The Conception of Language And The Use of Paradox

·期刊原文
The Conception of Language And The Use of Paradox
In Buddhism And Taoism

Edward T. Ch'ine
Journal of Chinese Philosophy
Vol. 11 1984
P.375-399
Copyright(c) 1984 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu, U.S.A.

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P.375

Both the Buddhists and the Taoists advocate
a form of linguistic skepticism, according to which
the ultimate reality is mute in the sense of being
not only pre-scriptive but also unsayable. Lao
Tzu(a) and Chuang Tzu, (b) for instance, are known
for their pronouncements on the Tao(c) as nameless
and unnameable Lao Tzu said that the Tao is
"infinite, boundless and unnameable" (sheng-sheng
pu-k'o ming(d) ).(1) He also said, "The Tao is
forever nameless. Though the uncarved block is
small, no one in the world dares claim its
allegiance....Only when it is cut are there names.
As soon as there are names, know that it is time to
stop."(2) Likewise, Chuang Tzu said that "the Great
Way is not named" (ta-tao pu-ch'eng(e))(3) and that
although "the ten thousand things differ in
principle, " the Tao shows "no partiality"
(pu-ssu) (f) among them and is therefore itself
undifferentiated and "nameless" (wu-ming)(g) .(4)
Among the Buddhists, Vimalakirti's "silence" is
proverbial and paradigmatic. It is the anticlimactic
climax of a series of attempts by thirty-three
Bodhisattvas including Ma~nju'srii to define the
Dharma-gate of Non-Duality (pu-erh fa-men)(h).(5) As
such, it exemplifies a conventional Buddhist wisdom
that the Tathagata as the ultimate truth is, as
Vimalakirti put it, "beyond the paths of word and
speech" and "cannot be revealed by word. speech,
discerning and pointing."(6)
To be sure, neither the Buddhists nor the Taoists
did away with language entirely. To say that the
ultimate reality is unsayable is already a form of
saying. In fact, Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu and
Virnalakirti all said a good deal more than that. In
doing so, however, they were not necessarily
contradicting themselves, for, as will be shown in
the following, the mode of language that they each
used and affirmed not only is consistent with but
actually articulates their linguistically skeptical
belief that the ultimate reality is ineffable. Lao
Tzu, for instance, made a number of statements

P.376

on the Tao. These statements, according to T'ang
Chun-i,(i) can be categorized into six distinct but
not mutually exclusive types:(7)
1. Statements concerning the Tao as the prin-
ciple of regularity in the universe. Here, the word
Tao stands for what the myriad things in the
universe share in common. It does not refer to the
ultimate reality, but to what in T'ang Chun-i's
terms is a "vacuous principle" (hsu-li)(j)and is
likened by him to an air route in the sky. An air
route has no reality in and of itself and becomes
manifest only because of a flying airplane.
Similarly, the Tao as the principle of regularity in
the universe does not exist in its own right and has
no independent existence to speak of. It depends on
the myriad things for existence and can be talked
about only as an observed commonality of the myriad
things. Examples of this type of statement may
include: (1) Chapter 40 where it is said: "Reversal
is the movement of the Tao"; and (2) Chapter 77
where the Tao is compared to the "bending of a bow"
: "Heaven's Way is indeed like the bending of a bow.
When (the string) is high, bring it down. When it is
low, raise it up. When it is excessive, reduce it.
When it is insufficient, supplement it. The Way of
Heaven reduces whatever is excessive and supplements
whatever is insufficient."(8).
2. Statements concerning the Tao as a metaphy-
sical existence, or, in T'ang Chun-i's terms, the
metaphysical "substance of the Tao (tao-t'i)(k).
Here, the word Tao is a designation ofr the ultimate
reality which has an independent and eternal
existence not only in and of itself but prior to the
existence of the myriad things and is the source of
the myriad things. An example of this type of
statement appears in Chapter 25 where it is said:
"There is something undifferentiated and yet
complete, which is born before heaven and earth.
Soundless and formless, it stands alone and does not
change. It goes round and does not weary. It is
capable of being the mother of the universe. I do
not know its name;I call it the Tao."(9)
3. Statements concerning the attributes of the
metaphysical "substance of the Tao." The
metaphysical "substance of the Tao" is in and of
itself "undifferentiated" and has no attributes to
speak of. However, since it is the "mother" of the
myriad things which have attributes, it bears a
relationship to the myriad things and, as a result,
takes on a set of attributes which are contingent
upon this relationship and which can and must be
talked about in terms of what the attributes of the
myriad things both are and are not. The Tao in its
metaphysical "substance" must be talked

P.377

about in terms of what the attributes of the myriad
things both are and are not because its relationship
to the myriad things consists of both identity and
contrast and is a necessary contradiction which is
entailed by the Tao's movement as "reversal" and
which can only be stated in paradoxical terms. For
this reason, Lao Tzu stated in Chapter 78 that
"straightforward words sound paradoxical" (cheng-yen
jo-fan)(l). In contrast to the myriad things which
have "shape" (chuang)(m) and "thingness" (wu)(n) and
which are nameable and susceptible to sensory
perception through seeing and hearing, the Tao in
its metaphysical "substance" is said to be a "shape
without shape" and a "thing without thingness" and
to be "unnameable," "invisible," "inaudible," and
beyond "touch." Thus it is said in Chapter 14,'We
look at it and do not see it; it is called
invisible. We listen to it and do not hear it; it is
called inaudible. We touch it and do not find it; it
is called minute and subtle....Infinite, boundless,
and unnameable, it reverts to nothingness and is
what is known as the shape without shape and the
thing (hsiang, (o) literally "image" or "concrete
phenomenon") without thingness."(10) Conversely, the
Tao in its metaphysical "substance" can also be
talked about as having attributes in terms of its
identity with the myriad things which it generates.
Therefore, since things have "being" (yu)(p) and are
spoken of as "things" with "names," the Tao in its
metaphysical "substance" can also be said to have
"being" and to be a "thing" whose "name ever
remains" (ch'i- ming pu-ch'u)(q). Thus, when Lao Tzu
spoke of the "undifferentiated and yet complete" Tao
in Chapter 25, he referred to it as a "something"
which "is" (yu). Similarly, he said in Chapter 21,
"As a thing, the Tao is elusive and vague. Vague and
elusive, there are images (hsiang) in it. Elusive
and vague, there are things in it....From the time
of old until now, its name ever remains so that we
may see the beginning of all things. How do I know
that the beginnings of all things are so? By means
of this."(11)
4. Statements in which the Tao is spoken of in
terms of te(r) or "virtue." In the Lao Tzu, Tao as a
concept is usually distinguishable from te. Tao is
the "mother" of the myriad things and is what they
all hold in common whereas te pertains to the
individuality of the myriad things and is what they
each obtain from the Tao and must observe in order
to become what they are as particulars. In this
regard, Lao Tzu is rather different from Chuang Tzu
who does not distinguish Tao from te as much as Lao
Tzu does and who is unequivocal in advocating both
"letting the te be in [one's]

