The range of Buddhist ontology

·期刊原文
The range of Buddhist ontology

By Kenneth K. Inada
Philosophy East and West
Voulme 38, no. 3
July 1988
P.261-280

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P.261

The perception of the nature of reality in Buddhism
is a consequence of the Buddha's original
enlightenment. Failure to recognize this fact has
caused many problems in the understanding of
Buddhism. Many take the enlightenment to be strictly
a private affair and will skirt around it and not
involve it in any discussion, especially within the
framework of other doctrines and principles of
Buddhism. This is simply a gratuitous gesture and
serves no purpose at all. For the greatest gift of
the Buddha, after all, is his enlightenment and the
exposition he gave of it.

There is no doubt that the content of the
enlightenment revealed a rare philosophic vision of
reality. Although the vision has eluded the best
minds, it still remains the greatest challenge, a
literal lodestone, for all followers. That challenge
of course is with us today despite the evolution of
Buddhism in its variant forms throughout the Asian
continent and now throughout the world. I am
therefore using this occasion to expand on that
challenge with the primary aim of returning to
Buddhist fundamentals.

By focusing on the nature of Buddhist reality,
it is hoped that we can see later developments in
Buddhism in a better light. Moreover, by coming to
grips with Buddhist reality, it is possible to
establish a meaningful beginning in any dialogue,
that is, Buddhism vis-a-vis any system of thought,
and thereby forge ahead in constructing a solid
basis for understanding human existence. My analysis
is strictly preliminary. There is no finality or
absoluteness. Its strength must lie in its frankness
and boldness to articulate in a philosophic manner
the Buddhist reality of experience. In this, I am
indebted immeasurably to my predecessors and
contemporaries. While it is not possible to cover
all phases and developments in Buddhism, I regret
the omission of a systematic treatment of the
meditative discipline that delineates the climactic
process toward the enlightened way of life. There
are, of course, specialized works for that phase,
for example, the basic early Buddhist text on The
Foundations of Mindfulness (Satipa.t.thaana
Sutta).(1) Be that as it may, I sincerely believe
that any meditative discipline would be empty and
meaningless unless the devotee has some measure of
understanding of the nature of Buddhist reality. My
analysis will focus, then, on the following three
aspects: (1) reality and its locus, (2) the nature
and function of reality, and (3) the implications of
reality.

REALITY AND ITS LOCUS

There are indeed restrictive elements in our lives
and society at large which not only hinder, but
actually cover up the true perception of reality.
Attempts by recent philosophers, such as Heidegger
and Derrida, have underscored man's own intended or
unintended occluding of reality itself. Our lives
are already burdened (impregnated) by subtle
blinders, so to speak, that lead us uncon-

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sciously for the most part to color and prejudice
our perceptions. This has been a long process for
mankind. In this vein, Nolan P. Jacobson has
declared: "The chief cause of disorientation from
what is unconditionally real and ontologically open
to us is the linguistic system every encapsulated
culture-world employs to preserve its identity
regardless of its distortion of reality."(2)

Indeed, language as the basis of culture has
greatly stymied our efforts to have a clear
perception of reality. We are caught up with the
objects of perception established with precise
correlations to the concepts in use, and such
correlations have crystallized to the point of
generating a matter-of-fact attitude concerning the
whole perceptual process. This has prevented the
recovery of the original nature of things. It has
thus become difficult to go back to the
preconceptual bald existence, the primitive
developmental stage prior to the onset of the
accepted correlations. Here I do not, of course,
wish to cast any gloom on the situation for,
certainly, I do not for a moment feel that all is
lost. We must, however, endeavor to start from the
bare ground, from the pristine context of things, if
we are to search earnestly for the true ground of
existence. This is my intent in probing Buddhist
reality, and it is conceivable that this may have
been the initial impulse of Siddhaartha Gautama
(Buddha).

A slight digression will help us understand the
issues. In the so-called Axial Age, a phrase coined
by Karl Jaspers, both Eastern and Western traditions
made brilliant contributions to speculative
metaphysics. In these we are able to perceive two
central foci: being and becoming. Where the former
focuses on the permanent, unchanging, eternal
entities, the latter focuses on the impermanent,
changing phenomena. Men have been fascinated by
change from time immemorial, but, more importantly,
they were even more interested in the permanent
unchanging nature of things. Even Heraclitus, the
champion of change and flux in nature, sought in the
final analysis to understand the unchanging nature
in the changing world. He went back to the concept
of logos, the logic of the nature of things, but did
not succeed.

As we know, the Pre-Socratics gave us variations
on the being-becoming theme, that it was Plate who
brought it to a climax. He clearly divided the
realms of being and becoming and gave the former the
superior eternal status. He, more than anyone else,
exalted the mind by making it the home of the Form
(eidos); indeed, the Form expressed the ideality of
existence, the nature of truth and knowledge. On the
other hand, the "perpetually perishing'' realm of
becoming is short-lived, transient, unreliable, and
unrealizable in any sense. Attachment to this realm
denigrates knowledge to the status of an opinion.
The way out of this situation is to seek the eternal
Form within the becoming world of particulars. Plato
said that the Form participates in the particular,
but herein lies the crucial problem. How does it
participate?

Even Plato's brilliant student, Aristotle, was
puzzled over this question. It became the parting
point between the two thinkers. With a naturalistic
inclination, Aristotle dismissed the Form and
concentrated on the realm of becoming.

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He premised his own metaphysics on substance (ousia)
with its attributes to establish a most powerful
influence on man's view of nature in the West. Even
today, this substance-oriented metaphysics has
lingered on in many quarters, both professional and
lay.

Over on the Asian side, particularly in India,
there were similar attempts to come to grips with
changing and unchanging phenomena. Saa.mkhya
philosophy, for example, emphasized the
indestructible nature of the soul (puru.sa) despite
its involvement in the physical nature of things
(prak.rti), but in the quest for the enlightened
life, the soul would finally triumph over the
physical.

The same format is seen in the Vedaanta system.
To wit, it postulated the empirical self (aatman)
bound up in the changing world, but when its purity
is uncovered by virtue of yogic discipline. the self
can rise above the impurities to become the greater
self (AAtman) and thereby identify itself within the
total nature of things (Brahman). This approach
certainly was a great spiritual insight; it captured
the imagination of the Indians and has enabled the
dominant Hindu philosophy to thrive so powerfully up
to the present day.

