Munitz concept of the world .. A Buddhist response

·期刊原文
Munitz concept of the world .. A Buddhist response

By Kenneth K. Inada
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 25
1975
p.309-317

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p. 309

The challenge posed by Munitz' paper, "The Concept of
the World,"(1) (all page references refer to this
paper, unless indicated otherwise) is formidable, but
inviting from the Eastern point of view. Few
challenges of this nature have been met in the past,
but now it is quite appropriate to engage in a
serious East-West dialogue. The subject matter is
just right and the presentation to the point.
Although it would be presumptuous to expect
definitive resolutions, the dialogue should hopefully
open up new vistas and avenues of approach to the
varied and persistent questions in and of
metaphysics.

Let me, first of all, commend Munitz for
presenting a clear and concise analysis of a Western
metaphysical position. We who represent Eastern
traditions have thus an easy focal point on which to
concentrate. This should make our dialogue that much
simpler and easier to carry out. I for one see that
he has left the door open for a fruitful exchange and
I shall therefore set out to take the opportunity to
pry open that door a little wider so that another
vision of reality can be seen, experienced, and
appreciated.

The first major concurrence of Munitz and the
Buddha is on the central issue of metaphysics itself.
Munitz says: "Metaphysics as the study of Being
attempts to discover, if it can, what Being is; but
it cannot do so by studying the properties, however
generic and widely shared these may be, of the
multiplicity of entities or beings, the individual
things or events that experience discloses" (p. 192).
He will concentrate on Being rather than on beings
and thus steer clear away from the "purely categoreal
investigation" (p. 197) . And in developing his
approach, he will treat the concept of Being as
synonymous to "existence as a whole" or "the world"
(p. 194).

The Buddha has, from the very beginning,
admonished those who would relish in system building
and adhere to the extremes of existential and
nonexistential elements.(2) That is to say, ill bids
those who would treat life and death as if they were
entifiable objects, or even subjects, and thereby
surround these concepts with a host of tangible
elements and build up a structure, nay a
superstructure, of being. The approach is neither
profitable nor fruitful (or conducive to the way to
nirvaa.na as the Buddhist is wont to say) since, in
the final analysis, it tends to stray away from
"things as they are" (yathaabhuutam), that is, the
real content of being.(3) As we all know, there is a
place for objects of perception and of the mind, but
these objects are not to be taken us independent
entities, isolated and abstracted from the realm of
the so-called existence as a whole. Thus the Buddhist
would also refrain from being carried away by "purely
categoreal investigation" of beings or entities as
such.

There is a second, and, perhaps more important,
concurrence of ideas. This is best illustrated by
Munitz' assertion of the existence of a paradox. The
revelation and understanding of the paradox is very
crucial to our dialogue. He states:

p. 310

The asking of the question, "What is the world?" and
the possible "answering" of it turn out to have
certain paradoxical qualities associated with them.
On the one hand the question, "What is the world?" is
in some ways the most important and basic question
that philosophy can ask; and yet there is no answer
to it (p, 197).

He goes on to say:

One of the reasons there is no answer to it, is that
philosophical analysis shows all one might do in
''answering" the question is to utter a tautology and
say. "The world is the world," or else show that the
very form of the question, by asking ostensibly for a
definition, a description, or an identification, in
the use of the "what" form of question, cannot, in
the case of the world, be satisfied at all (pp,
197-198).

And finally the significance of the paradox:

On the one hand, one of the great values of
philosophy is to have performed here the kind of
analysis which, in forcing us to take apart our
initial question, makes us see why it cannot be
answered, and why in a certain sense it is an
improper question and should not have been asked; at
the same time, the very same analysis that
accomplishes this dissolution of the question, this
therapeutic lifting of a false hope and an
intellectual snarl, also yields thereby the occasion
for a deeper insight into what the world is (p. 198;
italics his).

In the same paragraph, he ends by saying that it is
"an insight that shows a certain kinship with
religious experience and mysticism" and that "we have
an immediate awareness of its existence."