P.378

actions" (fang-te erh-hsing)(s) and "following the
Tao in [one's] journey" (hsuun-tao erh-ch'u)(t) (12)
Not surprisingly, therefore, the statements in which
the Tao is spoken of in terms of te are relatively
few in number in the Lao Tzu. Nevertheless, since te
is what the myriad things each obtain from the Tao
and has the Tao as its source, it bears to Tao the
same kind of relationship that prevails between the
myriad things and the Tao as metaphysical
"substance." Therefore, just as the Tao as
metaphysical "substance" can be talked about in
paradoxical terms of what the attributes of the
myriad things are and are not, so the Tao in its
relationship to te can also be spoken of in terms
which both identify and contrast the Tao with te. In
terms of its identification with te which is
embodied in things, the Tao is said to be a
possession of things. As such, in Tao is viewed by
Lao Tzu as a "treasure" which can even be "offered"
as a present. Thus, it is said in Chapter 62, "Tao
is the storehouse of all things. It is the good
man's treasure and the bad man's refuge....Therefore
on the occasion of crowning an emperor or installing
the three ministers, rather than present large
pieces of jade preceded by teams of four horses, it
is better to kneel and offer this Tao."(13) As a
contrast to te, the Tao is distinguished from the te
of things and is spoken of by Lao Tzu as the
"superior virtue" (shang-te)(u) or "profound and
mysterious virtue" (hsuan-te(v): Thus, it is said in
Chapter 38,"The man of superior virtue does not keep
to virtue and that is why he has virtue. The man of
inferior virtue never strays from virtue and that is
why he is without virtue. The man of superior virtue
never acts, but leaves nothing undone. The man of
inferior virtue acts, but there are things left
undone."(14) It is also said in Chapter 65, "In
ancient times those who practiced Tao well did not
seek to enlighten the people, but to make them
ignorant. People are difficult to govern because
they have too much knowledge. Therefore he who rules
the state through knowledge is a robber of the
state; he who rules a state not through knowledge is
a blessing to the state. One who knows these two
things also knows the norm. Always knowing the norm
is called profound and mysterious virtue. The
profound and mysterious virtue is deep and
far-reaching. And with it all things return to their
original natural state with the result that complete
harmony is established."(15) Statements in this
category are closely related to, but analytically
distinguishable from those in category\ #3 because
te, though embodied in things as the principle of
individuation, is nonetheless different as a concept
from things understood in terms of attributes.

P.379

5. Statements in which the Tao is understood in
a practical sense as the technique of realizing or
conforming to the Tao such as the correct method of
cultivation, the right way of living and the art of
good government, etc. Statements of this type are
numerically most significant in the Lao Tzu. But
they are not concerned with the Tao per se as the
ultimate reality, even though they have implications
which are relevant to any metaphysical consideration
of the Tao as the ultimate reality. Esemples may
include: (1) Chapter 15 where it is stated, "He who
embraces this Tao does not want to fill himself to
overflowing. It is precisely because there is no
overflowing that he is beyond wearing out and
renewal";(16) (2) Chapter 30 where it is said, "He
who assists the ruler with Tao does not dominate the
world with force. The use of force usually brings
requital. Wherever armies are stationed, briers and
thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by
famines. A good (general) achieves his purpose and
stops, but does not seek to dominate the
world....(For) after things reach their prime, they
begin to grow old, which means being contrary to
Tao. Whatever is contrary to Tao will soon
perish";(17) and (3) Chapter 37 where it is said,
"Tao invariably takes no action, and yet there is
nothing left undone. If kings and barons can keep
it, all things will transform spontaneously. If,
after transformation, they should desire to be
active, I would restrain them with simplicity, which
has no name. Simplicity, which has no name,is free
of desires. Being free of desires, it is tranquil.
And the world will be at peace of its own
accord."(18)
6. Statements in which the discourse on the Tao
is a description of a state of existence or mind
which has realized the metaphysical "substance" of
the Tao and is spoken of in the Lao Tzu in terms of
whatever and however can be said of the Tao as the
ultimate reality. Therefore, just as the Tao in its
metaphysical "substance" is said to be beyond
"inquiry" because it is "invisible," "inaudible" and
"minute and subtle" (Chapter 14), so the "best
rulers of old" who were "genuine like a piece of
uncarved wood" and "undifferentiated like muddy
water" are also said to be "subtly mysterious,
profoundly penetrating and too deep to comprehend"
(Chapter 15). Other examples of statements of this
type may include: (1) Chapter 8 where it is
said,'The best (man) is like water. Water is good;
it benefits all things and does not compete with
them. It dwells in (lowly) places that all disdain.
This is why it is so near to the Tao"; and (2)
Chapter 16 where it is said, "To know the eternal is

P.380

to act blindly to result in disaster. He who knows
the eternal is all-embracing, Being all-embracing,
he is impartial. Being impartial, he is kingly.
Being kingly, he is one with Nature. Being one with
Nature, he is in accord with Tao. Being in accord
with Tao, he is longlasting and free from danger
till the end of his life."(19) Statements in this
category are closely related to those in #3 and #4.
They differ, however, in focus or point of reference
and represent two different procedures of talking
about the Tao as the ultimate reality. While #6
proceeds from that which is differentiated to the
Tao as the undifferentiated in terms of what has
become of the differentiated, #3 and #4 begin with
the undifferentiated Tao as the "mother" of all
differentiated things and speak of the
undifferentiated Tao in terms of what the
differentiated things are and are not.
In terms of our concern with Lao Tzu's theory
and use of language, T'ang Chun-i's six types may be
re-grouped as two: (1) #2, #3, #4 and #6 which all
refer to the Tao as the ultimate reality; and (2) #1
and #5 which do do not refer to the Tao as the
ultimate reality. #1 and #5 are obviously compatible
with the mystical/skeptical belief in the
ineffability of the Tao as the ultimate reality
which is simply not their concern. As for #2, #3,#4,
and #6, it is noteworthy that what they say of the
Tao as the ultimate reality including the saying
that the Tao as the ultimate reality is unsayable is
said in terms of what can and cannot be said of the
sayable things and says nothing of the Tao as the
ultimate reality in and of itself. The saying thus
affirmed in #2, #3, #4, and #6 does not therefore
contravene Lao Tzu's mystical/skeptical vision.
Rather, it is informed by, and may in fact be viewed
as an articulation of, his mystical/skeptical belief
that the Tao as the ultimate reality is ineffable.
Chuang Tzu, as noted a little earlier, differed
from Lao Tzu in maintaining an unequivocally unitary
view of the Tao and the te. As a logical correlate
of this difference, Chuang Tzu advocated a form of
mysticism/skepticism which is even more radical than
Lao Tzu's. He extended his sense of ineffability not
only to the Tao as the ultimate reality but also to
things as concrete embodiments of the
individualizing te and considered both the Tao and
things to be ultimately beyond speech and silence.
He said, "The perfection of the Way and things -
neither words nor silence are worthy of expressing
it. Not to talk, not to be silent - this is the
highest form of debate."(20) Nevertheless, Chuang
Tzu also spoke. He

