Ritual, cosmology and ontology: Chang Tsais

·期刊原文
Ritual, cosmology and ontology: Chang Tsais
moral philosophy and neo-Confucian ethicss

Chow, Kai-wing

Philosophy East & West
Vol.43 No.2

Pp.201-228

April 1993

Copyright by University of Hawaii Press

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Introduction

Current studies on the ethical thought of Sung neo-Confucians
generally focus on issues concerning the cultivation of the
mind and the investigation of principles. Both are essential
to the realization of sagehood. The strong interest that
neo-Confucianism has received in American scholarship
notwithstanding, ritual, a major concern in neo-Confucian
ethics, remains understudied.[1] One of the consequences has
been the inflation of the importance of metaphysics in
neo-Confucian discourse on morality.

From the perspective of Chu Hsi (1130-1200), however, modern
students make the same mistake as the Buddhists, that is,
they one-sidedly stress the rectification of the internal
self with reverence (ching i chih nei) without also employing
propriety or duty to regulate the external self (the body) (i
i fang wai).[2] For Chu Hsi, both jen (humanity) and li
(principle) could be defined in terms of li (ritual
rules).[3] In Confucian discourse, li in the sense of ritual
rules are the major means that defines the proper level of
the public display of emotions, feelings, and actions in the
fulfillment of duty.[4] Li are indispensable to the
cultivation of proper conduct--the particular realization of
universal virtues. Like Confucians before them, leading
neo-Confucian thinkers such as Ch'eng I (1033-1107), Chang
Tsai (1020-1077), and Chu Hsi were no less concerned about
ritual. They had written on a wide range of rituals
pertaining to funerals, burial, mourning, and ancestor
worship.[5]

This essay seeks to redress this balance by demonstrating the
importance of ritual in the moral theories of Sung
neo-Confucians by focusing on Chang Tsai's thought. Chang
Tsai was of one of the most consistent and renowned
neo-Confucians in the Northern Sung. He formulated a theory
of moral cultivation that put a premium on ritual, which
informed his much-studied cosmology and ontology. In order to
assess the cen-trality of ritual within the fabric of Chang
Tsai's thought, I shall first show how it is inextricably
related to his cosmology, theory of human nature, view of
history, and system of ethics. I shall then try to place
Chang's thought within the broader context of his agenda for
reforming Northern Sung society.

Studies on Chang's thought in general stress the importance
of his contribution to the formulation of a monistic ontology
and a materialist notion of the cosmos based on the concept
of ch'i (matter).[6] The attention that Chang's metaphysical
ideas have received in current scholarship has overshadowed
his theory of moral cultivation. As I will demonstrate, this
situation results from a one-sided approach to Chang's notion
of ch'i that stresses its significance in his cosmology and
ontology without also considering the inherently disruptive
quality of ch'i for humanity.

Discussions of Chang Tsai's thought generally make little or
no mention of his view of ritual? By contrast, the importance
of ritual in Chang Tsai's thought had long been pointed out
by his contemporaries and his students. In a biographical
essay he wrote to commemorate his mentor, Lu Ta-lin related
that Chang often encouraged scholars to start practicing
ritual as the proper method of moral cultivation.[8] The
emphasis on ritual in Chang's teachings was also known among
officials, including the famed statesman Ssuma Kuang
(1033-1107).[9] Even the author of Chang's biography in the
Sung shih (A Dynastic History of the Sung) did not fail to
note his interest in ritual.[10]

Apart from his ch'i cosmology, what distinguished Chang Tsai
from other Sung neo-Confucians--such as Chou Tun-i
(1017-1077), Ch'eng Hao (1032-1077), and Ch'eng I--was his
strong emphasis on moral education through ritual practice.
His view is epitomized in his pedagogical method--i-li
weichiao (teaching by ritual). Similiar phrases conveying the
same idea abound in Chang's writings.

To understand why the learning and practice of ritual
constituted the central part of Chang's theory of moral
education, we need first to take note of the by now
well-recognized fact that there was a strong anti-Buddhist
impulse in the Tao-hsueh strain of neo-Confucianism. This
anti-Buddhist sentiment appeared faintly in neo-Confucian
cosmology but was expressed most pronouncedly in
neo-Confucian ethics. In order to understand Chang Tsai's
ethical thought, we need to examine the connection Chang
himself made between the cosmos and human nature, for they
form an inseparable and coherent system.

The Cosmos of Matter (Ch'i)

In traditional societies, ethics have often been rationalized
as founded in the cosmic order, be it the creator of the
universe or the very structure of the universe itself. Views
of the natural order provide the paradigm and justification
for the sociopolitical order of the human world. A
cosmological pattern provides a "permanent and unchanging
order of things," against which the flux of human conduct can
be explained, measured, and valorized.[11] The need to ground
a particular ethical system in the cosmos becomes acute when
there is more than one ethical system. Their differences may
result in an awareness of the arbitrariness and relativity of
the order of social relations and hence the rules of conduct
as they are prescribed by the competing systems. The battle
of ethical doctrines thus often involves a cosmological
debate. The Sung neo-Confucians' profound interest in
cosmological and metaphysical questions can be regarded as
evidence for their determination to counteract Buddhist
ethics at the cosmological level.

Setting aside the question of the accuracy of Chang Tsai's
understanding of Buddhism, his notion of a cosmos of matter
was meant as an explicit rebuttal of what he took to be the
Buddhist negation of the phenomenal world.[12] Chang Tsai
believed in a self-generating, self-renewing, and
self-sustaining cosmos. The cosmos is a "great void"
(t'ai-hsu) of formless matter (ch'i), which is its essence
(t'i).[13] There is no great void independent of matter.
Ontologically speaking, they are inseparable, but, viewed
from the vantage point of the human senses, they represent
the two general modes of existence--form and formlessness. It
is due to the principle (li) of the cosmos that essential
matter condensed to form physical existence of all sorts,
which will eventually disintegrate back into formless matter
again. The cyclical process of the condensation and
dispersion of matter are but two different states of the
transformation of the Way. This dynamism of the cosmos is
what Chang called ch'i-hua (transformation of matter), and
the great void (hsu) refers to the formless state of the
cosmos. These two aspects taken together constitute the
"nature" (hsing) of all beings. Therefore, there is always
matter regardless of its modality.

The Cosmic Hierarchy

According to Chang Tsai, all things are the same in terms of
the constituent ch'i and are without exception subject to the
universal process of condensation and dispersion. But things
in the universe do not flow freely in a chaotic manner; they
all have their proper positions. Far from being an
undifferentiated mass, nature is hierarchical. Things in the
universe are ordered by several cardinal principles. Chang
said:

There is a chronological order in birth; this is what
constitutes the temporal order of Heaven (t'ien-hsu).
Small and big, high and low, all appear in juxtaposition;
this is what is called the hierarchical order of Heaven
(t'ien-chih). Heaven creates things in an orderly manner,
and, after taking shape, things come to have a
hierarchical order.[14]

Thus, in the world of forms or existence, there are
principles regulating the relationship between individual
things. Human society also reflects these natural principles
of order. Any attempt to understand Chang Tsai's view of
human nature must take into consideration Chang's idea of a
cosmic hierarchy.

Cosmic Nature and Human Nature

According to the neo-Confucians themselves, one of Chang's
major contributions consisted in his conception of "physical
nature" (ch'i-chih chih hsing). Ch'eng I argued that no
discussion of human nature would be complete without an
explanation of man's physical nature? Indeed, the concept of
"physical nature" is essential to bridging Chang's seemingly
egalitarian view of the cosmos and his defense of social
hierarchy, a tension which Chang himself did not seem to
recognize. Chang's main concern was how to explain the myriad
differences of the human species in terms of their varying
physical constitution, and hence the social hierarchy in
terms of the variations in human intelligence and innate
abilities. It is no coincidence that Chang's concept of
"physical nature" was highly valued by Chu Hsi as an
important contribution to Confucian-ism. This notion is, in
fact, crucial to the neo-Confucians' response to Buddhism.
They were compelled to accommodate the universalism of
Buddhist cosmology while rejecting its altruistic implication
for social ethics. It is this notion of physical nature that
made it possible for the neo-Confucians to reconcile
ontological universalism and the Confucian doctrine of social
hierarchy based on the family.

