Problematics of the Buddhist nature of self

·期刊原文
Problematics of the Buddhist nature of self

By Kenneth K. Inada
Philosophy East and West
vol. 29 no. 2
April 1979
p. 141-158
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press

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p. 141

In dealing with the problematics of the Buddhist
nature of self, we are treading on familiar ground.
In this article, however, I hope to avoid the
all-too-familiar as much as possible and open up
fresh areas for a meaningful dialogical discourse.

By the Buddhist nature of self we are
specifically focusing on that unparalleled doctrine
of anaatman ("nonself"). Certainly, the doctrine was
a rare Copernican turn in philosophic insight in the
East, first in India proper then subsequently outside
of India, especially in the Asiatic countries in
general which developed unique social and cultural
forms that continue to exist today. It has, in short,
influenced major changes in the outlook and
perspective in man and his livelihood; yet, we
scarcely know what it means in its fullness and how
it has made the impact on him. For instance, ask any
Buddhist, practicing or professed, to explain the
doctrine or its rudiments and chances are he will not
be able to convey to you its full meaning and
significance in any satisfactory manner, barring
linguistic difficulties naturally. This is as it
should be. For any positive or objective accounting
of the doctrine would surely be held suspect.

In many respects it is possible to assert that
Buddhism is a philosophy of anaatman. By saying this,
I am not at all denigrating other important doctrines
in Buddhism; rather, I am trying to say that we can
focus on a single major doctrine, such as the
anaatman, and introduce other relevant doctrines of
equal or lesser values as well in ways that are
consistent and coherent to the whole system of
Buddhist thought. For it is an important character of
Buddhist thought in general that it includes traits
of malleability and flexibility, adaptation and
absorption, and interrelationship and
interpenetration. In this respect, the later
T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen doctrines, such as, "all in
one, one in all," or "all is one, one is all," are
not entirely new to Chinese Buddhist thinking. The
roots go back to original Buddhist thought. So a
Buddhist, nay even a strict academician, cannot
afford to experience clashes of ideas, concepts, or
doctrines in Buddhism, although clashes are
inevitable for many. There is deep concern and
uneasiness, to be sure, about the way Buddhists at
times set up contrasting doctrines side by side or
even on the same level of existence, for example, the
relative (sa.mv.rti) and absolute (paramaartha)
natures of truth, sa.msaara and nirvaa.na, relational
origination (pratiityasamutpaada) and emptiness
(`suunyataa), and so on. These only remind us of the
subtleties and profundities of the nature of Buddhist
doctrines.(1)

I wish to reexamine the doctrine of unaatman in
such a way that the old problematics will be covered
and at the same time new problematics, in the sense
of advancing the cause of Buddhist understanding wilI
emerg: It is not an easy task but well worth the
effort. By this attempt, I will return to Buddhist
thought what many scholars have tried to deny it,
namely, the place and func-
------------------------------------
Kenneth K. Inada is Professor of Philosophy at the
State University of New York, Buffalo. Philosophy
East and West 29, no. 2, April 1979

p. 142

tion of metaphysics. It would seem to me that such a
denial is ungrounded and greatly restricts or limits
our understanding of Buddhism. It is so in several
ways.

First, the denial is prompted by an overly
concern for the Buddhist goal, nirvaa.na, and the
meditative discipline that leads to it by
"transcending" any empirical analysis. Meditation,
afterall, it is argued, is the key to slough off the
elements of the empirical realm and that within this
process metaphysics or metaphysical understanding is
unnecessary (shades of logical positivism perhaps)
and in fact it becomes a burden on the practitioner.
We can understand the zeal to rid man of any
obstacles in his meditative practice but that is only
one aspect of man's quest for the goal. There is
another aspect, equally important and perhaps more
basic to his attainments, which is the critical
understanding of his own intimate empirical realm of
existence. In other words, the metaphysics of his own
ordinary experiential world is the most important
grounds upon which he launches his meditative
practice.

Second, the famous so-called antimetaphysical
suutra, Cuu.la-Maalu^nkyasutta, is readily invoked to
support the denial. The technical term, avyakata,
(indeterminate or inexpressible nature), for example,
is interpreted to signify the inanity or inefficacy
of any metaphysical principles or descriptions. In
one instance, the question of whether the tathaagata
(Enlightened One) survives death is metaphysical and
does not elicit an answer, thus suggesting the
Buddha's alleged silence. But it can also be argued
that the sutra is not really pointing at the
bankruptcy of metaphysics or metaphysical thinking as
such. The Buddha's constant or repeated entreaty to
Malunkyaputta that the question "does not fit" (the
case) can be interpreted to mean (out of several
other interpretations naturally) that his so-called
metaphysical imputations, for example, rathagata,
soul, death, finitude, infinitude, and so on, are
wrongly constructed or presented and therefore
wrongly understood. I will treat the nature of
metaphysics shortly.

Finally, by pointing at some of the principal
doctrines, such as `suunyataa, nirvaa.na, dharma,
pratiityasamutpaada, anitya and anaatman, it is
pointed out that these do not have substantial
contents and therefore they are metaphysically
neutral or indifferent. In this instance, I believe
the denial is very much pre- in their true natures
before they are cast into the same so-called
nonsubstantial and thus nonmetaphysical basket. It is
a simplistic device but a wrong one. It is wrong for
the reason that not one of the doctrines has been
given the chance to apply or manifest itself cogently
in one's experience. Of course, to demonstrate this
is a very difficult task, but it still is important
to indicate that to the detractors of metaphysics
Fall the burden of proof on experiential matters. It
seems quite ironic, moreover, that such detractors of
metaphysics go merrily along to indulge in the
doctrines of Buddhism in ways that not only suggest
but strongly indicate the place of metaphysics and
the function

p. 143

of metaphysical thinking. They reserve the right of
course to discard the metaphysical ladder after using
it, a l Wittgenstein. But can we or do we dispense
with the ladder so readily? This is a question that
requires further investigation.

