The First Systematizations of Buddhist Thought in China

·期刊原文
The First Systematizations of Buddhist Thought in China
By Leon Hurvitz
Journal of Chinese Philosophy
V. 2 (1975)
pp. 361-388
Copyright 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

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p. 361

The delineation of the early stages of a religion, whatever the sense in which that phrase is meant, is marked by certain difficulties, whatever the religion, the place or the epoch. The reasons are obvious. First, what happens to the religion in the course of time is something that the founder(s) could not foresee, that in the majority of cases he (she, they) never even intended. When an adherent of the religion in question undertakes to set down the history of his movement -- and that too will differ in meaning with the individual(s), it does not occur to him that the original movement was qualitatively different from the movement as he himself knows it. If it were different, he tells himself, that could mean only one thing: my contemporaries and I are being disloyal to a sacred tradition. It stands to reason, thinks he, that he and his fellows are not the equals of their ancestors, but the thought that they may be disloyal is an intolerable one. Second, the adherents of any religion are convinced that their beliefs correspond, to the extent that that is possible in the case of man with all his frailties, to objective truths; that the doctrines of their religion are not just one set of views among others. The conclusion to be drawn is that the proper contemplation of these truths, conducted in the proper manner (and the method is usually prescribed by orthodox tradition), must lead to an intuitive view of them, subject, of course, to enormous differences in the natural endowments, the spiritual dedication, the degree of inspiration, etc., of the contemplator. For these two reasons, the pious reconstructor, while admitting that he may be ignorant of many details of fact, date, person and event, is convinced that he knows the history even before he undertakes his labours.

This gets complicated when the religion in question is an imported one. The added dimension is usually one of two kinds. The convert -- the early Greek Christian, for example -- may tell himself that the Truth in question was originally revealed to another nation (in this case, the Jews), then transmitted by a member of that nation (Paul of Tarsus) to other nations as well. He may, on the other hand -- and this is what we are dealing with

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here, tell himself that the Truth in question needs no revelation, since a person with the proper intuitive faculties will understand it by himself, provided only that he make the proper efforts, accompanied by the proper spiritual devotion. For the Chinese until into the early twentieth century, for many Chinese at the very time of writing, the pronouncements of the Sages (sheng [a]) were not merely a reflection of the latter's ideas, but a verbalization. to the extent that that is possible, of objective truths. When Buddhism comes into China, the educated Chinese who comes into contact with it either rejects it, on the grounds that it contradicts the pronouncements of the said Sages, or accepts it on the grounds that it corroborates them.

Occidentals, including religious believers, tend to think in terms of Founders, but even there, in orthodox usage, the word refers more to spiritual ancestry than to organizational authority. As one comes closer to the present, however, the word tends to connote even in the religious realm more and more of what it conveys in the secular, i.e., the person who laid the foundation for an organization. That is emphatically not what is meant in the present context. The Chinese word, in fact, is tsu [b], whose classical meaning (though not its original meaning) is 'ancestor'. Later on, when Chinese Buddhism came to be characterized by discrete schools and denominations, the word came to refer to the lineal master of a succession of monks, whose relation to them was the monastic counterpart of a father-son relationship in secular life. At this time, however, the 'ancestor' was the first person who, so far as was known, formulated (usually in writing) the ideas to which the school in question attached the greatest importance. There was a monastic 'family tree' mentality involved here. Just as a gentryman would wish to trace his ancestry back as far as possible to personalities as renowned as possible in imperial service and in secular scholarship, so the learned monk would wish to trace his school back as far as possible to monks renowned for piety or scholarship or, hopefully, for both. Given the modest beginnings of Buddhism in China, the written evidence was thin. Thus the sectarian would seize on any scrap, however frail, to establish his claim. Later generations of Buddhist monks in China (as also in Annam [c], Korea and Japan) would perpetuate these traditions, not so much because they believed that So-and-so was in literal fact one of the founders of School So-and-so, a relatively unimportant matter, but because they saw in him the ancestor of

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a. spiritual lineage, of a lineage of ideas, to which they themselves felt to be heirs.

In view of everything said above, it will be evident that the tradition-bound Chinese Buddhist, when dealing with the origins of the several Buddhist schools in China, is not thinking in our terms at all, least of all in terms of 'founders of sects', a misleading expression found all too frequently in the English-language literature on this subject.

It was some time before the Buddhists in China began to think about their own Chinese antecedents, and this in spite of the Chinese preoccupation with history. The reason for this is probably that it took quite a time for the Buddhist church to achieve any kind of stability in that land. By the late sixth century the necessary measure of stability seems to have been realized, for two of the best-known schools of Chinese Buddhism had their -- admittedly modest -- beginnings at that time. The schools go under the respective names of T'ien-t'ai [d] and San-lun [e], the former name being that of the mountain on which its founder established a community of monks, the latter meaning 'three treatises', Maadhyamika treatises on which the school's philosophy was based. The three treatises bear the Chinese names Chung lun [f], Po lun [g], and Shih erh men lun [h], meaning, roughly, the Treatise of the Middle, the Hundredfold Treatise and the Treatise of Twelve Divisions. The first of them, whose original does survive, bears in Sanskrit the name Madhyamaka`saastra; the original names of the other two are guesswork, possibly `Sataka and Dvaada`samukha`saastra. At any rate, all three were translated into Chinese by Kumaarajiiva, whose presumable death was in the first decade of the fifth century. These translations, as well as Kumaarajiiva's other acts as a translator and interpreter, launched the Maadhyamika school in China, the Chinese expression being the San-lun school.

We will skip over the complicated question of what happened to Maadhyamika ideas between Kumaarajiiva and Chi-tsang [i] (549-623). Everything that could be done with the contradictory information has been done with it by the late R. H. Robinson in Early Maadhyamika in India and China, pp. 162-173. Chi-tsang himself was only half-Chinese, being the son of a Parthian father. Paternal ancestry to the contrary notwithstanding, Chi-tsang was culturally Chinese, and Chinese was the only language he knew. He is reputed to have received his clerical name from the great Paramaartha (arr. China in 546), one of the most prominent of

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the translating missionaries, to whom he was presented by his devoutly Buddhist father (who himself took orders toward the end of his days). In all likelihood, chi tsang stands for `sriigarbha. Launched by his father, Chi-tsang himself entered the novitiate at the age of six. Beginning late in the sixth century and, with some interruptions, for the rest of his life, Chi-tsang was a key figure in the Chinese Buddhist church. [1]

Part of Chi-tsang's Maadhyamika activity consisted of a phrase-by-phrase commentary to the Treatise of the Middle (or, as he would have it, of the Middle View, Chung kuan lun su [j]), a work whose termini are 605 and 616, most likely after 608. [2] The work is exactly what it professes to be, a phrase-by-phrase sub-commentary to Kumaarajiiva's translation of the Madhyamaka eked out by the commentary of a certain 'Blue-Eyes' (ch'ing mu [k]). [3] As to the commentary to the first chapter of the Madhyamaka, which is the only one that concerns us here, [4] Chi-tsang outlines his treatment of the said chapter under five headings, viz., (1) general and particular (t'ung pieh men [l]), i.e., an explanation of the distinction between the treatise as a whole and its several chapters; (2) rectification of the name (cheng ming men [m]), an explanation of why this chapter has this name and not another; (3) explication of the name (shih ming men [n]), i.e., of the meaning of the chapter's title; (4) refutation and declaration (p'o shen men [o]), i.e., a description of true and false views on the subject of causation, accompanied by a refutation of the latter and a defense of the former; (5) 'sameness and difference' (t'ung yi men [p]), a delineation of a variety of views on the subject, views which, in Chi-tsang's opinion, are all correct on essentials but differ on details. Once Chi-tsang gets into his exposition, however, no. 5 proves to be dealing with 'the shallow and the profound' (ch'ien shen men [q]), i.e., with the conventional truth (sa.mv.rtisatya, lokavyavahaarasatya) and the absolute truth (paramaarthasatya), between which, be it recalled, there is on the highest level, in Maadhyamika terms, no contradiction. 'Sameness and difference' thus acquires sixth place, not fifth.

