Relativity in Maadhyamika Buddhism and modern physics

·期刊原文
Relativity in Maadhyamika Buddhism and modern physics

By Victor Mansfield
Philosophy East and West
Volume 40, no. 1
1990 January
P.59-72
(C) by University of Hawaii Press

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P.59

I praise the perfect Buddha,
The Supreme Philosopher,
Who taught us relativity;
--------------------------------
I bow down to him whose insight and speech
Make him unexcelled as Sage and Teacher;
The Victor, who realized (ultimate truth),
Then taught us it as relativity!

Tsong Khapa(1)

I. INTRODUCTION

Pioneer scholars and translators of Maadhyamika
Buddhism, such as Stcherbatsky(2) and Murti(3) along
with modern writers such as Thurman,(4) translate
pratiityasamutpaada as relativity. The Maadhyamikas
equate pratiityasamutpaada with their Ultimate
Truth, `Suunyataa or emptiness, which is the pivot
of both theory and practice; thus, this term is of
utmost importance. Inada(5) notes, "...the term
[pratiityasamutpaada] translated as the principle of
relativity with all the overtones of modern science
has become very popular and acceptable even by
scholars."

Unfortunately the conceptual import of
scientific relativity is often poorly understood;
thus, translating this pivotal Buddhist term as
relativity almost guarantees incorrect scientific
associations. Inada does not favor making
associations of scientific relativity with
pratiityasamutpaada. He says in the sentence
following the one just quoted: "This technical term
undoubtedly does have 'strains' of the relativistic
notion but not in the normal nor in the scientific
sense." I claim the problem lies in differences
between the meaning of relativity in modern physics
and in normal philosophic use. In the Maadhyamika
translations and commentaries the fundamental
philosophic use of relativity is dependency,
interconnectedness, and relation to a knower.
However, in modern physics, this is only the smaller
part of its meaning. The physical principle of
relativity more fundamentally embodies the
independence of a particular observer, universality,
and a degree of absoluteness -- completely
antithetical to the use of relativity in
Maadhyamika. Conflating these divergent

P.60

meanings of the term relativity can lead to
confusion and a misunderstanding of the doctrine of
emptiness. The following sections expand and clarify
these issues and show the dangers of translating the
pivotal term pratiityasamutpaada as relativity.

Section II contains a discussion of emptiness
and dependent arising in Maadhyamika Buddhism, in
particular from the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika point
of view, which heavily relies on the writings of
Tsong Khapa. Section III is a self-contained,
nontechnical discussion of special relativity in
modern physics. I limit the discussion to special
relativity and omit general relativity because of
the former's comparative simplicity and because it
contains all the ideas necessary for the present
discussion. Everything said here about physical
relativity holds for both special and general
relativity. For clarity I will use dependent arising
rather than relativity as the translation of
pratiityasamutpaada. Section IV discusses parallels
and differences between Maadhyamika dependent
arising and physical relativity. Section V is a
summary and conclusion.

II. EMPTINESS/DEPENDENT ARISING IN PRAASA^NGIKA
MAADHYAMIKA

The Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika claims that all suffering
and limitation follow on the heels of our inborn
belief in the inherent or intrinsic existence of
phenomena. They contend that we innately or
instinctively believe that objects and subjects
exist inherently, intrinsically, independently of
conception or designation, from their own side, as
they appear, or as inherently findable upon
analysis--terms they use interchangeably to describe
the principle of concrete, independent reality that
we believe pervades our lives.(6) They assert that
this belief in independent or self-standing
existence is precisely what chains us to samsaara,
the beginningless round of birth, aging, sickness,
and death; yet for all but the most advanced
practitioners, inherently existent objects seem the
very touchstone of reality.

Ultimate Truth, `Suunyataa or emptiness, is the
lack of inherent existence in all phenomena. Showing
that phenomena are dependently originated,
interdependent upon causes and conditions--that is,
void of inherent existence (or, as some would say,
relative) --establishes emptiness. In this way
Ultimate Truth, emptiness, equals dependent arising
in Maadhyamika. Through emptiness the Maadhyamikas
avoid the extremes of eternalism and nihilism.
"Eternalism" or reification is avoided since all
phenomena lack in herent existence or are empty;
"nihilism" or deprecation is avoided because all
phenomena have a conventional or nominal existence
through dependent arising.

