Sinitic speculations on buddha-nature

·期刊原文
Sinitic speculations on buddha-nature:

The Nirvaa.na school (420-589)
By Whalen Lai
Philosophy East and West
32:2 April, 1982
p.135-149
(c) by University of Hawaii Press

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p. 135

The universality of Buddha-nature is a doctrine
accepted by all Chinese schools of Buddhism. The
Wei-shih(a) (Fa-hsiang(b), Vij~naptimaatrataa) school
of Hsuuantsang(c), for reviving the notion that the
icchantika is agotra, devoid of this seed of
enlightenment, had been summarily dismissed as
"Hiinayaanist" for that reason. The idea of "the
enlightenability of the icchantika" is associated
with the laternamed "Nirvaa.na School," a group of
scholars in the Southern Dynasties (420-589) that
chose to specialize on the Nirvaa.na Suutra, the
Mahaayaana scripture narrating the last day and
teaching of `Saakyamuni on earth. The person credited
with discovering this doctrine, before even the full
suutra was available to vindicate his stand, is Chu
Tao-sheng(d) (375?-434), perhaps better known for his
stand on "sudden enlightenment." The school as such
flourished best in the Liang dynasty (502-557); but
because it was then aligned with scholarship focusing
on the Ch'eng-shih-lun(e) (Satyasiddhi? ) by
Harivarman, it came under criticism when the latter
was denounced as Hiinayaanist in the Sui dynasty. It
is usually said that the T`ien-t'ai(f) school, based
on the Lotus Suutra, superseded the Nirvaa.na school
by incorporating many of its ideas, while the
Ch'eng-shih school suffered irredeemably under the
attack of Chi-tsang(g) of the San-lun(h) (Three
Treatise or Maadhyamika) school at the same time.
Henceforth, the Nirvaa.na school faded away while its
old association with the Ch'eng-shih tradition was
judged an unnecessary mistake.(1) This article will
introduce three moments from the history of this
Nirvaa.na school, showing the main trends of
development and, somewhat contrary to traditional
opinion, justifying the necessity for the detour into
Harivarman's scholarship. Emphasis will also be put
on the interaction between Buddhist reflections and
the native traditions.

THE FOUNDING OF THE SCHOOL: TAO-SHENG AND HSIEH LING-YUN(i)

The Nirvaa.na Suutra, from which the school drew its
inspiration, was first translated by Fa-hsien(j), the
pilgrim who brought it back from India, and
Buddhabhadra in 416. This shorter and earlier
recension already introduced the idea of "universal
Buddha-nature", but as surely it also stated that the
icchantika was destitute of this seed of
enlightenment. A later and longer version readmitting
the icchantika into the lot of the enlightenable was
rendered, in Liang-chou(k), by Dharmak.sema with the
help of Tao-lang(1) in 421, but unfortunately this
full text would not arrive at the southern capital
until a decade later, in 430. With only the Fa-hsien
version at hand, it was only natural that the
southerners regarded the exclusion of the
icchantika to be the canonical position. For someone
to openly go against the words of the Buddha should,
indeed in that context, be punishable, according to
the preceptual code, by banishment from the
community(2) . That was the fate at first for
Tao-sheng who somehow intuited that one day even the
icchantika should be de jure (that is, tang-lai(m):
in the
----------------------

Whalen Lai is an Associate Professor at the
University of California, Davis.

p. 136

natural course of time) given this seed of
enlightenment(3). Hui-kuan(n) petitioned the king for
Tao-sheng's removal in 428-429, and Tao-sheng left
the capital for Lu-shan(o), only to be vindicated the
next year when the full text arrived from the north.

It is not clear when Tao-sheng first intuited
this "enlightenability of the icchantika, " but
Hui-kuan's reaction was both sharp and apparently
quick, such that it is advisable to date it close to
428 itself. This is supported by a letter written by
Fan T'ai(p) to the pair, Hui-kuan and Tao-sheng,
circa 426-428, at which time the two were on speaking
terms though already divided over gradual versus
sudden enlightenment(4) . (This other controversy
warranted no expulsion of a heretic, because the
scriptures themselves show no decisive stand, unlike
the explicit exclusion of the icchantika in the
then-available Nirvaa.na Suutra.) Because later in
Ch'an (Zen(q)), the doctrine of sudden enlightenment
was predicated upon the idea of an innate
Buddha-nature, it has been assumed that Tao-sheng
also arrived at the subitist position by way of the
universality of Buddha-nature.(5) However, nowhere in
Tao-sheng's surviving writings do we find the
formula, chien-hsing ch'eng-fo(r), "upon seeing one's
(Buddha) nature, be [suddenly] enlightened." That
formula first appeared in Pao-liang(s) who is however
judged a gradualist because of his Ch'eng-shih
leanings (see infra). Thus "sudden enlightenment" and
"universal Buddha-nature" were originally two
separate issues, discovered by Tao-sheng independent
of one another.

In a separate investigation,(6) I discovered that
Tao-sheng proposed sudden enlightenment even before
he knew of the Nirvaa.na Suutra. The idea came to him
probably at Lu-shan in the last decade of the fourth
century when he was apprenticed under the
Sarvaastivaadin Sa^nghadeva and the famous hermit
Huiyuan(t). Sa^nghadeva translated the Abhidharmahrdaya
in 391 and chapter five of this text specified that
"the last act in training"---the vujrasamaadhi
(diamond trance) --leading to enlightenment involves
a one-step awakening, not any gradual progression.(7)
Hui-yuan himself took a cue from this, and in his
essay San-pao-lun(u) (On Three Modes of Retribution)
in 395 already so suggested a nonkarmic (that is,
noncausative) enlightenment.(8) This then formed the
basis for the twin theories of Tao-sheng which should
be read together, namely, "The [nirvanic] Good admits
no [karmic] retribution'' for indeed it is through
"sudden enlightenment that one attains Buddhahood."
It is only later that Tao-sheng further grafted this
Hiinayaana-based argument for sudden enlightenment to
items he learned in his next phase of scholarship
under Kumaarajiiva: the Emptiness philosophy of
Maadhyamika and the Ekayaana doctrine of the Lotus
Suutra. He and Hui-kuan parted company then over
suddenism and gradualism as related to these two
Mahaayaana doctrines.(9) The doctrine of Buddha-nature
was known to both, but was not regarded as having any
bearing, pro or con, on that controversy. The proof
lies in Hsieh Ling-yun's defense of Tao-sheng in his
Pien-tsung-lun(v) dated 423. Nowhere in this classic
defense is Buddha-nature rallied to the side of
suddenism. In fact, the only time it is mentioned was
by an

