On being mindless

·期刊原文
ON being mindless: The debate on the reemergence of consciousness from the attainment of cessation in the Abhidharmako`sabhaa.syam and its commentaries
By Paul Griffiths
Philosophy East and West
Volume 33, no.4 (October 1983)
P.379-394
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press

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P.379

I. THE PROBLEM

The Indian Buddhist meditative traditions bear
strong witness to the existence and desirability of
a trance state or states which are entirely without
consciousness. This fact has been the source of many
problems, both theoretical and practical, for
Buddhist philosophers and meditation teachers, most
of which originate in the uneasy tension visible
between this type of mindless trance state, together
with the techniques which produce it, and the more
central and "orthodx" techniques of Buddhist
meditation which aim at insight and are concerned to
develop the practitioner's analytic capacities
rather than to bring all mental operations to a
complete halt.(1) This paper is not intended as a
full discussion of the entire range of problems
associated with the higher trance states(2) but
rather as a study of one particular issue occasioned
by the existence of mindless trance states in the
tradition. This issue is: if the attainment of
cessation (nirodhasamaapatti.h.(3)) here considered
as a paradigm example of a mindless trance state)
really is a state wherein all mental events have
come to a complete halt, how is it that the
practitioner's mental life can begin again after
having completely ceased? How can mind arise from
mindlessness? By what system of causality can
something which has become completely nonexistent
come into being once again? Is it necessary to
postulate a continuing mental "something" in order
to account for the ability of the practitioner of
such trance states to enter and leave them at will?
The intent of this paper is first to show that the
Abhidharmako`sabhaa.syam--an influential summa of
Buddhist philosophical theory from fifth-century
India-and two of its important commentaries have to
say to these issues, and then to make some attempt
at clarifying and interpreting the issues at stake
here in non-Buddhist language. A preliminary attempt
will be made at relating these problems to similar
ones which have arisen during the course of Western
philosophical discussion of the relationship between
mind and body. The analogies will, we hope, prove
illuminating, and will show that Buddhists--or at
least Indian Buddhist Abhidharmikas--are a good deal
closer to being dualists than is often supposed.

II. THE SOURCES

Our discussion will be based on one short section of
the Abhidharmako`sabhaa.syam (hereafter cited as
AKBh):(4) that part of the second chapter which
discusses the attainment of cessation as an example
of a cittaviprayuktasa^mskaara.h. While we are
fortunate enough to have access to this text in its
original Sanskrit, a consultation of its Tibetan
translation(5) often clarifies obscurities and
corrects some of the many errors in Pralhad
Pradhan's edition of the Sanskrit text. Therefore,
although the translations in this paper are based
primarily upon

P.380

the Sanskrit, we have consulted the Tibetan version
throughout and will refer to it where appropriate.
The two commentaries to Vasubandhu's text we have
consulted are: Ya`somitra's
Abhidharmako`sasphu.taarthavyaakhyaa (hereafter
cited as AKV),(6) written from the Sautraantika
viewpoint and also extant in the original Sanskrit.
In this case also we have profited from a
consultation of the Tibetan translation.(7) Also,
Sthiramati's Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya.tiikaa
(hereafter cited as AK.T) , extant only in
Tibetan,(8) has been used and will be quoted and
referred to where appropriate. This latter is a
remarkably full and interesting commentary which as
yet has hardly been utilized by Western scholarship.
It is written from the Yogaacaara viewpoint and thus
provides an interesting contrast to the AKV.

Occasional reference will also be made to other
texts when this becomes necessary, notably to
Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakar.ana (hereafter cited
as KSP) (9) and its commentary by Sumati`siila
(Karmasiddhi.tiikaa, hereafter cited as KS.T),(10)
and to the Vaibhaa.sika Abhidharmadiipa.(11)

Finally, anyone who works on the AKBh must
gratefully acknowledge the debt owed to Louis de La
Vallee Poussin for his translation of the entire
work into French from Hsuan-tsang's Chinese version.
His work was a landmark in Western Abhidharma
studies and its existence has meant that almost no
Western scholars since Poussin's time have done
serious work on the AKBh. This is unfortunate
because Poussin's work has at least two serious
drawback: The first is that it was done before the
recovery of the original Sanskrit and thus is not
based upon a study of the text in the language in
which it was composed. The second is that Poussin
did not translate many of the technical terms which
are so important for a full understanding of the
AKBh. For the most part he was content to leave them
in (reconstructed!) Sanskrit, and this makes his
work of dubious value for the purpose of actually
coming to an understanding of the philosophical
debates which fill the AKBh. There is a pressing
need for serious scholarly work on the AKBh which
both takes the text seriously in its original
language and is concerned to communicate its
meaning. This paper is meant as a contribution to
such study.

III. THE DEBATE

In Ya`somitra's AKV we find the following
programmatic statement of positions of the schools
on the issue which concerns us:

On this matter the Vaibhaa.sikas and others say that
the attainments of unconsciousness and cessation,
together with the state of unconsciousness, are
mindless. The Elder Vasumitra and others say that
[these attainments] possess mind an unmanifest
mental consciousness. The Yogaacaaras say that they
possess mind--the store-consciousness. This is the
division of the schools.(12)

Vasubandhu's exposition of the
first-Vaibhaa.sika-position reads as follows:

How is it that mind can arise once again from a mind
that has been brought to a halt for a long period of
time? The Vaibhaa.sikas claim that because past
[dhar-

P.381

mas] continue to exist there is an immediately
antecedent and homogenous condition [for the
occurrence of such an event].(13)

