The debate at bsam yas

·期刊原文
The debate at bsam yas: religious contrast and correspondence

By Roccasalvo, Joseph F.
Philosphy East and West
30:4(October,1980)
P.505-520
(C) by The University of Press of Hawaii

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P.505

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

In the book, Kumbum Dschamba Ling, a volume of
Tibetan art dedicated to "the cloister of one
hundred thousand pictures of Maitreya," Wilhelm
Filchner describes the expulsion of the Chinese
Buddhists from Tibet, as it remains a living
tradition in the memory of the people in
mythological form. This event is enacted in the
Tscham mystery-dances, which are performed yearly in
the village monasteries, especially at Kumbum. He
writes:

The theatrical element in the Tscham dances, which
are brought to production in Kumbum, is presented
and portrayed through Hwaschang and the four
Atsaras. Hwaschang is surrounded... by a group of
similarly clothed children in similar masks. They
portray his students, or, according to the other
version, his children also, or indeed, boys who make
fun of the odd old man.(1)

In his study of Buddhist mythology in Tibet and
Mongolia, Albert Grunwedel further adds that the
figure of Hva 'sa^n appears in an exaggerated and
grotesque form as the representative of the ousted
ston min pa, or, party of the sudden path. He is
held up to ridicule by the children of the village
and is known among them as the monk with the
oversized stomach. In colloquial English we might
say that Hva 'sa^n is scornfully called "the
pot-bellied Buddha" (der Dickbauch-Buddha).(2)

The expulsion of the Chinese Buddhists,
symbolically represented by the Tscham dances,
determined that Tibet should not adopt the Ch'an
version of Buddhism but Indian Mahaayaana. This
event has received conspicuously little attention in
the text-books, and when it has, it is usually to
the detriment of the Chinese contingent, whose
doctrine of subitism has been grossly misunderstood
to this day. One striking example of such
misunderstanding in past history was the debate held
at bSam yas under the rule of K'ri sro^n lde
btsan--the so-called Council of Lhasa.(3) There in
the late eighth century (792-794), the Chinese
Mahaayaana Hva sa^n, a follower of the Dhyaana
school, was sternly opposed by a group of Indian
Mahaayaana Buddhists under the leadership of
Kamala'siila. According to the various Tibetan
sources, especially Bu-ston's History of Buddhism
(Chos-.hbyung), the Indian hostility is presented as
a reaction against the growing influence of the
Chinese masters who had won the majority of Tibetan
Buddhists to their cause: "The number of pupils of
the Chinese Hva-sa^n Mahaayaana increased, "(4)
Bu-ston tells us; he then proceeds to discuss the
consequences of the effectively propagated teachings
of the Chinese in whom "the Tibetans, for the
greater part, found pleasure" (192). Giuseppe Tucci
remarks in this regard that "we do not know if the
Indian party really lost a great number of its
adherents; the sources agree in

P.506

telling us that they were the minority and that only
some of the leading monks remained faithful to the
teaching of the Bodhisattva [Saantirak.sita].(5) In
any event, it is clear that the preaching of Hva
'sa^n Mahaayaana had steadily gained ground to such
an extent that the king was compelled to intervene
by staging a debate between the conflicting parties.

Paul Demieville, in his book Le Concile de
Lhasa, which Tucci rightly calls "one of the most
learned contributions to the history of cultural
relations between China and Tibet as yet
undertaken,"(6) has suggested in his "Historical
Commentary" that more than theological doctrines
were at play in the Indian-Chinese debate at bSam
yas. He writes:

That a sinophobic party had existed at the court of
Tibet, and that it had backed the Buddhists of
India, less suspicious of political compromises,
nothing [is] more likely, especially since the
rapport between China and Tibet was particularly
strained at the end of the eighth century. Across
all her history, since her origins up to our present
day, Tibet has been tossed between China and India;
its politics have always tended to safeguard
national independence by playing these powers, one
against the other ... and in favoring that which the
circumstances of the moment made appear the less
dangerous.(7)