Chi-tsang's treatment being in places rather summary, the procedure here shall be to supplement his remarks with those of a Japanese sub-sub-commentator, Anchoo [r] (763-814), without, however, necessarily ascribing the views in every case to the one man or to the other. [5] Let it be stated from the outset that we are not dealing with 'philosophical history' in our sense of the phrase. The important thing for Chi-tsang, culturally Chinese

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though he was, was less historical accuracy than the establishment of a lineage of ideas, rather, of a transmission of Truth. Thus some of his personalities are hazy at best, but 'in the crunch' this would have made no difference, for the validity of an idea -- in Buddhist terms, though not necessarily in Chinese terms -- is not contingent on the identity of the person who entertains the idea. Be it also repeated that the founders of schools, to say nothing of sects, are not the issue here.

Chi-tsang begins by saying that there were three schools of thought before the arrival of Kumaarajiiva in Ch'ang-an [s]. He lists Tao-an's [t] as the first of them, then seems to confuse his categories, for he goes on, in due course, to list six others. [6] In other words, Chi-tsang's intention seems to have been to list three older ones, then the newer ones, or else three general views, then several specific ones. At any rate, whether through confusion or through copyist's error, that is not what we have, nor, for that matter, is what Anchoo had. For the latter specifies the three views as the doctrine of Original Non-Being (hommu shuu, pen wu tsung [u]), that of (Emptiness) Identical with Visible Matter (sokushiki shuu, chi se tsung [v]) and that of Mental Disengagement (shimmu shuu, hsin wu tsung [w]). Here too, however, as may be seen later, there is some overlap.

(A) At any rate, the first view to be considered is indeed that of Original Non-Being (pen wu). Something must be said about the choice of English equivalent, for, instead of 'original' one sometimes encounters 'fundamental'; 'non-existence', 'inexistence' or even 'nothingness' for 'non-being'. In a pinch, 'fundamental' might indeed be acceptable, but 'original' seems to be better, because the Chinese view, unlike the Indian one, was indeed temporal: what is older is, almost by definition, better. 'Non-existence', 'inexistence' and 'nothingness' are all, however, inappropriate to this context. For the notion seems to be one of a primal toohuu waa-boouhu, in which nothing either is or is not anything. [7] To Tao-an is attributed the following statement:

When the Thus Come One emerged into the world, He propagated His doctrine by recourse to Original Non-Being. This is why the multitudinous Scriptures of Universal Scope all make clear the original non-being of the multitudinous forms. It is in Final Being that man gets bogged down, for, if he would but commit his mind to Original Non-Being, then his varied notions would at once come to rest.[8]

While Tao-an seems to be speaking of an ideal primordial state to which man can return, if only in his thoughts, Chu Ch'ien [x] [9] seems to be saying

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merely that Non-Being is the source of Being (another reason for its superiority). Another treatise, also lost, namely, the Shan men hsuan yi [y], is quoted by Ancho as identifying 'original non-being' (it is 'original' here, not 'fundamental') with paramaarthasatya, 'later being' with sa.mv.rtisatya. Some digression is needed to explain this.

Buddhism, in most of its variations, is not concerned with objective reality, i.e., with anything beyond the reach of consciousness or cognition. [10] Most of the older schools simply say: "This is suffering; this is the origin of suffering; this is the suppression of suffering; this is the way to the suppression of suffering". In other words, whether the source of the suffering is an objective reality or not, the suffering itself is a subjective reality. The evidence of the sages, and of THE Sage in particular, is that certain contemplative practices lead to the total suppression of that suffering, namely, to liberation from rebirth. The scholastics then categorized the phenomena in a way that, in their own view, was most conducive to the said suppression, then, in the course of time, developed the involved theories that seemed to flow from the premises mentioned above. The reaction of the Maadhyamikas to the scholasticism just mentioned was to accuse it of inconsistency, to say to the scholastics, "Granted your own premises (which, of course, we do not), you cannot possibly arrive at your conclusions". The method reminds one of Achilles and the tortoise. "So the dharmas (components of existence) appear and disappear at minute intervals, do they? How interesting!" They then proceed to analyze each instant of time, at which the dharmas are alleged either to be manifest or to be suppressed, thus indicating -- to their own satisfaction at least -- that they cannot possibly move from the one state to the other. Yet the evidence of the senses unmistakeably indicates that things do move and change, and the Buddha just as unmistakeably spoke of the alternation of birth and death (sheng ssu [z] , which usually renders sa.msaara) [11] and of its counteragent, total and ultimate extinction (nirvaa.na). A man ignores the evidence of the senses only at his peril and at that of others, while no one who calls himself a Buddhist would presume to question the pronouncements of the Buddha. The answer to the dilemma is that the world of the conventional, including the findings (abhidharma) of the earlier scholastics, is not in contradiction to the absolute truth. For the latter, which is beyond the reach of thought construction, can be attained only in a state of trance, while the former is what we all experience most of the

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time. The objects cognized, however (to the extent that one can even speak of 'objects'), are not different in the two cases. It is like looking at the same object through lenses of two different colors, the colors being, in this case, those of attachment to the world, on the one hand, and of enlightenment on the other.

The above is a sophisticated idea, difficult enough for anyone to understand, particularly for one who has spent all his life in a milieu in which it is assumed, or militantly asserted, that the evidence of the senses corresponds, one for one, with objective reality. This is certainly the case where pre-Buddhist China is concerned; at least, it seems to be the case. [12] The phenomenon of transic meditation or possession is, to be sure, neither peculiarly Indian nor peculiarly Chinese. For most adepts, however, real as the trance may be, its reality is something separate and distinct from conventional reality. To the Maadhyamika, on the other hand, it is not a question of reality but one of perception or, if one prefers, of construction. [13] Before Chi-tsang, this is something that no Chinese seems to have understood; Kumaarajiiva himself was apparently unable to convey the message effectively to any member of his own immediate Chinese entourage.

Thus, what one has in China, at least at the time we are dealing with here, is either the belief that the senses are deceptive, that Reality is otherwise than as one perceives it, or the more sophisticated view that there are two realities, the one that one experiences in trance and the one that one sees every day. One version of this latter view is that, by a joint effort of all mankind, one can restore the primordial perfection of whose historical existence all educated Chinese were convinced. What no one understood is that for the Maadhyamikas the distinction between sa.mv.rti and paramaartha or, for that matter, between sa.msaara and nirvaa.na is epistemic, not ontological.

To come back to Chu Ch'ien (if he indeed is the one), Anchoo quotes the Shan men hsuan yi, which puts the following words in his mouth:

The dharmas are originally (fundamentally, essentially, foncierement) inexistent, cavernous and shapeless: this is the Construction of Prime Meaning (ti yi yi ti [aa], paramaarthasatya). The myriad beings which are produced are called by the name of the Wordly Construction (shih ti [ab], laukika.m satyam). This is why the Buddha answered the Brahmin, "The Four Great (Elements, ssu ta [ac], catvaari mahaabhuutaani) are born of Emptiness".

On a much more sophisticated level, one that is inconceivable except as the product of the direct influence of India, is the interpretation of

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'fundamental non-being' as referring to everything, including non-being itself. For, if one says that 'there is non-being', one contradicts oneself. This does not happen if one says that 'there is no(t) non-being', but then one does or does not run afoul of `suunyataa, according to how one means this latter. If one is denying its existence, fine; if one is affirming its inexistence, that is not so fine. It is not really possible to know how these Chinese understood the assertion, all the more so because there is a passage in Chuang-tzu [ad] that undoubtedly influenced them at least as much as the Buddhist doctrine. That shall now be given, first in the version of Burton Watson, then in the version, and with the comments, of A. C. Graham.