At least for the purposes of comparison, let me
grant the Praasa^ngikas their premises. Then, to
make the analysis more lively, consider a simple
example and apply the Maadhyamika critique to it.
Take a thirty-foot aluminum flagpole standing
directly before me. It is a paragon of
self-standing, concrete, independent reality. What
is more obviously existent from its own side or

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intrinsically existent--glinting in the sun and
sounding musical notes as its rope flaps against it
in the breeze?

Although there are a variety of arguments used
by the Maadhyamikas to establish that phenomena lack
intrinsic existence, the agruments can be
conveniently grouped into three primary forms: the
dependency of phenomena upon causes and conditions,
the relation of parts to wholes, and the dependency
of phenomena upon mental designation or naming.(7)
The following argument is not one of these classical
arguments, but it is in harmony with them. Like the
classical arguments, it assumes a "commonsense" view
of objects which, according to Maadhyamika, always
captures our deepest pragmatic and emotional
responses--despite any conflicting philosophical
views we might claim to hold.

The flagpole must have light upon it and be a
moderate distance away for me to view it. The pole
did not always exist--its prior causes are its
extrusion at the foundry, its being put in place by
the owner, and so on. But this level of "causes and
conditions" for the pole's appearance does not
generate the slightest doubt about its concrete,
inherent existence as it stands stolidly before me
at this moment.

Galileo, Locke, and others claim that the human
perceiver's interaction with the object provides the
secondary qualities of the pole--its peculiar shine
of polished aluminum, color, musical sounds, cool
hardness to touch, and so on. (My dog hears higher
frequencies than I do; bees see ultraviolet missing
from my view, but they do not see red; and so on.)
The basis for the secondary qualities are the
primary qualities studied in the physical sciences:
physics, chemistry, and so on. The pole believed to
exist inherently is usually considered the bearer of
primary qualities such as space and time location,
mass, length, diameter, and so on.

Admitting all the subjective contributions
provided by sense functioning, most persons still
have no doubt that a "real" pole exists, localized
in space and time, causing these secondary
qualities, and providing for the common base of
shared experience. The attribute which seems most
essentially to account for the phenomenon's reality
is its independence--independence of other phenomena,
observation, or conceptualization. In other words,
we normally believe that inherent existence is the
wellspring of reality. Clearly identifying the
nature of inherent existence, the object of
negation, is always the first step of the
Maadhyamika analysis.(8) Now let us examine this
nature more closely.

For an object inherently to exist during a given
period of times, it must equally have been
inherently existent in any portion of that period.
Indifference to the lapse of time means the object
is fully itself in any subinterval, no matter how
short. In accord with the Buddhist view, instants or
moments of time are considered atomic, without
internal transitions or movement. Temporal
transition or the flow of time is the succession of
instants.

P.62

Inherent existence is an essential property and
must always pertain to the entire object without
qualifications.(9) Since the object is fully
contained and self-sufficient in any one moment, the
object at one instant has, by definition, no
intrinsic or essential reference to any other
objects at any other time. Because the intrinsically
existent object has no essential references to other
times and yet endures for more than one instant, it
must be intrinsically changeless, unable to produce
or be acted upon. It is impervious and impotent,
locked in its immutable self-nature.(10) An
inherently existent flagpole must be frozen in
eternity--a contradictory conclusion even the most
ardent patriot cannot accept.

An analogous argument can be made using the
object's localization in space. Inherently existent
objects must exist complete and self-contained in a
limited region of space, independent of interaction
with other regions. Just as in the argument based on
time, this inevitably leads to unacceptable
isolation and immutability. Considering inherent
existence as the reality principle leads inevitably
to isolated and inert objects.