And "the circumstances of the moment" pointed to the
fact that the Dhyaana school headed by Hva 'sa^n had
gained enthusiastic acceptance among the Tibetan
population, thereby threatening to assume
proportions which were able to stir up latently
hostile attitudes toward China. In whatever way we
understand the political sentiments involved, the
debate at bSam yas must be regarded as a historical
event of the greatest importance, what Paul
Demieville has aptly called "a major turn in the
religious history of Tibet" (183). Fortunately,
(thanks (1) to the Chinese dossier of Hva 'sa^n
Mahaayaana which was recovered in the grotto of
Tuen-huang, (2) the Sanskrit text of the third
Bhaavanaakrama, (3) the longer Tibetan version of
the latter, and (4) Bu-ston's History of Buddhism,
Part II), we are in a position today to make some
judgments regarding what occurred during this
disputation. But regarding who actually won the
debate there is no complete agreement between the
Chinese records and the Tibetan tradition. According
to the Chinese dossier translated by Demieville, the
Tibetan king decided in favor of Hva sa^n by
passing an edict in 794 confirming the doctrine of
dhyaana as taught by the Chinese party (42). The
Tibetan sources, however, speak of the firm support
given by K'ri sro^n Ide btsan to Kamala'siila and his
point of view. Bu-ston writes in his History:

Thereafter the king gave the following order:
--Henceforth, as concerns the theory, one must adopt
the system of Naagaarjuna. With regards to the
practice--one must become trained in the 10 kinds of
virtuous conduct and in the 10 Transcendental
Virtues. As to the Ton-mun views, the propagation of
these is not to be permitted! -Accordingly the
Hva-ca^n was sent back to China, and his books were
collected and kept concealed in a storehouse.
(195-196)

P.507

Tucci rightly points out in Minor Buddhist Texts
that, in an edict intended for laymen, it is rather
odd that Naagaarjuna is mentioned, for his name
signified little to the Tibetan people at large. He
concludes that it is most probable

The king did not at all intervene in an energetic
way in the debate: he attended it, followed the
course of the discussion but did not evidently have
the doctrinal preparation to be judge: most probably
he established at the conclusion of the debate that
the doctrine to be followed was the Maadhyamika.... And
this did not say very much, because neither sholar
could deny resting on that system for a
starting-point.(8)

No less a Tibetan scholar than David Snellgrove
affirms the generally held opinion that Kamala'siila
"came out the winner from the confrontation"(9) and
later composed three works(the Bhaavanaakrama) which
expound the gradualist point of view which he had
defended at the council. Even if we suppose that
Kamala'siila was proclaimed the victor, this does
not imply that there occurred an immediate
persecution of the Ch'an party. The court and the
ministers might have counselled that the doctrines
of the Indian Mahaayaana be followed, but we have no
reason to believe that steps were taken to impose
the Indian theory on the people by force of edict.
As Tucci further suggests,

The impression which one gathers is that after the
death of K'ri sro^n lde btsan there was a strong
revival of Indian- Buddhism, caused not only by the
direct instigation of the court, anxious to prevent
any further Chinese influence, but also by the
growing prestige of the Indians and the coming of
Indian aacaaryas in greater numbers than before.(10)

Despite the ambiguity of the debate's outcome, it is
historically indisputable that Tibetan Buddhism sat
at the feet of Indian Mahaayaana for its religious
tutelage.

While one cannot help but be fascinated by a
religious debate which seems to have turned into a
melodrama--with members of the two opposite parties
having recourse to violence, suicide, and
murder--the doctrinal issues, themselves raised at
the "council" are more than sufficient to focus the
attention of the student of both Buddhism and
comparative religion. The question of sudden and
gradual enlightenment, the value and disvalue of
moral selfcultivation at certain stages, and the
problem of language being employed from two distinct
standpoints, all are issues structurally analogous
to certain historical thought-trends within the
Christian context of mysticism and doctrinal
orthodoxy, faith, and works, as well as theological
precision and religious hyperbole. Within the
Tibetan context, however, such difficulties become
compounded to an even greater degree because of the
linguistic disparity between the opposing parties,
as Demieville points out in his "Introduction":

They [the Chinese party certainly did not know
Sanskrit, any more than their Indian adversaries
were familar with Chinese. The controversy must have
developed around written fragments in Sanskrit and
Chinese, with Tibetan

p.508

serving as common language for the two groups in the
oral debate whatever language had been used, some
thought in Sanskrit, others in Chinese (20-21).

Given such wide linguistic requirements together
with nationalistic prejudices, it is not difficult
to see how each side failed to comprehend fully its
opponent's point of view.

