The paradox of Buddhist wisdom

·期刊原文
The paradox of Buddhist wisdom

Donald W. Mitchell
Philosophy East and West 26, no. 1, January 1976.
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii.
p.55-67

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p.55

For a number of centuries, beginning about 100 B.C.,
Indian Mahaayaana Buddhists developed a literature
which explicated what they considered to be the
nature of "Perfect Wisdom" (praj~naapaaramitaa). This
concept of Wisdom became of central importance in
Mahayana Indian Buddhism and entered into the Hindu
tradition through its development by Gau.dapaada and
'Sa^mkaraacaarya.(1) Outside the borders of India the
concept had influence within the diverse cultures of
Tibet, Mongolia, China, and Japan. The concept
itself was originally developed in South India where
there was most likely an influence from the Greek
Wisdom tradition.(2) Indeed, one can find in the
Mahaayaana tradition the same concern for the
relation of theory and knowledge, on the one hand, to
practice and virtue, on the other, that was
emphasized in the Platonic and Aristotelian
traditions. Also one finds the Buddhist Wisdom
Literature stressing, much like the Stoics, the
soteriological effect of Wisdom as it liberates man
from the futile emotion al attachments and passions
caused by ignorance and leads him to a state of
higher freedom.
However, this does not mean that the Indian
Mahaayaana Buddhists were adopting the particular
positions developed by the Greeks concerning these
matters. In fact, their concept of Perfect Wisdom
entails both a unique way of relating knowledge to
virtue and of conceiving liberation. It is the
uniqueness of this position that I would like to
explore in the article. More specifically I want to
focus on what seems to be a paradox at the heart of
their position: a paradox that involves the status of
the Mahaayaana Buddhist "Man of Wisdom, " the
Bodhisattva (one whose essence is Perfect Wisdom). On
the one hand the Bodhisattva vows to practice
compassion by leading all beings to full nirvana with
nothing left behind. On the other hand, it is also
said that there are ultimately no beings to be led
nor any Bodhisattva to lead nor any nirvaa.na to be
led to: "That which is striven after does not exist,
he who strives does not exist, that wherewith he
strives does not exist."(3) Thus, it would seem that
the Buddhist aff irms both A (the Bodhisattva with
Wisdom strives to lead all beings to nirvana) and
not-A (there is no Bodhisattva, no Wisdom, no beings
no nirvana). This, of course, would be a blatant
contradiction. How can bodhisattvas, Wisdom, beings,
and nirvaa.na both exist and not exist at the same
time? Indeed, the Buddha commented upon this paradox
with the question: "How should I instruct and
admonish a non-creation in a perfect wisdom which is
also a non-creation?"(4)
With this paradox in mind I would like to go on
to an examination of the metaphysical and
epistemological presuppositions behind this
Mahaayaana Buddhist concept of Wisdom as it was
originally presented in the praj~naapaaramitaa
literature. My hope is to show thereby that there is
a way of escaping the dilemma and then to go on to
show how such a position thus clarified has Specific
soteriological implication. Since this concept of
Wisdom is basic to
_____________________________________________________

Donald W. Mitchell is Assistant Professor of
Philosophy at Purdue University.

p.56

Mahaayaana Buddhism and not part of the Theravaada
tradition of Buddhism, my use of the term "Buddhist,"
unless otherwise indicated, will refer to the
Mahaayaana tradition only. Let us begin then with the
metaphysical basis of this concept of Perfect Wisdom.

