The Investigative Interrelatedness

·期刊原文
The Investigative Interrelatedness between
the Study of the Human Mind and Present-Day Philosophy
By Mary Carman Rose
Philosophy East & West
V. 9 No. 2 (April 1979)
pp. 189-200
Copyright 1979 by University of Hawaii Press

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Mary Carman Rose is Professor of` Philosophy at Goucher College, Towson, Maryland

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Any two areas of inquiry may be related in one of three ways. First, they may be investigatively independent, in which case neither uses the conclusions of the other and hence advance in one does not depend on advance in the other. Second, one may dominate the other, in which case advance in one depends on advance in the other, but the relation is not reciprocal. A corollary is that in this relation, conclusions of one are appropriated but not assessed by the other. Third, a relation of investigative interdependence may obtain between them. In this case advance in one depends on advance in the other and the relation is reciprocal. A corollary is that the conclusions of one are offered to the other with the understanding that they will be further assessed and perhaps revealed as in need of development, clarification, supplementation, or modification. My thesis is that the time is right for the development of a relation of investigative interdependence between the study of the human mind and many aspects of philosophical inquiry--notably philosophy of language, methodology, ontology, and metaphysics. I will examine each of these in respect to its relation to the study of mind.

I
In this context philosophy of language names the concerns and modes of investigation of language which dominated American and British philosophy in the mid-twentieth century. Thus, philosophy of language includes the work of Ayer, Ryle, and Carnap, which was primarily concerned with language construction, the working out of criteria for determining the meaningfulness, specific meanings, and adequacy of linguistic expressions, and the use of these criteria in the analysis and assessment of the adequacy of language-in-use. To be sure, from some perspectives particular instances of philosophy of language are seen to be more unlike than alike. In this context, however, what matters is that virtually without exception they all intended to dominate the study of mind. That is, without explicit attention to diverse linguistic needs and diverse occasions where we talk about mind, philosophers of language have stipulated that language used in all studies of mind be worked out and assessed by specific criteria of meaningfulness and clarity. Thus, Carnap stipulated that ideally all questions, investigative procedures, and conclusions pertaining to the study of mind will be articulated in physicalistic language.[1] Ryle's work on the concept of mind makes use only of behavioristic interpretations of such terms as "motives," "exercise of intelligence," "feelings," and "dispositions."[2] And mutatis mutandis the same holds of Ayer's verifiability principle.[3] Of course, this form of philosophy of language no longer dominates philosophical thought, while the vitiating effects of its dominance over the study of mind have not been explored.

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An alternative to the dominance of the philosophy of language over the study of mind is an explicitly fostered investigative interdependence between the two areas. The philosopher of language who fosters this relation does not make a priori prescriptions concerning the linguistic needs and usages of inquiry concerning mind. He attempts, rather, to discern and to supply the de facto linguistic needs of the latter. But he will also consult with the investigator of mind concerning the adequacy of his prescriptions. And, for his part, the investigator of mind fosters the relation of investigative interdependence when, being aware of the advantage to him of using linguistic expressions the meaningfulness, specific meanings, and clarity of which can be demonstrated, he consults with the philosopher of language.

Unrecognized instances of investigative interdependence between inquiries concerning mind and philosophy of language are not far to seek. For example, some decades ago operationalism played an important role in the study of mind. As a result there was a development in the concept of operationalism which led to a distinction between radical operationalism and a modified form of the latter.[4] The modified operationalism, unlike radical operationalism, permitted operationally defined terms to refer to subjective experiences and subjective states. Hence, it gave to subjectivity a role in inquiry concerning the mind. Thus, there was an investigative interdependence between operationalism and particular studies of mind in which it has proved useful. From
the outset radical operationalism was helpful in studies of delimited aspects of mind. It became apparent, however, that for use in some aspects of the study of mind, radical operationalism required modification. And the nature of this modification was determined by progress in the study of mind, which radical operationalism helped to achieve.