First of all, it is regrettable that such a
phrase as "religious experience and mysticism" has to
be employed. I am sure Munitz feels the same here. We
have been compelled and conditioned, if you will, to
employ such a phrase because anything "external or
outside" the realm of the ordinarily accepted
epistemlogical process, which includes the logical or
rational scheme of things, is rejected outright or
dismissed as having no place or cogency. There has
been a self-imposed limitation in the process from
time immemorial. That is to say, our rational nature
has subtly and "unconsciously" prejudiced against
itself by not permitting unseen or intangible realms
and entities to remain in the epistemological
process. Rather, as we are now cognizant, the
attention and focus have constantly been directed
toward an ever-narrowing and limiting focus on the
so-called elements of existence. We have been seeing
the elements at the expense of the total landscape.

Thus, in the paradox, Munitz has first called to
attention the limitations of logic and language, that
is, that the various schemata utilized fail, in the
final analysis, to deal successfully with the nature
and structure of beings. Yet, on the other hand, from
the proper or rightful understanding of the
limitations of that body of knowledge accrued from
logic and language issues forth insight into the
greater dimensions of Being. What Munitz is saying,
in short, is that, as a philosopher cannot help but deal
in metaphysical accounting of things, it

p. 311

is precisely within the function and context of
metaphysics that he must extricate himself from the
very metaphysical entities exposed and move on to
something beyond. Language and logic have added much
to the descriptive and explanatory power in man but
these remain in the nature of complementary and
supplementary roles. Metaphysics should then go
beyond in the nature of our understanding of the
hyphenation, meta-physical.

We must capitalize on this last statement. I
believe there is no difficulty here in introducing
the Buddhist view. The Buddhist has always maintained
that man in his rational and metaphysical accounting
of things is only presenting an aspect (anta), a
fragment of total existence. Thus, man's
consciousness or conceptual process is labeled as
vij~naana, which literally means discriminative
knowledge. Every corpus of knowledge, from the basic
senses to the imaginative and speculative realm, is
an instance of a process resulting from a basic
bifurcation or dichotomization. The basis of that
bifurcation is the very notion of a self-existing
self(aatman) or a soul (jiiva) or a personal identity
(pudgala). These notions refer to a fragmented status
of existence and thus any fact or knowledge gained or
originating from this status is already deficient or
"tainted," as the Buddhist would say. What is more,
the bifurcation takes on metalevel dimension in that,
in very sophisticated ways, the mind continues to
abstract and fragment upon what had already started
as abstractions and fragmentations. For example,
unsophisticated minds confuse the notions of atoms
and subatomic particles with regard to reality. It is
difficult to keep them as only models for
understanding. In this situation, the idealistic
claim that thought equals reality is hard to accept.

The other side of the limitations of logic and
language is the meaningful use of them. When one
indulges in explaining either, the other side is also
being clarified. Thus, for example, to know the
limits of language is to know the full use of
language, and vice versa, to use language
meaningfully is to know the limits. In our
discussion, Munitz, I believe, has illustrated this
situation admirably in Sections II and III,
respectively titled "The World as a Totality" and
"The World as Individual." In them, he has
demonstrated the limits of language and logic insofar
as the treatment of Being is concerned. He has
concluded with the inability of language to express
the "final" status of the world. He asserts that the
term, "the world," refers to a unique, irreducible
and primitive idea; and he goes on to say that "to
acknowledge, on the other hand, that there is an
irreducible and primitive sense of the term, "the
world," which cannot be constructed out of the single
primitive idea of "an object in space and time," is
to take a long additional step in the working out of
an acceptable ontology" (p. 219). Further:

we cannot treat the term "the world" in our present
sense as any kind of referring expression, or
descriptive expression. The existence of the totality
of objects in space and time is not itself a totality
or an individual, or indeed any other

p. 312

normal or familiar type of concept. Another way of
exressing this is to say that the world is
transcendent (p. 220).

Also, "the world is transcendent because it does not
lend itself to description by other concepts, etc."
(p. 228); yet. "we must be prepared to leave room for
such a term as 'the world', although its 'logic' is
so unique that none of our ordinary criteria will
apply to it; that nevertheless this is precisely its
character" (p. 221),

The concept of "the world" is unique, not subject
to application or reference to anything else, or not
another element subject to a categorical analysis or
classification. It is transcendent in the unique
sense of being aloof to any referential nature, any
logical construction, any language-game, in short,
nonassimilative to any element within the contingent
nature of things. This means that the concept of "the
world" or Being has a totally different nature from
that of beings, where the latter is amenable to a
categorical scheme.

