Review Article

·期刊原文
Review Article

THE YOGAACAARA IDEALISM(1)
By ALEX WAYMAN
Philosophy East and West
volume 15(1965)
P.65-73
(C) by the University of Hawaii Press

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

P.65

A GENERAL SURVEY of idealism in India has
already been made by Raju,(2) but some other authors
do not concede the validity of his inclusion of so
many schools of Indian philosophy as well as leading
philosophers of India in this philosophical
category. Thus, Chatterjee, in the book under
consideration, admits as an idealistic school in
Hinduism only the special interpretation of the
Advaita Vedaanta known as d.r.s.ti-s.r.s.ti-vaada
(the school of those holding that perception is
creation) . (3) On the other hand, Padmarajiah
understands the latter interpretation (by
Prakaa`saananda) as a reasonable one for the
Advaita, which thus holds to an Absolute Idealism
rather than to the "so-called Objective Idealism"
(which "attributes 'objectivism' to a philosophy of
objectless reality").(4) Certain mystic or occult
doctrines of the Upani.sads seem to favor the growth
of idealistic philosophy, and thus to provide a
rationale for the generality of Raju's coverage. It
may be valuable to expand upon this idea by relevant
considerations which Chatterjee does not touch upon
or deal with as the present writer would.

The almost universal acceptance in India of the
doctrine of rebirth, along with the consequences of
karma, could easily have swung all Indian
philosophical systems to idealism. This doctrine
holds that the multitudinous personal experiences of
the present, as well as the characteristics of the
body holding the experiencing self, are the
expression of past acts carried in some residual and
seminal form by a transmigrating principle. When
such a doctrine comes to be implemented by theories
of being and knowledge, philosophy enters the
discussion. And then it turns out that this doctrine
could, but need not, give rise to an idealistic
philosophy. While Max Muller thought the Saa^mkhya
was idealistic--after all, it teaches that the sense
organs evolve from aha^mkaara

----------

1 Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogaacaara
Idealism, Banaras Hindu University Dar`sana Series,
No. 3 (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1962).
Pp. xii + 309.

2 P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953).

3 The Yogaacaara Idealism, p, 244.

4 Y. J. Padmarajiah, A Comparative Study of the
Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge (Bombay:
Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963), pp. 291 ff.
(Published posthumously.)

P.66

(egotism)--his was an unaccepted conclusion. The
Saa^mkhya teaches a material evolution from prak.rti
(primordial substance), each successively coarser
grade of substance being invested with, and
variously exemplifying, the passive consciousness of
puru.sa (person) . The first evolute is buddhi
(intellect); the second, aha^mkaara, which is the
grade of substance through which identifying and
"belonging" consciousness first manifests, to become
the source of all attachment. In this system, a
subtle body is the transmigrating principle.

Early Buddhism emphasized karma ("action") as
what transmigrates--and this is as surprising to a
first reading as is the Saa^mkhya theory of
evolutes. If one goes further into the Buddhist
texts he finds out that the karma that determines
destination (gati) after death is explained as an
important meaning of manas-karma ("acts of mind")
and finds out that this particular manas-karma is
cetanaa ("volition"). This word "cetanaa" has the
root cit- ("to think"), which is the root of the
word citta, often translated "mind," as in the
expression "Mind Only" (cittamaatra), a frequent
title for doctrines of the Yogaacaara school. Later
Buddhism used the expression "citta-sa^mtaana" or
"citta-sa^mtati" (both: "stream of thoughts") for
the transmigrating entity. Thus, the words "karma"
and "citta" are doctrinally equivalent to indicate
the transmigrating entity. If a "stream of thoughts"
can bring about a set of external circumstances
compensatory and retributive of past acts, we have
at once the idealistic picture of a subjective
element of a conscious or subconscious nature
projecting the "world." If this is true for early
Buddhism, it cannot be the whole truth, because
early Buddhism was certainly realistic and
pluralistic also.