The modification of operationalism was a spontaneously achieved investigative interdependence between philosophy of language and the study of mind. For both philosophy of language and the study of mind, however, a desideratum is an explicit fostering of this relation. The study of mind requires as precise instruments linguistic expressions for the articulation of problems, concepts, hypotheses, and data. This need has a correlative, a need for means of analysis, assessment, clarification, and modification of the language used in the study of mind.

Examples of current linguistic needs of the study of mind are provided by Eastern religious insights into mind and Western speculation concerning mind. For example, it is of no little importance for the study of mind that there is evidence that with proper discipline and subsequent development the individual can achieve the Zen Buddhist experiences of satori and kensho or the Vedaantist experiences of aananda and samaadhi.[5] Also of proved investigative usefulness in the study of mind are Freud's libido, id, and super-ego and Jung's collective unconscious and immanent archetypes. The Zen Buddhist and Vedaanta terms, however, name experiences which are possible only to the person who has

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undergone a profound spiritual and intellectual transformation and development. And the Freudian and Jungian terms name aspects of the self which cannot be identified ostensively. Hence, no one of them can be defined operationally, behavioristically, or physicalistically. A corollary is that the modes of language analysis which suffice for the analysis of operational, behavioristic, and physicalistic language will not be adequate to demonstrate the meaningfulness, specific meanings, or clarity of these terms.

Hence, a desideratum in respect to progress in the study of mind is the development of philosophy of language which will keep pace with the linguistic requirements of the former. If the available means of construction, assessment, and modification of language for use in the study of mind remain constant, then the latter will develop only within the limits determined by the philosophy of language. This constitutes a vitiating and philosophically indefensible dominance of philosophy of language over the study of mind. Moreover, when the language used in the study of mind is created or modified without benefit of philosophy of language, there are two unfortunate results. The technical language of the study of mind lacks the demonstrated meaningfulness and clarity which only philosophical analysis and assessment can provide. And philosophy of language fails to take advantage of an opportunity for its own development through the examination and supplying of novel linguistic needs of the study of mind.

II
Investigation of mind has also been dominated by current work in methodology. One example will suffice to demonstrate the fact of such dominance; the illegitimacy of the dominance, and the fruitfulness of developing the Investigative interdependence between the study of mind and methodology. As an example I choose the physicalist's assertion that the methods of the natural sciences, particularly in physics, can be counted on to give a comprehensive description of the human being.[6] In the absence of sufficient evidence that the methods of physics can, by themselves, provide such a description this assertion is unfounded speculation. I wish, however, to draw attention to another objection to physicalism and to suggest that in meeting this objection there is the promise of important development in methodology.

It is a truism that there are many modes of scientific investigation. And the question whether it is fruitful or even legitimate to speak, as John Locke did, of a general reflective method which proceeds by observation, reflection on observational data, and verification of hypotheses in experience remains a moot point. At any rate, in some contexts it is useful to stress resemblances among particular investigations. In the present context, however, it is useful to stress differences among them. And they differ in respect to the kinds of data which can serve as evidence (for example, subjective or intersubjective data); in respect to the sources of their evidence (for example, observations with or

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without experimentation); in respect to the categories used in the interpretation of data (for example, the quantification of all data or the use of qualitative observations), and in respect to the aspects of the investigator's mind, character structure, and general intellectual and spiritual development which have investigative roles (for example, calling into play only the intellect and power of making objective observations or calling into play also the creative imagination).

In short, data, sources of data, modes of interpretation of data, and investigatively useful human capacities are variables within inquiry. They are made determinate by the investigative requirements of the specific inquiry. And these requirements cannot be worked out by inspection of the possibilities, limitations, and demands of a dominant methodology which has been accepted without regard to the character of specific areas of inquiry. The foregoing analysis is important here because physicalism represents only one development of the general reflective method. This last is an extensive and important topic. I develop here only two aspects of it which pertain to the study of mind.

