On the Authority (Pramanya) of the Buddhist Agamas(1)

·期刊原文
On the Authority (Pramanya) of the Buddhist Agamas(1)
By Louis DE LA Vall`ee Poussin
The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
1902
pp.363-376

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

.

font FACE="System" LANG="ZH-TW">

p.363

THE well-known history of Buddhism by
Taaranaatha－not to mention here the book of
I-tsing－is filled with tales of the controversies
between Buddhists and 'orthodox' teachers of the
Miimaa^msaa, Nyaaya, or Vedaanta schools.
The Tibetan chronicler affirms, to say the truth,
that the noble (aarya) AAcaaryas were armed with all
the weapons magical art could afford; their
adversaries used the same weapons, and it was by the
striking effects of miracles that the Raajas mere
made generous or favourable, or were converted. Those
tales are confirmed by legends of which the
'Sa^nkaras and Udayanas are the heroes.(2) I do not

───────────

(1) A lecture given at the meeting of the R.A.
Society, 11th June, 1901.

(2) See, for instance, the Sa^mk.sepa'sa^mkaravijaya
(Cat. Aufrecht, Oxford, fol. 254a), where is
narrated, with variants, the legend elsewhere
attributed to Udayana: "..... ya.h patitvaa gireh
'srr^ngaad avyayah, tanmata^m dhruvam.....yadi
vedaah pramaa.na^m syur, bhuuyaat kaa cin na me
k.sati.h." The Buddhists do not accept this
ordeal: " saugataas tv abruvann: ida^m na
pramaana^m matanirnaye ma.nimantrau.sadhair eva^m
deharak.saa bhaved iti." The king does not yield
to this (rather conclusive) argument, but he
manages a new experience, asking: " What is
hidden in this basket?" The Buddhists do, of
course, know that there is a serpent. But a
divine voice is heard: "This serpent is not a
serpent, but Vi.s.nu." Therefore the king gives
orders for the slaughter of the heretics
(vadhaaya 'srutividvi.saam).
The story of the serpent in the basket is well
known from Taaranaatha.
The legend of Udayana－Brahmin and Buddhist
falling from the top of a mountain－is
interesting from its conclusion. The Naiyaayika
conqueror, being a murderer for the benefit of
the creed-is not approved of by the priests of
Jagannaath, and he does not conceal his anger. "
The following couplet, which has not been traced
beyond oral tradition, at once illustrates the
irreverence of the Hindu mind and shows that the
Nyaaya is prized as the stronghold of theism. The
verses are reported－falsely, it is hoped－to
have been uttered by Udayana AAcaarya:
ai'svaryamadamatto 'si, maam avaj~naaya vartase:
upasthite.su bauddhe.su madadhiinaa tava
sthiti.h.... but let the Bauddhas show
themselves, and upon me will depend thy very
existence.".(N. Niilaka.n.tha Gore: "A rational
Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems, p.
6, note. Mr. C. II. Tawney has given me this
curious reference. See also Barth, Bulletin,
1899-1900, 2, 32, n. 4; J.B.T.S., iv, 1, p.21.)

p.364

believe them to be only a fiction, but they must be
looked upon as of little historical importance. The
war is really elsewhere; it is between the
philosophical systems (dar'sana), not between the
magicians (mantra-vid).
The doctrinal debate is essentially a
philosophical one: the magister dixit argumentation
cannot be used, and it appears that Dignaaga's
adversaries have been obliged to submit to his
controversial axiom, that is to say, "a doctor cannot
be beaten, except by such way of reasoning as is in
accordance with his own point of view."(1)
We do not fully trust the legends on the Indian
St. Barthelemies, ruled over by 'Sa^nkara and his
fellowworkers; but we know that the prize of the
fight was an important one. The defeated doctor had
to accept his winner for a guru (master).(2) The
conversion or apostasy, it must be added, was not
very hard. Brahmins and Buddhists, those freres
ennemis, are the products of parallel intellectual
evolutions; they had many points of agreement; and
the Dubious Truth's kingdom, that is, the sphere of
the sa^mvrrtisatya (vyavahaara。), is large enough to
allow easy metaphysical concessions.
However, the importance of those logical and
oratorical contests is beyond any doubt. The
prosperity of Buddhism in India seems to have varied
with its doctors' fortune-luxuriant with its
hundreds of scholar-monks in the large universities
of the catholic Sa^mgha, when the Dignaagas,
Candrakiirtis, Candragomins, were giving the Good Law
a high degree of authority; falling almost into decay
under their anmic successors, mean magicians, and
of a poor dialectical training. Therefore, one must
insist on the special interest those disputes would
offer to the Indianist, were it possible to know them
with some details. The two schools, then in the full
strength of their maturity, were

───────────

(1) The law of controversy according to Dignaaga, see
Madhyamakavrrtti, fol. 9b, ed. Calcutta, p. 9
init.; 'Slokavaartika, p. 250, cf. p. 372;
Sadagiro Sugiura, "Hindu Logic as preserved in
China and Japan," p. 34 (Un. of Pennsylvania,
Series No. 4).

