Reviews the book `Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation

·期刊原文
Reviews the book `Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation
Movements in Asia,' by Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King

Source: by, Michael G. Barnhart
Review of Politics

Vol. 59 No. 3 Summer.1997

Pp.613-618

Copyright by Review of Politics

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LIBERATION BUDDHISM

Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King, editors: Engaged Buddhism:
Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia. (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1996. Pp. 446. $24.95.)

Engaged Buddhism represents a considerably expanded discussion begun in a
1990 panel at the American Academy of Religion entitled "Buddhist
Liberation Movements." The book consists of eleven substantial papers that
offer portraits of a variety of Buddhist social reform organizations and
their leaders sandwiched between beginning and closing essays that address
thematic and philosophical issues raised by these movements. By and large,
each movement corresponds to a separate country and is the product of
unique cultural and historical circumstances. Hence, the collection has the
feel of a tour of South and Southeast Asia from India and Sri Lanka through
Thailand and Vietnam, although Japan is also represented through a
discussion of the Soka Gakkai movement. The book is well organized, and
most of the separate essays are quite readable and engaging. Sometimes
there is more detail on activities and fund raising than would interest
most readers, but on the whole the various contributors maintain an
evenhanded approach with attention to the larger issues at stake.

To many readers, myself included, this is fairly unfamiliar material. And
insofar as Engaged Buddhism brings these groups to light this is a service
not only to Buddhist studies but to political theorists and philosophers
generally. The first question that naturally arises is "What is a Buddhist
liberation movement?" Furthermore, one might wonder, to what degree does it
differ from other sorts of "liberation movements"? Chris Queen's preface
and introductory essay answer by proposing "that a modern liberation
movement is a voluntary association guided by exemplary leaders and a
common vision of a new society (or world) based on peace, justice, and
freedom. Today's Buddhist liberation movements in Asia exemplify these
features, appropriately expressed in language and styles of conduct that
its members deem to be 'Buddhist'" (p. 10). As to the meaning of the term
Buddhist in this context there is less unanimity. Just as Buddhism
represents a variety of traditions (Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana) and
orientations (monastic versus secular), so these movements equally share a
remarkable variety of interpretations of the doctrinal basics of Buddhism.
However, the fact that they all deal in one form or another with the basic
tenets and interpret them in ways that have hermeneutical precedent within
the tradition becomes Queen's justification for labeling these movements
Buddhist despite the tradition's own tendency to fragment, sometimes into
mutually opposing camps.

In other words, each of these movements justifies its actions and promotes
an agenda based on some interpretation of traditional Buddhist doctrines.
Furthermore, these movements share similar goals primarily of world peace
and social justice, particularly in the form of assistance to the poor and
underprivileged, goals involving a refocus of Buddhist doctrine from an
other-worldly attainment to a "mundane awakening .... which includes
individuals, villages, nations, and ultimately all people, and which
focuses on objectives that may be achieved and recognized in this lifetime,
in this world" (p. 9). Generally, there are two directions one can go in
Buddhism in making this connection between the traditional goal of
attaining nirvana and compassionate assistance to those who suffer in the
worldly sense. The first derives more or less from the Theravada tradition
and the moral code (sila) set down for all Buddhists. The other route is
through the typically Mahayana emphasis on the concepts of emptiness,
interdependence, and egolessness.

To begin with, whatever one's Buddhist orientation, Buddhism has always
been concerned with the elimination of suffering as many of the
contributors to Engaged Buddhism point out. The Four Noble Truths, with
which especially Theravada Buddhism starts, proclaim that (1) all existence
is suffering, (2) desire and attachment are the cause of suffering, (3)
eliminating attachment is eliminating suffering, and (4) following the
eightfold path is the means to eliminate attachment. The eight-fold
path--right view, right thought, right effort, right speech, right action,
right livelihood, right mindfulness, and right concentration--is the means
to overcoming such attachment. The five, eight, or ten sila or moral
precepts (prohibiting killing, stealing, lying, adultery, intoxicants, and
sometimes more) follow as a minimum set of standards consistent with this
path. However, to advance along the path to the ultimate goal of nirvana
one must also acquire merit, and often in the form of rendering
compassionate assistance to those who suffer. The culmination of such
service is the four "Divine Abodes" of metra (loving kindness), karuna
(compassion), mudira (empathy, sometimes sympathetic joy), and upekka
(equanimity), all of which contribute to the final acquisition of nirvana
and freedom. Hence, monks in ancient India were often the source of medical
care and other social services as mandated by Buddhist principles of
selfless service. In short, altruistic social engagement was a form of
right livelihood and right action, essential aspects of the struggle for
freedom from attachment.