In this brief study, my interest will not focus
on the historical details of the controversy. These
have been exhaustively examined by the two great
Buddhologists, Paul Demieville and Giuseppe Tucci,
whose respective studies are models of clarity and
erudition. Rather, I should like to confine my
attention to the two standpoints represented by
Kamala'siila and Hva 'sa^n, especially since they
have been made available to us in various edited and
translated documents. Such interest in the debate at
bSam yas poses a number of striking questions for
the comparative religionist who is concerned about
the encounter of differing religious or
philosophical perspectives. The further importance
of this inquiry also becomes apparent when we
examine the writings of historians of this period.
In his book, The Religions of Tibet, Helmut Hoffmann
characterizes the standpoints of our two religious
protagonists in the following way:

The most important matters of doctrine in which
Hva-shang differed from his Indian rival were (1)
the attainment of Buddhaship does not take place
slowly as the result of a protracted and onerous
moral struggle for understanding, but suddenly and
intuitively--an idea which is characteristic of the
Chinese Ch'an and of the Japanese Zen sect which
derives from it; (2) meritorious actions whether of
word or deed, and, indeed, any spiritual striving,
is evil; on the contrary one must relieve one's mind
of all deliberate thought and abandon oneself to
complete inactivity.(11)

Judging from Hoffmann's unnuanced characterization
of Hva 'sa^n's position vis a vis Kamala'siila, one
has further evidence of the kind of misunderstanding
this debate may generate, even in the mind of a
modern scholar.

In this article I will restrict myself, first,
to an examination of the third Bhaavanaakvama as
given in the French translation by Etienne Lamotte
of the later Tibetan version, with an occasional
reference to the recent Italian translation by
Corrado Pensa (of the original Sanskrit version
edited by Tucci). Bu-ston's History of Buddhism will
act as an important apologetic commentary on the
Indian source-material. I will then turn my
attention to the Chinese dossier of Hva 'sa^n as
given in translation by Demieville. The overall
effort will be to ascertain the religious contrasts
and correspondences between our two interlocutors,
Kamala'siila and Hva 'sa^n Mahaayaana, concerning
their views of gradual and sudden enlightenment. Of
no less significance will be the endeavor of
discovering how much mutual understanding and
misunderstanding took place, and whether there is
any suggestion that they embraced (however
haltingly!) each other's frame of reference.

P.509

THE THIRD BHAAVANAAKRAMA OF KAMALASIILA

Several months before his death in 1935, the Russian
scholar E. Obermiller pointed out a new document
concerning the Sino-Tibetan controversy at bSam yas.
He had found a Sanskrit manuscript whose text was
printed on Tibetan paper at the library of the
Asiatic Museum in Leningrad. It had been brought
into Russia by the celebrated Siberian lama,
Dorjeev, leader of the Russian Buddhists at that
time. The text is attributed to Kamala'siila and
represents his side of the debate at bSam yas. As an
appendix to the book by Paul Demieville, Etienne
Lamotte translated this important treatise from its
Tibetan version (336-353), with the crucial Sanskrit
passages underlined. On the basis of the
photographic copy which Giuseppe Tucci obtained from
Leningrad and his own manuscript text, the Sanskrit
version has recently been produced,(12) and it has
been translated into Italian by Corrado Pensa.(13)
Both the Sanskrit and the Tibetan versions of the
third Bhaavanaakrama are organized into three
sections: first, there is the careful exposition of
the nature of 'samatha and vipa'syanaa with a
discussion of the objects of these two mental
operations prescribed for the yogi aspirant; second,
there is a detailed presentation of "spiritual
exercises" to be practiced by the yogin in
conjunction with 'samatha and vipa'syanaa; and
third, the controversy with Ho-chang (Hva 'sa^n) is
mentioned with a refutation of his quietism by
establishing that it is contrary to the Great
Vehicle, that it neglects essential means for
attaining enlightenment, and that it is incapable of
grasping 'suunyataa.

In the opening section Kamala'siila follows the
Indian tradition by stressing the dual mental
operations of 'samatha (stillness of mind) and
vipa'syanaa (intensive meditation with a view to
correct analysis). These two activities of the mind
are important, he tells us,because they unite all
the forms of concentration which, when practiced
assiduously, free one from bondage by destroying the
obstacles (336-1337). Edward Conze describes the
function of 'samatha in the context of yogic
meditation in the following way:

...after some degree of contentment with the
conditions of a solitary, beggarly, and homeless
life has been achieved, the mind is at last capable
of doing its proper yogic work. This consists in
systematically withdrawing attention from the
objects of the senses..And what could be the aim and
outcome of this act of sustained introversion....
All the adepts of Yoga, whatever their theological
or philosophical differences, agree that these
practices result in a state of inward tranquility
('samatha).(14)

Hence, the point of 'samatha or mental stillness is
to set the stage for the next operation,
vipa'syanaa; wherein the object of meditation is
focused efficaciously. Etienne Lamotte describes
this level of concentration as a piercing view of
insight,(15) which has as its effect a profound
penetration into 'things'. In other words,
vipa'syannaa is that mental operation within which
praj~naa occurs, resulting in an act of insight that
sees dhnrmas as they are in themselves, that is, as

P.510

transitory and deprived of substantial reality.(16)
Kamala'siila depends on imagery to describe this
level of mental achievement.

