Seng-Chao And The Maadhyamika Way of Refutation

·期刊原文
SENG-CHAO(a) AND THE MAADHYAMIKA WAY OF REFUTATION

MING-WOOD LIU
JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 14 (1987)
PP.97-110
COPYRIGHT @ 1987 BY DIALOGUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, HONOLULU,
HAWAII, U.S.A.

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P.97

The late Professor Richard H. Robinson, in his highly
illuminating posthumous paper, "Did Naagaarjuna Really Refute
All Philosophical Views?", comments on Nagarjuna's famous
destructive dialectic, which aims at demolishing all
determinate philosophical positions and reducing to absurdity
the naive beliefs of the common people:

In American country fairs there used to be a
well-known game played with three walnut half-shells
and one pea. The operator first held up all three
shells for the audience to see. Then he turned all
three upside down, placed the pea under one shell,
and proceeded to shuffle the shells. When he
stopped, a member of the audience would try to guess
which shell the pea was under. Naagaarjuna's system
resembles the shell game in several ways. Its
elements are few and its operations are simple,
though performed at lighning speed and with great
dexterity. And the very fact that he cannot quite
follow each move reinforces the observer's
conviction that there is a trick somewhere.(1)

This article will try to demonstrate that the above
observation, together with much of the conclusion drawn by
Professor Robinson in his analysis of Naagaarjuna's mechanism
of refutation, can equally be applied to the critique of the
concept of change as found in Seng-chao's much acclaimed
treatise "Things Do Not Alter" (Wu pu-ch'ien lun(b) ,
henceforth cited as Treatise)(2). Seng-chao, (378-414), as is
well-known, was one of the earliest as well as the most
philosophically-minded of Chinese Maadhyamikas;(3) the close
parallel between his and Naagaarjuna's way of refutation
reflects the quick assimilation

P.98

of Maadhyamika thought as it was first introduced into China
in the early fifth century.
Seng-chao opens the Treatise with the following remark:

That there are things which flow and change as life
and death alternate and as winter and summer succeed
each other is the usual belief of men. But I declare
that it is not so.(4)

Ordinary people think that things move along and change with
the passage of time, but Seng-chao maintains the contrary.
This critical attitude towards commonsense conceptions
clearly recalls Naagaarjuna's merciless attack on everyday
preconceptions in such works as the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa.
Seng-chao begins his refutation by citing the reason
underlying the general opinion that things undergo changes:

When people say that [things] change, it is on the
account that past things do not reach the present
and so are said to have changed and to be not
static. When I say that [things] are static, it is
also on the account that past things do not reach
the present and so are said to be static and to have
not changed. [People think that things] change and
are not static because [they see that past things]
do not come down [to the present]. [I maintain that
things] are static and do not change because [I see
that past things] have not left [the past]. So, our
starting-points are not different, and yet our opinions
are not the same.(5)

According to Seng-chao, ordinary people hold that things
change because they notice that "past things do not reach the
present" and are different from things of the present.
However, if past things "do not come down to the present",
past things would pertain to the past and present things
would pertain to the present, and past things "have not left
the past" to become present things. Then, from whence come
changes? The same is true of present things with respect to
future things. Seng-chao continues to chide the common folks
for entertaining the thought that present things move to

P.99

the future:

How sad that men's thoughts have remained deluded
for such a long time. Though they face the Truth,
they are not aware of it. They already know that
past things do not come down [to the present],and
yet they claim that present things can go [to the
future]! As past things have not come down [to the
present], how can present things go [to the
future]?(6)

Seng-chao approaches the issue by first attributing the
supposition "Past things do not reach the present" to the
common people. He then goes on to argue that this supposition
not only does not favour their view that "things flow and
change" in time, but can, on the contrary, be used to prove
the opposite view that things are static and do not alter.
Yet, do the common people actually entertain such a
supposition when they assert that "things flow and change"?
Of course, the idea "change" entails that "past things do not
reach the present" in the sense that they are different from
things of the present. But "do not reach the present" admits
of various degrees. It can be "totally do not reach the
present"or "partly do not reach the present". For example,
when we say that the street we have lived in for several
years has changed, what we usually have in mind is not that
the street of the past has totally disappeared and a brand
new street now stands in its place, but only that some
time-worn houses have been replaced and some additional trees
have been planted. Similarly, when we say that a long parted
friend has changed, we often do not mean that he has become
an entirely different individual, but only that he has
perhaps grown fat or has turned reticent.
In other words, the supposition behind the everyday
concept of ''change" is that "past things partly do not reach
the present," not that "past things totally do not reach the
present." If past things totally do not reach the present,
there would indeed be no alteration of things, for past
things and present things would then be totally separate, and
no past things would, by shedding old characteristics and
assuming new features, change into present things. But the
problem is that this is not the supposition of

