The Buddhistic technical terms upadana and upadisesa

·期刊原文
The Buddhistic technical terms upadana and upadisesa.

By ARTHUR ONCKEN LOVEJOY, Harvard University, Cam bridge, Mass.
Journal of the American Oriental Society, George F. Moore ed.
vol. 19, pp 126-136

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p. 126

THE meaning of the word upadana, the ninth nidana
in the paticca-samuppada, and of the kindred upadi-,
has been much discussed, without any altogether
satisfactory and universally accepted result. Yet for
the interpretation of the philosophical system of
Buddhism it is of considerable consequence that both
terms should be correctly understood; for the first
is a pivotal link in the celebrated formula of
causation which the legend represents as the third
and crowning insight gained by the Buddha on the
Night of Enlightenment, and the second is intimately
connected with that subject of interminable
controversy, Nirvana. Of upadana, in particular, a
distinguished scholar has lately put forward a
singular misinterpretation, which results in a
mistaken view of the whole causation-formula, and
thereby in a misconception of some of the essential
parts of Buddhist psychology. By an examination of
the use of these words in the Pitakas, it seems to me
not impossible to establish their meaning somewhat
more definitely and coherently than has hitherto been
done, and thus to throw some light upon the notorious
obscurities of the paticca-samuppada. A preliminary
study directed to this end is here offered.

I. The word upadana is ordinarily translated
"attachment," or "clinging to existence," a meaning
which its etymology naturally suggests, and which is
definitely assigned to it by Buddhaghosa.(1) This
signification is commonly regarded as indicating that
the ninth link of the paticca-samuppada is virtually
a repetition of the eighth, tanha; so Mr. Warren,(2)
"the relation of desire to attachment is that of
identity." Some late Buddhist commentators, however,
who are followed by Burnouf,(3) define upadana in
strictly physical terms as "the conception of the
embryo." Finally, M. Senart, in his paper "Apropos de
la
-------------------------------
1. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, p. 189.
2. JAOS. vol. xvi. p. xxvii.
3. Introduction, p. 475.

p. 127

theorie bouddhique des douze nidanas,"(1) has lately
propounded a third and surprising view of the matter,
which he bases upon the frequent use of the compound
upadanakkhandha. M. Senart holds that upadana is only
an abbreviated expression for this compound; in other
words, that it is a collective designation for the
five skandhas. "Upadana, plusieurs textes le
demontrent, n'est qu'une reduction pour
upadanaskandhas, on, plus completement, panca
upadanaskandhas. Ces skandhas sont compris en bloc
sous le chef d' upadana." Childers's translation of
upadanakkhandha, "the skandhas which have their roots
in upadana, " M. Senart declares to be wholly
arbitrary. Since, however, the five skandhas already
appear, more or less distinctly, in the second,
third, fourth, sixth, and seventh terms of the
paticcasamuppada, this interpretation makes it
necessary to regard the formula as extremely
repetitious; and from this supposed repetitiousness
M. Senart draws his principal argument for the
derivative, composite, and practically meaningless
character of the formula as a whole. But both
premises and conclusion are, I believe, entirely
erroneous.

The identification of upadana with
upadanakkhandha seems to be so altogether groundless
that only the eminence of the authority by whom it is
made can justify any serious criticism of it. Out of
the four passages cited by M. Senart in proof of it,
the three which I have been able to consult prove
nothing remotely like the interpretation which they
are intended to substantiate. The first two are
merely different versions of a familiar passage in
the Dhamma-cakkappavattana Sutta.(2) Here, in the
exposition of the first Noble Truth, it is said,
samkhittena panc' upadanakkhandhapi dukkha, "in
short, the five upadanaskandhas are painful." This
text, of course, throws no light whatever upon the
relation of the two elements in the compound word.
The remaining passage is a section from the
Abhidharma- koca-vyakhya given by Burnouf (Introd. p.
475) . Two alternative interpretations are there
offered for upadanakkhandha: (a)
upadanakkhandha=upadana[sambhutah]skandhah "c'est- a
dire les attributs produits par la conception,"--a
translation identical, so far as the relation of the
elements of the compound
-----------------------
1. Melanges Charles de Harlez, 1896, p. 284.
2. Mahavagga, i. 6. 19, and Feer, " Etudes Bouddhiques," JA. 1870, i.
pp. 382, 406.