In Chang's view, human existence derived its bodily form from
cosmic matter. Man's physical form embodies the cosmic
principle of the endless cycle of condensation and
dispersion. Individual human beings are no more than
particular instantiations of the coalescence of the essential
matter of the cosmos. In this sense, human beings are
identical with other things in the cosmos, and human nature
is identical with the nature of the cosmos. "Nature,"
therefore, is universal and is not peculiar to humankind.[16]
While human beings are identical with everything else in
terms of their cosmic origin and the material that
constitutes their bodily form, upon taking shape as
individual persons, they still differ as a result of their
inevitable "imbalance" of physical constitution. Chang gives
us no clue to why this is so. We can perhaps infer from his
other ideas that such an imbalanced human constitution is
inevitably a result of the natural process of condensation
and dispersion.

Chang distinguished this corporeal nature of human existence,
ch'i-chih chih hsing (physical nature), from its origin in
the cosmic being t'ien-ti chih hsing(nature of heaven and
earth). Distinctions appear as the cosmic ch'i condenses to
form different kinds of existence (wu), of which humans are
the most intelligent? When things acquire their specific
forms, they break away from the undifferentiated--and, in
this sense, pure--cosmic being. Humans assume their
uniqueness only when they come into existence both as
individuals and as a particular order of being. This rupture
marks the very constitution of human existence that is
different from other forms of beings and from the cosmic
substance. To stress the rupture of beings is to call for a
differentiated treatment of the cosmos, humanity, and
nonhuman beings. As we shall see, this rupture provides Chang
Tsai and the neo-Confucians with the logical and ontological
ground for reaffirming the centrality of the human world and
its hierarchical social structure.

It should be noted, however, that Chang did not regard
"physical nature" and "nature of heaven and earth" as two
differentiable aspects of the nature of an individual. The
ch'i of a person is at the same time both universal and
particular, since the body continues to be subject to the
cosmic principle of condensation and dispersion. The rupture,
therefore, is never complete. It is this linkage, however
slim it may be, that provides the possibility of achieving
full reunion with the cosmos through the comprehension of
principles and moral cultivation.

This partial rupture between humanity and the cosmos is
central to Chang's moral and social philosophy. There can be
no humanity, no individual life, without separation from the
undifferentiated cosmic substance. In Chang's thought,
appetites, such as the desire for food and sex, are
indispensable to human existence? The affirmation of physical
needs was necessary for repudiating the Buddhist suppression
of desires, especially sex, which served the important
function of reproducing humanity and thereby constituted an
indispensable element in the social institution of the
family.[19]

The point of departure for moral cultivation is therefore not
the universal nature of human beings as cosmic beings but the
human reality of living persons in society. The validation of
life was thus only the first metaphysical task that
neo-Confucians had to tackle before they could advance their
ethics. While insisting on the distinctiveness of the
particular form of cosmic ch'i as instantiated in humans,
Chang Tsai regarded physical nature as the determining force
in a given human, seeking to fulfill that human's personal
needs and appetites. To this extent the instantiation of
universal ch'i is potentially disruptive at the social level
as individual humans seek to gratify their appetites and to
preserve and extend their own lives.

The stress on the human break from the cosmos was important
for Chang's criticism of the Buddhist universal treatment of
individuals as members of the human species, on the one hand,
and of humankind as but one species of living creatures and
things among many, on the other. The "pernicious" effect of
Buddhist teaching, Chang explained, was that they "regard the
nature of all things (t'ien-hsia wan-wu) as being without
distinction."[20] By attacking the Buddhists' mistake of
treating human individuals as just another kind of living
thing, Chang was implicitly attacking the Buddhists for
extending their cosmic view to the human world. In accusing
Buddhists of taking a "materialist" and universalistic
approach to humanity, he was defending the Confucian position
that places humanity at the center of things and affirming
the hierarchical character of social relations--a point to
which we shall return. In brief, Chang took exception to the
Buddhists' elimination of social distinctions by virtue of
their ontological universalism. Thus, according to Chang, the
Buddhists failed to realize that humans should be treated
differently because their physical nature varied
considerably. Differences in physical nature justified social
distinctions, which were embedded in ritual rules.

Chang believed that the universal of human nature, what he
also called t'ien-ti chih hsing (nature of heaven and earth),
was good in terms of its completeness and balance. But when a
human is born, the cosmic ch'i is instantiated in a
particular form.[21] Hence physical endowment varies
according to the individual, as is evident in the myriad
variations of human temperament and talent.

The myriad differences among real human beings, however, was
for Chang precisely the source of the ethical problem faced
by humanity. Variations in temperament, disposition, and
intelligence were, in his words, the result of "the
inharmonious" constitution of human beings.[22] Even though
Chang did not consider physical nature to be evil in itself,
the physical constitution of each individual person was bound
to be either deficient or excessive in one way or another
(p'ien) compared to that person's cosmic nature prior to
birth.[23] Chang saw in humanity's "imperfect" endowment a
common proclivity to seek gratification of bodily appetites
(yu), which was evil in the sense of being selfish or
self-centered. A person's earthly existence, and hence the
propensity toward seeking satisfaction of desires, inevitably
rendered that person prone to all sorts of indulgences. Human
nature in the empirical world, as Chang often found, was a
far cry from its cosmic perfection.

In order to "return" (fan) to the harmonious and balanced
state of the cosmic nature, one thus had to cultivate
oneself.[24] It should be noted that Chang used "return" as a
metaphor, meaning that, having transformed one's character by
developing good habits, one would always behave as properly
and naturally as heaven. Put differently, morality has to be
"acquired" through cultivation. But if morality always
involves a choice, the question of morality does not arise at
the cosmic or onto-logical level. Morality only exists at the
intellectual, psychological, and social level, and morality
is possible because a human being has a mind (hsin).[25]
Morality is peculiarly relevant to human existence.
Therefore, morality needs to be created rather than
discovered.

The premium that Chang Tsai placed on personal effort in
acquiring morality is to some degree a response to Ch'an
Buddhism, which had become a prominent form of Buddhist
discourse in the Northern Sung. According to Ch'an Buddhism,
since human essence and cosmic essence are identical,
personal effort in cultivation is not necessary insofar as
one comprehends this truth. This Buddhist position that had
been embraced by some Confucians was the target of Chang's
attack.[26] It is no surprise that although Chang argued that
humankind had its origin in the cosmos, he did not entertain
the Taoist notion of the harmony between human being and
nature. For him, human nature is not to be left "un-carved,"
as Lao Tzu insisted, but controlled, transformed, and
disciplined.

The Malleability of Human Nature

Confucians since the classical period had believed in the
malleability of human nature.[27] Chang averred that one's
nature, which is the condensation of matter, was malleable
and hence capable of transformation. Except for one's life
span, birth, and death, there was nothing in one's nature
that one could not change.[28] When Chang spoke of
"transformation of nature, " he was without exception
referring to "physical nature." But why is transformation
necessary? If morality is something to be acquired, why not
concentrate on learning good conduct? To understand why Chang
stressed "transformation of nature," we have to examine
closely his view of physical nature.

When Chang spoke of "physical nature," he seldom referred to
human presocial or biological nature; in most cases he was
referring to internalized patterns of social behavior, which
in the aggregate amounts to an individual's character and
psychological makeup? While every human has natural abilities
and emotions, the way these abilities are developed and put
to use, and the manner in which humans are taught to express
their emotions, are shaped by social practices. Therefore
"physical nature" in Chang's usage has two meanings: the
natural endowments of the individual, and the socially
conditioned patterns of these natural endowments, which in
the aggregate constitute the character of a person.
"Transformation of nature" in Chang's mind in most cases
means the changing of the social character of individuals. In
brief, Chang's use of the term "physical nature" has strong
sociological and psychological connotations.