I

Before the praj~naapaaramitaa tradition developed,
Buddhists assumed that reality could be analyzed into
a number of fundamental elements called dharmas.
These factors of existence are the essential and
ultimate facts of the universe. There are both
psychic and somatic dharmic factors or "events" (for
example, volition and color). The universe is a
process of these momentary events or dharmas as they
interact in an interconnected causal nexus. An
analysis of the various types of dharmas has been
given in a number of sources and need not concern us
here.(5) What is relevant to our present
consideration is that the early Buddhists claimed
that each dharma has an "own-being" (svabhaava) which
can be known through the attainment of wisdom
(praj~naa). By "own-being" the early Buddhists meant
that each dharma has an essential nature which in
turn has its own mark (sva-lak.sa.na) or
characteristic. Further the doctrine entails that
this essential nature is a kind of independent
ultimate fact in its own right: svabhaava entails a
thing existing by virtue of its own-being.
It is against the svabhaava theory that the
praj~naapaaramitaa literature directed their theory
of emptiness ('suunyataa). True wisdom according to
this view "sees" that the dharmas, or elements of
existence, are empty of any own-being
(svabhaava'suunya). It is important to note that the
concept of emptiness qualifies the elements of
existence and does not entail the metaphysical claim
that the world is ultimately Void or Nothingness.
Rather it posits that each element of our experience
is empty of any essential nature that is an ultimate
and independent fact. In arguing for this position
the praj~naapaaramitaa points to the Buddhist
doctrine of dependent origination
(pratiityasamutpaada). Simply put, this doctrine
makes the empirical claim that all beings arise or
original only in dependence on something else. The
conclusion drawn from this is that all things
(ultimately all dharmas) are what they are only
through a relation with something else.(6) A thing's
existence is dependent upon a multiplicity of other
things. And since the existence of each entity is
defined by its coarising with other entities, it is
thereby empty of any independent own-being.
So the Man of Wisdom, when surveying the world of
dependent origination, "does not see any dharma that
is being produced without a cause...."(7) Dharmas are
not, as the svabhaava theory claims, independent but
are dependent upon other causal factors and
conditions for their existence and are therefore
wholly contingent. Own-being is an empty concept
insofar as it implies independence, and dharmas are
empty of any such own-being: "No dharma acting in
causal connection has a being of its own, because of
conditi onal co-production."(8) A correlary to this
position is the claim that the dharmas are not only

p.57

empty of any independent essential nature but that
the qualities, characteristies, or attributes of each
entity are determined by the entity's relation to
other entities. It is in this sense that the dharmas
are said to be signless (animitta). The Bodhisattva
sees the absence of separate marks in all dharmas
insofar as he realizes in Perfect Wisdom that the
qualities (marks, signs) of all entities are not
separate from the relation of that entity to other
entities. So when the praj~naapaaramitaa speaks of a
Perfect Wisdom that goes beyond all distinctions to a
state where "there is no discrimination at all,"(9)
this does not refer to a merging with some primoridal
One. Rather it simply means that given the empty and
signless nature of things, the Man of Wisdom does not
distinguish entities as independent and separate in
terms of either essence or attributes.
The praj~naapaaramitaa follows the implication of
this postulate to the conclusion that all dharmas
have "one single essential and original nature (which
is just the absence of a differentiated nature)."(l0)
That is, they claim that all dharmas are the same.
Indeed, if there is to be any independence between
two entities, it must be in terms of either their
essence or their attributes. These two possibilities
are denied by the positing of the categories of
emptiness and signless, and these two categories are
what is implied by the concept of Sameness (samatva).
This concept then does not imply, as some would have
it, that all dharmas ultimately merge in a monistic
One; rather it means that all dharmas are the same in
that they are all empty of svabhaava. This
interpretation must also be applied to the famous
Buddhist category of Nonduality: "Those who course in
duality cannot grow in merit. All the foolish common
people are supported by duality, and their merit
cannot grow. But a Bodhisattva courses in
non-duality."(11) Coursing in Nonduality means that
the Bodhisattva realizes that entities are not
independent from each other but owe their existence
to an interdependent nexus of relations. That is,
Nonduality refers to the contention that entities
cannot be divided or separated, dualistically, into
self-subsisting entities. But again this does not
mean that they merge into a nondual Oneness.
Once we understand the claim that all dharmas are
ultimately empty of any distinction, either essential
or accidental, that would separate one dharma from
another, the question arises as to what this
non-duality of things ultimately is like. A number of
symbols are popularly applied to this condition.
There are two basic symbols which are important to
our present analysis; namely, Suchness and Unborn.
However, we must keep in mind that the true condition
of things is ultimately ineffable and these are only
symbols.
Suchness (tathataa) is a positive term used as a
synonym for the empty, nondual nature of the dharmas.
Suchness is the object of the Wisdom of the
Bodhisattva. When wisdom goes beyond the distinctions
and discriminations that seemingly separate the
dharmas into independent entities it sees theirs
Suchness. The Bodhisattva is able "to look through to
the Suchness of all dharmas, to the Suchness of the
Dharmadhaatu."(12) This single Suchness is the

p.58

true reality of all dharmas since, given non-duality,
all things have the "same" reality.(13) The category
of Suchness is used in the praj~naapaaramitaa texts
in such a way that the underlying metaphysical
nondual Sameness discussed above is clearly shown:

The Suchness of the Tathaagata [the Buddha] is the
Suchness of all dharmas, they are both one single
Suchness, not two or divided. Unborn is that
Suchness, and there is nothing of which it is not the
Suchness; that is why it is not two or divided. It is
in this sense that the Elder Subhuti is born after
the image of the Tathaagata.(14)

Suchness as "the Sublime That which really
is,"(15) is the true nondual nature of all things.
Further, all things in their Suchness are as pure as
the Tathaagata in that they, like the Tathaagata, are
empty of own-being. Suchness then ultimately refers
to the famous Mahaayaana identity of nirvaa.na and
sa^msaara. Perfect Wisdom that has gone altogether
beyond transcends all distinctions including even
that of nirvaa.na and sa^msaara. The adept
Bodhisattva sees "the identity of defilement
[sa^msaara] and purification [nirvaa.na]."(16) Since
the Bodhisattva sees all dharmas as empty of
independence, sa^msaaric becoming and nirvaa.nic
quietude are not separate realms. They are both empty
of own-being. This identity of nirvaa.na and
sa^msaara will be discussed in detail later. However,
there is another term in an earlier passage that is
of extreme interest. The term "Unborn" is given as a
synonym for Suchness. This concept brings us to the
heart of praj~naapaaramitaa ontology, and it is here
that we can see the fuller implication of Suchness.
The term Unborn refers to the central category of
nonproduction (anutpaada).
The category of anutpaada is used to denote that
the dharmas are unproduced or unborn: "just as one
speaks of a self, and yet, absolutely, a self is
unproduced so also all inner and outer dharmas are
unproduced."(17) The word "self" for Buddhists is an
empty concept--it does not refer to anything that is
ultimately real. So, too, the words "inner dharma"
and "outer dharmas" refer to nothing that is
ultimately real. These dharmas have ultimately never
been produced into existence as independent and
self-existing entities: "For all dharmas have not
come, and from that situation (in emptiness) they do
not depart. And why? Because absolutely form does not
exist; how could its coming and going take
place?"(18) If this is the case then the independent
objects we perceive are not ultimately real. They are
like the objects in a dream or an illusion: "Because
a perverted view is a dream... It is a perverted view
on the part of the foolish common people... likewise
there is no Arhat, no Pratyekabuddha, no Bodhisattva,
no Tathagata. And why? Because all dharmas have
non-existence for own-being, they are non-produced,
have not come about."(19)
Indeed, it is this category of anutpaada that
brings us to the culmination of our analysis of the
metaphysical presuppositions of the
praj~naapaaramitaa concept of Wisdom. We have seen
that the Bodhisattva realizes that given dependent

p.59

origination all elements of existence are empty of
either an independent essential nature (svabhaava) or
any marks or qualities (lak.sa.na) that would
distinguish one as independent from another. Given
that all things are in a causal nexus of
interdependence, the Bodhisattva speaks of the
sameness of all dharmas and their ultimate nondual
nature. This nature is referred to as Suchness, which
is now finally described as unborn or unproduced.
Given this latter concept, referred to as the Single
Principle, the produced world of independent
multiplicity is in turn referred to with such similes
as dream, illusion, mirage, and magical creation.(20)
These similes are put forward to address the obvious
question that arises at this point: How is it that
things appear to us as they do in ordinary
experience? How is the world of multiplicity
"produced" from this "unproduced" Suchness? To
analyze the answer to these questions we must turn to
the epistemological presuppositions involved. To
maintain their position of metaphysical nondualism
and account for the phenomenal world of
sense-perception, the praj~naapaaramitaa must make an
appearance-reality distinction which posits an
epistemological dualism. And by an analysis of this
epistemic presupposition we can put the earlier
metaphysical categories into their proper context and
reach a fuller understanding of the concept of
Perfect Wisdom.