(2) Cf. the history of Sabhika, Mahaavastu, iii.389
foll.

p.365

fighting each other; philosophical questions of
capital consequence were being discussed. The
Buddhists, so to speak, champions of the "free
examination" (libre examen), are distinguished from
the other sects by the indelible character of a
definite creed, and by the somewhat revolutionary
appearance of some of their essential dogmas. But, up
to the present time, we have had nothing to base our
conclusions upon except hypotheses. Taaranaatha, like
many a chronicler, prefers the marvellous stories to
the doctrinal expositions. On the Buddhist dar'sanas
we knew almost nothing but what Colebrooke, the first
and no doubt the greatest of Indianists, taught us
some sixty years ago. The Sarvadar'sana and the
famous commentary on the Brahmasuutras were the only
authorities to draw from. On the Buddhist side the
Sanskrit documents are very few; they were left a
long time untouched or unknown. The courageous
explorations of Schiefner, Wassilieff, and others,
interesting as they are, throw little light on the
momentous matter.
But things are going now another way. Not to
speak of several collections, the Bibliotheca Indica,
the Vizianagaram S.S., the Chawkhamba S.S., give us
in a handy form the works of the high masters and the
commentaries of their pupils－honest, eloquent, and
learned men－the 'Sriidharas, Paarthasaarathimi'sras,
Vaacaspatimi'sras.
We find in the Bhaamatii the whole of a quotation
from the 'Saalistambasuutra; in the Nyaayavaarttika
we find a precise reference to some old canonical
definition of the pudgalavaada.(1) 'Sa^nkara mentions
the famous text, "What does the Earth rest upon?....
What does the Wind? "(2) In a chapter of the
Nyaayaratnaakara are twenty quotations ascribed to
the 'Bhik.su,' fourteen of which, at least, are to be
read in the fifth chapter of the Pramaa.nasamuccaya
by Dignaaga. The Taatparaya.tiikaa and the Maadhava's
well-known compilation show their high value by
numerous passages extracted from

───────────

(1) Bouddhisme, Notes et Bibl., p. 43, n. 1 (from the
Museon); J.R.A.S., 1901, p. 308.

(2) 'Sa^nkara, 2,2, 24; Abhidharmako'sav., 13a
(Burn., Introd., 449); Madhyamakavrrtti, ad vii,
25. Cf. Aitaraya Br. 11, 6, 4.

p.366

Pramaa.navini'scaya of Dharmakiirti. And lastly,
Dharmottara and his Nyaayabindu were both known to
Vaacaspatimi'sra.(1)
How could we doubt it? Those books are
circumstantial books, books of polemic. So says
Vaacaspatimi'sra: "Vatsyaayana has written a
commentary on the Nyaayasuutras; but that commentary
(bhaa.sya) has been discussed by Dignaaga; and it was
to answer that powerful antagonist that Uddyotakara
made his new commentary on the same Suutras
(vaarttikas)."
Not less rich, indeed, in precious references is
the Jaina literature, as the learned pandit k. B.
Pathak has conscientiously established.
It seems unquestionable, if we trust
Taaranaatha－and a short examination of Tandjur
confirms the Tibetan chronicler－that Dignaaga and
Dharmakiirti were fortunate enough to endow their
co-religionists with a complete new set of
philosophical principles. Thanks to those doctors,
the canonical dogmas of "universal momentariness" and
of "no existence of a soul" (k.sa.nikatva,
nairaatmya) were provided with a logic, with a
psychology, with a theory of the understanding. Since
Brahmins and Buddhists start from directly opposite
tenets, no wonder is it to find them in manifest
conflict concerning the definition of perception, the
essence of individual and universal, the normal use
of reasoning, the final emancipation. But not to
speak of the historical meaning of those strong
though subtle conceptions, we shall find abundant
food for our curiosity in the varied turns of a war
in which every blow is warded off, in which each
party, if uncertain to win, is, at least, sure not to
be irremediably conquered.

The above prolegomena seem necessary, firstly, to
show with a full light how much needed are the
researches to which we venture to call attention
(those researches, it must

───────────

(1) See the transl. of the Sarvadar`s.s., Museon,
1901. Taatp..t. 339; 'Slokavaart. 397;
Nyayaab..t. 16. 4. Professor Harapra'sad 'Sastri,
in his last report (1895- 1901), has given a
short but interesting notice of two little
treatises by Ratnakirti, Apohasiddhi,
K.sa.nabha^ngasiddhi.

