The Criticisms of Wang Yang-mings Teachings

·期刊原文
The Criticisms of Wang Yang-ming's Teachings as Raised by his Contemporaries
By Tang Chun-i
Philosophy East and West
Vol. 23 (1973)
pp. 163-186
Copyright 1973 by University of Hawaii Press
Hawaii, USA

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I. Introduction
When the teaching of liang-chih was expounded by Wang Yang-ming, various criticisms were put forward by his contemporaries. After Wang's death, his disciples divided into different schools, and doubts about the self-sufficiency of Wang's teachings, felt by some of his disciples, already contained some implicit criticisms. By the end of the Ming dynasty, Li Chien-lo, a second-generation follower of Wang, had made explicit his criticisms of Wang's teachings, and a debate occurred between Shu Ching-an and Chou Hai-men, representing the Chan Kan-ch'uan and Wang schools respectively. About the same time, such scholars of the Tung-lin school as Ku Ching-yang and Kao Ching-yi also criticized Wang's teachings severely. This critical assessment culminated in Liu Chi-shan, the disciple of Shu Ching-an (of the Chan Kan-ch'uan school), who replaced the teaching of liang-chih with his own teaching of chen-yi or "to make the will authentic." Liu nevertheless claimed that the real teachings of Wang Yang-ming were identical with his own. [1]

As we can see, the whole question about the position of Wang's teachings in the development of Neo-Confucianism during the late Ming dynasty is rather complicated as well as interesting. In this article I shall try to discuss in a very general way where these explicit or implicit criticisms of Wang's teachings originated, whether they were internal or external to Wang's teachings, and what were the philosophical problems involved. The criticisms of Wang's teachings as raised by scholars of the Tung-lin school and by Liu Chi-shan, I have discussed elsewhere, [2] and I shall just mention them without further comment. My conclusion in this article will be that, although the criticisms may not be fatal to Wang's teachings, they were historically and philosophically significant in clarifying Wang's teaching and that some of the internal criticisms were especially valuable in remedying some of the defects and pushing the development of Ming Confucianism further.

II. Wang's Teachings Criticized By Lu Ching-Yen
From the historical and philosophical points of view, the criticisms raised by four of Wang's contemporaries may be divided into four types. The first was presented by Lu Ching-yen, the great Confucian moral teacher in North China,

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1. Liu's criticisms of Wang's teachings were scattered in Liu's various writings. As a summary, see the Complete Works of Liu Tzu, Tao Kwang ed., vol. 5, pp. 13-24. In vol. 6, p.13, Liu said the original meaning of Wang Yang-ming's teaching is not far from his thought.

2. I wrote an article on Liu's doctrine of moral mind with a critique of Wang Yang-ming, which was read in the conference of "Thoughts of Ming Dynasty" held in Como, Italy, in 1971. The conference papers are expected to be published by Columbia University Press. In my article, I pointed out the most important criticisms of Wang's teaching, as raised by scholars of the Tung-ling school and by Liu.

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who criticized the adequacy of the teaching of liang-chih. He pointed out that in Mencius, where the term 'liang-chih' originated, it was coupled with liang-neng. While liang-chih means "moral knowledge," liang-neng means the "capacity for moral action." Hence, Wang's negligence of liang-neng was not justified. [3] Further, he claimed that in taking the realization of liang-chih as a way of universal moral practice, Wang was differing from Confucius, who taught his disciples differently -- according to their temperaments and stages of moral practice and moral learning. [4] However, it seems to me that Lu did not realize that Wang's liang-chih is not merely the origin of moral knowledge but also is the origin of moral action. Liang-chih is the original conscientious or moral consciousness which knows and acts at the same time. Nor did Lu realize that Wang's liang-chih, as the original conscientious consciousness, can be expressed in the "different stages of moral practice and different degrees of learning of different men, with their different temperaments." Hence, he did not succeed in criticizing Wang's teachings from within. Huang Tsung-hsi, author of Ming-ju-hsueh-an, defended Wang's point of view with vigor, judging that Lu failed to understand that liang-chih is a universal reality of the mind, for everyone, and not merely a special way for the moral practice of particular persons. [5] Although Lu could still rejoin that the realization of liang-chih is just a particular teaching of Wang Yang-ming's which Confucius did not talk about, there being many other ways of moral practice, I would agree with him on this point. Nevertheless, such a criticism can be used against all Confucianists who went beyond Confucius' sayings, including Lu himself. Even taken as an internal criticism, it is too general to be used specifically against Wang's teachings. Lu's criticism really can be taken only as an external criticism and the least important of the criticisms against Wang's teachings.

III. Huang Wan's Criticisms Of Wang's Teachings From The Pragmatic Point Of View
The second type of criticism of Wang's teachings was represented by Huang Wan. Huang was first Wang's friend before becoming his disciple, and he defended Wang's learning and character in the court when Wang was attacked by his political enemies. Yet Huang in the end of his study became suspicious of his master's teachings and criticized the teaching of the "realization of liang-chih," especially as propounded by Wang's disciples. [6] It seems to me that his

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3. Ming-ju-hsueh-an, Chung Hua Press ed., vol. 8, p. 4.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 1.

6. Huang Wan wrote the Ming-tao-Pien. It is a rare book and is still not available to me. There is a short biography of him in vol. 13 of Ming-ju-hsueh-an. In Jung Chao-tsu's History of the Thouqht of the Ming Dynasty, reprinted by (Taiwan: Kai Ming Book Store, there is a section which introduces Huang's thoughts with quotations from the Ming-tao-pien, which I used for my discussion.

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criticisms stem from his awareness of the bad influences which arose from Wang's teachings. Indeed there were such pernicious influences, and they worsened in the later period of the Ming. As the root is responsible for the fruit, Wang's teachings, and indeed the whole tradition of Sung and Ming Neo-Confucianism, came under the attack of Ch'ing scholars. Huang Wan may be considered the first representative who criticized Wang's teachings in terms of its influences.

Huang's criticisms were not purely external criticisms of Wang's teachings, for he understood Wang to a certain degree. His main difference from Wang may be seen in Huang's interpretation of the sentence "chih-chih (realization of knowledge) tsai ke-wu (investigation of things)." For Wang, this sentence means that ke-wu is the same thing as chih-chih. For Huang, the word tsai means "for the purpose of" and the word ke means "fa" or "norm." [7] Thus the whole sentence means that the purpose of the realization of knowledge is to put the norm into practice and to end in a pragmatic reconstruction of objective things. Hence, the realization of moral knowledge is not just for inner spiritual cultivation to attain sagehood (and Huang did not neglect its importance), but is also instrumental in the reconstruction of the objective things of the social, political, and natural worlds. In Huang's thought, the orientation of the inward moral mind should be turned outward, and his thought ended in a pragmatism or utilitarianism very close to the Yung-chia and Yung-k'ang schools of Sung dynasty philosophy, and the Yen-Li school of the Ch'ing dynasty. Thus, Huang not only criticized Wang Yang-ming, but extended his criticisms to Yang Tzu-hu, Lu Hsin-shan, then to Chu Tsu, the Chen brothers and even to Chou Lien-hsi, charging that all of them merely knew some way for the inner spiritual cultivation, which had no pragmatic utility. Their learnings were accused, by him, of consisting of Maahaayana Buddhism or Hinayaana Buddhism and not the original Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius.