The Buddhist Yogaacaara text called
Madhyaanta-vibha^nga sets up a rival theory to that
of the Saa^mkhya for showing the evolution and
resolution of the worlds, but in common with other
Indian schools has the influential Saa^mkhya system
before it as a guide. Thus, the Buddhist text
replaces the Saa^mkhya puru.sa with the "imagination
of unreality" (abhuutaparikalpa) and replaces
prak.rti with "voidness" (`suunyataa) . In this
Buddhist system, both the "imagination of unreality"
and "voidness" are real, co-exist, and are yet
distinct.(5) Apparently, these identifications have
not been recognized by modern writers on Indian
philosophy, although some have come close.
"Voidness" is the Absolute in this system, and
agrees for the most part with what is said by
Raju: (6) "One significant point is that this
Absolute is conceived to be the material cause of
the world. This conception belongs not only to the
Vedaantic but also to Buddhistic idealism. Ultimate
reality, paramaarthasatya, even as

-----------

5 Cf. Alex Wayman, "The Buddhist 'Not This, Not
This,'" Philosophy East and West, XI, No. 3 (Oct.,
1961), 102.

6 Idealistic Thought of India, p. 417.

P.67

`suunya, is said to be the tathaagata-garbha or the
womb of the tathaagata, which is the source of
everything." Where Raju goes astray is in including
the tathaagata-garbha--often equated with the
Yogaacaara aalayavij~naana (ideation store)--which
should be translated by Buddhist usage as "embryo of
tathaagata" (one who has come the same way, i.e., a
buddha) and which pertains to the "imagination of
unreality," rather than to the "voidness" principle.
Dasgupta comes close when he says, "I am led to
think that `Sa^nkara's philosophy is largely a
compound of Vij~naanavaada and `Suunyavaada Buddhism
with the Upani.sad notion of the permanence of self
superadded."(7) Here the word "Vij~naanavaada"
refers to the Yogaacaara kind of idealism. In short,
Voidness, or the pure dharmadhaatu (realm of
natures), is the material cause of the world, while
the "imagination of unreality" is the formal cause.
In respect to content, this system is realistic; in
respect to form, it is idealistic. For example, the
shape of a pot stems from the mind of the potter,
but not the clay. The latter comes from nature
(dharma) and abides whether a potter arises or not.

That is certainly not understood by Chatterjee,
as he often and variously says, e.g., "The
Yogaacaara holds that consciousness is the sole
reality."(8) This half-truth does not originate with
Chatterjee; indeed, he simply inherits an evaluation
of the Yogaacaara almost omnipresent in surveys of
Indian philosophy. European writers who deal with
Buddhism in the English language also take for
granted the basic idea of the Yogaacaara and develop
the theme accordingly. At the outset, Chatterjee is
given the supposed "sole" reality of Yogaacaara
philosophy; and, as a philosophical dissertation,
exerts a kind of temporary philosophical empathy
with this "sole" reality, expanding upon it with
fine philosophical sentences to the point where he
can compare it with other systems of thought, such
as realism and the Advaita as well as with other
forms of idealism (in which he does not include the
Advaita). For this purpose, it is not a serious
drawback that he does not employ Tibetan or Chinese
texts, or their French translations, of the
Yogaacaara school.(9) Such works would have enriched
his source material. But, as long as he holds to his
presupposition of the fundamental Yogaacaara
position, and has control over one language of the
relevant texts--it was Sanskrit--to write a
philosophical dissertation on the subject required
his obvious training in philosophical ways of
thinking rather than more philological background.

------

7 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian
Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge: At the University
Press, 1932), p. 494.

8 The Yogaacaara Idealism, p. 59.

9 One work can be mentioned that might have been
helpful: Etienne Lamotte, La somme du grand vehicule
d'Asa^nga (Mahaayaanasa^mgraha), Tome II, Traduction
et commentaire, Fascicule 2 (Chapitres III a X)
(Louvain: Bureaux du Museon, 1939). The very first
pages deal with the problem of the relation between
the bodhisattva and the dharmadhaatu.