By the force of 'samatha, thought (citta), like a
lamp placed in shelter from the wind, does not
swerve from its object (aalambanaan na vicalati); by
vipa'syanaa, the brilliance of true wisdom
(bhuutapraj~naaloka) is born after the manner of a
sunrise (suuryodaya) , by virtue of reflective
examination conforming to the reality of
things(yathaadharmattvam), and all the obstacles
(aavara.na) are destroyed" (337).(17)

What Kamala'siila seems to be saying is that such
intensively analytical meditation involved in the
operation of vipa'syanaa leads to a judgmental act
of extraordinary lucidity (praj~naa) wherein one
sees the dharmas as they truly are, desires are
eliminated ipso facto, attachments to the obstacles
(sensuality, rebirth, vain speculation, and
ignorance) are neutralized, and one is freed for the
state of enlightenment.

In the second part of the first section,
Kamala'siila proceeds to a discussion of the four
levels of attainment in 'samatha and vipa'syanaa:
(1) reflections free of concepts; (2) reflections
accompanied by conceptual thought; (3) knowledge of
the proper nature of realities in which "the Yogin
attains (upagacchati) all the dharmas according to
their nature (yathaabhaavam)" (337), and (4) the
final transformation of the Yogi who "by means of
the way of meditation (bhaavanaamaarga)
revolutionizes his personality gradually
(krame.naasraya^m paraavartayati) by the production
of successive moments of purification
(supravi'suddhik.sa.notpaadaat (338) .
Kamala'siilla's terse conclusion to this portion of
his treatise is as follows: "Consequently, he who
desires to obtain the state of Buddha must practice
'samatha and vipa'syanaa; those who do not practice
them do not grasp the final goal and do not succeed
in the undertaking" (338). It is important to note
here how, from the outset, Kamala'siila insists in
true Indian fashion on discovering the way in which
the mind is structured to ascend in stages to the
ultimate level, and to recognize how this goal is
gradually appropriated by means of a process. Our
Indian protagonist emphasizes a step-by-step effort
to enlightenment and thereby stresses the importance
of concomitant psychic development through
meditational practices. In this way, the outflow of
mental defilements is gradually purified and 'the
final goal' is achieved. Kamala'siila exhibits what
might be called a picture-preference for viewing
enlightenment from the standpoint of process rather
than from the standpoint of the goal.

In the second part of the dossier Kamala'siila
provides a practical guide for the yogin by
detailing the order of spiritual exercises to be
followed for the attainment of 'samatha and
vipa'syanaa. He suggests that the aspirant fix his
thought on the various corporeal forms of the
Tathaagata, and then, by examining their coming and
going, realize that "they are empty of own-being
(svabhaava-;suunya) and deprived of Me and Mine
(aatmaatmiiyarahita)" (339). It is vipa'syanaa which
achieves this correct analysis by recognizing that
phenomena
=====
P.511

which succeed one another serially last but a moment and
are bound to disappear, because as such they are deprived
of all autonomy, neither constituting an Ego nor
depending on one. It is also vipa`syanaa which dispells
the error due to ignorance which considers realities as
'Me' or 'Mine', thus detaching us from these fugitive
entities. Kasmala`siila's description of practices is
exhaustively detailed, including a section on distraction
and agitation during meditation with corresponding mental
forms of recreation to refresh the yogin. One is reminded
here of the Roman Catholic Doctor Mysticus, John of the
Cross whose analysis of the various stages of prayer and
spiritual purification in The Ascent of Mount Carmel are
as subtle as Kamala`siila's and, not infrequently, as
laborious.

The third and last section of the Indian dossier
deals with controversy with Ho-chan (Hva sa^n);as
Demieville points out, "the Bhaavanaakrama, in
Indian fashion,,does not make any mention either of
China or of historically determine
adversaries"(18).Kamla'siila gives a resume of the
false, quietistic dectrine of "certain teachers":

By the force of good and bad acts coming from mental
concepts (citta-vikalpa.samutthaapita-`subhaa`subha-
krama-va'sena), beings wander in transmigration,
enjoying heaven (svarga), etc., as the fruit of
their acts; but those who do not think of anything
and who do nothing are freed from transmigration
(sa^msaaraat parimucyante). Consequently (to attain
Nirvaa.na) it is not necessary to think about
anything, there is no further necessity to engage in
good practices (ku`sala-caryaa), as giving (daana),
etc.; the practice of giving, etc., has been
prescribed solely through involvement with stupid
people (kevala^m muurkhajanam adhik.rtya
daanaadi-ku`sala-caryaa nirdi.s.taa)(348).