Physicalism gives investigative roles only to intersubjective data which as far as possible have been interpreted quantitatively. Yet it is the ineluctable presence of consciousness which distinguishes mind as object of inquiry from the objects of inquiry of the natural sciences; and consciousness is the heart of subjectivity. Thus, the physicalist who takes mind as his object of inquiry is in a dilemmatic situation. If he remains within the limits of his chosen method of inquiry, then he does not directly examine consciousness per se. And if he does examine consciousness per se, then he is not faithful to the tenets of physicalism.

To be sure, the view that physicalism is not sufficient for all inquiry concerning mind is implicit in phenomenological studies of mind. These are almost exclusively concerned with the investigation of consciousness, including, of course, its qualitative aspects.[7] Thus, physicalism and phenomenology of mind may be interpreted as distinctive modes of making determinate the types, sources, and interpretation of data used in inquiry and hence as specific developments of the general reflective method. As it is currently practiced, however, phenomenology of mind shares with physicalism another type of dominance over the study of mind. For both fail to give sufficient attention to certain types of preparation which are helpful in the study of mind.

On the one hand, the physicalistic study of mind is informed by the assumption that only those aspects of the investigator which have roles in the physical sciences will have roles in the study of mind. These, of course, include the intent and the ability to observe intersubjective data with precision and to report what is observed with integrity. They also include either sufficient training to interpret data in terms of currently useful concepts (such as efficient causality or indeterminism) or sufficient scientific imagination to introduce fruitful new concepts.

The study of mind, however, is concerned necessarily with all aspects of

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consciousness, and consciousness encompasses the entire range of human experience. Further, it cannot be known a priori which experiences and, hence, which contents of consciousness will have revelatory significance in the study of mind. Hence, the study of mind requires alertness to the potential investigative roles in the entire range of human experience and a capability of comprehending the qualitative characteristics of the contents of consciousness chosen for their investigative roles and also their significance to the individual who has the experiences. It also requires alertness to the possibility of error in interpretation and assessment of these.

Thus, it has been pointed out that human experiences include what are known as 'raw feels' (for examples, unexpected pin pricks).[8] Human experiences also include, however, intense anxiety, compassion for others, sorrow, aspiration, and joy. And in most cases these experiences are informed by the individual's views concerning what it is to be human and by his ontological, metaphysical, and religious convictions. For example, these experiences include the individual's sorrow in bereavement and his hope for his own or another's survival of death, his aspiration for spiritual development, and his patience in awaiting it as well as his joy in achieving it. These are not the same experiences, however, for the secular humanist, Zen Buddhist, Hasidic Jew, or Trinitarian Christian. Moreover, to comprehend any one of these experiences sufficiently to appropriate it is to grasp its character qua inwardness and subjective state, its significance for the individual whose experience it is, its effects on his character structure and intellectual capacities, and the axiological, ontological, metaphysical, and religious convictions by which it is informed. Moreover, these experiences are inseparable from consciousness, and no part of consciousness can be ignored by the investigator of mind. Thus, the study of mind requires preparation, capacities, and insights which do not have investigative roles in the physical sciences.

On the other hand, although phenomenology of mind investigates all aspects of consciousness per se, it fails in two ways to take account of the requisite preparation for study of mind. First, because phenomenology requires an analysis of first-person experience, the individual phenomenologist's work is informed by the idiosyncrasies of his perspective on mind and eventuates in the articulation of his understanding of himself as incarnate mind. Moreover, as it is at present conceived phenomenology is not provided with safeguards against the limitations and errors of its idiosyncratic aspects. Any one thinker's conclusions on the nature of mind are, at least, in part a revelation of his self-understanding. As such they are autobiographical data and a source of evidence concerning the diversity of individual experiences as incarnate mind. If, however, they are offered as the perspective on mind which informs the self-understanding of all persons, then they are false. For the very diversity of individual interpretations of what it is to be incarnate mind refutes the hypothesis that there is one universal self-understanding. On the other hand,

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if one phenomenological analysis of mind is offered as the ideal, thought not always achieved, human self-understanding, then, being declared rather than proved, it represents an attempt at an unexamined dominance of one perspective on mind over all perspectives. For example, when Merleau-Ponty declared,'I am my body', he spoke for himself. He also spoke in explicit opposition to Descartes on this point. Yet he possesses no ground for persuading his reader to reject the Cartesian dualistic interpretation of the mind-body relationship if the reader happens to prefer it. Mutatis mutandis analogous comments hold of Merleau-Ponty's implicit opposition to Vedaantist and Buddhist unwillingness to identify the self with the body.