p.367

be admitted, will not get their full value before the
Tibetan translations of 'Saastras and Vrrttis have
been duly studied); secondly, to make any mistake
impossible: for the question I shall endeavour to
develop is certainly not to be neglected, but it is
only one of the many doctrinal topics the AAcaaryas
of both parties have explained.
The question bears on the authority of the Vedas
and of the Buddhist AAgamas, or, to use the technical
word, on the 'authority of the Verbum, ' the
'Sabdapraamaa.nya.
The problem is a difficult one, for it implies
the investigating of a more general question, namely,
the question of the praamaa.nya, or the validity of
the means of proof(1)－the very nucleus of Kant's or
of Descartes' philosophical systems. We shall not
investigate here this last question, which would
carry us too far.
As far as the 'Sabda is concerned, Sir John Muir,
in the third volume of his "Original Sanskrit Texts,"
has given a complete survey of all the texts
published up to 1873(2) ; Professor Cowell just
touches it, but throws a great deal of light upon it
in his translation of the Jaiminii-dar'sana (3);
Dr.G.Thibaut, in the introduction of his
Arthasa^mgraha, led us to hope he would some day
examine the opinion of the Miimaa^msakas on the
matter; Mahaadev Raajaaram Bodas treats it in a few
words in his ample commentary on the
Tarkasa^mgraha.(4)
I can only point out the final result of a long
scholastic elaboration. There are two orthodox
systems, not to dwell on the minute divergences, that
of the Vedaantists and Miimaa^msists on one side,
that of the Naiyaayikas on the other.(5)

───────────

(1) See 'Sa^nkaradigvijaya, AAnand. S.S., Comm. ad
viii, 81. 'Sa^nkara was paying a visit to the
Miimaa^msaka Mandana; as he asks some
washing-women the way to the aa'srama, they give
the following answer: "Where you should hear the
birds singing: svata.h pramaa.na^m, parata.h
pramaa.nam....there is the house."
On the philosophical problem,Advaitabrahmasiddhi,
p. 185, is interesting.

(2) Sanskrit Texts, second edition, 1873.

(3) Sarvadar'sanasa^mgraha, transl. 1882. The
so-called "second edition" (1894) is only a
reprint.

(4) Bombay S.S. Iv.

(5) On the Saa^mkhyas, Garbe, Saa^mkhya, 115;
Deussen, Vedaanta, 94.

p.368

The latter, champions of theism, establish by
reasoning the existence of God (ii'svara), maker and
ruler, good, and by his own goodness obliged to
reveal to the creatures the way of salvation. That
God, "who never can mislead or be misled," has
revealed the truth. And where is that revelation to
be found if not in the Veda, mould and pattern of the
sacrifices, of the castes, of the social and
cenobitic life?
For the former (Miimaa^msists and Vedaantists)
the Vedas are eternal; they have no personal author
(apauru.soyatva).
The 'Sabda, that is, the Verbum or Veda, is a
means of proof quite different from that our senses,
or reason, can furnish us. Its object－be it either
the Brahmnn, the endless and boundless substance, as
the Vedaantists believe, be it the Dharma, or the
sacrificial law, as the Miimaa^msists contend－is
above any common or worldly pramaa.na.
The Vedaantists call the smrrti, or tradition,
inference (anumaana) , and for them the word
perception (pratyak.sa) has the same meaning as
'sruti (revelation),2 which has a selfauthority, this
authority being recognized by an internal intuition.
The Vedas are eternal and the origin of
knowledge.
Against the opinion of all the Veda-followers
(vedavid) , Miimaa^msists or Naiyaayikas, the
Buddhists maintain that the 'sabda or aaptopade'sa
(the word of a truthful witness)

───────────

(1) Vaacaspatimi'sra, Nyaaya vaartika
taatparya.tiikaa, p. 300: ''It shall be
established, in the fourth book of the suutras,
that from the existence of created things
(kaarya), viz. the body and the world, can be
logically demonstrated the existence of a creator
of these creatures, able to create them, knowing
the essence of everything, unpolluted by the
impression of the matured passional action, and
endowed with a supreme pity. But, when this
compassionate Being sees that the creatures are
ignorant of the method to realize their own
welfare and to avoid bad destiny, that they are
consumed by the fire of numerous sufferings, he
must be grieved by the sufferings of the
creatures. Being so grieved, knowing the way of
salvation, is it possible that he did not teach
this way, or that he did teach this way
erroneously? Therefore, this compassionate Being,
after having created the earth and the four
classes of human beings, did certainly teach them
the way to attain happiness and to avoid the
reverse: he cannot stay without teaching it (na
hy anupadi'sya sthaatum arhati). And the teaching
of this father-like compassionate Being is
accessible to the Devas, to the RRsis, to the
men; it must be accepted by the four classes..."