P.381

not only spoke but also debated, sometimes even with
a sense of relish. He obviously enjoyed'Hui Shih(w)
as a debating partner and felt a sense of loss after
Hui Shih's death, saying, "There's no One I can talk
to any more."(21) Chuang Tzu's feelings for Hui Shih
as a debating partner are unsettling not only
because these feelings seem to contradict his belief
in the ineffability of the Tao and things but also
because he explicitly condemned debate as a result
of deficiency in "seeing" (chien)(x). He said,
"...debates arise because there is that which [the
debaters] do not see. The Great Tao is not named.
Great debates are not spoken.... If the Tao is made
clear, it is not the Tao. If debates are put into
words, they do not suffice."(22) He also criticized
the Confucians and the Mohists for arguing over what
they each regarded as the right and the wrong and
considered them both to have a "closed" mind which,
for Chuang Tzu, is what makes an argument possible.
Alluding to one of Hui Shih's paradoxes, he said,
"Not being closed in mind and yet having a sense of
right and wrong is [as impossible as] going to
Yueh(y) today but arriving there yesterday."(23) He
also said, "Because right and wrong appeared, the
Way was injured. ... "(24)
However,if Chuang Tzu in his engagement in speech
and debate seemed to be contradicting himself, he
was perfectly aware of his own contradiction. He
said of himself, "Now I am going to make a statement
here. I don't know whether it fits into the category
of other people's statements or not. But whether it
fits into their category or whether it does not, it
fits into some category which is still a category in
comparison with theirs. So in this respect it is no
different from their statements."(25) This statement
by Chuang Tzu embodies a sense of irony which is
typical of Chuang Tzu. It exemplifies his impulse to
double back upon himself to de-center himself as a
speaker. Therefore, as a critic, Chuang Tzu is
forever self-critical. He claims no privileged
position for his statements which are in fact
intended to be selferasing because, as statements,
they are all constituted by the principle of
alterity and necessarily imply their opposites as a
condition of existence. For Chuang Tzu, statements
and counter-statements exist for one another and are
inter-penetrating and mutually producing. For this
reason, they are viewed by him as intrinsically
self-disrupting; there is always "this" in "that" or
"right" in wrong" and vice versa. He said,

Everything has Its 'that,' everything has its
'this.' From the point of view of 'that' you
cannot see it, but through under-

P.382

standing you can know it. So I say,'that'
comes out of 'this' and 'this' depends on
'that'  which is to say that 'this' and
'that' give birth to each other. But where
there is birth there must be death; where
there is death there must be birth. Where
there is acceptability there must be
unacceptability;where there is unacceptability
there must be acceptability. Where there is
recognition of right there must be recognition
of wrong; where ithere is recognition of wrong
there must be recognition of right. Therefore
the sage does not proceed in such a way, but
illuminates all in the light of Heaven. He too
recognizes a 'this,' but a 'this' which is
also 'that,' a 'that' which is also 'this.'
His 'that' has both a right and a wrong in it;
his 'this' too has both a right and a wrong in
it. So, in fact, does he still have aa 'this'
and 'that'? Or does he in fact no longer have
a 'this' and 'that" A state in which 'this'
and 'that' no longer find their opposites is
called the hinge of the Way. W hen the hinge
is fitted into a socket, it can respond
endlessly. Its right then is a single
endlessness and its wrong too is a single
endlessness.(26)

Moreover, as that which contains within
itself the principle of its own negation, a
statement is viewed by Chuang Tzu not only as
self-erasing but also as infinitely substitutable by
any other statement. For this reason, Chuang Tzu
advocated "walking on two roads" (liang-hsing)(z) .
according to which "the sage harmonizes with both
right and wrong and rests in Heaven the
Equalizer."(27) Significantly, Chuang Tzu's "hinge
of the Way," though it must be fitted into a
"socket," is directionally not hinged anywhere in
particular. Being without a directional center and
capable of "responding endlessly" in all directions,
the "hinge of the Way" symbolizes Chuang Tzu's ideal
of speech or language use as a philosophically
nomadic performance which, as the title of his first
chapter suggests, "wanders freely and easily" and
which does not yearn for the certainty of a center.
There is in the Chuang Tzu an almost Derridian
celebration of the Nietzschean " joyous affirmation"
of "the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the
center."(28) On the other hand, however, this
celebration does not for Chuang Tzu, as it does for
Derrida, take place simply on what in Edward Said's
terms is "a field, or space, of language."(29) For,
according to Chuang Tzu,alterity is

P.383

not just a grammatological principle; it is also an
ontological principle of reality. Therefore, unlike
Derrida for whom the inter-substitutability of
statements is merely a "play" of signs with one sign
leading to another alternately as signifier and
signified,(30) Chuang Tzu envisioned his "play" as a
cosmic drama which acts out not only in the
linguistic theater of human signs but also on the
ontological stage of the Tao as the ultimate
reality. For Chuang Tzu, the Tao does not remain
self-same and things transform from and into one
another. Therefore, reality is the setting up of
unitary opposites and is itself self-erasing; it
shuttles perennially and dialectically between
"being" (yu) and "nothingness" (wu)(aa), between
"beginning" (yu-shih)(ab) and "not yet beginning to
be a beginning" (wei-shih yu-shih)(ac), and between
"not yet beginning to be a beginning" and "not yet
beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a
beginning" (yu wei-shih fu wei-shih yu-shih)(ad) as
accomplices of one another. Chuang Tzu said,