P.100

common man. Seng-chao, by conflating the two senses of "not
reaching the present," imputes to common man a supposition
which he never upholds, and then chides him for
misunderstanding its import!
If the preceding analysis is not misguided, Seng-chao
obtains the conclusion. "Things are static and do not change"
largely by reading the supposition "Past things do not reach
the present" as "Past things totally do not reach the
present." It should be noted that despite the centrality of
this supposition to his entire argument, Seng-chao neither
formulated it in clear and precise terms, nor offered reasons
for its support. Now, since "past things do not reach the
present", it follows that there exist in the present no past
things, as Seng-chao is quick to note:

What does this mean? If we look for past things in the
past, [we find that] there never were [past things] in
the past. If we search for past things in the present,
[we find that] there are never [past things] in the
present. That there are never [past things] in the
present shows that [past] things do not come down [to the
present]. That there never were any [past things] in the
past proves that [past] things have never left [the
past]. If we in turn examine present [things, we shall
discover that] present [things] also do not go [to the
future]. This means that past things existed by
themselves in the past, and [things do] not reach the
past from the present; and present things exist by
themselves in the present, and [things do] not come to
the present from the past.(7)

That "there never were any past things in the past" is
self-evident and requires no explaining, but that "there are
never past things in the present" needs more careful
examination. Judged from the commonsense standpoint, even
though the street years ago does not reach the present
intact, it has not become a completely different street
either;even though the long parted friend has taken on some
new features, he still retains enough of his desirable old
features to be accepted as the same friend. Thus,as is taken
by commonsense, the statement "There are never past things in
the present" can at most

P.101

only mean "There are never past things in their entirety in
the present." If the statement "There are never past things
in the present" can only mean "There are never past things in
their entirety in the present," its consequence. "Past things
do not come down to the present," can only mean "Past things
"in their entirety do not come down to the present." Now,even
though past things in their entirety do not come down to the
present, part of them still continues to exist in the
present. In this circumstance, Seng-chao's inferences (that
"past things existed by themselves in the past", that
"present things exist by themselves in the present", and that
nothing moves from the past to the present), will not obtain.
In order to get these conclusions, the statement "There are
never past things in the present" has to be rendered as
"There are never past things even in part in the present." If
there never are past things even in part in the present, no
part of past things would come down to the present. In that
case, past things would exist alone in the past, and present
things would exist alone in the present. They would exist in
the same manner as images on a movie-screen: despite their
close resemblance and quick succession, they would in fact be
distinct images.There would be no altering of things from the
past to the present state. However, why can past things not
exist in the present even in part? Why is the general
conviction that past things do not exist in the present in
their entirety but do exist in part not allowed? Again,
Seng-chao has offered us not a single word of explication,
but merely contents himself with playing upon the ambiguity
of such phrases as "There never are past things in the
present" and "not coming down to the present".

Seng-chao, it shouid be pointed out, has never explicitly
averred that "past things totally do not reach the present
and there are never past things even in part in the present";
but the genneral trend of his deliberation strongly suggests
such a conception. Furthermore, this conception explains his
frequent claim that he has not excluded the phenomenon of
change from his world picture, in spite of his thesis that
things are "static" and "do not alter":

The Fang-kuang(c8) says, 'Dharmas have no coming and
going, and do not change.'(9) Investigating the
meaning of [the phrase]

P.102

'not changing' here, how can it mean the casting
aside of 'change' in order to seek 'the static'? In
fact, it teaches that 'the static' must be sought
right in [the state of] 'change'. As 'the static'
must be sought right in [the state of] change,
[things,l though changing, are yet forever static.
As 'change' is not cast aside in order to seek the
static, [things, ] though being static, are yet
never separated from change.(10)

In a universe where "past things totally do not reach the
present and there never are past things even in part in the
present", past things would exist only in the past, and would
disappear completely as the past is superseded by the
present. The same would be true of present things, which
would exist only in the present, and would disappear
completely as the present is superseded by the future. Future
things would likewise follow this pattern of successive
replacement. So past, present and future things would be
continuously vanishing, and the world as a whole would be
like a stream flowing on incessantly, old water being
substituted by new water all the time. That is "change".
However, when the past, present, and future states of the
world are considered individually, it is seen that they exist
in perfect isolation from each other; there is no passing of
the world from one temporal position to another. That is what
Seng-chao means by "being static. So, while the universe would
be forever "changing" in the sense that it never remains the
same for a single second, it would be "static" in the sense
that it never undergoes any development. So, it can be said
that "things, though changing, are yet forever static."
Conversely, while the universe would be "static" in the sense
that it never undergoes any development, it would be forever
"changing" in the sense that it never remains the same for a
single second. So, it can be said that "things, though being
static, are yet never separated from change." In reply to the
query how his idea of the changelessness of things can be
reconciled with the Buddha's cardinal teaching of transience,
Seng-chao writes:
If we again investigate the saying of the Sage, [we shall
find it]