(2) Deusson, p. 96: "Dus Offenbarto ist ihm
('Saukara) das Offenbaro." Cf. 'Sa^nkara, 1, 1, 2
(AAn. S.S., p. 34); Bhaam. Objection of the
Miimaasakas, 1, 1, 3.

p.369

cannot be distinguished from the vulgar pramaa.nas.
Udayana and Vaacaspatimi'sra bring forth Dignaaga's
dilemma:-
"Where is the aaptopade'sa's strength to be
found? In the witness's undoubting trustfulness, or
in the specific truth of his learning? In the first
instance, it is a case of inference.(1) (Witness is
to be relied upon, for he knows the facts and he does
not lie.) In the second, the evidence comes from an
actual perception. (The truth of the teaching is made
obvious by its accordance with the facts.)"(2)
Let us see, however, if the dissidence is as deep
as it seems to be. On the one hand－the Brahmins do
not deny it－the eternity of the Vedas or the
existence of God, the Vedainspirer, has to be
established by proofs.(3) On the other hand, the
Buddhists consider their own suutras as eternal, and
one of the most commonly used names for Buddha is the
Omniscient. Both make an equal use of "Faith resting
on Reason," and the polemic, apart from the logical
dispute, grows up unchecked on the solid ground of
fact.
"The Buddhists," says Kumaarila, "give the Veda a
human origin; on account of the principle of the
universal momentariness they deny its eternity; but,
strange to say, they claim eternity for their own
books (aagamas)!" such

───────────

(1) AAptavaakyaavisa^mvaadasaamaanyaad anumaanataa =
Pramaa.nasamuccaya, ii, 5, fol. 5a, 4 (Tandjur,
Mdo, xcv):

yid-ches thsig ni mi-bslu-ba
spyi-las rjes-su-dpag-pa-~nid.

Cf. iii, 2 (fol. 7a, 2) ; Taatp, 138. 2;
Vaarttika, 61. 13; Nyaayas. i, 1, 17.

(2) "As it has not a specific object, the 'sabda is
not a specific pramaa.na.Things are perceptible
or imperceptible: the first ones can be known by
perception (pratyak.sa), the second ones by means
of the li^nga....." Nyaayas.ii, 1,46;Vaart. 260;
Taatp. 286. 3. See 'Slokavaart., pp. 51-53, the
characteristics of the 'sabda.

(3) 'Sa^nkara, of course, establishles by purely
rational arguments the principles of his system;
but, as well said by AAnandagiri, " If it is
possible to show by logical process that there is
a cause of the world, we are altogether unable to
ascertain by common pramaa.nas the nature of this
cause, the unity and the other characteristics of
Brahman." 'Sa^nkara says: "The true nature of the
cause of the world, on which final emancipation
depends, cannot, on account of its excessive
abstruseness, even be thought of without the help
of the holy texts; for it cannot become the
object of perception..., and as it is devoid of
characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to
inference..."(Thibaut, i, p. 316.) 'Sa^nkara, 2,
1, 11; see 1, 1, 4 (p. 47. 2); Bhaam. 294. 11;
and Vedaantakalpataru.

p.370

assertion of Kumaarila being supported by quotations
from old AAgamas. "Through hatred of the Vedas,
admitting the eternity to be a proof of veracity,
jealous of any superiority in the Veda, they insist
on the eternity of their aagamas; at the same time,
to exalt their master, they glorify him for having
discovered the doctrine of the ahi^msaa (respect for
living beings)."(1) "The Buddhist AAgamas, they say,
are eternal! But in what language are those books
written? In Prakrit, a barbarous dialect; worse, if
possible, than the Apabhram'sa!"(2) and Kumaarila
does triumph; for the

───────────

1 Tantravaartika, 169. 11:

yathaa miimaa^msakatrastaa.h 'saakyavai'se-
.sikaadaya.h
nitya evaagamo 'smaakam ity aahu.h
'suunyacetanam,
pradve.saad, vedapuurvatvam anicchanta.h
katha^m cana,
tanmaatre 'pi ca bhuuyi.s.thaam icchanta.h
satyavaaditaam....
ahi^msaady atatpuurvam ity aahus
tarkamaanina.h.

170.2:

aahu.h svaagamanityatva^m paravaakyaanukaari.na.h....
tatra 'saakyai.h prasiddhaapi sarvak.sa.nikavaaditaa
tyajyate, vedasiddhaantaaj Jalpadbhir nityam
aagamam.
dharmas tenopadi.s.to 'yam "anitya^m sarvasa^mskrrtam,
k.sa.nikaah sarvasa^mskaaraa asthiraa.naa^m kuta.h kriyaa,
buddhibodhyam trayaad anyat sa^mskrrta^m k.sanika^m ca tat."

171.2:

'sabdaadi.su vina'syatsu vyavahaara.h kva vartataam?
" sthitai.saa dharmatety" etad artha'suunyam ato vaca.h.
e.sety api na nirde.s.tu^m 'sakyaa k.sa.navinaa'sinii,
kim uta sthitayaa saakam e.sety asyaikavaakyataa.
tenaanitya'sabdavaadinaam aagamanityatvaanupapatte.h..

163. 2:

'saakyaadayo 'pi hy eva^m vadanty eva:
"yathotpaadaad vaa tathaagataanaam anutpaadaad vaa
sthitaiveya^m dharmanityateti."