To be sure, there is no exact term for
metaphysics in Buddhism, nor in Indian philosophy in
general for that matter. This may seem to be a
short-coming, but for us I would prefer to interpret
it as a real challenge, an invitation to explore
deeper into the elements of the Buddhist system. On
this, it should be noted at the outset that Buddhism
is not a well-defined system of thought with a
clearly defined framework into which all the fillers
can be readily thrown or framed so that both the
framework and the fillers can always be identified in
no uncertain terms. Such a framework is a fiction, a
bad myth, that simply does not stand. It is an
ungrounded myth or ideal to which we must address
ourselves and which I hope to clarify in the course
of this article.

It further seems to me that the detractors of
metaphysics do not distinguish between good and bad
metaphysics. They seem to be repulsed from the start
and quite abruptly, perhaps, by the term itself,
aghast that one could be so bold and presumptuous as
to attempt an analysis of man and the world with such
categorical verve as seen, for example, in some of
the idealistic and materialistic systems. Granted
that sheer absolutism or sheer relativism or even
sheer materialism has no legitimate place in sound
metaphysics, as I am willing to admit that the
detractors rightly observe in the imputations of
eminent realities in these so-called isms in both the
Western and Eastern traditions; still, it would be
folly to be ignorant of or to dismiss outright the
quest in man for the relative and the absolute nature
of things. My point is that the eminent realities
referred to within the context of relative and
absolute systems are somehow misplaced or misdirected
or misguided. They are so because of the truncated or
one-directional way in which they are treated within
a seemingly coherent system of metaphysics. The
proponents are in such a hurry to construct that
system that they either miss or gloss over much of
the nature of experiential content that constitutes
existence. It is so easy to see and count a few
realities (or elements of existence) and to indulge
in sweeping generalizations about the renlity of the
nature of things. I call this form of metaphysics
deviated. It is bad metaphysics. It is a myopic view,
a limited or constricted type of metaphysics.

So, granted that bad metaphysics Is prevalent
among us, even with religious and philosophical
thinkers of the first order, there is still a place
for good or proper type of metaphysics. In this
respect, I cannot help but recall Alfred Whitehead's
famous caution:

Whatever is found in `practice' must lie within
the scope of the metaphysical description. When the
description fails to include the 'practice', the
metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision.
There can be no appeal to practice to supplement
metaphysics, so long as we remain contented with our
metaphysical

p. 144

doctrines. Metaphysics is nothing but the description
of the generalities which apply to all the details of
practice.(3)

In Buddhism there is an incredible amount of
concern for the mechanics of `practice', a deep
concern for the ingredients that are necessary for
the description of a truly great metaphysical system
of experience.(4) In many ways, its metaphysical
system is unique in that it probes deeper than most
Western systems in accounting for the complex
mechanics of man's being including certain elements
that are unique to Buddhism. These elements will
emerge presently as our discussion develops.

In the main, then, antimetaphysicians have been
critical of any and all ontological assumptions. With
both idealistic and materialistic strains of
metaphysics, there is a tendency, on the one hand, to
indulge in a form of "Object"' or "objects of
discourse," such as the Absolute, God, Brahman, One,
Unity, Principle, and the like, relative to the
macrocosmic realm or, on the other hand, to identify
certain atomic components, such as the self, soul,
consciousness, elements of existence, and so on
relative to the microcosmic realm. Unless one is
wary, these implicit or explicit objectifications
have the tendency to result in definitive ontological
natures that frame one's life and life perspectives.
Even in Buddhism, the svabhrivic (self-nature)
ontology of the Abhidharma-Sarvastivada tradition was
immediately criticized by the Sautrantika as well as
by the Maadhyamika (that is, by Nagarjuna) and the
Mahaayaana tradition in general. But we would
certainly be remiss were we to dismiss ontologies
solely on the basis of their being bad metaphysics.
What is important here is to distinguish the kind of
ontology referred to that we should be wary of
(namely, the svabhaavic type) from the kind that we
should be able to explore and accommodate if proved
to be worthy as well as relevant to our experiences.

Needless to say, the svabhavic type belongs to
bad metaphysics and thus cannot be perpetrated. But
what about the other type? This other type of
metaphysics accounts for an ever-widening and
deepening nature of human experience. It came about
in Western philosophy relatively late, picking up
momentum, for example, with the ideas of Hegel,
Darwin, Bergson, Morgan, nineteenth-century science,
Einstein, Heisenberg, Heidegger iihd showing up
clearly in Whitehead's organic philosophy. In the
East, the Buddha had already expounded the rudiments
of such a thought twenty-five hundred years earlier.
The detailed comparisons between the East and the
West.on the matter is unnecessary at this point, but
suffice it to say that the principle of organic
process philosophy was known and lived through by man
earlier than usually noted. In the West of course
Heraclitus is the shining example of an earlier sage
who keyed on the principle of change and process but,
alas, few took him seriously. Plate carried e thought
litrther to some extent, but he could not really
accommodate it within his great doctrine on the Idea
of the Good. Nor did Aristotle, with his sweeping
architectonic view of things, really succeed in

p. 145

accommodating organic philosophy. His thoughts rather
fired a concern for the substantial treatment of
things. All this is not to fall complacent with a
false impression that modern man has understood and
accepted process philosophy all along as a way of
life. I might add that the situation can also be
applied to modern Buddhists, scholars and
practitioners alike.

It is my contention that organic process
philosophy is marvellously depicted in the Buddhist
philosophy of anaatman. Let us move into its
implications.