p. 128

is concerned, with Childers's; (b) upadanakkhandha
designe les attributs qui sent l'origine ou la cause
de la conception." In short, the commentator of the
Abhidharma-koca-vyakhya by no means identifies
upadana and upadanakkhandha, but he allows the reader
to understand by the latter term either " the
skandhas that are caused by upadana, " or "the
skandhas that are the causes of upadana" (both
interpretations, as we shell see, are to be
accepted). Thus there appears no evidence for M.
Senart's interpretation. On the other hand, that
interpretation is directly contradicted by numerous
passages in the Sutta Pitaka, which make both the
distinction and the relation between upadana and
upadanakkhandha sufficiently plain. Thus in Samyutta
Nikaya 22. 48 (ed. Feer, vol. iii. p. 47) we have the
following: "What, O monks," says the Blessed One,
"are the five skandhas? Whatever form (rupam) there
is, past, present, or future, near or far, etc.--that
is called rupakkhandha." So of the four other
skandhas. "And what are the five upadana-skandhas?
Whatever form there is, past, present, or future,
near or far, etc., which is connected with the asavas
and subject to attachment (upadaniya), --that, O
monks, is called rupupadanakkhandha." Here it is
sufficient to observe that a distinction is obviously
made between the skandhas as such, and the skandhas
as subject to upadana. A similar distinction is
indicated at Samy. Nik. 22. 7 (Feer, iii. p. 15),
where the mind is said to be characterized by upadana
in so far as it takes any (or all) of the skandhas
for a substantive Self. This, of course, corresponds
strictly to only one of the four sorts of upadana,(1)
viz., attavadupadana; but the demarcation between the
several sorts is not in any case a very rigid one.

It is sufficiently evident, then, that upadana is
by no means "merely an abbreviation for
upadanakkhandha." The view that has been criticised
may, however, serve to remind us that there certainly
was for Buddhist thought a particularly close
connection of ideas between upadana and the skandhas.
It may be worth while to attempt to state precisely
what this connection was; although the matter seems,
indeed, fairly obvious.

It is just this relation which a great part of
the Khandha Samyutta (Samy. Nik.. 22), is devoted to
expounding, at tedious length and with a great deal
of repetition. To this Samyutta in general the reader
may be referred. A couple of typical state-
------------------------------
1. Samy. Nik. 12. 7, Feer, iii. p. 3.

p. 129

ments taken from it will suffice for quotation here.
From Samy. Nik. 22. 63: rupam kho bhante upadiyamano
baddho Marassa, anupadiyamano mutto Papimato,
"Through attachment to form [or the other skandhas]
one is bound by Mara, but by non-attachment one is
released from the power of the Sinful One." From
Samy. Nik. 22. 121: katame bhikkhave upadaniya
dhamma, katamam upadanam. Rupam. pe. upadaniyo
dhammo, yo tattha chandarago, tam tattha upadanam;
"What, O monks, are the things subject to attachment,
and what is attachment? The skandhas are the things
subject to attachment; and whatever passion and
desire exist in connection therewith, that is the
attachment connected with the skandhas."