Second, sufficient attention has not yet been given to the development of the entire self which is the correlative of commitment to a particular world view and which is necessary preparation for work in the phenomenology of extraordinary experiences, states of consciousness, and awareness of reality. The individual cannot do the phenomenology of such distinctive Zen-Buddhist experiences as satori, absolute samaadhi, or kensho unless he is able to have these experiences. And only the person who has undergone a rigorous Zen Buddhist discipline will have them. We have noted that these have considerable value as revelatory of the nature of mind, but the person whose preparation for the study of mind is only such as is provided by the study and practice of phenomenology as it is taught by Husserl and Heidegger will not be able to report on the content and significance of these experiences.[9] Analogous comments are to be made, of course, concerning the phenomenology and revelatory value of experiences, states of consciousness, and aspects of the self which are known through Yoga, Buddhist, and Taoist disciplines or through Christian, Jewish, and Islamic mysticism.

It follows that in investigation of mind, sources, and modes of interpretation of data, kinds of data, preparation for observation and interpretation and fruitful investigative use of observations are variables which become determinate only in respect to the needs of particular dimensions of the study of mind. These are not the same for behaviorism, Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology, Zen Buddhism, Vedaantism, or Freud's speculation. Attention to these as variables and reassessment of the way in which they have been made determinate in particular studies of mind would end the dominance of one method over all aspects of the study of mind. It could be expected also to make for advance in the understanding of the general reflective method--its areas of usefulness, requirements, and ways in which it can be made determinate in particular areas of inquiry. And this last would make for advance in the general area of methodology.

III
The phenomenalistic orientations provided by phenomenology, secular existentialism, critical realism, and instrumentalism have import for the investi-

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gative interdependence between ontology and the study of mind. For each of these in its own way has extended its phenomenalistic interpretation of reality to its own study of mind. This is clearly true of the roles given to consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology and in Heidegger's rejection of what he calls traditional ontology and metaphysics. It is also true of Sartre's work in which the en soi of all things, including the hidden depths of the human mind, is existentially a cipher. Critical realism at least implicitly accepted a Humean interpretation of the self. Instrumentalism and logical empiricism were committed to a behavioristic approach to the study of mind. Each of these approaches to the study of mind has had some usefulness. None, however, has been sufficient for investigation of all aspects of mind. Further, even taken all together they cannot illumine or appropriate suggestions, experiences, and insights concerning mind which are informed by some variety of classical realism. Examples from both Eastern and Western studies of mind are ready at hand.

Thus, they cannot illumine the content or investigative value of Western speculation pertaining to aspects of mind which are not unconcealed and which, hence, cannot be interpreted in phenomenalistic terms---either behavioristically or phenomenologically. Clearly, Freudian speculation concerning id and super ego and Jungian speculation concerning innate archetypes and a collective unconscious are intended to name aspects of mind which are not open to direct inspection. Conclusions pertaining to them are speculation concerning what is concealed from direct observation and not induction from experience. A corollary is that they are not available for behavioristic or phenomenological inquiry. Rather, Freud's intent is that drives, taboos, frustrations, and fears of which we are aware may be interpreted as effects of a concealed id and super ego. And Jung's intent is that universally shared concepts may be interpreted as having their roots and rationale in aspects of mind not directly open to inspection and not necessarily traceable in behavior. Thus, id, super ego, collective unconsciousness, and immanent archetypes are not properly interpreted as existential ciphers nor as explicable wholly in terms of selected contents of consciousness. Rather, they are intended to be interpreted as dynamic, fundamentally important aspects of other-than- conscious aspects of the human self, even though it may be that in a particular situation no one is explicitly aware of their presence and importance within the mind.