He then proceeds to refute Hva `sa^n's alleged
position by showing that it is contrary to the
spirit of the Great Vehicle of Mahaayaana. First he
tells us that "to say that (to attain Nirvaa.na) it
is not necessary to think of anything, is to reject
wisdom which has as its hallmark correct analysis"
(348) . Kamala`siila's continued insistence that
correct analysis (which he has earlier equated with
vipa`syanaa [340]) is the root of supramundane
wisdom (praj~naa) is a valid recapitulation of the
Indian tradition of meditation; but such an
assertion is true from the standpoint of one who
stresses the step-by-step process to enlightenment,
and this is not Hva `sa^n's position at all.
Kamala`siila's debating tactics are clear: he sets up
what he claims to be Hva `sa^n's denial of a
constant in the Indian meditational tradition, and
then proceeds to deny that denial by a clever
marshalling of texts by way of refutation. His
conclusion, then, is that one "who rejects correct
analysis (bhuutapratyavek.saa) also rejeckts the
principal instrument of illumination which is called
the discernment of the dharmas
(dharmapravicayaakhyaa^m.pradhaanam eva
bodhya^ngam)" (349).

The second part of his refutation has to do with
Hva `sa^n's supposed rejection of pious practices
within the context of the bodhisattva ideal. He
tells us that "to say as follows that it is not
necessary to practice goodness, giving, etc., that
is also to destroy the Mahaayaana by casting off
giving, etc., which are

P.512

salvific means (upaaya). It is said in the AArya
Gayaa'siir.sa: 'In summary, the way of the
Bodhisattva involves two things... salvific means
and wisdom' " (349) . Once again, Kamala'siila
attempts to refute Hva 'sa^n's so-called libertine
view of the Indian tradition with regard to works by
denying Hva 'sa^n's denial of a constant in the
Great Vehicle; once again, one must remark (by
anticipation) that such a gross oversimplification
does not truly represent Hva 'sa^n's position at
all. In fact, as a careful examination of the
Chinese dossier will show, our Chinese protagonist
explicitly recognizes the importance of good works
as well as the need for mind-cultivation, even in a
gradualist's sense, but all from the standpoint of
the process, not from that of the absolute goal.

Such misunderstanding of Hva 'sa^n continues in
Bu-ston's History of Buddhism in an even more
exaggerated fashion. We are told that the followers
of Hva 'sa^n "favored nihilistic views and did not
exert themselves in the practice of virtue,
saying:--By acting according to the Doctrine, by
virtuous acts of body and speech, one cannot become
a buddha. One attains the state of the latter by
abiding in perfect inactivity" (192). According to
Bu-ston, Hva 'sa^n makes a vain effort to marshall
evidence for his unorthodox views by turning to the
'Satasaahasrikaa and other suutras to demonstrate
that "action according to the Doctrine was
unnecessary, and that it was sufficient to abide in
a state of deep sleep" (192). However, when he sees
that the Sa^mdhinirmocana Suutra contradicts his
conduct and views, we are told by Bu-ston that Hva
'sa^n "cast it away with a kick" (192). The overall
impression that the Tibetan commentator wishes to
leave his reader is patently clear: Hva 'sa^n is not
only the purveyor of false doctrine, he is also
malicious. This becomes clearer in Bu-ston's account
of how the Chinese representatives reacted after the
king gave the order that the Indian school of
Buddhism was to be followed: "(the Chinese party)
were enraged, armed themselves with sharp knives and
threatened to kill all the Tsen-min-pa (the
adherents of the Bodhisattva)" (192). As the final
proof of Hva 'sa^n's viciousness, and with details
that appear to come straight from the Tibetan
tabloids of the day, Bu-ston tells us that "four
Chinese butchers, sent by Hva-Ca^n, killed the
teacher Kamalaciila by squeezing his kydneys" (196).
According to A. K. Warder in his book, Indian
Buddhism, Kamala'siila "was murdered, apparently, by
followers of the ancient Tibetan religion."(18)
Whatever may be the historical truth, it is clear
that by the time Bu-ston writes his History of
Buddhism, Hva 'sa^n's antinomian character has
become proverbial. This supposed extra legem
attitude of Hva 'sa^n is demonstrated in the only
speech which Bu-ston permits him in the account of
the debate at bSam yas:

If one commits virtuous or sinful deeds, one comes
to blissful or to evil births (respectively). In
such a way the deliverance from Sa^msaara is
impossible, and there will always be impediments to
the attainment of Buddhahood. (The virtuous and the
sinful deeds) are just like white and black clouds
which alike

P.513

obscure the sky. But he who has no thoughts and
inclinations at all, can be fully delivered from
Phenomenal Life. The absence of any thought, search,
or investigation brings about the non-perception of
the reality of separate entities. In such a manner
one can obtain (Buddhahood) at once, like (a
Bodhisattva) who has attained the 10th Stage (193).

Bu-ston's presentation of Hva 'sa^n's alleged
position regarding works is surprisingly close to
Helmut Hoffmann's evaluation which has been
previously cited, though the Tibetan commentator's
prejudice leads him to caricature rather than
oversimplification. Yet through the caricatured
position one can gain some insight into why such
misunderstanding occurs. Bu-ston, like most
commentators who are unsympathetic to Ch'an
Buddhism, fails to understand the experiential
direction of Ch'an language. In their efforts to
calm the mind so that the reality of the
Buddha-nature can be apprehended, the Ch'an masters
insist that intellectual analysis can only scratch
the surface but cannot get at this most fundamental
reality. Furthermore, in any conscious thought or
deed there is the ego at work, making for the
distinction between subject and object. Such
conscious polarities beget karman, which ties one
down to the recurrent cycle of birth and death,
while deeds breed attachment to external goals
including enlightenment. Hence, when Hva 'sa^n
speaks disparagingly of "virtuous and sinful deeds"
and urges that one have "no thoughts and
inclinations at all," he is exhorting such practices
from the point of view of the goal, which sees
Ultimate Reality as inconceivable in thought and
inexpressible in word and deed.

According to Bu-ston's account, Kamala'siila argues
that Hva 'sa^n's literal renunciation of all
spiritual activity is precisely calculated to render
impossible the attainment of praj~naa:

Thou sayest thus that one ought not to think about
anything whatever. But this means the negation (or
rejection) of the Highest Analytic Wisdom
[vipa'syanaa] likewise. Now as the latter represents
the foundation of the Divine Wisdom [praj~naa] of a
Saint, the rejection of it necessarily leads to the
negation of this sublime Transcendental Wisdom
(193).

Kamala'siila has argued incisively and within the
Indian meditational school of step-by-step process
toward the goal, but he has missed the point Hva
'sa^n has been trying to make. Kamala'siila's
disciple, J~naanendra, is no less obtuse to the
Chinese party's point of view. He goes still further
in misunderstanding and suggests that Hva 'sa^n's
approach is tantamount to the passivity of slumber:
"If we admit your point of view, it follows that...
mental training is not required, and the knowledge
of the worldly matters is unnecessary. But, in such
a case, how can the knowledge of everything
cognizable be attained? If you do nothing and only
sleep, you will not even take food and thus die of
hunger!" (195). According to Bu-ston, the Chinese
party (Ton-mun-pa) were unable to answer and
declared themselves the losers by presenting the
wreath

P.514

of flowers to Kamala'siila; the king then ordered
that henceforth no one should regard the teachings
of Hva 'sa^n Mahaayaana, and the writings of the
vanquished party were collected and put under lock
and key.

Despite Bu-ston's rather biased and exaggerated
presentation of what went on at the debate at bSam
yas, is there any indication from the third
Bhaavanaakrma that Kamala'siila might have grasped,
however briefly, Hva 'sa^n's point of view? There
are certain remarks he makes at the end of the
Sanskrit dossier which would suggest an affirmative
answer. After addressing himself to the question,
how it would be possible to know the absence of the
own-nature of dharmas as well as the memory of one's
former existences, he answers that "without correct
analysis (bhuutapratyavek.saa) , to practice the
absence of memory and the absence of reflection
(asm.rty-amanasikaara-bhaavanaa) , is to practice
foolishness" (351) . Though Kamala'siila has
maintained this critique from the point of view of
the process, for a moment he qualifies his
accustomed position by admitting that "from the
absolute point of view (paramaarthata.h), one may
speak of the absence of memory (asm.rti) and the
absence of reflection (amanasikaara) " mine.gif border=0 align=middle> (352). But he continues to maintain that this
necessarily must be preceded by correct analysis.
Actually, this latter position is not that different
from the position which Hva 'sa^n himself
articulates toward the end of the Chinese dossier,
though our Chinese representative will also insist
that from the Ultimate point of view there are so
such dualities as process and goal, striving and
achievement, purification and attainment, and that
finally, the time element is completely transcended
in the totality of the enlightenment experience.