II

Perennial epistemological considerations concern the
origin, nature, and limits of our knowledge. Buddhist
philosophy in general has treated these topics in
great detail, and the praj~naapaaramitaa literature
is no exception. In terms of our question about the
production of the world of independent multiplicity,
the praj~naapaaramitaa claims that our knowledge of
the seemingly separate and distinct objects Of sense
experience is a product of something called avidyaa
(usually translated as ignorance) and are thereby
ultimately an illusion. The Sanskrit word avidyaa
derives from the root vid, to know, which also has
the meaning to find. Thus a-vidyaa as not-knowing may
also imply the belief in something that is not-found
or, by extension, does not-exist.(21) Thus avidyaa
brings about a belief in objects that are not found
in reality; that is, that do not ultimately exist.
The dharmas are in fact these objects produced by
avidyaa: "[they] do not exist except for ignorance,
they are called (the result of) ignorance."(22)
The question arises here as to what one means
when he says that-the elements of existence are the
"result" of ignorance, or avidyaa. The kind of
ignorance implied by avidyaa would seem to be more
than just a lack of knowledge. It implies a cognitive
power that constructs things that ultimately do not
exist. Given the simile that the world is like a
dream, it would seem that this power is akin to the
faculty of productive imagination which also produces
things which are not to be found in reality. Just as
the imagination produces a world of dreams and
daydreams, so the world of sense perception is a kind
of dream world-an illusion--conjured up by a similar
type of false discrimination (vikalpa):

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"The Praj~naapaaramitaa now claim that discrimination
(vikalpa) is the core of ignorance and that the
empirical world... is a thought-construction derived
from false discrimination."(23) Ignorance (avidyaa)
implies false discrimination (vikalpa). The world of
independent multiplicity is a mental construction
based on ignorance as a discrimination of objects
that ultimately do not exist. The world is like a
"magical creation" constructed of dharmas "which fail
to be produced."(24) There is but one reality-- the
Suchness of existence. However, ignorant thought
construction produces from it, or better,
discriminates onto it the empirical world of
independent self-subsisting entities. What is born or
produced is so by false discrimination (vikalpa).
Vikalpa superimposes, as it were, phenomenal
discriminations onto reality. The nature of an
ordinary empirical experience is then that of an
illusion. We do not see things as they really are but
as conditioned by false discrimination. Given this
origin, ordinary sense experience is limited in the
sense that it can never know what is real but only
what is constructed by the human mind.
It ought to be obvious by now that there is a
certain similarity between Buddhist epistemology and
that of Immanuel Kant. While the praj~naapaaramitaa
does not go into any great detail as to how the mind
constructs the phenomenal world, the general
phenomena-noumena distinction is affirmed. It should
be noted that other Buddhist schools do devote much
effort to an analysis of the dynamics of the
mental-construction process; however, those analyses
need not concern us here.(25) There is, however, a
major difference between Buddhism and Kant. Kant
fell that there is no faculty by which one can intuit
noumena, and thus man is limited to the experience of
phenomena. Buddhism, on the other hand, posits the
existence of a type of intuition by which one can
come to know reality. The coming to know reality is
the achievement of Wisdom. This type of awareness,
which is the Wisdom of the Bodhisattva, is referred
to as praj~naa. While vikalpa gives us the empirical
world of independent multiplicity, praj~naa gives us
ins ight into nondual Suchness.
Praj~naa is described in the praj~naapaaramitaa
literature as "an act of consciousness which has none
of the skandhas for an objective support..,"(26) That
is, praj~naa is a form of conscious awareness which
does not involve body senses, feelings, perceptions,
volitions, or thoughts. The ordinary modes of
awareness entailed by these five skandhas imply
duality; that is, a discrimination (vikalpa) of
independence between perceiver and objects perceived.
Praj~naa on the other hand does not employ these
faculties and is thereby said to "transcend" such
dualities. Further, the empirical world which is
constituted of these dualities fades from awareness.
Perfect Wisdom comes "through a non-viewing of the
world. Here the perfection of wisdom indicates that
the world is empty."(27) One's awareness is only of
Suchness described negatively as emptiness, signless,
wishless, uneffected, nonproduced, unborn, and
nonexistent. Positively stated, it is said to be the
essential nature of the universe which in the end is
one's own essential nature. Here again we must be
careful, for this is not to say