Huang's criticisms of Wang and the Neo-Confucianist tradition foreshadowed later criticisms of them toward the end of the Ming and the Ch'ing dynasties. Yet, because he was originally Wang's disciple, his learning may be characterized as one which started within Wang's teaching but ended in going outside it to take quite a different philosophical stand. Because his criticism was based on a standpoint outside of Wang's philosophy and was directed mainly against the pernicious influences which arose from Wang's teaching but which are essentially outside of Wang's teachings, Huang Wan's criticisms were still mainly external. Furthermore, as this type of criticism was used by

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7. Jung, History of the Thought of the Ming Dynasty, p. 171.

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him to attack the other thinkers of the Neo-Confucian tradition, it is still too general to be taken as a special criticism of Wang's teachings as it is.

IV. Chan Kan-Ch'uan's Teachings Versus Wang Yang-Ming's Teachings
The third type of criticism of Wang's teachings was represented by Chan Kan-ch'uan who was a good friend of Wang Yang-ming. Their systems went the same way of moral idealism. But, while Chan talked about the importance of liang-chih for moral cultivation in a way which was very similar to Wang Yang-ming, Chan had different thoughts about ke-wu as related to liang-chih. Hence, his criticisms provide an internal criticism of Wang's philosophy, which is historically and philosophically important. Chan's thesis was that the liang-chih or the conscientious consciousness is a consciousness of ke-wu or an experience of the Heavenly principle of things in the universe. "Sui-ch'u-t'i-jen-t'ien-li" was taken by Chan as the moral slogan, instead of "realization of liang-chih" as taught by Wang Yang-ming. T'ien-li means the Heavenly principle or the moral principle of things of the universe. T'i-jen means both "to be acquainted with" and "to be identified with" and "to investigate," which may be translated as "to experience" to include these two meanings. [8] Sui-ch'u means everywhere, or in any occasion of life. This means, as Chan explained, "whether in the occasion of knowing, or willing, or acting, or in the occasion of oneself, or family, or country, or the world under Heaven; whether in the expressed state of the Mind, or in the unexpressed state of the Mind." [9] Thus the way of ke-wu, for Chan, is to experience the Heavenly principle in any occasion of life. His Heavenly principle is a principle of existing in a state of spiritual equilibrium, which is not partial or biased, but is always impartial and keeps or preserves the whole and the particular principles in view. [10] Through the experiencing of the Heavenly principle, man knows the righteous way, and when keeping or preserving this very knowledge in acting, man acts rightly. This is called the "co-progression of knowledge and action" of man's moral life, "attaining and abiding in the utmost good" with a "sense of reverence" in every occasion of life. This is roughly what Chan taught.

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8. Complete Essays of Chan, K'ang-hsi ed., vol. 22, p. 20, Chan taught that T'i-jen means T'i-t'ieh and Ch'a-shih; I prefer to translate T'i-t'ieh as "to be acquainted with" and "to be identified with." Ch'a-shih, I prefer to translate as "to investigate."

9. Consult Chan's letter to Wang Yang-ming, Complete Essays of Chan, vol. 7, p. 25, where Chan explained the meaning of sui-ch'u, and vol. 8, p. 22 and vol.9, p.5, where Chan commented on the interpretation of sui-ch'u as understood by his disciples.

10. Chan always used the word chung or chung-cheng to explain the state of t'ien-li as the reality of mind. Chung means that the mind is located in the center, and cheng means mind's response is on the right way. This state of mind can be translated as a spiritual equilibrium which is easily understood, The idea of chung-cheng was explained in the article "The Way of Mind as Inherited from Confucian School," in Complete Essays of Chan, vol. 21, pp. 15-18; vol. 8, p. 9; vol. 17, p. 14; vol. 9, p. 21; vol. 18, pp. 17 and 23.

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It is my impression that Chan's teaching is a very well-balanced system. The meaning of "T'i-jen-t'ien-li,'' in including "to investigate the Heavenly principle," is very much like Chu Hsi's philosophy, while by including "to be identified with the principle" Chan is very much like Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming. Chan did not explain the Heavenly principle merely objectively or merely subjectively. It is a principle of our mind as well as a principle of things of the Heaven or the universe. It is apprehended or contained in the mind, and penetrated by mind's knowing and acting. Thus, in philosophy he is as idealistic as Wang Yang-ming. His system is well balanced; it may be taken to be self-sufficient, and we may not be able to find any flaw in it. Chan Kan-ch'uan was surely a great moral master of Neo-Confucianism of the Ming dynasty as was Wang Yang-ming. As a scholar, Chan was perhaps even more erudite and wrote many more books than Wang Yang-ming. However, his criticisms of Wang Yang-ming are a controversial matter. There were letters that Chan wrote to Wang and sayings that were scattered in his other writings which criticized Wang's teachings. He was dissatisfied with Wang's discussion about the nature or reality of mind as beyond good and evil. He claimed sometimes that Wang's teaching of the realization of liang-chih was taking "learning to be a sage" to be too easy and that Wang's teaching was rather biased. Yet we need not take such criticisms seriously, because Chan just asserted them occasionally, and he did not take them very seriously himself. [11] Now I shall just discuss one criticism of Chan's that is crucial to Wang's teaching.

This criticism is concerned with his interpretation of ke-wu as different from Wang's teaching. Chan's interpretation of ke-wu was along the line of Chu Hsi's. Ke-wu means, for him, "to investigate and to be acquainted with and then, to be identified with the principle of things," or "to experience the principles of things" as stated earlier. However, according to Wang, the word wu is interpreted as our motivative or volitional ideas, which includes the objective things known as its part. Henceforth, ke-wu means "chen-nien-tou" or "to rectify our motivative ideas." The rectification of motivative ideas is the same thing as the realization of liang-chih. Wang said that Chu Tsu's

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11. For Chan's other criticisms of Wang's teaching, consult: Complete Essays of Chan, vol. 10, p. 10, where Chan criticized Wang's way of moral cultivation as too easy; vol. 10, p. 2, vol. 23, p. 37, and vol. 23, p. 79, where Chan criticized the theory of no good and no evil; vol. 11, p. 30, where Chan criticized Wang's interpretation of ke-wu of the Book of Great Learning as not conforming to the context; vol. 11, p. 72, where he quoted Wang's saying that his teaching is just a rough teaching for beginners; volume 22, p. 21, where he criticized that Wang's teaching may have had influences; volume 23, p. 3, where Chan criticized Wang's idea about the relation of knowledge and action; volume 23, p. 50,where Chan criticized Wang's way of teaching as like the army who fights for victory with special strategy not with the general strategy; and volume 11, p. 11, where Chan criticized Wang's criticism of Chu Hsi's idea of ching, as not convincing.

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interpretation of ke-wu as "to investigate the principle of objective things" is to search for our moral cultivation to be a sage outside of the very moral mind and thus leading man to go outside himself. [12] Wang is also suspicious about Chan's teaching: "to experience the Heavenly principle in every occasion of life" is to search the way of cultivation of the moral outside oneself. Yet Chan wrote several letters to Wang to point out the four shortcomings of Wang's interpretation of ke-wu and to explain the five merits of his interpretation of ke-wu, [13] and asserted once to his disciple that Wang's "rectification of motivative ideas," without "other ways of moral cultivation for experiencing the Heavenly principle in every occasion of life," is merely subjective matter, and itself may be based on personal opinion which has not conformed to the Heavenly principle. [14] However, I shall not talk about the details of his criticisms in his letters to Wang and of his talks to his disciples. I just wish to point out that the difference between Wang and Chan did not merely come from their different interpretations of the term ke-wu in the context of the Book of Great Learning, but from their different philosophical backgrounds. In Wang's thought, moral cultivation is an inner matter, so the investigation of principles of objective things could never be the proper way for moral cultivation. Yet Chan had a philosophy which sees the objective things of the universe as existing in the very mind, hence, to know the principles of things is not to search for the way of moral practice outside one's mind. It is rightly what the man, as a moral being, should do for his mind. Wang taught also that the mind is pervasive in the things of the universe and that nothing is outside the mind. Therefore, when Chan's interpretation was blamed (by Wang) as searching for the way outside, Chan rejoined that, in his thought,

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12.Complete Essays of Chan, vol. 7, p. 24. Chan said in his letter to Yang Shao-mei that his difference with Wang is concerned with the idea of mind, and that in Wang's thought the mind is just located in the body, therefore, his to "experience the heaven principle of things" is searching for principle outside mind. Wang did not realize that there is no duality of inside and outside for the mind, which is identified with the myriad things of the universe, in his thought.