P.68

Of course, there is a good reason for thinking,
"The Yogaacaara holds that consciousness is the sole
reality." This is an interpretation of Vasubandhu's
intent in his two little treatises--Twenty Stanzas
[on Ideation Only] and Thirty Stanzas [on Ideation
Only].(10) In the former work, Vasubandhu stresses
ideation-only (vij~naptimaatra) because he is
setting forth the process of world illusion created
by the Madhyaanta-vibha^nga's "imagination of
unreality." However, in verse 10 (numbering of the
Sanskrit text) he sets forth the necessity to enter
first the "selflessness of personality"
(pudgalanairaatmya) and then the "selflessness of
dharmas" (dharmanairaatmya), thereby indicating the
two aspects of reality and inferring as well the two
truths--conventional truth (sa^mv.rtisatya) and
absolute truth (paramaarthasatya). In the latter
work, Vasubandhu again stresses ideation-only
because he is setting forth the removal of the world
illusion. However, throughout this second work he
speaks of two elements, beginning the first verse
with the expression aatmadharmopacaaro ("attachment
to self and dharma") . Sthiramati's commentary
explains these two as the corruption-covering
(kle`saavara.na) and the knowable-covering
(j~neyaavara.na), which are, respectively, removed
by the two kinds of selflessness mentioned in the
former work. Again, Vasubandhu alludes to the
voidness reality in verse 25 of the second work with
the words dharmaa.naa^m paramaartha`s ca ("the
supreme state of dharmas"). In early Buddhism, it
was said that whether tathaagatas do or do not
arise, the true nature (dharmataa) of dharmas
abides, meaning the moral law, impermanence of
natures.(11) In Mahaayaana Buddhism, it is again
said that whether tathaagatas do or do not arise,
the dharmadhaatu remains, and this is the voidness
of all the dharmas. The adepts of the Hiinayaana and
of the Mahaayaana attain this "non-discerning true
nature'' (avikalpadharmataa), but the adept of the
Mahaayaana, i.e., the tathaagata, has in addition
the knowledge and glory of a buddha.(12) The
Mahaayaana text teaching that, namely, the
Da`sabhuumika-suutra, is the one with the celebrated
doctrine that the three worlds are "Mind Only"
(cittamaatra).(13)

-------

10 The original Sanskrit for the two treatises,
each with Sanskrit commentary, was published by
Sylvain Levi, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi (Paris:
Librairie ancienne honore champion, 1925), as No.
245 in the series Bibliotheque de l`Ecole des hautes
etudes, Sciences historiques et philologiques. The
two works as translated from Chinese into English
are in S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore, eds., A
Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 328-337. The
commentarial tradition as translated from Sanskrit
into Chinese is rendered and annotated in French by
Louis de La Vallee-Poussin,
Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang
(Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928,
1929), Tomes I and II; Index (Paris: same publisher,
1948).

11 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 93,
remarks based on the Paali Anguttara-nikaaya, i.285.

12 J. Rahder, Da`sabhuumikasuutra et
Bodhisattvabhuumi (Chapitres Vihaara et Bhuumi)
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1926), p. 65.

13 Ibid., p. 49.

P.69

Vasubandhu's stress on Ideation Only is
consistent with the standard doctrine of Buddhism
through all its periods that the person whose mind
is stabilized or concentrated sees things as they
really are. From the beginning, the theory was that
an entity can be somehow visualized mentally in
better, more real or truer form than in ordinary
sense perception. To remove error and illusion, one
has to do something about the foundations of mind,
rehabilitate or transform it. In an ethical sense,
the acts of speech and body are dependent upon the
acts of mind; the fatter are the real villain or
saint. In yoga training, one should transfer the
object to the mind, then eliminate all mental
straying from the meditative object and avoid any
alteration of the meditative object itself. In the
final stage of such meditation, the object ceases to
be the object, since the subject-object relation has
been transcended. With the "eye of praj~naa"--which
is no "eye"--the mediator sees the entity in the
form of the void: he has carried it back to the
realm where it abides in itself, devoid of all
adventitious relations, and so it is not the
"object" of a "subject." The Madhyaanta-vibha^nga
teaches that the "imagination of unreality" creates
dependent origination (pratiitya-samutpaada) and the
unreal subject-object relation, and that liberation
is achieved by elimination of the subject-object
duality. It is no wonder, then, that Vasubandhu
should write his two classic treatises about
Ideation Only. But he does not forget the viewpoint
of the Madhyaanta-vibha^nga, on which he wrote the
basic commentary. The Buddhist path is principally
in terms of mental training and reorienting, but the
goal of the Yogaacaara school was the condition of
the dharmadhaatu or voidness free from
subject-object duality--the condition called
parini.spanna (perfect). Then the "imagination of
unreality" is in voidness, and voidness in it. So,
the two inseparable reals.