The critical point is the total independence of
inherent existence. As Hopkins puts it, "The pivot
of the practice of emptiness and of the generation
of the wisdom that realizes emptiness is the
identification that objects appear as if they exist
in and of themselves."(11) Or later he says, "The
Praasa^ngikas, however, answer that the very words,
'inherent existence' or 'own mode of being,' imply
independence."(12) This independence which seems to
make objects so substantial and real is just what
makes inherent existence contradictory and
self-condemned. Since phenomena lack independence
they must be dependent. What do they depend upon?

Phenomena are defined by and depend upon their
interconnections. We normally believe that
relatedness is an accidental or nonessential
property which occurs between inherently existent
phenomena. In fact, the Maadhyamikas claim that the
essence of phenomena, their most profound nature, is
their relatedness and dependency
(pratiityasamutpaada is dependent arising) and lack
of isolated identity (emptiness is voidness of
independent existence). (The next section gives a
dramatic illustration of this point within special
relativity.) We usually assume inherent existence is
essential for appearance, but according to
Maadhyamika an object's lack of inherent existence,
its emptiness, its dependency, is what makes
phenomena both possible and functional.

It is not too difficult to accept that secondary
qualities, the subjective contributions due to sense
functioning, are a combination of the perceiver's
interaction with the object and conceptual
designations or imputations, as the Praasa^ngika
Maadhyamika stresses. More difficult and more
important is the principle that the very notion of
independently existent objects is an imputation. In
other words, inherent existence is merely a
conceptual designation or imputation--it never has
and never will exist. Not only is there no access to
a

P.63

mind-independent world; such a world does not exist.
Praasa^ngikas claim we are deeply committed to
nonexistents, to conceptual designations or
fabrications, attributions in thought which we
instinctively and compulsively make. This continuous
imputation of inherent existence pervades all
objective and subjective phenomena. We ascribe good
or evil to objects where none actually exists in
them, generate powerful attachments with consequent
suffering--spin the wheel of samsaara on the axle of
inherent existence.

The importance of conceptual imputation for
generating both conventionally existent objects and
their usual contaminate, inherent existence is what
justifies the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika saying that
dependent arising, the king of reasonings, in its
most powerful form is: "All phenomena do not
inherently exist because of being dependently
imputed."(13) They claim that all other reasonings
proving lack of inherent existence derive from this
king of reasons which can, without residues,
overcome the extremes of eternalism and
nihilism.(14)

This ancient and austere Praasa^ngika view has a
strikingly modern ring. Nelson Goodman, along the
way to denying a mind-independent world, makes a
similar point in his celebrated Ways of
Worldmaking(15):

Although conception without perception is merely
empty, perception without conception is blind
(totally inoperative). Predicates, pictures, other
labels, schemata, survive want of application, but
content vanishes without form. We can have words
without a world but no world without words or other
symbols.

Or, as Goodman says in a later work(16): "The
worldmaking mainly in question here is making not
with hands but with minds, or rather with languages
or other symbol systems." (Thurman(17) makes more
extensive connections between Praasa^ngika and
modern Western linguistic analysis by developing
parallels with L. Wittgenstein.) Praasa^ngika fully
agrees with Goodman in denying an independent world,
but despite the importance of mind, they both
scrupulously avoid idealism. For Praasa^ngika, mind
also lacks independent existence and there must be
conventionally existent objects external to
consciousness(18) so that the interdependent minds
and objects can conventionally exist.

In the most inclusive sense nothing inherently
exists for the Praasa^ngika, yet phenomena have a
conventional or nominal existence and perform
functions through dependent arising. They are
efficient. Though phenomena do not inherently exist,
they certainly exist conventionally and their empty
nature prevents them from being inert and
nonfunctional. There is valid knowledge of
conventional realities and right action; to believe
otherwise implies that true knowledge is only about
inherently existent objects. Maadhyamika analysis
attacks our belief in inherent existence, but does
not replace it by some higher principle; hence
emptiness also lacks intrinsic existence. Denying
inherent existence does not imply some higher
affirmation.(19) Maadhyamika dialectic culminates in
a nonaffirming negation--the emptiness of inherent
existence--the Ultimate Truth of phenomena.