There is a beginning. There is a not yet
beginning to be a beginning. There is a not
yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be
a beginning. There is being. There is
nothingness. There is a not yet beginning to
be nothingness. Suddenly there is nothingness.
But I do not know, when it comes to
nothingness, which is really being and which
is nothingness. Now I have just said
something. But I don't know whether what 1
have said has really said something or whether
it hasn't said something.(31)

As the above quotation indicates, Chuang Tzu's
affirmed mode of language use as a self-erasing
practice is anchored in his ontological vision; it
is an imitation of the Tao as dialectical
transformation. As such, it has a doubleness not
only in its discursive specificity as both
statements and counter-statements but also in its
very being as both speech and silence. Just as
things transform from and into one another and just
as statements and counter-statements implicate and
produce one another, speech and silence are mutually
involved and substitutable. There is speech in
silence and silence in speech. Because there is
speech in silence, silence is capable of erasing
itself to become speech. Conversely, because there
is silence in speech, speech is also capable of
erasing itself to become silence. In this sense,
Chuang Tzu spoke of his words as "no words"
(wu-yen)(ae) and said, "With

P.384

words that are no words, you may speak all your life
long and you will never have said anything. Or you
may go through your whole life without speaking
them, in which case you will never have stopped
speaking."(32)
Being an imitation of the Tao,however, Chuang
Tzu's language is not assured of adequacy of
representation and is in fact forever incomplete and
uncertain vis-a-vis the Tao. Precisely because the
Tao does not remain stable and has no definable
enduring identity, language in its ideal use as an
imitative representation of the Tao can never be
complete or certain of its meaning. "The Way,"
Chuang Tzu said, "has never known boundaries; speech
has no constancy."(33) If, therefore, language is to
be composed for use, it must be decomposed as it is
being composed. Chuang Tzu compared this type of
language use to the use of the "fish-trap"
(ch'uan) (af)or "rabbitsnare" t'i)(ag) which are
useful for fish catching or rabbit-snaring but which
ought to be forgotten as soon as the fish or rabbit
is caught. He said,

The fish trap exists because of the fish; once
you've gotten the fish, you can forget the
trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the
rabbit; once you've gotten the rabbit, you can
forget the snare. Words exist because of
meaning; once you've gotten the meaning, you
can forget the words. When can I find a man
who has forgotten words so I can have a word
with him?(34)

The metaphors of the "fish-trap" and "rabbit-snare"
affirm the use of language for its instrumental
value. It is, however, an affirmation which entails
its own negation. Though somewhat different from Lao
Tzu's speaking which does not speak of the Tao as
the ultimate reality'in and of itself, Chuang Tzu's
speaking is also an expression and articulation of a
myrtical/skeptical vision in which the Tao as
dialectical transformation insures its ineffability
and permits the use of language only as a
self-erasing activity.
The principle of alterity also prevails in
Vimalakirti's use of language. It is, however, an
alterity which differs from Chuang Tzu's in
structure and which expresses and articulates a
Buddhist form of mysticism/skepticism. While Chuang
Tzu's alterity entails a doubleness in which Chuang
Tzu's self and the self of others are not only
inter-dependent in their coexistence but also
mutually producing and exchangeable as speaking
subjects, the

P.385

doubleness in Vimalakirti's alterity postulates
Vimalakirti as a speaking subject who is produced by
and for the sake of, but does not reciprocally
produce, the self of others as speaking subjects.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the statements by
Vimalakirti are more often than not occasioned by
requests, sayings or thoughts of others as speaking
subjects. In this regard, Vimalakirti as an
enlightened layman is very much like the Buddha who
does not usually preach unless asked.
This difference between Chuang Tzu on the one
hand and Vimalakirti and the Buddha on the other
does not mean that Vimalakirti or the Buddha never
took the initiative to speak. They both in fact did;
the Buddha's instruction to Maitreya in the last
chapter of the Virnalakirti-nirdesn Surta and
Vimalakirti's invitation to the thirty-three
Bodhisattvas to speak out on the Dharma-Gate of
Non-Duality are examples of their initiative as
active speakers. However, in taking the initiative
as active speakers, the Buddha and Vimalakirti do
not exist as speaking subjects in their own right,
but on the condition of an audience of deluded
beings as the speaking other. As enlightened beings,
neither the Buddha nor Vimalakirti has a self to
speak and to speak of; they come to be possessed of
a self in response to the selves of others as
deluded speaking subjects who, being deluded, still
have selves to speak and to speak of. For this
reason, what the Buddha and Vimalakirti say does not
have a determinate subjectivity which is contingent
upon the subjectivity of what the audience in their
delusion may have to say. It is only provisional
saying which makes no ontic reference either to
themselves as embodiments of the ultimate reality or
to the ultimate reality that they embody and which
automatically disappears with the disappearance of
the saying of the deluded other. Therefore, instead
of being self-erasing like Chuang Tzu's saying, the
saying of the Buddha and Vimalakirti is intended to
be other-erasing. It is saying for the sake of the
deluded other whose saying needs be erased so that
he can be saved from the delusion of himself both as
a saying subject and as the subjectibity of his
saying. As such, their saying is an exercise of
"skilful means" (upaya or fang-pien)(ah) (35) and is
no different from their use of magic. In fact, their
saying is often accompanied by their use of magic
and may be regarded as the verbal counterpart of
their magical demonstration which is visual. Just as
their magic produces nothing but conjured up maya
and is in thi sense non-producing, their saying also
does not say anything real and is a fictitious
non-saying comparable to

P.386

silence. Therefore, both the Buddha and Vimalakirti
can say a great deal without violating the
injunction against saying. Theoretically speaking,
their saying will have to go on so long as there is
still a deluded being to be saved. All deluded
beings must be exposed through the saying as
non-saying so that they can all be erased as saying
subjects. For this reason, Indian Buddhist
literature is often characterized by an enumerative
repetitiousness. It is noteworthy that Vimalakirti's
silence was preceded by an itemized listing of the
views of the thirty-three Bodhisattvas who attempted
one after another to speak of the Dharma-Gate of
Non-Duality. This enumerative repetitiousness may
tax the patience of a modern reader, but is
theoretically meaningful. It exemplifies both the
Mahayanic ideal of universal salvation and the
Buddhist mystical/skeptical affirmation of a
legitimate mode of saying as non-saying.
The legitimate mode of saying which is affirmed
in Indian Buddhism and which the saying of the
Buddha and Vimalakirti exemplify prevailed among
Chinese Buddhists as a model. However, in its actual
use by Chinese Buddhists, the model changed somewhat
in both conception and execution. In the hands of a
monk like Seng-chao(ai) (384-414), the model became
a simplified performance which is no longer
encumbered by enumerative repetitiousness. In his
three essays on "the Immutability of Things," "the
Emptiness of the Unreal" and "the Non-Cognition of
Prajna" in the Book of Chao (Chao Lun) (aj) ,
Seng-chao proceeded according to the Madhyamika
theory of twofold truth and the logic of negation
embodied therein. Therefore, he maintained the
distinction between chen(ak) and su(al) which
Liebenthal has rendered as "truth" and "public
view"(36) and which are Seng-chao's terms for
paramartha-satya and samvriti-satya. He also
followed the Madhyamika logic of negation by arguing
for the exact opposite of the "public view" from the
same premise. Therefore, he said, "From the fact
that things past do not reach up to things present,
[ the common people] infer that things change and do
not remain still while I infer the opposite from the
same fact."(37) He also said, "[The common people
believe that] things change and do not remain still
because they do not come [to the present]....[But I
believe that] things remain still and do not change
because they do not leave [where they were in the
past and come to the present]."(38)