Anaatman is etymologically, an-aatman, or the
negation of the aatman (self); it connotes the exact
opposite of aatman. Logically, there is no doubt that
this is very clear but the question remains whether
that is all there is to the concept. Does it convey
to us the full meaning? To say that there is no soul
or self, or that the soul or self is negated does not
really advance the true understanding of the concept
of anaatman, except on the linguistic and logical
levels.(5) The antithetic treatment of
aatman-anaatman does not really resolve the question
or even come close to clarifying it. As a matter of
fact, Buddhist thought never saw the aatman view as
wholly antithetic to its own nnatman view. In my
understanding, it seems to be a simple case of
imposing bad metaphysical elements on the
experiential process or confusing bad and good
metaphysics.

The problem is much more complicated than we
suppose since even on the linguistic and logical
levels we go on to accept the aatman concept as if we
know all about it and premise it for further
manipulation. The atman and its spiritual cognate,
Brahman, are essentially noncognitive or nonlogical
entities, and yet we do not cease to give them
circumscribed epistemological meanings. The aatman
concept still remains in the province of the Hindu
who has his own metaphysics as well as the faith and
will to pursue it. What the historical Buddha reacted
against was the inadequacy of the Hinduistic
metaphysics to account for the so-called worldly
empirical nature of things. It was not a simple
overturn of the aatman concept into nullity but a
unique overhaul of the understanding of human
experience. The famous Middle Doctrine in Buddhism
specifically cautions us to avoid the extremes of
substantialism (sassatnvaada) and nonsubstantialism
(ucchedavaada). I believe the doctrine supports my
view that the extremes (anta) refer to the ends or
elements that are considered obviously bad
metaphysics, both of which are iii-grounded in
experience.

In many respects, however, the Buddhist
introduction of the anaatman concept was a complete
turn around from the prevailing aatman concept. Where
the latter attempted to see the whole from the
metaphysical totality, illusion notwithstanding, the
former attempted to see the whole as much as possible
from the metaphysically fragmentary nature of things.
Where the latter presupposed the aatman-brahman
identity explicitly or implicitly from the beginning
to the end, the former delved into no presuppositions
at all and denied any bad metaphysical elements to
influence such concepts as jiva (soul) sattva
(sentient being) and pudgala (personal identity).
Where both

p. 146

invoked the indeterminate principle (avyaak.rta),
they used it for different purposes, namely, the
latter used it to explain away the barriers relative
to the aatman-brahman identity and all things related
to it, but the former used it to exhibit or expose
the limitations or shortcomings of relying solely on
the entified empirical concepts (prajn~napti). Where
the latter was involved in a kind of emanation theory
of being in a relatively "steady-state" affair, the
former remained true to a strictly naturalistic and
evolutionary basis for man's being, a process that
indeed defies one's imagination--and rightly so--but
one that purports to have all the ingredients of a
consistent system of process thought. I have
elsewhere argued that the latter aims at a
metaphysical absolute regarding the nature of being,
whereas the former aims at an ontological absolute of
being.(6)

In Buddhist metaphysics, we are focusing on the
concrete nature of experiential reality. And this
reality is nothing but the ontological nature of the
individual being, his entire experiential content.
The reader will be quick to note that I am already
using terms that relate to or depict certain
realities or ontological objects, something I had
previously criticized. This is an inevitable
circumstance and a practical necessity. Even the
historical Buddha, it will be recalled, was quite
mindful and cautious regarding this matter, and yet
he had no recourse but to use the prevailing language
to convey the intent and purpose of seeking that
concrete nature of reality (yathaabhuutam) . In
essence, then, we are in search of that reality
within the matrix of things, however laden it may be
with the elements of the provisional and conventional
natures.

Reality is like a maze. If one is caught up with
the elements of the maze, one is prevented from
seeing the passage-way and contrariwise, if one is
not, then the passage-way is there without the usual
obstructive elements and thus one is able to move
freely and easily. In other words, one understands
the maze for what it is or sees it at a glance, so to
speak. There are no impediments. It is rather a habit
of our ordinary epistemological nature that we try to
catch everything in one's experience even by imposing
on it unsupportable metaphysical elements. A good
example is the Cartesian framework that reduces all
epistemological entities to clarity and distinctness.
It should be noted that it is one thing to say that
epistemological entities must be clear and distinct
but it is quite another to say that they relate to
reality. And still another to say that reality must
be clear and distinct.

So in Buddhism, regardless of the false
impositions we make, we are dealing with the
metaphysics of being which is in truth a reference to
individual ontology. But individual ontology is also
process ontology. Therefore, it is not an ontology in
the usual sense. The three cardinal characteristics
in basic Buddhism, namely, anicca dukkham, anatta
(impermanence, suffering, and nonself) point up to
this unique ontology. The first, reminds us clehrly
that everything is a moving phenomenon or a moving
ontology. The "great chain of being" is not merely a
static linking phenomenon where the nature of being

p. 147

persists in linear fashion; rather, it is a novel
creative process based on the everfresh dynamic
nature of the links where nothing persists or
endures.

Thus we may now be able to assert that there is a
stream of reality (bhava) in the general or primal
sense, and also a stream of consciousness (bhava^nga,
sa.ntaana) in the finer and more technical sense. The
stream cannot be framed, either substantially or in
the usual ontological sense, unless we are to speak
of it conventionally. Perhaps, I may be permitted to
say that the stream of reality has to do with process
ontology whereas the stream of consciousness with
epistemological process, although the latter process
necessarily "rests" upon or functions within the
realm of the former.