13.Consult Complete Essays of Chan, volume 7, pp. 25-28, for Chan's letter to Wang Yang-ming. This is the most important letter which pointed out the four shortcomings of Wang's teaching about ke-wu and the five merits of Chan's teaching about ke-wu; and volume 7, p. 20, where Chan maintained that the mind inwardly-oriented and outwardly-oriented are both diverted ways of moral cultivation and not the right way.

14. Consult Chan's letter to Wang Nei-hsueh in Complete Essays of Chan, volume 7, p. 22, where Chan criticized Wang's teaching of rectification of motivative ideas as the only way of moral cultivation as too narrow and biased; and vol. 23, p. 26, where Chan said that if the realization of liang-chih is accompanied with other ways of moral cultivation as extensive learning, accurate inquiry, careful thinking, clear discrimination, earnest practice, he shall have no objection to Wang's teaching; vol. 20, p. 21, where Chan said that Wang's teaching about liang-chih originated from Mencius. Yet he did not pay attention to the word "ta" of Mencius which means the extension of liang-chih through further ways of moral practice, and if it supplemented Wang's teaching with a further way, Wang's teaching would be better.

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the principle of the things of the universe is also within the mind, and that it is Wang himself who separated the inside mind and the outside things and limited the way of moral cultivation to the inward rectification of motivative ideas within the mind, without experiencing the Heavenly principle by other ways in every occasion of life where the things of the universe are encountered. Chan did not claim explicitly that Wang's teaching, which emphasized the "inward rectification of the motivative ideas" in contrast to the "outward knowledge of principle of things," is also contradictory to Wang's thought that nothing is outside the mind. Yet this is implied in Chan's criticism. As this is the case, then the fault seems to be on Wang's side, and Chan's criticism of Wang is forceful and convincing.

When Chan raised his questions to Wang through several letters, Wang did not answer. Wang explained once to his student Ch'ien Hsu-shan why he did not answer. [15] Wang said that if he and Chan could live together for several months, perhaps, they could agree with each other. It is no good just to have a verbal controversy through letters. Ch'ien Hsu-shan recorded the story and regretted very much that the two great masters, both of whom he admired, did not meet. Hence the differences between Wang and Chan remained like a kung-an of Ch'an Buddhism, which is unsettled but worthy of our study. In the following, I shall try to defend Wang's standpoint through Chan's criticism and see what is the contribution of Wang's teaching to the ways of moral cultivation, which can compete with or be superior to Chan's teaching.

In the first place, I have to admit that the thoughts of Chan and Wang were on the same line of moral idealism and that they had many points in common. Yet the difference between them, if emphasized, is a great difference in philosophy. Chan is a very broad-minded man and his teachings form a well-balanced system. It seems to me that Chan has too many commonplace sayings and his whole teaching seems to have no definite focus. "To experience Heavenly principle everywhere" is still too broad in meaning. It may not be able to lead man to begin his moral cultivation from a definite starting point. However, Wang's teaching of the "rectification of our motivative idea" as the way of ke-wu and also the way of realization of liang-chih may be said to point out a definite starting point for moral cultivation. Surely, the motivative ideas are reflected and rectified inwardly, and Wang's teaching may be criticized as establishing "the inward" in opposition to "the outward." It seems also to be contradictory to the idealism of both Wang and Chan, which sees the outer world as existing also inside the very mind. However, the very idealism of both Chan and Wang had to be established through an inwardly oriented reflexive thinking, at least in the beginning of their thought, in contrast to the ordinary thinking of man, which is merely outwardly oriented and

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15. Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 11, p. 8.

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attached to things that are regarded as just objective and external to the mind. The idealism of both Wang and Chan is never the philosophy of ordinary thinking. The objective things encountered in the occasions of our life can be looked upon as also existing inside the mind only through reflective thinking about "the thing encountered as also a thing apprehended and contained in the mind, and then as existing also inside the mind." Otherwise, in his ordinary thinking, man's mind is just outwardly oriented and takes the things seen as merely objective and external to his mind. Yet the very thinking of man as reflexive is inwardly oriented, at least in its beginning. Henceforth, all men's idealism must arise from a certain inward orientation of mind, and Chan's idealism is no exception. This orientation of mind is called inward, because it is reflexive and is differentiated from the outward orientation of the mind in ordinary thinking. Of course, when the idealism is established and the world is known as also existing inside the mind, there shall be no duality of the outside and inside or of the inward and outward. Then the mind and the world would be taken as an identical whole. This is the point where Chan and Wang both agreed. Yet, it seems that Chan just took the identical whole of mind and world as an already given state, in the very beginning of men's thought, and had forgotten that the sense of this identical whole has to be established by reflexive thinking, which is inward oriented. The inward orientation of mind is the foundation of the very sense of the identity of mind and world. Hence, Chan seems to be wrong when he claimed that Wang's teaching is inwardly oriented. He had no reason to complain that Wang's emphasis on an inwardly oriented way of moral cultivation is contradictory to the thesis that there is nothing outside the mind. In the entire philosophical pilgrimage, perhaps we have to say that in the beginning stage there is an outward orientation of the mind in ordinary thinking, which sees the things of the world as just external and even sees the moral principle and the practice of it as external too. In the middle stage, there is the inward orientation of the mind in extraordinary thinking, which sees the things of the world as also internal and the moral principle and the practice of it as internal too. Passing through the extraordinary thinking, there is no duality of inward and outward in the last stage. So there is no self-contradiction in Wang's teaching, when Wang taught men starting from the middle stage, and ended in the last stage.

In the second place, I have to say that to experience the Heavenly principle in any occasion of life, as taught by Chan, may not be contradictory to Wang's teaching. According to Wang, liang-chih has a natural light as a conscient consciousness. As man exists as an occasion of life, and things are encountered in the occasion, his liang-chih can know by its natural light the Heavenly principle or moral principle for his responsive action. For example, when a man's father is encountered in certain occasions of life, a man can know

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filial piety as a moral principle for his action. Here, the father as a thing and the filial piety as a moral principle are all in man's universe and also are immanent in his mind. Chan could say also that it is an example of "to experience the principle in man's occasion of life," and that without the actual occasion of life and the father as an actual thing encountered there could be no principle actually known or experienced. Thus, "looking at the occasion and the thing," is necessary for knowledge or experience of the moral principle. As our life is going on, our encounter with things is always changing; the moral principles are known and experienced successfully in the different occasion of things. Man always had to look at what his present occasion of life actually is and to know and to experience its moral principle within his mind. I do not see that Wang could quarrel with Chan on this point. Wang understood quite well that the natural light of liang-chih as conscient consciousness with its moral principle is successfully known and experienced in each actual occasion of life. [16] As the actual occasion of life is changing and each occasion is concrete, the moral principle of our action could not be just a static and abstract principle. It has to be particularized, become dynamic and concrete through the present creation of liang-chih. [17] For example, Wang talked about the story of Shun. Shun's father was unkind to his son. According to Shun's filial piety, Shun should tell his father about his intention to marry and receive his father's permission. Yet Shun knew quite well that if he told his father of his intention to marry, he would not be permitted to do so, and without the marriage he would have no posterities to serve in the sacrifice to his ancestors. This would be even more contrary to his sense of filial piety, and therefore Shun decided to marry and not tell his father. [18] Wang quoted this story to show that filial piety as a moral principle is not a static and abstract principle but a principle which must be practiced in the concrete occasions of life and which was particularized in its expression. It would then become a dynamic and concrete principle through the present creation of liang-chih. Thus, Wang could never disagree with Chan's teaching "to know and experience the moral principle in the occasions of life with things."