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that one sees his essence as absorbed into some
monistic One. What is meant is that one simply sees
that his essential nature is empty of svabhaava and
so is the essential nature of all other things.
The claim that there are two modes of awareness
(vikalpa and praj~naa) each with its distinctive type
of knowledge is later developed by the great Buddhist
philosopher Naagaarjuna into the Maadhyamika doctrine
of the Two Truths. Here in the praj~naapaaramitaa,
the basis of such a doctrine is being established.
The praj~naapaaramitaa makes a distinction between
truth from the standpoint of ultimate reality and
truth in a conventional sense.(28) Vikalpa produces,
in a conventional sense, independent dharmas which in
ultimate reality are not produced. Wisdom (praj~naa)
is the awareness that the empirical or phenomenal
world thus produced is from the highest point of view
empty of the distinctions and discriminations that
ordinarily make it up. The Bodhisattva sees that the
true nature of all dharmas is without modification or
discrimination and that any empirical distinction has
no existence (apart from ignorance.)(29) The true
nature of all dharmas is Suchness. The dharmas are
not distinct from Suchness insofar as their true
nature is Suchness. The difference here is again
epistemic and not ontological.
This kind of thinking leads to what is perhaps
the most well-known identity of the
praj~naapaaramitaa literature. As stated in the Heart
Suutra it is claimed that:

Here [in Wisdom], O 'Saariputra, form is emptiness
and the very emptiness is form; emptiness does not
differ from form, form does not differ from
emptiness; whatever is form that is emptiness,
whatever is emptiness, that is form, the same is true
of feelings, perceptions, impulses and
consciousness.(30)

By vikalpa one perceives the universe as the
empirical world of sense perception. This world of
forms has inherent truths analyzed by logic and the
sciences. All claims made by these disciplines are
judged to be true or false on the conventional or
phenomenal level. Conventional truths are concerned
with these phenomenal forms of the empirical world.
By praj~naa the Bodhisattva sees that the empirical
world, made up of the five skandhas referred to in
the preceding quotation, is empty, that is, is
ultimately identical with Suchness. The Suchness of
the phenomenal skandhas, elements, sensefields,
dharmas, Tathaagatas, and all beings is "one single
Suchness."(31) The higher truth, then, refers to the
Bodhisattva's awareness that the empirical world of
forms (sa^msaara) is a phenomenal appearance which is
ultimately empty of svabhaava. Nirvaa.na is gained
through this awareness of sa^msaara as being empty of
svabhaava. Nirvaa.na is not a separate realm from
sa^msaara, but is attained by seeing the Such ness
(or emptiness) of sa^msaara. One then either knows
the world by vikalpa as sa^msaara and is aware of
things from the standpoint of a lower truth, or he
knows the world by praj~naa and is aware of the world
from the standpoint of a higher truth and attains
nirvaa.na. In either case it is the same reality that
is being considered. The difference is in the nature
of one's awareness of it, and

p.62

the state of being that awareness brings (either
sa^msaaric or nirvaa.nic).
To exemplify this idea, the praj~naapaaramitaa
employs a famous simile. In a number of passages the
dharmas are said to be like "mere names:" ''A mere
name is all this that is conditioned."(32) Or
elsewhere, "The dharmas on which beings seek a false
support are mere names and signs; they are not real,
they are imagined, artificial adventitious
designations which are added to what is really
there."(33)
This simile can be interpreted in two main ways.
First, it can be seen as claiming that objects
(forms, etc.), like names, do not exist as
independent, separate, and discrete entities. In
terms of our earlier discussion of vikalpa, both
names and dharmas are dependent on mental
discrimination for their existence. But more
important than this rather straightforward
understanding of the simile, is the interpretation
that words are added onto or superimposed onto what
is real by the mind. For example, I (my person) can
be referred to by many names: "Don," "son," "father,"
"teacher, " etc. All these names have the same
referent, and one would be mistaken if he felt that
each referred to a separate individual. In a similar
way, it would be wrong to say that all empirical
entities refer to, or, better in this case, manifest,
a separate and independent essence. Such is the error
of essentialist superimposition. I should here note
that for the praj~naapaaramitaa, names function by
"pointing out" or "manifesting" an object. Names call
objects to our attention and manifest them more
clearly to us. In so doing, however, they often make
us feel that what is pointed out is a separate and
independent entity. So in terms of out above example,
a number of names might manifest the various roles my
person may assume (for example, son, father, teacher,
etc.), but none of the names refers to anything which
is independent from what is referred to by the
others. In a like manner, the dharma objects that
make up our phenomenal world (for example, trees,
houses, books, etc.) owe their seemingly independent
subsistence to the conceptual construction of
vikalpa. Vikalpa reinforces the belief that the
entities it discriminates are ultimately
self-subsisting, and it is here that the illusion
arises.
This is not to say that the forms referred to by
words do not exist on the conventional or phenomenal
level of appearance. Certainly they do. However, from
the perspective of Wisdom that goes beyond such
appearances the Buddhists claim, to follow our
simile, the Bodhisattva trains in a knowledge that
all objects are like "mere names... without a
corresponding entity."(34) The Buddha himself warns:
"From false discrimination has all arisen, it is a
mere designation. May you not get attached to a false
discrimination!"(35) And finally the Bodhisattva is
cautioned not to imagine "that the gift is one thing,
the donor another, the fruit another, the recipient
another, [etc.]...."(36)
In this latter quotation we can finally see the
basis of the paradoxes quoted at the beginning of
this article. That is, the Bodhisattva with
compassionate Wisdom strives to lead all sentient
beings to nirvaa.na while at the same time