Early in the Indian philosophical milieu, the
Buddha appeared to give a novel twist to the eternal
quest for the unchanging within the changing
phenomena. He was literally the Plato of his times
for he offered a great revolutionary thought, a
penetrative insight into things as they really are.
His insight was remarkably free of technicalities,
although new terms and new interpretations were in
order. All previously accepted views had to go, for
they simply did not fit into the new scheme of
things. Thus, a novel approach required a novel
perspective, which, in turn, gave new meaning and
expressions to old terms or terms in current use. In
brief, it was the dawn of a new ontology, a radical
ontology, that essentially turned things right side
up from the roots of existence rather than muddle
through and attempt to justify the prosaic elements
of existence that ordinary beings live by.

From all indications, the Buddha's message was a
philosophy of the present or an understanding of the
nature of the momentary nows in the quest for
enlighrenment. In a series of short chapters in the
Majjhima-nikaaya, the Buddha repeatedly emphasized
that "the past should not be followed after, the
future not desired" and, in turn, that one ought to
concentrate on the present things, that is, present
happenings.(3)

Buddhism was early characterized by the
so-called Three Marks, that is, impermanence
(anicca), suffering (dukkha), and nonself(anattaa).
Close examination will reveal that these marks
actually refer to the "contents" of the Buddha's
enlightened state. In that state of existence, he
experienced the basic momentary nature of existence,
the cessation of the nature of suffering, and the
uncompounded nature of the self. In contrast, the
unenlightened state shows up the exact opposite,
that is, the incessant quest for the permanent
nature of things, the interminable rise of the
nature of suffering states, and the persistence of
personal identity or the self. Our common knowledge
of things would

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apparently sanction such states of being, seeing
nothing wrong with those features of permanence,
suffering, and self. This is conventional
understanding, and so the Buddhist is quick to
respond that in conventionality we do not really
grasp the truly natural states of existence, but
rather go against those states by manipulating the
natural flow.

It seems quite obvious that life is a process, a
series of moments that continue on and on until
death overtakes.(4) Even the Buddha denied life
after death, the immortality of the soul, on the
grounds that it would transgress and disregard the
normal flow of existence. Thus, if immortality or
permanence (eternality) is not to be experienced,
then the concentration would have to be on the
moment-to-moment existence. In this way, the great
insight was not about permanent or eternal life, but
on the microscopic behavior within momentary
existence. That is, it denied the attachment to
permanent entities within the cycle of life
(sa.msaara), that each cycle, though unique and
independently related, is but a segment of the
continuum of life. As such, nothing permanent
resides in the continuum, nor is anything made
permanent by the cycle or moment in question. Each
cycle or moment, moreover, is a compounding
phenomenon where its own character is revealed in
its own"carving out" process within the continuum.
The continuum is more like a symmetrical series of
intersecting and overlapping phenomena. But within
this context of things, it is so easy to refer to a
permanent nature of a self that is directing the
compounding activity. This is a simple case of
placing the cart before the horse, since the very
nature of the self is that it is already a
compounded phenomenon (sa^nkhaata). In other words,
to set the self apart from the activity itself is to
commit a fallacy of misplaced abstraction or simply
to beg the question. The self, therefore, does not
exist in the moment-to-moment continuum; if
reference is made to it at all, then it would have
to be in terms of what has already transpired. This
is looking to the past and not in any way infringing
on the present or the future. As an illustration, a
potter may claim ownership of the pots he has made
but, strictly speaking, he cannot claim his
artisanship as a potter. Put another way, an
association is conventionally made with respect to
the potter and his pots, but in the reality of
pot-making there is neither the potter nor the pot,
but only pottering. it should be clear that the
potter and the pot are always involved in the
dynamics of the continuum of existence and that
references to them are mere abstractions and belong
to "dry metaphysics."

Understanding the nature of universal suffering
is the key. The Buddha repeats over and over again
that failure to accept the impermanent nature of
things will result in suffering, that is, seeking
permanent elements in the impermanent, and the
resolution can only come when one realizes that
there is no self that seeks the permanent, indeed no
self at all.(5) Specifically, he expounded the rise
of suffering in terms of the incessant thirst
(ta.nhaa) that keeps the life cycle going. He
mentioned three phenomena of thirst. The first deals
with the perpetuation of the whole biological nature
of human beings, the thirst for sen-

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sual pleasures (kaama-ta.nhaa) , that is, the
constant gratification of our senses in permanent
ways, like sustained eating or seeing something
appealing or attractive. This is the most common of
the three phenomena and thus the easiest to
understand and accept as a basis for the continuance
of the life cycle.(6)

The second and third phenomena are highly
psychological in nature in that there is a conscious
intent involved, though deviant in nature, either to
continue or to discontinue in the life cycle. To
wit, the second is known as the thirst for existence
or the becoming nature (bhava-ta.nhaa), which is
perhaps akin to Schopenhauer's celebrated will to
live or to Freud's general nature of eros. It can be
illustrated by the child's conscious effort by
imitation or other means to grow up as fast as
possible, to become a teenager, or it can even be
manifested in the case of an elderly person who does
everything possible to slow down the pace of life in
order to increase longevity. In either instance,
something forced or strained or manipulatory has
entered to distort the natural life cycle.

The third phenomenon is the desire to annihilate
oneself (vibhava-ta.nhaa) or the tendency toward
self-destruction. Naturally, it includes suicidal
attitudes as well as the fascination with death or
the dead. In this respect, it is akin to Freud's
reference to thanatos.

These three phenomena are basic drives in man
which may or may not be apparent or consciously
striven for, and yet, over a period of time, they do
appear in more obvious or crystallized forms. In
fact, the Buddha, immediately after enlightenment,
was quite reluctant to expound on the nature of his
enlightenment precisely because human beings are
fundamentally consumed by these drives or thirsts.
They are so blinded by the elements of these desires
or thirsts that they are prevented from probing the
very foundation of the momentary happenings. Indeed,
their unreal existence is so ingrained that they
could not be jolted sufficiently enough to
experience the dramatically revolutionary perception
of things. After much entreaty by his friends and
followers, however, the Buddha reconsidered his
initial stand and decided to expound his nirvaa.nic
experience in the form of the famous Four Noble
Truths, which are essentially the truth of universal
suffering and the way out of it.

It would serve us well to pause here and assess
the personal situation of the Buddha when he decided
to expound. Although the suutras do not precisely
record his inner feelings or thoughts. we may
indulge in some speculation here. For the situation
is undeniably the greatest moment in the story of
Buddhism.(7) Therein lies the basis of the Buddha's
truth of existence (Dhamma, Dharma) and his helping
hand.