As to the last point, we may also say that Wang's thought of liang-chih is rightly for teaching man to practice the moral principles experienced or revealed in his different occasions of life. The most important thing in man's moral life is to realize the moral principle which is known in his present

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16. As to the way Wang Yang-ming's idea about li or principle and mind, consult my article "Spirit and Development of Neo-Confucianism," in Inquiry, 14 (1971): 77-83.

17. Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming, vol. 1, p. 15, and vol. 2, p. 8. See my interpretation of present creation of liang-chih in my article "Revaluation of Wang Yang-ming's Learning and Similarities and Differences between Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan," in New Asia Journal, section 7, 2, no. 1 (1956): 37-43.

18. Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming, vol. 3, p. 5.

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concrete occasions of life. So Wang said that what is known today through my liang-chih must be extended as far as it can be today; if there is a new enlightenment of my liang-chih tomorrow, then I must extend the new enlightenment as far as I can tomorrow. [19] Wang never taught that what is revealed through the function of liang-chih is a totality of moral principles which are the same for every man in any occasion of life at any time. And it is also quite possible that a moral principle which is known in the present occasion of my life is based on a wrong knowledge of the actual occasion and my liang-chih may be obscured and perverted by selfish desires or biases. Wang knew as well as Chan that even the rectification of motivative ideas may be based on wrong personal opinion, which is not in conformity with the Heavenly principle and is not the genuine expression of liang-chih. Yet, according to Wang, we have to know that the very intention to correct the wrong opinion and to make the liang-chih more enlightened and clearer -- to know the wrong as wrong -- still originated from the further creation or expression of liang-chih. What was emphasized in Wang's teaching is that man should have a reflexive and inwardly oriented thinking, and a "self-consciousness" and "self-faith" in the existence of liang-chih through its successive revealment and practice of what is successfully revealed. This is what Chan did not emphasize.

From what was said earlier, we can know that the central thesis of Wang's teaching is not about the general knowledge of moral principle or the knowledge of what is good or evil but the practice of the principle and to do what is good and undo what is evil. So far Wang is not very much at variance with Chan, because Chan talked also about the co-progress of moral knowledge and action. Wang and Chan both thought that the relation of genuine moral knowledge and moral action should and could go together. Yet, in the ordinary cases, man always has moral knowledge which is not going together with or followed by moral practice. Then we have to ask, why these cases exist, and what is the way for moral cultivation to make the two always going together?

It seems to me that Chan had no serious discussion about the above problem, yet Wang had an insight that could solve the problem. This insight came rightly from a deep inwardly oriented thinking that Chan lacked.

What was Wang's insight? It was that the go-together of moral knowledge and moral practice or action is not merely something which should be, but it is also the very ontological reality of original moral mind or liang-chih as it is. In the reality of original moral mind, moral knowledge was originally connected with moral action through a moral feeling. Liang-chih feels what it knows and initiates its action and thus unites knowledge and action into one, and then there is a trinity of "moral knowing, feeling, and acting," which is

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19. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 13.

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the very original reality of liang-chih as revealed in its first human expression. For example, when a child knows to love his parents, there is "his knowing, his loving, and his acting in a loving way" toward his parents at one time. This is the child's liang-chih, revealed in its first expression as a trinity, without self-consciousness. Thus, when the child knows further that "to love his parent" is good and that "to hate his parent" is evil, he also likes the "good" and takes action to do "good," and dislikes "his hate" as evil, and takes action to undo "evil." This is his self-conscious realization of liang-chih revealed in its first expression as a trinity. Even in an adult, if something morally good is encountered suddenly, his knowing it, liking it, and acting in an appropriate way toward it, always come simultaneously. Here liang-chih as a trinity of moral knowing, feeling, and acting is revealed. In the trinity, the three exist in reality as three moments of an integral whole, which functions as a whole.

As the reality of liang-chih is thought, by Wang, to be a trinity of moral knowing, feeling, and acting, therefore practice of the moral knowledge is nothing more than to realize the liang-chih as it is. Yet why do people not practice what they know morally? Wang said that this is because they have lost the reality of liang-chih; consequently, its function of knowing and acting are separated. What is the cause for this loss of reality and the separation of the function of knowing and acting? Wang said that it was owing to selfish desires which interrupted the expression of liang-chih as a trinity. Here Wang's explanation may not be sufficient.

One may have no doubt about the first expression of liang-chih as a trinity of moral knowing, feeling, and acting, as explained earlier. Yet we have to know that the past expression of liang-chih also can be recollected in memory and that its moral principle can be abstracted out by our present conceptual thinking and be imitated or put into practice again, in the present life by the present mind. Once more, a moral principle can be known through the observation of the moral action of other people or told by other people. In such cases, the moral principle known is not necessarily accompanied by the living conscient consciousness like the first expression of liang-chih. Our knowledge of the moral principle is like the pure intellectual knowledge of nonmoral principles of the universe and may have no moral feeling or moral acting immediately following the knowledge, especially when we have other present selfish desires, which interrupt.

If the separation of moral knowledge and action came from what was said above, then the way to make the two one is not to take the principle as something outside my present moral consciousness, even if it is suggested by my past moral life, or by other men's moral action, or told by other people. Because the principle is known by my present moral mind, we must conceive of it as being revealed by my liang-chih in its present expression, with the principle being the very nature of liang-chih and nothing external. Thus it

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is necessary to think of the principle as inside the liang-chih or my moral life. Furthermore, the feeling of "the existence of the principle," the feeling about "the realization of principle in the present occasion of life as good," and the feeling of "the good as good" and "liking the good" are also necessary for initiating the action. The feeling itself may be thought of also as the beginning of action or as already being an action. Thus moral knowledge and moral action are seen as one thing. When said objectively, we may say that knowledge and action as two are brought into one. Actually, there is just one thing, that is, a trinity of moral knowing, feeling, and acting. This one thing, seen as one thing, is also the expression of liang-chih's original reality.