P.64

Figure 1: Pole, runner, and garage as seen by an
earth-based observer. L0 denotes rest lengths.

The essence of phenomena is their voidness of
intrinsic existence, and they exist through
dependent arising. Phenomena abide in the "middle
way"--neither inherently existent nor nonexistent,
but as interconnected, as varieties of dependent
arising.

III. RELATIVITY IN MODERN PHYSICS

Rather than give a formal presentation of special
relativity,(20) it is more informative for me to
return to the thirty-foot aluminum flagpole and use
it in a popular relativity example. The pole is
twice the length of a fifteen-foot garage equipped
with extraordinarily high-speed doors at both ends.
At this point all lengths are rest-frame values,
measured with no relative motion between the object
and the observer. When a very fast runner carries
the pole parallel to the ground at a speed of.9C, or
ninety percent the speed of light, the pole can
truly get entirely within the garage for a short
time (see figure 1). In other words, the garage
attendant can quickly close (and then quickly open)
the doors at each end, so the entire pole is
physically within the garage at one time. This
occurs because the pole, moving at .9C relative to
the garage, has a length of thirteen feet, as
measured from the point of view of the garage. A
strange result, but diverse experiments confirm
special relativity's predictions for events that
occur thousands of times each day all over the world
at speeds well above and below.9C. Special
relativity is an essential and integral part of
modern physics. There is little doubt about the
validity of the theory.

To the garage attendant's amazement, once the
runner stops and brings the flagpole up alongside
the garage they both see it is twice as long as the
garage. The rest-frame lengths are truly thirty and
fifteen feet, respectively. Nevertheless, thanks to
relativistic length contraction, the attendant did
get the entire pole within the garage for a brief
moment. But there is no absolute standard

P.65

Figure 2: Pole, runner, and garage as seen by
the runner. Lo denotes rest lengths.

of rest in physical relativity; therefore, as the
runner approaches the garage, he observes, from his
point of view, that the garage is coming toward him
at.9C. In the runner's reference frame, the garage
is therefore contracted to 6.5 feet while his pole
is still thirty feet long (see figure 2). The
genuinely bizarre problem is: how do both doors
close simultaneously so that a thirty-foot pole gets
inside a 6.5-foot garage? I emphasize that the
runner's perspective on the event is in every way
just as legitimate and "real" as the garage
attendant's. The psychology of human perception is
also irrelevant here. The measurements can be made
photographically or by any other piece of apparatus
and stored in a computer for later puzzlement. Take
a moment to relish the paradox.

It is difficult to accept that lengths, times,
and masses of objects are relative to the reference
frame from which the measurements are made. But even
accepting this does not resolve the paradox.
Resolution comes from understanding the relativity
of simultaneity. Both doors shut and enclose the
flagpole for the garage attendant simultaneously (at
one instant); but the doors never close at the same
instant for the runner. The simultaneous events of
the doors closing in the garage attendant's
reference frame are far from simultaneous in the
runners reference frame. For the runner, the pole
can never get entirely inside the garage at any one
time. Thirty feet is truly larger than 6.5 feet!

This example quickly illustrates some important
points of special relativity. The lengths (in the
direction of motion), masses, and time intervals of
moving objects change by a simple multiplicative
factor relative to the values measured by a
stationary observer (the rest-frame values). The
pole has a larger mass for the garage attendant than
for the runner. The ticks of a watch fixed to the
pole would come further apart for the garage
attendant than when the pole's watch is brought to
rest relative to the attendant. All these effects
are

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completely symmetric for each observer. There is no
preferred reference frame--the garage attendant is
not in a privileged position, nor is the runner.
Many physical attributes, generally considered
primary qualities, suffer relativistic changes. But,
as I stress later, not all attributes do.