(1) ... There is being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there is nonbeing. But I do not know, when it comes to nonbeing, which is really being and which is nonbeing. Now I have just said something. But I don't know whether what I have said has really said something or whether it hasn't said something.

(2) There is 'there being', there is 'there not being'.
- There is "there not yet being 'there not being'".
- There is "there not having been 'there not yet being "there not being"'".

Suddenly "there is 'there not being'", and of 'there being' and 'there not being' we don't know which there is and which there is not. Now as far as I am concerned I have referred to something, but still do not know whether my reference really referred to something or did not refer to anything.

... these alternatives assume that we are distinguishing things of which we can say 'there is' or 'there is not'. Prior to making distinctions we can do neither, only say, "There is 'there not yet being 'there not being''". But with this we are caught in the same infinite regress as before: "There is 'there not yet being "there not yet being 'there not being'"'".

We may notice that elsewhere Chuang-tzu describes the Tao by both wu [ae] yu [af], "there is no 'there being something'", and wu wu, "there is no 'there not being something'". He is much more sophisticated than later Taoists who describe Tao simply by wu, "there is not anything". Here he rounds off his criticisms by pointing out that as soon as we distinguish yu and wu we find ourselves in the anomaly of saying yu wu, ''there is 'there not being'".

We are here on very slippery Sino-Indian ground. What Chuang-tzu seems to be saying is that there are four possibilities, viz., mere being, mere non-being, a state in which non-being has not yet come about, and, finally, a state in which the non-existence of non-being has not yet come about. The Maadhyamikas, on the other hand, [14] are denying everything without affirming anything. An hypothetical dialogue between a Maadhyamika and a brush salesman, for example, might be about as follows:

S. There are some brushes here, as you can see.
M. No.

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S. You mean there are no brushes here?
M. No, I don't mean that.
S. You aren't trying to tell me that they're here and not here at the same time?
M. No, I certainly am not.
S. You mean they're not here and not not here?
M. I don't mean that either.
S. Then what do you mean?
M. I don't mean anything.
S. Are you telling me you mean nothing at all?
M. I certainly am not telling you that.

It could go on in this way forever, provided the salesman were sophisticated enough to pose such questions but not enough to understand the answers. The Chinese, if I understand them accurately, are not denying all the possibilities but affirming them all. The denial of all the possibilities without the affirmation of any of them seems not to have suggested itself. [15] Yet, to repeat ourselves, some Chinese were going so far as to say that the affirmation of non-being amounts to ascribing being to it.

(B) The second view to be considered is the one that, for lack of a better English equivalent, we must call the Doctrine of (Emptiness) Identical with Visible Matter. This renders chi se yi [ag], the chi se standing for k'ung chi se itself the translation (though the Chinese we are dealing with did not know it) of `suunyataiva ruupam. This comes back to what was said above, namely, that the data of common experience and the truth of the inaccessibility of Reality to thought construction are not different, except in the eye of the viewer. Chi-tsang distinguishes two sub-schools, one within the Passes, i.e., in the area of Ch'ang-an, which he does not identify with any particular individual, the other of which he associates with Chih Tun [ah] (314-366). The former of these seems very close to the Maadhyamika position, for it says, according to Chi-tsang's account, that visible matter 'has no nature of its own', which is why it is stated that 'visible matter, just as it is, is empty', not that 'visible matter is empty in its original nature'. In other words, there is no contradiction between the evidence of the senses and the inaccessibility of Truth to thought construction, as said above. This is not an assertion that matter, as we know it, is but a manifestation of Emptiness.[16]

(C) The second sub-school says that 'matter, just as it is, is empty',

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which seems to me to be no different from the position of the first sub-school. I shall now summarize what Anchoo has to say about the matter, in the hope that the reader, at least, may see something that I have failed to see. Anchoo refers to the view that matter has no own-being because it is made of atoms, also to the view that it is not in control of itself because it hinges on cause and condition. In other words, matter can perish; it is not stable, hence it is 'empty'. The counter-argument is that it need not perish in order then and only then to be 'empty'; that it may exist as solidly as ever you please and still be empty, because it has no own-being, no 'matterhood', so to speak. It still strikes me that the two sub-schools are saying the same thing. [17]

(D) Next in order is the doctrine of Mental Disengagement (hsin wu yi). Actually, this is based on a misreading of a passage in a Chinese translation of one of the Praj~naapaaramitaa scriptures, but that is not relevant to the present issue. [18] The proponents of this view came remarkably close to a proper understanding of `suunyataa, only to wreck it with their conclusions. That the concept of 'emptiness' is an epistemic one they understood perfectly, but then went on to say that beyond the senses is a world of objective reality. Anchoo has some quotations that make interesting reading:

Being has shape, while non-being has no form. What has shape cannot inexist, while what has no form cannot exist. Yet the Scripture declares that visible matter is inexistent, but, when it does so, it is merely referring to the internal cessation of thought, it is not ascribing emptiness to outward matter. (Quoted from the Shan men hsuan yi.)

... the really existent exists, visible matter is genuine matter. When the Scripture says that 'visible matter is empty', its aim is merely to halt thought internally by not letting it get bogged down in external matter. If external matter is not preserved within the superfluous affects of the mind, then, if not inexistent, what is it? Can this possibly mean the inexistence of visible matter in the sense of a vast formlessness? (Quoted from the Erh ti sou hsuan lun [ai], likewise lost.)

The adherents of this point of view, while recognizing the epistemic nature of 'emptiness', did not understand that Buddhism is simply not concerned with the existence or inexistence of objective reality, of a Ding an sich.

(E) If the fourth view was materialistic, the fifth is idealistic.

The Triple Sphere is the abode of a long night, while the cognizing activity of the mind is the subjective agent of a great dream. The assembly of existents that one sees now are visions in a dream. Once one has awoken from the great dream, once dawn has come to the long night, straightway the perverse and erroneous vanish from ones consciousness, and the Triple Sphere is seen to be totally empty. At such time, there is no source whence anything is produced, yet there is nothing that fails to be produced.

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In other words, subjective impressions are all hallucinations, for there is absolutely no objective reality.

(E-F) In the case of the fifth and sixth, we are dealing with what seems to me, at least, to be the same thing said in two different ways. The fifth view compared the world to a dream, the sixth to a magician's conjurings, in both cases a congeries of sensory images corresponding to no objective reality, which flies in the face of Buddhist ideas (with the exception of those of the Yogaacaara school) no less than does the assertion of the existence of external objects. The doctrine just outlined is ascribed to a certain Tao-yi [aj], known to have been a disciple of Chu Fa-t'ai, but known for little else. Anchoo quotes the Shan men hsuan yi, which in turn quotes Tao-yi in the following words:

All dharmas are the same as magical conjurings, therefore they are referred to under the name of the Wordly Conception. The mind and the spirit, for all that, are still real, not empty: this is the Prime Meaning. If even the spirit were empty, what would the Doctrine have to propound? Who would cultivate the Path, get beyond the common and achieve the saintly? Thus one knows that the spirit is not empty.

(G) The seventh view, ascribed to Yu Tao-sui [ak], [19] bears a strong resemblance to another view treated above. Chi-tsang quotes him as follows:

The proposition that existence is due to the meeting of causes and conditions is called the 'worldly conception'; the proposition that the dispersal of causes and conditions is eo ipso non-existence is called the Conception of Prime Meaning.