p. 137

opponent in support of the gradualist's cause.(10)
These facts, however, can only be documented on a
separate occasion.

Although sudden enlightenment was not derived
originally from the universality of Buddha-nature,
the two did come together eventually and do represent
a key contribution in the founding days of the
school. The argument for suddenism based on the
innateness of Buddha-hood (without as yet accepting
the icchantika, the exception) was first presented,
as far as surviving documents go, by Huijui (alias
Seng-jui(w)) in his Yu-i-lun(x). This work is not
dated but I prefer to put it after 423. Hui-jui
notes:

The (Nirvaa.na) suutra says, "Nirvaa.na is
non-extinction; the Buddha does have a self. All
sentient beings have Buddha-nature and will, upon
completion of cultivation, become enlightened."...
Nirvaa.na lasts forever because it corresponds to the
mirroring (chao(y) ) element in men. The Great
Transformation will not cease and so the true basis
[Buddha-nature] has to be. Still there are those who
doubt only the more, settling for gradual
enlightenment and criticizing the true (suddenist)
understanding.(11)

These stubborn ones were compared to the
icchantikas.(12) Finally, Tao-sheng after his
vindication and at the invitation of Hui-kuan to
contribute a preface to the southerners-edited text,
offered this succinct statement:

The true principle is naturalness itself (chen-li
tzu-jan(z)). Enlightenment is just being mysteriously
in tune to it. What is true permits no variance, so
how can enlightenment permit any change? The
unchanging essence is quiescent and forever mirroring
(chao). If a person out of delusion goes counter to
it, then enlightenment indeed appears to lie beyound.
If he with effort seeks it out, he would reverse the
delusion and return to the Ultimate.(13)

Although the word Buddha-nature is not mentioned (in
this or any other prefaces)(14) and although sudden
enlightenment is absent too, the implication is
clear: the direct uncovering of this innate, natural,
unchangeable, mirroring essence has to be sudden and
total. For such cutting simplicity, Tao-sheng has
been loved by many, past and present.

The charm of his thesis notwithstanding, it must
be judged as reflecting a certain freedom, even
license, in the founding days of the Nirvaa.na
school. There is a certain Neo-Taoist innovation in
his reading of the "real" intention of the text, a
meaning he regarded as lying behind the tools (the
"rabbit snare") of the language. Edward Conze well
notes how the gradual versus sudden was never that
divisive an issue in India:

In fact, Indian Buddhist had made a distinction
between "gradual" and "sudden" enlightenment, but had
regarded the second as the final stage of the first
and nobody had thought of taking sides for one or the
other. Tao-sheng now argues that since the absolute
emptiness of Nirvaa.na is absolutely and totally
different from all conditioned things, the
enlightenment which mirrors [chao] it must also be
totally different from all mental stages which are
directed at other things. In consequence,
enlightenment, if it is to be achieved at all, can be
achieved only in its totality, and not in a gradual
or piecemeal fashion.(15)

p. 138

The logic might appear to be derived from
Maadhyamika, but I am told both the Maadhyamika and
the Tathaagatagarbha tradition in India were inclined
toward what Tao-sheng would have considered as
gradualism.(16) Moreover, if we stand back and look
at the short quote from Tao-sheng given earlier, we
would have to say that the psychology of this
mirroring faculty, chao, like the metaphysics of the
invariable, unceasing, one true principle, tells more
of native Taoist psychology and ontology than things
immediately Indian.(17) The very language used by
Tao-sheng, such words as tzu-jan (nature,
spontaneity, as-is-ness) and pu-i(aa) (the
nonchanging), belies a monism that is less obvious
than what is found in the Nirvaa.na Suutra.(18)

The native proclivity in Tao-sheng's thesis was
actually acknowledged by Hsieh Ling-yun himself.
Instead of seeing his Pien-tsung-lun as an
interesting excursion into "comparative religion" in
the fourth century, we should see it as an implicit
concession on Hsieh's part that, after reviewing the
on-going debate between the two camps, the suddenist
cause was justifiable more by chinese proclivity than
by Sanskrit scriptural authority. Hsieh's work is as
much a hymn to the Chinese genius as it is a
confession that Tao-sheng's position was
ill-supported by the mainstream in Indian Buddhist
reflections (including the authority of Kumaarajiiva
and Seng-chao(ab) (19)). Hsieh writes:

In the discourses of `Saakyamuni, though the Way of
the Sage is remote, by accumulated learning one may
reach it;
but only when the bonds are exhausted and
illumination is born, will one gradually become
enlightened.
In the discourses of Confucius, since the Way of the
Sage is subtle, even Yen(ac) (Hui) only approximated
it;
but when one embodies Nonbeing and illumination is
universal, then all principles revert to the One
Ultimate.
Of late, a man of the Way [Tao-sheng] said, "The
passive comprehension is fine and subtle and permits
no gradition. Accumulated learnings have no end, how
will that ever terminate itself?" Thus I will reject
gradual enlightenment in `Saakyamuni's teaching but
retain his accessibility. I will cast out the idea of
approximation in the Confucian tradition and take in
its One Ultimate.(20)

In other words, for Hsieh, India provided the
gradualism of the effective means, while China the
suddenism of the uncompromising end.