Analogous comments hold of the ontology of latent and normally concealed aspects of mind of which the individual may become aware only through the rigors of a discipline provided by one of the Eastern religions, such as Taoism, Hinduism, or Buddhism, especially Zen Buddhism. The importance, characteristics, and ontology of these aspects of the human mind have had little attention from Western investigators of mind. They may, however, be expected to prove a very fruitful source of insights into mind.[10] What matters in this

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context is that aspects of mind which are developed by, say, Yoga meditation, controlled breathing exercises, chanting, and, above all, commitment to a particular religious path, are not initially unconcealed and can be examined phenomenologically only in their developed state and, further, as we have noted, only by a person who has undergone the discipline.

It is not, however, only the study of extraordinary types of development of the mind that must be informed by a realist ontology. Many--perhaps most--of any one individual's everyday and commonsense experiences of being incarnate mind are at least implicitly informed by a realist ontology. There are two senses in which this is true. On the one hand, in many of its activities mind is interpreted as possessing some concealed aspects. We search our memories to recover past experiences; and while some of these are easily recovered, others are recovered only with great difficulty and perhaps only with the aid of hypnosis. We speak of other-than-conscious aspects of the self from whence come dreams. And the concealed sources of the unpredictable creativity which makes for progress in science, philosophy, and the arts have ever been a matter of controversy and mystery. On the other hand, in everyday activities the world is often--perhaps most of ten--encountered in terms of a realist ontology. We are concerned with the otherness and inwardness not only of human beings but also of animals and plants.[11] Wonder before the unknown, as Aristotle understood it, necessarily implies appropriation of a realist ontology and the acceptance of the presence of an irreducible otherness not directly discerned by phenomenological analysis. For the persons who cultivate Aristotelian wonder, the en soi of natural objects is not existentially a cipher. Martin Buber declared this when he asserted that "the fundamental words are words of relations."[12]

What is the importance for this inquiry of the fact that for all persons much of the time and perhaps for some persons all of the time their concerns with some aspects of the mind per se or with the situations in which the mind finds itself are informed by ontological realism? C. S. Peirce's distinctions among firstness, secondness, and thirdness are useful here.[13] Any phenomenalism translates secondness into firstness and thirdness, while all forms of positivism interpret thirdness as a human imposition of order on firstness. Yet firstness, secondness, and thirdness are categories of the phenomenal--of what Peirce called the "phaneron."[14] They are the product of an egocentric perspective on reality, and an irreducible secondness as well as firstness regularly inform most concerns of the human mind. Hence, all three are the accompaniments of data that pertain to mind, as the data are wrongly interpreted when their ingredient of an irreducible secondness is ignored.

If emphasis on the de facto presence of ontological realism as informing most concerns of the human mind is necessary in at least some aspects of the study of mind, this emphasis can also be expected to make for progress in present-day understanding of the characteristics and importance of ontological

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realism and the de facto roles of the latter in some of the most profoundly important human concerns. This attention to ontological realism can be an important next step in the renewed interest in ontology which is explicit in the work of Heidegger and Sartre but which is also present in critical realism, instrumentalism, and logical empiricism. For each of these in its own way denied the presence of an irreducible secondness in human encounters with reality. We have already noted that what Peirce called secondness is for Heidegger 'unconcealed' and for Sartre 'existentially a cipher'. On the other hand, in effect, logical empiricism declared secondness to be meaningless, instrumentalism declared a concern with secondness to be a waste of human effort, and critical realism declared that secondness cannot be known. While each of these doubtless has its value in illumining the ways in which a concern with secondness is present in some human activities, no one of them does justice to the ineluctable presence of an irreducible secondness in some human encounters with reality.

IV
Modern philosophy provides many instances of the dominance of the study of mind by particular metaphysical views. Examples are the conclusions concerning mind which derive from the rationalistic systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Hegel. Less obvious, but equally vitiating to the study of mind, is the situation in which, on the one hand, conclusions concerning mind are, indeed, derived from attention to mind per se but in which, on the other hand, the inquiry is kept within limits determined by a particular world view and all data pertaining to mind are interpreted from the perspective of that world view.