While the development of character is closely related to
one's temperament and dispostions, there is no reason to
assume that everyone's character is bad and in need of
transformation. Chang Tsai's idea of the imbalance in
physical endowment only makes improper conduct possible but
not inevitable or permanent. An "unbalanced" constitution has
yet to produce thoughts or actions whose effect will then
constitute a moral problem. But, for Chang Tsai, human
character as a rule is in need of transformation. Why did he
insist on transformation of physical nature as the main task
of moral cultivation? This explanation has to be sought in
Chang's view of history, which, as will be explained later,
is inseparable from his perception of Northern Sung society
in the eleventh century.

The Historical and Social Origins of Immoral Conduct n of
nature presupposes a belief in the presence of patterns of
improper conduct, or evil (o), in a given individual. Where
does evil arise? According to Chang, one's unbalanced
constitution is a necessary but not the sufficient condition
for the generation of evil because different social
environments can prevent or facilitate its development. When
the individual with an unbalanced constitution is taught li
(ritual rules), which involves bringing one's emotions and
actions into line with standard rules (as occurred during the
Three Dynasties in high antiquity), that individual will not
have the opportunity to develop bad habits, and hence a bad
character. Under the proper tutelage and government of the
sages, deviations from the mean were rare. Therefore, it was
much easier for people living in the Three Dynasties to learn
propriety, since their social environment was virtually free
of incidents of impropriety. In contrast, it was only when,
being unbalanced in one's endowment, one grew up in an
environment pervaded with immoral examples that one was
prompted to seek the excessive gratification of one's
appetites.

In Chang's view, therefore, the process by which a person
acquired a bad character was originally a historical one.
With the disappearance of sage-kings, human society since the
Golden Age had suffered from the loss of their teachings, and
hence people failed to conduct themselves properly,
succumbing to all sorts of "vices." Since those who violated
propriety and broke laws were too numerous to be executed,
people born thereafter could not but be influenced by immoral
conduct, giving them free rein to their selfish desires.[30]
It was more difficult to learn to be moral even if one so
wished.[31] The relevance of Chang's historical explanation
of what he regarded as the social "vices" of human society
will become apparent when social practices in the early Sung
are considered.

Buddhism and Society in the Northern Sung

In Chang's times, scholar-officials and official aspirants
grew up in a society pervaded by Buddhism. Most had not only
taken Buddhism to be true but had also grown up accepting
many Buddhist practices as natural and indispensable facets
of their daily life.[32]

Buddhism might have suffered a brief period of decline after
the suppression by Wu-tsung in 845. But it bounced back and
rapidly grew in strength when the successor to the throne
rescinded the policy. The number of Buddhists in the early
Sung exceeded that of the T'ang, and there was evidence that
Buddhism had become a much more powerful religion affecting
the social life of all classes.[33] It was customary for
emperors to visit Buddhist temples during important
festivals. Students of the imperial university would gather
in Buddhist temples to mourn the death of high officials.[34]
Buddhist monasteries continued to serve as rendezvous for
informal meetings and feasts for the literati. Successful
candidates of the palace examination were entertained in
monasteries by order of the emperor.[35] Public bathhouses
owned and operated by Buddhist monasteries were frequented by
urban dwellers in cities like K'ai-feng, Lo-yang, and
Hang-chou.[36] Most Buddhist monasteries provided travelers
with accommodation and food.[37] Merchants, craftsmen, and
peddlers chose to convene at Buddhist temples. The Hsiang-kuo
temple in K'ai-feng was a notable example.[38] Ironically,
despite their anti-Buddhist stance, the Ch'eng brothers and
Chang Tsai, like other literati, frequented monasteries.[39]

Buddhism in the early Sung was more than a physical presence
in society; it was also firmly entrenched in the realm of
cultural symbolism --the realm where social actions were
given their meaning. The importance of many ceremonies that
define the meaning of the major events of the human life
cycle--such as birth and death--were perceived in Buddhist
terms. In the early Sung, it was common for families in
K'ai-feng prefecture to hire Buddhists to perform rituals,
and "barbarian music" was used in the ceremony. Despite
injunctions issued by the imperial government in 970 and 981
against the use of the service of Buddhists and Taoists in
funeral processions, most families in the prefecture
continued to violate the regulations as late as the
1220s.[40]

Ou-yang Hsiu's idea of using ritual and music to occupy the
peasants so that they would not have time for Buddhist
practices is well known.[41] Ssu-ma Kuang, Ch'eng I, and
other neo-Confucians were very critical of the use of
Buddhist services in funerals.[42] The Buddhists provided a
wide range of services pertaining to funeral and mourning
rites: experts leading funeral processions and the offering
of vegetarian meals, sermons, and the postmortem seven weekly
services or "seven sevens."[43] Buddhist temples also
provided storage for unburied dead.[44] The widely held
belief in geomancy that often resulted in the delay of burial
made it necessary to employ the service of Buddhists.[45] For
those who chose cremation to dispose of the dead, the
Buddhist not only provided a cheaper alternative to expensive
ground burial but a justification for such a choice as
well.[46] The use of these Buddhist services perpetuated and
reinforced the Buddhist teachings about the meaning of life,
death, and spirits. The performance of "seven sevens," music,
and cremation could only be justified in Buddhist terms that
denied physical life absolute value and which held that the
ultimate goal was the speedy delivery of the dead.

The pervasive presence of Buddhism in the Northern Sung was a
major source of what Chang called the "bad" habits of his
contemporaries. Their physical nature, or character, was
"bad" because they had internalized Buddhist and
non-Confucian patterns of conduct. They confused the
Confucian way of life with that of the Buddhist. Worse still
was their ignorance of the impropriety of their conduct. To
create a Confucian society--a common goal of neo-Confucians
of the Northern Sung --Chang Tsai did not and could not start
from scratch. The only way to realize such a goal was to
transform social customs so that they would be free of
Buddhist influence.

The Process of Acquiring Morality

In the light of the pervasive influence of Buddhism in Chang
Tsai's times, the connection between the stress on
transforming improper conduct and the anti-Buddhist thrust of
his ethical thought becomes clear. It should be noted that in
Chang's explanation, evil, or improper conduct such as
Buddhist practice, arose as a result neither of the mere
"unbalanced constitution" nor of the exclusive impact of
environment but of the combined effects of both. While a
human being's unbalanced constitution was the necessary
precondition, the social environment was the precipitating
cause. Immoral conduct was a result of a person's own making
in the absence of a moral environment. Therefore, anyone born
after the Three Dynasties would almost without exception have
developed a bad character by virtue of his or her "unbalanced
constitution" and the immoral environment in which that
person lived.

According to Chang, improper conduct began in childhood, and
even in the womb prior to birth. With the advance of age,
having continuously given free rein to one's natural
inclinations, one came to develop a "bad nature" in the form
of bad habits.[47] Before coming to realize one's own
improper behavior and resolving to become good, one had
already developed a personality with a mixture of good and
bad patterns of conduct.

Just as a person's bad character is the product of a
developmental process, so, too, is the acquisition of the
good. The work of moral cultivation, therefore, calls for a
continuation of the good behavior one has already acquired
along with the uprooting of improper behavior.[48] The work
of transformation thus consists of two parts: the persistent
performance of good deeds (chi-shan) and the extirpation of
evil thoughts and acts (ch'u-o). These two types of effort
were necessary because in any given individual were present
both good and evil.[49] And these two different kinds of
effort were to be undertaken simultaneously, since an
individual was constantly pulled in both directions. Chang's
view of the initially indeterminate quality of one's physical
nature was clearly expressed in the following remark: "When
[one's] nature is not yet fully developed (ch'eng), both good
and evil tendencies coexist. Hence, one's nature is good only
if one practices good conduct assiduously. The good will be
accomplished when every bit of evil is eliminated."[50]

Only when one is committed to eradicating evil and performing
good deeds will one be able to "establish one's nature"
(ch'eng-hsing) and thereby bring it to resemble the
undifferentiated state of cosmic essence. This human effort
in cultivating a moral personality is what Chang calls
"transforming physical nature" (pien-hua ch'i-chih). But
where exactly was the line between good and evil, or good and
bad habits? Who set the criteria? How did an individual know
about them?

