The Buddhist conception of time and temporality

·期刊原文
The Buddhist conception of time and temporality

David J. Kalupahana
Philosophy East and West 24, no. 2, APRIL 1974.
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii
p.181-191

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p.181

During the early period of Indian thought, time
(kaala) baffled the Indian thinkers to such an extent
that they came to look upon it not only as the cause
of the universe but also as an all-pervading
principle which governs everything in it.(1) But as
speculation advanced, time came to be considered one
of the causes which determines the course of natural
phenomena. Thus, a later Jaina scholiast, 'Silaa.nka,
attempting to explain the nonabsolutism in Jaina
thought, maintained that time can be recognized as
one of the causal factors in the evclution of nature,
because it is found that certain events like the
flowering of trees, etc., occur at certain times
only, not all the time.(2) In the thought of the
Upani.sads, with its emphasis on permanence and
eternity and the resulting denial of change and
causation as being illusory, the problem of causation
received scant attention. But in early Buddhism,
where there is a denial of permanence, the
conceptions of change and causality, and, hence, of
time, occupied prominent places.
Causality (Paali, Pa.ticcasamuppaada; Skt.,
pratiityasamutpaada) is the central philosophy of
early Buddhism. With the insight he gained as he sat
contemplating under the bodhi tree on the bank of the
river Nera~njaraa, the Buddha realized that
everything in this world of experience is causally
produced, It was this insight that enabled him to
eliminate all the doubts (karikhaa) he had
entertained regarding the nature of existence.(3)
Thus, in early Buddhism, the recognition of the fact
that everything is impermanent (anicca), conditioned
(sa.nkhata) , and causally produced
(pa.ticcasamuppanna) , along with the denial of
anything permanent (nicca) or eternal (dhuva,
sassata) red to fruitful speculation regarding time.
But it must be emphasized that during this early
period of Buddhist thought whatever reflections there
were on the problem of time were invariably connected
with speculation on the nature of things which are
temporal (kaalika).
Let us begin with the Buddha's conception of the
universe. Unlike his later Mahaayaana disciples who
maintained that them is no beginning (anavaraagra) of
the world process (sa.msaara),(4) the Buddha insisted
that the beginning is totally inconceivable
(anamatagga) .(5) Although the beginning is
inconceivable, yet it is possible to see periods of
evolution (viva.t.ta) and dissolution (sa.mva.t.ta)
following one another.(6) These periods are reckoned
in terms of aeons (kappa), each of which is said to
be of such immense duration that it can only be
illustrated by means of similes, and these became
very popular in Indian thought later on. One such
simile is as follows: "If there were to be a great
mountain, one league in width, one league in length
and one league in height, a solid mass without chasms
or clefts, and a man at the end of every hundred
years, were to strike it once each time with a silken
cloth, that mountain will sooner be done away with
than would an

p.182

aeon"(7) This passage, while emphasizing the
immensity of time, also shows aeon. that we can
observe events only and use processes based on these
events to I measure time.(8) Thus we derive time from
events which are in time (kaalika), but not vice
versa.(9)
The processes of evolution and dissolution are
said to take place in accordance with the causal
principle which is stated as: "When this exists, that
exists or comes to be; on the arising of this, that
arises. When this does not exist, that does not exist
or come to be; on the cessation of this, that
ceases."(10) Since it has been pointed out that
"there is a profound connection between the reality
of time and the existence of an incalculable element
in the universe,"(11) let us pause to consider the
nature of the causal principle stated in the
preceding formula. This causal principle was
presented by the Buddha in the background of several
theories, one of which was popular in the early
Upani.sadic tradition. In the early Buddhist texts,
this is referred to as the theory of self-causation
(saya.mkata-[vaada])(12) and was based on the belief
in a self (attan) considered to be the essence of
everything (sabba.m) . Thus, "everything exists"
(Paali, sabba.m atthi; Skt. sarvam asti) (13) means
that this essence of everything exists. This leads to
the view that the consequence preexists in the cause,
the future in the present. Such a strictly determined
causal principle would also mean that we can, by
examining the present, predict with absolute
certainty what will happen in the future, for the
future is merely the hidden present. For this reason
temporality becomes a mere illusion.
The Buddha's theory of causality differs from
this in that it is not a form of strict determinism
of this sort. The very use of the term 'when' (and
this idea is expressed by the use of the locative
absolute construction in Paali) , which in this
context is equivalent to the conditional particle
'if', should be sufficient to show that the future
events cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.
For this reason, we find that none of the
extrasensory perceptions recognized in early Buddhism
refer to the future. As is well known, omniscience
(sabba~n~nutaa), as later understood, was not claimed
by the Buddha. We come across only two instances when
the Buddha made any kind of prediction into the
future with much certainty. One is the prediction
that a 'stream entrant' (sotaapanna) is certain
(niyata) to attain enlightenment
(sambodhiparaayana),(14) and the other is that a
person who has eliminated craving and thus attained
enlightenment will not be reborn (khii.na jaati,
n僷ara.m itthattaaya).(15) Both these could be
considered knowledge based on inductive inference
(anvaye ~naa.na).(16) Depending on such inductive
inferences the Buddha recognized the future validity
of the causal principle. This prompted him to make
such declarations as: "Whether the Tathaagatas were
to arise in this world or were not to arise, this
causal status, this causal pattern, this
conditionality remains."(17) If this causal pattern
is said to exist