P.387

Nevertheless, notwithstanding his subscription
to the Madhyamika theory of twofold truth and its
logic of negation, Seng-chao's style of
argumentation is notably different from that of
Nagarjuna and Aryadeva. Nagarjuna and Aryadeva did
not use the theory of twofold truth in isolation.
Rather, they used it in connection with the "four
points of argumentation" to form the so-called
"eight-fold negation" which is a dialectical process
of progressive negation. The ideas of "four points
of argumentation" and "eightfold negation" are
conspicuously absent from Seng-chao's three essays
which followed the Madhyamika logic of dialectical
negation without, however, becoming entangled in the
seriality of progressive negation.
The ideas of "four points of argumentation" and
"eightfold negation" and the practice of progressive
negation are all characteristically Madhyamikan. But
the style of argumentation that they constitute is
not peculiar to the Madhyamika school. It is an
instance of what I have referred to above as
"enumerative repetitiousness" which is common in
Indian Buddhist literature. Indeed, both Nagajuna
and Aryadeva were engaged in the ongoing task of
erasing the sayings of the deluded other. The
so-called Three Treatises of the Madhyamika
school(39) are all preoccupied with refutation of
what Nagarjuna and Aryadeva regarded as erroneous
views, whether the views involved be Hinayanic,
Mahayanic or Brahmanical. In this regard, Seng-chao
is again different. He did not itemize the "public
views" of "change," "reality," or "cognition" in
their variety. Instead, he spoke of them together
categorically as "public views" and then proceeded
to argue for their opposites by turning them around
or standing them on their head to establish the
thesis of what in Liebenthal's rendition is the
"coincidence" of opposites.(40) This thesis is
unexceptional in terms of the Indian Buddhist
insight into the identity of nirvana and samsara.
But the style in which Seng-chao argued for its
establishment is simple and direct. It does not
involve the use of enumerative refutation or
progressive negation as a mediating procedure.
In being simple and direct in his style of argu-
mentation, Seng-chao practised a type of language
use which later became characteristic of Ch'an.
Ch'an is known for its doctrine of "direct pointing
to the mind of man" (chih-chih jen-hsin)(am). This
doctrine is part of the contention that Ch'an is a
silent "transmission from mind to mind" (i-hsin
ch'uan-hsin)(an) and that it "does not institute
words and literature" (pu-li wen-tzu)(ao).(41) As
such,

P.388

"direct pointing" expresses Ch'an's radical
rejection of language use including the kind of
language use entailed by sutrareading as unnecessary
for attaining enlightenment. Nevertheless, Ch'an
masters did not stop talking. The Sixth Patriarch,
in spite of his iconoclastic image as an illiterate
woodcutter who tore up the sutras, not only preached
and quoted from the sutras in his preaching but, as
part of his last instruction to a chosen group of
"ten disciples, " told them to "hand down the
teaching of the one roll of the Platform Sutra" so
that they would "not lose the basic teaching."(42)
Even Lin-chi(ap) (d. 867) who is known for the use
of beating and shouting as teaching methods and who
condemned those who studied the scriptural
literature as "blind idiots" who looked for "juice"
in the "dry bones" of "some old fellow, long
dead"(43) did not refrain from preaching or quoting
from what in his terms were the "old masters"
(ku-jen(aq)).(44)
That the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi could have
done so with no sense of contradiction is
understandabie in terms of the Indian Buddhist
conception of the saying of non-saying as legitimate
saying, which both the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi
continued to affirm as a model. As was the case with
the Buddha and Vimalakirti, neither the Sixth
Patriarch nor Lin-chi rejected the use of language
unconditionally, but only as other than an
othergenerated and other-erasing activity. For the
Sixth Patriarch, therefore, "all the sutras and
written words, Hinayana, Mahayana and the twelve
divisions of the canon have been established because
of men." He said,...all the sutras exist because
they are spoken by man. Among men there are the
stupid and the wise. The stupid are insignificant,
the wise, great men. Should deluded people ask the
wise, the wise will expound the Dharma for the
stupid and enable them to understand and gain a deep
awakening."(45) Similarly, for Lin-chi, "names and
phrases are not names and phrases in and of
themselves: " but are constructions for the
"accomodation and guidance" (chie-yin) (ar) of
"little children" so that they can be cured of their
"illness" of delusion.(46) As such, they are devoid
of a determinate self and are unreal like "the moon
reflected on water." He said, 'The Buddha-realm
cannot say of itself'I am the Buddha-realm.' It is
only the unattached man of the Way who comes forth
by riding on circumstances. If a person asks me
where to look for the Buddha, I will respond by
coming forth in a state of purity. If a person asks
me about the Bodhisattvas, I will resp ond by coming
forth in a state of compassion. If a person asks me
about Bodhi, I will respond by

P.389

coming forth in a state of pure mystery. If a person
asks me about Nirvana, I will respond by coming
forth in a state of tranquillity. Circumstances
differ in ten thousand ways, but I as a person do
not discriminate. Therefore, I appear in forms in
response to things as the moon is reflected on
water."(47) He also asked his followers "not to
seize hold of " what he spoke because what he spoke
was "without evidence and proof" (wu
p'ing-chu)(as)(48) and said, "I, a simple monk of
the mountain, have no Dharma to offer anyone. I
merely cure disease and undo bondage."(49)
However, while observing the Indian model of
saying as nonsaying, neither the Sixth Patriarch nor
Lin-chi indulged in the practice of enumerative
refutation or progressive negation. To be sure, the
above statement by Lin-chi involves the use of
enumeration. But it is enumeration of a different
kind which is categorical in orientation and which
does not attempt to list the various inquiries about
the Buddha or Bodhisattvas as itemizable
specificities. In comparison with the Indian
masters, both the Sixth Patriarch and Lin-chi tend
to focus on the here and now and to pursue speech as
an other-generated and othererasing activity in the
intimacy of an immediate personal encounter.
Therefore, if Ch'an dialogues are not unprecedented
in Indian Buddhism for being dialogical, they are
nonetheless distinct in being forthright. They
embody what in Ch'an terminology is described as
"trigger-fast and razor-sharp" or chi-feng.(at 50)
Doctrinally, this Ch'an use of language was
advocated by the Sixth Patriarch as the "law of
thirty-three confrontations: which requires a person
to speak in "symmetrical" terms of paired opposites
so that his subjectivity will remain indeterminate
and therefore unidentifiable with either affirmation
or negation."(51) What was thus advocated by the
Sixth Patriarch was also prescribed by Lin-chi when
he stated,