The Sinitic input cannot be denied; but the
unique nature of the synthesis should not be
overlooked either. Something unprecedented in both
Indian Buddhist and Chinese native tradition was
forged. Apropos the latter, it should be remembered
that although Mencius said every man might become Yao
or Shun(ad) (Sages) or that Hsun-tzu(ae) rooted
Goodness in acquired learning itself, such rational
humanism was eclipsed largely in the Han period. The
conscensus was that Confucius was a Sage, but then
Sages were rare beings indeed. His leading disciple
was Yen Hui, called distinctly a hsien (virtuous
one)(af). As hsien, Yen Hui at best approximated
Sagehood; he could never and should never aspire to
be a Sage. Yen Hui loved learning (ai-hsueh(ag)), but
it is not until Sung that finally this learning could
be called sheng-jen chih hsueh(ah), Sage Learning
(mean-

p. 139

ing learning conducive to the creating of sagehood in
oneself). For one thing, among the Neo-Taoists, it
was agreed that the learning provided by the Classics
was only the "trace" of Sagehood, not the "essence"
which is forever ineffable and inimitable. The
Neo-Taoists might speak of renouncing the trace and
aspire directly for the essence, but they, too,
stooped to the mystique that Sages were somehow
simply "born" and not "achieved." (The Seven Sages of
the Bamboo Grove are, strictly speaking, hsien and
not sheng(ai) as the English might mislead one to
believe.) In light of this, namely, the
inaccessibility of Sagehood, so total and sudden as
to exclude all known means, the incorporation of
Buddhist learning as the gradual path to that end
should be seen as a new and significant departure
pointing ahead to the Sung Neo-Confucian educational
revolution to come. As T'ang Yung-t'ung(aj) puts it,
prior to Hsieh Ling-yun and Tao-sheng, the Sage
(sheng-jen) is neither "learnable nor arrivable"
(p'u-k'o-hsueh, p'u-k'o-chih'(ak)); with the pair,
now it is learnable by Indian means but not arrivable
gradually (k'o-hsueh, p'u-k'o-chih); after them, in
Sung Neo-Confucianism, Sagehood is finally learnable
and acquirable through learning itself (k'o-hsueh,
k'o-chih(al)).(21)

THE FLOWERING OF THE NIRVAA.NA SCHOOL: THE CH'ENG-SHIH
SYNTHESIS

Considering the radical nature of Tao-sheng's theses,
many observers are disappointed with the eventual
direction of the Nirvaa.na school. Why should its
scholars align themselves with the Ch'eng-shih-lun, a
text structured by the Hiinayaanist Four Noble Truths
and wherein universal Buddhahood would have no place.
It seems more logical and definitely more preferable
to continue the line of thought initiated by
Tao-sheng, a synthesis of the Nirvaa.na, the Lotus
and the Praj~naapaaramitaa Sutva. That, however, was
not to be. The next phase, the flowering of the
Nirvaa.na school, went hand in hand with the
flourishing of the Ch'eng-shih scholarship.

Yet, in that historical context, there were
reasons why this new alignment occurred the way it
did: (i) there are indiciations that purist
Maadhyamika defenders would not accept the Nirvaa.na
Suutra, whereas (ii) the Ch'eng-shih-lun was
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as endorsing a similar
postive gospel compatible with the suutra's
endorsement of a Buddha-self or essence. Apropos (i),
there was at first a Seng-kao of the Chung-hsing(am)
temple who "accepted the larger Praj~naapaaramitaa
Suutra and rejected the Nirvaa.na Suutra, charging
the latter with not being the words of the Buddha."
So heated was the debate that Seng-jui would like to
remember Seng-kao as one "growing more stubborn with
age... finally dying with his (blasphemous) tongue
showing first the signs of decomposition." The
Wei-shu(an) remembered him differently. Seng-kao was
known also as a renowned Abhidharmist who introduced
no less than the Ch'eng-shih-lun to the North.(22)
Seng-kao's reservations about Buddha-nature are
understandable. After all, the Buddha denied any idea
of a substantial 'self' and Naagaarjuna had well
exposed universal emptiness. In view of all that, to
reintroduce this quasiaatman was judged by him to be
untrue to the teachings. Seng-kao could not have

p. 140

been alone in this, because even in the San-lun
tradition of She-shan(ao) (where Chi-tsang ultimately
came from), there was recorded a refusal to digress
into the then-popular Nirvaa.na Suutra. It was under
the continual urgings of his students that
Seng-ch'uan(ap) finally lectured on this suutra. His
successor, Fa-lang(aq) , then tapped the
a`suunyatathaagatagarbha (the not-empty embryonic
buddha) ideology in the `Sriimaalaa Suutra to ease
the `suunyavaada (emptiness) transition of She-shan
into a rapprochement with the Nirvaa.na suutra.(23)
Chi-tsang was Fa-lang's student who then championed
this orthodox linkage against the misguided one he
saw in the Nirvaa.na/Ch'eng-shih school. In short, it
took some time for purist or critical Maadhyamika
followers in the Southern dynasties to come to terms,
successfully, with the renewed aatmavaada trend found
in the Nirvaa.na suutra. In contrast to this and
apropos the second reason (ii), the Ch'eng-shih group
somehow was more receptive to this Buddha-self
concept. But why? Here we cannot look at what
Harivarman actually said, because objectively
speaking, his Ch'eng-shih-lun should not support the
doctrine of universal Buddha-nature. We must look at
what the Chinese perceived the work to be endorsing.