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always in this world, and if "perceiving the dhamma
means perceiving causality (Pa.tccasamuppaada),"(18)
then it is possible to say that his teachings will be
valid at all times. It is only in this sense that the
teaching (dhamma) was described as being timeless
(akaalika) .(19) On the basis of this theory of
causality, it is possible to define the three periods
of time, past, present, and future, in the following
manner: the past is the determined (=bhuuta); the
present is the moment of becoming (=bhava); and the
future is the as yet undetermined (=bhavya).(20)
Thus, using the terminology of Whitrow on the
problem of time, it is possible to say that according
to Buddhism, "the future is hidden from us--not in
the present, but in the future."(21) Time is the
mediator between the past and the present. Hence for
that which is born (jaatassa), death is a matter of
time. This may be the idea behind the use of the
phrases kaala.m karoti(22) (literally, "he does his
time," "is fulfilling his time"), which means dying,
and kaala.m ka^nkhati(23) (literally, "awaiting
time"), that is, awaiting death. For this reason,
time assumes the position of Maara, the
personification of death. The famous quatrain in the
Jaataka runs:

Time consumes all beings
including oneself;
the being who consumes time,
cooks the cooker of beings.(24)

Although time is supposed to overwhelm ordinary human
beings, yet the one who has attained enlightenment is
able to bring time under his control. Just as he
overwhelms Maara, the evil one, even so does he
overcome time. He is said to overcome time, not
because he attains to a state of permanent existence
(as it wad advocated in Mahaayana),(25) but because
of two important reasons. First, with the complete
eradication of craving and attachment, he no longer
has any longing for existence or anything associated
with it Hence, dying or 'fulfilling time'
(kaalakiriyaa) never worries him, as it does the
ordinary man. Secondly, he has put an end to
continued becoming (bhava). Thus, immortality (Paali,
amata; Skt. a.mrta) in early Buddhism becomes a
synonym of no-rebirth (a-punabbhava).(26) He who has
overcome the process of becoming also overcomes time,
because there is no time apart from the process of
becoming. As pointed out by Whitrow, "... the idea
that time is ultimate and irreducible does not commit
us to the unnecessary hypothesis that it is absolute,
for moments do not exist in their own right but are
mere classes of co-existent events."(27)
It was mentioned that during the pre-Buddhist
period there was a theory which upheld that
"everything exists." The foundation of this theory
seems to be the view that an event can never cease to
be an event.(28) Because of the popularity this
theory enjoyed during this period, the Buddha seems
to have

p.184

taken much trouble to refute it. In addition to the
argument from experience that be adduced to refute
this theory, the Buddha also pointed out that it was
the result of a linguistic fallacy.(29) His criticism
runs thus:

Monks, there are these three linguistic conventions
or usages of words or terms which are distinct, have
been distinct in the past, are distinct at present
and will be distinct in the future and which are not
ignored by the recluses and brahmans who are wise.
Which three? Whatever form (ruupa) there has been,
which has ceased to be, which is past and has changed
is called, reckoned or termed "has been" (ahosi); it
is not reckoned as "it exists" (atthi) nor as "it
will be" (bhavissati). (The same is said about the
other four aggregates--sensation, perception,
dispositions and consciousness.)... Whatever form is
not arisen, not come to be, is called, reckoned or
termed is "it will be" (bhavissati) and is not
reckoned as "it exists" or as "it has been."
...Whatever form has become and has manifested itself
is called, reckoned or termed as "it exists" (atthi)
and is not reckoned as "it has been" or as "it will
be."(30)

It is very clear from this passage that the theory
according to which the past and the future exist in
the present or even the view that a thing exists
during the past, the present, and the future an the
results of unwarranted interpretation of linguistic
usage. Here the temporal copulas "was," "is now," or
"will in propositions which assert temporal relations
between events are being confused with the timeless
copulas of logic.
One of the arguments against the reality of time
seems to be based on the view that it is not an
object of the five types of sense experience. Hence
it is nothing but a mysterious illusion of the
intellect.(31) For early Buddhism, which not only
recognized six senses but also held that the sixth
sense (that is, the mind) could be developed to
perceive, with the help of memory, a long period of
one's past history, time was an important ingredient
of experience.(32) As if rejecting the theory of
atomic moments of time, which is recognized to be a
logical abstraction,(33) the Buddha is represented as
saying: "This physical body made up of the four
primary existents is seen to exist for one, two,
three, four, five,ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty,
hundred or more years. That which is called the mind,
thought or consciousness arises as one thing and
ceases as another whether by night or by day."(34)
This is a clear recognition of the two types of
experience that we have. One is the experience of
things which endure for some finite segment of time,
and the other is the experience of momentary things.
The latter experience is illustrated by the simile of
the flowing river. According to the description in
the early Buddhist texts, "there is no moment, no
inkling, no particle of time that the river stops
flowing."(35) These two types of experience of time
can be compared to the experiences one has of the
movement of the two hands of the clock, the hour hand
and the second hand.(36) It is important to note that
early Buddhism never reduced the experience of the
former to the experience of the latter, although
logical abstraction can always lead to such a
hypothesis. In fact, a reduction

p.185

form of experience into further indivisible moments
(Paali, kha.na; Skt. k.sa.na) was carried out during
the period of scholasticism, and such a theory is
conspicuous by its absence in the early discourses.
Therefore, during the early period, although there
were statements which could be interpreted to mean a
theory of momentariness, the most dominant view was
the one which recognized a finite segment of time as
constituting our immediate experience... The
recognition of this finite segment of time means that
according to early Buddhism there is a duration of
temporal experience with a certain unification of
perspective. For this reason, unlike in the cases
where a theory of moments dominated, (37) early
Buddhism considered both time and causation as parts
of our experience, not as mere inferences based
primarily on the succession of momentary ideas. Thus,
it is possible to maintain that early Buddhism
presents us with an empiricist analysis of time.
With regard to the problem of time, early
Buddhism seems to have followed the middle path, so
famous in the history of Buddhist thought. It appears
as if it considered absolute time as an extreme and
an unnecessary hypothesis. The other extreme is the
consideration of time as a mysterious illusion of the
intellect. Avoiding both these extremes, the Buddha
seems to have considered tune as an essential feature
of the universe and the experience of it.
With the development of scholasticism after the
passing away of the Buddha, this empiricist
philosophy of time and temporality changed
completely. Unbridled speculation during the period
of the Abhidharma led to the development of many
theories which are more metaphysical than empirical.
In his desire to eliminate the pre-Buddhist
conception of an eternal and immutable self (attan),
the Buddha adopted the analytical method
(vibhajjavaada) of reducing things to their
components. Thus the human personality was analyzed
sometimes into five aggregates (Paali, khandha; Skt.
skandha) and at other times into six elements
(dhaatu). Yet all these aggregates, as well as the
elements, were the contents of experience, not of
pure logical analysis. But with the development of
scholasticism, this analytical approach was carried
to its logical conclusion, and the result was the
emergence not only of a theory of atoms (paramaa.nu)
but also a theory of moments (kha.na), spatial
analysis giving rise to temporal atomicity.(38) The
development of these two theories occasioned several
other doctrines which are not compatible with the
basic teachings of the Buddha.
One of the immediate results of the analysis of
time into atomic units or chronons was the view that
time is fleeting or flowing from the future into the
present and from the present into the past. Thus, in
the commentarial literature, we come across
expressions such as gacchante gacchante kaale meaning
"as time passed by" or "with the passage of
time."(39)
All these developments were summarized by
Buddhaghosa in the Atthasaalinii, his commentary on
the Dhammasa.ngani, where he refers to the three