To understand what this Vaibhaa.sika view means, we
need to know something of the Buddhist theory of
causation, since the Vaibhaa.sikas are here claiming
that a particular kind of cause--the
samanantarapratyaya.h--accounts for the reemergence
of mind from the mindless trances. We find a
discussion of the nature of samanantarapratyaya.h in
the commentary to AK2.62a-b, where the compound is
glossed as a karmadhaaraya.h:
sama`scaayamanantra`sca pratyaya iti
sammanantarapratyaya.h(14) Hence the meaning is that
samanantarapratyaya.h is a condition (pratyaya.h)
which is of the same kind as (samam) and immediately
antecedent to (anantaram--without interval. either
temporal or spatial) its effect.(15) Normally, every
mental event both has and is a
samanantarapratyaya.h: that is, it is caused by the
immediately preceding event in the relevant mental
continuum, in conjunction with other significant
nonmental causes, and itself causes the immediately
subsequent event. The exceptions to this rule are:
the last moment in the mental continuum of an Arhat
before he attains final nirvaa.na(16) --which
possesses an immediately antecedent and homegenous
condition but is not itself such since consciousness
ceases at that point--and, depending upon which
school's viewpoint is followed, the last moment, of
consciousness before entering the attainment of
cessation (which, like the last conscious moment of
an Arhat, may be considered to have, but not be, an
immediately antecedent and homogenous condition) and
the first moment of consciousness upon emerging from
that trance (which may be considered to be, but not
have, an immediately antecedent and homogenous
condition) . Thus we find the following view
attributed to the Sa.mtaanasabhaagikas in the AKBh:
for this school, the first moment of consciousness
which occurs upon leaving the attainment of
cessation (vyutthaanacittam) has as its immediately
antecedent and homogenous condition the last moment
of consciousness before entering that trance
(samaapatticittam). For this school, the fact that
the two moments of consciousness are separated by a
more or less extensive period of time--during which
there is no consciousness at all--does not affect
the fact that one is the immediately antecedent and
homogenous cause of the other. On this view,
separation of an effect from its cause by a
dissimilar dharma does not constitute real
separation; thus there is no real separation of the
samapaatticittam from the vyutthaanacittam. This
school further claims that any given immediately
antecedent and homogenous cause can only give rise
to an effect of the same type as itself; thus a
moment of sensation gives rise only to another
moment of sensation, a moment of conceptualization
only to another moment of conceptualization, and so
forth.(17) We do not know much else about the
Sa.mtaanasabhaagikas. Ya`somitra merely tells us
that they are "certain Abhidharmikas"
(kecidabhidharmikaa.h) .(18) and Sthiramati adds
nothing of significance.(19)

To return to our main text: we now understand
what a samanantarapratyaya.h is and can see that the
Vaibhaa.sikas hold a view of it which is not
dissimilar to that

P.382

attributed to the Sa.mtaanasabhaagikas in the
passage discussed above. Further information on the
latter school is lacking for the present, but it
certainly seems right to attribute their views on
the immediately antecedent and homogenous condition
to the Vaibhaa.sikas; it may even be historically
correct to say that the Sa.mtaanasabhaagikas were
simply a subgroup of the Vaibhaa.sika school. In any
case, the Vaibhaa.sika view amounts to this: every
mental event must have an immediately antecedent and
homogenous condition, including the first moment of
consciousness after the nirodhasamaapatti.h.
Further, such a condition must be of essentially the
same type as its effect, and so great stress is
placed on the 'homogenous' (samam) element of the
samanantarapratyaya.h compound, and rather less on
the "immediately antecedent" (anantaram) element.
For the Vaibhaa.sikas it is acceptable that the
cause of a given mental event, X, may be another
mental event, Y, which occurred at a considerable
distance in time from X. This also explains the
stress placed by this school on the continued
existence of past dharmas or events; for something
to be causally efficacious at a distance in time it
must in some sense still be in existence.(20)
Sthiramati's comment on the Vaibhaa.sika assertion
of the existence of past dharmas in this context
betrays his Yogaacaara affiliation without adding a
great deal to what has been said here; he merely
asserts that the Vaibhaa.sikas do not allow the
existence of the aalayavij~naanam or
store-consciousness.(21)

We may now move to the second view discussed by
Vasubandhu in the AKBh:

Others say "How is is it that physical form can
arise once again for those who have been reborn in
places like the formless realms and whose physical
form has been brought to a halt for a long period of
time? It arises precisely from mind, not from
physical form [since mind continues to exist in the
formless realms]. Such is also the case with the
mind [of one in the attainment of cessation]. It
arises from the body with its senses, not from
mind." Previous teachers have said: "Both of these
mutually seed one nother: namely, the mind and the
body with its senses."(22)

Ya`somitra identifies the "others" with the
Saurtaantikas,(23) and by the use of bruuma.h, "we
say, " shows that he agrees with their view.
According to Ya`somitra, the Sautraantikas deny that
a past dharma can have causal efficacy; when a
particular state of mind has ceased to exist its
causal efficacy ceases with it. Therefore the
Vaibhaa.sika view, that the immediately antecedent
and homogenous condition for the first moments of
consciousness after the attainment of cessation is
the (long ceased) last moment of consciousness
before entry into the said trance, cannot, for the
Sautraantikas, be admitted. In contrast to this
view, they offer the idea that mind is capable of
sowing seeds which can remain dormant within the
physical continuum even when all other mental events
have ceased, and only much later mature and give
rise to other mental events. If we unpack this seed
metaphor in a little more detail. we see that it
strongly implies that the attainment of cessation is
mindless. What happens in this view is that the last
moments of consciousness before entry into the
nirodhasamaapatti.h plant seeds in the continuing
stream of physical events. In time these seeds ripen
and

P.383

produce their fruit--the reemergence of
consciousness. If this is a correct understanding of
the Sautraantika view,(24) then it would seem that
Lamotte and Poussin are wrong in suggesting that all
Sautraantikas held the view that there is some
subtle form of consciousness extant in the
attainment of cessation. The Sautraantika view under
discussion here certainly does not support such an
interpretation. We shall have to return to this
issue when we come to consider the views of the
Bhadanta Vasumitra.