In view of the exposition in the Khandha Samyutta
I venture to state summarily the signification of
upadana and its relation to the skandhas as follows:
upadana is specifically that result of desire which
consists in the habitual identification of one's will
and interests with the skandhas, i. e. with the
conditions of ordinary sentient, and especially
(Samy. Nik. 35. 110) of physical, existence. It is
thus, on the one hand, dependent upon the skandhas
for its source and origin; but on the other hand, as
its place in the paticca-samuppada shows, the
existence of upadana is what leads directly to the
formation of a new combination of skandhas in the
next succeeding birth. It is this latter side of the
notion which has given rise to the definition of the
word that is offered by the Mahayana commentators
cited by Burnouf (I. c.), "the conception of the
embryo." In any given birth, a man's individual
existence consists in the aggregation of skandhas
which has resulted from his upadana in a previous
birth. The continuance of these existing skandhas can
be in no wise affected by anything which he may do in
the present life. But he may or may not identify his
will with, attach his whole being to, these existing
skandhas; and upon this it will depend whether the
dissolution of the present group shall be followed by
the formation of a new one, or not. As distinguished
from tanha, upadana seems to be the chronic condition
of the will to which the particular cravings of
desire lead; the more a man is given over to desire,
the more his entire existence becomes bound to, and
dependent upon, the transitory, insubstantial, and
worthless conditions of sentiency and bodily form. An
instructive comparison can also be drawn between the
distinctive significations of upadana and karma as
causes of rebirth. The word karma came

p. 130

to Buddhism with a long history behind it, and with
its own set of moral ideas which had grown up around
it. The morality to which it referred was simply the
ordinary morality of social and religious propriety;
the rewards which it implied were merely the
blessings of rebirth in a more desirable state of
existence,-- in one of the heavens, in a wealthy
family, or the like. This morality and this system of
rewards Buddhism retained; but it added thereto a
wholly new conception, namely, that of absolutely
passionless, motiveless action; and a new summum
bonum, namely, the cessation of rebirth altogether
and the attainment of Nirvana. For the general idea
of the influence of moral causes in affecting future
destiny, Buddhism adopted the old word, karma. But
the pre-philosophical doctrine of karma apparently
took the necessity of rebirth in some form or other
as a matter of course. Since, therefore, the
Buddhistic conception asserted the possibility of
putting an end to rebirth, it implied that rebirth
simply as such, apart from its particular form, must
also have a cause; and for this special cause of
rebirth per se, the name upadana was used. It will,
then, usually be found, I think, that for the general
notion of moral causation the word karma is employed;
but that, when there is occasion to distinguish
between the old sort of virtue and its reward, which
Buddhism accepted, and the new sort, which Buddhism
propounded, there is a clear difference of usage
between the two expressions. Karma, in this special
sense, is the cause of the particular condition in
which a man is reborn,(1) while upadana; is the cause
of the fact of rebirth in itself.(2) Thus a man who
has not entered the Paths, and so has not begun to
extinguish upadana at all, is still capable of
creating for himself good rather than bad karma. If
this general distinction be borne in mind, it will, I
think, make the paticca- samuppada seem rather more
significant and intelligible than it would otherwise
appear. The formula, though not expressing strict
temporal sequence, falls broadly into three parts,
the first (links 1-2) referring more particularly to
past existences; the second (3-9), to the present
existence; and the third (10-12) , to future
existences. The first section begins with Ignorance
(i. e., of the Buddhist Dharma), and ends with
samkhara, which are
---------------------------
1. Cf. Samy. Nik. 3. 2, tr. Warren, B. in T. p. 226,
and Milinda Panha,
2. Cf. the passages cited above, and MP. p. 32 12.

p. 131

equivalent to karma in its more general sense; what
is asserted is that those who have never known the
truth revealed by the Enlightened One have of
necessity been subject to the law of karmic
causation, and so to rebirth; this is, so to say, the
preBuddhistic era, and therefore the pre-Buddhistic
term is used for the cause which carries the sequence
over into the next stage. But the "present" existence
of the second section is characteristically an
existence described with reference to the special
doctrine of Buddhism; the being who is in this stage,
is, as it were, conceived as potentially acquainted
with the saving truth of the impermanence of all
composite things and the worthlessness of all
skandha-existence; and consequently the cause and
transitional link at the end of the section (9),
which, if it be not extinguished and salvation be not
gained, will lead to repeated birth after death, is
here spoken of, not simply as karma, but as the
peculiar cause of rebirth itself, which has been
discovered by the Buddha,--i. e., as upadana. The
indeterminate future existences of the third stage
are briefly summarized under the ordinary colloquial
expressions for the great termini of human
life, --bhava, jati, jaramarana, --and the sorrow
inevitably connected therewith.