p.63

realizing by that Wisdom that "that which is striven
after does not exist. he who strives does not exist.
that wherewith he strives does not exist."(37) In
other words, in terms of the lower truth of
phenomenal appearance there is a Bodhisattva who
strives to take all sentient beings to nirvaa.na. But
in terms of the higher her truth of Perfect Wisdom,'
the Bodhisattva, sentient beings, and nirvaa.na are
all empty of svabhaava; they ultimately do not exist
as independent, discrete, separate entities. It is
with this understanding of the paradox that the
dilemma stated at the beginning of this article can
be resolved.
Indeed, given two truths as exclusive as has been
outlined above, such paradoxes are inevitable. For
example, consider the Tathaagata himself. It is only
in terms of referring to the lower truth that one can
make empirical statements about the birth,
attainment, teaching, and death of the Tathaagata:
"If we take such statements as 'the tathaagata
continues to exist after death,' 'the tathaagata does
not continue to exist after death'... then these
statements refer to the skandhas only."(38) The
categories discussed in this quotation and the
entities referred to are part of phenomenal
experience. However, in terms of what the universe is
really like these statements are meaningless. They
derive their meaning only in the phenomenal context,
one does not "look in non-production [reality] for a
Tathaagata, nor for his turning of the wheel of
Dharma."(39) This is the reason behind the silence of
the Buddha when asked metaphysical questions.
Given the above metaphysical and epistemological
presuppositions grounding the Buddhist concept of
Wisdom, the dilemma it seemed to entail no longer
poses such a problem. Indeed, given this doctrine of
two truths and the metaphysical position it entails,
many Buddhist paradoxes even down to those of
modern-day Zen Buddhism are more understandable.
This, of course, does not imply that the Buddhist
position is a valid one. In fact, the whole position
stands or falls on the veracity of the praj~naa
awareness . The metaphysical position established
earlier and its epistemic correlate are derived from
praj~naa awareness. From a critical point of view,
the central question is whether there is a praj~naa
awareness and, if so, whether the praj~naapaaramitaa
interpretation is a valid one. The first question
must be assumed in the Buddhists favor. Empirically
one cannot deny that Buddhists do have and have had
for thousands of years an experience they refer to as
praj~naa. However, the second question is more
problematic. Restated it asks whether the awareness
achieved is one of reality or of some mind-created
illusion. If the former is the case, then, perhaps
the Positions outlined are correct, if the latter,
then it is Suchness that is an illusion and not the
empirical world. The praj~naapaaramitaa does not
present arguments for the veracity of praj~naa
awareness, but simply attempts to clarify the above
metaphysical and epistemological positions entailed
by that awareness in an understandable and internally
coherent fashion. The Maadhyamika school of Buddhism
established by Naagaarjuna will later make such a
philosophical attempt to support this position, but
an adequate investigation of that attempt

p.64

would take us beyond the scope of this article. Let
it suffice to say the thrust of his arguments is
reductio in nature: that is. he begins by assuming
the existence of the various factors necessary to
explain the nature of phenomenal experience (for
example, time, space, causality. material objects.
etc.). He then shows that such assumptions lead to
absurd results. Thus, he concludes that it is the
empirical world which is illusory. But let me stress
again that this does not entail a nihilism where
nothing exists, rather only that it is logically im-
possible for the world to exist as it is normally
perceived by vikalpa. Of course, the argument can
always be made that just because vikalpa is
invalidated as a mode of knowledge does not logically
entail that praj~naa is thereby validated. Praj~naa
could also be another type of illusory awareness. In
other words, there seems to be no logical necessity
that there be only two truths. Perhaps there is a
third, in the light of which the other two might be
relegated to illusion, and it would seem that this
process could conceivably go on ad infinitum.
These problems are the perennial considerations
that arise whenever there are knowledge-claims made
on the basis of direct experience. Wherever such
claims are made, the questions of verification and
objectivity ultimately arise. However, rather than
pursue these broader philosophical questions, I would
like to continue the specific task at hand and go on
to consider some of the soteriological implications
of this Buddhist concept of Wisdom.