An instance of this second type of dominance occurs when inquiry concerning mind is carried on within limits of some variety of metaphysical naturalism--that is, when the inquiry is dominated by the view that the physical world as illumined by the natural sciences either is the whole of reality or provides the only perspective on reality which is of concern to man. Thus, despite the differences among them, Dewey's instrumentalism, Carnap's logical empiricism, Santayana's critical realism, and neo-materialism are all naturalisms. And Spinoza's pantheism, Vedaantism, Zen Buddhism, Plotinus' immanent theism, and Bonaventure's Christian Platonism are not naturalisms. For each in its own way claims insight into the physical world and other aspects of reality which goes beyond scientific knowledge and which it takes to be of the highest importance in the understanding of mind.

When inquiry into mind is informed by any type of naturalism all human experience, all intellectual and spiritual development and achievement, all character structure, and ail self-understanding which take their rise from other-than-naturalistic world views are ignored, rejected as error, or reinterpreted as naturalistic myth. And this dominance of naturalism over the study

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of mind is not without its untoward effects on the latter. For where such dominance is present only the revelatory character of the human spirit in its naturalistic development is permitted to make a contribution to the study of mind. It is important, however, that the study of mind appropriate data and insights pertaining to mind which are provided by a variety of interpretations of reality. Clearly useful in the general project of the study of mind have been the data and insights provided by naturalistic interpretations of man--for example, the speculations of Freud, the behavioristic analysis of Ryle, and the empirical generalizations of Fromm. On the other hand, the study of mind will also benefit from the appropriation of data and insights which are provided only by persons who live by the disciplines, accept the challenges, and know the intellectual and spiritual development of one of the other-than-naturalistic world views.

Thus, we have noted the effects of a Zen Buddhist discipline on the mind and personality. Analogous comments can be made pertaining to the effects of Buddhist, Yoga, and Taoist disciplines on mind and personality.[15] And the spate of publications dealing with psychology and Zen, physiology and Yoga, and artistic creativity and Zen is evidence that the revelatory effects of these diverse disciplines have been noted by those concerned in some way with the study of mind. Further, Christian, Jewish, and Islamic mysticism as well as the writings of Christian and Jewish existentialists are important but as yet insufficiently recognized sources of data, insights, and suggestions pertaining to mind. Thus, the topic of free will versus determinism is of no little importance for the study of mind. And Kierkegaard's existential analysis of the effects of the 'decision which is made with moral passion' and believed to be an act of free will is a valuable contribution to this subject.

What will be the advantages to metaphysical inquiry of the development of an investigative interdependence between the study of mind and the diverse metaphysical views? It will draw the attention of the philosophical community to that diversity, which has not yet had sufficient recognition. Thus, it will become clear that many metaphysical views make significant contributions to the study of mind which is, undeniably, an important feature of that total reality with which metaphysics is concerned. And recognition of this fact can, in turn, create interest in the possibility that each metaphysical position can supply distinctive data, insights, and suggestions pertaining not only to mind but to other aspects of reality as well.

Metaphysical thinkers who take up the challenge of this possibility will be able to develop an investigative interdependence among several metaphysical approaches to reality. And this work, in turn, may draw attention to the diverse investigative approaches to metaphysics which each requires. For example, we have noted that the extraordinary development of investigative and cognitive capacities which accompany the faithfulness to the distinctive Zen Buddhist or Yoga disciplines are a source of invaluable contributions to the metaphysical

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and, perhaps, scientific study of nonhuman aspects of reality. And these contributions are different from the equally valuable contributions of metaphysical inquiry made by, say, Spinoza's rationalism, the Judaism of the Zohar, the many forms of metaphysical idealism, and metaphysical naturalism. A sharing of questions, data, and insights among these and many other metaphysical views can be expected to eventuate in a burgeoning of metaphysical creativity and a renewed understanding of the necessary and highly significant roles of metaphysical convictions in virtually all human concerns.