In our present mind, we have some motivative ideas of the knowledge of the good, which is the knowledge about what should be or what conforms to the principle known through liang-chih. This is a good idea. We also have some other motivative ideas which are generated by selfish desires and which do not conform with, or rather violate, the principle as known through liang-chih. This is an evil idea. The feeling and action which accompany the good idea are the liking and doing; and the feeling and action which accompany the evil idea are the disliking and undoing. The liang-chih which functions as knowing the good idea and the evil idea -- liking the former and disliking the latter, and doing the former and undoing the latter -- exists at a higher level than what is known, felt, or acted on as good or evil. When liang-chih completes its function as knowing, feeling, and acting, and the good is done, evil is undone; we have the fulfillment of our moral life. Yet when evil is undone, we should not have a self-possession of the good, because self-possession is not good. Therefore, when good is done, the good has to be forgotten. Thus we are in a state beyond evil and good, which is also the utmost good or chief good. This is the ultimate stage of the realization of liang-chih, where the reality or nature of our moral mind or liang-chih is realized as it is. This ultimate stage is a stage of "beyond good and evil" or of "no good and no evil"; therefore, the reality or nature of mind, or liang-chih as an ontological reality or nature of mind, can be thought as no-good and no-evil or also as beyond good or evil. In this state of mind, there is only the liang-chih or original conscient consciousness, which is always impartial, serene, transparent, and void. It is a state of mind full of bliss and joy. This state of mind, as fully realized, is a state of sagehood. Wang's teaching that the ultimate state of mind and the reality or nature of mind is beyond good and evil, or no-good and no-evil, was not accepted by Chan Kan-ch'uan, Chan thought that the nature of mind must be good. Yet Chan did not speak much about this problem. Wang taught that the state beyond good and evil is a very lofty state of mind identified with Heaven. The attainment of such a state is by the inward realization of liang-chih. Chan criticized Wang's way of moral cultivation as too inwardly oriented, so he could not have had a sympathetic

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understanding and a serious criticism of this aspect of Wang's teaching. The serious criticism of this aspect was expounded by Lo Cheng-an and disciples of Wang Yang-ming.

V. Lo Cheng-An's Accusation Of Wang's Teaching As Disguised Buddhism
Lo's criticisms, as the fourth type, was concentrated on the very concept of "mind" and "nature," and the "ultimate state of mind as transparent, void, and beyond good and evil." This criticism is quite different from Chan's criticism which just said that Wang's teaching about the way of ke-wu and realization of liang-chih, as starting from the rectification of motivative idea, is rather narrowly inwardly oriented and is not broadly open to any occasion of life. Lo's criticism was directed to the central thought about the mind, nature, and ideal of our moral life. It is a type of criticism going into the inner kernel of Wang's teaching, though Lo, like Chan, raised his objections to Wang's teachings through the discussion about the interpretation of ke-wu. Generally speaking, Chan's criticism of Wang was repeated by such scholars of the late Ming as Ku Ching-yang, Kao Ching-yi, and others. Lo's criticism of Wang was followed by such scholars of the Ch'eng-Chu school as Feng Chen-pai, and Ch'en Ch'ing-an, [20] from the late Ming to the Ch'ing dynasties.

Lo's Records of Hard Search of Knowledge was almost a bible for the scholars of the Ch'eng-Chu school during the Ch'ing dynasty. Lo's criticism of Wang is originally based on study of Ch'an Buddhism. He had experienced sudden-awakening, conforming to what is experienced by the Ch'an Buddhist. Afterward, he thought that in this state of mind only the miao or "mystery" of mind as transparent and void is seen but that is not the nature of mind as principle. He said that he had thought about this matter for several decades, and at the age of about sixty he realized the truth of mind and nature. In his book, he concluded that Buddhism, Lu Hsiang-shan, Yang Tzu-hu, and Wang Yang-ming had the same way of spiritual cultivation and that each saw something about the mind with its knowing as transparent, void, and beyond good and evil and never saw what is the real nature, as principle of mind, which transcends the mind as such. In one sentence: "they know mind but not its nature." [21] In Lo's thought, the nature of mind is profounder and deeper rooted and can be expressed and known only through the contact of the mind with objective things and the investigation of their principles, as Chu Tsu taught. The principles of things may be

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20. As to Feng Chen-pai and Ch'en Ch'ing-an's criticisms of Wang's teaching, consult Takehiko Okada, Wang Yang-ming and Confucianism of Late Ming (Tokyo: Meitoku Press, 1971), pp. 318-399.

21. Records of Hard Search for Knowledge, vol. 2, p. 10.

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taken as the differentiations of the one great principle of the universe. Lo liked to use the term "one li with its myriad differentiations as its ramifications." Through the investigation of things, we know their principles or the differentiations of the one li; and when we respond to the things, then, the oneness of our mind and things can be experienced. Yet we must first conceive of the li or principle of things as objectively existing in the universe and as something common. In the work of the investigation of things, I must look outwardly and forwardly to the objective li or principles as outside my mind, then when the li or principles are known, I may think them inwardly and backwardly as our principles or li, which is also my nature. On the other hand, if I just look at my nature of mind backwardly and inwardly, I shall know, in the end, only the mystery of my mind as transparent, void, and beyond good and evil, as Wang said, yet I shall never know that this nature is deeply rooted in my mind and is the common principle of the universe. In this case I shall be destined to go beyond the moral sphere and become a disguised Buddhist without genuine moral responsibility.

The thought of Lo, in which the nature of the mind as its principle is different from the mind as such, was criticized by Huang Tsung-hsi as being contradictory to Lo's cosmological theory in which the li, or principle, can never exist apart from the ch'i, the existential process of the whole universe. If li cannot exist apart from ch'i, then the nature of the mind as principle or li could not exist apart from the existential process of the mind as well; hence, there can be no difference between mind and its nature from the existential point of view. Thus, Lo's criticisms of Wang's teachings fall to the ground. However, it seems to me that Huang's evaluation of Lo's criticisms is not quite fair to Lo. Admittedly, from the cosmological point of view, there can be no li or principle existing apart from the existential process, the ch'i, of the whole universe. Yet man is not the whole universe, but only a part of the universe. Thus, it is not unreasonable to take the nature or principle of mind as deep-rooted, as transcending, and as being different from the mind as such, and, in a certain sense, as existing apart from the mind.

If Huang's evaluation of Lo's criticisms of Wang was reevaluated as above, then Lo's system, upon which he based his criticisms of Wang, will be clear to us. It may be called a system of objective rationalism. The nature of mind, as rational principle, is not merely immanent in our particular mind, but it is a universal principle transcending mind and existing in the myriad things of the objective world as well, and hence is different from the meaning of mind as such. Therefore, the person who wants to realize his nature as the principle must pass beyond his mind to investigate the principle of the universe of things as the different expressions of the one great principle of the universe. Consequently, it is no wonder that he criticizes Wang's theory of ke-wu, or realization of liang-chih, as knowing only the subjective mind without knowing the objective nature, or li, or principle of the mind.

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Nevertheless, Lo's criticisms based on his objective rationalism are still external to Wang's teachings. Faced with such a criticism, Wang Yang-ming could well rejoin that nature and mind are existentially one. Nature as principle is the very moral principle in the expression of liang-chih as the conscient consciousness or the original moral mind. In the process of expressing liang-chih, the so-called objective things and their objective principles are known by liang-chih as immanent in the mind, constituting also the subjective principles or nature of liang-chih expressed from within. Even if we say that the principle is universal and existing in other entities and that it is transcendental to our empirical mind, it may not be transcendental to liang-chih as the self-transcending consciousness which goes to infinity, or the very transcendental consciousness which knows that there is the transcendent. The transcendent as known may exist immanently in the very transcendental knowing as a function which originated from our mind or liang-chih. Wang Yang-ming did not exactly say this, but my explanations are in accord with his teachings.

However, Lo's criticisms are important in philosophy because he called attention to a certain horizontal point of view that places the principles of our mind and of other things on an equal footing, and recovered Chu Hsi's teaching that our mind has to be outwardly and forwardly oriented to investigate the principles of things for the very purpose of realizing our nature, inwardly and backwardly. This is different from Wang's vertical point of view, which always places the mind, or liang-chih, as existing on a higher level, above the objective things seen through the outward and forward orientation of the mind. The horizontal and vertical points of view belong to different dimensions of philosophical thought, and one could never conquer the other in an ultimate sense. Hence, Wang's teachings were not defeated by Lo's criticisms, and Lo's type of criticism was also destined to rise again in the later criticisms of Wang Yang-ming's teachings.