What then are the intrinsic or inherent mass and
length of the flagpole? Does it truly possess an
intrinsic mass and length? We conventionally take
them as the values measured in the rest frame and
implicitly assume that these are the "real" mass and
length of our inherently existent pole. The message
of relativity is emphatic: it is equally valid to
take the measurements of an observer who moves at.9C
(or at some other speed) relative to the pole. There
is no preferred reference frame and hence no value
of the mass, length, or time which is inherently
more real or fundamental than any other values
measured in a different frame. Thus, there is no
length or mass of the pole separate from or
independent of a particular reference frame.
Reference frame independent or intrinsic lengths,
masses, and other relativistic properties are
meaningless. Relativistic attributes connect to the
rest of the universe and never stand alone like
stars in the dark night sky--they are part of an
extended constellation. The world of classical
physics was badly shaken because some of the most
fundamental (most "real") primary qualities of
objects lost their inherent existence in physical
relativity. On the other hand, as I stress in the
next section, physical relativity has not reduced
everything to dependence upon the reference frame in
which measurements are made.

IV. PARALLELS AND DIVERGENCES

So far there is a striking similarity between
certain aspects of physical relativity and
Maadhyamika dependent arising, although one only
applies to physical phenomena while the other
applies to inner and outer phenomena on all levels.
But conceptual discussions of physical relativity
often fall into the serious error of only stressing
the dependency of space, time, and certain other
physical attibutes upon a particular reference
frame. This dramatic dependency upon reference frame
is what many consider to be the fundamental import
of physical relativity, but from the point of view
of developments in theoretical physics after the
advent of special relativity in 1905, it is more
important that physical relativity discovered
numerous invariants--attributes identical in all
reference frames. The simplest example is the speed
of light in a vacuum, which is the same for all
observers regardless of their state of motion. There
is also a large number of other physical attributes
which are frame independent. More fundamentally,
the laws of physics take the same form in all
reference frames. For example, although the runner
violently disagrees with the garage attendant about
values of certain physical attibutes, two fleas
playing billiards on the moving flag pole find their
game is exactly the same as when they are at rest on
the garage floor because of the frame invariance of

P.67

the laws of mechanics. Or, all the electrical
equipment in an airplane works the same whether it
is on the ground or flying at Mach II or.9C, because
the laws of electromagnetism and quantum mechanics
are frame-invariant.

Given the most sophisticated laboratory
imaginable, it is experimentally impossible to tell
which frame is at rest and which is in uniform
motion because the laws of physics, and thus all
physical experiments, are identical in all reference
frames. The very notions of "rest" and "motion" are
relative, yet all things are not relative in
physical relativity--the invariants are more
important than the relative. In fact, since the
1920s the most important physical theories have been
explicitly constructed to be relativistically
invariant. This means that, whether the theories
deal with the largest scales, as in cosmology, or
the smallest, as in high energy physics, they must
take the same form in any reference frame.

Another way of appreciating the importance of
invariants is to recall that the derivation of
special relativity only requires two assumptions:
first, that the speed of light in a vacuum is the
same for all observers, and second, that the laws of
physics take the same form in ail reference frames.
(These two assumptions require suitable
generalization only in general relativity.) The
entire theory with all its counterintuitive
dependencies of length, mass, and time stems from
these two assumptions--which explicitly embody
invariance right from the beginning.

Although measurements made in any particular
reference frame are relative, this is not true of
the physical theory of relativity itself. The theory
relates measurements in different reference frames
in a fully determined and precise manner and
embodies the invariance of the laws of physics.
Within physical relativity theory, detailed
knowledge of the relative is not relative knowledge.
Peaks of invariants tower above the ocean of the
relative. Does dependent arising in Maadhyamika
similarly point to principles superior to it? Is
there a parallel movement of thought in Maadhyamika?

In Maadhyamika, phenomena always have been and
always will be devoid of independent existence, and
thus emptinesses are not produced phenomena--not
something which comes and goes due to causes and
conditions. Emptinesses are not brought about or
produced by the causes of the individual transient
phenomena, which lack inherent existence; thus
emptinesses are permanent phenomena.(21) In
distinguishing emptiness from the merely
"occasionally permanent," Hopkins writest, "However,
emptiness in general, though not existing as a
separate entity from its specific instances, is
always existent because there never is a moment when
there is no instance of emptiness."(22) Although
emptinesses are particular in that each phenomenon
lacks a specific inherent existence, nonetheless, a
profound realization through direct cognition of the
emptiness of a single phenomenon can lead to a
realization of the emptiness of all world
systems.(23) This permanence, degree

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of independence, and seeming universality of
emptiness might therefore incorrectly suggest that
it, in analogy with the laws of physics, towers
above the dependently related phenomena.