p.186

varieties of the present (paccuppanna).(40) The first
is the pretensive present (addhaa paccuppanna) or the
finite segment of time constituting our immediate
experience. This is said to be the kind of present
recognized in the discourses (sutta). The second is
the flowing or the continuing present (santati
paccuppanna) , which was then accepted in the
commentarial tradition (a.t.thakathaa). The third is
the momentary present (kha.na paccuppanna), which is
not identified with any tradition. Yet it was the
conception mentioned last which dominated the
scholastic tradition.
Buddhaghosa's commentary on the Vibha^nga, the
second book of the Abhidhamma Pi.taka, in introducing
the theory of moments, says that it is a doctrine
peculiar to the Abhidhamma and not to the Suttanta.
According to this, ruupa (matter or form) is
classified as past, future, or present
(atiitaanaaga-tapaccuppanna) in the Suttanta and this
division is made an the basis of becoming (bhavena
paricchinna) . In the Abhidhamma, however, the
division is made on the basis of moments (kha.nena
paricchinna).(41)
These are different versions of the theory of
moments. The Sarvaastivaadins recognized four
moments, the nascent (jaati), the static (sthiti),
the decaying (jaraa), and the cessant (naa'sa).(42)
Post-Buddhaghosan Theravaada recognized three: the
nascent (uppaada), the static (.thiti), and the
cessant (bha^nga) .(43) The Sautraantikas differed
from all of them in accepting two moments only, the
nascent (utpaada) and cessant (vyaya), and rejecting
the static moment (sthiti-k.sa.na).(44)
The difficulties posed by the analysis of time
into atomic units are innumerable. Although a moment
was considered to be the unanalyzable unit of time,
it was found that a distinction had to be made
between a moment of thought and a moment of matter,
because, as pointed out earlier, thought changes more
rapidly than physical bodies.(45) Therefore, in the
Theravaada Abhidhamma it is said that during the
lifetime of a single moment of matter sixteen moments
of thought arise and pass away.(46)
The most difficult problem created by the theory
of moments concerned the experienced continuity of
temporal events. A moment was considered to be
durationless, comparable to the dimensionless point
of space, and hence, past, present, and future
moments are utterly distinct from each other. They
are discrete. To explain the problem of continuity
arising as a result of the analysis of time into
momentary and discrete units, the Buddhist schools
offered various solutions. The most widely known and
the most severely criticized of these different
solutions was that proffered by the Sarvaastivaadins
who insisted that underlying the succession of
momentary events is the substance or 'own-nature'
(dravya, svabhaava) which remains unchanged.(47)
Thus, a thing (dharma) has two aspects: the
characteristic (lak.sa.na) which is temporal
(kaalika, k.sa.nika) and the substance (dravya) which
is eternal or