My judgment on the matter is that the Buddha
decided to expound on his enlightenment not only
because he was prompted by his infinite compassion
for his fellow creatures but also, more profoundly,
because this was for the sake of revealing a deeper
nature of momentary existence that resides in, so to
speak, the compassionate act itself. That is, he
came to the realization that

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existence is a truly open nature and that
individuals living in the world, regardless of their
capacities, mirror that very openness in their
momentary existence. Thus, a moment of existence, in
its openness, absorbs indiscriminately as well as
relates equally with everything in its wake,
although in our ordinary perceptions, due to our
volitional karmic forces, we mold everything by a
process of selection, restriction, and retention in
order to clarify and continue our activities; yet in
so doing we unconsciously overlook the holistic
nature or framework in which evenything is naturally
flowing. We see the proverbial tip of the iceberg of
human existence rather than the whole openness, the
vastness, in every momentary existence. The
selectivity and fragmentation of momentary existence
sharpen our perceptions, to be sure, by sending
clear and distinct images to our minds. but, at the
same time, they narrow the existential compass of our
own beings and thereby contribute toward our own
undoing.

Holistic or total nature does not merely mean a
greater sphere of existence or a fuller volume of
data. The Buddha, I believe, saw another unique
dimension to the total nature of things. This is the
reflexive nature of existence. In our case, the
momentary existence means that at each moment or
cycle, the total or holistic nature is reflexive in
the sense of a vital or dynamic two-way phenomenon,
that is, it reaches as far as it will go in
manifesting its own nature, but, simultaneously, it
reflects back at each step of the expanding process.
This dimension is missing, neglected, or even
ignored in our ordinary treatment of human
experience. The pnenomenon must apply in human
behavior. The relationship we speak of in human
contacts is, from the Buddhist perspective, always a
two-way reflexive process. A person's behavior
toward another, for example, is always reflexive,
mutually speaking, although the reflexive nature of
mutuality is generally uncognized and unfelt by the
persons involved. The deadening of reflexivity is
becoming increasingly patent in a world dominated by
the tangible elements and in which even human beings
are similarly treated. The nature of reflexivity is
indeed subtle, but its presence must be respected in
our relations. In many respects, it provides the
vital component for the fruition or fullness of
momentary existence.

Concepts such as mutuality and human relations
are normally interpreted in a more tangible
framework, but it should be noted that there is also
much of the intangible nature that goes along with
the tangibles. That things are in mutuality means
that they mutually support each other in their
natures, that is, they reflect each other, and each
cannot exist without the other. Such being the case,
it would be apparent that a focus on the tangibles
alone does not give us the whole picture on the
involvement of the relationship in question. Yet,
this is precisely the kind of truncated perception
and understanding that we normally pursue, promote,
and perpetuate.

In sum, then, Buddhist reality or ontology is
dynamic, and its locus is in the momentary nows,
however elusive, nebulous, and uncharacterizable
they may be.

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THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF REALITY

The Four Noble Truths have already indicated that
there is the rise of a universal nature of suffering
and a way out of it. This situation, simple as it
may seem, establishes the fact that the nature of
suffering and the cessation of suffering take place
in the selfsame reality of existence, a situation
not unlike that of a sick person regaining health
again without any dramatic physiological changes. In
both, the ontological status has remained relatively
stable throughout the process. Consistent with this
understanding and, expanding on it, the Buddha made
the following cryptic statement:

Whatever is of the nature of arising, all that is of
the nature of cessation.

Although the central thought is already
manifested in the Four Noble Truths, this statement
reveals one of the great philosophic insights. The
term "all" refers to the dhammas (dharmas), the
factors of experience, which manifest themselves in
the momentary existence. But the same passage goes
on to say that there arose the "dustless, stainless
vision of the dhamma."(9) We note that the factors
of existence are now seen from the enlightened
standpoint. The most striking thing here is that
both the unenlightened and enlightened natures
belong to the selfsame momentary existence. The
arising and cessation of dhammas are then two
aspects of the dynamics of the moments as they are
relative to the state of suffering and the state of
release.

It is clearly seen that arising has to do with
the compounding (sa^nkhaara) or grasping (upaadaana)
nature of the dhammas, and cessation has to do with
the noncompounding and nongrasping phenomena. In
brief, there is what I call the parity of existence.
This can be labeled the ontological parity, for it
is centered on momentary existence whether in the
enlightened or unenlightened sense. The fact that
the same term, dhamma, can be seen from two
different aspects or perspectives means that
Buddhist reality is always close to home, that it is
not separated or alienated from our common
experiences. On the one hand, common experience
functions with the pluralistic dhammas, which are by
their very grasped natures already stained or
tainted. On the other hand, that selfsame realm of
common experience could function without the
pluralistic dhammas or could simply be envisioned as
dustless, stainless dhammas, the singular unified
nature of existence. It means that our ordinary
sa.msaaric life, as tangled as it is, has all the
necessary ingredients for the transformation into
the inordinate nirvaa.nic life. In a way, this
spells out the saving truth of mundane existence.
And so the Udaana, in a very cryptic way, summed it
up as follows:

There is, O Bhikkhus, an unborn, unoriginated,
uncreated, unformed. Were there not, O Bhikkhus,
this unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed,
there would be no escape from the world of the born,
originated, created, formed.(10)

The passage clearly indicates that there is a
way out of the normal conditioned or compounded
realm of existence (sa.msaara) because there is a
parity

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principle in function that is intrinsic to momentary
existence. In brief, the unborn, unoriginated, and
so forth is not somewhere aloof or transcendental of
the born, originated, and so forth, but it
constitutes the pure realm realizable when the
compounding elements are no longer in force.

With this concept of the ontological parity of
existence in place, we may proceed to discuss
further the nature of momentary existence. After
repeatedly asserting the impermanent nature of
things, that is, reference to the five skandhas, the
Buddha launched into a series of fundamental
doctrines. The passage is one of the finest
philosophical expressions made by the Buddha. The
first part reads:

On two things, Kaccaana, does this world generally
base its view, --on existence and on non-existence.
Now he who with right insight sees the arising of
the world as it really is, does not believe in the
non-existence of the world. But, Kaccaana, he who
with right insight sees the ceasing of the world as
it really is, does not believe in the existence of
the world.(11)

The passage is clearly focused on the dynamics
of momentary existence. As a result of his
enlightenment, the Buddha very well knew that
conventional understanding works in devious and
dichotomous ways, that is, the extremes of existence
(bhava) and nonexistence (abhava), two terms we have
earlier seen on the thirsts of life (ta.nhaa).
Within the context of the impermanent nature of
things, he saw that these dichotomous terms are the
most dominant extremes that human beings are
attached to and that, thus conditioned, they are not
able to intimate with their own momentary existence.
Thus he saw that without proper vision, the
dichotomy will remain and that from this basic
dichotomy other dichotomies will arise. It is here
that he revealed what right insight will do. If one
envisions the arising of the world, that is, the
rising of a moment, as it really is, then one will
not fall into nihilistic tendencies or
understanding. On the othet hand, if one envisions
the ceasing of the world as it really is, then one
will not fall into materialistic or substantive
understanding. "To envision the world as it really
is" precisely describes the relational dynamics
involved in the momentary nature of one's life, that
is, experiencing in a natural mode. Failing to
realize that mode, the dichotomous nature swiftly
takes over and overwhelms the experiencer. But
despite the snares of dichotomy. the ontological
parity remains nascent, so to speak, and shows the
way out of the dilemma, a way which is made possible
by meditative discipline.