From this point of view the whole formula of
causation becomes, I think, reasonably intelligible,
and the value traditionally assigned to it can be
understood. To conceive, as M. Senart does, that the
paticca-samuppada is a virtually meaningless affair
of shreds and patches, is to go a long way towards
missing the point of certain of the most interesting
and essential doctrines of Buddhism. In spite of a
considerable residue of obscurity, the formula has,
in general, a distinguishable meaning and an
important one. Buddhism,--I speak throughout, of
course, of the Buddhism of the Pitakas and of the
orthodox commentators,-- is essentially a system of
spiritual discipline based, not upon a metaphysic,
but upon a Psychology of sensation. It is this, of
course, which sharply differentiates it from the
other important Hindu philosophies, which are highly
metaphysical. It seems to be difficult for European
expounders of Buddhism to keep this distinction
steadily in mind. There is a tendency to assimilate
the doctrine to the type of the metaphysical
systems.' Thus one
-----------------------------
1. A corresponding tendency appears in the
interpretation of the practical side of the system,
to make the essence of the Buddhistic conception of
virtue lie in "union,--the sense of oneness with all
that is," etc., while sorrow and evil are "in fact
the result of the effort of the

p. 132

of those who have done most to advance Buddhistic
studies has been led to lend his weighty sanction to
an unfortunate suggestion of Mr. Waddell's(1) for the
interpretation of the very first of the nidanas; the
suggestion, namely, that the Ignorance there referred
to is "an Ignorant Unconscious Will to Live,
identical with what is now generally known to
occidentals as Hartmann's Absolute." But this,
surely, is almost enough to disturb the Bhagavat in
the quietude of Nirvana. Buddhism knows nothing of
any ontological absolute, and it has a really morbid
antipathy to the Unconditioned. Tile first nidana
simply asserts that salvation depends ultimately upon
a certain theoretical insight; namely, an insight,
not into any ultimate truths about the prime
substance and metaphysical essence either of the
universe or of man, but into a certain simple
psychological analysis of the nature and value of
human sensation and volition. Now, just this analysis
is concisely packed into the middle and longest
section (3-9) of the paticca-samuppada. The terms
used there, perhaps even the ideas, are doubtless
largely borrowed ones; but the arrangement and
application of them is certainly original and
characteristic. It is impossible here to attempt to
review this analysis, and to show how the skandhas
are somewhat obscurely referred to in the nidanas
between 1 and 8. The analysis ends with the seventh
term of the formula, the completed and concrete fact
of Sensation, with which, for the first time, appear
determinations of worth, the pleasure-pain
characteristics.' Hereupon arises the activity of the
sensuous will in the form of desire and aversion (8);
and from this there ensues that habitual volitional
attitude of upadana which seeks, with inevitable
failure, to find fixity and a stable satisfaction in
what is inherently changeful and transitory. The fact
of imperma-
--------------------------------
individual to keep separate from the rest of
existence." This, in reality, is not an original
Buddhistic notion at all, but Vedantic. The spirit
and tendency of Buddhism is far more pluralistic than
monistic. In the sense in which the doctrine
recognizes individuality, the individual is
inherently "separate from the rest of existence," and
always remains so. This separateness consists in the
individuation of the sequence of karmic causation.
Only the substantive permanence, not the
separateness, of the Self is denied. For Buddhism, so
to put it, a longitudinal section of existence would
show no Ego, but a cross-section at any given moment
would show an irresoluble individuation.
1. Buddhism in Tibet, p. 112.
2. Cf. Milinda Panha, p. 60, and Warren, B. in T.,135.

p. 133

nence, which is the cause of this failure, is not
made explicit in the formula itself, but is given in
the complementary formula of the Three
Characteristics. It may almost be said that the
paticcasamuppada, properly understood, and the
tilakkhana for a commentary upon its middle section,
constitute all the absolutely indispensable
theoretical impedmenta with which Buddhism burdens
itself.
II