III

The question arises as to what the Buddhist Man of
Wisdom is like. Given Wisdom how does he live in the
phenomenal world that he knows is empty of ultimate
reality? There are two sides to the answer to this
question. First is that the awareness of emptiness
leads to an attitude of nonattachment. Emptiness is
referred to as an antidote, It cures one of a
grasping attachment to worldly concerns by showing
that they are ultimately based on empty or false
distinctions, To see the essential nature of
phenomenal things "as a no-nature which has not been
brought about" leads to a state where "all points of
attachment will then be abandoned."(40) The
nonapprehension of all dharmas, the realization that
they are like a mirage or a dream leads the
Bodhisattva to not settle down in sa^msaara. He does
not attempt to appropriate any dharma but remains
unattached and free from them. Wisdom allows him no
support in the phenomenal world. This mode of
existence is referred to as nonattachment or
nonappropriation.(41)
This first side of the character of the
Bodhisattva often leads those outside the tradition
to view Buddhist Wisdom as leading to world-denial.
However, there is another side which puts
nonattachment in a more positive perspective. While
the Bodhisattva does not appropriate the dharmas, so
too, he does not abandon them either. Perfect Wisdom
then entails both "the non-appropriation and the
non-abandonment of all dharmas."(42) The reason for
this is, again, twofold. First, abandonment is seen
as a negative form of attachment. It implies

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that one is attached to the negation of that which is
being abandoned. However. as we discussed earlier,
Perfect Wisdom entails the nonduality or sameness of
sa^msaara and nirvaa.na. (Form is emptiness,
emptiness is form.) There is no other world for which
we could abandon this world. Perfect Wisdom is the
awareness of this world-the only world there is--as
it really is in its Suchness and not as it ordinarily
appears to be,
The second reason for the nonabandonment of the
phenomenal world is that Perfect Wisdom gives rise to
a deep sense of compassion (karu.naa). Perfect Wisdom
is Compassionate Wisdom for, while it is aware of the
emptiness of all dharmas, it also is aware that
emptiness is not separate from those dharmas and so
continues to distinguish the dharmas in an unattached
manner and goes forth into the world as an agent who
effects nirvana for the benefit of all sentient
beings. Ma~nju'srii Bodhisattva states that Perfect
Wisdom entails that:

One neither approaches the faults of birth-and-death
nor longs for the virtues of Nirvana, For one does
not review birth-and death, how much less its faults,
And I do not apprehend Nirvaa.na, how much less will
I see its virtues.(43)

Thus, the Bodhisattva neither attaches himself to
things in the world nor seeks to escape the world. He
is in the world but not of the world and seeks
selflessly to help his fellow sentient beings with
bliss bestowing hands. All this must be seen as a
rejection of the earlier Buddhist ideal of the Saint
(Arhat) who forsakes the world (sa^msaara) for the
bliss of some transcendent nirvaa.na. Given the
praj~naapaaramitaa identity of nirvaa.na and
sa^msaara, and their stress on Compassionate Wisdom,
this type of world-denial is considered a lesser
religious goal, Indeed, the Bodhisattva as the
Buddhist "man-for-others" presents us with the high
point of the Buddhist religious ideal, I would like
to conclude with a short investigation of the
religious implications of this Bodhisattva ideal. For
in terms of soteriology the Bodhisattva's relation to
the universe is uniquely religious,
Perfect Wisdom (praj~naapaaramitaa) is idealized
and personified as the "Mother" of the Tathaagata in
that it is Wisdom which begets enlightenment
(bodhi).(44) Like the Greek Sophia, Wisdom is viewed
as the great Mother Goddess. She is the genetrix of
enlightenment and truth, And through the aid of the
Bodhisattvas, she nourishes goodness and beauty in
the world, The Bodhisattva Practices perfection
(paaramitaa), with the aim of ridding all sentient
beings of the evils such as depression, fear, hate,
and greed, When sentient beings are happy the
Bodhisattva is friendly and joyful, When they are
sad, the Bodhisattva is compassionate, Thus one is
called on to seek a mode-of-existence that is
energetic, zestful, and vigorous, full of joy, love,
and compassion, and stressing courage, strength,
patience, and charity. All of these virtues are
extolled at length in the suutras. One should create
a pleasant and joyful environment for himself and for
others, for pleasant things can be enjoyed without
attac hment. It is said that the Buddhist householder
should seek "enjoyment of sense