We might also add that in the strictest sense
there is process ontology but no ontological process
that refers to static entities in movement. Again, in
a different sense it might be asserted that there is
ontological understanding of the nature of things but
no understanding of ontological (static) elements as
such. It is this unique ontological understanding
that contributes to good or proper metaphysics. In
other words, there seems to be a widening receptacle,
a field of being, that aids in the understanding of
the nature of things. In this, however, the
ontological elements do not constitute that
receptacle or field of being, for the focus is always
on the dynamic field of existence.

All this is indeed paradoxical and puzzling but
process philosophies are of this nature. Yet they are
not contrary to or contradictory of the facts of
experience. indeed, they are most adaptive and
accommodative of the facts. From the Buddhist
standpoint, the seeming contradictions occur from
several causes or bases. They may arise, for example,
from the inability to distinguish between the
provisional or conventional and the ontolologically
absolute natures of being. Or, it may be due to the
inability to follow the middle doctrine which eschews
us to stay clear from the extremes as discussed
earlier.

It goes without saying that in process ontology
we are concerned with the dynamics of the specious
present. The present is specious because its locus of
reality is never at a standstill or steady and is
thus unaccountable in any definitive sense,
especially in terms of the manipulable data and
aspects of things. Moreover, it can now be stated
that the locus of anaatman is likewise specious and
therefore we must concentrate on it.

The problematic of the specious present is
somewhat aggravated by the plain fact that we
normally assign only a one-dimensional framework to
the process of being. That is. we normally understand
temporality to be a simple one-directional flow. But
it is much more complicated than that. That present,
in actuality, is a multi-faceted, multi-directional
phenomena which the Buddhists early on sensed and
captured in their doctrines. How that
multi-dimensional nature manifests in our experiences
is the crux of the problem in our understanding of
the specious present. The difficulty is basically one
in which we are asked to be both spectator and
participant of the activities, a difficulty as old as
Platonism in the West. This spectator-participant
view or approach

p. 148

is so basic yet so fraught with difficulties of
understanding that the average intellect and even
great minds find it totally incomprehensible, on the
one hand, and beyond reach, on the other.

Naturally, we refrain from resorting to
meditative devices of any form for the understanding
since we believe that man must still initially seek a
naturalistic understanding, bringing into sharp focus
all the canons of logic or the intellect together
with the utilization of the empirical data in the
most exhaustive sense. And in many ways, we have not
really taxed our reason and its power to anything
like the optimum degree of usage when it comes to
intimating ourselves with the nature of reality. The
same can be said about our intimacy with the
empirical realm. For the most part, we simply get
carried away with the mechanics or the elements
thereof and these in turn result in subtle dogmatic
stands, be they psychological, social, metaphysical,
or whatever.

Again, we do not have the time to enter into the
reasons for the rise of the dogmatic stands. Rather,
it is more important now to focus on one aspect and
educe the subtle and unknown ways in which the
experiential process is taking place. Moreover, the
failure to understand this aspect has resulted in
grave misgivings and at times irreparable damage to
the person in his pursuit of a proper development of
the enlightened way of life.

The aspect in question upon which I wish to focus
is the ontological grounds and nature of the process.
Failure to understand this, in a rather circuitous or
circular way, results in the most damaging
phenomenon, namely, the ontological unclarity of
existence or one's clouded nature of being (avidyaa).
Of course, I am not implying at all that one cannot
go on living in this clouded nature of being, as
there are abundant examples personified by our normal
samsaric (du.hkha-ridden) pursuits. Yet, the message
of Buddhism is that there must be a constant vigil
and search for the opposite, that is, the pursuit for
the ontological clarity of existence. This is the
search in the right direction of the Buddhist nature
of self, the unatmnn. But this search is futile and
unproductive should one adhere to old methods and
framework. This is not to say that the old methods
and framework are to be discarded or abandoned
completely; that would be a total destruction or
negation which no Buddhis would ever sanction.

What is then called for is the "reorganization,"
or "reconstitution,'' if you will, of the ontological
framework that I propose. Moreover, certain scholars
have conveniently labelled such reorganization or
reconstitution as a systematic deontologization. To a
targe extent, this is true and cogent. However, as I
see it, the more important question is. After
deontologization, what? True, Naagaarjuna's
systematic critique of his opponent's position is an
attempt to deontologize his realistic tendencies. But
Naagaarjuna's critique does not end there. He will
not leave his opponent suspended in so-called
deontologized mid-air. He, like all true Buddhists,
will try his best to return the deontologized nature
back to solid grounds, that is, in constant contact
with true reality,

p. 149

without the traces or vestiges of the mind's
imposition on reality as such (tattva), In short,
deontologization is at best a half-way measure, a
conceptual device, that needs to be brought back to
the full experiential content in the total process.

Let us proceed to examine further the specious
present. As mentioned earlier, the Buddhist will
premise two types of continuum; one the continuum of
being (bhava) , the other the continuum of
consicousness (sa^ntaana, bhava^nga) . Though
different in definition and application they are
really indicating certain aspects of the self-same
flow of existence. The former refers to the general
nature of being and the latter to the subtle links
relative to conscious plays. Regardless of the
differences then, the specious moment is functional
in both. They both exhibit the ways in which the
continuum is a fact ofexistence. The specious moment,
as the literal center of being, is always real. But
the question to be posed here is, In what way is it
sustaining its reality or its real "contents" in the
flow of existence? Or, How can we speak of it in its
speciousness?

It can be said that the Buddha came to grips with
the concept of passage, nay actual passage itself, in
a most profound way. Empirically, he perceived
rightly that the rise (utpaada) of a moment is seen
and so is its fall or subsidence (bha^nga or
anityataa). And he also perceived that there is a
duration (sthita) in which the moment is full blown,
so to speak, or attains fruition (vipaaka).(7) These
three aspects of the moment are incessantly involving
themselves in such a unique way that even graphs or
diagrams fail to describe the full import of the
process. Yet, it is highly important now to utilize
these devices in order to delineate, if only in a
small way, the peculiarities of the process.