The Buddha went further to clarify the first
part, thus:

[H]e who does not go after, does not grasp at, does
not take his stand on this system-grasping, this
dogma, this mental bias,--such an one does not say
"it is my soul (self, attaa)." He who thinks, "that
which arises is but ill (suffering, dukkha): that
which ceases, it is ill," such an one has no doubts,
no perplexity. In this matter, knowledge not
borrowed from others comes to him. Thus far,
Kaccana, goes right view.(12)

The Buddha is certainly correct here to point
out that in our ordinary views on life and the
world, we are prejudiced by "dogmas" and "mental
biases"

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such that we are no longer able to view our
existential flow correctly. Thus we must forsake any
metaphysical conceptions, such as the self, and
properly ride the horse that pulls the cart, so to
speak. Clearly, the right view (sammaa-di.t.thi)
expounded by the Buddha is not a mere intellectual
alignment, but a truly existential transformation of
the primary order, if I may so phrase it.

The Budhha ends the passage with a series of
most profound statements: "All exists, "
Kaccaana,--that is one extreme. "Nought exists,"
Kaccaana, --that is the other extreme. Not
approaching either extreme, Kaccana, the Tathaagata
(Buddha) teaches you a doctrine by the middle way:
"Conditioned by ignorance comes the activities:
conditioned by the activities comes consciousness,
and so forth." Thus is the arising of this whole
mass of ill (suffering). By the utter fading away
and ceasing of ignorance comes the ceasing of the
activities, and so forth. Thus is the ceasing of
this entire mass of ill.(13)

By not approaching the two extremes of existence
and nonexistence, the Buddha now introduces the
doctrine of the middle way (majjhimaapa.tipadaa).
And this doctrine is another way of expressing the
famous doctrine of dependent origination
(pa.ticcasamuppaada) . Here we note a virtual
identity of the two doctrines. It is interesting to
note that Naagaarjuna (150-250 A.D.) later makes the
same equation except that he interposes the concept
of emptiness (`suunyataa)--but more on this later.

It should also be noted that the foundation
suutra that sets in motion the Wheel of Dhamma
(Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta), popularly known as
the "First Sermon," identifies the middle way with
the Eightfold Noble Path--right view, right thought,
right speech, right action, right living, right
effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. It
also goes on to say that the middle way gives vision
and knowledge and leads to calm, insight,
enlightenment, and finally Nibbaana (Nirvaa.na).

The identity of the middle way and the Eightfold
Noble Path is plausible and acceptable in light of
the previous passage on the right view, which
constitutes the first step of the path. The right
view is the initial and primary corrective measure
in which it is necessary for the devotee to engage
himself so as to proceed with the rest of the steps
in the path ending in right concentration
(sammaasamaadhi).

As it now seems clear, the much neglected middle
way is a unique doctrine in Buddhism found nowhere
else in either the East or the West. It has nothing
to do with the workings of the rational or logical
mind, that is, the logical entities with which we
carry out logical functions. It is not subject to
mensuration or calculation, nor is it subject to a
moderating process a la Aristotle or by common
sense. It is rather a truly dynamic doctrine
delineating the supreme momentary nature of things,
and, in this sense, it denies all functions of
contingent matters or factors of experience. In
fact, it avoids these elements or factors in order
to issue forth the underlying pure, untainted nature
of momentariness. If anything, it underlies without
involving itself with those elements or factors; but
this should not be construed to mean that the middle
way is a receptacle of

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being or a catchall doctrine. It still remains a
strong guiding principle, indescribable by means of
contingent elements, and functions like a border
guard who checks for contraband but permits the
normal flow of traffic. The middle way, in brief, is
another means of exhibiting things (moments) as they
really are.

The fact that dependent origination is depictive
of Buddhist reality is readily seen in the following
assertion by the Buddha:

Who sees Conditioned Genesis (pa.ticca-samuppaada)
sees Dhamma; who sees Dhamma sees Conditioned
Genesis.(14)

The passage has several implications. Foremost
is the identity of the Dhamma and conditioned
genesis or dependent origination, but the identity
holds true only from the enlightened realm. Another
implication is that conditioned genesis has two
facets, that is the nonempirical (enlightened) and
empirical (unenlightened). A further implication is
that the two facets are possible and function
together because of the ontological parity of
existence. Moreover, the parity is assumed in the
movement from the empirically oriented dependent
origination to the Dhamma. In many respects,
empirical dependent origination depicts the rise and
fall of experiential events and provides the vital
link to the realm of Dhamma. In its empirical mode,
the pet formula for dependent origination is as
follows:

If this is, that comes to be; from the arising of
this that arises; if this is not that does not come
to be; from the stopping of this that is
stopped.(15)

The formula is simple enough. At first glance,
it reminds one of the general criterion of
pragmatism, that is, if certain conditions are met,
then certain results will follow. This is well and
good, but the formula further reveals the subtle
empirical dynamics of the rise of suffering and its
cessation. The first part of the formula refers to
the incessant conditioning or compounding nature of
ordinary experience. To wit,

Conditioned by ignorance are the karma-formations;
conditioned by karma-formations is consciousness;
conditioned by consciousness is mind-and-body; etc.(16)

With this series of conditioned natures, the
existential continuum will go on forever, that is,
sa.msaara or the wheel of life. The Buddhist
naturally seeks to resolve the situation but, once
again, the selfsame reality of suffering is the
ground for an ontological shift, so to speak, that
is, from the rise of sa.msaaric conditions to the
cessation thereof. Thus, the second part of the
formula precisely describes this shift. To wit,

From the stopping of ignorance is the stopping of
the karma-formations; from the stopping of the
karma-formations is the stopping of consciousness;
from the stopping of the consciousness is the
stopping of mind-and-body; etc.(17)

P.271

The suutras rarely elaborate on the specifics of
this aspect of cessation. In the
Sa.myutta-nikaaya,(18) for example, it says that the
Eightfold Noble Path is the course leading to the
stopping of karma formations. Right view, the first
of the path, is indeed a most profound insight into
reality, but it is a tortuous path for any person to
take up, much less to understand. Naturally,
meditative discipline is prescribed to remove the
initial ignorance, the hindrances, and the
graspings.