Experiential Knowledge and Moral Knowledge

Indeed, in Chang Tsai's view, the individual's ignorance of
right and wrong prevented him or her from doing good
consciously and consistently. The common people had no notion
of right and wrong because they only lived by their
experience. They were molded by the customs and commonly
accepted practices of society.

Chang therefore cautioned against learning through one's
senses and personal knowledge of others' experience.
Knowledge acquired through one's "eyes and ears" (wen-chien
chih chih) is not to be depended on as a guide to moral
conduct.[51] There are several inherent defects in this type
of knowledge. First, experiential knowledge was mostly no
more than an extremely small accumulation of unexamined
records of social practices. The limited experience of an
individual tended to reinforce the impression that there were
no morals beyond the social customs with which people were
familiar. Such parochialism, in fact, more often than not,
led to the mistaken notion that conformity to social
practices constituted propriety. As Chang lamented, those
"mean people" (hsiao-jen) of wit, who have developed a bad
character, may even use experiential knowledge to justify
their improper conduct. Others might do it in good faith. The
knowledge that other members of society were doing exactly
the same thing would even strengthen their conviction in the
rectitude of their conduct.[52] Moreover, experiential
knowledge, being an amalgam of fragmentary knowledge of
customary conduct, provided no clear guidelines for proper
conduct. The common people, including the literati, would not
be able to distinguish good from bad. It was harmful if one
mistook bad conduct for good deeds, which in Chang's view was
what most people did in his times. Without a firm grasp of
knowledge of proper conduct, the scholar should not hastily
begin changing his habits.[53] Chang knew that habits die
hard. For these reasons--limited experience and inability to
distinguish good from evil --experiential knowledge could not
be trusted as a guide to moral development. It is in this
sense that Chang rejected experiential knowledge acquired
through one's senses. Nonetheless, Chang did not fall back on
intuition exclusively for a knowledge of morality. He
admitted that there were moral lessons to be learned from the
experience of exemplars of moral excellence.[54]

In Chang's view, to learn to be good always began with
learning to do virtuous things or, in Aristotle's term, "the
that."[55] The quest for knowledge of virtue (te-hsing chih
chih) was therefore the first task of those who aspired to
become worthies and sages. If moral knowledge was external to
the individual, it followed that moral cultivation called for
"extensive learning" (po-wen) in order to accumulate a
knowledge of virtue--propriety and duty (po-wen i chi-i).[56]
For Chang, "extensive learning" essentially meant the study
of books (tu-shu), which was an integral part of Chang's
program for moral transformation. "Extensive learning" did
not mean indiscriminate pursuit of knowledge. The relevance
of knowledge was defined in terms of the purpose of learning.
In Chang's case, to be a sage was the goal of learning; hence
all knowledge required for achieving that goal had to be
acquired.

Chang designated the Classics, the Analects, and the Mencius
as-core readings and dismissed Buddhist and Taoist writings
as dispensable.[57] Reading the right books was important,
for it was through learning that moral knowledge could be
accumulated. The broader the learner's knowledge, the more
profound the learner's moral knowledge would become.[58] And
more important, the better that person would be able to
comprehend moral principles (i-lj).

Chang clearly believed that most individuals could learn to
be good. But there were very few scholars who could do good
persistently, regardless of the circumstances. The common
scholar might do good under duress or as the state of his
emotions and mind dictated. The common scholar did not always
do the same thing whenever the situation demanded such an
action. Put differently, morality remained in an unsettled
state. It was not the character of the scholar to behave
consistently in response to the same situation. The
discrepancy between knowledge and action always generates
tension, conflict, and displeasure in those individuals whose
performance of the good depends on whether they succeed in
overcoming the tendency of their character to respond
improperly. As Chang had noted, one major obstacle to the
development of moral conduct was psychological. Chang was
perhaps the only neo-Confucian to stress the reluctance of
ordinary people, including scholars, to shed their bad habits
because of their fear of being ridiculed. He therefore did
not recommend drastic change in reforming rituals.[59] The
lack of consistency among scholars could not be changed
without re-aligning their actions with moral rules.

Learning to Be a "Great Man"

As Alasdair Maclntyre has aptly stated: "moral concepts
change as social life changes."[60] In any given society,
learning to be good is always defined by culturally and
socially sanctioned models of virtuous conduct. To develop
moral conduct requires a clearly defined model or goal. To be
a sage was the highest goal in all neo-Confucian moral
discourses. In Chang Tsai's thought, the sage represented the
highest stage of moral cultivation. Chang, however, preferred
to use the term "great man" (ta-jen) to denote the highest
stage of moral achievement. Ta-jen was a term Chang borrowed
from the Book of Changes. In his exposition on the Book of
Changes, Chang distinguished the sheng-jen (sage) from the
ta-jen (great man). The sage naturally followed heavenly
principles without the help of external learning or the need
for self-discipline.[61] Such perfection and effortless moral
conduct were almost beyond human capacity.

For Chang, sages were not ordinary people. Sages could not be
completely understood by ordinary human beings. Sages were
born, not made, and humans could therefore never completely
become sages. Chang said: "sagehood cannot be known; it is
the natural endowment of heavenly virtue."[62] Elsewhere he
said: "Sagehood, like heaven, has no stairs whereby one can
ascend."[63] What Chang is saying is that the sages' conduct
was perfect without exertion, a feat that could not be
emulated by ordinary scholars. Chang's teachings therefore
focused entirely on how an ordinary scholar could learn to
become a "great man." Nonetheless, according to Chang, when
scholars resolved to make progress in their moral
development, they could eventually reach a stage comparable
to the moral qualities of the sages. When a scholar became a
"great man," his morality was so firmly established that his
nature was perfectly in accord with the heavenly virtues of
natural sages. At that stage it was difficult to distinguish
between sages and great men. Although great men were still
aware of the differences between themselves and Confucius,
others might have difficulty making such a distinction.[64]

Sages and "great men" differed in that the moral perfection
the latter attained was a result of great resolve and
persistent effort of cultivation. In brief, human resolve and
unfailing effort could elevate one to the level of a sage.
Chang therefore rejected the view that sagehood could be
attained without "moral cultivation" (hsiu) and "learning"
(hsueh).[65] Chang's stress on moral cultivation can be seen
as a refutation of those scholars who, under the influence of
Ch'an Buddhism, argued that sage-hood was attainable without
studying and cultivation.[66]

Learning Ritual and Good Habits

For Chang Tsai, to become moral, one had to learn proper
conduct. In his times, to learn proper conduct entailed
changing most of one's current patterns of behavior. To learn
morality, one had to undo the immorality that had taken form
in the individual as character traits. In Chang's view,
learning to practice ritual was the most effective way to
transform one's deep-rooted habits by gradually eradicating
the settled state of bad character traits and by consistently
molding one's conduct in accord with clearly prescribed
rules. Chang's idea of learning to be a moral person through
habituation in some ways resembles Aristotle's approach to
moral development.[67] The morals of a given individual are
the result of the development of good habits rather than the
mere acquisition of knowledge of propriety.

The centrality of rituals in Chang's ethical thought is well
epitomized in several expressions he often used. First, Chang
understood morality in terms of ritual practice. "Rituals are
the established rules of sages; there is no morality (tao)
without rituals."[68] In his commentary on the Book of
Changes, Chang explained his teaching of chih-li ch'eng hsing
(fashioning one's nature or character through learning
rituals). He insisted that rituals were the ground on which
one stood and that only through learning rituals could one
settle one's character. With the firm establishment of good
character, moral conduct would emanate unfailingly. Then
one's actions would always correspond to moral principles as
naturally as the transformation of things operates with the
fixity of the positions of heaven.[69]

Chang knew extremely well that a person with moral knowledge
has yet to become moral. One's physical nature with its
deep-rooted habits prevented one from acting in accord with
one's understanding. There is a gap between knowledge and
behavior. One may break any rule with full knowledge of its
impropriety because of the settled state of one's character.
To bring one's emotions and actions into line with one's
knowledge of proper conduct calls for extreme self-control.
Any exclusive appeal to the intellect for generating moral
conduct will not always work since most people are
weak-willed.