But the Praasa^ngika Maadhyamikas are
adamant--the entire universe, both objective and
subjective, lacks inherent existence and hence
nothing is superior to dependent arising, including
emptiness itself. This is the meaning of a
nonaffirming negation--the denial of inherent
existence implies no other superior principle or
existent. The parallels between physical relativity
and Maadhyamika come to a rude halt on this point.
Although it is true that emptiness is a permanent
phenomenon, it still depends upon the phenomenon it
qualifies and an imputing consciousness.(24) This
dependency of emptiness guarantees its lack of a
self-standing nature. Furthermore, the particularity
of emptiness, it being the lack of independent
existence of a unique phenomenon, does not conflict
with the emptiness that qualifies all phenomena.
Just as a particular whole number embodies the
nature of integers, so does the mathematical-type
integer.

Given this permanence, degree of independence,
and seeming universality of emptiness, it is natural
to seek a parallel in Maadhyamika with the
development of higher forms of independence as in
physical relativity. But this would be another
example of the inveterate tendency of the mind to
reify, to imput incorrectly inherent existence. As
pointed out in the previous paragraph, despite the
permanence and limited independence and universality
of emptiness, Ultimate Truth is not substantive,
inherently existing, or self-standing. Rather,
emptiness is formulated within the doctrine of the
two truths wherein there are two complementary views
of phenomena, one ultimate, where all is empty, and
the other conventional, where objects have an
existence, functionality, and efficiency in the
realm of everyday action. All phenomena or objects
of knowledge are included within the two truths.
Though the flagpole is totally void of independent
existence, it conventionally or nominally exists and
flags can be hoisted on it. Normal life and
discourse is in the realm of conventional truth, but
we unfortunately contaminate conventional truth
(and, occasionally, even ultimate truth) by imputing
inherent existence to it. The Ultimate Truth,
emptiness, though a permanent phenomenon with a
degree of independence and universality, is still
empty--a nonaffirming negation of inherent
existence. Any formulation of the Ultimate Truth
must be a conventional phenomenon--nominally existent
but thoroughly empty of independent existence.

As for physical relativity and its
frame-invariant laws and attributes, the Maadhyamika
philosophers would quickly point out that all
physics is an elaborate conceptual imputation, an
interaction between man and nature--neither of which
independently exists. All the objects and laws of
physics must lack inherent existence, whether
frame-invariant or not--a view shared by a large
body of philosophers and scientists. For example,
Goodman holds

P.69

that the version of the world presented by physics
is one of many possible worlds, a version
inseparable from the world described, but in no way
the only or preferred world. Maadhyamika would
assert that the discerning physicist would not want
to burden any objects or laws in hysics with the
contradictory attribute of inherent existence,
thereby rendering them impotent and inert.

Physical relativity and Maadhyamika also
understand causality differently. The view of
causality in physical relativity has its roots in
classical or prerelativity physics. There causality,
or more precisely determinism, means that a prior
event is the efficient agent which transforms a
preexistent entity into the caused event or effect.
The law is inviolable: a given set of causes always
yields the same result. Implicit in this view is the
assumption of a self-subsistent or inherently
existent entity undergoing some transformation. For
example, a force generates or causes an acceleration
of an independently existent particle of specified
mass, as predicted by Newton's Second Law of motion.