The line: K.sa.nikaa.h sarvasa^mskaaraa.... is
quoted, Bodhicaryaavat.t. 251, 27. Cf. Bhaamatii,
361. 3, and the Nyaayabindupuurvapak.sa, a very
interesting little tract by Kamala'siila, Tandjur,
Mdo, cxi, fol.118(b). The following one is to be
found, 'Sa^nkara, 540, Comm. 'Slokavaart. p. 735. The
three 'asa^msk.rta' are well known.
See for the quotation 163. 2 the Sarvadar's.s.,
p. 21, 1. 8, and notes to the translation (Museon,
1901-2).
As concerns the ahi^msaa, see Atmatattvaviveka
(ed. 1873), p,. 121 in fine. There are some curious
observations on the matter in Rhys Davids'
"Dialogues," p 165.

2 Mimaa^msaatantravaart. (Ben. S.S.), p. 171. 9:

Asaadhu'sabdabhuuyi.s.thaa.h 'saakyajai-
naagamaadaya.h
asannibandhanatvaac ca 'saastratva^m na
praliiyate.

Maagadhadaak.si.naatyatadapabhra^m'sapraayaasaadhu's-
abdanibandhanaa hi te ｜ mama vihi bhikkhave
kammavacca isii save ｜ tathaa ukkhitte lo.dammi
ukkheve atthi kaara.na^m

p.371

Prakrits were, at his time, considered as recent
degenerations of the Sanskrit.
That philological argument is capital; but
Kumaarila goes on, for it is of interest to overthrow
Buddhism in the very core of the Good Law, in the
dogmatic conception of the Teacher. "This word of
Buddha," so he says, "is well known: 'May all sins
done in the world during this iron age fall down upon
my head; but may the world be saved!'" In that saying
we find the whole of the Great Vehicle's glory. But
Kumaarila shows how absurd is that

───────────
(5) pa.dane.natthi kaara.nam ｜ atthy ubbhave
kaara.nam ime sakka.daa dhammaa sa^mbhavanti
sakaara.naa, akaara.naa vi.nasanti
a.nupyattikaara.nam ity evam aadaya.h.
Tata's caasatya'sabde.su kutas te.sv
arthasatyataa
d.r.s.taapabhra.s.taruupe.su katha^m vaa
syaad anaaditaa.

173. 19: 'Saakyaadigranthe.su punar yad api ki^m
cit saadhu'sabdhaabhipraye.naa-
(10) vina.s.tabuddhyaa prayukta^m, tatraapi praj~nap-
tivij~naptipa'syataati.s.thataadipraayapra-yogaat
ki^m cid evaavipluta^m labhyate.
Kim uta yaani prasiddhaapabhra.s.tade'sabhaa.s-
aabhyo 'piapabhra.s.tataraani bhikkhave ity
evamaadiim, dvitiiyaabahuvacannasthaane hy
ekaaraanta^m praak.rta^m pada^m d.r.s.ta^m, na
prathamaabahuvaeane sa^mbodhane 'pi;
sa^msk.rta'sabdasthaane ca kakaaradvaya-
(15) sa^myogo,'nusvaaralopah, .rvar.naakaaraapattim-
aatram eva praak.rtaapabhra^m'se.su d.r.s.ta^m
na ukaraapattir api ｜ so 'ya^m sa^msk.rtaa
dharmaa ity asya sarvakaala^m svayam eva
prati.siddho 'pi vinaa'sa.h k.rta iti
asaadhu'sabdanibandhanatvaad ityantena hetunaa
vedatvaakrrtaka'saastraantarn'sa^nkaanivrrtti.h....
I am indebted to Mr. F. W. Thomas for The readings
of the India Office MS., to Mr. A. C. Woolner for the
readings of the Oxford MS.
Line 3, Oxford has mamaa. Line 4, Oxford,
kammavacasii, ukhittai, ukheve; printed text, lodasmi
uvve; F. W. Thomas, no doubt rightly, ukkheve, sic
for ubbhave via ubjave. Line 5, I.O., padune (=
patane, du might be ddu), acchi uttave (=uhbhave);
Oxford, ajjhadbhave (jjha can be tthyu); printed
text,.nubhave, asa^mkadaa; Oxford, sakka.daa; I.O.,
sakvadaa. Line 6, Oxford anupattikaara.naad; I.O.
agrees with printed text; F. W. Thomas's suggestion
auupraapti and the reading kara.naad might be right;
Oxford, evamaadiruupaa.h.
Line 12, Oxford, ki^m punar. Line 13, Oxford after
bhikkave has sakka.daa dhammaa ity evam. Line 14,
Oxford, sa^msk.rtapadasthaane. Line 16, Oxford, na hy
u.
This tenet of Buddhist schools alluded to in the
Praakrit quotation by Kumaarila, viz. that vinaa'sa
is ahetuka, is known from various authorities. See,
for instance, 'Slokavaartika, 736. 1: "aahu.h
svabhaavasiddha^m hi te vinaa'sam ahetukam," and
Comm.: "svaabhaaviko gha.taadiinaa^m vinaa'sa.h: te
hi svahetubhyo vina'svaraa eva jaataa.h: janitvaiva
pradhva^msyante, kim atra kaara.neneti." Bhaamatii
(1891), 360. 18: "vainaa'sikair akaara.na^m vinaa'sam
abhyupagacchadbhi.h." Abhidharmako'sav., Paris MS.,
fol. 269(b) 6: " utpattyanantaravinaa'siruupa^m
cittacaittavat: aakasmiko hi bhaavaanaa^m vinaa'sa
iti; akasmaadbhava aakasmika.h, ahetuka ity artha.h."
Madhyamakav.rtti, 7. 16 (Buddh. T.S.); Nyaayabindu,
106. 3; Nyaayakandalii, 78. 8.
We have, therefore, to read:
Udbhave asti kaara.na^m patane naasti kaaranam. Asti
udbhave kaara.nam:
Ime sa^msk.rtaa dharmaa.h sa^mbhavanti
sakaara.naa.h
akaara.naa vina'syanti [svayam?] utpattikaara-
.naat.