One advantage of ritual as a method of cultivating proper
conduct is its efficacy, derived from the fact that the
participants do not analyze the pattern of relationships
prescribed by the ritual.[70] Whether strong-willed or
weak-willed, the participants are required to follow the
rules in ensemble. Chang argued that ritual practice as a
vehicle for moral cultivation was most effective in
transforming one's "improper habits" (hsi-ch'i) and
internalizing patterns of proper behavior.[71] He wrote:

[One may] know them [the moral imperatives of heaven],
but, if one does not internalize them as one's nature
through ritual practice, they are not yet an integral
part of one's self (pu i li hsing chih). Therefore,
learning ritual to realize one's [essential] nature (chih
li ch'eng hsing) will result in the manifestation of the
Way (tao-i).[72]

Ritual and the Stages of Learning

Chang recommended the learning and practice of ritual to all,
including children and scholars aspiring to become sages.
Chang stressed that learning ritual was the most important
task for scholars.[73] There were several advantages to
learning rituals. Rituals helped to cultivate moral
character. Furthermore, they provided a constant pattern of
rules for action. Rituals helped to develop spontaneous
responses to specific situations without reasoning and
without the internal conflict between reason and action.
Finally, studying rituals would increase one's moral
knowledge.[74]

Chang distinguished two stages of learning, using Confucius
and his disciples as the scale: the first began with learning
for a scholar and ended with achievements equal to Yen Hui's.
Among the disciples of Confucius, Yen was most venerated by
the Sung neo-Confucians. The second stage began with the
level of Yen's learning and ended with the perfect character
of Confucius.[75] But these two stages of learning only
applied to scholars who were already educated.

In fact, in addition to these two stages, there was the
period from childhood through the "first stage." Therefore,
there were actually three stages in Chang's learning program.
According to Chang, the learning process began even in the
mother's womb. [76] After a child's birth, the family
provided the most important learning environment. Children
developed a character as they learned from other members of
the family, who, more often than not, conducted themselves
improperly. Before children were old enough to receive formal
education, they had already acquired improper habits, which
had become fixed as character traits. It was therefore
important that children should be taught to do sweeping and
to conduct themselves properly toward elders before they
developed "bad" habits in these respects?

Though aware of the importance of education during childhood,
the focus of Chang's teachings about learning was on the
scholar. After committing himself to the goal of learning to
be a sage or a "great man," the initial difficulty involved
in learning for the scholar was the question of how to
"transform" his physical nature or character. The
transformation was difficult, for it demanded "overcoming
oneself" (k'o-chi), which involved undoing one's conditioned
state of improper conduct?

The need to learn ritual practice was not the exclusive
concern of beginning scholars. Although Chang Tsai
distinguished between two stages of learning, he did not
relegate ritual practice to only the second stage [79] Even
Yen Tzu had to learn and practice rituals throughout his
life. How much more important, then, was it for ordinary
scholars to learn ritual practice? Literati would be
indistinguishable from mean people if the former concerned
themselves with nothing but sensual and material
satisfaction, paying no heed to the importance of ritual and
duties, [50] Here it is clear that Chang Tsai's main concern
was how to establish the distinctive patterns of behavior of
the elite. The function of ritual as a "class" marker is
unmistakable--a point to which we shall return.

Rituals and PRINCIPLES

It is now clear that by moral knowledge, Chang Tsai primarily
meant rules of proper conduct befitting the social status and
role of the individual. It is the knowledge of how to conduct
oneself in relation with others in all conceivable daily
situations. He was not concerned with the question of how one
can reach a moral judgment about action in an unusual
situation, especially one that involved a conflict of values
and duties. Chang's program of learning morality consisted
essentially of learning what, not learning why, because the
reason was not a particular reason for a specific action in
an unexpected situation. It was a general reason for a
prescribed action for the same occasion under normal
circumstances. Chang Tsai's view of moral education therefore
called for the learning of both the concrete rules of proper
conduct and the general reasons for those rules. These
reasons, for Chang Tsai, were based on moral principles. In
his writings he sometimes speaks of ritual in terms of
concrete ceremonies, decorum, etiquette, or institutions.
Sometimes he refers to ritual in the sense of the general
reason or principle of proper conduct.

It is therefore no surprise that a casual reading of Chang's
writings seems to suggest that there were two kinds of
rituals: those that changed with time and those that were
absolute (pupien). In fact, what he was referring to were two
aspects, rather than two categories, of rituals. Rituals had
their form--the outward, public act--and their meaning--the
reason for the need to perform these formalized acts. While
the form might and often should change with circumstances,
the meaning, or, in his terminology, the principle, was
permanent. It is in this sense that Chang spoke of the
identity of ritual with principle [31]

A formalized act can lose its symbolism but retain its
pattern of behavior as social custom. Customary practices can
be observed without comprehension of their meanings on the
part of the participants. The alienation of symbolism from
ritual act makes it possible for the performance of ritual in
a totally different context of meaning. Social practices
often contained "improper" rituals and duties. [62] These
were often the result of the "erroneous" matching of meaning
and ritual forms. A simple example was the performance of a
Buddhist rite to fulfill a Confucian obligation--such as the
use of a Buddhist service in funerals and burials to express
the grief and filial emotions of the bereaved. [63] According
to Chang, these were the kinds of improper ritual practices
that needed to be abandoned. There were others that should be
changed under new circumstances. [64] What kinds of rituals
were correct? How could scholars know these rituals? More
fundamental questions were how the general criteria were to
be obtained whereby specific rituals could be evaluated, and
how the criteria were constituted. These criteria were, in
fact, the types of rituals that Chang regarded as absolute,
permanent rules of human society.

In Chang's thinking, "absolute rituals" were more than
customs and social practices. They had a cosmological basis
[85] "Rituals are principles," Chang explained? Although
rituals were mostly created by humans, Chang claimed that
"the rituals of heaven and earth exist of themselves." One of
these absolute rituals or principles was hierarchy. Chang
said:

There are rituals that need no change. [They are] like
the order and laws of heaven, how can they be changed?...
Heaven begets things with differential images of superior
and inferior, big and small. All man should do is to
observe these [principles]; this is what rituals should
be. There are scholars who think that all rituals were
created by man; they are not cognizant of the fact that
rituals are rooted in the nature of heaven? [87]

Chang is, in fact, claiming that social distinctions are not
artificial but an extension of the natural order. Hierarchy
is a basic principle of the universe. It is inevitable and
natural that things occupy different positions within the
universe. As demonstrated above, Chang's ontology may lend
itself to a radical interpretation of egalitarianism; but his
view of the "unbalanced" endowment of human existence
provided the needed justification for his stress on social
distinction, which only becomes apparent in his writings on
moral cultivation and ritual.

The function of rituals was twofold: to distinguish and to
integrate. [88] As Hsun Tzu had pointed out long before,
individual human beings can only survive by forming a
society, which provides a set of common rules regulating the
conduct of its members. These common rules and
institutions--li (ritual) --are essential means of
integration. But the pattern of integration takes the form of
hierarchy, and ritual serves to define, institutionalize, and
reinforce the structure of social differentiation. For Chang
Tsai, ritual was essential to defining mankind both as a
group having a common bond in their origins in the cosmos and
as individual members of a social hierarchy with specific
roles and stations (fen).