Lo's criticism of Wang is also important because he raised the problem of the relationship between nature and the mind. Though Lo's discussions of the problem may not be sufficient to convince Wang Yang-ming, yet this problem has its deeper side if it is discussed along the line of development of the very teachings of Wang. Looking into the deeper side, the nature and mind also may not be thought of merely as existentially identical, a problem I shall discuss later.

VI. Nieh Shang-Chiang's "Back To Tranquility" And Wang Lung-Chi's Two Kinds Of Learning
Of the four types of criticisms mentioned earlier, the first two were merely external criticisms because they did not address themselves to the problems within Wang's teachings. The next two may be taken as internal criticisms because they were concerned with problems central to Wang's teachings and

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were intended to point out some intrinsic inconsistency or insufficiency in Wang's thought. Yet, their criticisms, based as they are on other traditions of Confucianism and other philosophical standpoints, and lacking an adequate understanding of Wang's position, are still external criticisms. Their criticisms made the different standpoints sharper, but they were unable to shake the standpoint of Wang Yang-ming. However, the implicit and explicit criticisms of Wang from within his own school were quite another matter. They emerged from certain doubts about the self-sufficiency of Wang's teachings.

The criticisms from within Wang's school may be taken as actual internal criticisms. From among the disciples of Wang, Ch'ien Hsu-shan and Chou Tung-kuo were the most faithful to Wang's teachings and were taken by some scholars as the real heirs of Wang Yang-ming. But I shall not talk about them here, rather, I shall concentrate on the disciples of Wang Yang-ming who doubted the self-sufficiency of his teachings. I shall mention first the scholars of the Chiang-yu school. The eminent scholars of this school, such as Nieh Shuang-chiang and Lo Nien-an, were not Wang's disciples while Wang was living, but became his avowed disciples after he died. They never questioned the ontological identity of mind or liang-chih and its nature, or principle, as Wang taught, but they doubted that the way for the realization of liang-chih, as taught by Wang, was sufficient. [22] Nieh proposed "back to tranquillity" as the way for the revelation of liang-chih. This stems from his suspicion of the doctrine that the liang-chih, as the ontological reality, is really expressed in our present expressions of mind. Wang had taught that liang-chih is revealed in the continuous process of our life, and also that our liang-chih may be obscured and perverted by our selfish desires. Yet, Wang thought that the remedy for these defects is rightly the further clearer expressions of the liang-chih in our mind. Nevertheless, in the continuous process of the expressions of our mind, there seems to be no stopping point. If the present expressions of mind may not be the expressions of liang-chih as it is, we have then no a priori guarantee that the same would not be true of the future expressions of the mind as well. This is a delicate and serious problem. In view of this, Lo Nien-an commented that Wang's learnings still have not attained the ultimate stage. [23] Therefore, Nieh proposed the teaching "back to tranquillity," approved by Lo, to supplement Wang's teaching. This contained an implicit criticism of Wang's teachings also.

The "back to tranquillity" means that "if the present expressions of mind may not be the expression of liang-chih as it was, then we should have to

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22. Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 18, p. 19. Lo Nien-an said to Wang Lung-ch'i that Wang Yang-ming's learning is surely the learning to be the sage, yet still had not attained the ultimate stage.

23. Consult my article, "The Development of the Concept of Moral Mind from Wang Yang-ming to Wang Ch'i," in William T. De Bary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 108-117.

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transcend such expressions and let our mind return to a state of absolute tranquillity, so that in this state our liang-chih, as an ontological reality, shall be revealed and its light shine forth." This is a simple explanation of Nieh's proposal, which Lo approved. I shall not go into greater detail about the depth and profundity of their thoughts and the subtle differences between them. However, in discussions with Nieh and Lo on the doctrine of "back to tranquillity," Wang Lung-ch'i of the Che-tung school criticized it as indicating a certain lack of faith in the self, concerning the existence of liang-chih. If we had enough self-faith, we would know that the liang-chih, as an ontological reality, is like the sun, always shining forth. Liang-chih, as an ontological reality, should not be thought of as separated from its expressions, which are its functions. Thus, we have to know liang-chih through its present expressions, and we need not turn around from its present expressions to go back to a state of tranquillity for revealing its hidden reality. This is not the direct way for the realization of liang-chih. Wang Lung-ch'i is very lofty and brilliant in his discussions with Nieh and Lo, but I shall not discuss him here. I do not consider the controversy between Nieh and Lo and Wang Lung-ch'i to be a very serious one. In the present expressions of mind, there is some expression of liang-chih and also expressions of the other elements of mind, such as selfish desires, various purposeless ideas, habitual tendencies, and so on. Therefore, if we dislike the present expressions of mind, then going back to tranquillity to purify our mind would be quite right and proper. Thus, Nieh and Lo were correct. In the first stage of his teachings, Wang Yang-ming had also taught his disciples to practice quiet sitting for the same purpose. On the other hand, if we are conscious that there is a certain expression of liang-chih in our mind even when that expression is obscured and perverted, we can still be self-conscious of it, we can like it, extend it, and take actions in conformity with it, establishing our self-faith in this existence of liang-chih. Hence Wang Lung-ch'i was right also.

However, I wish to say further that the very decision of liking or disliking the present expressions of the mind all originate from liang-chih, as Wang already had taught. Hence, either the decision to "go back to tranquillity" as Nieh and Lo thought or the decision to have full self-consciousness and self-faith in the present expressions and existence of liang-chih, as Wang Lung-ch'i taught, may all spring from liang-chih itself. In my personal opinion, this is a way to reconcile Wang Lung-ch'i's view and Nieh-Lo's views within the teachings of Wang Yang-ming.

Wang Lung-ch'i had some further thoughts about liang-chih. He classified the learnings for the realization of liang-chih into two kinds. [24] One is called "making the will authentic or sincere," the other is "putting the mind itself right in its place." The former is closer to Wang Yang-ming's usual teaching.

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24. As to the learning of Wang I-an, consult Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 32, pp. 16-25, as to the sentence quoted in volume 32, p. 19.

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It means that when we know what is good and evil and when we like the good and dislike the evil, the liking and disliking should be authentic without reserve, and then the moral will become genuine or sincere to the fullest extent. "Putting the mind right in its place" means something deeper and was taken by Wang Lung-ch'i to be a higher type of learning. Here the mind itself was taken, by Wang Lung-ch'i, as a pure superconsciousness which is beyond the ordinary moral consciousness which knows good or evil and has the will to do the good or to undo the evil. For Wang Lung-ch'i, even the will to do the good or to undo the evil still belongs to the sphere of will in our ordinary moral consciousness. Yet the mind itself is just a pure superconsciousness above the sphere of will, which goes beyond any ordinary good will or evil will and also any ordinary moral will, which can do the good and undo the evil. To be conscious of the mind as a pure superconsciousness beyond good and evil and to keep its purity and superiority as a pure knowing, without any attachment to anything known as good and evil, is called "putting the mind in its right place." In this case, the mind, as pure knowing, is always void, transparent, and shines forth its light. It is also the state of the utmost good of our mind and is the reality of liang-chih fully realized. According to Wang Lung-ch'i, it is a state of mind which is aspired to also by Buddhists and Taoists. Thus the teaching of liang-chih became a teaching which Buddhism and Taoism are also based on. Since Wang Yang-ming had sometimes said that when the reality of liang-chih is fully realized, it is in a state of no good and no evil and is also the utmost good, and that liang-chih, as void or empty, is no less void or empty than what the Buddhist or Taoist talked about. Wang Lung-ch'i's thought should be taken as inherited from Wang Yang-ming. However, Wang Yang-ming did not say explicitly that there are two kinds of learning, one concerning ordinary moral will and consciousness and the other, which is above ordinary moral will and consciousness. Wang's talks with Wang Lung-ch'i and Chien Shu-shan, about his two ways of teaching, did not necessarily imply that there are two kinds of learnings, Wang Lung-ch'i claimed that there are two kinds of learnings and said that the "putting the mind in its right place" where man has no ordinary moral will and consciousness, as the higher kind of learning where Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism meet, was plainly a further development of Wang Yang-ming's thought and emerged from his implicit dissatisfaction or implicit criticism of Wang Yang-ming's teaching.