The distinctness of the two reals is shown by
such statements as whether or not a tathaagata
arises, the void dharmadhaatu abides--comparable to
saying, whether or not a potter arises, the void
clay abides. Immediately it follows that a
tathaagata, foremost of all, and all other beings,
selves, persons, pertain to the category called
"imagination of unreality." And all grades of
matter, subtle or coarse, pertain to the void
dharmadhaatu. The inseparability of the two reals
derives from the fact that man has devised this
system of thought; and man cannot conceive of an act
of thinking apart from a substantial vehicle for
thought, cannot conceive of a form without a
content. It is significant that the theory of three
buddha bodies arose in the Yogaacaara school. The
one called dharmakaaya (body of natures) is on the
side of the Void Absolute, the self-abiding
Dharmadhaatu (realm of natures). The two other
realms, sa^mbhogakaaya (body of bliss) and
nirmaa.nakaaya (body of transformation), are on the
side of the "imagination of unreality" in the sense,
respectively, of the puru.sa

P70

(person) and maayaa (illusion-creating power) .
Hence, Mahaayaana Buddhism teaches that the
sa^mbhogakaaya has the thirty-two characteristics of
the Great Person (mahaapuru.sa), and teaches that
the nirmaa.nakaaya has the power of magical creation
of different bodies, comparable to the illusory
power that is maayaa (and the two expressions are
based on the same Sanskrit root, maa-). So, the
Yogaacaara school does have a subjective kind of
idealistic philosophy limited to formal cause. The
myriad forms of things are no more real than the
forms seen in dream: they are all projections of
mind--foundation mind or evolving mind
(aalayavij~naana or prav.rttivij~naana; citta or
caitta)--on the blank screen (voidness) that is the
Absolute in this system, pure substance of unlimited
impressionability, capability, efficiency. The
reality of voidness is paramaarthasatya, literally:
the actual fact of the supreme thing (artha). The
reality of the "imagination of unreality" is
sa^mv.rtisatya, literally: the actual fact of the
covering process. Thus, the "imagination of
unreality" covers the pure dharmadhaatu with
transient dharmas (sa^msk.rta-dharmas), which arise
and pass away with "dependency characteristic"
(paratantra-lak.sa.na), while it covers itself with
corruptions (kle`sa) having the "imaginary
characteristic" (parikalpita-lak.sa.na). And when
the pure dharmadhaatu is free from those transient
dharmas evoked by the subject-object covering, it
has the "perfect characteristic"
(pari.spanna-lak.sa.na) . But, before the
dharmadhaatu can become free of the "dependency
characteristic," the "imagination of unreality" must
become free of the "`imaginary characteristic."
Therefore the prescription: first, selflessness of
personality, and, next, selflessness of dharmas.
That is the Yogaacaara in brief.