Followers of the Way, if you wish to attain
the view that is in accord with the Dharma,
just do not let yourselves be deceived.
Whether you face the inside or the outside,
kill whatever you encounter. If you encounter
the Buddha, kill the Buddha. If you encounter
a patriarch, kill the patriarch. If you
encounter your parents, kill the parents. If
you encounter a relative, kill the relative.
Only then will you attain release....There are
people who study the Way everywhere, but none
come forth without

P.390

delpending on things. When I, a simple monk of
the mountain, face them, I beat them down at
the very source. If they come forth through
the hands, I beat them in the hands. If they
come forth through the mouth, I beat them in
the mouth. If they come forth through the
eyes, I beat them in the eyes.(52)

This statement by Lin-chi and the Sixth Patriarch's
"law of thirty-six confrontations" are both informed
by the Indian Buddhist logic of dialectical
negation, but they promote a style of its use which
is simple and direct like Seng-chao's and which
typifies a Chinese affirmation of the Indian
Buddhist saying of non-saying as a simplified
performance.
In contrast to Seng-chao, the Sixth Patriarch
and Lin-chi who simplified the Indian model of
saying as non-saying, Chih-i(au) (538-579)
complicated the model by constructing an elaborate
theory which no longer regarded the Buddha's
preaching merely as an other-generated exercise of
"skilful means" for the sake of the deluded other.
Rather, according to Chih-i, what the Buddha said in
his preaching embodies his "original intent in
appearing in the world" (ch'u-shih pen-huai)(av) and
is based upon the truth which he experientially
realized under the bodhi tree as the culmination of
an astronomically long process of cultivation. For
this reason, the Buddha's preaching is viewed by
Chih-i as consisting of both "the words which follow
the minds of others" (sui-t'a-i yu")(aw) and "the
words of the Buddha's own mind" (tzu-i yu)(ax).(53)
The precise relationship between "the words which
follow the minds of others" and "the words of the
Buddha's own mind" is a main concern of Chih-i's
Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i(ay) where Chih-i
analyzed the problem in terms of a set of paired
categories like "origin (pen) (az) and "trace"
(chi) (ba) , , the "real" (shih ) (bb) and the
"provisional" (ch'uan)(bc) the"subtle"(miao)(bd) and
the "gross" (ts'u)(be)etc. These paired categories
were then further analyzed by Chih-i in terms of a
number of other paired categories such as
"self-practice" (tzu-hsing)(bf) and "conversion of
others" (hua-t'a)(bg) , principle" (li) (bh) and
"occasion" (chi) (bi) , "following wisdom"
(sui-chih) (bj) and "following situation"
(sui-ch'ing)(bk), and "seven kinds of twofold truth"
(ch'i chung erh-ti)(bl),ect.(54)
Chih-i's elaborate theory of the relationship
between "the words which follow the minds of others"
and "the words of the Buddha's own mind" informs his
p'an-chiao(bm) system, according to which the Buddha
preached

P.391

"Four Dharmas of Conversion" (hua-fa ssu-chiao)(bn)
in five periods: (1) the Storehouse Teaching
(tsang-chiao)(bo) which the Buddha preached during
the second period; (2) the Pervasive Teaching
(t'ung-chiao)(bp) which the Buddha preached during
the third period; (3) the Separate Teaching (pieh-
chiao) (bq) which the Buddha preached during the
fourth period; and (4) the Round Teaching
(yuan-chiao)(br) which the Buddha preached during
both the first period when he taught the doctrine of
the Avatamsako Sutra and the fifth period when he
taught the doctrine of the Lotus Sutra.(55) With an
analogy that can be traced to the "five flavors"
parable in the Mahapari-nirvana Sutra,(56) Chih-i
compared the Storehouse Teaching to "milk(ju)(bs),
the Pervasive Teaching to "cream" (lo)(bt), the
Separate Teaching to "butter" (sheng-su)(bu), the
Round Teaching of the Avatamsaka to "boiled butter"
(shu-su)(bv), and the Round Teaching of the Lotus to
"ghee" (t'i-hu)(bw). Just as "milk, " "cream, "
"butter," "boiled butter," and "ghee" form a series
of progressive refinement in "flavor," so the five
teachings in the "Four Dharmas of Conversion"
constitute an ascending hierarchy in which "the
words which follow the minds of others" gradually
decrease as "the words of the Buddha's own mind"
increase. The hierarchy culminates in the Lotus
which is comprised of only "the words of the
Buddha's own mind." As such, the Lotus contains no
"grossness, " is "absolutely subtle" (chueh-tai
mino)(bx) and is possessed of both the "real" and
the "provisional" which are both "subtle"; it "opens
up the provisional as it reveals the real" (k'ai-ch
'uan hsienshih)(by).(57)
In using such paired categories as "origin"/
"trace" and "real"/"provisional" for a
conceptualization of the Buddha's preaching, Chih-i
sounds rather like but is actually different from
Chi-tsang(bz) (549-623) who also made use of these
categories for his theory of twofold truth and
practice of p'an-chiao and regarded the Lotus as a
text which "opens up the provisional as it reveals
the real." As T'ang Chun-i has pointed out, these
categories constituted for Chi-tsang a conception of
the Buddha's teac hing which is notably different
from Chih-i's. As the Buddha's teaching which "opens
up the provisional as it reveals the real," the
Lotus was considered by Chi-tsang to be produced by
the Buddha through an exercise of the Buddha's
twofold wisdom as both "real" and "provisional" for
the purpose of converting the deluded other. For
Chi-tsang, therefore, although the Buddha's twofold
wisdom which "opens up the provisional" and which
"reveals the real" is