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pleasures without settling down in them."(45)
Further, in such a cultivated environment one should
seek peace and be a "dweller in peace"
(ara.naa-vihaarin). The religious task then is to
manifest Wisdom in the world by a courageous,
energetic, joyful, loving, and compassionate
affirmation of the life and well being of one's
fellow sentient beings. Disgust with life and world
negation are seen as cowardly and low-spirited. These
attitudes are relegated to the lower level where one
works through his fears in order to gain clarity of
understanding, but once that clarity has been gained
such attitudes dissipate with the conquered fears:
"'Near Nirvaana even in this life, the saved do not
isolate themselves from the world, but become its
saviors."(46)
Thus, through his Wisdom the Bodhisattva sees
that all this is Suchness and that "This perfection
is undefiled."(47) It is only defiled by false
imagination (vikalpa) that covers it with phenomenal
distinctions (skandha-coverings). When these
coverings are stripped away from the transparent
luminosity (prabhaasvara) of praj~na, one sees that
"absolutely defilement does not exist."(48) Thus, the
Bodhisattva compassionately and courageously strives
to uncover this Highest Wisdom to all sentient
beings. It is in the light of this religious goal or
summum bonum that the above metaphysical and
epistemological doctrines must be viewed. Indeed, it
is my feeling that when this is done, one can come to
appreciate this Buddhist concept of Wisdom as an
extremely unique and profound contribution to the
history of philosophical and religious thought.

NOTES

1. Edward Conze, "The Ontology of the
Praj~naapaaramitaa," Philosophy East and West 3,
no. 2 (Jul. 1953): 117; hereafter cited as OP.

2. Edward Conze, The Praj~naapaaramitaa Literature
(London: Mouton & Co., 1960), p. 10.

3. Edward Conze, trans., Selected Sayings from the
Perfection of Wisdom 2d ed. (London: The Buddhist
Society, 1968), p. 84; hereafter cited as SS.

4. Edward Conze, trans., The Large Sutra on Perfect
Wisdom (London: Luzac and Co., 1961), p. 182;
hereafter cited as LS.

5. See: Theodore H. Stcherbatsky, The Central
Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta, 1923).

6. SS, p. 19.

7. LS, p.492.

8. SS, p. 95.

9. Edward Conze, trans., Abhisamayaala^nkaara (Rome:
1954) p. 95; hereafter cited as A. Also, see LS,
p. 372.

10. A, p. 45.

11. OP, p. 126.

12. LS, p. 15.

13. A, p. 66.

14. LS, p. 381.

15. LS, p. 373.

16. A, pp. 74-75.

17. LS, p. 191.

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18. LS. p. 374.

19. LS. p. 569.

20. OP. p. 124.

21. LS. p. xxviii.

22. LS. p. 84.

23. OP. p. 126.

24. SS. p. 81.

25. This whole distinction is analyzed in depth by
T.R.V. Murti in The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960). chap. 12.

26. LS, p. 357.

27. LS, p. 357.

28. A, p. 71.

29. LS. pp. 71. 75.

30. E. Conze, trans., Buddhist Wisdom Books (London:
Alien & Unwin, 1958), p. 81.

31. LS, p. 352.

32. LS, p. 598.

33. OP, p. 112.

34. LS, p. 642.

35. LS, p. 598.

36. LS, pp. 604-605.

37. SS, p. 84.

38. LS, p. 351.

39. LS, p. 191.

40. LS, p. 303.

41. LS, p. 42.

42. LS, p. 77.

43. SS, p. 84.

44. LS, p. 348.

45. LS, p. 401.

46. OP, p. 129.

47. LS, p. 317.

48. SS, p. 75. Transparent luminosity is referred to
by Conze as "Spirit."