p.187

timeless. The term sarvaastivaada means the "theory
that everything exists" (sarvam asti) . This
everything (sarvam) was the substance of everything
which, they held, exists during the three periods,
past, present and future. This theory was examined by
the Theravaadins in their Kathaavatthu where they
make the Sarvaastivaadins admit that not only
everything past, present, and future exists, but that
past, present, and future themselves exist, that is,
they are independently real.(48) While the basic
theory of the Sarvaastivaadins was not much different
from the Upani.sadic theory of "everything exists"
referred to and criticized by the Buddha, there is
also a significant difference. Unlike the thought of
the Upani.sads which is idealistic, the
Sarvaastivaada represented a school of realism and
therefore, as pointed out by the Theravaadins, they
upheld the independent reality not only of things,
but also of time. It is interesting to note that in
support of their rejection of this theory of
"everything exists" (sarvam asti), the Theravaadins
are represented as quoting a discourse from the
Buddha on the nature of linguistic conventions
referred to earlier.(49)
The school of Buddhism known as the Sautraantika
rejected the Sarvaastivaada conception of substance
(svabhaava) as being no different from the theory of
self (atman) .(50) But the rejection of this
underlying substance compelled them to the view that
there is no duration whatsoever and that what appears
as duration is a series of fleeting moments, like the
cinematograph. This continuum of durationless
instants, no doubt, is the result of logical
abstraction, a theoretical construction based on the
empirical data of consciousness. Unlike the
Theravaadins who recognized two different types of
moments, that is, a moment of thought and a moment of
matter, the Sautraantikas made no such distinctions.
The most important consequence of this conception of
time was the theory that there are no instantaneous
connections between external events and the
observer.(51) Hence there is no direct perception of
an object; there is inferential knowledge (anumaana)
only. Thus the Sautraantikas were popularly known for
their doctrine of "representationism," that is, the
inferability of the external object
(bahyaarthaanumeyavaada).(52)
In the Mulamadhyamakakaarika, Naagaarjuna devotes
one chapter to the examination of the problem of
time.(53) It is indeed a very short but extremely
important chapter. There is no doubt that it was the
Sarvaastivaada conception of time which drew the
criticism from Naagaarjuna. The theory, as explained
by Candrakiirti, recognized the existence of the
substance of things during the three periods. It was
argued by the realist that since substance exists,
time with which it is associated also exists.(54) It
is this independent reality of time which Naagaarjuna
takes up for criticism. His criticism was based on
the fact that a thing (bhaava) or its substance
(bhaavasvabhaava) and time (kaala) are relative to or
dependent upon one another Early Buddhism, as pointed

p.188

out earlier, would have stopped at this point, but
Naagaarjuna did not. He employed his dialectic to
demonstrate the unreality or nonexistence of
time.(55) Naagaarjuna's. agrument was based on the
assumption that two thing cannot be related unless
they are coexistent. Hence, if present and future are
held to be contingently related to the past, then
both present and future should be in the past.
Otherwise they cannot be contingently related. On the
other hand, present and future could not exist
without being contingent on the past. Hence,
according to Naagaarjuna, there is no justification
for the recognition of a present and a future
time.(56) The selfsame argument was used to refute
the reality of the part. Past, present, and future,
which were comparable to such concepts as above,
below and middle (uttamaadhamamadhyama), or arising,
enduring, and passing away (utpaadasthibhannga) ,
etc., could not thus withstand the onslaught of
Naagaarjuna's dialectic.
The opponents argued that time exists because it
has dimension and is measured in terms of moments,
days, fortnights, months, and years.(57) Naagaarjuna
pointed out that it is not possible to measure time.
He maintained that nonenduring or nonstatic time
cannot be measured, because it cannot be manipulated,
and that an enduring or static time, although
manipulatable, does not exist.(58) By way of
conclusion, Naagaarjuna points out that if time
exists depending on existential structure, then it
cannot be obtained without such structure. But no
existential structure is to be found, for he has
already refuted such a structure.(59) Hence,
according to him, time does not exist.
Naagaarjuna claimed that his exposition of the
doctrine is based on the recognition of the two
truths, the conventional (sa.mv.rti-satya) and the
ultimate truth (paramaartha-satya).(60) According to
Candrakiirti, the ultimate truth is the independent
(aparapratyaya) , peaceful ('santa) , without
conceptual proliferation (prapa~ncaatiita) ,
nonconceptual (nirvikalpa), and without plurality
(anekaartha).(61) Hence, Naagaarjuna's, no doubt, was
a transcendentalist criticism of phenomenal reality.
This would become clear from a comparison of the
standpoints adopted by the two schools, early
Buddhism and Maadhyamika. When early Buddhism
maintained that things are relatively real,
Naagaarjuna insisted that things are unreal because
they are relative, the real being the transcendental.
Summing up the whole discussion, I may say that
(1) early Buddhism presented an empiricist and
relativistic conception of time; (2) the Abhidharma
scholasticism produced an absolutistic conception
mainly because of its speculative approach, and (3)
the Maadhyamikas, as a result of their
transcendentalism, denied the reality of time.
_____________________________________________________

