer this ultimate question that all
Mahaayaana philosophers since Naagaarjuna have tried
to speculate by exploring all possible points of
view, such as Maadhyamika, Yogaacaara, the
Tathaagatagarbha thought, T'ien-t'ai(at) (the Lotus
school) , Hua-yen, or Zen. They are different
Mahaayaana schools to be sure, but all of them
subscribe to the same fundamental principle, the
Middle Way. They all agree on the real nature of the
Absolute, if it is, that it is ontologically
nondifferentiatable (nondualistic) though
epistemologically differentiated (through the mental
fabrication of the nonenlightened) .
Epistemologically we dichotomize reality-as-it-is
(tathataa) into the Absolute and the phenomenal, and
this dichotomy presupposes the duality of our
(ignorant) mind. Our dual mind establishes two kinds
of truth in order to describe the Absolute and the
phenomenal respectively; and what is asserted as
real from the mundane point of view is to be denied
of its reality from the transcendental point of
view. If the phenomenal world, sa.msaara, the realm
of events (shih), form, etc., are taken as real from
the standpoint of worldly truth, they are denied of
their own-being (svabhaava) from that of
transcendental truth, which instead establishes
suchness, nirvaa.na, the realm of Principle (li),
dharmakaaya (the Law-body), etc., as real. In short,
the phenomenal mind takes the worldly point of view
to establish a conventional truth about the reality
of the world of appearance; and the transcendental
mind takes the higher point of view to establish a
higher truth about the unreality of the phenomenal
world and the reality of the noumenal.

But the Mahaayaana analysis of this
epistemological duality of the mind, the truth, and
the reality is at best the final pedagogical device
to lead the Buddhists to the stage of perfect
enlightenment, if they are still one removed from
it. Once the last maayaa (illusion) or avidyaa
(ignorance) is removed, the transcendental wisdom of
the ontologically nondifferentiatable would
naturally emerge in the nondualistic mind. The
Middle Way now steers between all pairs of
"perverted views" (viparyaasa) : Paradoxically,
nirvaa.na is now sa^msaara and vice versa, emptiness
is now form and vice versa, the realm of Principle
is now the realm of Events and vice versa, the
absolute

P.390

mind is now the phenomenal mind and vice versa,
transcendental truth is now mundane truth and vice
versa, etc.(54) The absolute mind, the
transcendental truth, emptiness, or nirvaa.na are
all provisional names (praj~naapti) based on our
thought-constructions; their existence is, so to
speak, "parasitic" upon the existence of the
phenomenal mind, the mundane truth, form, or
sa^msaara. In other words, if no mundane truth is
constructed, there is no necessity to create an
absolute truth to refute it. To say that the world
is real is a one-sided view (mundane truth), but to
say that the world is unreal is again another
one-sided view on a higher level (transcendental
truth). If the former view is discarded, the latter
view will disappear altogether: herein lies the real
Middle Way.(55) If the principle of the Middle Way
in Mahaayaana Buddhism is understood this way, it is
senseless to speak of its metaphysical principle as
real or "vacuous." Failing to comprehend Mahaayaana
metaphysics in terms of the Middle Way through and
through, the Neo-Confucianists mistakenly treat, as
did many European Buddhist scholars generations ago,
Mahaayaana Buddhism as sheer negativism.

Conze once gave us a misleading interpretation
of the word "`suunyataa" as follows:

Roughly speaking we may say that the word as an
adjective (`suunya) means 'found wanting' and refers
to worldly things, and as a noun (`suunyataa) means
inward 'freedom' and refers to the negation of this
world....When in China Buddhism fused with
Neo-Taoism, 'emptiness' became the latent
potentiality from which all things come forth, and
it became usual to say, in a cosmological sense,
that all things go out of emptiness and return to
it. None of all this is intended here....As a
practical term 'emptiness' means the complete denial
or negation of this world by the exercise of wisdom,
leading to complete emancipation from it.(56)