(1) First, the flow of existence in the simplest
possible manner is illustrated with an arrow
thus:----> or it may be expanded into a "bloated"
arrow thus: -->to depict the content of the flow. In
either illustration, it says or describes relatively
little, if any, of the full experiential content. At
best, it only shows the directional flow of the
process. And so we move on to the next diagram.

(2) The second diagram can be illustrated thus:
--> The arrow is quite gratuitous but necessary for
conceptual understanding. This diagram is an
improvement over the first but it still is inadequate
and perhaps is misleading in its simplicity. It ives
the false impression that the moments of existence go
on in a substantially one-dimensional fashion and in
a predictable way. The idea of a causal chain here is
too simplistic. Again, it does not really tell us
much about the experiential content prior and
posterior to the specious moment. Nor does it address
itself to the crucial question of the continuity of
moments. And finally it suggests a reversion to the
normal ontological understanding of process that
could only lead to bad metaphysics.

(3) The third diagram does address to the problem
of continuity very well. It is depicted as follows:
3a. --> Although it illustrates the interlocking

p. 150

nature of the moments, we can improve on it in the
following way. 3b. ----> This diagram shows up the
truly interlocking nature of the moments, not only
between two moments but a multiple-faceted nature of
several moments within the flow. In this respect, it
is closer to the reality of the process although
confusing in its implicated nature of things.

(4) Finally, at this point, we need to have a
closer microscopic look at the moment in the making.
We might then "blow up" the present specious moment
in the making thus:

The specious present is equivalent to one of the
rings in the above interlocking phenomena, either in
3a or 3b, and the past and the future could very well
correspond to the prior and posterior natures,
respectively, in the continuum with the proviso that
the future is not yet but has all the potential of
becoming.

Each specious present is a carving-out phenomenon
with respect to the continuum of existence. It has a
past from which it has basically but not entirely
arisen. In other words, the past is necessary to the
present but not sufficient for its own being. It also
has a future in terms of latent potential for being.
However, what is unique here is the fact that the
specious present can "look" two ways, that is, to the
components (or realms) of the past and the future for
the constitution or creation of its own being. The
interlocking phenomena must be viewed in this sense.
That is to say, there is every bit of the past,
actually as well as potentially, within the specious
present. Or, it can be said that there is a sense of
the concept of reverse causality functioning here to
check the wholly one-directional causal chain of
moments. Perhaps the Buddhist accounting here is in
correspondence with the Whiteheadian concept of
assymmetry, which states that the flow of existence
involves a reverse or assymmetric relationship of the
specious present to the past and not merely a vice
versa phenomenon, in other words, the past
symmetrically relates to the present and the present,
in turn, to the future. The minutely circular
interpenetrating and interlocking diagram in 3b shows
to an extent the symmetric as well as assymmetric
dimensions in the continual flow of existence. To
illustrate this further and to gain some
understanding of the subtle movements, we must
proceed to the next diagram.

p. 151

(5) To illustrate the temporal flow with the more
subtle features. I diagram thusly:

A glance at this diagram will show the unique
implications of the real temporal characteristics
involving the past, present, and future. The locus of
reality or the Bow of reality resides in the specious
present, but it is never left alone for it not only
creates in cooperation with the past and becomes a
past as well, but it also is intimately related to a
potential future in the process. This sounds odd or
even absurd on first reading, to be sure, but at
least the diagram does sufficiently justify the
nature of the profound doctrine of momentary
existence in Buddhism (k.sa.nika-bha^nga). For, there
is undoubtedly the rise of the moment, not ex nihilo
but in full view or cooperation of the components of
the temporal dimensions. The specious present gains
something but at the same time loses something in its
procession to the next triadic contextual matrix of
dynamics. In this way, the continuum is fulfilled in
terms of content and simultaneously exhibits its
open-endedness. The gaining and losing phenomena are
dependent largely on the conditions or materials
prevailing with respect to the total nature of the
relational conditions (pratyaya, paccaya). And in the
search for the understanding of these phenomena, we
return finally to a few significant Buddhist
doctrines that are relevant to the process thus far
delineated and which in turn should make us realize
that the anaatman doctrine is supreme here and that
it is infinitely superior to the aatman approach to
reality.

In diagram 5 I have used the phrase, "nisus of
being," for the real temporal flow of existence. It
is a nisus in that there is a striving, a motive, to
perfect one's own being, Life is a creative process
in this sense but not always in the best or
propitious sense. The Buddhist calls this relational
origination (pratiitya-samutpaada which is indeed one
of the most difficult concepts to fathom orcepts to
fathom or grasp, much less to feel its functional
dimensions in our everyday activities.

p. 152

It depicts the becoming process (bhava) in its most
unique Form--uniqueness in the sense that the process
is another way of delineating on how the ordinary
conception of the self becomes or is at once a
nonself phenomenon. The dynamic character of this
concept, which is so depictive of the subtle
movements in the microscopic realm of existence,
issues Forth the challenge to understand the anaatman
concept. The two concepts, pratityasamutpaada and
anaatman. may seem so distanced yet are so proximate
to our nature of being: indeed. in the strictest
sense, they are referring to the self-same reality of
existence from two novel but technically isomorphic
natures. By asserting this I am not trying to confuse
the issue. Rather, I wish to call to attention a
desideratum for a closer and critical examination of
the ordinary situation in which we continue to exist
so that the nature of Buddhist reality could be
understood or realized in its own right. Again, all
this is cryptic but, only in the hope of showing up
the problematics that the becoming process or the
nisus of being cannot be reduced to a simple,
cut-and-dried type of analysis or manipulation of the
elements, be they dharmas in the case of Buddhism, in
and of themselves as they occur in all facets of our
experiences.