Firstly, there was emerging a concensus about the
teleology of the Buddha's teachings, how it began
with the AAgamas and ended in the Nirvaa.na suutra. This
scheme was codified as Hui-kuan's p'an-chiao(ar)
system (tenet classification of suutras). The logic
is already implied in Tao-sheng's theory of the Four
Dharma-Wheels found in his Commentary on the Lotus
Suutra. Even though the format given below--in a
p'an-chiao fashion--is not intended by Tao-sheng,(24)
it may nonetheless serve to illustrate the teleology:

The Four Dharma-Wheels are (i) the Pure Teachings in
Hinayana for transcending samsaara; (2) the Praj~naa
teachings exposing all as empty; (3) the Lotus
teaching establishing the one real truth of Ekayaana;
and (4) the Nirvaa.na teaching of the permanently
abiding (Buddha-nature)(25).

In this sequence, Hiinayaana is usually accredited
with seeing the sa.msaaric particulars; the
Praj~naapaaramitaa corpus with emptying them; the
Ekayaana with positing one Ultimate; and the
Nirvaa.na suutra with a positive doctrine of
permanence--a permanent Nirvaa.na and an abiding
essence in men. Since positivism in (4) reverses the
judgments in (2), the disjuncture could not be easily
smoothed over. In fact, the disciples of Kumaarajiiva
were a little embarrassed that their master who
taught them Emptiness did not foresee that reversal
to come. To find a continuity, Seng-jui would say
that the Lotus Suutra's concept of the Buddha's
omniscence anticipated the Nirvaa.na suutra's idea of
universal Buddhanature.(26) He probably made up a
legend involving Hui-yiian's foresight and
Kumaarajiiva's prophesy of the coming of the
Nirvaa.na suutra.(27) The point for us here is that
neither Seng-jui nor others could see the link
between `suunyataa (emptiness) and this new mahaatman
(great self). On the surface, they seemed indeed
opposite to one another.

Just as many turned to the Lotus Suutra for a
justifiable continuity, many turned

p. 141

to Harivarman's Ch'eng-shih-lun for a `saastric
defense of this Buddha-self. The Lotus Suutra
established one true reality (ch'eng i chen-shih(as);
see earlier) meaning Ekayaana, the real goal behind
the expedient Triyaanas. Can it be just a coincidence
that Harivarman's treatise is titled, in Chinese, as
Ch'eng-shih-lun, the Treatise to Establish the Real?
Considering the fact that the opening gaathaa (verse)
in this work refers to itself as the
Cheng-chih-lun(at), the Treatise of the Noble Wisdom,
I am led to think that the current title "To
Establish the Real" was imposed upon it either by
Kumaarajiiva or his followers to underline, for some
reasons, the `positivist' tone allegedly found in
this text. That the text was perceived as espousing
more than Hiinayaanist particularism as well as more
than Praj~naapaaramitaa's obsession with negation is
proven by this preface written in Liang.

Harivarman... noticing how the misguided debate of
his time... authored this work. Ch'eng means that it
is grounded upon wen(au) (the scriptures). Shih means
that it will illuminate the Principle. One uses
Ch'eng to oppose the practice of huai(av) (mere
negation). One sides with shih to oppose the hsu(aw)
(mere vacuity, emptiness).(28)

The treatise completes (ch'eng) the meaning of
the suutras, as the opening gaathaa so claims.(29)
However, the Chinese further saw it as endorsing a
real Principle (shihli(ax)) that is clearly beyond
mere destructive (huai) dialectics, assuredly
reversing the Emptiness philosophy of hsu. Now,
"right or wrong" is a separate issue; the scholars
then saw it that way.

What is this "real Principle" that cannot be
denied or destroyed? In the Satyasiddhi, this is
associated with the third of the Four Noble Truths,
nirodha. Unlike the other three, namely, the truths
of suffering, its cause, and the way out, which
pertains not illogically to the samsaric state (even
the path, maarga, leads from sa.msaara), the truth of
nirodha (cessation, nirvaa.na) is opposed to this
illusion of a world. For that, Harivarman called it
the real truth, even the One Truth and the
paramaarthasatya. This highest truth is set against
the other three as mundane truths.(30) Likewise, we
find, in the Chinese translation of this text, the
adjective shih (the real, the concrete) as being
applied to the item that secures one's attainment of
this transmundane reality. What is real (shih) while
all else is illusory is wisdom, praj~naa. Thus by a
coincidence--however improper this might be by later
standards and modern philological ones--it was
thought that Harivarman also endorsed a "permanent
Nirvaa.na" and a "substantive Praj~naanature." The
Ch'eng-shih-lun was taken at the time as therefore
going beyond mere Emptiness, beyond the
Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutra and Maadhyamika, to
underscoring a higher reality (ch'eng-shih). This I
believe is the reason this text was heavily relied on
by members of the Nirvaa.na school, especially in its
heydays in the Liang dynasty.(31)

Having explained the reason for this "detour"
into Harivarman, let us examine how Harivarman helped
the Sinitic speculations on the nature of this
Buddha-essence. For that, we have selected Pao-liang,
the first to successfully

p. 142

wed the two systems. A grand master, protege of the
Liang Emperor Wu(ay), he influenced the thinkings of
this era.