1. Atharvaveda Sa^nhitaa, ed. R. Roth and W. D.
Whitney (Berlin: F. D乵mler, 1924) , 19.54;
Maitri Upani.sad 6.14 (see The Principal
Upani.sads, ed. and trans. S. Radhakrishnan
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953)).

p.189

2. Suutrak.rt儈nga with the commentary of Silaa~nka,
ed. A. S. Suri and C. Ganindra (Bhavanagara,
Bombay, Vijayadeva Sura, 1950-1953) , i.31-2,
"Tathaa kaalo 'pi kartaa, yato
bakulacampakaa'sokapunnaaganaagasahakaaraadinaa.m
vi'si.s.ta eva kaale pu.spaphalaadyudbhavo na
sarvadeti."

3. Udaana, ed. P. Steinthal (London: PTS, 1948,
reprint) , p.1: "Yadaa have paatubhavanti
dhammaa/aataapino jhaayato braahma.nassa/ath'assa
ka.nkhaa vapayanti sabbaa/yato pajaanaati
sahetudhamma.m."/

4. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaas (hereafter cited as MK)
des Naag價juna, avec la Prasannapadaa
commentaire de Candrakiirti (hereafter cited as
MKV), publi?par Louis de la Vall俥 Poussin (St.
Petersburg: Academy of Sciences of USSR,
1903-1913), xi. 1.

5. Samyutta Nikaaya (hereafter cited as S), ed. Leon
Feer (London: PTS, 1884-1904) , i.178 ff.;
Saaratthappakaasinii, ed. F. L. Woodward (London:
PTS, 1929-1937), ii.156, anamattaggo aviditaggo.

6. Diigha Nikaaya (Hereafter cited as D) ed.
T.W.Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter (London: PTS,
1890-1911), iii.84-5; Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo
(hereafter cited as Yaisho), ed. J. Takakusu and
K. Watanabe (Tokyo, The Taisho Shinshu
Daizokyo Kanko Kai, 1962, reprint), i37b-c.

7. S ii.181-4; Taisho ii.242a-243b.

8. Whitrow, G.J., The Natural Philosophy of Time
(London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1961), p.34.

9. Cp. J. Alexander Gunn, The Problem of Time
(London: 1929), p.323 (quoted by Whitrow, op.cit.
p.36).

10. Udaana, p.1; Majjhima Nikaaya (hereafter cited as
M), ed. V. Trenckner and R.Chalmers (London: PTS,
1948-1951) i.262-4; S ii.28,70,96; MKV 9; Taisho
i.562c; ii.10a, 67a, 713c-714a.

11. Whitrow, op.cit.,p.295.

12. S ii.18; Taisho i.76a;ii.81a,86a-c.

13. S ii.17; Taisho ii.85c.

14. D i.156; Taisho i.616c.

15. M i.184; Taisho i.658a. In fact, on one occasion
it was anticipated that an outsider might point
out that the Buddha has knowledge with regard to
the past but not with regard to the future. The
Buddha's reply was that, with regard to the past,
his knowledge follows in the wake of memory
(sataanusaari) and that, with regard to the
future, the knowledge is that gained with
enlightenment (bodhi~naa.na) , namely, the
knowledge that there is no more future rebirth.
See D iii.134; Taisho i.75.

16. S ii.58; cp. Taisho ii.99c-100a.

17. S ii.25; Taisho ii.84b; MKV 40.

18. M i.190-1; Taisho i.467a, "Yo
pa.ticcasamuppaada.m passati so dhamma.m
passati."

19. A^nguttara Nikaaya (abbr. A), ed. R. Morris and
E.Hardy (London: PTS, 1885-1900), iii.212, etc.;
Taisho i.616c.

20. Cp., op. cit., p.295.

21. The Natural Philosophy of Time, p.259.

22. Vinaya Pi.taka, ed. H.Oldenbreg (London: PTS
1879-1883), iii.80.

23. S i.187; Sutta Nipaata, ed. D. Anderson and
H.Smith (London: PTS, 1948), 516.

24. Jaataka, ed. V. Fausboll (London,
(1895-1907), ii.260.

25. Kaalo ghasati bhuutaani sabbaan'eva sahattanaa,
yo ca kaalaghaso bhuuto so bhuutapacani.m paci.
Cp. Maitri Upani.sad, 6.15. See also Theragathaa,
ed. H.Oldenberg and R. Pischel(London: PTS 1883),
661; MKV 386. Speaking of the Tathaagata, the
Saddharmapu.n.dariika-suutra (ed. H. Kern and B.
Nanjio (St. Petersburg: Academy of Sciences of
the USSR, 1912, p.271)) says that he remains for
ever (sadaa sthita.h).