In the process, the elements (dharmas) have no
ontological nature or status, either in an a priori
or a posteriori sense. For, their "participation" in
the process is the fact of the process itself, just
as the process itself properly reflects the various
elemental presence. I believe that Diagram 5 is
conducive to the Sarvaastivaadin's (Vaibhaa.sika's)
choice of the third explanation for the description
of the differences in the temporal flow as stated as
a change of condition (avasthaaapari.naama). The
relevant passage states thus:

Thus it is that among all proposed explanations the
(remaining one alone), the third in number is right,
that which maintains a change of condition (or
function). According thereto the difference in time
reposes on the difference in function; at the time
when an element does not yet actually perform its
function, it is future, when performing it, it
becomes present; when. a'fter having performed it, it
stops, it becomes past.(8)

We should now have a better picture ofthe way in
which the specious present is flowing as the nisus of
being. But I hasten to add here the final diagram to
depict the way in which the aatman approach vitiates
the nisus.

(6) The specious present relative to the
aatman-process is now represented thus:

p. 153

It will be seen that the linear symmetrical flow
has all the trappings of a causal or deterministic
system. The temporal flow is firmly set in the sense
that the present came from the past and that it will
eventually enter into or become a new phenomenon
known as the future. But the problematic involved
here is that this type of temporal flow does not, or
is unable to. accommodate new or novel contents or
elements that are added and at the same time to and
one which reason by itself fails to answer. A
deterministic or even semi-eterministic nature would
invariably introduce a form of "transmigration" of
the elements of being which is so often erroneously
attributed to Buddhism.

The Buddhist approach was not only profound but
practical. It did not shirk the problem by presenting
a mere theoretical accounting of the facts of
experience but went deeply into the components of the
experiences themselves in order to present a holistic
view that included both the tangible as well as
nontangible contents of the said experiences It
started off naturally with the accepted self-view
(aatman process) but quickly indicated that once such
a view is set up or the conditions relative to it are
perpetuated, there will be no prevention of the
limiting and restrictive phenomena from Occurring.
For the Buddha came to an understanding that if man
were left alone he would continue to assert his basic
drives. namely. the desires or thirst for life
(t.r.s.naa). Close examination, however, will point
up the fact that both thirst and the object of thirst
are mutually limiting or restrictive in the sense
that they isolate themselves from the rest of the run
of nature of from the experiential process itself.
Yet, nothing in nature or in the experiential process
is really independent, isolated, or aloof, except
perhaps when we deal with them in abstract or
speculative terms.

The Buddha's insight probes deeply here to make a
signiticant contribution toward the subtleties of the
thirst for 1ife. The drive is prominently present, as
we can easily see, but what makes that drive
"counterproductive" is the tendency in it to be
"overextending'' and thereby "overproductive." In
this respect, there is no real appreciation for the
drive or thirst itself. for this is warped or
unbalanced In short, the fullness of the drive or
thirst is not realized or implemented. What then is
this strange new obstructive element? It is nothing
but the clinging or attaching phenomenon present in
each thrust of the drive or thirst. The technical
term for it is upaadaana, a term which is basic and
yet little understood The thirst or drive is
ever-present, as stated earlier,. but it overextends
itself as soon as the upaadaana force is present.
Upaadaana usually goes hand in hand with t.r.s.naa,
but it does not necessarily have to be so. In other
words, the passions and desires are vital parts of
our experiences but they need not be restrained by
the clinging phenomenon, i.e., they can go on in a
purely detached manner without the clinging elements
of being.

In many respects, there is an element of
contradiction in the two terms; at least there is an
element of incongruency in treating them together.
For, on the

p. 154

one hand, t.r.snaa (thirst) is a force, an activity
that lungs forward in the experiential process and on
the other. upaadaana (attachment) is a holding,
steadying pattern that keeps the process from lunging
forward in the sense of incorporating new elements
The former is a basic drive, while the latter is a
subtle aspect of that drive which becomes narrow and
specialized by the latters presence. The latter is
always ancillary to the former and in its expended
nature counters the flow of the basic flow. While the
former thrives on processl the latter thrives on
static objectification. Or, it can be said that while
the former is a moving oiltology, the latter is a
static type of ontology. the type that becomes grist
for the conceptual mill and perpetuates bad
metaphysics. Yet, despite all, the truth of the whole
matter is that both are very much functioning
mutually in that the function of one invariably
entails the function of the other, and that the
function of both only obviates the fact of the
subject in its elemental perceiving or grasping
activities; this is the assertion of the aatman
process. Thus the perpetuation of the atman-process
theory, although giving way to biological,
psychological, and phenomenological phenomena, still
is a basic ontological phenomenon. And the failure to
understand the ontological implications, both in the
ordinary sense of static objectification and in the
true sense of nonobjectifiable process flow, has only
impeded a real grasp of the reason for man's
suffering (du.hkha), For, indeed, one of the most
basic origins of the sufferinp state is the inability
of man to cope with the flow of existence or the
plain fact that life and its elements are momentary
or transitory.

It is curious to note that the self (aatman) as a
subject has really, in turn, become an objective
component in the process of perception. It as well as
the object of perception have both become ontological
objects, and, in consequence, a mild fbrm of rigidity
has set in. And thus the ontological nature and the
ontological dimensions seen and employed within the
framework of the three temporal dimensions begin to
rule the order of the process itself.