Pao-liang (d. 509) on the Middle Path Buddha-nature.
There are many problems confronting a theoretician of
Buddha-nature, and Pao-liang had tackled these in his
exegesis of the suutra. However, one basic issue is
(a) where to locate this Buddha-essence, and (b) how
to reconcile this 'self' with the earlier doctrine of
`no-self' or anaatman. The suutra has variously
defined the Buddha-nature as seed of, or cause of,
enlightenment; as Buddhaseed (gotra), Buddha-womb
(garbha) ; as wisdom (praj~naa) , buddha-realm
(dhaatu), Dharmakaaya; as synonymous with anaatman,
aatman, mahaatman, and dialectically as neither
aatman nor anaatman; as empty, not-empty, likewise
dialectically as neither empty nor not-empty; as
paramaartha (the highest truth) ,
paramaartha-`suunyataa (Emptiness of the highest
truth); as the Middle Path and so on. Pao-liang's
position on Buddha-nature, in response to the
preceding, has located the Buddha-nature in the mind,
the innately pure mind, the embyronic buddha
(tathaagatagarbha: womb of the Tathaagata) which he
called the shen-ming miao-ti(az), the mysterious
essence of divine illumination. He also associated it
with suchness (tathataa), paramaartha,(32) the middle
path and, perhaps most intricately, with a union of
the Two Truths. Essentially, Pao-liang located
Buddha-nature, said to be possessed by all sentient
beings, in the core of sentiency, the mind, seeing in
this "mysterious essence" the function or ability to
bring about liberation, a liberation rooted in the
attainment of suchness and the appreciation of the
symmetry of sa.msaara and nirvaa.na.

We can see Pao-liang's basic argument in the
following:

There are four kinds of Buddha-nature, that is, the
basic-cause, the conditionedcause, the result and the
result-of-result Buddha-nature. These four aspects
subsume the whole (process of enlightenment) and
leave nothing out. The basic and the
conditioned-cause Buddha-natures pertain to the way
of the divine aspiration (in the mind). This is
because (in terms of the aspiration) to avoid pain
and to seek after peace, the fool and the wise man
are alike. However in accordance with the "essential"
and its functioning, we distinguish the two aspects
(of the basic and the conditioned cause). We take as
the basic cause that aspect that has, from beginning
to end, been always enlightened and never suffers
increase nor decrease (in its substance). There is
not one split second in which this liberating essence
is not functioning (to deliver the person from
ignorance); it is only that it would cease being
active upon attaining Buddhahood. Thus we know that
the (natural) tendency (in men) to avoid pain and
seek bliss is this liberating function and that this
would be active (in the fool as in the wise man)
irrespective of the karmic good or evil that might or
might not stimulate it. This is what the `Sriimaala
Suutra designates as "the innately pure mind" or what
the Lion's Roar chapter (in the Nirvaa.na suutra)
calls "the one Middle Path." Because this functioning
(aspiration) is not contrary to the great Principle,
therefore how can it not be the basic-cause
(Buddha-nature)? As to the conditioned cause, it has
as its substance the myriad good (contributing to its
fruition). Anything above a thought to do good would
contribute to that excellent fruit. As it is aroused
pending such conditions, it is called the
conditioned-cause (Buddha-nature). As this liberating
aspect dwells in the aspiring mind yet never
eternally, something that rises at one point and (as
a contributing good) never since ceases to be, it is
different from the (changeless) basic

p. 143

cause. However, if there is not the aid offered by
these conditions, then the person would abide with
(his present) nature, never changing his way (for the
Good). For that reason, these two causes must go hand
in hand. Now if the function of the conditioned cause
is fulfilled and the meaning of the basic cause is
replete, then the two activities would be perfected
and life and death (sa.msaara) would end. Omniscence
is what is attained after the vajrasamaadhi (Diamond
trance) stage. It transforms the cause into the
result; this is known as the result Buddhanature. As
to the result-of-result (Buddha-nature), this is set
up against life and death. To give it a comprehensive
name above the myriad good, we call it the
mahaanirvaa.na (great nirvaa.na). Because it is put
as a result above the result, it is called
result-of-result (Buddha-nature). it is not that the
two (results) involve any time gap; the distinction
is logical (not chronological).(33)

Buddha-nature is here dynamically conceived under (i)
a changeless, enlightened basic core, (ii) a tireless
aspiration accumulating merits, (iii) a final
liberation and wisdom, and (iv) for emphasis and
distinction, the grand nirvanic state at the end of
the pilgrimage. Such detailed causative analysis of
the four Buddha-natures, absent as far as we know
from Tao-sheng and other early thinkers, is
characteristic of this peak period.(34)

Although metaphorically Pao-liang would locate the
Buddha-nature in the mind (heart), this is not the
mind faculty in man. He avoided that ontic fallacy by
qualifying it as lying outside the standard elements:

Although Buddha-nature is within the skandhas, the
dhaatus and the aayatanas, it is not subsumed under
them. The reality of divine illumination is the unity
of the Two Truths of the mundane and the highest
truth. It is only the mundane side that is always
within the skandhas etc.; the transmundane side is
forever nirvanic (wu-wei(ba)). Because the latter is
so, therefore the Buddha-nature may, while being
within the skandhas, lie outside it. The essence is
unchanging and the function never diminishes. Because
its function never diminishes, therefore it is called
the basic cause (Buddha-nature). If there is not this
mysterious essence acting as the basis for the
spirited functions, then it would not be said that
Buddha-nature is within and yet not subsumed under
the skandhas etc. thus we know this has to be
true.(35)

Buddha-nature encompasses both the samsaric skandhas
and the nirvanic enlightenment; it is in but not of
this world. Pao-liang could point to the authority of
the `Sriimaalaa Suutra, wherein it is said that "all
sentient beings are dependent on the
tathaagatagarbha"-never the other way around.(36)
Pao-liang followed the Nirvaa.na suutra in ruling out
Buddha-nature for nonsentient objects. Things are
part of suchness (tathataa) too, but lacking mind and
consciousness, their life (sheng(bb), sentiency) has
been terminated. Things without life are without
nature (hsing(bc)).(37)

The unity of the Two Truths which constitutes
Buddha-nature is realized by the person upon his
liberation.

The essence of the basic cause is the principle of
suchness' nature residing in sentient life for the
establishing of both the highest and the mundane
truth. Why? Because unless there is no mind (hsin),
there must be suchness. Upon its nature (hsing),
there is life.

p. 144

It should be noted that in Chinese, hsing is written
as life (sheng, sentiency) with a mind (hsin(bd))
radical.