We may now turn to consider briefly the meaning
of the element upadi- in the compound upadisesa. This
compound has usually been translated, "having the
five Skandhas remaining;" and saupadisesa niibbduna
and anupadisesa nibbana are rendered respectively as
the condition of the Arahat before, and his condition
after, the dissolution of the skandhas, i. e. before
and after his physical death (cf. Childers s. v.).
Upadi is thus represented to be what M. Senart has
taken upadana to be, --a summary designation for the
skandhas. But upadi (according to Childers's
etymology, which is the usually accepted one) is
virtually the same word as upadana, in a form adapted
to composition; and we have seen that upadana, at all
events, is no more a name for the skandhas than 'hen'
is a name for 'hen's-egg.' It is, therefore,
surprising, if true, that substantially the same word
should have two so different meanings. The only
hypothesis, I think, that has been offered to account
for it, is one suggested by Professor Rhys Davids: "
A comprehensive name for all the skandhas is upadi, a
word derived (in allusion to the name of their cause,
upadana) from upada, to grasp." This, however, is an
explanation that hardly explains. The improbability
of such a change of meaning led Oldenberg to argue,
in an admirable discussion appended to his Buddha
(English tr., P. 433), that upadisesa has primarily
nothing to do with the skandhas, but means simply,
"having a residue of attachment remaining." His
contention is fortified by some citations which come
near to being conclusive as to the prevailing, though
not quite universal, usage; and to these citations
those interested may be referred. Oldenberg's view
seems, however, to have been pretty commonly ignored
or rejected by subsequent expositors, who cling
rather to the theory of Childers. The question is
rendered somewhat difficult and complicated by the
confusing similarity between upadi and upadhi, which
allows a large chance for scribal errors,

p. 134

and by the uncertain etymology of both these words.
The Skt. word upadhi is a technical term in the
Nvaya,(1) and in the Sankhya,(2) where it signifies
the elements of phenomenal existence. This, according
to E. Muller(3) and J. Dahlmann,(4) is the equivalent
of the Pali upadi, while Bohtlingk, Childers and Rhys
Davids derive upadi from upada, and regard upadhi as
the Pali representative of Skt. upadhi. Both
derivations seem to be etymologically possible; the
meaning of upadi must therefore be settled rather by
an examination of its use than by etymological
arguments. I can only contribute here a few points,
relevant but not necessarily conclusive, in favor of
the view that upadi means the same thing as upadana.

For light upon the original signification of
Buddhistic terms we naturally turn first to the Sutta
Nipata. The word upadisesa occurs there in three
connections. At p. 135 (ed. Fausboll), and repeatedly
in a similar context we have the following: evam,
samma dvayatanupassino bhikkhuno.... phalam
patikamkham, ditthe va dhamme anna, sati va
upadisese, anagamita, "to the monk who rightly
attends to this twofold truth, this result follows:
either he attains in this world to perfect knowledge,
or else, if upadi remains, he becomes an Anagamin."
To be upadisesa is here described explicitly as the
characteristic attribute of the Anagamin, just as
perfect insight is the attribute of the Arahat. The
obvious antithesis is between "perfect insight in
this life " and upadisesa. Now the customary
translation of this passage, "if at death the
skandhas still remain he will attain to
non-returing," makes the antithesis almost pointless.
In the first place, the words "at death" are a
gratuitous interpolation, since the time referred to
may equally well be that of entering the Third Path.
Again, it is incorrect to speak of the skandhas as
"still remaining" at death; the skandhas do not
remain but only their cause, which produces new
groups in the next birth. This consideration alone is
sufficient to make the more usual rendering of
upadisesa improbable; for if the word really meant
"having the skandhas remaining, " it could not
properly be applied as the differentia of the
Anagamin, since until death both Anagamin and Arahat
have the skandhas remaining, and after death neither
can be said to do so. More-
-----------------------
1. Cf. Sarvadarcana-samgraha, tr. Cowell, p. 275.
2. Cf. Garbe, Die Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 171, 305-7.
3. Pali Grammar, p. 30.
4. Nirvana, p.14.

p. 135

over, if upadisesa is the especial epithet of the
earthly life of the Arahat, it is difficult to see
how it can at the same time express the
characteristic which distinguishes the Anagamin from
the Arahat. Finally the passage seems to indicate the
presence of upadi as the cause which prevents the
disciple from reaching the Fourth instead of the
Third Path. In short, then, it appears to be not only
justifiable but necessary to render upadisesa here by
"having remaining a residue of attachment (upadana)."