The same phenomenon can also be said of the five
skandhas (constituents of being) which manifestly
show up the way in which the aatman-process is narrow
and obstructive. In the famous Burden Sutta,(9) it is
repeatedly stated that the skandhas are the burden or
the carrying of the burden (bhaarahaara) of life. In
the organic skandhic structure, the mere structuring
becomes a burden in the sense that they in tote would
spell out some form of an objective self. The sutta
goes on to say that the "burden-taking is the
individual," and that "the craving which tends to
re-birth, accompanied by delight and passion, taking
delight here and there, namely the craving for
sensual pleasure, for existence, for non-exisrence,
for non-existence."(10) Edward J. Thomas makes a
telling point that the term, bhaarahaara, can be
translated either as "burden-taking" or "burden
bearer."(11) He aptly states that in either case, it
points up to the concept of an individuality
(pudgala) or a self (aatman).

Now, Why is it a burden? With diagram 6 in view,
we can show that the five skandhas have the tendency
to construct a steadying ontological entity called

p. 155

a self or a subject that moves through the temporal
periods, rather than to be the process itself. That
is, the skandhic classification, in terms of each
element or any combination, seems to arrest the flow,
whereas in reality there is no arresting possible at
all. From rttpu (corporeality) to vij~naana
(consciousness), all the skandhas seem to statically
structure a self or an image thereof. This fact is
also supported by the concept of upaadaana where the
aatman concept is considered to be one of the four
forms of ignorant outflows (aasravas), the others
being sensual desire (kaama), false or dogmatic view
(d.r.s.ti), and ritualistic following of conduct
(`siila). These outflows are the seemingly blind
irrational forces that seem to dominate the Bow by
their rigid moorings on life's process. But they, as
well as other structural entities (for example,
skandhas, aayatanas, dhaatus, dharmas) , are the
makings of still another rigid process, perhaps the
worst form possible, namely, the rebirth process or
the relinking of the staticized (upaadaana-bound)
nature of being.(12)

The rebirth concept is quite problematic in
Buddhism. In general, there are two ways to view it.
One is that it couId be taken to be the phenomenon of
an after life in terms of the last so-called
clingings or attachment remaining in man. This seems
to be the accepted religious or moral view. The other
more philosophical view is to take rebirth to mean
the clingings relative to the moment-to-moment
existence, The latter is preferred since it is the
more tangible and plausible of the two views and also
for the fact that it can be accommodated very nicely
in diagram 6.

The question of karman is also quite relevant
here, Karmic acts are, in the main, deeds that are
determined by one's clinging phenomenon within the
process, There is a cessation of that phenomenon
should there be a subsidence of the clinging action
and which, in turn, immediately exhibits the
undefiled nature of being.The early texts speak of
different kinds as well as different forms of
kurman.(13) Regardless of the kinds or forms, karmun
is indeed an accounting of the process of being in
its exhibitive and sustainable aspects, and thus it
only promotes the perpetuation of the concept of the
self. This would have to cease in the on-going
process ifthe aim is the enlightened realm of
existence.

In many respects, the karmic act is another form
of the relational origination (pratiityasamutpaada)
as interpreted in terms of the ordinary conception of
the perpetual turning of the wheel of life
(sa.msaara). There are both the bad deeds as well as
the good ones that motivate the sa.msaaric life due
to its self-directing carving-out process. But
self-directing only makes obvious the static nature
of being, whereas the inexorable Row of existence
must not be hampered by this nature, There is no time
to go into the details of the defiling elements
(kle`sas) relative to the flow, but suffice it to say
that the Buddhist always solved the problems within
the empirical nature of things. In short, the
relational origination in its empirical nature is
another way to look at the sa.msaaric nature, but it
can also be turned around or transformed into a
nonempirical and

p. 156

ontologically absolute nature which is another
perspective of the Bow of existence from the
supremely free and unhampered nature of things.
Needless to say, the Mahaayaana tradition, in
general, pursued such a course with respect to the
cogency of the concept of relational origination.(14)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the foregoing, I have attempted to return to man
the dynamics of his own process ontology. It is an
ontology that should not be confused with ontologies
of the usual type. Diagram 6, which depicts the
aatman process, exhibits all the signs of
constructing or continuing a deterministic system
based on the usual concept of ontology, that is, the
substantiation and attribution of all the elements of
existence. It does this because each element defines
its own existence or is definable by relating to
other entities with the usual ontological base. But
nature is far from a mere collection of independent
or interdependent entities.

Diagram 5, on the other hand, depicts an open
moving ontology where the three temporal dimensions,
with respect to the subtle elemental plays, are
accommodated without the imposition of restrictive
conditions. It addresses itself to the crucial
question of delineating the continuity of being. And
this continuity of being in turn is also crucial in
turn for the fact that it makes it possible to speak
of the open-ended ever-widening nature of individual
process ontology which must be the basis for the
compassionate (karu.naa) and enlightened (praj~naa)
natures in man. Without this widening character of
process ontology, man's nature will not be afforded
the chance to grow and develop. In this way then
process ontology makes it possible to identify the
metaphysics of man and the world in a continuum or in
a coterminous sense. It is essential for man in
Buddhism to move out of his restrictive
aatmun-process in order to realize the illimitable
nature of the anaatman-process ontology.

I have thus expressed the desideratum for a
uniyue ontological turn in understanding the
experiential process. The series of diagrams only
served to get a handle on the problematics of the
Buddhist nature of self (anaatman).

NOTES

1. For example. it is said that Louis de la
Vallee Poussin struggled throughout his lifetime on
the question of how to accommodate a deed (karman)
with the doctrine of nonself (anaatman, nairaatmya)
because both concepts do not lend themselves readily.
Toward the end or his life, he finally moved from
Buddhism as a system of contingency to Buddhism as a
system of transcendency. As Maryla Falk put it
nicely:

The new understanding of Buddhism acquired in
three decades of earnest personal investigation had
brought home to him that the notion of nirvaa.na is
based, not on the concept, however subtly formulated,
of an unconscious and senseless unimaginable
condition or or absolute non-existence, but,
primarily and throughout the history of Buddhist
thought, on the experience or the fulness of
salvation. How is this conception possible without
the admission of an immortal soul? This was the
problem now unhusking itself to its nakedness before
the mind of the thinker who had lovingly

p. 157

devoted his life to the subject of his research and
was now preparing to Justify it, along with his life,
before the Creator. (N. N. Law, ed., editor Louis De
La Vallee Poussin Memorial Volume (Calcutta: Calcutta
Oriental Press, 1940), p. 444).