The question of the criteria for evaluating the propriety of
ritual rules was not a concern for either the common people
or the beginning scholar, for they did not understand
heavenly principles, and, therefore, they only needed to
learn from the sages. The institutions and rules of human
conduct prescribed by the sages of the Three Dynasties
without doubt were the sources of proper rituals. Since for
the Sung neo-Confucians the teachings of the sages had been
lost for over one thousand years since Confucius and Mencius,
the revival of ancient rituals posed considerable
difficulties. But Chang, like other Sung neo-Confucians,
believed that the tao had been rediscovered in his times.
Those who comprehended the tao would be able to create "moral
principles" (i-li). [89] This was only possible when one had
"learned extensively" (powen) the moral principles contained
in the Classics? Chang at one point summarized the
relationship between learning, principles, and rituals:

What are called ritual rules are principles. It is
necessary to learn principles exhaustively; rituals are
principles put into practice. When [one] knows the
principles, [one] can create rituals; therefore, rituals
come out of principles. [91]

Although Chang had the modesty not to claim sagehood for
himself, he did regard himself a "great man" (tajen). He had
already argued that there was little difference between a
natural sage and a great man who strove to learn the sagely
principles? The fact that he called his study on the Classics
"The Repository of Principles of Classical Learning"
(Ching-hsueh li-k'u) is strong evidence for his belief in his
ability to understand the principles contained in the
Classics? It is therefore no surprise that he had already
written extensively on rituals. Firmly believing in his
comprehension of moral principles, Chang took liberty in
creating rituals, so much so that he incurred Chu Hsi's
criticism. [94]

Ritual, Aristocracy, and Social Hierarchy

The transformation of society could be made with less
difficulty if the emperor supported such a cause. But
unfortunately for the neo-Confucians, most emperors of the
Nothern Sung--T'ai-tsu (r. 960-975), T'ai-tsung (r. 976-997),
Chen-tsung (r. 999-1022) , Jen-tsung (r. 10231063), and
Ying-tsung (r. 1064-1067)--were great patrons of Buddhism.
Sung emperors also erected buildings for the translation of
Buddhist scriptures, from 982 through 1082. [95] Without the
support of the emperors, the neo-Confucians could only hope
to win over the literati. To create a class of Confucian
literati entailed initially overcoming the Buddhist beliefs
and practices that had been internalized by them. It was
therefore necessary to establish the goal of attaining
Confucian sage-hood for the literati, thereby refuting
competing definitions of good and bad conduct offered by the
Buddhists. To "transform" their character, or physical
nature, entailed replacing Buddhist rituals with Confucian
rituals.

It is time to take up the question of the "class" dimension
in Chang Tsai's thought. Although barely noticeable in his
ontological and cosmo-logical thinking, this dimension
figured prominently in his writings on ethics and rituals. In
fact, Chang's class interest is so obscure in his ontology
that it deceptively savors of egalitarianism. When Yang Shih,
a student of Ch'eng I, pointed out that Chang's ontological
egalitarianism might be compared to Mo Tzu's notion of
universal love, Ch'eng I denied the comparison and stressed
that the main idea of Chang's treatise was li i fen shu
(unity of principle and differentiation in social stations).
[96] As Donald Munro has pointed out, the Ch'eng-Chu school
of cosmology drew heavily on the attributes of a clan-based
society. Hierarchically arranged position is one such
attribute. [97] Chang Tsai's cosmology is no exception to
this mode of thinking that analogized the social hierarchy to
nature. For if Chang's contribution had to do only with the
universalism of his ontology without also explaining
"differentiation" or different stations, he would be
endorsing what he took to be the Buddhist position. It is
therefore appropriate in this connection to discuss the
social vision underlying Chang's view on rituals.

The society that Chang Tsai envisioned was one dominated by a
small number of hereditary families with an independent
economic basis? They were also to serve as the guardians of
the common people, providing them with instructions for
proper life-style and norms of conduct. Ritual rules would
serve to institutionalize the elite's privileges and would
make an effective instrument for the uprooting of Buddhist
influence in society.

We have already seen that Chang projected a hierarchical
structure onto the cosmos, which included the order in which
things come into existence. The hierarchical nature of the
cosmos was used to explain and sustain a parallel social
hierarchy. Chang explicitly said that distinctions were
natural. The basic function of ritual was to "distinguish'.'
(pieh-i). [99] Indeed, individuals differed in their physical
endowment. Humans were more intelligent as a species than
animals and things despite their common origins in the cosmic
ch'i. But within the human species, individuals varied
considerably in terms of their intellectual capacities. [100]
Therefore, some were more intelligent than others. Some had
natures so "clear" (po) that they could easily be enlightened
and attain sagehood. On the other extreme, however, were
those whose nature was so "thickly obscured" (hou) that they
could never be enlightened. [101] This natural difference in
human endowment justified a social hierarchy, and the main
function of ritual was to define and reinforce distinctions
between individuals. On one occasion, Chang clearly revealed
the audience he was addressing when he noted that the ritual
practice of the common people was simple. He did not demand
observance of rituals from them for they did not have the
resources for expensive rituals. Besides, they could not
comprehend the meanings behind the rituals. [102] Chang
believed that the common people were the least endowed in
intelligence. [103]

Much of Chang's teachings about the stages of learning
discussed earlier, and in fact his entire program of
learning, were not meant to apply to all classes. The
"scholar" or "learner" to whom Chang always referred could
not possibly include the common people of the lower classes
(hsia-min) . Chang at times made this explicit in his
writings. [104] He believed that there were human beings
whose "physical nature" had so thoroughly settled into bad
habits that they had become "impenetrable and closed" to
transformation. [105] But the educated class could transform
their character by ritual practice.

Neo-Confucian Sages and Ritual Reforms

Strong interest in rituals was by no means idiosyncratic in
Chang Tsai's thought, nor was it confined to the Tao-hsueh
neo-Confucians such as Ch'eng I. Eminent politicians such as
Ssu-ma Kuang and other Confucians, including Shih Chieh and
Li K'ou (1009-1059), also expressed strong concern about the
need to "revive" Confucian rituals. [106] It should be noted
that even though Sung neo-Confucians had great interest in
rituals, they, unlike scholars in the T'ang, were more
interested in the role of ritual in moral cultivation and in
preserving the family. They did not look to the imperial
state as the center through which Confucian rituals could be
promulgated. [107]

When Chang Tsai called for the forming of habits in
accordance with proper rituals, he was not simply demanding
the determination and endeavor to practice some well-defined
and clearly prescribed rituals authorized by the government.
He was making a plea for reforming or reinventing rituals for
the scholar-official class. It should be noted at this point
that Chang, like most Confucians in the Northern Sung, was
not anachronistic when it came to details of specific rites.
They recognized the need to change the specific form of
ancient rites so that the material conditions of the times
could be taken into consideration. [108] Chang justified his
recommendations for rituals in terms of the lack of interest
in the investigation of principles on the part of the
Sheng-tsung emperor. [109] And as the discussion above has
shown, Chang believed that there was little difference
between a "great man" and a sage. When a great man had
investigated the principles of humanity, he was equally
qualified to authorize rituals. Chang was confident that he
had comprehended enough moral principles to reform and create
rituals on his own authority. [110] Chang had written
prescriptions on funerals, burial, mourning, and ancestor
worship. [111]

Perhaps for Confucians no individual rite was more important
than paying homage to the ancestors to whom the entire family
and kinship group owed their existence. Tu Yen (978-1057),
Han Ch'i (1008-1075), Fan Tsu-yu (1041-1098), Ch'eng I,
Ssu-ma Kuang, Chang Tsai, Lu Ta-fang (1027-1097), and Shih
Chieh all had expressed different opinions about the proper
ceremony for ancestor worship.[112] Han Ch'i wrote an account
of instructions for sacrifice to ancestors at the grave.[113]
Although they strove to reform popular practice, their
flexible approach to ritual forms resulted in the
accommodation of some customs. [114]

Of the various rituals Chang wrote about, none were more
important than those designed to strengthen kinship ties.
Like many neo-Confucians in the Northern Sung, Chang
attempted to revive the tsung-fa (rule of descent) system,
which required the practice of primogeniture, keeping
properties and official rank in the hands of the "son of the
descent line" (tsung-tzu) . [115] Chang regarded the
rule-of-descent system as crucial to the preservation of
family wealth and official status. He lamented the fact that
the system had fallen into disuse and that no official
families could survive two generations. [116] But with the
revival of tsung-fa, the heir to the descent line would be
able to use his wealth to support his kinsmen and so
cultivate kinship solidarity. And, more important, the
kinsmen who were qualified for official appointment could
transfer their privileges to the heir. If the heir proved to
be incompetent, the next of kin with the highest virtue would
be made the heir.