P.103

subtle, profound and difficult to fathom. [Things] appear to
change and yet are static, appear to leave and yet are
retained. [Such ideas] can only be apprehended by the spirit,
and are hard to discover in [ordinary] events. Thus, when
[the Sage] affirms that [things] leave, [he does] not
necessarily [mean that they] leave, [but he so asserts
merely] to check the [ordinary] people's thought of
permanence; and when [the Sage] affirms that [things] abide,
[he does] not necessarily [mean that they] abide, [but he so
asserts merely] to dismiss what the [ordinary] people call
the passing [i.e., impermanence) [of things]. He does not
mean to say by "leaving" that [things] can be sent away and
by "abiding" that [things] can be retained. So, the
Ch'eng-chu(d) says, 'The Bodhisattva, while living in the
midst of the false view of permanence, propagates the
teaching of impermanence.'(11) The Mahaayaana-`saastra(12)
says,'Dharmas do not change. They neither go anywhere nor
come from anywhere.'(13) All these [statements] are intended
for the edification of the common folks, and are diverse
pronouncements leading to the same goal. Shall we maintain
that since they differ in their wording, they are opposite in
their objectives? So, even though permanence is mentioned, it
does not [mean] abiding; and even though leaving is spoken
of,it does not [mean] alteration. Since [things] do not
alter, they are always static even though going away and
since [things] do not abide,they always go away even though
being static. Since [things] always go away even though being
static, they do not alter while going away; and since
[things] are always static even though going away, they are
not retained while being static. So, when Chuang-tzu(e)
[declared that it is impossible] to hide a boat [in a ravine,
for at midnight, a strong man would come and carry it off on
his shoulder],(l4) and when Confucius stood by a stream [and
sighed, 'It passes on like this, never ceasing day or
night'(15)],both were expressing the feeling that what is
gone cannot be retained. Did they hold that by casting aside
the present, [things] can go [to the future]?(16)

P.104

On the one hand, things come into and go out of existence
incessantly, past things being displaced by present things.
So it is said that they "appear to change" and "appear to
leave." On the other hand, things are bound to the moment of
their inception, there being no transition of things from one
point of time to another. So it is said that they "are
static" and "abide." "When the Sage affirms that things
leave, he does not necessarily mean that they leave", for the
Sage understands that even though things never remain
constant for a single instant, they do not depart from the
temporal position to which they belong. This same
consideration underlies the assertions "Even though leaving
is spoken of, it does not mean alteration" and "Things do not
alter while going away." "When the Sage affirms that things
abide, he does not necessarily mean that they abide", for the
Sage realizes that even though things adhere to the time of
their appearance, they vanish as soon as they are born. Such
is also the reason behind the declarations "Even though
permanence is mentioned, it does not mean abiding" and
'Things are not retained while being static." In Seng-chao's
opinion, when the Tathaagata preached the doctrine of
transience, he had in mind this aspect of "not abiding" of
the phenomenal order, which, as the above discussion clearly
demonstrates, does not preclude the aspect of "no
alteration." Likewise, when Chuang-tzu illustrated the
fleeting nature of things with the parable of the boat hidden
in a ravine being carried off by a strong man, and when
Confucius commented on the passing on of the stream, what
they were observing was the fact that things, once gone,
leave behind no trace of their being. They were not
maintaining that past things move on to become present
things, nor that present things move on to become future
things.
Thus, we can see that all the main theses of the Treatise
hint at the presupposition that "past things totally do not
reach the present and there never are past things even in
part in the present." However, not only has Seng-chao never
made direct statement to this effect throughout the entire
Treatise, but he often intimates that the common people
actually share this same presupposition of his. Their failure
to perceive the non-changing nature of things is due to their
one-sided way of thinking:

P.105

People seek past [thingsl in the present,and [since
they do not find them in the present, they] say that
[things] do not abide. I, on the other hand, seek
present [things] in the past, and [since I do not
find them in the past,I] say that [things] do not go
away. If present [things] reach [back to] the past,
there should be present [things] in the past. If
past [things] reach the present, there should be
past [things] in the present. As there are no past
[things in the present, we know that [past things]
do not come down [to the present]. As there were no
present [things] in the past, we know that [present
things] do not go [back to the past]. As past
[things] do not reach the present, and present
[things] likewise do not reach [back to] the past,
things, each according to its nature, are bound to
one period of time. How can there be anything which
goes and comes?"(17)

Seng-chao is suggesting that ordinary people think that
things change ("do not abide") because they only "seek past
things in the present", and do not "seek present things in
the past" as he does. If they would adopt his perspective,
they would immediately realize that things do not alter. But
is the matter really so simple? It may be true that ordinary
people get their concept of change when they look for past
things in the present and find them different from what they
once were. But as the ordinary people do not hold that "past
things totally do not reach the present and there never are
past things even in part in the present", the difference they
perceive is only a difference in part. So, even if they
follow Seng-chao's advice and seek present things in the
past,they still would not, on finding completely no past
things in the present and completely no present things in the
past, come to see that past things belonged only to the past,
present things belong only to the present, and "things do not
go away." Seng-chao further pronounces:

If present things reach back to the past, there
should be present things in the past. If past things
reach the present, there should be past things in
the present,

P.106

It is as if it is self-evident that there can be no present
things in the past and no past things in the present. But the
actual situation is the reverse, for to most common people
who see past things and present things as different only in
part and not in entirety, what seems apparent is that part of
present things already existed in the past and part of past
things still persist in the present. Of course, starting with
the premise that "past things totally do not reach the
present, and there are never past things even in part in the
present", one can infer that "there are (completely) no past
things in the present" and "there were (completely) no
present things in the past." As there are completely no past
things in the present, "past things do not come down to the
present." As there were completely no present things in the
past, present things "do not go back to the past." As a
consequence, past things, present things, and - for that matter
- future things as well, are each "bound to one period," and
there would be no transformation of things in time. But this
is not a conclusion which can be arrived at merely by
"seeking present things in the past" instead of "seeking past
things in the present," as Seng-chao would like us to think.
In everyday conversation, the idea of change is often
connected with the idea of causality. For example, our
assertions that a bud has changed into a flower, or that
pieces of wood have changed into a chair are often based on
the belief that there exist causal links between the bud and
the flower or between the pieces of wood and the chair they
form. Thus, if it can be demonstrated that such links are
actually non-existent and that causes never survive in their
effects, it will surely advance the thesis that "things do
not alter." Thus, at the end of the Treatise, we find
Seng-chao arguing that past causes do not change to become
present effects:

The effect is not simultaneous with the cause, and
[it is] due to the cause that the effect [comes into
being. Now,since it is] due to the cause that the
effect [comes into beingl,the cause did not perish
(i.e., was not non-existent) in the past. [Since]
the effect is not simultaneous with the cause, the
cause does not come down to the present. [Since the
cause] did not perish [in the past] and does not
come down [to the present],the inference that it
does not alter is obvious.(18)

P.107

Seng-chao thinks of causality as involving the following
axioms:
i. The cause and the effect are not simultaneous.
ii. The existence of the effect is dependent on the existence
of the cause.

From the second axiom,he infers that:
iii.The existence of the effect in the present proves the
existence of the cause in the past.

So far, all sounds quite innocent.(19) Complications arise,
however, when Seng-chao continues to deduce from the first
axiom the proposition:
iv. The past cause does not come down to the present.

Looked at from the perspective of commonsense, the fact that
the existence of the pieces of wood which are the "past
causes" precedes that of the chair which is the "present
effect" ("not simultaneous") does not by itself imply that
the pieces of wood can "not come down to the present"and be
part of the chair of the present. To get proposition iv,
further hypotheses have to be postulated, such as the
hypothesis "past things totally do not reach the present and
there are never past things even in part in the present." In
such a circumstance, the causes which are the pieces of wood
of the past would exist only in the past ("did not perish in
the past" only), and not even a part of them would persist in
the effect which is the chair of the present ("do not come
down to the present" completely). So, there would be no
ontological link between the pieces of wood of the past and
the chair of the present. The conclusion that past causes do
not alter to become present effects would follow. The problem
is that Seng-chao has nowhere mentioned this hypothesis, or
any other hypotheses, which is required to prove his case. He
talks as if, so long as we agree to axioms i and ii, we would
be obliged by reason to agree to propositions iii and iv,
together with their logical consequence that causes do not
alter. The situation, however, as shown above,is far more
intricate.
After examining some of the axioms on which Nagarjuna's
refutations of all philosophical views depend, Professor
Richard Robinson sums up his analysis as follows:

P.108

The nature of the Maadhyamika trick is now quite
clear. It consists of (a) reading into the
opponent's views a few terms which one defines for
him in a self-contradictory way, and (b) insiting
on a small set of axioms which are at variance
with common sense and not accepted in their
entirety by any known philosophy. It needs no
insistence to emphasize that the application of
such a critique does not demonstrate the
inadequacy of reason and experience to provide
intelligible answers to the usual philosophical
questions.(20)

And the trick we encounter in the Treatise is quite similar:

i. Seng-chao construes the common people's views that
"past things do not reach the present" and "there never
are past things in the present" in such a way that they
are contradictory with their belief that things change.
ii. Seng-chao bases his argument on the tacit assumption
that "past things totally do not reach the present and
there are never past things even in part in the
present," an assumption which is "at variance with
common sense" and whose validity he has not
demonstrated.

So, similarly, it requires no emphasis that such a polemic
does not prove the deficiency of the general belief in the
changing of things, even if the thesis that "things do not
alter" follows logically from Seng-chao's tacit assumption
and reading of the common people's view, for the common
people need not accept his tacit assumption and his
interpretation of their view. Finally, it is worth observing
that the tacit assumption "Past things totally do not reach
the present, and there never are past things even in part in
the present" readily calls to mind the cardinal Hiinayaana
teaching of momentary existence. According to this teaching,
"the world consists of separate and disparate dharmas which
exist only for one fleeting instant and then vanish without
residue",(21) clearly implying the complete disappearance and
total nonexistence of past things in the present. However,
since the concept of momentariness is not central to Early
Maadhyamika and does not figure importantly in any of
Seng-chao's extant writings, it would appear a bit far-

P.109

fetched to see in it the source of inspiration of the
Treatise.(22)

NOTES

1. Philosophy East & West 22,3 (1972), P.325.
2. I have so far come across three English translations of
the Treatise:
i. Wing-tsit Chan, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
(Princeton: Universtiy Press, 1963), pp. 334-350.
ii. Walter Liebenthal, trans., Chao Lun, 2nd ed.rev. (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 1968), pp.45-53.
iii. Richard H. Robinson, Early Maadhyamika in India and China
(Madison, Milwaukee & London: The University of Wisconsin
Press, 1967), pp. 228-232.
I borrow freely from these three sources in rendering the
cited passages in this paper. My interpretation of the
Treatise, however, differs markedly from those of the
three translators.

3. For information on the life, writings and thought of
Seng-chao, consult Walter Liebenthal, op. cit., pp.3-42,
and Richard H. Robinson, Early Madhyamika in India and
China, pp.123-161. There are many different theories
regarding the dates of birth and death of Seng-chao; those
given here are based on Kamata Shigeo(f), Chugoku
Bukkyoo-shi(g) vol.2 (Tokyo: 1924-1934) , vol. 45,
pp.285-288.

4. Takakusu Junjiro(h) & Watanabe Kaikyoku(i), ed., Taisho
Shinshu Daizokyo(j) (henceforth cited as T) 85 vols.
(Tokyo: 1924-1934), vol.45, p.151a, 11.9-10.

5. Ibid., p.151a, 11.22-26.

6. Ibid., p.151a, 1.27-b,1.1.

7. Ibid., p.151b, 11.1-5.

8. The Pa~ncavim`satisaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa-suutra.

9. See T, vol.8, p.203b, 11.8-11.

10. T, vol.45, p.151a, 11.10-13.

11. See T, vol.15, p.451c, 1.25.

12. That is, the Ta Chih-tu Lun(k).

13. See T, vol.25, pp.427c-428a.

14. See Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang
Tzu (New York &

P.110

London: Columbia University Press, 1968), p.80.

15. See James Legge, trans., Confucian Analects, in James
Legge, trans., The Chinese Classics vol.1, 2nd ed.rev.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893), p.222.

16. T. vol. 45, p.151b, 11.12-23.

17. Ibid., p.151c, 11.13-17.

18. Ibid., p.151c, 11.23-25.

19. Seng-chao seems to have ignored the possibility of the
simultaneous arising of cause and effect. Furthermore,
proposition iii is strictly speaking not the consequence
of axiom ii alone, but of axioms i and ii together.

20. Philosophy East & West 22,3 (1972), p.331.

21. Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), p.137.

22. For an attempt to interpret the Treatise using the theory
of momentary existence, see an earlier paper of mine in
Chinese entitled "Seng-chao wu-pu-ch'ien i chih-i(1)",
Nei Ming(m) 126(1982), pp.3-6.