In the transition from classical Newtonian
physics to physical relativity, causality only
undergoes modest changes. Except for the
relativistically affected physical attributes
mentioned above, objects are still considered
inherently to exist. The main addition is that the
cause cannot propagate its effect faster than the
speed of light in a vacuum. Relativity theory shows
that this constraint guarantees all observers a
consistent view of determinism: causes always occur
before effects, despite the relativity of space and
time. Quantum mechanics drastically revises this
notion of inherently existent objects along with
causality and brings them more in line with
Praasa^ngika Maadhyamika, a subject I treated in a
recent paper.(25)

In contrast to causality in physical relativity,
Maadhyamika causality is a more general dependence
of phenomena on causes and conditions which
establishes the dependently related nature of
phenomena. Rather than deterministic causality with
its inherently existent objects acting as material
or efficient causes, the doctrine of emptiness has
mutual dependence of relative phenomena or essential
relatedness. For practical purposes in Maadhyamika,
causality can still be conventionally or nominally
understood in the usual fashion. For example, mental
afflictions can be reliably transformed by
appropriate mental exercises. In fact, the
Maadhyamika spiritual practice relies on a precise
understanding of the causal laws of psychology, but
it never loses sight of the truth that if the
subjective factors were inherently existent there
could be no transformation. A correct view of
emptiness is essential for practice.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Maadhyamika critique shows the contradictory
nature of inherent existence, thereby establishing
the doctrine of emptiness. The quality of
independence, believed to provide for the reality of
objects, is the fatal weakness in

P.70

inherent existence. Yet the Maadhyamika claim that,
despite any superficial intellectual commitments we
have, all but the most advanced practitioners
innately believe in and impute inherent existence.
As Hopkins says: "This 'inherent existence' is not a
concept superimposed by philosophical systems but
refers to our ordinary sense of the way that things
exist--as if they concretely exist in and of
themselves, covering their parts."(26) Analysis
shows the absurdity of inherent existence, but it
nonetheless has our deepest emotional commitment.

The Maadhyamikas emphasize that the revolution
in attitude required for realizing Nirvana cannot be
got from just an intellectual understanding of
emptiness. Arduous intellectual effort must combine
with poweful meditative techniques for removing
mental afflictions and deepening the understanding
of emptiness. Above all, the development of great
compassion ignites and fuels the fire of wisdom
which in turn makes compassion possible. In other
words, a profound realization of emptiness requires
the practice of compassion, and the wisdom of
emptiness makes the practice of compassion possible
by removing our belief in isolatedly existing
individuals. The highest goal is not personal
liberation, but attainment as a means for the relief
of suffering of all sentient beings. The best
exemplars, the Bodhisattvas, delay their final
liberation from the wheel of suffering to work for
the liberation of others.

Despite the modern controversy surrounding the
interpretation of Maadhyamika.(27) it is clear that
their highest goal is the liberation of all sentient
beings from the suffering and ignorance of samsaara.
Since the mistaken belief in inherent existence and
our inveterate imputation of it on phenomena
shackles us to samsaara, there is no quicker way to
obtain release than to attack this fetter. For this
reason the Maadhyamikas make a Herculean effort to
rid us of this poison.

As I showed above. it is dangerous to get
support from physical relativity in combating this
poison. Since the ideas of physical relativity are
increasingly being assimilated into our intellectual
heritage--however imperfectly--it is impossible to
translate the pivotal term pratiityasamutpaada as
relativity without getting associations from
science. There are points of genuine similarity
between dependent arising and physical relativity,
and an appreciation of physical relativity can help
in understanding Maadhyamika. But the divergence of
their views on causality and especially the status
of their highest principles makes associations
hazardous, and it is a psychological law that the
part represents and invokes the whole association.

After destroying our belief in intrinsic or
frame-independent mass, length, time, and other
physical properties, the great glory of physical
relativity is the development of a fully invariant
or frame-independent formulation of the laws of
physics. From the smoldering ashes of our belief in
independent physical attributes a fully invariant
physics rises up like a great Phoenix. Independence
returns at a higher level! In contrast, when
Maadhyamika destroys our

P.71

belief in the intrinsic existence of phenomena we
are left with a nonaffirming negation--emptiness.
Rather than restore the vanquished principle of
independent existence in some higher or more secure
form, we are left with sheer dependency and
interconnectedness. The Ultimate Truth is the
voidness of independent existence in all
phenomena--including emptiness. The mind must be
left with no inherently existent thing or principle.
Something which never could nor will exist shall
never arise from the Maadhyamika pyre.
Unfortunately, the association of emptiness with
physical relativity offers perilous opportunities
for imputing inherent existence upon the Ultimate
Truth itself.