The discussion, at this point, brings to question
the Buddhist doctrine of the twofold nature of
truths. On the one hand, there is the conventional or
relative nature of truth (sa.mv.rti-satya), and on
the other the nonconventional or supreme (unique)
nature of truth (paramaartha-satya) Outwardly, they
seem to suggest the Platonic division of appearance
and reality, but there is more to it than that.(4) For
the Buddhist, the whole realm of existence short of
enlightenment (nirvaa.na) comprises the nature of
conventional truths. This is the realm of sensuality,
of perception, of reason, of logic, and of general
intelligence. Yet, this is not enough for the
Buddhist; he wants to strive for the ultimate goal,
the realm of wisdom which is coextensive with the
total realm of existence. In the conventional nature
of truth, there is epistemological clarity and
distinctness, to use Cartesian terms, but in the
supreme nature of truth there is only ontological
clarity in the sense of going beyond the merely clear
and distinct ideas occurring in the mind. This latter
I take it to be quite close, if not similar, to the
sense of the "transcendent" that Munitz uses for "the
world."

Let us expand. First, to assert that there are
two realms does not mean to say that these realms are
absolutely and mutually exclusive; if anything, they
are mutually inclusive in a very unique sense, that
is, not in epistemological but ontological ways.
Stated in another way, it is to say that the
ontological realm governs or lies at the bottom of
all epistemological functions. Consequently, it is
permissible to assert that both the unenlightened and
the enlightened exist in the same epistemological and
ontological spheres and yet, paradoxical as it may
seem, where the unenlightened cannot comprehend the
nature of function of the enlightened, the latter can
clearly comprehend the former. The former, in other
words, remains with the constructed or created
epistemological structures and elements, for example,
a categorical scheme, and never experiences the total
ontological sphere, though the former is in-

p. 313

evitably in the latter. The latter, on the other
hand, goes beyond these epistemological structures to
the pure ontological facts of experience. But going
beyond here does not mean abandonment or
relinquishment; indeed, the epistemological elements
are all there. The former is exclusivistic or
abstractivistic, and the latter, inclusivistic. These
terms, to be sure, are conventional terms but in the
case of the second term, inclusivistic, the content
of which will end in a paradoxical quality as was the
case with Munitz in his search for the referring role
or nature of "the world." It is difficult again to
avoid the sense of the transcendent.

The early Buddhist refers to the realm of
conventional existence as lokiya. Literally, it means
the world or realm of existence but only in the
unenlightened sense, for, there is the other more
important realm of existence known as lokuttara,
literally, the realm that is beyond the merely
conventional. Thus from the ordinary intellect's
point of view, there seems to be a transcendent realm
beyond the ordinary nature of things and from the
enlightened standpoint, ordinary things are always
deficient of reality. From the latter, all concepts
in the conventional realm of existence must be
characterized as pseudo or quasi-ontological. In this
way then all facts or distinction derived in and from
the conventional realm are in the makings of
ignorance (avidyaa) and therefore in the nature of
suffering (du.hkha) . The terms ignorance and
suffering are generic terms relative and comparative
to the true ontological nature of beings. They refer
to the self-imposed or other-imposed falsely created
elements which become obstacles or hindrances to
clear (that is, ontological) perception. Thus, when
the Buddhist talks of defilements (kle`sa), he is
referring to any and all elements that obstruct or
"taint" true knowledge. So long as we self-perpetuate
this realm of existence there is seemingly no way
out. Yet, within the conventional realm of existence
there is a way out; that is, man must attempt to
rightly view his true ontological situation. This is
the basic message of the Middle Path. Munitz, I
believe, has also taken a similar ontological stance
on this matter, if not in content at least in spirit.
Or, the door is left ajar for a fruitful exposition
and exchange.

In the final section, Munitz insightfully says:

We do not start with the term "the world" and attempt
to give it a definition, either verbal or ostensive,
for no such ordinary definitional techniques are
possible. It is rather the other way around. We have
an awareness or experience of the world, and we call
that of which we have this experience "the world" (p.
232).

And thus, "the world is not used, it is had" (p.
232-233).