The twelve-linked dependent origination has a
clockwise flow (anuloma) --from ignorance (avijjaa)
to aging-death (jaraa-mara.na) and a
counter-clockwise flow (pa.tiloma)--from aging-death
to ignorance. This is another instance of the
dimensional nature inherent in momentary existence
that depicts the rise and cessation of suffering. We
go back necessarily to momentary existence and the
uniqueness of each moment, although there is no way
to avoid the conditions (paccayas) that must be
present or absent, as the case may be, in the flow
of momentary existence. The focus is still on that
moment which is supremely and vitally "appearing."
It is like watching a spot in the ocean where a wave
appears and disappears but only to be "replaced" by
another wave, ad infinitum.

There is another important dimension in
momentary existence that cannot be overlooked. The
linking phenomena of dependent origination are not
only linked in serial order, each condition
contiguous to the next, but each condition is
involved with the immediate past and present in a
mutually penetrative sense. In this way, the flow of
momentary existence is not limited to a serial order
(merely seriatim) , but proceeds in a rhythmic
asymmetric-symmetric flow, where the present
happenings have a backward thrust (asymmetric
penetration) before appearing as a present moment.
The range of Buddhist reality is seen clearly in
these microscopic present happenings. Thus the
concept of dependent origination, by its very
compounding nature, shows the asymmetric (dependent)
nature as well as the symmetric (origination)
nature. Yet, after all of that has been said, we
must note that this novel asymmetric-symmetric
relationship is known only within the framework of
the empirical nature of things--the sa.msaaric
realm.

At any rate, dependent origination in the
empirical sense forces the continuity of the process
of suffering. This is the wrong path.(19) It must be
stopped, but how? In the empirical realm, things are
going on in truncated ways; we only get glimpses of
the total happenings. We see the rim, axle, and
spokes of the wheel, but not the full function of
the wheel itself. Something seems to be missing or
lacking in the dynamics. What is it?

In the Discourse on Complete Purity for
Alms-Gathering, we get a revealing statement on the
fullness of being. The conversation between the
Buddha and Saariputta runs:

Your faculties are very bright, Saariputta, your
complexion very pure, very clear. In which abiding
are you, Sariputta, now abiding in the fulness
thereof?

P.272

Abiding in (the concept of) emptiness do I, revered
sir, now abide in the fulness thereof.

It is good, Saariputta it is good. You, Saariputta,
are now indeed abiding in fulness in the abiding of
great men. For this is the abiding of great men,
Saariputta, that is to say (the concept of)
emptiness.(20)

The concept of emptiness (su~n~nataa) has added
a new dimension to Buddhist reality. It has revealed
at once (a) the limited nature of empirical
functions, that is, empirical dependent origination
and (b) the way out to the unlimited realm in which
the dependent origination can resolve itself. Simply
put, the self, mind, chariot, wheels, and so forth
are more than their respective constituent parts.
They come alive as they are in reality, but their
imposed natures have made them into static entities,
metaphysically and ontologically speaking.

Buddhaghosa, the great Theravaada interpreter,
gave us an authoritative account of this situation
when he brought back a verse depicting the wheel of
becoming.

Becoming's wheel reveals no known beginning;
No maker, no experiencer there;
Void with a twelvefold voidness, and nowhere
It ever halts; for ever it is spinning.(21)

His interpretation was made in the fifth century
A.D., but the idea of voidness goes back to the
earliest period and may even have filtered back from
Mahaayaana developments, since he was a native of
South India, some say North India.

Prior to Buddhaghosa and in the Mahaayaana
tradition, we find Naagaarjuna (150-250 A.D.) giving
the final touches to the elusive momentary
existence. Undoubtedly, he had been exposed to the
ideas found in the early Mahaayaana suutras, such as
the Praj~naapaaramitaa, Avata^msaka,
Saddharmapu.n.dariika and Vimalakiirti suutras. His
great work, Verses on the Fundamental Middle
Doctrine (Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, hereafter
Kaarikaa), is actually a philosophic confirmation of
the dynamics of dependent origination as the locus
of Buddhist reality. In order to establish this, he
had to discuss matters from the standpoint of the
middle way, hence the namesake in the title of the
work (madhyamaka), to involve (a) the most inclusive
view of reality and (b) the most systematic denial
(prasa^nga) of self-existent nature (svabhaava). In
this respect, it is natural that there is reference
to the famous Kaatyaayanaavavaada (Karccaayanagotta
Sutta), which we have seen earlier in the Pali
version as foundational to the understanding of the
middle way concept. By this reference, the basic
idea on the radical ontology and methodology is kept
intact.

In his analysis, Naagaarjuna utilizes the
concept of emptiness (`suunyataa) to clarify both
the epistemological and metaphysical traps into
which ordinary beings are prone to fall. He gives
the concept a distinctive ubiquitous quality.
Epistemologically, emptiness keeps at bay any
attempt to impose a self-nature or self-existent
nature on any externally existing entity or on its
image or im-

P.273

pression derived thereof in the mind. In this sense,
it signifies the function of epistemic nullity.
Metaphysically, emptiness disallows any reference to
being or nonbeing, or a combination of both. It also
disallows any causal order or relationship applied
to momentary existence because that would sunder the
process in dichotomous ways and thereby strain or
distort the dynamics of dependent origination.

Naagaarjuna's first chapter of the Kaarika is a
brilliant analysis on the inanity of causal or
relational conditions (pratyayas) in terms of
establishing the nature of the dependent origination
dynamics. It is seizing the bull of causal
conditions by the horns and turning them against the
proponent's position, which inherently subscribes to
the concepts of being (sat, bhaava) and nonbeing
(asat, abhaava) . The doctrine of momentariness
became an issue with the Abhidharma systems because
of the element of justifying temporal dimensions in
existence, that is, how to cope with the continuity
of the moments of existence. On this matter, the
Sarvaastivaada seems to rely on the persistence of
factors (dharmas) to describe the moments in
question. The Sautraantika, on the other hand, tried
to sneak in a specious self (pudgula) to act as an
"overlord" of the momentary process. But Naagaarjuna
sensed the pitfalls of these systems by pointing out
the inner contradictions that would invariably sink
them deeper into the conundrum of existence.