It is doubtful that early Indian Buddhists thought
of emptiness and nirvaa.na in terms of "the complete
denial or negation of this world" as Conze
interprets here. But even if this were the case,
their escapist tendency was corrected first by
Naagaarjuna and his Maadhyamika followers, then by
the life-affirming Chinese Mahaayaanists. And it is
important to point out that Naagaarjuna's
"negativistic" logico-ontological analysis of the
epistemological duality of the mind, the truth, and
the reality constructed by men as well as of the
onto-logical nondifferentiatability of
nirvaa.na/sa^msaara, absolute/relative, etc., is
finally transformed into a direct, positive, and
dynamic affirmation of the reality of the phenomenal
world and everyday life--an interesting example of

--------------
54 Naagaarjuna says it well: "Sa^msaara is nothing
essentially different from nirvaa.na. Nirvaa.na
is nothing essentially different from sa^msaara,"
in Kenneth K. Inada, trans., Naagaarjuna (Tokyo:
Hokuseido, 1970), p. 158.

55 Op. cit., p. 148. Here Naagaarjuna declares that
"whatever is relational origination is
`suunyataa. It is a provisional name... for the
mutuality (of being) and, indeed,it is the middle
path."

56 Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 60-61.

P391

Chinese emphasis on transcendence-in-immanence. The
T'ien-t'ai philosophers are able to say, on the
basis of the principle of perfectly harmonious
three-fold truth, that "Everything, a color or a
fragrance, is none other than the Middle Way," which
manifestly displays the affirmative restoration of
the entire phenomenal world. But it is in the
totalistic philosophy of the Hua-yen school and Zen
Buddhism that a dynamic and naturalistic reemphasis
on the reality of the phenomenal world and everyday
life is explicitly placed. This is probably the best
example of the Sinicization of Indian Buddhism. In
the case of the Hua-yen "round" doctrine of realms
embracing realms non-obstructively, only the final
realm of (the totality of) Events-and-Events
harmoniously merging into one another is regarded as
"the ultimate and the only Dharmadhaatu that truly
exists. The other three Dharmadhaatus...are merely
explanatory expedients to approach the fourth
Dharmadhaatu of shih-shih wu-ai(au) [nonobstructive
interpenetration of Events-and-Events]."(57) One
more step from here and we reach the stage where Zen
Buddhists say "Every day is a good day" or
"Everyday-mindedness is Tao." In Zen, all Mahaayaana
doctrines are simply "put behind one's brain"
(p'ao-chu nao-hou(av)), if not denied of their
truth. In Zen, one must certainly give up the
Buddhist quest for the absolute reality/truth and
forget spontaneously that one is giving up the
quest. Only then one is said really to "see into
one's nature and attain Buddhahood." It is in this
sense that we can say, to use my own jargon,
"Emptiness works wonders in everyday life." Zen is
indeed a happy combination of Buddhist
transcendentalism and Taoist naturalism.(58) Thus,
the greatest mistake in the Neo-Confucianists'
attack against Mahaayaana metaphysics is that they
read too much of the Conzean "emptiness" into the
context of Mahaayaana Buddhism in China. Hence their
baseless criticism.

A further Neo-Confucian attack upon Buddhism,
Zen in particular, is that its quietist cultivation
of the mind lacks dynamic functioning in daily
activities, and that the no-mind of Zen is as dead
as a withered tree and is therefore useless in
everyday moral practice. All great Zen masters since
Hui-neng would retort that this criticism is utterly
erroneous, for, they would say, in the Zen teaching
of mind-cultivation, there is always a strong
emphasis on what is called "the great functioning of
the great potentiality" (ta-chi ta-yung(aw)).(59) If
Sitting or resting is Zen, walking or acting is
equally Zen. Even in the flowering age of
Neo-Confucian thought in the Southern Sung dynasty,
Ta-hui Tsung-kao(ax) was drastically opposed to the
quietist approach

-----------
57 Garma Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1971), p. 153.

58 The Taoist tone of the Zen way of life can be
found in the poem about everyday-mindedness:
"Drinking tea, eating rice, I pass my time as it
comes;... How serene and relaxed I feel indeed,"
in Chang Chung-yuan(cb) , trans., Original
Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1969), p. 141.