We have seen, then, that Ya`somitra identifies
himself with the Sautraantika view discussed in this
section of the AKBh. Sthiramati makes an interesting
contrast because he offers some criticism of the
seed image, and suggests some undesirable logical
consequences of the Sautraantika view. After
offering the usual grammatical comments(25) and
agreeing with Ya`somitra that these "former
teachers" are in fact Sautraantikas, Sthiramati says
this:

If [as the Sautraantikas claim] consciousness can
arise from the body with its senses without
reference to the cause which assures homogeneity of
species, then when there exist both basis and object
consciousness would occur simultaneously everywhere.
But if mind arises subsequently by way of connection
to that state of mind which existed prior [to it],
then since there is no immediately antecedent and
homogenous condition for the second [i.e.,
subsequent state of mind], the conclusion is that,
even when basis and object exist there would be no
simultaneous arising [of the relevant
consciousness]. And if it is asked how, in the
absence of mind, [mind] can arise from a seed by
means of the mindless body with its senses, then
[the answer is] that this is not possible because
there is no distinct cause [for such arising to
occur].(26)

If we have understood Sthiramati correctly, he here
makes three separate points: first, that the
Sautraantika view must be wrong because it ignores
the necessity to take into account the
nikaayasabhaagahetu.h(27) (ris mthun pa'i rgyu) ,
that type of causality which ensures that an effect
is in some significant way like its cause. This
causal principle, for example, is the one which
ensures that the sexual intercourse of two human
beings always produces other human beings as its
result, and not, say, elephants. To assert that mind
can arise from the body with its senses is to assert
that it can arise from something quite other than
itself; the result, thinks Sthiramati, is that the
kind of consciousness which occurs at any given
moment need not be causally related to the
combination of sense-organ ("basis," aa`sraya.h,
rten) and sense-object ("object," aalambanam, dmigs
pal. For example, when the eye and a visual
sense-object come into contact, the
nikaayasabhaagahetu.h (among other things) ensures
that visual consciousness results, and not, say,
auditory or olfactory consciousness. But if the
nikaayasabhaagahetu.h is ignored, as the
Sautraantikas appear to do with their theory of mind
originating from body (or, more precisely, from
mental "seeds" in a physical continuum), then any
kind of consciousness whatever could result--or many
types at once.

Sthiramati's second point is that on the
Sautraantika view, if we disallow the body as the
immediately antecedent and homogenous condition for
the reemer-

P.384

gence of consciousness, there can be no such
condition. And if there is no such condition,
according to the Yogaacaara position which
Sthiramati is here explaining, consciousness can
never reemerge from the attainment of cessation.

Sthiramati's third point is to criticize the
Sautraantika image of seed. In order that
consciousness may reemerge after the attainment of
cessation, some distinct or specific cause is
necessary; the general fact of the existence of the
"seeded body" will not suffice to meet this
requirement. What mechanism accounts for the
ripening of seeds of consciousness at a given
moment? The Sautraantikas offer no account. We shall
return to Sthiramati's criticisms of the
Sautraantika position at a later stage in this
paper. For the moment, we simply need to note that
Sthiramati's own position has not yet been stated;
his criticisms are a propadeutic for the later
introduction of the aalayavij~naanam.

To summarize what we have learned about the
Sautraaintika position thus far: first, the
Sautraantikas seem to agree with the Vaibhaa.sikas
that the attainment of cessation is mindless. They
suggest that the reemergence of consciousness is
caused by mental seeds preserved in the continuum of
physical events which is all that exists in the
nirodhasamaapatti.h.

To return to our main text, Vasubandhu next
summarizes the position of the Bhadanta Vasumitra:

The Bhadanta Vasumitra, on the other hand, says in
the Parip.rcchaa: "This problem [i.e., of how
consciousness can reemerge from the attainment of
cessation] occurs for one who thinks that the
attainment of cessation is mindless. For me, though,
the attainment possesses mind."(28)

There are some problems with the identification of
the Vasumitra mentioned here, and with his
scholastic affiliation. Ya`somitra tells us that
Vasumitra was the author of a number of works, among
them the Pa~ncavastuka, and that the Parip.rccha is
named in order to give a specific reference for this
quotation.(29) Sthiramati merely expounds
Vasumitra's position in a little more detail,
showing that he thinks the arising of consciousness
from a state that is entirely without it would be
impossible. Sthiramati offers no criticism, except
to note that Vasumitra's concept of the mind that
does exist in the attainment of cessation is not the
same as the aalayavij~naanam, but instead a kind of
unmanifest mental consciousness.(30) In this
attribution of the theory of
aparisphu.tamanovij~naanam to Vasumitra both
Sthiramati and Ya`somitra agree,(31) and this theory
alone is enough to make it likely that the Vasumitra
referred to here is not the Vasumitra frequently
quoted in the Mahaavibhaa.saa. In that text we find
attributed to a Vasumitra a theory on the
nirodhasamaapatti.h which seems precisely the same
as the one attributed to the Vaibhaa.sikas in the
AKBh and is therefore in direct contradiction to
that attributed to Vasumitra here.(32) This problem
has led both Poussin and Lamotte to suggest that the
Vasumitra referred to here must have been a
Sautraantika.(33) There seems to be no hard evidence
to support this view of our Vasumitra's scholastic
affiliation. We have already seen that neither
Ya`somitra nor Sthiramati identifies Vasumitra as a
Ssutraantika, and indeed both

P.385

attribute to the Sautraantikas a view which is quite
different from that of Vasumitra. Noriaki Hakamaya
has pointed out that the quotation from Vasumitra's
Parip.rcchaa occurs not only in the AKBh (as
translated above) but also in Vasubandhu's KSP.(34)
In the KSP itself Vasumitra--or rather the quotation
from the Parip.rcchaa--is not said to belong to a
particular school, but in Sumati`siila's KS.T it is
attributed to a school which upholds the existence
of external objects, (35) not a characteristic
usually taken to be definitive of the Sautraantikas.