VII. Wang I-An's Thought About The Will As A Directive Principle Of Moral Mind To Supplement Wang Yang-Ming's Teachings
Besides the Che-tung school and the Chiang-yu school, there was the T'ai-chou school, which was the most influential of all the schools of Wang's disci-

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ples. The founder of this school was Wang Hsin-ts'ai who had taught and practiced Confucian teaching before he met Wang Yang-ming and who argued with Wang Yang-ming at their first meeting. Although Wang Hsin-ts'ai submitted himself to be Wang Yang-ming's disciple, he insisted upon his theory of ke-wu, which was quite different from Wang Yang-ming's. This is proof that he was still dissatisfied with some elements of Wang Yang-ming's teaching.

In the following, I shall not discuss such other thinkers of the T'ai-chou school as Lo Chin-ch'i and Li Ch'o-wu, and I shall not discuss whether they were on the same line of thought as Wang Yang-ming. Instead, I will bring up Wang I-an, who said explicitly that the teaching of ke-wu or the "investigation of things," and the teaching of ch'eng-yi or "making the will authentic," should be combined with Wang Yang-ming's teaching about the realization of liang-chih. Wang Yang-ming's idea of will was then reexamined and clearly defined by him, and this is actually a supplement and a further development of Wang Yang-ming's thought. Wang I-an's emphasis on the will is also a reversal of Wang Lung-ch'i's underestimation of will.

In Wang I-an's thought, the will should be regarded as a directive principle of the knowing mind. He said that the mind as knowing is void, transparent, and also responsive. Yet, the will, as immanently contained in the mind, has its definite direction. [25] His thought may be taken as being derived from Wang Yang-ming's thought about the "liking good and disliking evil," which are the moments of feeling, or will, or liang-chih. The "liking good" is directed to the good and the "disliking evil" is directed to the good, too. Hence both the "liking good" and the "disliking evil" have the same definite direction. Yet Wang I-an did not merely consider the will as a moment of liang-chih. It is the directive principle of liang-chih as knowing. Wang I-an knew, also as did Wang Lung-ch'i, that the mind or liang-chih as pure knowing may exist in a state which is void and transparent, in which nothing is known even without any motivative idea or will, either good or evil. Yet, Wang I-an said that even in this state, as the mind is responsive also, there is the self-creating of the mind, or liang-chih as pure knowing. The self-creating is the very intention or will immanent within the mind, or liang-chih as pure knowing.

For the full understanding about Wang I-an's thought of the will, we have to remember that Wang I-an had the teaching of the T'ai-chou school as his background. As I said before, Wang Hsin-ts'ai, the founder of the T'ai-chou school never adopted the theory of ke-wu as taught by Wang Yang-ming. Wu, for Wang Hsin-ts'ai, includes one's self, one's family, one's country, and the world under Heaven, as objective things. Ke-wu means for him to will the peace and happiness of oneself, of family, of the country, and of the world, for the realization of the utmost good. Hence, in Wang I-an's thought, the

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25. As to the learning of Wang T'ang-nan, consult Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 5.

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will as the directive principle of mind is immanent within the mind or liang-chih, on the one hand, and is also immanent in all the responsive activities of our mind and body to the objective things and to the realization of the "utmost good," on the other hand. Hence it is like a horizontal axis of our moral life from the inward mind to the outward things, and also like a vertical axis from the upward mind to the downward things.

Wang I-an's discussion of the will was intended to supplement the teachings of Wang Yang-ming. Of course, Wang Yang-ming had emphasized "making the will authentic." But as Wang did not differentiate this from '"realization of liang-chih," there was a certain ambiguity in his understanding of the will. When Wang Yang-ming talked about "making the will authentic," the will meant a transcendental moral will, which likes good and dislikes evil, existing in a higher level above the ordinary empirical will or motivated ideas, which may be either good or evil. Yet, in Wang Yang-ming's famous "Four-sentence Teaching," where he stated that "sometimes good and sometimes evil is the movement of the will," it is plain that this will is just the ordinary empirical will or motivated ideas. This ambiguity of "will" is a serious defect in Wang's teaching, indicating that Wang did not have a profound and definite understanding of the moral will of a higher level than that of the ordinary empirical will. When Wang Lung-ch'i later taught that the will has to be transcended, in his teaching of "putting the mind in the right place," the word "will" also meant primarily the empirical will which is sometimes good and sometimes evil. For these kinds of will, Wang Lung-ch'i may be quite right in saying that they must be transcended or even banished from the mind. Still, as the moral will is on a higher level, there seems to be no reason to banish it from the mind, and it is very doubtful also that it can be transcended on the way to one's becoming a sage. If it is transcended as the ordinary will is, then the moral consciousness and the moral life may be wholly corrupted, and man will fall down to a level of moral indifference as a first step, letting immoral actions go freely, leading himself ultimately to immoral being. So, the consequences of this ambiguity in the meaning of "will" in Wang Yang-ming is very serious. It is Wang I-an who elucidated the meaning of the will and used it to denote the principle within the mind, which is directed to the good or utmost good only. It is then a pure moral will, transcendental to the ordinary empirical will, and nothing else. Wang I-an's insistence on the "will as directed to the good only" is to save the idea of the "will" and the idea of the "good" as well. When Wang Lung-ch'i taught that our will may be good or evil and has to be transcended, he also taught that the idea of good and evil has to be transcended also, stressing the state of mind which is beyond good and evil as the highest state of mind, which he considered to be the highest good. Of course, when Wang Lung-ch'i talked about the utmost good, he still did not forget the idea of good. How-

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ever, the term "utmost good" may be taken as an attributive term. What is attributed to is a state of mind, which is beyond good and evil. This state of mind itself may be nothing other than a supermoral state of mind, and then can be criticized as nonmoral, and its conceived neutrality may lead men to be immoral also.

VIII. Wang T'ang-Nan's Thoughts About The Pre-Heaven Nature And Its Relation To Pure Knowing And "Constant Will"
Wang I-an's thoughts about the ideas of "will" and "good" are all very important, both historically and philosophically, yet his sayings were not very elaborate. The relation of his will with the other aspects of mind was left unclear. It was Wang T'ang-nan of the Chiang-yu school who presented the will as the directive principle of our present mind, originating from the nature of the mind, and connected it with the other aspects of the mind, carrying the "learning of will" of Wang I-an further. This development also opened the way for later criticisms of Wang Yang-ming.

Wang T'ang-nan, [26] very much like Wang I-an, viewed the will as always existing in our mind. But it was taken by him to be the silent, self-constant-knowing of the mind with its constant creativity. As such, the will neither rests nor moves, neither rises nor falls. What rests and falls or moves and rises successively is called nien. The ordinary empirical will or motivated idea, which continuously moves and rests or rises and falls in our mind, was downgraded by him to nien, which, as attached to definite things, is merely certain solidified or dissipated expressions of will in a lower level of the mind. Hence, there are two distinct terms to differentiate the two types of will in Wang T'ang-nan's thought, and only the will which exists above the empirical will be called "will." Thus, the ambiguity of meaning of the word "will" in Wang Yang-ming's thought was definitely removed, and the underestimation of will by Wang Lung-ch'i remedied.