The essence acts as the basic cause to suchness
attaining an equilibrium. The mundane truth is
suffering and impermanence; the highest truth is
identity with emptiness. Finding the mean between the
two is the function of this suchness nature even as
suchness transcends the two.(38)

The unity of the Two Truths is explained as a necessary
coincidence.

In the early teachings, there was the one-sided
obsession with sa.msaara and with the self as real.
Now this suutra reveals the mysterious essence of
divine illumination (shen-ming miao-t'i) and sees
suchness as real (shih). Upon passing beyond the
vajrasamaadhi, one indeed realizes that all is
suffering, empty and impermanent The resultant
Buddhahood is always permanent, blissful, with self,
and pure. If one can understand it this way, then one
would realize the real meaning on both sides and walk
the middle path. The reason for this is that life and
death (sa.msaara) is essentially empty. From the very
beginning, (the sa.msaaric reality and the essential
emptiness) are not two and never different. Likewise,
Nirvaa.na is essentially suchness; it too has no
form. This is the experiental way to understanding
the real form of the various realities; what the
middle path sees is this one Way.(39)

The unity of the Two Truths is taken to be the middle
path, the one Way, the coincidence of sa.msaara and
nirvaa.na. Sa.msaara is "empty reality"; nirvaa.na is
"Real Emptiness." By this semantic juxaposition, the
two coincided in a "positive mean." This is a typical
manuever of the Ch'eng-shih masters in their
understanding of the Two Truths. It will be flawed
later by Chi-tsang, for mistaking the pair to pertain
to reality (yueh-li(be)),

The idea of a "positive mean" is in part indebted
to a native understanding of life (sheng), mind
(hsin) and nature (hsing) as rendered in the Doctrine
of the Mean. There, nature is larger than life and
rooted in the mind just as Pao-liang would say
Buddha-nature is larger than sentiency and functions
through the mind. There the middle path is a mean
derived from equilibrium and harmony:

Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and
joy are aroused, it is called equilibrium. When the
feelings are aroused and each and all attain due
measure and degree, it is called harmony.... When
equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest
degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper
order and all things will flourish.(40)

Perhaps we can see shades of this in Pao-liang: the
Buddha-nature is the prearoused hsing, functioning to
achieve the harmony of opposites in a middle path
that is a positive Confucian mean.

THE ECLIPSE OF THE SCHOOL: THE PRAASA^NGIKA CRITIQUE

The synthesis of the Nirvaa.na and the Ch'eng-shih
scholarship in the Liang dynasty soon came under
attack in the Sui era. From a more purist Maadhyamika
perspective, Pao-liang's explanation of Buddha-nature
would be judged as too positive and too realistic,
thereby missing the negative dialectics, the
emptiness at

p. 145

the heart of wisdom that is the Buddha-nature.
Pao-liang's use of causality has failed to question
the rationale of cause and effect itself. Pao-liang's
explanation of Buddha-nature as "in but not of the
skandhas" is more a case of rationalizing Both/And,
instead of a critical Neither/Nor. Pao-liang's
understanding of the Two Truths is dangerously
ontological, aligning the pair so easily with
sa.msaara and nirvaa.na as if we are dealing with two
realities instead of two ways of knowledge. In the
end, Buddha-nature is something inconceivable
(acintya) and beyond predication (avikalpya) and the
art of talking about it is not so much explaining
what it is as what it is not. It is not through
reason but rather the dismantling of it that we may
be psychologically freed to catch a glimpse of it.
This in short is what Chi-tsang would do to the
system built up by the Nirvaa.na school.

Chi-tsang technique of praasa~ngika, destructive
dialectics, through which the true might be pointed
at, is best demonstrated in the following persistent
antithetical stand to any definition of
Buddha-nature:

Always it is necessary to oppose any definition of
Buddha-nature. If someone says there it is, say there
it is not. If sentient beings are said to be the
basic cause, say nonsentient beings are instead. If
he says the six elements are the basic cause, say the
non-six elements are instead. If he says the highest
truth is the basic cause, say the non-highest truth
is instead. If he says the mundane truth is the basic
cause, say the non-mundane truth is instead.
[Whatever is said, negate accordingly.] Therefore it
is said that the Middle Path--where there is neither
even the highest nor the mundane truth--is the basic
cause. As one applies the cure according to the ills
perceived, so the negations are employed.

The medicine is to cure, but if the person is to be
liberated, he must also be made to see beyond the
upaaya (expediency) in that antidote. Only so may he
be pointed toward the truth. Thus Chi-tsang went on
to say:

It is not that "non-sent beings" etc. are the basic
cause either. If what-is-so is shown to be not-so,
then why talk of sentiency as opposed to
nonsentiency? We speak of the sentient vs. the
nonsentient (as a language convention), but can the
sentient be said to be real? Unreal? Both real and
unreal? Neither real nor unreal? If you can
understand [the antinomies involved in] sentiency,
what further reason is there to wonder if `it' is the
basic cause or not? The same applies to (the other
items above). Understanding this (dialectics), you
have replete in you that basic cause
Buddha-nature.(41)

Buddha-nature is ultimately not 'something' you know.
It is rather the knowledge penetrating the emptiness
pertaining to any and all `thing'.

In that spirit, Chi-tsang dismantled the Nirvaa.na
school's various stands one by one in the section on
Buddha-nature in his Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun(bf). An
abridged translation is offered below without
comments because more important than any annotations
and corrections at the moment is the train of logic
employed in this intentionally destructive
enterprise.