I believe we are on the right track. We normally
and unconciously a situation where there is an
existent individual, that is, the subject, with
initiates and becomes aware or experiences the world.
As pointed out earlier, this is a basic ontological
error in that bifurcation has already set in. Without

p. 314

falling into that error, Munitz goes on to say that
the world is transcendent without giving a positive
description of it and that transcendence means "to
employ a second-order term to express the fact that
no first-order descriptive terms we should wish to
apply to the world in attempting to give a
satisfactory account of the world will in fact serve"
(p. 233).

One ought to be extremely careful not to revert
to a metaphysical game that Munitz has been careful
to avoid all along. The Buddhist, on the other hand,
explains the situation by asserting that all
categorical schemata, that is, metaphysical
accounting, originates in the nature of the
speculated concept called the self (aatman). Any
"knowledge" derived from this premise only lies in
the realm of conventional knowledge. There is no
doubt about the "awareness and experience of the
world" on this premise. However, the larger question
is, whether perceptual process under this scheme will
present the continuity, clarity, and vigor necessary
for that experience to be even called that? In
Munitz' analysis of the world as transcendent, the
latter experience seems, at least to me, to be
momentary, fragmentary, and a kind of on-and-off
affair. This point has to be clarified. On the
Buddhist side, precisely because the world that the
existent individual or self (aatman) constructs is
conventionally bound, there is nothing lasting,
intense and clear. As stated earlier, this realm of
existence is limited and in the nature of ignorance,
that is, in reference to the sense of ontological
clarity. It is the ontologically imperfect realm. As
a consequence, the Buddhist answer will be that the
ontologically perfect realm can be arrived at by
taking an aloof position to all concepts, notions,
elements, etc., which hinder all perceptions and
experiences. And, seriously speaking, the notion of
transcendence applied by Munitz to "the world" should
be extended over to every conceivable item in the
experiential process. This may be a strange way of
speaking, but it should be a part of the mystery of
existence, so aptly demonstrated by Munitz, but not
only with reference to the world but more
fundamentally to the "individual" in the making. If
this is acceptable, then it is a small jump to
understanding why the Buddhist postulates a nonself
doctrine (anaatman) as the final and ultimate realm
of existence. This ultimate realm of existence refers
naturally to the nonconventional nature of things. We
must pursue the issue further.

What I am proposing here is that the concept of
transcendence should be arrived at in an inclusive
way. By this I mean to say that we should not only
arrive at this experience from the "logical" route as
demonstrated by Munitz but also set out to seek a
more "open" and all-encompassing route, which gets at
the core of the nature of being. So, paradoxical as
the approach may seem, the nature of the end or goal
(that is, transcendence) that we seek to understand
must always be present in the means in which we are
engaged, although the present state of understanding
that we have of the perceptual process does not allow
for the vision of this transcendent nature. The
perceptual mechanism that we describe and relate is
limited and self-restrictive. Its focus on the end

p. 315

result has overshadowed, sometimes denied outright,
the existence of the ever-present nascent nature or
ontological content in any process. Thus, the
transcendent nature felt by the individual should not
be a nature coming as a goal or a final unique
experience but rather as part and parcel of the
individual's nature itself. It should be spontaneous
in the way of self-revelation, self-assertion, and
self-enjoyment.

As can be seen in the earlier statements, there
is no escape from the predicament of using terms
which are objective or metaphysical in meaning and
intent. Such terms as "self-restrictive,
"self-revelation," "self-enjoyment," and "individual"
are descriptive indicators and are not intended as
referents to something objective or entifiable. They
are intended rather to point at the central area in
which true reality resides. That area is in our
ordinary perceptual process, though we tend to veer
away from it. Thus, first of all in analyzing the
process, the Buddhist cannot postulate an abstract
subject or an object, or both, prior to the process.
There is no doer or a deed but only doing in the
strictest sense. The process, from birth, is
continual in the manner of total relational
origination (pratiityasamutpaada) . This is the
Buddhist doctrine of momentariness or momentary
existence where life is a series of coming into being
and going out of being and where the so-called
creative origination occurs within a total relational
field. It is popularly referred to as the Wheel of
Life. The term, "being," used above does not refer to
an enduring entity because the whole process is
dynamic through and through. Yet, there is a matrix
for that dynamic process. A structural analysis can
be presented by way of the five "aggregates" of being
(pa~ncaskandhaa) , (5) but they remain as vital
components in the total perceptual process. In this
analysis, again, there are no subjective or objective
components as such, for any or all elements are
mutually bound to each other and thereby implicate
each other. The five aggregates are convenient, if
not conventional, ways in which we can come to an
understanding of the experiential process. They are
not absolute elements. As the Buddhist would say, the
becoming wheel (pratiityasamutpaada) reveals no
beginning, no maker, no experiencer; it is void,
never halts, for it is constantly spinning.(6)