Wang T'ang-nan also connected the idea of the will with the idea of nature. The meaning of nature was not thought of by him to be merely identical with the idea of mind's knowing or willing. There are some subtle differences between them. Wang T'ang-nan sometimes sighed that the "learning of nature" was lost. He thought of Nature as the source of the revealed creativity of the mind. Nature as source is thus transcendent and different from what flows from it. Lo Cheng-an's thesis of the difference of mind and nature seems to be restated now in a new form with a deeper significance. Wang T'ang-nan said sometimes that nature is the "pre-Heavenly" and could not

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26. As to the learning of Li Chien-lo, consult Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 31.

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even be talked about. As I understand it, "nature" for Wang T'ang-nan has to be understood primarily as a name to point out that the present mind and its constant knowing and willing has its transcendental source, which is not given. The mind's knowing, as originating from its source, is the son of the pre-Heaven, and mother of what follows as post-Heaven. This means that the mind's knowing is the primary connecting link between the pre-Heavenly nature and what flows from the knowing is post-Heavenly -- the will with its solidification as nien. Thus, the will as constant-knowing, with its constant creativity, is directly originated from and expressing its source or nature, as transcendent. Hence, nature has to be posited as transcendent on the one hand, and has to be thought of as immanently expressed in the very constant-knowing and willing of the mind on the other hand. Thus there is an identity in difference between nature and the mind's will. Nature as the source of the mind's will should not be understood merely as a totality of objective principles or as one great principle of the universe with its differentiations into secondary principles, as Lo Cheng-an thought. Nature as the source is nothing less in content than the mind, which constantly knows all objective principles. Hence, the source is not merely the source of the objective principles known, but mainly the source of the mind's constant knowing or willing as pure subjectivity. If such a source has to be thought of as a principle, or as consisting of a principle, then the "hsu erh sheng," or the "creativity in the vacuum" is transcendent because it is the source of the constant expressed-knowing of the mind which springs constantly from the vacuum. Yet, it is immanently expressed in the mind's expressed and constant-knowing as the expressed will of the mind. The constant creativity in constant-knowing or willing of the mind is also called the "constant creativity" of "spirituality as function of nature."

From what has been said earlier, Wang T'ang-nan criticized Wang I-an's thought as being inadequate. When Wang I-an talked about the will as master of the mind, he seems to suppose that the mind is not its own master and depends upon the will to be its master. The truth is that the nature or the very creativity in vacuum expressed in the mind's constant-knowing, which masters the nien, or the empirical motivated ideas, is the very will. Thus we may more adequately know the relation of the will of the mind and the nature.

In Wang I-an's thought, the will is taken as having its direction toward the utmost good. Wang T'ang-nan said also that the good is originated from the nature of mind. They all wanted to save the idea of the good and oppose Wang Lung-chi's theory of beyond good and evil. I would like to say that anyone who really understood the moral will as directive must want to save the idea of the good. It may be true that when an ideal or a good is realized, then we may pass beyond the ideal as ideal and the good as good. But the

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ideals and goods of man and of the universe could never be fully realized, then the "idea of an ideal" and "idea of the good" can never be transcended. As the constant creativity of the mind expressed in the will is infinite and directed to the infinite good, we can never pass beyond the infinite creativity and infinite good to attain the state of beyond good and evil. Hence, the nature of mind as the source of the will cannot be thought of as beyond good either. Therefore, the thought of Wang Yang-ming and Wang Lung-ch'i that the reality or nature of mind is beyond good and evil, though attractive, is still inadequate to the nature of mind with its will.

IX. The General Trends Of Thought To Save The Idea Of Will And Good In Confucian Schools Of The Late Ming
After Wang T'ang-nan, there came a thinker Li Chien-lo, [27] a disciple of Tsou Tung-kuo of the Chiang-yu school, who criticized Wang Yang-ming's teachings frankly. He said that the only good can be our goal or the end of our moral teachings, and chih or knowing can never be this. Since Wang Yang-ming's liang-chih was called chih, Li proposed the teaching of chih-hsiu to replace Wang's teachings of the realization of liang-chih. In chih-hsiu, chih means "to attain and to abide in the good" while hsiu means "cultivation of the good virtue." The influence of his criticisms of Wang Yang-ming's teachings was very wide in the academic sphere of the Late Ming.

When Wang Yang-ming died, his school was divided into six schools, as Huang Tsung-hsi said, of which Che-tung, Chiang-yu, and T'ai-chou were the most influential. I have said earlier that there were implicit criticisms of Wang's teachings raised by Nieh Hsuang-chiang of the Chiang-yu school, Wang Lung-ch'i of the Che-tung school, and Wang Hsin-tsai of T'ai-chou school. Later, there came Wang I-an of T'ai-chou school, and Wang T'ang-nan of the Chiang-yu school, who proposed the theory of will to supplement Wang's teachings. At the end came Li Chien-lo, of the Chiang-yu school, who proposed the chih-hsiu to replace Wang's teachings on the realization of liang-chih. In the final period of the Ming dynasty, Chou Hai-men still insisted on Wang's theory that "beyond good and evil" is the utmost good, but Hsu Ching-an, a second-generation follower of the Chan Kan-ch'uan school raised ten objections to attack Chou's thought. Feng Shao-shu, another scholar of the Chan Kan-ch'uan school, said also that the central idea of Confucianism is the "idea of good" in contrast with the "beyond good" of Buddhism. [28] Hsu and Feng revived Chan Kan-ch'uan's idea of nature as good, though Chan himself did not emphasize this. During the same period, the

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27.Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 41, p. 8.

28.Ming-ju-hsueh-an, vol. 58, p. 11.

p. 186

learning of the Tung-ling school was rising. One of the founders of the Tung-ling school is Ku Ching-yang, who wrote a book called Chen-hsing pien [An Essay on the Awakening of Nature]. In this book he concentrated his attack on Wang's theory that nature is beyond good and evil, and even said that the reason this theory was flourishing is because the theory is affiliated with "the great way of the gentleman while also satisfying the selfish desires of bad men who want to find some excuse for their actions." The excuse comes from the fact that if man's nature is beyond good and evil, and all good and evil has to be transcended in the end, then the good is not good and the evil not really evil, therefore, all the evil can be done without shame.

Next to Ku there was Kao Ching-yi of the Tung-ling school who also insisted upon the good of nature. Kao revived the "learning of nature" (as good) and the teaching of ke-wu along the line of Chu Hsi, without contradicting the thesis that the mind and the principle of things are not separated. A friend of Kao's was Liu Chi-shan, who was a disciple of Hsu Ching-an and who was influenced by Li Chien-lo. Liu emphasized the idea of good and the "learning of nature" as connected with the "learning to make the will authentic," the idea of ching, or reverence as taught by Chu Hsi and Chan Kan-ch'uan. Liu's thought may be taken as a last synthesis of Neo-Confucianism in late Ming. Because I have talked about Ku, Kao, and Liu's criticisms of Wang's teachings elsewhere, I shall not repeat my opinions here.

Compared with the criticisms of Wang's teachings by his contemporaries from other traditions of Confucianism, which I have already discussed, the criticisms of Wang by scholars of his own school, by scholars of the Chan Kan-ch'uan school, and Tung-ling school, and by Liu Chi-shan, are much deeper and are internal to Wang's teachings. Their criticisms of Wang's teachings produced certain positive results to supplement what was lacking in Wang's system and ended in Liu's grand synthesis of Neo-Confucianism in the late Ming.