59 Op. cit., p. 186.

P.392

of "silent illumination" and took a dynamic approach
to Zen for the purpose of perfect functioning in
everyday affairs.(60) Small wonder that a great
number of troubled Confucian scholars and officials
begged for his help.

Regarding the nature of Zen no-mind or
mind-of-nonabiding, Zen Buddhists would reply that
the words like "no-mind," "no-thought," "no-form,"
or "nonabiding" should not create a linguistic
barrier to such an extent that the Zen mind is
identified with a dead thing. In reality, all these
terms are used to point to the nonduality of the
Buddha-nature or One-mind (ekacitta) , which is
totally free from the duality of right/wrong,
good/evil, etc., in the mundane (relative) sense. It
does not follow from this that the authentic Zen
Buddhists would not engage themselves in everyday
moral practice. On the contrary, they would rather
think that only by means of breaking off the
dualistic shackles constructed by the ignorant mind
is one able to work real wonders in handling human
affairs. They could even say that the real Zen mind
of nonabiding is no more than the Mencian moral mind
transcended, not denied! Interestingly, it was
mainly due to the influence of this Zen rediscovery
of the transcendental or nondualistic dimension of
the mind that Wang Yang-ming could not help
introducing the "Zennist" notion of the mind into
his moral idealism. Hence his instruction about the
substance and function of the mind as follows: "In
the original substance of the mind there is no
distinction between good and evil. When the will
becomes active, however, such distinction
exists."(61) Since Zen Buddhists do not deny human
morality, they of course would not register any
objection to such an idea. And it is actually not
difficult to find some evidence to support my
interpretation of Zen here. Wing-tsit Chan(ay), for
instance, acutely observes, "According to him [Zen
Master Lin-yu(az)] on the level of absolute truth
there is only one nature, which is free of any
contamination such as the distinction between right
and wrong or subject and object, but on the level of
worldly truth, Buddhism does not discard any element
of existence and therefore exhorts the minister to
be loyal and the son to be filial."(62)

IV

From the above philosophical clarification of
Mahaayaana thought, it would not be unfair to say
that most of Neo-Confucian attacks against
(Mahaayaana) Buddhism are based on either
misunderstanding or distortion. It seems to me,
however, the Neo-Confucian ethico-social criticism
of Buddhism, in general,

-------------------
60 See Kengo Araki(cc) , Bukkyo to jukyo(cd)
[Buddhism and Confucianism] (Kyoto: Heirakuji
Shoten, 1963), pp. 196-228. Also his Daie sho(ce)
[Zen Letters of Ta-hui], vol. 17 of Zen no goroku(cf)
[Conversational Records of Zen] (Tokyo: Chikuma
Shobo, 1969), pp. 64-65.

61 Wang Yang-ming, op. cit., p. 243. Set also Source
Book, p. 686.

62 Ibid., pp. 647-648.

P.393

requires our serious attention and should not be
brushed off as senseless or pointless. The orthodox
Neo-Confucianists believe that "the Buddhist harm is
far greater than Yang Chu and Mo Tzu,"(63) for it is
completely against the Confucian principle of
gradational love beginning with filial piety and
brotherly love.(64) Even the Chinese Buddhists
themselves have been very sensitive to the problem
of filial piety, which they must tackle in order to
resolve the ideological confrontation between their
imported religion and the Confucian tradition. As
Ryoshu Michihata(ba) points out, traditionally China
has been the country that unconditionally accepted
the Confucian culture of filial piety, and anybody
who did not practice this cardinal virtue was always
treated like a man who committed the gravest sin of
lese-majeste. The most difficult task of the Chinese
Buddhists is not to make a direct, face-to-face
confrontation with Confucianism, but rather to
effect a necessary compromise by means of a partial
Confucianization of their doctrines. One striking
example is that, to meet the criticism of the
Confucianists, they sometimes reply that their
"leaving home" (ch'u-chia(bb))(65) is actually the
greatest filial piety, for they can help their
parents (as well as others) attain to the Buddhahood
of supreme happiness. But the halfway compromise of
Chinese Buddhism with the Confucian tradition would
not satisfy the hard demand of the orthodox
Confucian philosophers, to all of whom the principle
of gradational love is the alpha and omega of human
morality. That the principle of gradational love is
used by the Neo-Confucianists as the ultimate
criterion for their refutation of Buddhist
heterodoxy is clearly evidenced by Chu Hsi in the
following statement:

Yang Chu originally had no intention at all of
plucking out a single hair to benefit the entire
world, and yet he said the world could not be
benefited by just plucking his single hair; Yi Tzu
originally advocated love without distinctions or
gradation, and yet he said its practice should start
with love of parents; the Buddha [and the Buddhists]
need no parents of their own, and yet chat about
filial piety. All of these are but quibbles!(66)

Even if the orthodox Neo-Confucianists accepted all
the points I have clarified for Mahaayaana Buddhism,
they would not give up their charge against the
Buddhist lack of gradational love, which is to them
the only way to practice jen.

-------------
63 Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 3, Ts'ui-yen(cg)
[Pure Words], 1:7B.

64 "Filial piety and brotherly love are the starting
point for the practice of jen," in the Analects,
1:2. My translation here is based on Ch'eng Yi's
unique way of reading the original sentence in
the Analects.

65 It is interesting to note here that Buddhist
monks are traditionally called in Chinese
ch'u-chia, which literally means "leaving home,"
obviously so called against the Confucian
background. It further means "withdrawing oneself
from the secular world." From the Confucian point
of view, to leave home and to withdraw from the
world are just the same thing.

66 Chu Tzu yu-lei, vol. 3, p. 2018.

P.394

When someone asked Ch'eng Hao "How is the Way,"
his reply was: "It should be found in [the concrete
human relations between] sovereign and minister,
parent and child, elder brother and young brother,
friend and friend, husband and wife."(67) To the
Confucian moralist, the Buddhist is just like a
person who cannot love his relatives and neighbors
in the concrete sense, though he may be able to love
humanity at a distance; they are, in making such a
transmoral leap, violating the fundamental moral
principle of jen-yi. The Neo-Confucian accusation
against Buddhism on this point is at least
applicable to quite a great number of Buddhists in
China whose only interest in this life is simply to
escape into a Buddhist monastery at the expense of
leaving their parents, wives, children, or brethren
at home. In the Record of the Transmission of the
Lamp, for instance, we may find a number of cases in
which Zen masters, when they were still children,
begged their parents to let them withdraw from the
world (ch'u-chia) for the sake of enlightenment. As
Zenryu Tsukamoto(bc) observes, Mahaayaana Buddhism
in China did transform self-concerned Hiinayaanism
into a religion of universal salvation; in practice,
however, the traditional Mahaayaanists in China
still have a strong tendency to escape from what
they call "the dusty world" (ch'en-shih(bd)) into
loftier and quieter places like mountains and
forests. And despite their strenuous efforts to
break off the otherworldly shackles of Buddhism,
both Zen and Pure Land Buddhists have never
successfully overcome the practical weakness of
Mahaayaana Buddhism in China.(68) One typical case
is that of Hui-neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Zen, who
when young happened to be awakened to the Way upon
hearing the Diamond Suutra, then decided to leave
his poor, widowed mother and went to Mount Feng-mu
to make obeisance to the Fifth Patriarch, Hung-jen.
In practice he himself withdrew from the world,
though in theory he instructed his disciples as
follows:

Learned Audience, those who wish to train themselves
(spiritually) may do so at home. It is quite
unnecessary for them to stay in monasteries....

On the principle of gratefulness, we support our
parents and serve them filially.

On the principle of righteousness, the superior and
the inferior stand for each other (in time of
need).(69)

The traditional Zen Buddhists in China seem to
have been very much satisfied with the spontaneous,
enlightened life described by P'ang Yun's(be)

---------
67 Erh-ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 2, Wai-shu, 12:10A.