The second instance of the word in the Sutta
Nipata occurs at v. 354 (cited also by Oldenberg).
Here the question is raised concerning a certain monk
recently deceased: "Has he entered Nirvana or is he
saupadisesa?" The Buddha replies, --recalling how
fully the monk has accepted and followed the Buddhist
doctrine--that he has entered Nirvana Not only, then,
is it clear, as Oldenberg points out, that, since the
monk is already dead, saupadisesa cannot be
peculiarly am epithet of the Arahat before his death;
but we may also note that the point upon which the
inquirer wishes to be assured, is whether this monk,
obviously far advanced in the Paths, had quite, or
merely almost, reached perfect freedom from
attachment,--i. e. whether in his lifetime he had
reached the stage of the Arahat or only that of the
Anagamin.

Once more, the word occurs at Sutta Nipata, v.
86, with the negative prefix:

Ettavat' aggam pi vadanti h' eke
yakkhassa suddhim idha panditase
tesam pun' eke samayam vadanti
anupadisese 'kusala' vadana;

"thus some learned men say that the chief thing in
the world is the purification from the demons; some,
again, say that religious observances are the chief
thing; but the truly wise say that the chief thing
consists in being anupadisesa.'' No one familiar with
Buddhist modes of thought could suppose that
anupadisesa here means merely the extinction of the
(present) skandhas, i. e. physical death. To the man
who has once become freed from desire it is
indifferent whether he lives or dies; to regard
death, in itself, as the summum bonum, would be the
least Buddhistic of sentiments. Plainly, the word
anupadisesa in this passage means that morel
condition of freedom from attachment which is the
goal of the true Buddhist's aspiration.

p. 136

In the Sutta Nipata, then, it would appear, first,
that upadisesa or saupadisesa never refers primarily
to the persistence of the five skandhas, but always
to an ethical state; and, second, that the word, so
far from describing the Arahat either before or after
his death, is precisely what serves to distinguish
the Anagamin from the Arahat, while the special
superiority of the latter consists just in having got
rid of upadi. Compare with this the numerous other
texts, e. g. Samy. Nik. 23. 85, in which freedom from
attachment is spoken of as the mark of the Arahat.

In accordance with these results we should be
warranted in rendering saupadisesa nibbana and
anupadisesa nibbana respectively as " proximate " and
" complete " freedom from attachment. Another phrase
in which the Anagamin and Arahat are at once grouped
together and contrasted is oraparam or paraparam,
"the hither and the further shore" (see the first
sutta of the Sutta Nipata, and Childers, p. 336). The
''hither shore" is the state of the Anagamin, who has
rid himself of the first five samyojanas, or fetters,
but has five still remaining. The Arahat, who "has
crossed both the hither and the further shore," has
thrown off all the ten samyojanas. The samyojanas are
roughly synonymous with upadana (v. Oldenberg,
Buddha, p. 430); so that this form of expression
seems to be precisely parallel to saupadisesa and
anupadisesa nibbana. Both phrases indicate the
Anagamin as one who has just fallen short of the
religious perfection of the Arahat by reason of a
slight residuum of upadana.

It remains to say that, although the oldest and
probably the most numerous texts thus point to the
interpretation of upadisesa suggested by Oldenberg,
other passages might be cited in favor of the more
usual view; so that the matter cannot be regarded as
finally settled. The discrepancies in usage may, as I
have suggested, prove to be explicable as due to
scribal errors resulting from the homophony of upadi,
upadhi and the Sankhyan upadhi.