Nietzsche and Buddhism: Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study

·期刊原文
Nietzsche and Buddhism: Prolegomenon to a Comparative Study,
By Freny Mistry
Reviewed by Vijitha Rajapakse
Philosophy East & West
V. 34 (July 1984)
pp. 332-335
Copyright 1984 by University of Hawaii Press

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Nietzsche is one of the few Western philosophers of note who not only knew something about Buddhism but also referred to its teachings in his principal writings. These references are somewhat widespread, and they clearly point to an interesting philosophic encounter between the East and the West which look place during the last century. Nietzsche's knowledge of the Oriental faith (grounded on a perusal of none too reliable translated material and secondary sources) was of course necessarily imperfect: as Max Ladner has shown in his Nietzsche und der Buddhismus (Zurich, 1933), Nietzsche on many occasions either misunderstood or misrepresented Buddhist positions. One must recognize, however, that the attitude to Buddhism which this German philosopher projects appears in the last analysis to be ambivalent. Though he found weakness and infirmity to lurk behind Buddhism's "morality of pity," and indeed characterized this religion gener-

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ally as a "decadent" and "nihilistic" one, he also, on the other hand, went to considerable lengths to pinpoint with evident admiration its mellowed realism and phenomenalistic stances It is significant that in Der Antichrist, for example, Nietzsche insisted polemically that there was more to commend in Buddhism than in Christianity. While Mistry takes due notice of Nietzsche's reactions to Buddhism, his inquiry in the book under review is actually devoted to a larger and in many ways a more interesting topic, namely, the examination of the affinities between the philosophy developed in Nietzsche's writings and Buddhism. The existence of such affinities is, of course, not something that Nietzsche himself really discerned. Yet Mistry contends that the messages contained in the two systems are "recognizably affiliated" and that there is a striking "consonance of outlook" between them. Notably enough, it is Buddhism in its Theravada form-especially the outlook elaborated in the Nikaayas -- that Nietzsche is said to approximate. The thesis that Mistry seeks to establish is certainly significant: despite differences in what he considers to be matters of detail, early Buddhism and Nietzsche's thought, he maintains, highlight a common tendency to shift attention away from speculative metaphysics and focus it instead on a practical ethic of self redemption. Now I am not sure whether one could give equal credence to every one of the author's conclusions. Nevertheless, Nietzsche and Buddhism, I think, is an innovative contribution to comparative philosophy and hence merits careful consideration.

Mistry adopts a thematic approach to his complex inquiry. The book's principal contents (which follow a clarification of aims in the introduction) are organized in six chapters, each devoted to a specific theme and together offering a fairly systematic and broadly based comparative study of the philosophies of Nietzsche and of early Buddhism. The themes in question-"overcoming of metaphysics and nihilism," "analysis of personality and the universe," "experiments with truth and reason," "suffering," "ethics of Eternal Recurrence,'' and "transformation of suffering and nirvaa.na" -- indeed provide the conceptual framework for this study. The emphases of Nietzsche's philosophy are somewhat more conspicuous here than those of Buddhism; nevertheless this framework paves the way for a meaningful juxtaposition of these two systems.

Now a comparative effort strictly understood should, I suppose, bring out the points on which the systems compared not only converge but also diverge. In this book, the former -- in other words the parallelisms -- are indeed the focus of most of the attention; the differences, on the other hand, are treated in a much less prominent way, often only incidentally.

In any event, the parallelisms identified touch on a wide range of issues. Both Nietzsche and Buddhism, it is noted, showed a common awareness of the contradictions inherent in dialectical reasoning and proposed a rejection of the conventional notions of deity and the self. Nietzsche's call for the redefinition of the idea of the soul in terms of a grouping of energy aggregates in particular is held to echo the Buddhist doctrine of nonself (anattaa). More important, his theory of Eternal Recurrence (which might well have been conceived under Oriental. perhaps Buddhist, influence) incorporates, in the author's view, perspectives very much stressed in Buddhism -- the continual presence of rebirth and suffering in the universe as also the possibility of overcoming it. Mistry finds the positions inculated in the two systems to be particularly close on this last point. Indeed, he insists that notwithstanding marked differences in expression, Nietzsche's philosophy of overcoming is "intrinsically affiliated with, not dissociated from, " the Buddhist quest for nirvaa.na. What

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is particularly interesting in this connection is the similarity identified between the arhant ideal of Buddhism and the high point of the will to power attained by Nietzsche's Uebermensch. All in all, nirvaa.na itself is held to parallel the creativity Nietzsche glorified, and Mistry goes so far as to claim finally that "the transformation of agony through art into power enjoined by Nietzsche bears perhaps the closest approximation that any European thinker has formulated to the experience of nirvaa.na within sa^msaara" (p. 196).

