Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture

·期刊原文
On Deconstructing Life-Worlds: Buddhism, Christianity, Culture
Reviewed by Charles B. Jones
Theological Studies

Vol.59 No.2

June 1998

Pp.349-351

Copyright by Theological Studies Inc.

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ON DECONSTRUCTING LIFE-WORLDS: BUDDHISM, CHRISTIANITY, CULTURE. By
Robert Magliola. American Academy of Religion Cultural Criticism
Series. Atlanta: Scholars, 1997. Pp. xxiv + 202. $29.95; $19.95.

Edith Wyschogrod remarks in her Preface that "Magliola has written a
highly unusual book"; she is surely correct. For one thing, M.
devotes two-thirds of the book to his own autobiography; and, for
another, this unexpected subject matter is presented in
unconventional prose--alternatively playful, lyrical, oblique, and
morose, as if M. desired to convey how different periods and events
in his life felt to him rather than to present a dry rehearsal of
the facts.
Nevertheless, a couple of points about academic method emerge from
this stow which are worth mentioning. First, M. clearly dislikes the
tendency of the academy to compartmentalize itself into various
"disciplines." Even while the academy pays lip-service to the idea
of interdisciplinary studies, M. observes that his own shift from
one discipline to another required him to make new friends and
colleagues, join new learned societies, go to new conferences, and
subscribe to new journals. Our courses may be interdisciplinary
(sometimes), but our research and the institutional apparatuses that
support it remain very inbred.
Second, M. wants to pursue his work in a more holistic manner.
Religion and literature both create "life-worlds" which people
inhabit as whole psycho-physical-spiritual beings. In studying
Buddhism, for example, M. reminds us that the old masters, who
produced the philosophical texts that scholars study today, were
meditators, and their ruminations frequently came from subsequent
reflection on meditative experiences. How can scholars understand
the depth of these works when they do not meditate? To correct this,
especially in the area of interreligious dialogue, M. ends his
autobiography with a form of meditation to be practiced by mixed
religious groups, and it is significant that this book itself
represents a kind of valedictory as he moves out of urban academic
life into a Vipassana meditation community in Thailand to deepen his
own practice.
The remainder of the book contains four short essays that make
connections between Buddhism (particularly of the
Prasangika-Madhyamika school), Derridean deconstruction, and
Christian theology. The first sets the general tone and agenda for
the others. It seeks to show that the particular way in which the
Prasangika-Madhyamika school presented (or chose not to present) its
elaboration on the Mahayana Buddhist notion of emptiness (sunyata)
shares much in common with Derrida's deconstruction thought, and in
fact can help to complete it. M. assumes that readers are familiar
with both postmodern deconstructive thought and ancient Buddhist
philosophy.
M.'s claim here is that Derrida's thought intersects that of the
second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. Both use the logic of
their debate partners to undermine the foundations of that logic.
(The Prasangika-Madhyamikas got their name from their procedure of
showing that the opponents' position necessarily led them, by their
own rules, to absurd consequences, or prasanga.) Both refuse to put
forth any "system" of their own that would imply "closure" to any
given problem. The Prasangikas, following Nagarjuna, had no
philosophical system of their own, but confined their activity to
demolishing their opponent's positions in a relentless campaign of
reductio ad absurdum.
The way in which Nagarjuna can help to complete Derrida's project
lies in the Buddhist doctrine of the Two Truths, Conventional Truth
and Ultimate Truth. Conventional Truth is the provisional
construction we put on the pure factuality of the world and its
"goings-on," and they enable us to function within it by making
distinctions between, say, food and nonfood, enemies and nonenemies.
This Conventional Truth, M. asserts, corresponds roughly to
Derrida's "logocentrism" (143). Ultimate Truth consists in
discovering the pure provisionality of all our groupings and
differentiations. However, Nagarjuna and his followers were able to
affirm the value of Conventional Truth: without it, we could not
long survive, and so it remains Truth, not deceit. This is the move
that could complete Derrida's system, which so far has not come back
to assigning a positive value to our "logocentric" constructions of
the world (150).
The other essays deal with various consequences of applying
Nagarjunian/Derridean thought to different religious/philosophical
enterprises. The second analyzes a specific Derridean text (the
Denegations), the third criticizes the Abe-Cobb strand of
Buddhist-Christian dialogue for its overly logocentric emphasis (via
Masao Abe's presentation of a Yogacara Buddhist-based reading of
Zen), and the fourth is a marvellous analysis of the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity as seen through the application of
Nagarjunian/Derridean thought to conciliar theology. All of the
essays are dense and difficult, but worth reading.
M.'s initial autobiographical statement should appeal to anyone
interested in the interplay of emotion and intellect in the
development of a modern academic. The later essays are addressed to
scholars conversant with both Buddhist thought and postmodern
critical theory. Readers with backgrounds in both these areas will
find M.'s reflections on the intersections and double-binds with
Nagarjuna's and Derrida's systems provocative and stimulating.