p.372

incomprehensible pity (karu.naa): "Can me for a
moment believe that a K.satriya, a member of the
royal caste, after deserting the duties of his own
caste to make himself a teacher and a boon-receiver,
thereby intruding on the rights peculiar to the
Brahmins alone, can we believe that such a man could
teach the true teaching? He boasts in putting aside
his own duty (svadharma); he is praised for his
altruism; but how could he be both the loser of
himself and the saviour of others? Indeed, Buddha's
disciples, despising revealed as well as traditional
precepts, are conspicuous by the unlawfulness of
their life."(1)
But to go further, Buddha is omniscient.(2) Where
are, then, in Buddhism all those treatises, those
laws, metric, grammar, astronomy, those Vedaa^ngas
(members of the Veda) which are the hereditary
possessions of the Brahmins?
The Buddhists answer, not without some wit: "Be
it so; Buddha is not omniscient, but he knows the
Dharma (Religious Law). It has been said: 'What use
is it for us that Buddha knows or knows not the
number of the insects, that he be far-sighted or not,
since he knows the truth

───────────

(1) Tantravaart. 116. 13: svadharmaatikrame.na ca:
yena k.satriye.na sataa pravakt.rtvapratigrahau
pratipannau, sa dharmam aviplutam upadek.syati
iti ka.h samaa'svaasa.h? Ukta^m ca

Paralokaviruddhaani kurvaa.na^m duuratas tyajet
aatmaana^m yo 'tisa^mdhatte 'nyasmai syaat
katha^m hita? iti.

Buddhaade.h punar ayam eva vyatikramo
'la^mkaarabuddhau sthita.h; yenaivam aaha:

Kalikalu.sak.rtaani yaani loke
mayi nipatantu, vimucyataa^m tu loka ! iti.

Sa kila lokahitaartha^m k.satriyadharmam atikramya,
braahma.nav.rtta^m pravakt.rtva^m pratipadya,
prati.sedhaatikramaasamarthair braahma.nair
ananuanu'saasan'sista^m dharma^m baahyajanaan
anu'saasan dharmapiidaam apy aatmano '^ngiik.rtya,
paraanugraha^m k.rtavaan iti; eva gu.nai.h stuuyate;
tadanu'si.s.taanusaari.na's ca sarva eva
'srutism.rtvihitadharmaatikrame.na vyavaharanto
viruddhaacaaratvena j~naayante.

(2) On the sarvaj~natva of Jina and of Buddha, see
the very interesting lecture of K. B. Pathak, The
Position of Kumaarila in Digambara Jaina
Literature (Trans..Congr. London, pp. 186-214);
also Sarvadar's,s., Jaina chapter; and
Nyaayabindu.t (112, 17, 114. 3, 116. 15, 117. 2
foll.), a handful of syllogisms on sarvaj~natva,
vakt.rtva, raagaadimattva. Cf. Kandalii, 397
fine; Bhaamatii, 322. 4.

p.373

that we want?(1) And we shall prove that Buddha knows
the Dharma. This Buddha's saying, 'All compound is
momentary, ' and any other texts dealing with
ascertainable mattters, are easily shown to be exact;
therefore, the dogmatic principles, or verites de
foi, those, for instance, that bear on the
worshipping of relics or caityas, must needs be
exact, since they have been said by Buddha himself."
Kumaarila answers: "The way you reason does not
make the authority of Buddha certain; on the
contrary. That Buddha, in matters of common
experience, might have said the truth, no wonder; but
as soon as his teachings pass those limits, where
does his authority come from? Since you appeal for a
certainty to your own examination; you make Buddha's
authority useless. Shall I show you with a more
striking instance how irrelevant is your reasoning? I
shall use your own syllogism: 'Buddha is not
omniscient, since I say he is not; for the fire burns
when I say it does.' To affirm safely that Buddha is
omniscient, one must needs be oneself omniscient."
Then Kumaarila: "Buddha, you say, has made
himself a teacher. What for? For his own, or for
other people's advantage? In both cases he is led by
raaga, by desire, or some; and an omniscient
being cannot be(raagaraan).Do you not also
affirm that Buddha is completely devoid of any vikalpa?
(2)He must, therefore, keep himself absolutely motionless;
he gave no teaching, and his Dharma was taught by
some one else. Will you say [in accordance with one
of your suutras] that Buddha stays motionless, as
does the Miraculous Jewel, (3) but that by his
presence alone he gives all things around him, and
even the walls, the teaching power? You will not make