Anchoo, quoting the Shan men hsuan yi, puts it this way:

Yu Tao-sui published a Treatise on the Two Truths in the Light of the Meeting of Causes and Conditions (Erh ti yuan hui lun [al]), in which he says, "Existence because of the meeting of causes and conditions is the conventional conception; reduction to inexistence is the true conception. It is, for example, just as earth and wood unite to form a house. The house, however, having no prior substance as such, has a name but no reality. This is why the Buddha declared to Raadha, 'When the signs of visible matter have been annihilated, there remains nothing to see'."

After setting forth the views just mentioned, Chi-tsang proceeds to discuss Chou Yung [am], a Buddho-Taoist recluse of the fifth century, whose precise dates are not known, and his Essay on the Three Theses (San tsung lun [an]). We set the three theses forth below, on the basis of Anchoo's restatement of them.

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(1) pu k'ung chia ming. Visible form (ruupa, se) has no own-being (svabhaava, tzu hsing [ao]), to be sure, but it does have a provisional existence (identified with 'provisional name', pu k'ung chia ming [ap]), which means that its existence cannot be flatly dismissed. For the Sarvaastivaada, visible matter has substance (t'i [aq]), for the Tattvasiddhi (Ch'eng shih lun [ar]) it has sign (? hsiang [as], representing nimitta?) but no substance, for the Praj~naapaaramitaa it has neither. Shan men hsuan yi 5 is quoted to the effect that the teacher of Chih-lin, [20] a man whose name is given now as Hsien-liang, now as Hui-liang, published a treatise entitled Pu k'ung erh ti lun, in which he said that interdependent origination (yuan ch'i, pratiityasamutpaada) and the dharmas resulting from it (yuan ch'i chu fa [at], i.e., pratiityasamutpannaa dharmaa.h) have a reality (hsing hsiang [au], which leads one to suspect that the hsiang mentioned above may be not 'sign' but 'mark', not nimitta but lak.sa.na) whether there be a Buddha or no. Yet the Scriptures say that the dharmas are 'empty'. Hence the dharmas are indeed internally empty, 'subjectless' (wu chu [av]) from the point of view of transcendental truth (chen ti [aw], paramaartha), but the existence of these very same internally empty, 'subjectless' dharmas has, from the point of view of mundane truth (shih ti, su ti [ax], laukika.m satyam, sa.mv.rtisatya), a reality of its own. A metaphor is that of the chestnut eaten out by a rodent (probably a squirrel) so that only the shell remains: no one can say that there is no chestnut, but no more can one say that the chestnut has any substance. The Chinese AAbhidhaarmikas are credited with the view that transcendental truth corresponds to Ch. li [ay] (abstract universal truth) while conventional (worldly) truth corresponds to Ch. shih [az] (concrete, particular reality).

(2) k'ung chia ming. This formulation means that conventional truth can be looked at from the vantage-point of being (in which case it is all transcendental) or from that of non-being (in which case it is all conventional). It is like touching a melon afloat on the water: if one touches it lightly, it stays entirely afloat; if heavily, then it all sinks. Provisionally existent though they may be, the dharmas have no substantial nature that can be apprehended (t'i hsing pu k'o te [ba], apraapyasvabhaava?). This is a Ch'eng-shih position: since the dharmas are born of cause and condition (yin yuan so sheng [bb], hetupratyayaja), they fall away once the causes and conditions are removed. (The Chinese traditionally call this 'emptiness by analysis', hsi k'ung [bc].) The implication seems to be this: it is either

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empty (k'ung) and nothing else or, when seen from the other angle, being (yu) and nothing else. There is no talk here of identity between the two. In a letter to Chang Jung [bd], Chou Yung says that this was Lao-tzu's position, for only the Buddha knew that visible matter, while remaining visible matter, is not being (chi se fei yu) [be].

(3) chia ming k'ung. The word is a karmadhaaraya: empty (k'ung) because conventional designation (chia ming), conventional designation because empty.

The first two are supposed to be provisional truths (neyaartha, pu liao yi [bf]), the third being the final truth (niitaartha, liao yi). In the case of view no. (1), the dharmas, while empty of own-being (svabhaava`suunya, tzu hsing k'ung), maintain their provisional existence, which is a denial of the identity of the two. In the case of no. (2), 'empty' means 'free of marks' (if indeed alak.sa.na is the meaning of wu hsiang [bg]), while 'provisionally existent' means 'falsely' existent, which is an expression of duality, not of unity. Yet the empty and the provisional are supposed to coincide (hsiang chi [bh]), which they do in the case of no. (3) but of it alone. (For Chou Yung, Buddhism was superior to both Confucianism and Taoism.)

Chi-tsang now attempts to sort out all of the above, adding his own opinions. Anchoo supplements this with further information. An attempt shall now be made to restate the substance of this material, referring at the same time to Anchoo's comments and to his mentions of other literature.

As to the non-assertion of the emptiness of provisional designations, the Scriptures say, "'Emptiness of visible matter' means a denial and a voiding of substantial reality, which is the only reason that 'emptiness' is spoken of". It is no ascription of emptiness to matter as conventionally viewed or understood. The formulation that the name 'empty' is given to what is devoid of substantial reality is the True Conception (paramaartha). The other view, because it does not ascribe emptiness to the provisional, is called the Worldly Conception (laukika.m satyam). Later persons designated this the "doctrine of the squirrel gnawing at a chestnut".

Shan men hsuan yi 5 ascribes the following statement to Hsien-liang, mentioned above, in his Treatise on the Non-Emptiness of the Two Truths (Erh ti pu k'ung lun [bi], now lost):

The Scriptures say in so many words that dharmas, being the product of cause and condition, constantly abide whether there be a Buddha or no. The Scriptures also say that the 'emptiness of the dharmas' is a reference to their lack of an inherent identity; that

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the supposition of existing dharmas, in the face of this truth, is what is known as sa.mv.rtisatya (laukika.m satyam), while the objective truth of the lack just mentioned is what is known as paramaarthasatya. In the light of the former scriptural pronouncement, it is surely out of place to speak of the dharmas as 'inexistent'. In the light of the latter, the AAbhidhaarmikas identify sa.mv.rtisatya with constituted (conditioned) dharmas (sa.msk.rtadharma), paramaarthasatya with the Four Noble Truths, each in its four aspects. [21]

Hui-chun [bj], a T'ang [bk] monk about whom not much is known, says in his Ta sheng ssu lun [bl] of which some portions are missing, [22] that the notion of the "two truths in the light of non-emptiness" was propounded by Chou Yung (above mentioned), who, on the basis of a statement in the Praj~naapaaramitaa that Subhuuti, without destroying provisional designations, preaches the real marks of the dharmas, interprets the meaning of the said scriptural passage as follows: Since the dharmas have no nature of their own, therefore they are empty. Yet this does not signify by any means that there are no dharmas. It is for this reason that provisional designations may be taken as really existent. [23]

The Shan men hsuan yi's resort to the metaphor of the squirrel gnawing at a chestnut Anchoo glosses with the following comment:

... what difference is there between this (sc. view of the Two Truths) and the squirrel's gnawing at a chestnut so that the inner meat is completely voided while the form of the outer shell exists still? The provisional designation certainly exists, yet, for want of a substantial reality, it is empty. This is why, of old, it was given the name of the "two truths in the light of the ascription of non-emptiness to provisional designations". [24]

Next, Chi-tsang raises an objection from an imaginary opponent. The Maadhyamikas assert, according to the said opponent, that 'emptiness' applies both to the lack of a permanent nature in the dharmas and to the dharmas themselves. This, says the same opponent, is surely no different from the view of the aforementioned school that asserts the identity of Emptiness with visible matter.