Traditionally... there are eleven schools of
opinions on Buddha-nature.... The first regards
sentient beings to be the basic cause Buddha-nature
for the suutra has

p.146

said, "The basic cause is sentient being; the
conditioned cause are the six paaramitaas."... The
second school regards the six elements to be the
basic cause for the saatra says, "Buddha-nature is
neither same as nor different from the six elements."
... The third school takes the mind as the basic
cause Buddha-nature for the suutra says, "Those with
mind will inevitably attain the highest wisdom.
Beings with mind and consciousness are different from
insentient things such as wood or stone. By
cultivation, they can attain Buddha-hood."... The
fourth school regards the incorruptible element
within rebirth to be the basic cause Buddha-nature.
This is different from the one above. Why? Because
this understands the mind as having an incorruptible
element and takes this function to be the basic
cause. The fifth school regards the impulse to avoid
pain and preference for bliss to be the basic cause.
The (`Sriimaalaa) suutra says, "Were there not the
tathaagatagarbha, there would not be the desire for
Nirvaa.na and the abhorence of pain and pleasure."...
The sixth school regards the true spirit to be the
basic. cause Buddha-nature. If there is not the true
spirit, how can there be true enlightenment?... The
seventh school regards the aalayavij~naana and the
innately pure mind to be the basic cause
Buddha-nature.... The eighth school regards the
future result (in enlightenment) to be the basic
cause Buddha-nature.... The ninth school regards the
principle by which one gains enlightenment to be the
basic cause Buddha-nature.... The tenth school
regards paramaartha as the basic cause
Buddha-nature.... The eleventh school regards
paramaartha`suunyataa to be the basic cause
Buddha-nature.... It is necessary to negate these,
one by one....

The suutra says, "If the bodhisattva still
harbours the idea of a self... he is not a
bodhisattva," and "when the Buddha discourses on
sentient beings, he is not discoursing on sentient
beings."... It may be said that sentient beings
possess Buddha-nature but never that sentient beings
are Buddha-nature.... The suutra clearly says that
Buddha-nature is neither same nor different from the
six elements." (So why say it is same as the six?) As
to the next five schools, the first three regard the
mind as the basic cause Buddha-nature. But the suutra
only says, "Beings with mind will be enlightened."...
Where does it say that mind itself is Buddha-nature?
To guard itself from misunderstanding, it clearly
says "the mind is impermanent; Buddha-nature is
permanent." So the mind cannot be Buddhanature... The
next two schools come under the same critique... And
where does the suutra speak of an incorruptible
element?... When the `Sriimaalaa suutra speaks of
"desiring nirvaa.na etc." It is talking about the
attribute of the tathaagatagarbha...; where does it
ever designate that impulse... as the basic cause
Buddha-nature?... The tathaagatagarbha is already a
priori buddhahood, so why (would the sixth school)
regard future enlightenability as the
tathaagatagarbha? ...The aalayavij~naana cannot be
the Buddha-nature because the Mahaayaana Sa.mgraha
says it is the mother of ignorance and root of
sa.msaara.... Apropos the eighth and ninth schools'
theses on the principle of future enlightenment, this
principle pertains only to the mundane truth (which
cannot be Buddha-nature). Apropos the tenth and
eleventh on paramaartha and paramaartha`suunyataa,
the principle here pertains to the highest truth.
However, the suutra, immediately after identifying
Buddha-nature with the paramaartha`suunyataa, goes on
to say that it is the perception of both the empty
and the not-empty (alone) is Buddha-nature. The
Middle Path and not Emptiness itself is
Buddha-nature. As to paramaartha..., what scripture
and authority so call it Buddha-nature?... The theory
of future enlightenability... implies incipiency...
and karmic action; these, being impermanent, cannot
be regarded as Buddha-nature.... The thesis that the
principle by which one becomes enlightened is the
Buddha-nature... is the best... but on what scripture
and by what authority is this taught?(42)

In this way, Chi-tsang demolished the
achievements of the Nirvaa.na school, offering his
own much more critical and alert reading for
Buddha-nature instead.

p. 147

The onticization of Buddha-nature was avoided. That
point is well taken by subsequent theorists, but
since Chi-tsang's rather stringent dialectics did not
sit well with the Chinese, the mode of thinking found
in the Nirvaa.na school actually survived him. Even as
the school and its suutra were superseded by other
movements and other works, the legacy of its ideals
lived on. The universality of Buddha-nature, the
heart of the school's message, became indeed credal
for Sinitic Mahaayaana ever since.

NOTES

1. The most detailed work on this school is Fuse
Kogaku, Nehanshuu kenkyuu in two volumes
(Tokyo:Sobun, 1942).
2. Materials on Tao-sheng's life based largely on
T'ang Yung-t'ung, Han-Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-ch'ao
Fo-chiao-shih (Peking reissue: Chung-hua, 1955)
ch. 16, pp. 601-676. I will only note any
disagreements I might have.
3. See ibid., pp. 637-638; there is some confusion
about whether Tao-sheng did not argue for
pen-yu(bg) (a priori possession of Buddha-nature)
instead of tang-yu (future possession) as he was
later charged. T'ang defends the former, but it is
conceivable that Tao-sheng at one time proposed
the latter in a lost treatise known as Fo-hsing
tang-yu lun(bh) . At any rate, the sharp
distinction between pen-wu and shih-yu(bi)
(incipient possession) is a Sui dynasty creation;
all members of the Nirvaa.na school subscribed to
pen-yu (a basic category in their exegesis) even
as they accepted the gradual, incipient maturing
of this seed of enlightenment (buddhagotra).
4. T. (Taisho Daizokyo) 52, p. 78bc.
5. T'ang, p. 658 so assumed; Edward Conze's short
review (see 15) did not.
6. "The Early Theory of Sudden Enlightenment of
Tao-sheng: Before Involving Buddha-Nature"
(manuscript, 1981).
7. In English see Charles Willeman trans. The Essence
of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahrdaya (Brussels: 1975),
p. 82.
8. T. 52, p. 34b.
9. After Kumaarajiiva's death (if dated in 409;
Kumaarajiiva was never consulted on this issue as
he was on others) but before Seng-chao's Nirvaa.na
is Nameless (now authenticated, dated 413; he
reported on both positions).
10.Hui-lin recalled Confucius' ideal of "changing
hsing" (T.52, p. 226bc) and Hsieh then noted the
Buddhist parallel in Buddha-nature (p. 227a).
11.T. 55, p. 41c.
12.One reason for putting this work before 428.
13.T. 37, p. 377b. Full translation in my "The
Mahaaparinirvaa.na suutra and Its Earliest
Interpreters in China" forthcoming in Journal of
the American Oriental Society.
14.Ibid. Only Pao-liang hinted at it.
15.Edward Conze, A Short History of Buddhism
(London: Sense Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1980), p. 70
16.By Prof. Luis Gomez (Michigan University, Ann
Arbor) during a conference on sudden and gradual
enlightenment at the Institute of Transcultural
Studies, Los Angeles, sponsored by the ACLS, 1981.
17.Not that similar metaphors are absent in India,
but the matrix is different.
18.Tzu-jan had been used to translate tathataa; the
invariable is implied.
19.Both, in their exegesis of the ten bhuumis,
accepted progress after intitial enlightenment.
20.T. 52, pp. 224c-225a. Translation indebted to
Prof. Richard Mather, who has a full translation
of this text in manuscript form.
21.This, I believe, is from his Wei-Chin hsuan-hsueh
lun-kao (not available to me at the moment), with
slight changes, ex. sudden enlightenment is
characterized by T'ang as pu-hsueh erh-chih(bj)
instead.