26. S 1.174; Taisho ii.27b.

p.190

27. Whitrow, op. cit, p. 313.

28. See J. M E McTaggart, Nature of Existence
(Cambridge: At The University Press, 1927) ,
ii.10.

29. S ii.17; Taisho ii.85c.

30. Cp. C. D. Broad, Examination of McTaggart's
Philosophy (Cambridge: At The University Press,
1938), ii.316, "When I utter the sentence 'It has
rained', I do not mean that, in same mysterious
non-temporal sense of 'is', there is a rainy
event, which momentarily possessed the quality of
presentness and has now lost it and acquired
instead some determinate form of the quality of
pastness. What I mean is that raininess has been,
and no longer is being, manifested in my
neighbourhood When I utter the sentence It will
rain', I do not mean that, in some mysterious
non-temporal sense of 'is', there is a rainy
event, which now possesses some determinate form
of the quality of futurity and will in course of
time lose futurity and acquire instead the
quality of presentness. What I mean is that
raininess will be, but is not now being,
manifested in my neighbourhood"

31. Whitrow, op. cit, p. 313.

32. D iii.134; cp. Toisho i.75b-c.

33. Whitrow, op. tit, p. 312.

34. S ii.94-7; Taisho ii.81c-82a.

35. A iv.137; cp. Taisho i.682b.

36. C.D.Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1923), p. 351.

37. As a result of the acceptance of the theory of
moments, David Hume reduced causation to mere
succession of ideas. His theory of moments is
very clearly set ant in A Treatise of Human
Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 39 f.

38. Whitrow, op. cit.,p. 153.

39. Dhammapada-a.t.thakathaa (London: PTS 19061914),
i.319.

40. Atthasaalinii, ed E. M乴ler (London: PTS, 1897),
p. 421.

41. Sammohavinodani (hereafter cited as VbhA) ed. A.
P. Buddhadatta (London: PTS, 1923), p, 7.

42. Abhidharmadiipa (hereafter cited as Ad), ed. P.
S. Jaini (Patna, K P.Jayaswal Research Institute,
1959), p. 104,

43. VbhA 7.

44. Sphu.t價th僢hidharmako'savyaakhyaa of Ya'somitra
(hereafter cited as Sakv) , ed. U. Wogihara
(Tokyo: The Publication Association of
Abhidhatmako'savyaakhyaa, 1932-1936), p 33.

45. VbhA 25, Ruupa.m garupari.naama.m
dandhanirodha.m, aruupa.m lahupaari.naama.m
khippanirodha.m.

46. Ibid. 25-26, Ruupe dharente yeva so.lasa cittaani
uppajjitvaa nirujjhanti. Ta.m pana sattarasamena
cittena saddhi.m nirujjhati,

47. L'Abhidharmako'sa de Vasubandhu, traduction et
annotations par Louis de la Vall俥 Poussin
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1923-1925), v.52 ff.;
Taisho xxix.104c; Ad 259; Tattvasa.mgraha, ed E,
Krishnamacharya (Baroda: Oriental Institute
1926), i.504.

48. Points of Controversy (translation of
Kathaavathu), by S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids
(London: PTS, 1915), p. 84 ff.

49. Ibid. p. 95 f.

50. Sakv p. 362.

51. Whitrow, op. tit., p. 179, where it is given as a
theory formulated by Albert Einstein.

52. Sarvadar'sanasa.mgraha, ed, V. S. Abhyankar
(Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
1924), p. 36.

53. Chap. xix, Kaalapariik.saa.

54. MKV 382

55. MK xix3, tasmaat kaalo na vidyate.

p.191

56. Ibid xix.l.

57. MKV 385.

58. MK xix.5.

59. See MK chapters iv, v, vii, xv, and xviii.

60. Ibid. xxiv.8.

61. MKV 493.