The answer (to the extent that I have understood it) is as follows: By sa.mv.rtisatya is meant that dharmas exist in the limited sense of representing an agglomeration of causes and conditions. By paramaarthasatya is meant that an analytical search of the causes and conditions will yield no dharmas. He then cites a parable concerning a melon floating on water: either it all floats or it all sinks. [25]

According to Anchoo, Chi-tsang's aim here is to refute the Yogaacaarin doctrine of the 'three natures' and the 'three lacks of nature' (traya.h svabhaavaas trividhaa ni.hsvabhaavataa ca). The first three are parikalpitasvab-

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haava (pien chi so chih hsing [bm]), i.e., existence as falsely imagined by ordinary beings; paratantrasvabhaava (yi t'o ch'i hsing [bn]), i.e., the objective reality of the interdependence of phenomena; and parini.spannasvabhaava (yuan ch'eng shih hsing [bo]), i.e., absolute Reality, short of all misconceptions. The second three are lak.sa.nani.hsvabhaavataa (hsiang wu hsing [bp]) the resemblance, to resort to simile, of parikalpita objects to the visions seen by persons afflicted with ophthalmia; utpattini.hsvabhaavataa (sheng wu hsing [bq]), i.e., the absence of true existence in anything that owes its apparent existence to cause and condition; and paramaarthani.hsvabhaavataa (chen to wu hsing [br]), i.e., the absence of any 'nature' in the parini.spanna in the sense that it is above and beyond any and all predication. Chi-tsang's authority, according to Anchoo, is the last `sloka in the Sa.mskaarapariik.saa, the Madhyamaka chapter dealing with the constituents of existence. The original (which, of course, was irrelevant to Chi-tsang, since he knew it only in translation) reads as follows: bhaavaanaa.m ni.hsvabhaavatvam anyathaabhaavadar`sanaat/ asvabhaavo bhaavo naasti bhaavaanaa.m `suunyataa yata.h. "The absence of own-being in all beings may be deduced from the sight of their becoming otherwise./ But there is no being devoid of own-being, whence comes the emptiness of all beings."

In other words, Chi-tsang is challenging the Yogaacaara theoreticians by telling them that the absence of own-being is in no sense a 'quality' or an 'entity'. He puts it more concretely, however:

When I say that "everything is devoid of own-being", I am not implying that you will find any particular object that is devoid of own being. The own-being is not there, and the things that lack it are also not there.

Anchoo goes on to say that Chi-tsang is also attacking the Ch'eng-shih school, but a consideration of that would take us too far a field.

On Chi-tsang's answer to the imaginary objection, Ancho quotes Chun-cheng's comments on the Shan men hsuan yi:

The Moutain School and others state that the designation of the two conceptions, that of Emptiness and that of being, in terms of manipulating a melon refers to the fact that, when the melon sinks, all of it sinks; that, when it emerges, all of it emerges; that at the time of emergence there is no submersion, at the time of submersion no emergence.

He asserts that only one conclusion can be drawn from this statement, namely, that being and Emptiness are mutually exclusive, neither leaving any room for the other.

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Next, Chi-tsang levels another attack against the proponents of 'emptiness by analysis', i.e., those who hold that Emptiness is to be explained solely and simply by the fact that a composite has no existence independent of its components. Chi-tsang's view, though he does not put it in those very words, is that atomization and annihilation are not the same thing, for the dismemberment of anything ad infinitum will not put an end to the existence of the said thing. Even if it did, this would not affect the fact that Emptiness and nothingness are not the same.

The thesis of the emptiness of provisional designations Chi-tsang ascribes to Chou Yung. "Its broad meaning is that provisional designations are in and of themselves empty." Anchoo identifies this with the first of the 'four pairs of truths'. K'uei-chi, writing much later, specifies the four in Ta sheng fa yuan yi lin chang [bs] 2 (T45.289a), but his treatment of it is laconic. A good explanation is furnished by Fukaura Seibun [bt] in Yuishiki gaku kenkyu [bu] 2.570ff. There are four subdivisions of conventional truth, of which the first and third have three names each, the others two each. There are likewise four subdivisions of transcendental truth, each with two names. They shall be given in order below.

(a) shih chien shih su ti [bv]
chia ming wu shih ti [bw]
yu ming wu shih ti [bx]

This refers to the erroneous tendency of the ordinary wordling to take the apparently external world (pots, clothes, armies, forests, living beings, and even the self are specified) at face value. Pots, clothes, and the like are no more than collections of the four elements, while armies are bodies of men; forests, of trees. Yet this reality is obscured by appearance and the abovementioned things exist, as such, only in the imagination of worldlings. Worldlings mistake them for real, and build all sorts of things on these false premises.

(b) tao li shih su ti [by]
sui shih ch'a pieh ti [bz]

This refers to the Abhidharma doctrine of skandhas, dhaatus and aayatanas, which, on the AAbhidhaarmika level, are both true and distinct from one another.

(c) cheng te shih su ti [ca]
cheng te an li ti [cb]
fang pien an li ti [cc]

This refers to the Four Noble Truths, which from the Yogaacaara point of view, are but projections of the mind (and shallow ones at that). Yet they lead men in a proper religious direction.

(d) sheng yi shih su ti [cd]
chia ming fei an li ti [ce]

This is the doctrine of the emptiness of both the dharmas and the pudgala, again, from the Yogaacaara point of view, a projection of the mind, but this time a profound one. It

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conveys the practitioner beyond the realm of conditioned dharmas, which places him, in a sense, on the paaramaarthika level, but, to the extent that he is still verbalizing, albeit in terms of double emptiness, he is still not quite out of the world.

(e) shih chien sheng yi ti [cf]
t'i yung hsien hsien ti [cg]

This, again, refers to skandhas, dhaatus and aayatanas whose concrete marks are a bit clearer to the practitioner, but which have still to be annihilated. Yet the practitioner is still beyond (a) (above), and on his way to acquiring the p.r.s.thalabdhaj~naana of an aarya.

(f) tao li sheng yi ti [ch]
yin kuo ch'a pieh ti [ci]

Here the practitioner learns to understand the Four Noble Truths and the doctrine of cause and effect, also to act on them. Moreover, his is an area of anaasravaj~naana.

(g) cheng te sheng yi ti [cj]
yi men hsien shih ti [ck]

Here the practitioner intuits Twofold Emptiness.

(h) sheng yi sheng yi ti [cl]
fei ch'uan t'an chih ti [cm]

This is the stage beyond all conceptualization, not to mention verbalization or discrimination.

The conclusion, as one might almost expect, is, for Chi-tsang and Anchoo both, a statement of the lack of contradiction between being and Emptiness, with the repeated assertion that matter need not be destroyed in order, then and only then, to be 'empty': it is empty just as it is. There is scriptural quotation to corroborate the statement.

Thus, it will have been seen that the ideas of the early 'schools' are hazy in the extreme. For one thing, no one knows of a certainty how many schools there were, what their names were, what they thought, which personalities were most representative of them. For another, what is set forth in all seriousness as the conflicting views of two schools looks -- to our (my) eyes, at least -- as two statements of the same position. When one comes to the San tsung lun, on the other hand, one seems to be dealing, at last, with three clearly delineated views. (Whether these views were, in fact, held by distinct schools is a question that can never be answered, but to the Buddhists, be it repeated, the question is not terribly important.)