Naagaarjuna was intensely interested in
justifying the present dynamics of momentary
existence as expressed in the doctrine of dependent
origination. Opponents, including the average
intellect for that matter, do not understand the
microscopic process of these dynamics because their
understanding is framed within a network of huge
chunks of temporal and spatial dimensions. Like the
Buddha, he saw that the dynamics reveal more than
what is seen in ordinary perception. In this, he was
not introducing an entirely new conception of things
for he went right back to the fundamental doctrines
to analyze in a truly philosophic fashion the
pregnant dynamics of dependent origination. They are
"pregnant" in the sense that (a) they do not focus
on a finished product or effect (phala). which would
invariably reduce to the hypostatization of an
inherent self-nature in the process, but rather (b)
they focus on the very making of the product or
effect, the very fiber of dependent orgination. Yet
we do not become cognizant of that product or effect
in question until we become conscious of the
conditionality (pratiityasamutpanna) of the event
itself. This is ex post facto understanding. It is
perceiving the nature of a conditionality that
describes the transpired event. It is understanding
the mode of existence of an event in the immediately
transpired past tied to the present becoming. There
is nothing wrong about this backward dependence, as
normal perception and immediate memory reveal the
presence of events in the rapidity of becomingness.
Nothing again is wrong concerning an understanding
of events by metaphysical descriptions. The crucial
point, however, is that an event is always
transpiring in the immediacy, in this present
momentary existence, and that at that

P.274

point all descriptions are mute. Given this
situation, the reality of an event cannot be in the
past, however immediate in time it is, but rather it
must reside in the present dynamics. It is here that
the "pregnancy" of the event takes on an important
meaning.(22)

To elaborate on the "pregnancy" of an event, let
us return to the concept of asymmetric dimension.
How the asymmetric relationship occurs is a large
problem. Whether Naagaarjuna knew fully of this
dimension and whether his works manifest it cannot
be answered directly. Indeed, it is difficult to
discuss the borders between symmetric and asymmetric
natures, and yet our common understanding seems to
suggest their function. Naagaarjuna would probably
say that to define or describe the momentary
becoming with the symmetric and asymmetric
dimensions in mind is clearly to attempt another
tortuous trip down the dichotomy lane, a blatant
contradiction of the middle way. He would
further more recommend the meditative discipline to
clear away the webs of our inherent dichotomous
understanding of things. The middle way avoids the
poles of dichotomy, but at once affirms the reality
of the rise and cessation of current becomings, as
seen earlier. The four relational conditions
(namely, hetu-pratyaya, aalambana-pratyaya,
anantara-pratyaya, adhipateya-pratyaya) are neat
ties that cement the elements (svabhaava natures) in
the dynamics, but, on the other hand, they impede
rather than foster the current becomings. Thus
Naagaarjuna denied their function in the dynamics of
becoming. The famous Eight Noes or Negations
(namely, nonextinction, nonorigination,
nondestruction, nonpermanence, nonidentity,
nondifferentiation, noncoming into being, and
nongoing out of being) are asserted to hold in check
any misunderstanding based on the reification of
sense impressions or the reification of reification,
as the case may implicate itself to be. Buddhist
reality, in brief, is much too dynamic to stay in
view in a certain holding patterns (upaadaana
effect) and to establish its identity at any time or
in any manner. Self-identity is no identity in the
becomingness of things.

Perhaps, on second thought, Naagaarjuna did have
an answer to the symmetric-asymmetric dimensionality.
It may be possible that he reaffirmed the concept of
emptiness in order to "cross the borders" of the
alleged dimensions. Like the middle way, emptiness
avoids the dichotomy and at once affirms the rise
and cessation of current becomings. Indeed,
emptiness is said to be a provisional concept
(praj~napti) pointing at the middle way.(23) It
expresses the dynamic, open ontological process that
has no truck with epistemic and metaphysical
entities. It opens up both sides of the borders, so
to speak, and. in terms of emptying the factors
(dharmas) of the wheel of becoming (dependent
origination), it serves to identify the realms of
sa.msaara and nirvaa.na. As Naagaarjuna is wont to
say, emptiness should not be falsely grasped, for it
is in reality that which makes momentary becoming
possible and, without it, momentary becoming would
be meaningless and without vitality.(24)

The concept of emptiness, to be sure, was
central in praj~naapaaramitaa suutras and other
Mahaayaanistic works. The Diamnnd Suutra and Heart
Suutra, for ex-

P.275

ample, present us with a capsuled accounting of the
identity of the five skandhas and emptiness, and
vice versa.(25) This is one of the clearest
expressions of the ontological parity of
experiential reality seen in Buddhist literature. In
reality, it is not only an expression but a guide
and goal in meditative discipline. From the
corporeal nature to the conscious realm, the empty
nature is basic and confirmed in the dynamics of
dependent origination. Being an heir to this
tradition, Naagaarjuna simply incorporated the
emptiness idea into his own analysis of the
fundamental concept of dependent origination,
bringing into play rare insight into the dynamics,
and thereby he set a high-water mark in Buddhist
philosophical understanding.

IMPLICATIONS OF REALITY

The unity of experience, the being in becoming, is
an enigma for all. No need, however, to introduce a
Platonic demiurge to tie up things. In our
discussion so far, we have seen how the Buddha's
enlightenment gave a new twist to the whole matter.
His supreme enlightenment was the beginning of a
radical ontology of experience, one which turned our
ordinary understanding of ontologies
(substance-oriented) into a new phenomenon of
unencumbered existence. We must now probe the
implications of Buddhist reality based on the
central doctrine of dependent origination.

The compounded term, dependent origination, has
the dependent nature expressed by the Sanskrit,
pratiitya, which breaks down etymologically to prati
+ ii, which means "to go toward," "to go to meet"
but it also means "to come back" and "to
return."(26) Thus the meaning here is inclusive of
both going toward something and returning with that
something. Put another way, in the supremely
microscopic momentary existence. each moment can be
taken to be a singular "act" or movement, that is, a
phenomenon of "going-returning" or "reaching
out-bringing in." And from the initial or incipient
condition of dependence (pratiitya), there is a
total arising of the moment of existence
(samutpaada). This is experiential becoming at its
most fundamental level.

Our one- or two-dimensional bias in the
perception of things would normally assign a single
movement, either "to go" or "to return," without
being mindful of the nature of continuity. The two
movements, furthermore, cannot be conceived together
because one movement has to cease before the other
takes over. In this way, the continuum of existence
is broken off or vitiated, but this is a very common
understanding issuing forth from the empirically
oriented realm. In a way, it shows up the Humean
dilemma on giving up on causal connection. At any
rate, the rise of the moment in its incipient
dependent stage (asymmetric nature) shows up the
reflexive character, without which the doctrine of
dependent origination will lose any sense of
continuity in the nature of becoming. Thus,
dependent origination is a multidimensional
phenomenon which depicts the asymmetric-symmetric
nature in the growth of the moment, but each
currently appearing moment is a vital part of the
continuum of exis-

P.276

tence. We cannot really know the exact nature of the
moment or the territory that it occupies, as it
were, but here we must rely on our perceptual memory
of past events in order to derive some semblance of
the characteristics of those events. But how do we
intimate with any of the characteristics?