It seems clear, then, that there is no
unambiguous attribution of Vasumitra's view to the
Sautraantika school in any of the relevant texts,
and there is plenty of evidence which suggests that
the Sautraantikas in fact held a different view. It
is likely that Poussin and Lamotte were wrong to
call Vasumitra a Sautraantika, although the exact
nature of his scholastic affiliation must await
further research.(36)

Vasubandhu next turns to the objections offered
by one Gho.saka to Vasumitra's view:

The Bhadanta Gho.saka says that this does not follow
since the Lord has said: "When consciousness exists
there is also contact--which is the conjunction of
the three [i.e., sense-organ, sense-object,
consciousness].(37) Further. sensation,
conceptualization and volition have contact as their
cause." Hence [if consciousness does exist in the
attainment of cessation as Vasumitra suggests] the
cessation of sensation and conceptualization therein
could not occur.(38)

Ya`somitra's comment offers nothing of note, merely
pointing out that the appellation 'cessation of
sensation and conceptualization' is commonly applied
to the attainment of cessation.(39) Sthiramati's
explanation is more illuminating:

A detailed explanation of the words: "Sensation and
so forth have contact as their cause..." has been
given [in the sutra]. Since the result follows
automatically when an unobstructed cause exists,
then in accordance with contact [which is the
unobstructed cause of sensation and
conceptualization] the cessation of sensation and
conceptualization cannot occur in the attainment of
cessation.(40)

Ghosaka's view is now clear: he thinks that the
existence of consciousness necessarily implies also
the existence of indriyam and artha.h, sense-organ
and sense-object, and that the existence of these
three together is a sufficient condition for the
existence of contact (spar`sa.h/reg pa). Contact, in
turn, in Ghosaka's view, is a sufficient condition
for the existence of sensation, conceptualization,
and so forth. The conclusion is that if we allow any
kind of consciousness to exist in the attainment of
cessation--as we have seen that Vasumitra wishes to
do--there can be no possibility of sensation and
conceptualization ceasing as they are supposed to do
in this trance state. Gho.saka is here expounding
the standard Vaibhaa.sika view on the nature of
consciousness and the mechanisms by which it
arises,(41) and, if this view is followed in the way
in which Gho.saka presents it, we have no choice but
to conclude that the attainment of cessation really
is as mindless (acittakam) as the Vaibhaa.sikas
suggest.

P.386

The next stage in the debate preserved in the
AKBh is a reply from Vasumitra:

[Vasumitra replies] But it [i.e., the existence of
consciousness in the attainment of cessation] could
occur. Just as in the case of thirst, which is said
to have sensation as its cause: when sensation
exists for an Arhat thirst does not arise. Just so,
when contact exists sensation and so forth need not
necessarily arise because this [case] is not
different from that [case].(42)

Ya`somitra does not comment upon this section and
Sthiramati merely unpacks the position presented in
the AKBh at some length.(43) Drawing partially upon
what he says, we may explain Vasumitra's reply in
the following manner: Gho.saka claimed that contact
is a sufficient condition for the existence of
sensation and conceptualization. Vasumitra admits
that contact is a condition or cause (pratyaya.h)
for the existence of sensation and
conceptualization, but denies that it is a
sufficient condition. He illustrates this by taking
the analogous case of "thrist" (t.r.s.na.h), which
is conditioned by sensation; here also, claims
Vasumitra, there is no relation of necessary
concomitance since in the case of an Arhat it is
possible for the cause (in this case sensation) to
exist without its effect (in this case thirst). The
analogy holds, he claims, in the case of contact and
sensation. Sthiramati summarises his position thus:

Just as with sensation, not all instances of contact
are causes of sensation.(44)

If Vasumitra's position is correct, then his
contention that it is possible for the attainment of
cessation to contain some sort of consciousness
without this necessarily also implying the existence
of sensation and conceptualization may stand. But
the section of the AKBh we are considering in this
paper ends with some final criticisms of Vasumitra's
view:

But this [case] is not the same, since it is said
that thirst arises in dependence upon sensation
which is born from connection with ignorance, but
with regard to the arising of sensation it is not
said that contact is differentiated [i.e.,
differentiated in the sense that some types of
contact give rise to sensation and some do not].
Therefore the Vaibhaa.sikas say that the attainment
of cessation is mindless.(45)

Ya`somitra's comment attributes this reply to
Gho.saka. He adds:

"With regard to the arising of sensation it is
not...." means that with regard to the arising of
sensation contact is not differentiated by saying
that a particular kind of contact is the cause of
sensation.(46)

This is very clear. Vasumitra claims that contact
can occur without sensation necessarily following,
using the model of sensation and thirst which have
no necessary connection. Gho.saka refutes this by
pointing out that in the case of thirst it is not
said that all types of sensation give rise to it,
but only that sensation linked to ignorance has this
power. That is to say, a distinction or
differentiation is made among different types of
sensation with regard to their ability to give rise
to thirst, but no such differentiation is made with
regard to contact as the cause of sensation; in the
latter case we have a straightforward relationship
of sufficient causality.

P.387

Sthiramati's comment reinforces this
understanding of the somewhat elliptical material in
AKBh. He says:

[According to Gho.saka] it is not possible to
establish that sensation which is not an example of
ignorance can be a cause of thirst.... Therefore,
since this absence of differentiation [in contact as
the cause of sensation] has been approved, and
because all types of contact are causes of
sensation, [Vasumitra's counter-example] of the
causal relationship between sensation and thirst is
not appropriate.(47)

Here again we have the point that only in some cases
is sensation a condition for the arising of thirst
but that in all instances of contact sensation
necessarily arises. Sthiramati's comment on this
section concludes with a brief discussion of the
sense in which the Vaibhaa.sikas assert that the
attainment of cessation is mindless, and then passes
to other matters.

Here we conclude our examination of the sources,
and we may pass to a restatement and discussion of
the positions outlined here.

IV. THE POSITIONS RESTATED

We have now presented an outline account of the
debate as it occurs in our sources. What has been
said up to this point should be reasonably
comprehensible anyone with some background in
Buddhism, but is likely to remain almost completely
unintelligible to, let us say, the Western
philosopher specializing in philosophy of mind. The
terms of reference are very different in each sphere
of discourse. This is unfortunate, as the debate
under discussion in this paper has many clear
similarities to related debates in Western
philosophy, and it is probable that both Buddhists
and Western philosophers could profit from a fuller
awareness of each other's achievements in the
philosophy of mind. This concluding section of our
paper is therefore intended as a restatement of the
issues underlying this debate and the positions
taken within it in terms that might be
comprehensible to Western philosophers.