P.392

ultimately real, what it "opens up" and "reveals" as
the teaching of the Lotus is no less a teaching for
the sake of others and is for this reason still
provisional.(58) Chi-tsang's conception of the
Buddha's preaching is well within the Indian
Buddhist mold, even though it is couched in terms of
native Chinese categories of "origin" /"trace" and
"real"/"provisional."
For Chih-i, the matter is different; the Buddha
spoke not only for the sake of others but also as an
expression of"the Buddha's own mind." Chih-i thus
reconceptualized the Indian model and postulated the
Buddha as a speaking subject in his own right who
was increasingly implicated in what he spoke until
what he spoke as the Round Teaching of the Lotus
consisted of nothing but "the words of the Buddha's
own mind." On the other hand, however, though
postulating the Buddha as a speaking subject, Chih-i
denied that the subjectivity of the Buddha's
speaking was ultimately speakable. Commenting on a
gatha in the Lotus where the Buddha instructed
Sariputra to "cease" speaking and proclaimed that
his "dharma is subtle and hard to imagine: "(59)
Chih-i said that the Buddha's dharma was "beyond
words" (chueh-yen) (ca) and "beyond thought"
(chueh-ssu)(cb) and that it was called "subtle" not
because it was relative to what was "gross" but
because it was "inconceivable."(60) Moreover, as
that of which the subjectivity of speaking is
ultimately unspeakable, "the Buddha's own mind" does
not have a language of its own to speak or to be
spoken of. "The words of the Buddha's own mind"
speak in the borrowed language of "the words which
follow the minds of others" and can be spoken of
only in terms of the categories which relate to "the
words which follow the minds of others." Thus,
Chih-i said, "In opening up the traces and revealing
the origin, the meaning lies in the traces"
(k'ai-chi hsien-pen i-tsai yu-Chi)(cc).(61) He also
said, "In opening up the provisional and revealing
the real, the meaning depends on the provisional"
(k'ai-ch'uan hsien-shih i-hsu yu-ch'uan(cd)).(62)
Just as "the words which follow the minds of others"
can be spoken of in terms of "origin"/ "trace" and
"real"/ "provisional," so "the words of the Buddha's
own mind" can also be spoken of in terms of
"origin"/"trace" and "real"/"provisional." There
are, according to Chih-i, not only "the real and the
provisional for the conversion of others" (hua-t'a
ch'uan-shih)(ce) which pertain to the realm of upaya
but also "the real and the provisional of the
Buddha's self-practice" (tru-hsing ch'uan-shih)(cf)
which pertain to the Buddha's wisdom.(63)

P.393

The borrowing of "the words which follow the
minds of others" by "the words of the Buddha's own
mind" entails the use of paradox which is
necessitated by the speaking of the unspeakable.
"The words of the Buddha's own mind" are implicated
in but nonetheless distinguishable from "the words
which follow the minds of others" because, as noted
before, they are considered by Chih-i to be
possessed of both the "real" and the "provisional"
which are both "subtle." For this reason, the
categories which relate to "the words which follow
the minds of others" are both affirmed and negated
by Chih-i for "the words of the Buddha's own mind."
Therefore, while speaking of the Buddha's wisdom in
terms of the "real" and the "provisional" as "the
real and the provisional of the Buddha's
self-practice, " he also maintained that the
Buddha's wisdom was "without boundary" (wu-pien)(cg)
and was "neither real nor provisional" (fei-ch'uan
fei-shih) (ch) .(64) He said, "The Principle of
Dharmata is neither past nor present, neither origin
nor trace, neither real nor provisional....It comes
to be possessed of past, present and future only
because of [the use of] the worldly words and
literature."(65) For the same reason, the
"revelation of origin" required for Chih-i not only
the"opening up of traces" but also the "abandoning
of traces" (fei-chi)(ci).(66)
The use of paradox is common among mystics.Their
paradoxes however, are not always the same in use or
meaning. In the case of Chih-i, his paradox differs
from those of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu and is
constituted by a mode of mysticism which is
distinctly Buddhist. As noted earlier, Lao Tzu's Tao
moves in "reversal" whereas Chuang Tzu's Tao is the
setting up of unitary opposites involving the mutual
transformation of things. For both Lao Tzu and
Chuang Tzu, therefore, the use of paradox is
entailed by the structure of the Tao as dialectical
change and has in this sense a direct ontic
reference. By contrast, Chih-i's paradox makes no
direct ontic reference and is engendered by the
speaking of the unspeakable in a borrowed language.
For Chih-i, the ultimate reality is not
intrinsically paradoxical and is neither paradoxical
nor non-paradoxical. 'The words of the Buddha's own
mind" can be affirmed in terms of the borrowed
language of "the words which follow the minds of
others," not because the former is determinable
through the latter, but because the Buddha in his
infinite wisdom can always "illuminate" (chao)(cj)
and "penetrate" (tung-ta) (ck) a "situation"
(ching)(cl) and what he says can therefore always
"match" (hsiang-ch'eng) (cm) the "situation.''(67)
The subjectivity of "the words of the Buddha's

P.394

own mind" is forever indeterminable, and its
affirmation in terms of "the words which follow the
minds of others" must be followed by negation.
Unlike the paradoxes of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu,
Chih-i's paradox does not attempt to talk about the
ultimate reality as a paradox. Rather, it is a
paradoxical attempt to talk around the ultimate
reality as a semantic enclosure which, ironically,
is semantically unoccupied and unoccupiable and can
for this reason never become semantically enclosed.
Though postulated as a speaking subject, Chih-i's
Buddha speaks with a subjectivity which is either
indeterminate as "the words which follow the minds
of others" or indeterminable as "the words of the
Buddha's own mind." In this regard, Chih-i is still
identifiably Indian Buddhist. Like the Monkey
Wu-k'ung(cn) who, though capable of
"cloud-somersaulting" a hundred and eight thousand
miles in one leap, never jumped clear of the
Tathagata's palm, Chih-i, in spite of all the
windings and twistings in his theorizing of "the
words of the Buddha's own mind" and "the words which
follow the minds of others, " was never really out
of the mystical/ skeptical mold of his Indian
Buddhist predecessors for whom the ultimate reality
is unsayable and the Buddha's saying is the
indeterminate saying of non-saying.