The one thing that seems not to have been understood to any of the Chinese schools at issue here is that the notion of 'emptiness' has to do only with the subjective construction placed by a person on the data of experience, not on their objective reality or lack of it, which latter was of no concern to the Maadhyamikas. The Chinese views described above all

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had to do, in one way or another, with undifferentiated non-being, not with an undifferentiating understanding. For some, Non-being was in the irretrievable past, for others it was literally retrievable, for others yet it was attainable in a state of trance. For these last named, what one saw in the trance was objectively real, as long as the trance lasted. Still others would have said that reality is only what one sees in trance, the common experience is deceptive, that its data are not to be taken at face value. Thus there was a total misunderstanding of the Two Truths even on the part of those who insisted on a duality of 'truths'. What one saw every day was the objective reality called sa.mv.rtisatya, lokavyavahaarasatya (shih ti, su ti) or sa.msaara (lun hui [cn], sheng ssu), while what one saw in trance was another objective reality entitled paramaarthasatya (chen ti, ti yi yi ti) or nirvaa.na (nieh-p'an [co], ni-huan [cp], ni-yueh [cq]; ching chi [cr], chi mieh [cs], etc.); at any rate, paramaartha and sa.mv.rti, whatever one chose to call them, were two objective realities counterposed, but not hostile, to each other. Certain Chinese did say, to be sure, that matter, just as it is, is empty, that it need not wait upon its own destruction in order to be, then and only then, empty. What this seems to have meant, however, is that everything in existence has the potentiality of perishing, and will, in fact, perish sooner or later: 'empty' in that sense. This could be understood in two ways, (a) either that gross matter was nothing but a collection of subtle matter, the latter always subject to dispersal, (b) or that the particular object [26] owed its circumstantial existence to the confluence of causes and conditions. Since this confluence, like all confluences, is temporary, the object is of finite duration, hence 'empty' of any identity. Another view, that came even closer to the Indian, was that the impressions are subjective. This was canceled, however, by saying that matter did indeed have an objective existence.

The only genuinely Buddhist view to be ascribed to these early Chinese 'schools' was the one that there is no objective reality corresponding to the subjective impressions. This is a Yogaacaara view, but there is no saying how far the Chinese understood, if at all, the implications of this fact. [27] For all that, the school just mentioned insisted that the mind, for its own part, was an objective reality.

Finally come Chou Yung's three theses. They are hard to sort out because the expressions themselves are not of a crystal clarity, also because they have been overlaid with interpretations of a later date, themselves opaque

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in places, of which one can never be sure that they are accurate. The three theses seem to be these:

(1) One can say as much as one pleases, and with perfect truth, that visible matter is 'empty', i.e., that it has no existence as such. The fact remains that there are conventional concepts whose existence cannot be denied.

(2) One can view matter in one of two ways, each of which has its own validity, but which cannot both be maintained simultaneously. Either it is absolutely 'empty' or absolutely existent.

(3) 'Empty' and 'conventional' are just two ways of saying the same thing.

A gloss on all three says that only the third of these, affirming the identity of 'empty' and 'conventional', is niitaartha, while the first two, each maintaining the notion of duality till the bitter end, are both neyaartha. (On that, more later.) Although (or perhaps because) it is niitaartha, not much further comment is devoted to the third view. Some comment is made on the second, much more on the first.

The first view appears to have been the most attractive, at least to the Chinese Buddhists with whom we are dealing. Not because they really understood the relationship between paramaartha and sa.mv.rti but because this way they could have their cake and eat it too. On the other hand, they had their levels confused. Rather, they did not fully understand that the Maadhyamikas were functioning on two levels. On the lower sa.mv.rti level, to coin an expression, are the data of common experience, the constantly shifting collocations of dharmas that look to the ordinary citizen like pots and pans, automobiles and television sets, etc. Just as, even on that lower level, one can take a TV set apart to its smallest components, thus arriving at the realization that the 'set' is nothing but a collective name, a single syllable much easier to pronounce, and must less time-consuming, than it would be to list by name all of the components every time one wished to speak of the apparatus, so one can, on the higher level, dismember all of existence to its component dharmas. On the paramaartha level, however, nothing can be affirmed. The Chinese seem to have misunderstood two things, (a) They did not realize that the AAbhidhaarmikas and Maadhyamikas were judging the apparent material reality in two different ways, that for the Maadhyamikas the AAbhidhaarmika

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analysis, as well as the worldly view, was a form of sa.mv.rti. (b) They did not understand that the acceptance of provisional designations for purely practical reasons in no way implied any ascription to these latter of a correspondence to objective reality.

Ironically enough, it is the second view that comes closest to orthodox Maadhyamika: through worldly eyes one sees the data of common experience, or, at best the component dharmas; through the eyes of praj~naa one sees `suunyataa, but (and here is the difference) one sees through those same eyes that there is no difference between the two.

At their best, however, none of the Chinese thinkers with whom we are dealing could see that Yogaacaara and Maadhyamika were not saying the same thing. The former is not dealing with objective reality at all, while the latter is, albeit in a negative way. For the former, paramaartha and sa.mv.rti are the same truth seen through two different sets of lenses. For the latter the paratantra seen for what it is amounts to parini.spanna; when not so seen, it is parikalpita. Thus, though the Chinese probably did not know it, the last of the three views last mentioned is a Yogaacaara view: the conventional view is empty of reality. Chi-tsang, the convinced Maadhyamika, attacks this view, but for our purposes he is merely a recorder of earlier views. The earlier Chinese thinkers, who are the main concern of the present paper, had Yogaacaara and Maadhyamika confused with each other as much as they had the latter confused with Abhidharma.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I cannot close without giving the names of all of the following collaborators in this Chi-tsang/Anchoo project, for the findings here presented are those of all of us: Roger Ames, Sonja Arntzen (Van Nostrand), Taylor Binkley, Daniel Bryant, Neal Donner, Rosemary Haddon, Iida Shootaroo, Arthur Link, Jane Nishi, Craig Risser, Alan Sponberg.

University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

NOTES
1. An interesting aside on Chi-tsang is the comment of his biographer to the effect that, monk though he was, he had a certain taste for extravagance. The same source (Hsu kao seng chuan [ct] 11, Taishoo [cu] 50.513c-515a) notes that he was a poor ecclesiastical ad-

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ministrator, and that in his fondness for argument he had a tendency to oversimplify. He was, however, a prodigious writer and preacher.

2. For a thorough description of the Chung kuan lun su, cf. Bussho kaisetsu dai jiten [cv] 8.30f., s.v. chuukan ronsho.

3. On the thorny problem of this person's identity, cf. Robinson, ibid., p. 28ff.

4. Naagaarjuna's original, as it comes down to us, has a first chapter entitled pratyayapariik.saa, lit., 'a look round conditions', i.e., an over-all view of the issue of causation or, in other words, a Maadhyamika critique of the Sarvaastivaada position on the question. Kumaarajiiva's version renders that chapter title with kuan yin yuan p'in [cw], lit., 'the division that looks at cause and condition'. Chi-tsang, in his commentary, omits the kuan, thus arriving at 'section on cause and condition'.

5. Chi-tsang's commentary, the Chung kuan lun su, is found in Vol. 42 of the Taishoo shinshuu dai zookyoo [cx], the section that concerns us here being quite short, covering not quite the whole of p. 29. Anchoo's commentary, written in Chinese, but not always in flawless Chinese, and entitled Chuuron shoki [cy], is found in T65.92b-96c.

6. The secondary literature on Kumaarajiiva is already considerable. For a good overview, cf. Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, Buddhism in China, p. 512f. More recently, Kumaarajiiva's biography has been translated into French. Cf. Robert SHIH, Biographies des moines eminents (Kao seng tchouan [cz]) de Houei-kiao [da], pp. 60-81. One of the best sources remains T'ang Yung-t'ung's [db] history of early Chinese Buddhism (Han Wei liang Chin Nan pei ch'ao Fo chiao shih [dc]), chapter 10, devoted in its entirety to Kumaarajiiva and his disciples (Chiu-mo-lo-shih chi ch'i men hsia [dd]).
For a survey of the literature on Tao-an, cf. Ch'en, ibid., p. 515, also T'ang, ibid., chapters 8 (dealing with Tao-an himself) and 9 (dealing with praj~naapaaramitaa theories contemporaneous with Tao-an), the latter being a very important secondary source.

7. While this is not quite the same as the Maadhyamikas' `suunyataa ('emptiness', always rendered with k'ung by the Chinese Buddhists), nevertheless the resemblances are so striking as to lead most Chinese Buddhists, at least at the time under consideration here, to assume their complete identity. The Indians' `suunyataa is epistemic, the Chinese wu is ontological.