We have seen that the debate centred around a
particular trance state called the
nirodhasamaapatti.h--the attainment of cessation. It
is important to be clear about what this is. Its
definitions in the earliest texts available to us
make clear that it is a condition entirely without
consciousness. differing from death only in that
certain processes of the autonomic nervous system
continue. At first sight it seems as though we are
talking about a cataleptic trance in which the
individual exhibits no reactions to external stimuli
and is incapable of initiating action. Someone in a
long-term coma would be another example. Such
individuals, like the Buddhist who has attained
cessation, exhibit no mental activity. But there is
an important difference: for Western psychology, on
the whole, catalepsy and coma are not thought of as
though they are entirely without consciousness. It
may be said that the psychotic in catalepsy has
retreated into the depths of his psyche and erected
powerful defence mechanisms against the external
world, but it is not usually said that his
consciousness has ceased altogether. The presup-

P.388

position is always that within or beneath the
apparent mindlessness mental processes continue; the
subconscious mind still functions. Indeed: all
therapy for cataleptic psychoses and long-term coma
patients is based on such presup-positions. For some
Buddhists, as we have seen, the attainment of
cessation is thought of as a complete bringing to a
halt of all mental events without remainder. The
nearest analogy in Western thought would probably be
the idea of brain death, that condition in which a
patient is declared clinically dead but whose
nervous system may be kept in operation--for a time
at least-by artificial means. An extreme example of
such a condition would be the case of a person who
underwent a neat, surgical decapitation, and whose
heartbeat and so forth were thereafter kept in
operation artificially.

For Western psychology and philosophy such a
condition is by definition irreversible. After such
a complete cessation of consciousness there is no
way that it can reemerge. So, on the whole, Western
thought would equate the complete cessation of
consciousness with death. For the Buddhist
philosopher, on the other hand, the problem is still
more pressing, since he conceives death on a
different theoretical model. In Buddhist
thought,(48) death does not involve the complete
cessation of consciousness but is simply one more
moment in a causally linked stream of mental and
physical events. Consciousness--in various more or
less attenuated forms--continues through it. The
problem for Buddhists then becomes not whether the
attainment of cessation is the same as death, but
whether such a condition is possible at all. For the
fundamental presupposition behind all of Buddhist
soteriology is that the continuum continues; there
is no escape from continuing consciousness unless
and until one enters nirvaa.na.(49) Therefore all
Buddhist schools presuppose tha it must be possible
for consciousness to reemerge after the meditator
has entered the attainment of cessation, for if
consciousness does not reemerge, the causal chain
has been broken and the meditator has attained his
goal of final liberation. To make the problem
clearer let us formalize it:

P1 Every event has a cause.
P2 There are only two kinds of event: mental and
physical.
P3 Any given chain of caused events is beginningless
and endless unless brought to a final halt in
nirvaa.na.

P4 It is possible that, in a given continuum X, at a
given time T, there be a complete absence of
mental events while physical events continue.

All the Buddhist schools we are considering in this
paper hold P1-P3; these are fundamental
presuppositions. Let us see what happens if P4 also
is assented to, as we have seen it to be by the
Vaibhaa.sikas and by at least some Sautraantikas.
There seem to be only three possible alternatives:

P5 All of P1-P4 are true, and the cessation of
mental events described in P4 is permanent and to
be identified with nirvaa.na.

P.389

No buddhist would wish to take this step. To
identify nirvana with a specific trance state is
heresy (though see note 49). Therefore we do not
find an instance of this option in the texts we are
considering.

P6 All of P1-P4 are true and the cessation of mental
events described in P4 is temporary; their
reemergence is caused by continuing physical
events.

We find no clear instance of this position being
taken either, and that this is so reveals something
interesting about the basic Buddhist conception of
the relationship between physical events and mental
events. In terms of Western philosophy of mind it
appears that Buddhists are, on the whole, modified
dualists. They are strongly aware of the essential
phenomenological difference between mental and
physical events, and thus have many of the problems
which have faced Western dualists in accounting for
the causal relationship between the two. If it is
the case that only things which are in some sense
alike (samam) can be causally related, then it is
difficult to see how consciousness can arise in a
situation where there exists nothing but the
physical. This is the main reason why P6 is not held
as a possibility by the schools referred to in the
sources discussed in the third section of this
paper.

This might seem to suggest that Buddhists must
of necessity be adherents of parallelism--that view
which states that physical and mental events run
along in parallel streams, contemporaneous with each
other but without causal connection, since it is not
possible for events as radically different as the
mental and the physical to causally influence one
another. There are clearly many problems with such a
view, problems which have been rehearsed ad nauseam
in the history of Western philosophy, and it can be
no part of this paper to review them yet again. It
must suffice to point out that the Buddhist view is
not quite so simplistic. One example should be
enough to show this. Let us take the case of a
person looking at a splash of red paint on a white
wall. The Buddhist would call this an instance of
visual consciousness (cak.survij~naanam) and say
that it has as necessary precondition for its
occurrence the contact between three things: mind
(the general continuum of mental events) ,
sense-organ (in this case the eye, part of the
continuum of physical events), and sense-object (the
splash of paint) . This shows that interaction
between the mental and the physical is possible. but
it also makes very clear that for any kind of
consciousness to occur, a preceding moment of
consciousness is necessary. The mental and the
physical can enter into various combinations with
one another, but the requirement that each moment of
consciousness have an immediately antecedent and
homogenous cause shows why none of the schools are
willing to assert that a mental event can arise
solely from a physical event. Therefore, P6 is not a
genuine option.

P7 Ail of P1-P4 are true, and the cessation of
mental events described in P4 is temporary. The
reemergence of mental events is caused by other
mental events.