As indicated at the outset, resemblances, not differences, are the real focus of this study. The latter, however, are not entirely forgotten: it is observed, for example, that the Buddhist conceptions of redemption (through the "middle way"), of rebirth (as determined by the moral agency of karman), and of causality (in terms of pratiityasamut-paada) have no parallels in Nietzsche. Some other emphases of Buddhism -- like the pivotal roles assigned to meditation and compassion -- again cannot be accommodated within his system.

Though Nietzsche and Buddhism does not highlight the application of any methodological insights of an original nature relating to comparative philosophy, this work as a whole should appeal to the comparativist, for it serves to underscore once again the possibility of fruitfully juxtaposing systems of thought that belong to dissimilar cultural contexts and epochs. Since Nietzsche has made comments of a sort on Buddhism, its discussions at some levels can be said to throw light on aspects of his thought itself, and also on the nineteenth century philosophic reception of this religion in Germany. I think Mistry is in the main correct when he notes that Nietzsche's negative comments on Buddhism are not seriously pondered reactions to Buddhism per se but rather to Buddhism as it came to be interpreted in his milieu by Orientalists like C. F. Koeppen and H. Oldenberg (and also by Schopenhauer). On the other hand, the parallelisms drawn, I found, were sometimes inexact or at least questionable.

I would like to dwell briefly on this matter. An explicit soteriological aim informs and permeates all aspects of Buddhist philosophic pronouncements; the same is not really the case with Nietzsche's thought, which, notwithstanding its inclusion of a redemptive dimension, was after all elaborated as a secular, not a religious, system. This basic disparity generates notable differences of perspective between them; to whittle down such differences or to treat them lightly is, in my view, a mistake. Unfortunately, however, I noticed some evidences of this in Mistry's discussions. I am not sure whether one could, for example, recognize a significant harmony in the attitudes to suffering projected in the two systems. True, both admit its reality and call for its overcoming; but Nietzsche saw suffering as an experience which might well serve to deepen one's mind and sharpen the feelings. Now there is nothing that quite corresponds to this stance in Buddhism. In keeping with its soteriological orientation, early Buddhism in particular only stresses the need to eliminate suffering. Then again, there is the idea of creativity. Now I do not know (and Mistry does not show) whether there is an exact equivalent to this idea (so pivotal to Nietzsche's thought) in Buddhist languages, especially Pali. In any event, the creativity that Nietzsche speaks of has some heuristic and aesthetic overtones of a kind which nirvaa.na as represented in classic traditional contexts would scarcely include. Further, while Nietzsche's creativity might well be a transforming experience like nirvaa.na, it is perhaps still possible to ask whether they can be equated in other respects. The nature of the transcendence they involve and its duration, I think, are especially worthy of consideration here; yet who can determine for sure whether creativity and nirvaa.na are alike on these

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counts? Nirvaa.na, it is well to remember, is deemed to be ineffable. Last but not least, there is a matter which, though pertinent, is nevertheless hardly considered in this comparison, namely, the backgrounds and the personalities of Nietzsche and the Buddha. Needless to say, one discerns a very wide chasm at this level. No doubt there are grounds for saying (as Mistry does) that both Nietzsche and the Buddha were "innovative iconoclasts." But it is important to recognize that the latter was a spiritual leader who consciously elaborated a "saving doctrine." The former, on the other hand, was a worldly (and rather erratic) genius whose thinking, even while he criticized other Western philosophies, was still not wholly divorced from the intellectualist traditions of the West.

Though I discern these shortcomings in Mistry's discussions, I would still like to say that Nietzsche and Buddhism is a study that no one interested in comparative philosophy can quite afford to ignore. Mistry brings out his points neatly and clearly here, even though his language sometimes has a pedantic air about it. I am sure most readers would admire the extensive knowledge of Nietzsche and the sympathetic attention to Buddhist philosophic claims that are brought together in this notable scholarly work.