CONCLUSION
We have noted the potentiality for the fruitful development of investigative interdependence between, on the one hand, the present-day study of mind, and, on the other hand, the philosophy of language, methodology, ontology, and metaphysics. These last four, however, may also be seen as interdependent; advance in any one of them may provide a basis for advance in one or more of the other three.

For example, advance in philosophy of language by virtue of which it would be possible to demonstrate the adequacy of the linguistic expressions generated by the several facets of the study of mind might once more draw attention to the language of metaphysics. In the third through fifth decades of this century the language used in metaphysical inquiry was a target of philosophical criticism to which there was some but not sufficient creative response on the part of metaphysicians. The fundamentally important philosophical problems of demonstrating the de facto meaningfulness, specific meanings, clarity, and investigative adequacy of the language used in the several modes of metaphysical inquiry are of major importance to metaphysics, philosophy of language, and the metaphilosophical relations between the two areas. This critical work on the language of metaphysics is now, however, largely neglected. And the questions it raised concerning the cognitive status and investigative worth of the language of metaphysics are still unanswered. In recent years, however, there has been a burgeoning of metaphysics, both West and East, with some promise of a development of an investigative interdependence among the diverse metaphysical systems.[16]

Hence, the time may be propitious for new creativity in respect to the language of metaphysics. The positivistic orientation of philosophy of language as it was practiced a few decades ago in American and British philosophy may now be seen to have blocked the road to the development of the philosophy of language. For the ethos of this work on language did not encourage an openness to the real linguistic needs and achievements of metaphysical inquiry.[17] On their part, metaphysicians were understandably not inclined to accept destructive criticism of their language which missed the real power and appropriateness of the latter. A philosophy of language, however, which is informed by an intent to enter into investigative interdependence with the

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many diverse investigative procedures of the present-day study of mind will, as we have already had occasion to note, have touched upon metaphysical language. It would then point the way to further creativity in the philosophy of language.

Finally, analogous comments are to be made of the interrelations among philosophy of language, ontology, and methodology. Hence, advance in the study of mind at the present time holds great promise for development in all the most fundamental areas of philosophy and, hence, in virtually all aspects of philosophical work.

NOTES
1 Rudolph Carnap,"Psychology in Physical Language," in Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 165-197.

2 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949).

3 A. J. Ayer, Language Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, n.d.), chapter (1).

4 Herbert Feigl, The 'Mental' and the 'Physical' (Minneapolis, Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p. 6.

5 D. T. Suzuki, 'Lectures on Zen Buddhism' in Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 20-21. Sri Aurobindo, The Essential Aurobindo, ed. Robert McDermott (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), p. 134.

6 John O'Connor, Introduction in Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), p. 5.

7 See, for example, The Essential Writings of' Merleau-Ponty, ed. Alden L. Richer (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), Part III.

8 Feigl. op. cit., passim.

9 Katsuki Sekida, Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy (New York: John Weatherhill, 1975), chapter (1).

10 Ibid., passim.

11 See, for example, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, eds. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976). Peter Tomkins and Christopher Bird, The Secret Life of Plants (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

12 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith 2d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), chapter (1).

13 "Principles of Philosophy,"chapter (1), pp. 23-26 in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), vol. 1.

14 Ibid., Book III: Introduction to chapter (1).

15 In addition to references already given on this point see Arthur Waley,The Way and Its Power (New York: The Grove Press, 1958), Appendix III: Taoist Yoga.

16 See,for example,R. C. Zaehner, Evolution in Religion: A Study in Sri Aurobindo and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (London:Oxford University Press,1971); C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of` Man (New York: Macmillan, 1974), Appendix; and Thomas Merton, Mystics and Zen Masters (New York: Farrar, Stras, and Giroux, 1961).

17 Cf. A. J. Ayer, "The Elimination of Metaphysics," in Classics of Analytic Philosophy, ed. Robert R. Ammerman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).