P.390

We have seen that both the Vaibhaa.sikas and
Sautraantikas adhere to this view and that neither
of their accounts is altogether satisfactory. The
Vaibhaa.sika account postulates causation at a
substantial temporal distance without explaining
exactly how this can work. The Sautraantika image of
"seeds" of consciousness preserved in a purely
physical medium is just that--an image,
unsystematized and probably incapable of being so.
It explains nothing. In a sense, although both these
schools wish to affirm P4, they cannot
wholeheartedly do so. They have to preserve some
element of existence of the mental--whether as seed
or as past, but still in some sense extant and
efficacious--cause, in order to account for the
reemergence of consciousness without slipping back
into the unacceptable P6.

The final possibility open in this matter is to
affirm P1-P3 and to deny P4. This means that the
attainment of cessation as classically conceived in
Buddhism becomes an impossibility because of the
difficulties we have examined, For both Vasumitra,
with his "unmanifest mental consciousness," and the
Yogaacaarins, with their "store-consciousness," the
complete cessation of consciousness is not possible
short of nirvaa.na,(50) and with this understanding
of the attainment of cessation we are back to the
Western model of a short-lived cataleptic trance.

There are clearly substantially fewer
philosophical problems with this last position. The
reemergence of consciousness is not a problem if it
never fully ceased in the first place. The
interesting point about this position is the issue
of what kind of consciousness can remain in the
attainment of cessation, and it is here that there
are significant differences between Vasumitra and
the Yogaacaarins. For Vasumitra the model of
consciousness used is still that of the
Vaibhaa.sikas and indeed that of the Abhidharmikas
per se. It is, as we have seen in our brief
discussion of visual consciousness, a type of
interactional model in which consciousness is
occasioned by the interaction of mental and physical
events. The corollary of this is that for the
Vaibhaa.sikas and Vasumitra, consciousness is
intentional in Brentano's sense of that term--to be
conscious is to be conscious of something. This
explains the basic point of the long debate between
Gho.saka and Vasumitra; Vasumitra says that
consciousness is still possible in the attainment of
cessation. Gho.saka replies that since all
consciousness has an object, and since being
conscious of something implies having sensation, if
we allow consciousness in the attainment of
cessation it seems that none of the other mental
functions can cease. Vasumitra, hampered by his
intentional model of consciousness, has no effective
reply. It is only the Yogaacaarins, with a radically
different idea of what consciousness is, who can
escape this dilemma. The aalayavij~naanam is not
necessarily a dualistic consciousness; it can exist
without sensation or conceptualization; and it is
fully capable of providing the necessary causal
impetus for the reemergence of ordinary everyday
consciousness from the attainment of cessation.

To summarize: this debate on the reemergence of
consciousness from the attainment of cessation is
important from a number of different angles. For the

P.391

Buddhologist it sheds new light on the history of
scholastic Buddhism; for the philosopher it lays
bare some key Buddhist assumptions about the nature
of consciousness and the causal interactions between
mind and body; and for the historian of religions it
shows the vitally important role that the meditative
experience of the religious virtuoso can play in
shaping new theories of consciousness.

NOTES

1. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of the present article. For a partial
discussion of the problem as it appears in
Theravaada sources, see Paul Griffiths,
"Concentration or Insight: The Problematic of
Theravaada Buddhist Meditation-Theory," Journal of
the American Academy of Religion 49, no. 4(1981):
605-624.

2. A fair amount of scholarly work has been done
on the problems associated with the attainment of
cessation. The following are important: Louis de La
Vallee Poussin, "Musiila et Naarada, " Melanges
Chinois et Bouddhique 5 (1936-1937), especially p.
210ff, L'Abhidharmako`sa de Vasubandhu, nouvelle ed.
(Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes
Chinois, 1971), Tome 1, pp. 203-214; Tome 4, pp.
223-227; Tome 5, pp. 207-208; Etienne Lamotte, Lee
Somme du Grand Vehicule D'Asa^nga (Louvain: Bureaux
de Museon, 1938) (Tome 2, pp. 15-16 of the Notes et
References section contains an especially useful set
of references) ; Lambert Schmithausen, Der
Nirvaa.na-Abschnitt in der Vini`scayasamgraha.nii
der Yogaacaarabhuumi.h (Wien: Hermann Bohlaus, 1969)
pp. 122-124; "Zur Struktur der erlosenden Erfahrung
im Indischen Buddhismus," in Transzendenzerfahrung,
Vollzugshorizont des Heils, hrsg. Gerhard Oberhammer
(Wien: Publications of the De Nobili Research
Library, 1978), pp. 97-119, "On Some Aspects of
Descriptions of Theories of 'Liberating Insight' or
'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," in Studien Zum
Jainismus und Buddhismus, hrsg. Klaus Bruhn und
Albrecht Wezler (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981),
pp. 199-250 (these last two papers--the latter
develops ideas outlined in the former--are
especially suggestive. It is to be hoped that
Professor Schmithausen will continue his
investigations in this field) ; Stefan Anacker.
"Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakara.na and the Problem
of the Highest Meditations," Philosophy East & West
22, no. 3 (October 1972): 247-258; Winston King,
"The Structure and Dynamics of the Attainment of
Cessation in Theravaada Meditation," Journal of the
American Academy of Religion 45, no. 2, suppl. (
1977): 707- 725. (much of the material in this paper
is repeated in the relevant chapter of Professor
King's later book, Theravaada Meditation: the
Buddhist Transformation of Yoga (Pennsylvania:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980); Noriaki
Hakamaya, "Nirodhasamaapatti--its Historical Meaning
in the Vij~naptimaatrataa system." Journal of Indian
and Buddhist Studies 23. no. 2 (1975): 33-43 (this
paper of Professor Hakamaya's, together with many
personal discussions I have been fortunate enough to
have with him, has had a great deal of influence on
the present work. I wish to record my gratitude to
him without, of course, suggesting that he should be
held responsible for any of the ideas expressed
herein).

3. The nirodhasamaapatti.h is not the only
mindless trance state discussed in the AKBh. Among
the cittaviprayuktasa.mskaaraa.h we also find the
asa.mj~nisamaapatti.h and its result, aasa.mj~nikam,
fully discussed at AKBh 68.12ff. The reasons for the
distinctions made between these states and the
attainment of cessation lie beyond the scope of this
paper; it is sufficient to note that they are
phenomenologically identical.