For Chang the tsung-fa system was a heavenly principle. But
no doubt the system was designed to centralize the resources
of a kingroup so that the best person would receive official
appointment and at the same time manage the lineage property
in support of the entire kin-group. [117] This hoary
institution, Chang hoped, would keep officials from losing
their privileges and wealth, which was the inevitable
consequence of the civil service examination system. [118]
Chang Tsai strongly opposed the civil service examination,
and he always taught his students to focus on learning to be
sages rather than on success in the examinations? [119]

Chang's advocacy of the revival of the tsung-fa system is a
clear indication of his vision of a new Confucian society--a
society governed by a small number of hereditary elite
families. The institutional bases of these families were the
tsungofa and the "well-field" system. The tsung-fa system
would guarantee a small number of elite families the
perpetual ownership of land and an uninterrupted access to
official appointment. While the tsung-fa system would
concentrate land and political resources in the heir of the
descent line, the "well-field" system would ensure the
economic independence of the elite families. Chang believed
that if the emperor was "benevolent" enough to revive the
"well-field" system by parceling out land to officials as
permanent holdings, it could be easily done without the need
to punish one dissident. The ultimate goal, however, should
be the full installation of the feudal system (feng-chien).
[120]

To conclude, against the social background of Buddhism and
the effort of neo-Confucians to rebuild a Confucian society,
it can easily be understood why Chang Tsai's program of moral
cultivation stressed the transformation of character or human
physical nature. Even the scholars who served in the
government took Buddhism as a higher truth and practiced
Buddhist rites as much in earnest as did the commoners.
Buddhism had come to constitute so essential a part of their
character that any attempt to challenge and undermine it by
disputations and criticism would have been to no avail. The
recreation of a hierarchical society dominated by the
scholar-official class involved nothing less than a thorough
undoing of behavioral habits promoted by Buddhist teachings
and rituals. Confucian rituals had to be created and
propagated in order to remold social conduct. Chang's
profound insight into the process of behavioral development
led him to emphasize the role of ritual in the cultivation
and changing of character. It also explains why ritual
occupies a central place in Chang's moral philosophy.

NOTES

1 - There are two essays in Neo-Confucian Education: The
Formative Stage that focus specifically on Sung neo-Confucian
teachings about properly ritualized conduct in the family.
But neither is concerned with an explicit analysis of the
role of ritual at a higher level of neo-Confucian education
such as the cultivation of the mind. See M. Theresa Kelleher,
"Back to Basics: Chu Hsi's Elementary Learning (Hsiao-hsueh),
" and Patricia Ebrey, "Education Through Ritual: Efforts to
Formulate Family Rituals During the Sung Period," in Neo-
Confucian Education: The Formative Stage, ed. Wm. Theodore de
Bary and John Chaffee (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1989), pp. 219-251, 277-306. With a few exceptions,
the importance of ritual in neo-Confucian ethics has received
no greater attention among Chinese and Japanese scholars. See
Ch'ien Mu's comprehensive study of Chu Hsi, Chu Tzu hsin
hsueh-an (Taipei: San-min Shu-chu, 1971) , vol. 4, pp.
112-179. Ueyama Shunpei has treated Chu Hsi's theory of human
nature in relation to ritual in "Shushi no 'karei' to 'girei
kybden tsukai,'" Toho gakuh6 54 (1981): 173-256.

2 - Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yyulei(Classified conversations of
Master Chu) (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1986), 126:3019,
126:3027.

3 - Ibid., 6:101, 6:109. The term//will be translated as
ritual rules in this article, a rendering I borrow from
Donald Munro. See his Images of Human Nature (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 8. Li in its broadest
sense includes formal aspects of ritualized conduct, social
and political institutions, and the principles and meanings
in whose terms they are justified.

4 - For an interpretation of Confucius' thought that stresses
the centrality of ritual and its magical power, see Herbert
Fingarette, Conlucius--The Secular as Sacred (New York:
Harper & Row, 1972). For a discussion that grants ritual the
power of cultivating the inner qualities of the participants
in addition to shaping behavior by ceremonial rules, see
Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985),
pp. 67-75.

5 - For a discussion of the interest and significance of the
ancient institution of kinship--the tsung system, ancestor
worship, the compilation of genealogy, and the setting up of
sacrificial fields--see Patricia B. Ebrey, "The Early Stages
in the Development of Descent Group Organization," in Kinship
Organization in Late Imperial China, 1000-1940, ed. Patricia
B. Ebrey and James L. Watson (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986), pp. 35-50. For a discussion of the
use of family ritual to mold behavior by neo-Confucians in
the Sung, see Ebrey's "Education through Ritual, " pp.
277-306.

6 - Ira Kassoff, The Thought of Chang Tsai (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984); T'ang Chin-i, "Chang
Tsai's Theory of Mind and Its Metaphysical Basis," Philosophy
East and West 6, no. 2 (July 1956): 113-136; Huang Siu-chi,
"Chang Tsai's Concept of Ch'i' Philosophy East and West 18,
no. 4 (October 1968): 247-260.

7 - To give just a few examples: Fung Yu-lan, A History of
Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1952) , pp. 477-498; Car-sun Chang, The Development of
Neo-Confucian Thought, vol. 1 (New York: Bookman Associates,
1957; reprint, New Haven: The New College and University
Press, 1963), pp. 159-182; Hou Wai-lu, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang
t'ung-shih (A general history of Chinese thought) (Peking:
en-min Ch'u-pan She, 1957), vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 545570; Wm.
Theodore de Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 466-470; Wing-tsit
Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963) , pp. 495-517; Huang
Siu-chi, "The Moral Point of View of Chang Tsai," Philosophy
East and West 21, no. 2 (April 1971): 154155. Ira Kasoff has
begun to take note of this understudied aspect of Chang's
thought even though his treatment does not do full justice to
the centrality of ritual in Chang's theory of moral
cultivation (Ira E. Kasoff, The Thought of Chang Tsai, pp.
81-82, 128).

8 - Chang Tsai, Chang Tsai chi (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu,
1978), p. 383 (hereafter CTC).

9 - CTC, pp. 387-388.

10 - T'o T'o, Sung Shih (Peking, Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1977),
427:12724.

11 - For a general discussion of the importance of cosmogony
to ethics, see Cosmogony and the Ethical Order: New Studies
in Comparative Ethics, ed. Robin W. Lovin and Frank E.
Reynolds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) ,
"Introduction."

12 - CTC, pp. 7-9.

13 - Ibid., pp. 7-8, 66.

14 - Ibid., p. 19.

15 - Carsun Chang, The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought,
vol. 1, p. 178.

16 - CTC, p. 21.

17 - Ibid., p. 341.

18 - Ibid., p. 63.

19 - Ibid., p. 63.

20 - Ibid., p. 324.

21 - Ibid., p. 23.

22 - Ibid., p. 324.

23 - Ibid., p. 23.

24- Ibid.

25 - Chang Tsai said, "Heaven does not have mind; the mind is
in the mind of man" (C/C, p. 256; see also pp. 185-189).

26 - Chang Tsai, however, did not give the names of these
Confucians (C/C, pp. 64, 267).

27 - See Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Earl;/China
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 15-16.

28 - CTC,, p. 23.

29 - Most studies of Chang's thought do not identify
"physical nature" with character.

30 - CTC, p. 355.

31 - Ibid., p. 274.

32 - Ibid., pp. 64, 350.

33 - Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T'ang (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 134,
153, 166; Huang Min-chih, Sung-tai Fo-chiao she-hui ching-chi
lun-wen chi (Essays on the social and economic history of
Sung Buddhism) (Taipei: Hsueh-sheng Shu-chu, 1989), pp.
349-355.