NOTES

1. Lao Tzu,Chapter l4.
2. Ibid., Chapter 32;translation modified from D.C.
Lau. Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (hereafter cited as
Lao Tzu), Baltimore: Penguin (1963), p. 91.
3. Wang Hsien-ch'ien, Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, Taipei:
Shih-chieh shu-chu(co)(1962); 2/14.
4. Ibid.,25/173.
5. Wei-mo-chieh so-shuo ching ( hereafter cited as
Wei-mo ching), Taisho,(cp)V. 14, No. 475, pp.
550-551;Charles Luk, trans., The Vimalakirti
Nirdesa Sutra (hereafter cited as Vimalakirti),
Berkeley: Shambala (1972), pp. 92- 100.
6. Wei-mo ching.p.555;Luk, Vimalakirti,p.122.
7. T'ang Chun-i, Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun: tao-
lun p'ien, Hong Kong: Hsin-ya shu-yuan yen-chiu
so(cg) (1974) , pp. 348-398, especially pp.
350-370. However, some of the statements cited
from the Lao Tzu to exemplify each of the six
types are my own selections and not provided by
T'ang.

P.395

8. Translation by W. T. Chan,A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy (hereafter cited as Source Book),
Princeton: Princeton University Press (1963), p.
174.
9. Translation adapted from ibid.,p.152 and Leu, Lao
Tzu, p. 82.
10.Translation adapted from Chan,Source Book, p.146.
11. Translation adapted from ibid.,p. 150.
12. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 13/85.
13. Translation by Chan,Source Book. pp.168-169.
14. Translation adapted from Lau,LaoTzu, p.99.
15. Translation derived from Chan, Source Book, p.170,
with minor modifications.
16. Ibid.,p.147.
17. Ibid.,pp. 154-155.
18. Ibid.,p.158.
19. 'Translation from ibid., pp.143 & 146-148, with
minor modifications.
20. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 25/175 ; translation by
Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu
(hereafter cited as Chuang Tzu) , New York:
Columbia University Press (1968), p. 293.
21. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 24/159 ; translation by
Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 269.
22. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/14 : translation derived
from Watson, Chuang Tzu, p.44, with minor
modfications.
23. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/9.
24. Ibid., 2/11; translation by Watson, Chuang Tzu,
p. 41.
25. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/12;translation by Watson,
Chuang Tzu. pp. 42-43, with minor modifications.
26. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/9-10; translation by
Watson, Chuang Tzu, pp. 39-40.
27. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/11;translation by Watson,
Chuang Tzu, p. 41.
28. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans.
by Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press (1978), pp. 292 -293.
29. Edward M. Said, Beginnings, Baltimore:The Johns
Hopkins University Press (1975), p. 342.
30. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by
Gayatri Chakavorty Spivak, Balti-more:The Johns
Hopkins University ress (1976), " Translator'r
Preface," p. xix.
31. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/12-13;translation derived
from Watson, Chuang Tzu, P.43, with slight
modification.
32. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh. 27/182; translation by
Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 304.
33. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 2/13;translation by Watson,
Chuang Tzu, p.43.
34. Chuang-tzu chi-chieh, 26/18l ; translation by
Watson, Chuang Tzu, p. 302.
35. See Vimalakirti-Nirdesa Sutra, Chapter 2 and
Lotus Sutra,Chapter 2.
36. Waiter Liebenthal, Chao Lun: the Treatise of
Seng Chao (hereafter cited as Chao Lun), Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press (1968), p.47.
37. Translation adapted from ibid., p. 41. For Chao
Lun in the Chinese original, see Taisho, V. 45,
No. 1848, pp. 150- 161.
38. Translation adaptad from Liebenthal, Chao Lun,
p.48.

P.396

39. I.e., Madhyamika-sastra and Dvadasa-dvara by
Nagarjuna and Sata-sastra by Aryadeva.
40. Liebenthal,Chao Lun,p.46.
41. See Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist
Philosophy, Honolulu: Office Appliance Co., Ltd.
(1956),p. 163.
42. Philip B. Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra of the
Sixth Patriarch (hereafter cited as Platform
Sutra), New York: Columbia University Press
(1967), p. 173.
43. Yanagida Seizan,Rinzai roku, Tokyo:Daizo shuppan
kabushiki kaisha(cr) (1972), p. 158; see also
Irmgard Sc -hloegl, trans., The Zen Teaching of
Rinzai, Berkeley: Shambala (1976), pp. 53-54.
44. E.G., Yanagida, Rinzai roku, pp. 127, 145 & 175.
45. Translation by Yampolsky with slight modifica-
tion, Platform Sutra, pp. 150-151.
46. Yanagida.Rinzai roku, p. 167.
47. Ibid.,pp. 119-120.
48. Ibid.,pp.169-170.
49. Ibid.,p.14?
50. The trigger or chi in this case is the trigger
of a crossbow while feng, strictly speaking,
refers to the sharpness of the edge of an
arrowhead and not of a razor; cf. Chung-wen
to-tr'u-tien, Taipei: Chung-kuo wen-hua ta-hsueh
ch'u-pan pu (cs) (1982, popular edition), V. 5,
p. 485.
51. See Yampolsky,Platform Sutra. pp.170-173.
52. Yanagida,Rinzai roku.pp. 139-140.
53. Chih-i, Miao-fa lien-hua ching hsuan-i ( here-
after cited as Fa-hua hsuan-i)'(ct) Toisho, V.
39, No. 1716, p. 704. See also ihid., pp. 682,
684, 696 and 770 and Leo Hurvitz, Chih I
(538-597): a Study of the Life of a Chinese
Buddhist Monk (hereafter cited as Chih I),
Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation (1959),
p. 333.
54. Chih-i Fa-hua hsuan-i,pp.683, 685, 690, 696-697,
702-704, 712-713, 764-765, 768-770, 773 &797-800.
55. See Hurvitz, Chih I, pp. 252-301;Kenneth Chen,
Buddhism in China: a Historical Survey,
Princeton: Princeton University Press (1966),
pp. 305-311.
56. For an English translation of this parable, see
Hurvitz, Chih I, pp. 235-236.
57. Chih-i, Fa-hua hsuan-i, pp. 682, 688-689, 690,
696-697, 703-704, 705, 713, 714 & 770. For an
analygis of Chih-i's view of the Lotus, see
Hurvitz, Chih I, pp. 223-232.
58. T'ang chun-i.Chung-kuo che-hsueh yuan-lun: yuan-
tao p'ien (III),(cu) Hong Kong: Hsin-ya shu-yuan
yen-chiu so (1974), pp. 1119-1120.
59. Set Leon Hurvitz, trans.,Scripture of the Lotus
Blossom of the Fine Dharma, New York: Columbia
University Press (1976), p. 28.
60. Chih-i,Fa-hua hsuan-i, p.697.
61. Ibid.,p.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.,pp.682-683.
64. Ibid.,pp.696&715.
65 Ibid.,p.770.
66. Ibid.,p.773.
67. Ibid.,pp.693-694.

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