In the previous statement, there is one term
which comes close to Munitz' concept of
transcendence, that is, void. This term is
technically known as `suunya or `suunyataa, in the
abstract. It not only describes the true status of
all elements in the process, conventionally speaking,
but also advances the ontological state of being,
nonconventionally or supremely speaking. But
basically it is the realm of existence devoid of any
characterization. Since nothing is relatable or
assimilable in the ultimate sense and since the
existential flow is a fact, the Buddhist concludes
that all must be in the nature of voidness or
emptiness or suchness. This is the Buddhist
ontological principle. There are other terms
similarly used in Buddhism, for example, tathataa
(thatness) and dharmataa (true state of all
elements). The knowledge and sustainment of the
supreme realm is naturally the goal in Buddhism. The
term nirvaa.na is used for

p. 316

that achievement, and the achiever is known as a
buddha (enlightened) or even a bodhisattva
(enlightened being). When Munitz speaks of the "act
of transcendence" in which man knows the world
differently and uniquely (p. 233), I am reminded
greatly of the concept of bodhisattva.

The crucial question now is, how does one go
about achieving the nirvaa.nic realm of existence?
This is, of course, the central quest of all
Buddhists. The answer usually presented in the texts
is to follow the eightfold Noble Path, that is, right
view, right intention, right speech, right action,
right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
and right concentration. There is no time to
elaborate on these steps, but suffice it to say that,
in essence, the Noble Path means to rightly
understand the state of universal suffering and to
work toward liberation (mok.sa, nirodha) by means of
right meditative discipline (`samathavipa`syanaa).
Since it is so difficult to understand the true
nature of suffering, meditation becomes a hollow
thing for most of us. As stated earlier, the Buddhist
concept of suffering strikes at the core of
ontological nature of being. As to the concept of
meditation, most people do not know its real intent
and purpose. Some seek external help just as in
prayers offered or hope for a miraculous event to
occur, and some earnestly attempt to discover
"secret" powers within oneself. Real Buddhist
meditation is, in principle, to secure the nature of
the whole man by having his potential nature be what
it is without the usual clutterings or hindrances
ruling over him. It is to exhibit the "unity,"
"totality," "wholesomeness," etc., without searching
for a basis for them. The goal is the unique and
proper function of being qua being. Consequently and
paradoxically, suffering (du.hkha) and nirvaa.na are
only two sides of the same reality of being.

I have thus concluded with just a few basic
comparative notions in both Munitz and Buddhism,
hoping to widen the door of approach in viewing the
transcendent nature of the world. Much needs to be
explored in the dialogue, and I welcome any responses
to the above.

NOTES
1. Milton K. Munitz, "The Concept of the World," in
Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, Volume I of
Contemporary Philosophic Thought: The
International Philosphy Year Conferences at
Brockport (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New
York Press, 1970), pp. 190-235.

2. This is the admonition expounded in the famous
Middle-Path Doctrine. Samyutta-Nikaaya, III,
134-135. Pali Text Society Translation Series, The
Book of Kindred Sayings, Part III, pp.

3. There should be no difficulty here in accepting
Munitz' use of Being for my use of being. Both
terms are devoid of any separate or independent
status of anything.

4. Indeed, a comparative study of Platonism and
Buddhism would be an awesome project but one that
must be carried out in the near future. Both
philosophies have existed nearly the same period
of time and have influenced the minds of peoples
of the leading European and Asian civilizations.

p. 317

5. The five "aggregates" of being are ruupa
(corporeal nature), vedanaa (general feeling or
sensitivity) , sa.mj~naa (primitive imagery) ,
sa.mskaara (play of imagery) , and vij~naana
(discriminative knowledge). The essential point is
to see the "aggregates" in terms of genetic and
continuous functions. They begin with simple
nature or feelings and end up in sophisticated and
even abstract contents.

6. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa; Chapter XVII, 576.
Bhikkhu ~Naanamoli Translation, The Path of
Purification, pp. 666f. (Colombo, Ceylon: R.
Semage, 1956).