34 - Huang Min-chih, Sung-tai Fo-chiao, p. 271.

35 - Those who succeeded in obtaining the chin-shih degree
were granted a feast in K'ai-pao Buddhist temple in 979. See
Wang Yung, Yen-i rnou lu (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu, 1981),
1:4.

36 - Fang Hao, "Sung-tai Fo-chiao tui lu-yu chih kung-hsien"
(Sung Buddhism's contribution to tourism), in Fang Hao
liu-shih chih liu-shih-sze tzu-hsuan tai-t'ing kao (Taipei:
Hsueh-sheng Shu-chu, 1974), pp. 124-126; Huang Min-chih,
"Sung-tai Fo-chiao," pp. 432-434.

37 - Fang Hao, "Sung-tai Fo-chiao," pp. 115-121.

38 - Wang Yung, Yen-i i-mou lu, 2:20.

39 - Ch'eng I, Erh Ch'eng chi (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu,
1981) , p. 26; $ung-jen i-shih hui-pien (Collection of
anecdotes of Sung personages) (Peking: Chung-hua Shu-chu,
1981), p. 452.

40 - Wang Yung, Yen-i i-mou lu, 3:24.

41 - See James T. C. Liu, Ou-yang Hsiu: An Eleventh-Century
Neo-Confucianist(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967),
pp. 164-165.

42 - Han Yu and Li Ao were critics of mixing Buddhist and
Confucian rituals. See David McMullen, State and Scholars in
T'ang China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.
154.

43 - Patricia Ebrey, Confucianism and Family Rituals in
Imperial China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991),
pp. 88-89.

44 - Fang Hao, "Sung-tai Fo-chiao," pp. 159-165; Patricia
Ebrey, Confu-cianism, pp. 94-95; Huang Min-chih, Sung-tai
Fo-chiao, p. 431.

45 - Patricia Ebrey, Confucianism, pp. 93-98.

46 - Patricia Ebrey, "Cremation in Sung China," American
Historical Review 95 (1990): 406-428.

47 - CTC, pp. 329-330.

48 - Ibid., pp. 187-188.

49 - Ibid., pp. 22-23.

50 - Ibid., p. 23.

51 - Ibid., pp. 24, 63, 269.

52 - Ibid., p. 269.

53 - Ibid., p. 271.

54 - Ibid., pp. 273, 313, 328.

55 - Aristotle argues that morality begins with learning
about virtuous actions, or the "that, " in contrast to
learning the "because," or the explanation and justification
of virtuous action. For discussion, see M. F. Burnyear,
"Aristotle on Learning to be Good," in Essays on Aristotle's
Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980), pp. 71-72.

56 - CTC, p. 286.

57 - Ibid., pp. 277-278, 284.

58 - Ibid., pp. 29, 269-270, 275.

59 - Ibid., p. 312.

60 - Alasdair Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York:
Macmillan Publishing, 1966), p. 1.

61 - Chang said: "The sage transforms himself spontaneously"
(CTC, pp. 73, 17-18, 27-28, 78).

62 - CTC, pp. 76. 17-18, 28.

63 - Ibid., p. 76.

64 - Ibid., pp. 76-77.

65 - Ibid., p. 64.

66- Ibid.

67 - For a discussion of Aristotle's idea about the role of
developing good habits in cultivating morality, see M. F.
8urnyeat, "Aristotle on Learning to Be Good" (see note 55
above), pp. 69-88.

68 - CTC, p. 264.

69 - Ibid., p. 191.

70 - A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical
Argument in Ancient China (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court,
1989), p. 25.

71 - CTC, pp. 279, 330.

72 - Ibid., p. 37.

73 - Ibid., pp. 279, 330. His student Lu Ta-lin pointed out
that Chang always told scholars about the need to learn
ritual in order to transform their bad character (CTC, p.
383).

74 - Ibid., pp. 279, 330.

75 - Kassof, The Thought of Chang Tsai(note 6 above), pp.
76-103, 128.

76 - CTC, p. 329.

77 - Ibid., p. 31.

78 - Ibid., pp. 281,130.

79 - Kassof thinks that ritual is important only in the first
stage, not in the second stage (The Thought of Chang Tsai,
pp. 81-82, 128). But in fact, Chang clearly said: "it is not
possible to attain the state of Confucius without learning
the Book of Songs and the Records of Rites"
(CTC, p. 278).

8O - CTC, p. 31.

81 - Ibid., pp. 259, 326.

82 -Ibid., pp. 51,328.

83 - Ch'eng Hao lamented that his family was among only a few
families in Lo-yang that did not use the Buddhist service in
a funeral (Erh Ch'eng chi, p. 114 [see note 39 above]).

84 - CTC, pp. 264, 328.

85 - The idea that ritual had its roots in the cosmos can be
traced back to no later than Hsun Tzu (A. C. Graham,
Disputers of the Tao, p. 259).

86 - CTC, p. 326.

87 - Ibid., p. 264.

88 - Ibid., p. 261.

89 - Ibid., p. 274.

90 - Ibid., pp. 269, 275-278.

91 - Ibid., p. 326.

92 - Ibid., pp. 77-79.

93 - Ibid., p. 288.

94 - Chu Hsi, Chu-tzu yu-lei, 84:2183.

95 - Kuo Pang, Sung Yuan Fo-chiao (Buddhism in Sung and Yuan
times) (Foochow, Fukien: Jen-min Ch'u-pan She, 1981), pp.
1-5.

96 - This rendering reads fen as station, rather than
divisions. I owe this rendering to Professor K. C. Liu. For a
similar translation, see Peter Bol and Kidder Smith et al.,
Sung Dynasty Uses of the I-ching (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), p. 145. For Ch'eng I's praise of
Chang's "Western Inscriptions," see Ch'eng I, Erh Ch'eng chi,
p. 22.

97 - Donald Munro, "The Family Network, the Stream of Water,
and the Plant: Picturing Persons in Sung Confucianism," in
Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist
Values, ed. Donald Munro (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese
Studies, 1985), pp. 264-269.

98 - Chang Tsai wished to resurrect the "feudal" system
(feng-chien), which he recognized to be impossible. The best
alternative was to make local government office hereditary
(CTC, pp. 250-251).

99 - CTC, p. 261.

100 - Ibid., pp. 341,322, 374.

101 - Ibid., p. 341.

102 - Ibid., p. 317.

103 - Ibid., p. 256.

104 - Ibid., pp. 30, 317.

105 - Ibid., pp. 23, 374.

106 - For a discussion of Li K'ou's advocacy of Chou-li as
the foundation of "Ultimate peace" (t'ai-p'ing), see Hou
Wai-lu, Chung-kuo ssu-hsiang t'ung-shih, pp. 408-414 (see
note 7 above).

107 - David McMullen, State and Scholars in T'ang China, p.
117. For discussion of the importance of state rituals for
T'ang scholars, see chap. 4.

108 - See Patricia Ebrey, Confucianism, chap. 3.

109 - CTC, p. 327.

110 - Ibid., p. 288.

111 - Ibid., pp. 258-265, 289-303. For a detailed discussion
of rituals by Chang Tsai and other Sung neo-Confucians, see
Ebrey, Confucianism, chaps. 3 and 4.

112 - Ebrey, "Education through Ritual," pp. 286, 292 (see
note 1 above). For Shih Chieh, see Tsu-lai hsieh-sheng
wen-chi (Collected writings of Shih Chieh)(Peking: Chung-hua
Shu-chu 1984), pp. 234-235.

113 - Ebrey, "The Early Stages," pp. 24-25 (see note 5 above).

114 - Ebrey, Confucianism, chap. 3.

115 - Ebrey, "The Early Stages," pp. 35-39. See also her
Confucianism, chap. 3.

116 - CTC, p. 259.

117 - Ibid., pp. 258-261.

118 - Ibid., pp. 267, 382. See also Chu Hsi, Reflections on
Things at Hand, trans. Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1967), pp. 199-200.

119 - CTC, p. 382.

120 - Ibid., pp. 248-252.