4. All references to this text in what follows
will be to page and line of the text edited by
Pralhad Pradhan, Abhidharmako`sabhaa.syam of
Vasubandhu, 2nd ed. (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal
Research Institute. 1975). We shall be considering
72.19-73.4.

5. Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa, Peking
No. 5591, Mngon pa'i bstan bcos GU 27b6-NGU 109a8.
We shall be considering GU 88b1-89al.

6. All references to this text in what follows
will be to page and line of the text edited by Swami

P.392

Dwarikadas Shastri, Abhidharmako`sa and Bhaa.sya of
Acharya Vasubandhu with Sphutaarthaa Commentary of
AAcaarya Ya`somitra, 4 vols (Varanasi: Bauddha
Bharati, 1970-1973) . We shall be considering
245.4-246.29.

7. Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi `grel bshad, Peking
No. 5593, Mngon pa'i bstan bcos CU la1-CHU 408a8. We
shall be considering CU 174b2-175a7.

8. Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa'i rgya
cher `grel pa don gyi de kho na nyid zhes bya ba,
Peking No. 5875, Ngo mtshar bstan bcos TO la1-THO
565a8. We shall be considering TO 265b6-267a6. The
full Sanskrit title of this commentary appears to
have been
Abhidharmako`sabhaa.sya.tiikaatattvaarthanaama.

9. Edited and translated into French by Etienne
Lamotte, "Le Traite de L'Acte de Vasubandhu, "
Melanges Chinois et Bouddhique 4 (1935-1936) :
151-263. References will be to page and line of
Lamotte's edition of the Tibetan text.

10. Las grub pa'i bshad pa, Peking No. 5572.
Sems tsam KU 69a6-117b1.

11. References will be to page and line of the
text edited by Padmanabh S. Jaini, Abhidharmadiipa
with Vibhaa.saprabhaav.rtti, 2nd ed. (Patna: Kashi
Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977).

12. tatraacittakaanyeva
nirodhaasa.mj~nisamaapattyaasa.mj~nikaaniiti
vaibhaa.sikaadaya.h
aparisphu.tamanovij~naanasacittakaaniiti
sthaviravasumitraadaya.h
aalayavij~naanasacittakaaniiti yogaacaaraa.h--iti
siddhaantabheda.h/ (AKV 245.21-23//CU 174b2-4)

13. katham idaanii.m bahukaala.m
niruddhaaccittaat punarapi citta.m
jaayate/atiitasyaapyastitvaat i.syate
vaibhaa.sikai.h samanantarapratyayatvam/(AKBh
72.19-21//GU 88b1-2)

14. AKBh 98.10-11//GU 114a4-5.

15. We may note that Vasubandhu's gloss here
reveals a folk etymology rather than a true one. If
samanantara were really derived from sama plus
anantara we would expect samaanantara rather than
samanantara. Ya`somitra recognizes the difficulty
and says samaanaarthe sam`sabda.h--"The prefix
samhas the meaning of homogenous" (AKV 342. 16). The
Tibetans also translate the sam- prefix in this case
as if it were sama- or samaana- using mtshungs pa.
As always, therefore, the meaning of a given term to
its users is more important than its "true"
etymology.

16. AKBh 98.9-10//GU 114a3-4.

17. AKBh 98.23-28//GU 114b5-7.

18. AKV 344.11-14.

19. TO 358a1-2.

20. AKBh 295.20ff. makes this very clear. For an
illuminating discussion of the rationale behind the
Vaibhaa.sika assertion of sarvam asti see Paul M.
Williams, "On the Abhidharma Ontology," Journal of
Indian Philosophy 9(1981): 227-257.

21. 'das pu yang yod pa'i phyir zhes bya ba
'byung ste/gal te yod na ji ltar 'das pa ying zhe
na/byed pa gas pa'i 'das pa zhes bya'i/rang gi ngo
be yongs su btang ha'i phyir ni ma yin no/de'i phyir
gags ma thag pa lar `gags nas yun ring du lon pa
yang bye brag tu smra ha rnams mtshungs pa de ma
thag pa'i rkyen nyid du `dod do-kun gzhi rnam par
shes pa yod pa ma yin pa sems la bzhag nas bye brag
tu smra ba smos so/(AK.T TO 265b6-8)

22. apare punaraahu.h/katha.m
taavadaarupyopapannaanaa.m ciraniruddhe'pi ruupe
punarapi ruupa.m jaayate/cittaadeva hi tajjaayate na
ruupaat/eva.m cittam-apyasmaadeva
sendriyaatkaayaajjaayate na cittaat/anyonyabiijaka.m
hyetadubhaya.m yad uta citta.m ca sendriya`sca kaaya
iti puurvaacaaryaa.h/(AKBH 72.21-4//GU 88b2.4)

23. AKV 246.15//CU 174b7-8.

24. For further information we may look to KSP,
which quotes a similar opinion: kha cig na re de'i
sa hen dhang po gzugs can la gnas pa las te (KSP
193.14) . The KS.T glosses kha cig with "some
particular Sautraantikas," thus indicating that at
least some sautraantikas held this view. Clearly, as
the rest of the KSP shows, not all did so.