68 See Zenryu Tsukamoto, Chugoku bukkyo shi(ch) [A
history of Chinese Buddhism], reprinted in
Chugoku no bukkyo(ci) [Buddhism in China], vol. 5
of Gendai bukkyo meicho zenshu(cj) (Tokyo:
Ryuubunkan, 1965), p. 336.

69 Wong Mou-lam, trans., The Sutra of Wei Lang,
reprinted as Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch
on the High Seat of "The Treasure of the Law"
(Hong Kong: Buddhist Book Distributor Press), p.44.

P.395

gaathaa on "carrying water and chopping wood."(70)
But, in his critical examination of Zen, Fung
Yu-lan(bf) makes a very thoughtful remark:

However, if carrying water and chopping wood are all
manifestations of the wondrous Way, why do those
[Zen Buddhists] who cultivate the Way have to leave
the world? Why isn't "one's service to parents and
sovereign" taken to be the wondrous Way? The mission
of Neo-Confucianism in the Sung and Ming dynasties
is exactly to create such a turning point.(71)

The Neo-Confucian mission is, as I understand it, to
carry out to the utmost the Confucian ideal of
sublime transcendence right in everyday moral
practice through gradational love, wherein is found
the essence of the Confucian Mean. That is why the
Neo-Confucianists often lament that although
Buddhism is loftier and more transcendental than the
teaching of Chuang Tzu, it is still weak in not
following the path of the everyday Mean.(72)

In their teaching of enlightenment, Zen masters
often use the expression "To make a further leap
after climbing up onto the top of the pole 100-feet
high." But Neo-Confucian philosophers would ask: In
order to make such a final leap toward
enlightenment, why do you have to escape into a
Buddhist monastery? And why shouldn't the
enlightenment-taste of "Every day is a good day" be
realized right in what you Buddhists (as well as
Taoists) call the dusty world? Although to be or not
to be a Buddhist monk ("one who leaves home") is in
some cases a matter of existential self-commitment,
the above hard-hitting point made by the
Neo-Confucianists in their ethicosocial criticism of
Mahaayaana Buddhism in China seems to require at
least a mature philosophical reflection on the part
of Mahaayaana Buddhists themselves.(73)

----------------
70 Chang Chung-yuan, op. cit., p. 175.

71 Fung Yu-lan, Hsin yuan-tao(ck) [The new treatise
on Tao], p. 163. See also the translation of this
book by E. R. Hughes, The Spirit of Chinese
Philosophy (London: Kegan Paul, 1947), p. 174.

72 Erh-Ch'eng ch'uan-shu, vol. 1, Yi-shu, 18:11A;
vol. 3, Ts'ui-yen, 1:9A. See also Chu Tzu yu-lei,
vol. 4, p. 2519.

73 Although I am not concerned in this paper with
the problem of the modern reconstruction of
Mahaayaana Buddhist thought, I will add a final
word here. It seems to me that Mahayana Buddhists
should learn a good lesson from the challenge of
Neo-Confucianism and engage in a necessary and
urgent inquiry into the moral dimension of their
own tradition, by shifting their traditional
emphasis on transcendental truth to a new
emphasis on worldly truth in terms of everyday
ethicosocial practice. This shift of emphasis is
not an impossible task, if Mahaayaana Buddhists
have a perfect understanding of the principle of
the Middle Way as well as of the real meaning of
the twofold truth in their tradition. In the
past, they tended to regard morality ('siila) as
primarily a means, discipline, or prerequisite
toward the ultimate goal. It is now time for them
to develop a new and modern philosophy of the
Middle Way by placing equal emphasis on morality
as well as on wisdom (praj~naa) and meditation
(samaadhi). Further, a new moral wine should be
put into the ancient bottle full of karu.naa
(universal compassion). But it remains to be seen
whether Mahaayaana Buddhists can work out in this
modern age an ethical system to tackle most if
not all, human and secular problems they
encounter in everyday life.