The question must have taxed the imagination of
the early thinkers of the Mahaayaana tradition,
including Naagaarjuna. They were in search of a
concept that is at once thoroughly neutral and
pervasive in all experiences. It must be neutral in
the sense that it does not participate with the
elements in the empirical realm. It must be
pervasive in the sense that it permits the elements
to be what they are, but at the same time serves as
a kind of universal ground for momentary existence.

At any rate, the early thinkers found what they
were looking for in the concept of emptiness.
"Emptiness," "voidness," "nothingness." and so forth
are weak translations for the original term,
`suunyataa. It does not, however, mean nonentity in
the literal sense. It means empty of content, that
is, nonsubstantive nature, but at the same time it
connotes the swelling of the locus of reality. Taken
in this dual sense, nonsubstantive nature and
swelling, it refers to the fullness of existence.
Moreover, both connotations reveal the potency and
pregnancy of the moment of existence.

The role and function of emptiness are
inestimable.(27) It has opened up the floodgates to
an understanding of human existence in all its
aspects. With its later refinement, it only
confirmed the radical ontology ushered in by the
Buddha's momentous experience.

In Mahaayaana Buddhism--the liberal or "radical"
wing of Buddhism--the implications of emptiness
fostered the development of different schools of
thought. Yet, in all phases of the development, the
focus did not deviate from the momentary nature of
things, nor did it forsake any of the basic
doctrines of early Buddhism. Diverse systems such as
Tantrism, Pure Land, Ch'an (Zen), Hua-yen, and so
forth, with their respective novel doctrines, all
brought their ideas together in the basic context of
dependent origination. In time Mahaayaana Buddhism
identified four types of dependent origination.
Because space does not allow me to develop each in
detail, I shall mention them only briefly and save
the detailed analysis for another occasion. In a
way, the four types give a sweeping view of the
whole of Mahaayaana development.

1. Dependent origination by karma (action or
volitional force). This is the basic type which we
have seen in early Buddhism, that is, the
twelve-linked dependent origination. The point is
that in each linking process there is a karmic
effect which causes the linkage; for example, based
on ignorance (avijjaa) the dispositions (sa^nkhaara)
arise, and so forth in either a forward or a
backward cycle. Mahaayaana Buddhism kept this basic
dynamics of becoming.

2. Dependent origination by aalayavij~naana
(storehouse consciousness). All phenomena originate
from the interplay between the aalayavij~naana and
manas

P.277

(discriminative consciousness). The aalayavij~naana
contains the potential or seeds for the
manifestation of phenomena (experiential), and the
manas provides fresh seeds by perfuming them into
the aalayavij~naana. The original impressions for
the seeds come to the manas by way of the five
sense-consciousnesses and the integrative
consciousness (manovij~naana) . This type of
dependent origination is subscribed to by the
Vij~naanavaada ("Consciousness-only" School).

3. Dependent origination by tathaagatagarbha
(matrix of thuscome). All phenomena originate from
the involvement of the realm of thusness, the
enlightened pure realm, regardless of the
unenlightened status of mundane beings. In brief,
this means that the Buddha-nature is ubiquitous.
residing even in insentient beings. This type is
expounded, for example, in the Awakening of Truth in
the Mahaayaana (Mahaayaana`sraddhotpaadasaastra) .
The Pure Land School naturally makes optimum use of
this conception.

4. Dependent origination by dharmadhaatu (realm
of factors or elements of existence). All phenomena
arise based on the interdependent, interrelated, and
interpenetrative natures of the factors of being. In
this sense, all phenomena mutually identify each
other. This conception was crystallized in the
Chinese Hua-yen School, although its rudiments are
already found in Indian Buddhism, even in the
Buddha's teachings. Ch'an (Zen) of course makes
liberal use of this idea in its teachings as well as
in awakening the devotee to the reality of things.

Although these four types give the impression of
being separate and distinct, they are actually
expounding on the selfsame reality of dependent
origination, the dynamic cocreative momentary
process. The common thread that runs through them is
the concept of emptiness. Emptiness may have various
uses in the four types, but all variant forms have
the distinct Buddhist quality of leading to or
aiming at the nirvaa.nic realm. The T'ien T'ai
School in China, for example, uses the emptiness of
phenomenal existence in the unique sense of
provisional conception and then the emptying of
emptiness itself to bring forth the middle way. All
three conceptions-emptiness. provisionality, middle
way--are in the final analysis interpenetrative of
one another, The variant forms of emptiness only
make obvious the extent to which the implications of
Buddhist reality or ontology has ranged.

With a focus on dependent origination, the
Mahaayaana development can generally be seen in
terms of two strains: (a) self-realization of the
basic nature of momentary existence and (b)
self-realization through other-realization.

The first (a) is what we have discussed in this
article. It will be touched on later. As for the
second (b), it is a new perspective on the total
nature of things and gives a distinctive Mahaayaana
flavor. Basically, the nature of dependent
origination becomes expanded or more extensive based
on the reflexive character. In a figurative sense,
the realm of the wheel of becoming has been widened
to

P.278

include everything on earth. This is the genuine use
of the words Mahaa (great) and yaana (wheel). Again,
the term Tathaagata is used in a distinctive sense,
that is, to refer to the Buddha himself; now, with
the reflexive nature the Mahaayaana has brought
forth a new dimension, a greater cosmological
extension and effect. That is, the term can be seen
in two dimensions, to wit, Tathaa + gata (Thusgone)
and Tathaa + aagata (Thuscome). The Buddha's life is
then interpreted as one that has gone forth to the
nirvaa.nic realm and at once returned to the
sa.msaaric realm to save sentient beings. This
reflexive interpretation has opened up the realm of
existence to include sentients as well as
insentients and has given a new meaning to the
concept of compassion (karu.naa). In essence, the
Mahaayaana not only has moved toward more inclusive
philosophic implications for the acts of man and
nature, but has provided man a new sense of
belonging to the community or of understanding the
social nature of things. It has fired up the spirit
of community action in terms of the universal
dimensions of all actions. It is no accident, then,
that Pure Land Buddhism expands on this reflexive
nature of existence by speaking of the Other Power
of Amida Buddha manifesting by virtue of the
Original Vow to save all sentients. All of this
seems mythical and perhaps beyond comprehension, and
it is. Enter the nature of faith (`sraddhaa), but
this is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I
return to (a), self-realization of the basic nature
of momentary existence.

Self-realization or self-power is inherent in
all Mahaayaana Buddhism, except that some schools
will not bring it out into the open as a central
issue, and indeed that may be the case in Pure Land
Buddhist practice. But it is fundamental and
attractive precisely because it does not deviate
from the basic teachings of the Buddha. It entails
the discipline necessary to realize the truth of
existence. Thus, the Mahaayaana tradition emphasizes
meditation, dhyaana or praj~naapaaramitaa, as a
central thrust for the perfection of personhood. In
Far Eastern Buddhism, the pursuit of life has
somehow brought about an amalgamation of self-and
other-power elements.