The Mahayana approach is quite different from the path of attaining merit
through service to others. The salient principles for the Mahayana
tradition are emptiness, interdependence and egolessness, although
Theravada ethics also rely on the non-egocentric nature of altruistic
social action. Broadly, the teaching of emptiness discredits ideologically
based action, especially coercive action; interdependence stresses our
interconnection and identification with all forms of nature; and finally
egolessness and nonattachment mandates creative engagement with those
others to whom we are so interconnected. In fact, from the Mahayana
perspective, interdependence is the very essence of reality, so that one
cannot coherently draw a rigid distinction between the state of nirvana and
the world of suffering (samsara). Since nirvana and samsara are
interdependent, two sides of the same reality, one cannot leave samsara by
going to nirvana. Hence, nonengagement with the world is simply not an
option for the enlightened. Thus, not only must we have concern for fellow
humans but the nonhuman world including the natural environment as well. In
this view, any form of dominance, manipulation, coercion or even outright
neglect is a symptom of egocentric attachment and a product of desire. In a
sense, one is enjoined from doing anything but good works as these
represent the only alternative for selfless living. Good Buddhists do not
behave cornpassionately because it is the right thing to do or because they
will acquire merit toward nirvana; rather good Buddhists cannot but be
compassionate.

Each of these movements adopts one form or another of these justifications
in appealing to Buddhist principles in support of their work. And
interestingly, many of them mix both types of approach whether they come
from a Mahayana or a Theravada background. For example, Santikaro Bhikku
gives a fascinating account of his mentor, Buddhadasa Bhikku, a Thai monk
and religious reformer who broke ranks with the native Theravada clergy,
establishing what he took to be a more authentic and accessible form of
Buddhism. He also wrote extensively about the political implications of
Buddhism and incorporated much of the Mahayana emphasis on emptiness and
interdependence in order to justify his version of what he called "Dhammic
Socialism," sometimes provocatively, "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism." I
leave the details for the reader to gamer, but briefly emptiness provided
Buddhadasa with a defense of the nonideological nature of his approach with
interdependence and hence man's inherent sociality providing the socialist
part. Whether such a grafting is ultimately successful in terms of Buddhism
remains to be seen, and there is controversy over this point, especially
from more traditionalist elements. I myself have to confess a certain
uneasiness over the label "socialism," since such an economic program seems
rather too specific to be based simply and straightforwardly on the mere
fact of human sociality.

Other movements are more straightforwardly traditionalist and Theravada.
The Sarvodaya Shramadana (shramadana means "work camp" in this context)
founded by A. T. Ariyaratne in Sri Lanka offers such an example. Originally
a college professor who taught Buddhism and was heavily influenced by other
engaged Buddhist leaders such as Ambedkar, Ariyaratne urges his students to
go forth from a cloistered setting and put their principles to work helping
Sri Lanka's villagers (irrespective of their ethnic background I might
add). In his view, the process of awakening and pursuing nirvana is not
simply individual but involves collective advancement. Furthermore, in
order to advance to the supramundane level one must first address mundane
suffering. In short, the traditional Theravada view of the various stages
of progression toward eventual enlightenment are broadened to include the
society of which the individual is inextricably a part. One cannot pursue
one's own enlightenment without pursuing equally that of the village's, and
first their mundane suffering of poverty and hardship must be addressed.

In fact, much of the work of other groups in India especially and
principally in support of the so--called scheduled castes or former
untouchables follows the lines of this socialization of the Theravada
dharnrna. TBMSG (Trailokya Bauddha Mahasanga Sahayaka Gana) and Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar's advocacy of a socially conscious Buddhism for untouchables
certainly follow such a route. Chris Queen and Alan Sponberg each offer an
interesting look at this movement, Queen covering Ambedkar's very public
search for a religion that would address the needs of the downtrodden
untouchables in an independent India and Sponberg the activities of
Englishborn Sangharakshita and his continuation of Ambedkar's vision.
Indeed, Ambedkar is a fascinating figure within Buddhism, for although he
converted to Buddhism taking some 380,000 of his followers with him at the
same time, he embraced a form of Buddhism very much of his own making,
systematically reinterpreting the Four Noble Truths and dropping much of
the more "mystical" and even spiritual doctrines such as karma and rebirth.

"For Ambedkar, the first noble truth for the present age was the widespread
suffering of injustice and poverty; the second truth was social, political,
and cultural institutions of oppression ... the third truth was expressed
by the European ideal of'liberty, equality, and fraternity'; and the fourth
truth was the threefold path of Ambedkar's famous slogan,'Educate! Agitate!
Organize!' (p. 62). The problem this raises is, of course, whether such a
doctrine is Buddhism. I have to admit doubts on this matter which is not to
say I find Ambedkar's ideals un-Buddhist. Queen defends Ambedkar as an
authentic Buddhist but fails to connect this admitted reinterpretation of
fundamental doctrine to any deep-level principles within Buddhism, other
than Buddhism's distinctive tendency to reinvent itself. The problem with
Ambedkar is that he argues that these are the only or best interpretations
of the Buddha's teaching. And Ambedkarites have argued that Buddhism itself
is ripe for a "new way," a navayana. However, Sponberg notes that TBMSG,
which continues Ambedkar's work, may owe its success, where other more
politically oriented Ambedkarite movements have failed, to its emphasis on
Buddhist spiritual practices (pp. 105-106). In other words, a Buddhism
shorn of the teachings regarding egolessness, interdependence, and the
relation between desire and suffering is just too thin to be religiously
engaging.