That neither Kamala'siila nor Bu-ston caught the
full flavor or subtlety of this standpoint was of
decisive significance for the history of Tibet. To
what extent the Indian side of the debate is to be
judged as deliberately culpable in its rejection of
Hva 'sa^n's arguments, the reader can better
ascertain from the Chinese dossier itself.

THE CHINESE DOSSIER AND HVA 'SA^N'S DEFENSE

What was the doctrinal position which Hva 'sa^n
defended in the Chinese dossier, and which eluded
his Indian opponents? We have seen in Kamala'siila's
third Bhaavanaakrama that the Chinese master is
accused of the repudication of those meditational
constants ('samatha and vipa'syanaa) which are the
sine qua non for the attainment of wisdom leading to
enlightenment. He is also accused of rejecting the
practice of virtuous means (upaaya) which are
required for the path of the bodhisattva. Bu-ston
charges him with indifference to human actions to
the point of antinomianism, further suggesting that
such laxity accounts for his vicious activity after
his complete defeat in the debate. A careful and
unbiased reading of the Chinese dossier reveals
another image of Hva 'sa^n, one which contradicts
the caricatures and oversimplifications of hostile
commentators and historians. What the Ch'an master
affirms, even if

P.515

somewhat diffusely, is that from the Ultimate level
of truth, enlightenment does not take place in a
step-by-step process but is given totally, in that
sense, 'suddenly'. Such bodhi is beyond discursive
reasoning, states of quietude, correct analysis, or
the polarities of evil and virtuous actions, for
these have all been experienced and are now
transcended in the firm realization of the final
goal. In fact, such notions and activity are
therapeutically valuable only during the initial
phases of the yogin's spiritual process toward
enlightenment. However, from the standpoint of the
Absolute, nothing can be said about it, nor can
anything be done about it. As Edward Conze rightly
points out in characterizing the Ch'an school, "Any
exertion put forward in favour of the Unconditioned,
results only in useless toil. Any idea we form of
the Absolute is ipso facto false.... This
'Absolute', which forms the object of a provisional
and ultimately untrue thought, is then, in religious
prjctice seen side by side with the conditional
world."(19)

Given this picture-preference for viewing things
from the ultimate level of truth, it is no wonder
that Ch'an Buddhism is reluctant to speculate
metaphysically and is averse to theory and intent on
the abolition of reasoning. Direct insight is valued
more highly than the intricate network of subtle
thought constructed, for example, by Kamala'siila.
Hva 'sa^n is no exception to this Ch'an
thought-trend. In the Chinese dossier, he constantly
inveighs against the snare of notions, invoking the
scriptural authority of the La^nkaavataara Suutra to
evidence his position: "It is said in the
Ln^nkaasuutra: 'In my teaching there is the
elimination of differentiated knowledge of what is
knowable, which is called nirvaa.na'. It is not said
that the path of nirvaa.na is the Triple vehicle"
(66). To the objection of the Indian opponents that
one obtains peaceful contemplation only after being
exercised in examination which is a "gradual
practice" and that "the gradual door [is] what the
Buddhas teach" (73-74), Hva sa^n replies incisively:

The notion of'gradual' and 'sudden' of which you
also speak are only notions of beings' spirit, false
notions of things seen. That is why the suutra says:
"It is necessary to abstain, Mahaamati, from views
of gradual and sudden, in what concerns the
particularities of combinations of causal
activities." If one abstains from every notion and
false notion,'gradual' and 'sudden' are not to be
found... one thing alone is of import, to suppress
false notions (75).

Hva 'sa^n's repeated citation of the La^nkaavataara
Suutra is consonant with this Mahaayaana text's
affinity with the Ch'an tradition. In A History of
Zen Buddhism, Heinrich Dumoulin, S. J., suggests
that

The conspicuously irrational character of this sutra
demonstrates its close relationship to Zen. Possibly
the obscure allusions and the odd replies may have a
function similar to that of the Koan in Zen, namely,
to unmask the inadequacy of reason (emphasis
mine).(20)

It is in his efforts to 'unmask' the insufficiency
of reason that Hva 'sa^n resorts to the use of
paradoxical language which comes remarkably close to
the