Until his final days, Poussin could not
completely divest himself from his Christian
orientation. It should also be noted that Mrs. Rhys
Davids drew somewhat similar conclusions concerning
the anaatman concept. Her views on the concept of a
More, man's transcendent becoming nature, occupies
much of her thinking in later years in such works as
Sakva or Buddhist Origins (London: Kegan Paul.
Trench, Trubner, 1931) and Wayfarer's Words (London:
Luzac & Co., Vol. 1, 1940; Vol. 2, 1941). Both
Poussin and Davids were formidable Buddhist thinkers
in the Mahaayaana and Theravaada traditions,
respectively. They both struggled with the
problematics of the anaatman concept, as we all do,
but in the final analysis offered no conclusive
explanation.

2. Majjhima Nikaaya, 63 & 64; Paali Text Society
Translation Series, No. 30; The Callection of the
Middle Length Sayings, Vol. 2 (London: Luzac & Co.,
1957), pp. 97-107. In the suttas, the Buddha is more
interested in the empirical nature of things, that
is, the origin of suffering and release from it,
rather than pursuing impractical discourse on
hypothetical or empirically groundless states of
being.

3. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Rrality
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1929), p. 19

4. I have previously drawn some parallels and
differences in Buddhist and Whiteheadian metaphysical
systems in an assay, "The Metaphysics of Buddhist
Experience and the Whiteheadian Encounter, " in
Philosophy East and West 25, no. 4(1975): 465-488.

5. Richard Taylor in a fairly recent essay, "The
Anattaa Doctrine and Personal Identity" (Philosophy
East and West 19, no. 4(1969); 359-366) has argued in
an indirect way that the particular person or self is
one and the same thing as his body, that there is no
personal self as such, and thus everything points to
the non-self doctrine. While his analysis has certain
linguistic and logical considerations as well as
merits, his conclusion on the concept of anaatman is
still unconvincing from the Buddhist standpoint.

6. In a symposium essay, "Munitz' Concept of the
World... A Buddhist Response" together with a
"Rejoinder to Munitz" (Philosophy East and West 25,
no. 3 (1975): 309-317, 351-352) I have argued that
Buddhism is basically stressing on the ontologically
absolute nature of things rather than the
epistemological entities as such. Or, in another
sense, the epistemological structures and entities
are grounded in the ontological nature.

7. Anguttara-Nikaaya I, 152, article 47; Paali
Text Society Translation Series, No, 22; The Book of
the Gradual Sayings, Vol. 1 (London: Luzac & Co.,
1960), p. 135. The gist of the passage states thus:
"The arising is apparent, the duration is apparent
and the passing away is apparent. These are the three
marks relative to the compounded (or conditioned)
nature of being." But it also goes on to state,
contrariwise and very cryptically, in the very next
paragraph: "The arising is not apparent, the duration
is not apparent, and the passing away is not
apparent. These are the three marks of the
uncompounded (or unconditioned) nature of being." The
key terms here are of course the compounded
(sa^nkhaata) and the uncompounded (asa^nkhaata) .
Their study is beyond the space of this essay, but at
least the way is left open for some understanding as
the discussion proceeds in the direction of the
ontological absolute nature of things and the
problematics thereof.

8. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conteprion of
Buddhism (Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956; First
Edition printed in London, 1923), pp. 66-67.

9. Samyutta-Nikaaya, III, 25, article 22; Paali
Text Society Translation Series, No. 18; The Book of
the Kindred Sayings. Vol. 3 (London: Luzac & Co.,
1954), pp. 24-31. 10. Ihid. p. 25; I have followed E.
J. Thomas' translation (reference follows).

11. Edward J. Thomas, The History of Buddhist
Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953),
p. 100.

12. The Milindapa~nha, 32. makes it very clear
thus. "lf I should have attachment (upaadaana), sire,
I will reconnect (pa.tisandhi)." Confer Milinda's
Questions Vol. 1. translated by I. B. Horner (London:
Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1963), p. 43. Hennry C. Warren.
Buddhism in Translations (New York: Atheneum, 1963),
pp. 232-233.

13. For example, there are fruitful as well as
barren types of karman (A^nguttara-Nikaaya, III 33)
or good and bad karman (S^amyutta-Nikaaya, III, 2)
and that the Visuddhimagga, XIX, elaborates

p. 158

on the fourfold nature of karman, that is, that
which bears fruit in the present existence, that
which bears fruit in rebirth, that which bears
fruit at no fixed time, and by-gone karman.
Confer, Henry C. Warren, Buddhism in
Translations, pp. 215-221. 226-228, 242-252.

14. The concept of relational origination
(pratiityasamutpaada) takes on a different, much
more inclusive and intense, meaning in the
Mahaayaana tradition. There is no time to go into
its complicated nature here but at least it could
be said that it has a profound meaning in the
sa.msaaric-nirvaa.nic identity in virtue of the
novel understanding of emptiness (`suunyataa)
that is germane to the foundational Mahaayaana
suutras, including the early Praj~naapaaramitaa
texts, and the followers of that tradition. The
understanding of emptiness, I believe, can be
accommodated in the ontological scheme as
described in Diagram 5. Naturally, this has to be
explored further.