25. AK.T TO 265b8-266a1.

26. gal te ris mthun pa'i rgya la ma bltos par
dbang po bcas pa i lus las rnam par shes pa skye ba
nyid yin na/rten dang dmigs pa gcig car gnas pa na
yul thams cad la rnam par shes skye bar `gyur
ro/sems snga ma gang yin pa de la rag las pas sems
phyi ma skye bas na/gnyis pa la mtshungs pa de ma
thag per rkyen med pas rten dang dmigs pa yod kyang
cig car mi skye bas tha/bar `gyur ro/gal te sems yod
pa ma yin yang sems med pa'i dbang po dang bcas pa'i
lus kyi sa bon las so zhe na/'di yang mi rigs
te/khyad par gyi rgyu med pa'i phyir ro/so zhe
na/`di yang mi rigs te/khyad par gyi rgyu med pa'i
phyir ro/(AK.T TO 266a2-4)

P.393

27. On sabhaagataa see AKBh 67.14ff//GU 83b6ff.

28. bhadantavasumitrastvaaha parip.rcchaayaa.m
yasyaacittakaa nirodha-samaapattistasyai.sa do.so
mama tu sacittakaa samaapattiriti/(AKBh 72.24-26//GU
88b4-5)

29. AKV 246.20-3//GU 175a2-4.

30. de la btsun pa dbyig bshes ni yid kyi rnam
par shes pa'i sems dang bcas pa `dod kyi/kun gzhi
rnam par shes pa'i sems dang bcas pa ni ma yin
no/(AK.T TO 266a8)

31. See AKV 245.22//CU 175a2-4.

32. See the quotation from the Mahaavibhaa.saa
given by Poussin in L'Abhidharmako`sa, Tome 1, p.
212n2, and more fully by Hakamaya in
"Nirodhasamaapatti--its Historical Meaning in the
Vij~naptimaatrataa System,'' pp. 36-37.

33. For Poussin's view see L'Abhidarmako`sa,
Tome 1, p. xlv; for Lamotte's view see "Le Traite,"
p. 237n77.

34. Noriaki Hakamaya, "On a Verse Quoted in the
Tibetan Translation of the
mahaayaanasa.mgrahopanibandhana." Journal of Indian
and Buddhist Studies 22, no. 2 (1974): 61-21, and p.
19n6. The two Tibetan versions of this quotation
(KSP 193.33-1 94.3//AKBh GU 88b4-5) are
substantially the same and also certainly rest upon
an identical Sanskrit original.

35. phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba (KS.T KU
94b8).

36. We may note finally that in the
Abhidharmadiipa, a Vaibhaa.sika rejoinder to the
AKBh, the view that the nirodhasamaapatti.h
possesses mind is attributed to the
Ko`sakaara.h-atra puna.h ko`sakaara.h pratijaaniite
sacittakeya.m samaapatti.h iti (AD 93.14). It seems
to us that this is the view attributed to Vasumitra
in the section of the AKBh under discussion in this
paper.

37. See AKBh 143.2ff.

38. bhadanta gho.saka aaha tadida.m
nopapadyate/sati hi vij~naane trayaa.naam
sa.mnipaata.h spar`sa.h/ spar`sapratyayaa ca vedanaa
sa.mj~naa cetanetyukta.m bhagavataa/ata.h
sa.mj~naavedanayorapyatra nirodho na syaat(AKBh
72.26-8//GU 88b5-7)

There are two illegibilities in the Tibetan text
at this point, easily reconstructed from the
Sanskrit given above. There is also one minor
difference between the Sanskrit and the Tibetan. For
the Sanskrit trayaa.naam sa.mnipaata.h spar`sa.h
(which places sa.mnipaata.h in apposition to
spar`sa.h) the Tibetan translation reads gsum 'dus
pa las reg pa, constructing an ablative case which,
if anything, makes the sense clearer.

39. AKV 246.23-5//CU 175a4. There is a
difference between Sanskrit and Tibetan here. The
Sanskrit reads tasmaad bhadantagho.saka eva.m
prasa^nga.m karoti. The Tibetan reads de'i phyir de
ltar thal bar byed par yin no, omitting the
reference to Gho.saka.

40. reg pa'i rkyen gyis tshor ba dang zhes bya
ba rgyas par 'byung ba la/gegs byed pa med pa'i rgyu
yod no 'bras bu gdon mi za bar `byung bas `gog pa'i
snyoms par `jug pa'i rdzas `di la `du shes dang
tshor ba dag kyang `gog par mi `gyur/(AK.t TO
266b2-3)

41. See AKBh 143.2ff. and Th. Stcherbatsky,
Buddhist Logic, vol. 2 (New York: Dover
Publications, 1962). pp. 311-312.

42. athaapisyaat/yathaa vedanaapratyayaa
t.r.s.netyuktam/satyaamapi tu vedanaayaam arhato na
t.r.s.notpattireva.m satyapi spar`se vedanaadayo na
syur iti/tasyaavi`se.sitatvaat/(AKBh 72.28-73.2/GU
88b7-8) The Tibetan translation differs slightly
here; for tasyaavi`se.sitatvaat, we read khyad par
du byas pa'i phyir de ni ma yin te.

43. AK.T TO 266b3-7.

44. tshor ba bzhin du reg pa thams cad tshor
ba'i rkyen ma yin ni/(AK.T TO 266b6)

45. avidyaasa.mspar`saja.m hi vedita.m
pratiityotpannaa t.r.s.netyukta.m na tu
vedanotpattau spar`so vi`se.sita
ityasamaanametat/tasmaadacittakaa
nirodhasamaapattiriti vaibhaa.sikaa.h/(AKBh
73.2-4//GU 88b8-89a1)

46. na tu vedanotpattaaviti/na tu vedanotpattau
spar`so vi`se.sita.h iid.r`sa.h spar`so
vedanaapratyaya iti/(AKV 246.27-8//CU 175a6-7)

The Tibetan translation here omits na tu
vedanotpattau spar`so vi`se.sita.h, the sense is not
affected.

47. ma rig pa mi dpe'i tshor ba ni srid pa'i
rkye yin no... de'i phyir bye brag med par nye
bar blangs pa'i phyir reg pa thams cad tshor ba'i
rkyen yin pas dpe `di mtshungs pa ma yin no/(AK.T TO
267a1 -2)

48. Almost any sentence beginning "In Buddhist
thought..." is very easily falsifiable, and this one
is no exception. The whole of the concluding section
of this paper moves on a high level of generality
and should be taken and discussed on that level.

P.394

49. This raises the fascinating possibility that
the nirodhasamaapatti.h may be assimilated to
nirvaa.na. There is in fact some evidence that by
some Buddhists at some periods the two were thought
to be identical (see Paul Griffiths, "Buddhist
Jhaana: A Form-Critical Study, " forthcoming in
Religion).

50. And maybe not even there for a Yogaacaarin.