If Ambedkar's Buddhism represents the extreme of a materialistic adaptation
of traditional, especially Theravada beliefs, Buddhadasa and Thich Nhat
Hanh, of Thailand and Vietnam respectively, represent a more traditional
emphasis on the spiritual. Both have incorporated many Mahayana elements in
their teaching, Thich Nhat Hanh because Vietnamese Buddhism has always and
Buddhadasa as part of his own critique of traditional Thai Buddhism. For
them, the path to enlightenment is still Buddhism's appropriate
preoccupation, but in characteristic Mahayana fashion they construe that
path in terms of compassionate engagement with the world. Concern for
fellow humans and amelioration of their suffering is an entirely expected,
natural expression of a Buddhist life. For Buddhadasa, social action has
largely been in the form of political theorizing and writing although,
given the political climate in Thailand, this can be a harrowing
undertaking. He describes his "Dhammic Socialism" as "living for the
benefit of society, not for the individual benefit of each person" (p.
166). While this seems somewhat vague, Buddhadasa did see such a policy as
realistic and consistent with what he viewed as "true" democracy, although
his version of democracy more closely resembles simple egalitarianism.

Interestingly, in contrast to the Theravada and Mahayana approaches a third
form of justification for Buddhist social engagement, which I shall label
pragmatic, seems to emerge from the various discussions in Engaged
Buddhism. The pragmatic approach stresses not so much a reformulation of
Buddhism's fundamental principles but a recognition of the realities
involved in attaining enlightenment. If one is hungry, then as Ambedkar and
others noted, there will be little capacity to concentrate on spiritual
ends. In many ways such an approach echoes Aristotle who recognized a wide
variety of goods essential to happiness not the least of which was health
and a modicum of material well-being. And indeed, a number of authors in
this collection emphasize a correlation for many engaged Buddhists between
the promotion of human happiness and the elimination ofdukkha or suffering.
Of course, it remains to be seen just how materially focused Buddhism can
become without unduly compromising its soteriological aims.

A number of important themes emerge in these discussions both for Buddhism
and political theory. For Buddhism, the more socially engaged one becomes
as a Buddhist, the more compelled one is to either completely reinterpret
the fundamental teachings, as in the case of Ambedkar, or to draw on the
disparate varieties of Buddhist doctrine both Theravada and Mahayana
despite their historical antagonism. While the ethical codes and rules in
Theravada provide a practical guide and focus for action, the teachings of
selflessness and interdependence in Mahayana provide a larger framework of
inspiration. Additionally, engaged Buddhists are inevitably faced with the
question of participation in politics, a point nicely handled by coeditor
Sallie King in her discussion of Thich Nhat Hanh and in her conclusion to
the book. Obviously, the issue is complex and, to some extent, different in
different contexts. Generally, the question comes up in terms of the
desirability of a Buddhist political party, and in this regard the case of
Soka Gakkai in Japan, which sponsored its own opposition party in the
Japanese parliament, is instructive as it has suffered from charges of
corruption and betrayal of its principles in the process of political
compromise. However, as the book makes abundantly clear, not all political
action need be in the form of partisan electioneering, and Chris Queen
emphasizes NGO status as something of a defining feature of Buddhist
liberation movements.

In terms of political theory, these movements raise important questions
regarding the political and economic implications, which are mostly
communitarian, of Buddhism in general. While the Indian and Sri Lankan
groups concentrate on issues of social justice, most others move in the
direction of both endorsing democracy and some form of socialism.
Universally they reject unbridled capitalism as thoroughly inconsistent
with Buddhist ethical principles. Even Soka Gakkai, situated within the
thriving and capitalist economy of Japan, advocates "a democratic welfare
state" dedicated to removing "the causes of social inequality" (pp.
385-86). However, not all unequivocally embrace democracy and unfettered
political freedom. Ajarn Buddhadasa in particular, as noted, goes to some
lengths to distinguish "political" from "moral" democracy, arguing that not
all forms of political democracy are moral, especially liberal democracy."
As Santikaro Bhikku expresses the point," forms of democracy... that
encourage or give too much freedom to selfishness" are to be rejected in
preference to "Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism" as" a middle way between the
contending ideologies of liberal democracy and vengeful communism" (pp.
177-78).

There is much in this volume I have failed to cover which is some
indication of its richness as a resource for understanding this phenomenon
of engaged Buddhism. Not least of these issues emerges in Nancy Barnes's
treatment of the status of the bhikshuni or Buddhist "nun's" orders.
Obviously, the way Buddhism grapples with a legacy of discrimination under
contemporary challenge will be instructive for understanding its full
political and moral dimensions. Let me conclude by adding that so often
people speak of Buddhism and the Buddhist view in monolithic terms that it
is genuinely refreshing to see work which introduces readers to the
complexities, nuances, stresses, and strains that mark the Buddhist
tradition.