p. 148

22.T'ang, Fo-chiao-shih, pp. 617-18.
23.See Hirai Shun'ei, Chuugoku hanya shisoshi
kenkyuu (Tokyo: Shunjuu, 1976), pp. 309-322.
24.Originally intended for internal analysis of the
Lotus Suutra.
25.Compare Seng-jui's Yu-i-lun: "The Tripi.taka
drives off hindrances; the Praj~naa texts
eliminate vacuous illusions; the Lotus reveals the
one Ultimate; and the Nirvaa.na shows the real
transformations" (T. 55, p. 41bc).
26.Still accepted by Theodore de Bary ed. The
Buddhist Tradition (New York: Vintage, 1972), see
note to pp. 158-160 translation.
27.Yu-i-lun: Hui-yuan supposedly wrote a
Fa-hsing-lun(bk) saying "What attains the Ultimate
has as its nature the unchanging/what possesses
nature has as its principle the embodiment of the
Ultimate"; and Kumaarajiiva sighed at this
intuition of the (permanent) principle prior to
the (Nirvaa.na) suutra's arrival. T'ang accepted
this as true (p. 632).
28.T. 52, p. 244b. The last line reads "... to
praise shih and oppose hsu" after emending hsing
(form) to hsing(bl) (punish).
29.This is accepted by Chi-tsang and is one reason
why Harivarman has been classified at times as
Sautranika.
30.C. D. C. Priestley has dealt with this "seeing
the One Truth" in "Emptiness in the Satyasiddhi,"
Journal of lndian Philosophy 1 (1970): 30-39.
31.The traditional reason given for the Chinese
interest in this text is that they knew no better
or Harivarman did criticize the Abhidharmists. I
do not think that can explain the alignment of the
two schools here. Compare Tao-lang, the aide to
Dharmak.sema and an authority accepted by
Chi-tsang, was insistent on not emptying praj~naa
itself when he said "The myriad dharmas are empty
but the essence of wisdom is not empty" (T. 38, p.
142b). The Satyasiddhi as the Cheng-chih-lun was
indeed regarded in the South as the companion
piece to Naagaarjuna's Maadhyamikakaarikaa, then
also known as the Cheng-fa-lun(bm). The former
affirms the reality of wisdom (chih) as the latter
empties the illusion of dharmas (fa) . Even
Seng-chao agrees with Yao Hsing that there must be
a Sage to understand Emptiness, an essence
somewhere within man. The Southerners needed a
positive `saatra.
32.T'ang, p. 693, wonders if Chi-tsang in
attributing paramaartha Buddha-nature to Pao-liang
had not mistaken chen-ju(bn) (tathataa, suchness
Buddha-nature) as chen-ti(bo) (paramaartha). But
T'ang's own citation on p. 695 of Pao-liang can
easily be taken to support a paramartha
Buddha-nature: "The mundane truth involves
multiples and to the perverted, it is there
always. However, to the delusionfree, it is empty
and has never been. From the Buddha's perspective,
there is only one truth, known only to the
enlightened. What to sentient beings is a (real)
dream is to the Buddha something that never was.
There, being and nonbeing do not apply; only peace
and formlessness. Thus as far as the Buddha is
concerned, there is only paramaartha."
33. T. 37, p. 447c, cited by Fuse, op. cit., II, p.
343.
34. See Hirai. op. cit., pp. 623-624. Both Chi-tsang
and Hui-yuan revolted against the causative scheme
by creating a new category called "neither cause
nor effect Buddha-nature," However, that category
was actually recognized by Liang Emperor Wu in his
preface (T. 52, p. 242c)!
35. Cited by Fuse, p. 353.
36. T'ang, p. 698.
37. T'ang, p. 694.
38. T'ang, citing from Chun-cheng's(bp) Ssu-lun
hsuan-i(bq) as attributed to Pao-liang, pp.
693-694.
39. T. 37, p. 460c, noted by T'ang, p. 694 and Fuse,
p. 348.
40. Wing-tsit Chan ed. A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1963), p. 98.
41. T. 45, p. 37a.
42. Full translation available also in Aaron Koseki,
"Chi-tsang's Ta-ch'eng hsuan-lun: The Two Truths
and Buddha-Nature" (Madison, Wisconsin: University
of Wisconsin, 1977). Selection here from T. 45,
pp. 35c-36c.

p. 149