While the Madhyaanta-vibha^nga does not discuss
how the system takes account of the multiplicity of
beings, one can infer this topic in Saa^mkhya-like
fashion, according to the explanations of Dasgupta.
He explains that the first evolute of prak.rti,
called buddhi, has a preponderance of
intelligence-stuff (sattva); "it thus holds within
it the minds (buddhi) of all puru.sas which were
lost in prak.rti during the pralaya [the quiescent
period]." At the beginning of the new evolution,
there is a separating out of the old buddhis, or
minds, belonging to the puru.sas from beginningless
time, and each of these buddhis holds the old
specific ignorance (avidyaa). This stage is called
mahat (the great one) because it is the synthetic
unity of all the minds of the puru.sas.(14) There is
as yet no individual evolution, as this will begin
with the next evolute, that called aha^mkaara. The
equivalent statement in Yogaacaara terminology is
that the "imagination of unreality" is the synthetic
unity of individual citta-sa^mtaanas ("streams of
thoughts") , each with its specific dharma.
Individual evolution

-------------
14 A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp.
248-249.

P.71

begins at the next stage with dependent origination.
Elsewhere I have equated its first three members
with the three kinds of Saa^mkhya aha^mkaara, as
follows:

(1) unwisdom (avidyaa) = taamasika aha^mkaara

(2) motivation (sa^mskaara) = raajasika aha^mkaara

(3) perception (vij~naana) = saattvika aha^mkaara.(15)

The pre-aha^mkaara stages of the "imagination of
unreality" are difficult to describe. Before the
equilibrium is upset it seems to be what some
Mahaayaana scriptures call the tathaagata-garbha
(embryo of the tathaagata). At this point, since
there is as yet no subject-object duality, this
element is not "aimed" at the pure dharmadhaatu. The
first change that occurs is a kind of "turning
around" which causes the tathaagata-garbha to be
reversed into the aalayavij~naana (the basic
perception) , which, the Madhyaanta-vibha^nga
explains, has as object the mere object (artha). As
such, the aalayavij~naana corresponds to the
Saa^mkhya buddhi, which, as Dasqupta explains, has a
mere understanding as "thisness."(16) The first of
the evolving perceptions is called the
kli.s.tamanas, and, according to the same text, its
object is the qualities of the thing
(arthavi`se.sa) . This kli.s.tamanas must then
correspond to aha^mkaara and inaugurate dependent
origination.

Chatterjee writes, "For the Vedaantin the
function of Avidyaa consists in covering up the
real, which is the unrelated object, the rope, and
showing in its place; the snake; the snake is false
because it is subjective which has being only as it
is related with consciousness (Praatibhaasika). The
Yogaacaara holds that the function of Avidyaa is
just the reverse, the snake is perfectly real as the
form of the subjective; its illusoriness consists in
its objectification; the snake is false because it
is objective,"(17) The foregoing discussion leads to
the comment that the person Chatterjee here calls
the "Vedaantin" could just as well have been called
the "Yogaacaara" person, with one qualification.
That is, when one goes into the foundations of the
Yogaacaara school to expound the Yogaacaara in ways
Chatterjee does not--one finds that at the stage of
aalayavij~naana there is still no positive
falsification because there is mere object and
nothing else, and so the initial subjectivity does
not alter the rope into the snake: this is the one
qualification. But this initial subjectivity has
"set the ball rolling": it is a privation of snake,
a forecast of snake. Once the subject-object duality
has been posited, the next stage of "evolving
perception" (kli.s.tamanas) is inevitable and
necessarily introduces the positive falsification,
because the re-emerging ignorance (avidyaa) causes
the subject to project various transient

----------

15 Alex Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination
and the Saa^mkhya Gu.nas, " Ethnos, 1962 (The
Ethnographical Museum of Sweden, Stockholm), pp.
14-22.

16 A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p.
250.

17 The Yogaacaara Idealism, p. 183.

P.72

dharmas onto the object in the dharmadhaatu. From
that time on, the rope is always falsified into the
snake; that is, unless one reverses the process by
yoga meditation or other means to the point where he
re-attains the stage of aalayavij~naana and then
introduces a transmutation (paraav.rtti) or "turning
around" of this element so that it re-becomes the
tathaagata-garbha. Then what shall we say of the
person Chatterjee calls the "Yogaacaara"? The latter
is the one who "holds that consciousness is the sole
reality." Chatterjee very well states how this
so-called "Yogaacaara" individual regards the
function of avidyaa.