8. Anchoo quotes this from a now lost Japanese commentary to the Chao lun [de], the Jooron jutsugi [df], which, in turn, is citing Tao-an's essay on Fundamental Non-Being (Pen wu lun [dg]).

9. If indeed he is the author of this alternate view. Cf. T'ang, ibid., p. 252.

10. The Sanskrit word is vij~naana, which indicates the act of being actively conscious, a notion that cannot properly be expressed in English at all. The French do beautifully with connaissance, the Chinese less well with shih [dh].

11. Sheng ssu is a literal translation of jaatimara.na, while sa.msaara has other renditions, of which the best known is lun hui, 'the spinning of the wheel'. In most conventional Chinese Buddhist usage, however, sheng ssu = sa.msaara.

12. It bears mention that the formulated ideas of Taoism, at least what we know of them, postdate the arrival of Buddhism in China. For reasons mentioned at the beginning of this paper, when the Chinese encountered an attractive idea of Indian origin, they appropriated it, telling themselves, "Why yes! we've been saying this all along. In fact, it is not our idea at all; we owe it to the Great Sage _____-tzu! [di]". They would then, albeit unconsciously, reinterpret _____-tzu to mean something different from what he had originally meant; this would, in fact, be all the easier if ____-tzu's original statement was so opaque as not really to be understood by anyone. Thus there is no

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telling what Taoist thought looked like before the contact with India. (It is equally true that the Indian idea would also be altered, partly in order to suit preconceived Chinese notions, partly because the Chinese knew it only in translation, a translation whose accuracy they were in no position to verify.)

13. Interestingly enough, Skt. satya, usually rendered in English with 'truth', but more accurately with 'reality', is always given in Chinese as ti [dj], which does mean 'perception' or 'construction'. Ch. shih [dk] and chen [dl], both of which mean 'reality' or 'truth', usually stand for tattva.

14. It should be borne in mind that Maadhyamika ideas as such were not known in China until Kumaarajiiva.

15. Thus it seems to me that Graham is reading too much into Chuang-tzu. If I am mistaken, then there is much more common ground between the Chinese and the Indians than I suppose.

16. It remains a question, of course, in what sense the Chinese understood the denial of 'own nature' (tzu hsing). The latter renders svabhaava, 'own-being', i.e., the quality of being oneself or itself. To take a crude example, there is no applehood in an apple. In other words, nothing has any identity. To say, however, that a thing has no 'nature of its own' may not quite mean the same thing. It may possibly mean that it has a nature with which it has been endowed by an entity outside itself, that it is entirely dependent, in other words. This might mean dependent on the tao or, for a devout Buddhist, dependent on the Buddha. Given the paucity of the literature, there can be no certainty.

17. For more information on Chih Tun, cf. T'ang, ibid, pp. 254-263; Jooron kenkyuu, p. 204; Liebenthal, Chao-lun, pp. 138-143; Robinson, ibid., p. 223; p. 312, n. 9; Fung-Bodde, History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. ii, p. 249ff.; Hurvitz, 'Chih Tun's Notions of praj~naa' (JAOS 88.2., April-June 1968, pp. 244-261). The difficulty in sorting out Anchoo's meaning is due, in part, to the fact that he is a Japanese writing in Chinese. His meaning seems to be that the concept of Emptiness is a transcendental truth, but that mind and matter, while 'empty', have nonetheless a conventional reality of their own, which latter concept is usually known, in these contexts, as 'conventional truth' (sa.mv.rtisatya).

18. Cf. Ch'en Yin-k'o [dm], 'Chih Min tu hsueh shuo k'ao [dn], in Ch'ing chu Ts'ai Yuan p'ei hsien sheng liu shih wu sui wen chi [do] (1933), pp. 1-18.

19. For this man. cf. Kao seng chuan [dp] 4 (T50.350b); Zurcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China, p. 140f.; Liebenthal, ibid., p. 149; Fung-Bodde, ibid. ii. 257f.

20. This monk, whose biography is in Kao seng chuan 8 (T50.376ab), is stated to have been himself the author of a treatise on the Two Truths, one in which he delineated three theses. It is possible, though this is nowhere suggested in so many words, that Chou Yung may have been inspired by the said essay to compose one of his own on the same subject.

21. The so-called Four Noble Truths (catvaary aaryasatyaani, ssu sheng ti [dq]) are, somewhat oversimplified, (1) that the world and everything associated with it are woeful (du.hkha, k'u [dr]), (2) that the said woe has an origin (du.hkhasamudaya or simply samudaya, chi [ds]), (3) that it can be suppressed (du.hkhanirodha or simply nirodha, mieh [dt]) and (4) that there is a definite Path leading to the said suppression (du.hkhanirodhagaaminii pratipat or simply maarga, tao [du]). (1) du.hkha has four aspects, viz., (a) du.hkha (k'u), (b) anitya (fei ch'ang [dv]), (c) `suunya (k'ung), (d) anaatmaka (fei wo [dw]); (2) samudaya has four, viz., (a) samudaya (chi), (b) prabhava (sheng [dx]), (c) hetu (yin [dy]), (d) pratyaya (yuan [dz]); (3) nirodha has four, viz., (a) nirodha (mieh), (b) `saanta (ching [ea]), (c) pra.niita (miao [eb]), (d) ni.hsara.na (li [ec]); (4) maarga has four, viz., (a) maarga (tao), (b) nyaaya (ju [ed]), (c) pratipatti

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(hsing [ee]), (d) nairyaa.nika (ch'u [ef]). (The Chinese equivalents are those of Hsuan-tsang, The Abhidharmakosa, as translated by M. Louis de La Vallee-Poussin, explains as follows (vii.31-39):

(31)... les Vaibhaa.sikas soutiennent que les seize aspects existent en fait, (car ils doivent etre contemples un a un):

(i) Pour la verite de la douleur (du.hkhasatya):

(1) anitya, impermanent, parce que naissant en dependance des causes (pratyayaadhiinatvaat = pratyayapratibaddhajanmatvaat).
(2) du.hkha, douloureux, parce que penible de sa nature (pii.danaamakatvaat) (vi.3).
(3) `suunya, vide, en tant qu'en contradiction avec la vue de 'mien' (aatmiiyad.r.s.tivapak.sa).
(4) anaatmaka, impersonnel, en tant qu'en contradiction avec la vue de "moi" (aatmad.r.s.ti).

(ii) Pour la verite de l'origine (samudayasatya):

(1) hetu, cause, parce qu'ayant le caractere de la semence (biijadharmayogena). Le hetu est la cause lointaine. Le mot yoga = nyaaya.
(2) samudaya, origine, en tant que produisant (praadurbhaavayogena). C'est la cause prochiane (sa.mnik.r.s.ta): ce dont un dharma prend immediatement naissance (utpadyate) ou origine (samudeti).
(3)prabhava, causation successive, en tant que constituant une serie (prabandhayogena, sa.mtatiyogena): semence, pousse, tige ....
(4) pratyaya, en tant que realisant un effet en causation conjuguee (abhini.spaadanayogena); par exemple, le complexe (saamagrii) des co-facteurs (pratyaya) -- terre, baton, roue, corde, eau, etc. -- realise la cruche (Voir ii. 64). (l0b)

(iii) Pour la verite de la destruction (nirodhasatya):

(1) nirodha, destruction, en raison de l'abolition (k.saya) des skandhas (impurs).
(32) (2) `saanta, calme, en raison de l'extinction des trois feux, raaga, dve.sa et moha (viii.26c).
(3) pra.niita, excellent, en raison de l'absence de toute peine (nirupadravatvaat) (upadrava = du.hkha).
(4) ni.hsara.na, 'salvifique', parce que dissocie de toute cause de peine (sarvaapak.saalaviyuktatvaat = sarvadu.hkhavikaara.navimuktatvaat).