────────────

(1) Cited by Paarthasaarathimi'sra ad 'Slokavaart.,
p. 83:
Kii.tasa^mkhyaaparij~naana^m tasya na.h
kvopayujyate
duura^m pa'syatu maa vaasau tattvam i.s.ta^m tu
pa'syati.

(2) This word is difficult to translate. It would be
rather dangerous to understand "any
discriminative operation." The paramaarthasatya
(true Truth) is, of course, above expression and
thought; there is not thought without vikalpa, "
falsche Vorstellung" (P.W.).

(3) Cf. Bodhicaaryaav. ix. 37, 38.

p.374

us believe in whatever teachings walls can give!
Those are devilish games! (pi'saaca). Go and tell
such tales to anyone you will find ready to believe
them." (1)
Besides, to study the question closely, the
Buddhist AAgamas must have been derived from the
Vedas. Kumaarila does not mention the Puraanic
hypothesis of the Buddha avatar of Vi.s.nu, that is,
avatar of malevolence(2) or of pity, according to the
way it is looked at. More clever still, and with a
sort of anticipation of Professor Hermnn Oldenberg's
theory, he thinks that the Vedas, misunderstood,
contain the germs of all heretic systems: " The
doctrine of the non-existence of the external world,
that of the universal momentariness, and that of the
non-existence of a soul, are derived, he says, from
the Upani.sads."(3) Therefore we have to recognize
the authority of those nihilistic doctrines only so
far as they lead us to dislike the sensible world.
But, "That indebtedness to the Veda is fruitless
for those heretic leaders (tiirtha^mkaras): they give
the Veda up since they are rationalists." "'Saakya
does not teach the Dharma

────────────

(1) 'Slokavaart. 86. 10 (Comm.) : "... tasmin
nirvyaapaare 'pi tatsa^mmdhimaatre.naiva
ku.dyaadibhyo 'pi de'sanaa ni.hsarantiiti cet...."See
the suutras quoted Bodhicaaryaav..t. 276: "tasmin
dhyaanasamaapanne cintaaratnavad aasthite ｜
ni'scaranti yathaakaama^m ku.dyaadibhyo' pi'
de'sanaa.h taabhir jij~naasitaan arthaan sarvaan
jaananti maanavaa.h ｜....." And: "te
tathaagatamukhaad ur.naako'saad u.s.nii.saad
gh.r.ni^m 's.r.nvanti..." Cf. Sik.saasamuccaya, 284.
9: "... yadi buddhaa na bhavanti gaganatalaad
dharma'sabdo ni'scarati ku.dyav.rk.sebhya's ca."

It is well known that Buddha did not speak after he
had attained the Sa^mbodhi (the silence
(tuus.nii^mbhaava) is the highest Truth
(paramaarthasatya), cf. Madhyamakav.rtti, 15a (B.T.S.
15. 11), and La^nkaavataara, 17. 15: maunaas ...
tathaagataa.h); but it is worth while to contrast the
AAryatathaagataguhyasuutra and the Paali books. We
read in the Northern Suutra (Madh. v.rtti, fol. 109b,
p.130.15) : "yaa^m ca.... raatri^m tathaagato
'nuttaraa^m samyaksa^mbodhim abhisa^mbuddho, yaa^m ca
raatrim upaadaaya parinirvaasyati, asminn antare
tathaagatenaikaak.saram api nodaahrrtam...." The same
phraseology Itivuttaka, p. 121, 20;
Suma^ngalavilaasinii, Intr., § 44, and no doubt
elsewhere, but with an altogether different
conclusion.

(2) Maayaamohaavataara (Vi.s.nupur.).