In Chatterjee's excellent chapter entitled
"Dharma Theory in the Yogaacaara," he brings forth
some facts that might have been, or at least ought
to have been, disquieting to him regarding the
thesis of consciousness-only as the sole reality.
Besides the caita.sika-dharmas (the dharmas related
to thought), there are the dharmas called ruupas,
"out of which the objective world is made." Since
Chatterjee is consistent to the last with this
imputation to the Yogaacaara that for it
subjectivity is the only reality, the objective
world false by virtue of objectivity, he is now
forced to say, "It is consciousness itself which
creates and projects these ruupas, making them seem
as though external and independent." This amounts to
saying that the ruupas, which include such things as
the four elements (fire, wind, etc.) and their
derivatives, are projections of thought, but
unaccountably the Yogaacaara school believes in
these ruupas and still does not classify them as
caita.sika-dharmas, which would have proved
Chatterjee's point. The next group of dharmas, called
citta-viprayuktasa^mskaara-dharmas, are even harder
to fit into the usual theory--the expression
means "the dharmas or sa^mskaaras that are
independent of mind (citta)." Chatterjee now
writes, "Though they must ultimately pertain to
consciousness in order to attain reality, their
relation to consciousness is not very apparent. They
are really 'forces' or functions which are neither
specifically material nor mental; they can belong to
either indifferently." However, one need not be
forced into this logical corner if one admits at the
beginning of the discussion the two realities which
the Madhyaanta-vibha^nga set forth in its first
verse.(18)

These considerations could be continued in
extenso, but the conclusion would be the same. If
Chatterjee's "Yogaacaara" is indeed the Yogaacaara
person that Vasubandhu was, then Chatterjee's book
is certainly a wonderful exposition of the
Yogaacaara philosophy. But, if the Yogaacaara
fundamentals are what I have indicated above,
happening to be in rough agreement with Raju and
with Dasgupta, the Chatterjee book is still worth
reading as a philosophical exegesis of what was
traditionally held, principally by non-Yogaacaarins,
to be the Yogaacaara position. And I cannot help
admiring the sinewy thread of philosophical
discourse by which he expands his presupposition.

-------------

18 Ibid., pp. 143-166, especially pp. 163-165.

P.73

The "dharmas that are independent of mind''
deserve some further consideration. These dharmas
are included in the Abhidharma-samuccaya of Asa^nga,
the elder brother of Vasubandhu and founder of the
Yogaacaara school. Among this class of dharmas, nine
seem to correspond to Vai`se.sika reals, and eight
of these are designations (praj~napti) for some
feature of the cause-and-effect continuum. For
example, "time" (kaala) is among these and is
defined by Asa^nga as a designation for the
evolution of the cause-and-effect continuum.(19) In
Yogaacaara philosophy, the cause-and-effect
continuum is what is meant by the "dependency
characteristic" (paratantra-lak.sa.na), which covers
the dharmadhaatu.(20) The dharmadhaatu as voidness
is the foundation for objectivity as impressed upon
the dharmadhaatu by the "imagination of unreality."
While the various forms conjured up by that
imagination are unreal, the underlying substance,
the content of those forms, is real. So, the
cause-and-effect continuum is not quite real, not
quite unreal. However, Asa^nga has no qualms about
including dharmas equivalent to Vai`se.sika reals.
One interpretation is that Asa^nga intends these
particular dharmas to mean something quite different
from what they mean in the Vai`se.sika system.
Asa^nga employs them in roughly the same way as does
the Vai`se.sika, for Asa^nga in adhering to an
idealistic viewpoint of the Mahaayaana did not
thereby reject or forget the realistic viewpoint of
the Hiinayaana.(21)

--------------

19 Pralhad Pradhan, ed., Abhidharma-samuccaya
(Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950), text, p. 11.

20 Cf. Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi, La Siddhi de
Hiuan-Tsang, II, p. 526.

21 Cf. Alex Wayman, Analysis of the
`Sraavakabhuumi Manuscript, University of Cailfornia
Publications in Classical Philology, Vol. 17
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1961), p.
29.