(iv) Pour la verite du chemin (maargasatya):

(1) maarga, chemin, parce qu'on le parcourt (gamanaarthena) vers le Nirvaa.na.
(2) nyaaya, raisonnable ou pratique, parce que yogayukta, c'est-a-dire upapattiyukta ou upaayayukta, muni de preuves, muni de ressources ou moyens.
(3) pratipad, obtention, parce qu'il fait obtenir correctement (samyakpratipaadanaarthena), c'est-a-dire qu'on obtient par lui le Nirvaa.na.
(4) nairyaa.nika, sortie definitive (atyanta.m niryaa.naaya prabhavati), parce qu'il fait passer au dela d'une maniere definitive.

Il y a une seconde exegese:

(i) (1) anitya, parce que non definitif (anaatyantika).
(2) du.hkha, parce que semblable a un fardeau.

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(3) `suunya, parce que vide de puru.sa (agent, etc.).
(4) anaatmaka, parce que n'obeissant pas a la volonte.

(ii) (1) hetu, parce qu'il y a arrivee de la (niruktiparigrahaat/ hetur aagamanayogeneti hi gatau hinoty asmaad iti hetu.h/ asmaad utpadyata ity artha.h/)
(33) (2) samudaya, parce qu'il y a emersion (unmajjana): le dharma emerge pour ainsi dire (unmajjatiiva) du futur.
(3) prabhava, en tant que procession.
(4) pratyaya, en tant que fondement, c'est-a-dire element essentiel de l'action de generation.

(iii) (1) nirodha, en raison de la cessation du du.hkha ancien et de la non-continuation en du.hkha ulterieur.
(2) `saanta, parce que delivre (vimukta) des trois sa.msk.rtalak.sa.nas (ii.45c).
(3) pra.niita, parce que absolument bon (paramaartha`subha). (iv.8c).
(4) ni.hsara.na, parce que supremement rassurant (iv.8b).

(iv) (1) maarga, parce qu'oppose a mithyaamaarga.
(2) nyaaya, parce qu'oppose au non-nyaaya
(3) pratipad, parce que non en contradiction avec la ville du Nirvaa.na (nirvaa.napuraavirodhanaarthena).
(4) nairyaa.nika, parce que rejetant, abandonnant le triple bhava, l'existence des trois spheres.

Puisque les anciennes explications divergent, il nous est permis de presenter une troisieme explication:

(i) (1) anitya, parce qu'il nait et perit.
(2) du.hkha, parce que repugnant a la pensee des Aryas (vi.124).
(3) `suunya, parce qu'il ne s'y trouve pas d'aatman.
(34) (4) anaatmaka, parce que ce n'est pas un aatman.

(ii) Les quatre aspects de la seconde verite: hetu, samudaya, prabhava et pratyaya, s'expliquent d'apres la Suutra (11a): "Les cinq upaadaanaskandhas (skandhas impurs, i.8a) sont chandamuulaka, chandasamudaya, chandajaatiiya, chandaprabhava", c'est-a-dire ont le chanda ( = souhait -- tr.s.naa = soif) pour racine (muula) ou hetu, cause initiale, pour cause qui amene (samudaya), pour cause specificatrice (chandajaatiiyachandapratyaya), pour cause prochaine (prabhava) ...

(37) (iii) (1) nirodha, parce que coupure de la transmigration.
(2) `saanta, parce que cessation (uparama) de toute douleur, ainsi qu'il est dit: "Tous les sa.mskaaras, o Bhik.sus, sont douleur; le seul Nirvaa.na est absolument calme".
(3) pra.niita, parce que sans superieur (anuttara).
(4) ni.hsara.na, parce que sans retour...

(iv) (1) maarga, parce que semblable a un chemin droit.
(2) nyaaya, parce que vrai.
(3) pratipad, parce que determine ou exclusif (pratiniyata): c'est-a-dire on arrive par ce chemin et non par un autre, comme il (38) est dit: "Ce chemin mene a la purete, les autres systemes n'y menent pas".
(4) nairyaa.nika, parce que separant definitivement de la triple existence (bhava).

(Quatrieme explication).

(i) En outre, c'est pour guerir les gens qui nourrissent les vues de nitya, sukha,

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aatmiiya et aatman que sont etablis les apects (aakaara) de anitya, du.hkha, `suunya, anaatmaka,

(ii) (1) L'aspect hetu s'oppose a la vue: "Il n'y a pas de cause" (naasti hetu.h). (v.7, trad.p.18).
(2) L'aspect samudaya s'oppose a la vue: "La cause est unique" - soit II`svara, soit le pradhaana (ii.64). La cause est un complexe (samudayo hetu.h).
(3) L'aspect prabhava s'oppose a la vue d'evolution (pari.naamad.r.s.ti), a la theorie que le bhaava, existant d'abord, se transforme: le bhaava commence.
(4) L'aspect pratyaya s'oppose a la vue que le monde est cree par un etre intelligent (buddhipuurvak.rtad.r.s.ti) (iv.1): les choses naissent de telles et telles causes, d'une multiplicite de causes.

(iii) (1) L'aspect nirodha s'oppose a la vue: "Il n'y a pas de delivrance".
(2) L'aspect `saanta s'oppose a la vue: "La delivrance est douleur".
(3) L'aspect pra.niita s'oppose a la vue que le bonheur des dhyaanas et des samaapattis est excellent (pra.niita). (v.7, trad, p. 18).
(39) (4) L'aspect ni.hsara.na s'oppose a la vue que la delivrance est sujette a chute, n'est pas definitive.

(iv) Les aspects maarga, nyaaya, pratipat, nairya.nika, s'opposent respectivement aux vues qu'il n'y a pas de chemin, qu'un faux chemin (mithyaa) est le chemin, qu'il y a un autre chemin, que le chemin est sujet a chute.

22. The work in question, whose full title is Ta sheng ssu lun hsuan yi [eg], is one of ten rolls, of which nos. 1, 3 and 4 are missing. The source of the present quotation is among the missing portions. What little is known of Hui-chun will be found in Gyoonen [eh] (1240-1321), Un'u shoo [ei]. For further information, cf. Bussho kaisetsu dai jiten 1.230c, s.v. un'ushoo; 7.306bc, s.v. daijooshirongengi [ej].

23. What this seems to mean is that, while the data of common experience do not exist as real entities, yet the names by which they are called are not entirely without foundation.

24. Again, to take the example of the chariot, it has no existence apart from its component parts, but no more can one say that there is no chariot.

25. I am not quite certain of what this parable is intended to convey. Below we will see what Anchoo makes of it.

26. Here again, 'matter' is a misleading term. The Chinese is always se [ek], whose original meaning appears to have been 'facial expression', hence color, hence high color or gloss, hence anything visible. The word it is rendering is ruupa, lit. 'form', i.e., visible form. The emphasis of both words is on what appears, rather than on what is. For the Chinese, however, what appears must correspond to what is. For the Abhidharma, ruupa is but one dharma among many, one subjective impression among many. For the Chinese, however, the very object is se, and this in spite of the fact that the Chinese word itself has primarily to do with appearance.

27. It should be pointed out that the first Chinese Buddhists had no knowledge of the sectarian divisions that split the Indian Buddhist community. The Buddhist doctrines and scriptures known to them were conveyed by missionaries who, although the Chinese did not know it, were all spokesmen of distinctly sectarian movements. When they heard pronouncements that could not be reconciled, they concluded that it was they themselves who, in sin and stupidity, were ascribing internal contradiction to the supremely consistent doctrine of the Buddha. Later on, before even becoming fully aware of the existence of rival schools in India, they resolved the problem by resort to p'an chiao [el]. That, however, is another story.