(3) Tantravaart. 81. 20 : sarvatra hi tadbalena
pravartate taduparame coparamatiiti vij~naanamaat aam
apy upani.satprabhavatva^m vi.saye.sv aatyantika^m
raaga^m nivartayitum ity upapanna^m sarve.saa^m
pramaa.nyam. sarvatra ca yatra kaalaantaraphalatvaad
idaaniim anubhavaasa^mbhavas tatra vedamuulataa.
I am unable to identify the quotation from the
Upani.sads.-Similarly the Sautraantikas maintain that
Buddha, when teaching the 'suunyataa, was directed by
principles of policy (upaayakau'salya).
Cf. Nyayavaart. taatp..t. 415. 21.

p.375

without surrounding it with a complete net of
proofs"(1);－and all those Vedabaahyas, or strangers
to the Veda, as Manu has said, despise the tradition.
They approve the teaching of the outcasts ('suudra),
the building up and the worshipping of the caityas,
things unheard of and against the Sm.rti.
This last is the main objection, the only one, it
seems, that proved to be of any historical moment. On
the side of the Brahmins we find the perennial
constitution of castes and rites, and the
universality of honest people.
In vain does Dignaaga claim for his own side the
'mahaajanaparigraha'(2); Vaacaspatimi'sra, (3) after
having, in beautiful words, possibly inspired by
Buddhist theism,

────────────

(1) Tantravaart. 117. 13: "Saakyaadaya's ca
sarvatra kurvaa.naa dharmade'sanaam ｜
hetujaalavinirmuktaa^m na kadaa cana kurvate.'' This
rationalistic side of Buddhism is illustrated by the
formula: " yat ki^m cit subhaa.sita^m tad buddha
vacanam" (A^nguttara N. iv, 164. 7; Bodhic..t. 284.
1;'Sik.saas. 15.19) Minayeff (Recherches, 85) gives
reference to the Bhabra Edict: "... e kechi bha^mte
bhagavataa budhena bhaasite save se subhaasite
vaa..." 'The meaning is quite different; the new
sentence can be a tendencious recast of the old one?

Cf. Majjhima N. i, 71. 20: " Yo... eva^m vadeyya
...takkpaariyaahata^m sama.no Gotamo dhamma^m deseti
viimaa^msaanucaritam saya^mpa.tibhaanan ti, ...
nikkhitto eva^m niraye."

(2) See the curious stanza (Subhaa.sitaavali, 3437)
ascribed by Vallabhadeva to Dignaaga (three of the
four MSS. mention Dignaaga). As observed by P.
Peterson, the stanza occurs in Mahaabhaarata, iii,
312, 115 (ed. Protap)=Bohtlingk, Spruche, 2505 = Mbh.
iii, 17,402 = Subhaa.sitaar.nava, 163. I cannot agree
with P. Peterson; "It is impossible to contend that
its attribution here to the well-known Buddhist
writer.... may not be a copyist's error." Our stanza
in the Mbh. episode occurs in an answer of
Yudhi.s.thira to some Yak.sa. Cf. the closely
connected story (of Bahubha.n.daka) in the Comm. to
Dhammapada, 141, and the Devadhammajaataka (Jaataka
1, 1, 6 (p. 126)).
The stanza runs as follows:

tarko 'prati.s.tha.h 'srutayo vibhinnaa
naasaau munir yasya vaco (sic) pramaa.nam
dharmasya muula^m nihita^m guhaayaa^m
mahaajano yena gata.h sa panthaa.

In the Mbh.: naiko r.sir yasya mata^m pramaa.na^m,
dharmasya tattvam.....
Tarko 'prati.s.tha.h: cf. 'Sa^nkara, ad ii, 1, 11
(Deussen, Vedaanta, 97) ; Mahaajana = dharmaparo loko
braahma.naadi.h =Manvaadi.h. Cf. 'Slokavaart. 75;
Taatparya.t. 301; AAtmatattvav. 121.
(3) Taatp..t., pp. 300 ff.; see supra, p. 368, n.
1. － There are many strong arguments against the
authority of the Vedas. See, for instance, Comm.to
Nyaayasuutras, ii, 1, 56 (or 57). "When it is said
'svargakaamo yajeta' we cannot ascertain the
truthfulness of the precept; but we see that the
putre.s.ti's, the kaariirya's, rites for promoving
mundane fruits, do not realize the expected fruits;
therefore..."

p.376

defined the personal God and defended revelation,
breaks down, stone by stone, the whole of the
Buddhist edifice. "None of those saviours
(sa^msaaramocaka(1)), Buddha or Jina, is omniscient;
'Suddhodana's son is evidently neither the creator of
the world nor the maker of the human body. The
Buddhist aagamas did not regulate the laws of caste
and of the Brahmanic life; they know nothing of the
rites of life from the cradle to the grave. Those
aagamas, of which the authority is vainly supported,
depend for all that concerns the practical life upon
the 'Sruti, the Smrrti, the Itihaasas, the Puraa.nas.
Buddhists themselves do not fear to say, 'It is the
custom (saa^mv.rtam etat), ' and they follow, in
practical life, Revelation and Tradition. The Vedas,
and the Vedas only, are observed by the three castes.
In order to keep their meaning unaltered, the .R.sis,
one after the other, have written the several limbs
of the Vedas and the Treatises ('Saastras), Buddha's
words do not, in fact, interfere with the every-day
life of men. They are heard and obeyed by nameless
people only (manu.syaapasada), by foreigners, by
tribes who live like beasts (pa'supraaya). They can
have no authority."

────────────

(1) Cf. Petavatthu, ii, 1.