The present Dalai Lama cites(28) Naagaarjuna's
famous Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa (XIII, 8) as:

The Conquerors said that emptiness
Is the remover of all [bad] views;
Those who view emptiness [as inherently existent]
Were said to be incurable.

None of those mentioned above who translate
pratiityasamutpaada as relativity ascribe inherent
existence to emptiness. Nevertheless, associating
emptiness and physical relativity with the latter's
pervasive invariants and absolutes unnecessarily
exposes us to this incurable disease."

There are many profound sympathies between
Maadhyamika and modern science, especially in
quantum mechanics. However, in our culture,
dominated by the scientific-materialistic world
view, it is hazardous to make imprecise associations
with science. For this reason I agree with Inada
when he says: "This technical term undoubtedly does
have 'strains' of the relativistic notion but not in
the normal or in the scientific sense.

NOTES

1. Tsong Khapa, "The Short Essence of True
Eloquence Eulogy of Buddha Shakyamuni for This
Teaching of Relativity," in Robert Thurman. Tsong
Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True
Eloquence (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1984), p. 177.

2. T. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist
Nirvana (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978 rep.).

3. T. R. Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism
(London, Allen & Unwin, 1968).

4. Thurman, Tsong Khapa's Speech.

5. Kenneth K. Inada, Naagaarjuna: A Translation
of His Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa (Tokyo, Hokuseido
Press, 1970), p. 17.

6. Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness
(London: Wisdom Publications, 1983), pp. 36-37.
Hopkins provides a less technical, but equally
careful, treatment of the topics in this book in the
more recent Emptiness Yoga (Ithaca, New York: snow
Lion, 1987). My citations are to the more technical
book.

7. Thurman, Tsong Khapa's Speech, pp. 137-149,
and Hopkins, Meditation. pp. 127-196.

8. Thurman, Tsong Khapa's Speech, p. 137;
Hopkins, Meditation, pp. 625-638.

9. Richard H. Robinson, "Did Naagaarjuna Really
Refute All Philosophical Views? Philosophy East
and West 22, no. 3 (July 1972): 325-330.

P.72

10. Thurman, Tsong Khapa's Speech, pp. 157-158.

11. Hopkins, Meditation, p. 10.

12. Ibid., p. 38.

13. Ibid., p. 168.

14. Ibid., p. 167; Thurman, Tsong Khapa's
Speech, pp. 146-147.

15. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company,
1978), p. 6.

16. Nelson Goodman, Of Mind and Other Matters
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1984), p. 42.

17. Thurman, Tsong Khapa's Speech, pp. 90-111.

18. Hopkins, Meditation, pp. 367-368; Thurman,
Tsong Khapa's Speech, p. 316.

19. Hopkins, Meditation, pp. 721-727; Thurman,
Tsong Khapa's Speech, pp. 166-167.

20. Limiting the discussion to special
relativity restricts the analysis to nonaccelerating
reference frames and phenomena not depending upon
gravity. General relativity removes these
restrictions and universalizes the arguments to all
possible reference frames.

21. Hopkins, Meditation, pp. 215-217.

22. Ibid., p. 216.

23. Ibid., pp. 408-409.

24. Ibid., p. 432.

25. V. Mansfield, "Maadhyamika Buddhism and
Quantum Mechanics: Beginning a Dialogue," to be
published in International Philosophical Quarterly.

26. Hopkins, Meditation, p. 9.

27. E. Naper, "Dependent-Arising and Emptiness"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, 1985; available from University
Microfilms), chaps. 4-6, which offer a good analysis
of the controversy.

28. Tenzin Gyatso, The Buddhism of Tibet, trans.
J. Hopkins and L. Rimpoche (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1975), p. 76.