P.516

pithiness of a koan: "to see that notions are not
notions at all is to see the Tathaagata. To
understand that thought well is of such merit that
all the merits which are acquired in practicing
goodness during numberless periods are not worth the
merit of that unique thought" (76-77). The defect of
notions, of discursive thought in general, is that
they have the power to "obstruct original
omniscience" (77), and that is why Hva 'sa^n insists
that if one is to return one's vision to the source
of the spirit, one "is not to reflect even on
non-reflection" (78). What the Chinese master has in
mind here is Ch'an's intuitive method of spiritual
training aimed at the disclosure of the original
reality an Buddhanature within the innermost
recesses of the individual. This reality is as
Kenneth Ch'en points out, "the fundamental unity
which pervades all the differences and particulars
of the world. This reality is called the mind, or
the Buddha-nature that is present in all sentient
beings."(21) Hva 'sa^n, along with the Ch'an
masters, insists that this apprehension does not
mean the acquisition of something new; rather, it
means only the realization of something that is
always present. The problem is that the aspirant to
bodhi is not aware of this because of his ignorance
and folly, especially demonstrated in the
ratiocinative process of conceptualization. In fact,
Hva 'sa^n stresses that all the buddhas who were
disengaged from every thought of what is graspable
and ungraspable were "without thought and without
reflection, as s clear mirror"(83).

It is important to note here that Hva 'sa^n is
not denying the need for these mental practices at a
certain stage in the process. In fact, he explicitly
recognizes the 'gradual' point of view (even if
grudgingly), as represented by Kamala'siila and the
Indian meditational school. But he consistently
claims priority for viewing things from the
standpoint of ultimate truth:

From the point of view of the essence of things,
they escape the word. For whoever is grounded in the
essence of things, the necessity and the
nonnecessity, being and non-being, identity and
difference-all that is ungraspable.... It is spoken
of in the suutras... of the necessity (of practicing
the perfections) for beings of obtuse faculties; for
those whose faculties are sharp, the discussion of
necessity or non-necessity is not discussed. All the
same, medication is necessary for the ill person,
the boat is necessary for one who wishes to cross a
river; but for the healthy man, it is not a question
of saying if medicine is necessary or not; for one
who has crossed the river, the boat is no longer
necessary (86-87).

Still later, quoting the La^nkaavataara Suutra
again, Hva 'sa^n asserts that the six paaramitaa
"are accomplished automatically as soon as one is
capable of being without reflection, without
examination" (88). in a footnote to this passage,
Paul Demieville remarks that "one will notice here
the explicit acknowledgement of the value of works"
(88), on the condition that the spiritual aspirant
does not engage in them solely out of interest in
the rewards such practices bring. What is of supreme
importance here is the purport of Hva 'sa^n's
assertions which have so frequently been
misunderstood. He did not intend to say that no
preparation was necessary nor that enlightenment was
won

P.517

suddenly or automatically; as if these latter two
adverbs were commensurate with the expression,
"easily and in a very short time." More
significantly, throughout the Chinese dossier Hva
'sa^n has laid stress on the common Buddhist truth
that bodhi occurs in a timeless moment, that it
transcends time and, in that sense, our own doing
(whether of thought or action) which takes place in
time. In other words, it just happens, without the
mediation of any finite influence or condition. It
is, as Edward Conze describes it, a totally "free
event."(22) It is not the gradual accumulation of
meditational merit or virtuous practices which
causes enlightenment, but an unpredictable act of
recognition. All this teaching is, in its essence,
irreproachably orthodox.(23)

In commenting on the La^nkaavataara Suutra in
his book, On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, D. T. Suzuki
makes some remarks which are applicable also to Hva
'sa^n's thought-trend. Suzuki writes:

Sa^mbodhi or enlightenment looks more toward the
cognitive aspect of the revulsion (paraav.ritti) one
experiences. This is all well as far as it goes,
which is indeed the basis of all Buddhism, be it
Hinayana or Mahayana. The La^nkaavataara, however,
has come to see that the whole of the Buddhist life
is not in merely seeing into the truth, but in
living it, experiencing it, so that there will be no
dualism in one's life of seeing and living: seeing
must be living, and living seeing, with no hiatus
between them, except in language.(24)

Hence, when Hva 'sa^n suggests that "what is called
the perfection of wisdom... is that which does not
admit either of notion or appropriation, abandonment
or attachment" (90) , in the spirit of the
La^nkaavataara he is moving beyond 'the dualism' of
existence in seeing and living. Or again, when, in
almost koan fashion, he urges that "to practice all
the practices is not to practice them at all" (67),
he is by no means preaching a slovenly antinomian