In the field of aesthetics, finally, the
implications of Buddhist reality (ontology) have
propelled Far Eastern art collectively into the
status of one of the wonders of the world. In all of
this, the role and function of emptiness. couched in
the basic, dependently originating nature of things,
have played no small part in this development. Thus,
however slowly or quickly the wheel of becoming may
be turning, the goal is the selfsame realization of
the Buddhist Dharma.

NOTES

1. Diigha-nikaaya, 22. Maha Satipa.t.thaana
Suttana (Setting up of mindfulness); see Dialogues
of the Buddha (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1959), pp.
327-346. Also, there is the Majjhima-nikaaya, 10,
Satipa.t.thaanasutta (Discourse on the applications
of mindfulness) ; see The Middle Length Sayings
(London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1954). pp. 70-82.

P.279

2. Private correspondence, January 29, 1987.
This statement will appear in his forthcoming book,
The Heart of Buddhist Philosophy, published by
Southern Illinois University Press.

3. Majjhima-nikaaya, 3.131, 132, 133, 134; see
Middle Length Sayings, trans. I. B. Horner, Pali
Text Society translation series (London: Luzac &
Co., Ltd., 1959), vol. 3, pp. 233-248.

4. A most graphic illustration of the
impermanent nature of life is presented in a short
piece from the Angutrara Commentary, 225-227,
entitled Kisaa Gotamii, in which a woman who has
lost her beloved son seeks medicine to revive him.
The Buddha, sensing that she is ripe for conversion,
tells her to go into the city and inquire at each
household if no one has ever died in the family and,
if such be the case, to collect tiny grains of
mustard seed. She makes her rounds, but cannot
obtain a single mustardseed. She soon realizes that
death is an inevitable human phenomenon, and she
brings her dead child to the cremating ground. She
realizes that all things are impermanent and becomes
the Buddha's disciple (Eugene Watson Burlingame,
Buddhist Parables (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1922), pp. 92-94).

5. For example, Sa.myutta-nikaaya, Part IV
35.1-26; see The Book of Kindred Sayings, trans. F.
L. Woodward, Pali Text Society translation series
(London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1956). vol. 4, pp. l-14.

6. The Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 3, is devoted to an
analysis or the khandhaa (skandhas). It presents
fine arguments on why our cravings for the permanent
nature of things are based on the skandhic
graspings. It is literally a burden that we carry
with us without knowing about the mechanism
involved. So long as the skandhic natures remain,
the notion of the self cannot be dispelled (Kindred
Sayings, vol. 3). Perhaps the most famous account
supporting the impermanent nature of things is the
Fire Sermon, which says that everything is on
fire--analogously referring to the skandhic
graspings (Kindred Sayings, vol. 4, pp. 10-11).

7. This momentous decision is reflected clearly
in the Mahaayaana tradition, where the Bodhisattva
Dharmaakara vowed to save all sentient beings. More
specifically, it refers to the Original Vow
(pra.nidhaana), that is, to delay entrance into
nirvaa.na until all sentients are liberated from their
suffering, a vow which is basic to Pure Land
Buddhist faith.

8. Majjhima-nikaaya, 3.280; see The Middle
Length Sayings, trans. I. B. Horner (London: Luzac &
Co., 1959) vol. 3, p. 330. See also Kindred Sayings,
vol. 4, p. 66.

9. Ibid.

10. The Udaana (The Solemn Utterances of the
Buddha), trans. D. M. Strong (London: Luzac & Co.,
1902), p. 112.

11. Kindred Sayings, vol. 3, pp. 113-114.

12. Ibid., p. 114 (parentheses mine).

13. Ibid., (parentheses mine).

14. Edward Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts Though the
Ages, trans. by I. B. Horner (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 65.

15. Ibid., p.66.

16. Ibid., The twelve links of dependent origination
are: ignorance, karma-formation, consciousness,
corporeality-mentality, six bases of sense,
impression, feeling, craving, clinging or
attachment, becoming, rebirth, and aging-death. The
best treatment of dependent origination is by
Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga (The Path of
Purification) , translated by Bhikkhu ~Naanamoli
(Colombo. Ceylon: R. Semage, 1956) , XVII, pp.
592-678.

17. Edward Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts Through
the Ages, pp. 66--67.

18. Sa.myutta-nikaaya, 2.42-43, Kindred Sayings,
vol.2, p. 33.

19. Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, p. 593.

20. Majjhima-nikaaya, 3.294; The Middle Length
Sayings, vol. 3, p.343.

21. Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, p. 666. Abiding
in the concept of emptiness is also the main theme
in two short texts, Lesser Discourse on Emptiness
(Cu.lasu~n~nataa Sutta) and Greater Discourse on
Emptiness (Mahaasu~n~nataa Sutta) , in
Majjhima-nikaaya, 3.121, 122; see The Middle Length
Sayings, vol. 3. pp. 147-162.

22. In the pragmatic tradition, George H. Mead
emphasized the preparatory and anticipatory stages
of the act. This is a great insight in expanding on
the dimensions of the pragmatic act, although it may
be problematic when it comes to applying the
pragmatic criteria to Buddhist momentary existence.
The dimensions, for one thing, may not coincide on
all points.

P.280

23. Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, XXIV. 18

24. Ibid., XXIV. 11, 14.

25. Edward Conze, trans., Buddhist Wisdom Books
(London: George Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1958). This
contains by far the best translation and doctrinal
analysis of the two texts.

26. Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English
Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), p.
673. In the Prasannapadaa (The Clearworded) ,
Candrakiirti comments on Naagaarjuna's meaning of
pratiitya-samutpaada thus:

The first part of the term consists of the gerund of
the root "i" and the preposition "prati". The root
"i" means motion, the preposition "prati". means
"reaching". But the preposition (when added to a
verbal root) modifies its meaning. It has been said
that "the meaning of the verbal root is changed by
the preposition as if it were violently dragged into
another place just as the sweet waters of the Ganges
(change their savour when reaching) the waters of
the ocean". Therefore the word pratiitya, being a
gerund, means "reaching" in the sense of being
dependent (or relative). The word samutpaada means
appearance, manifestation. It comes from the verbal
root "pad" which with the preposition "samut" has
this meaning. Thus the term pratitya-samutpada (in
our system) conveys the idea of a manifestation of
(separate) entities as relative to their causes and
conditions (hetu-pratyaya-apek.sa).

This quote is taken from Th. Stcherbatsky, The
Conception of Buddhist Nirvaa.na, revised and
enlarged edition with comprehensive analysis and
introduction by Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1977), p. 89 (on chap. 1, "Examination
of Causality").

27. Naagaarjuna brought the basic doctrines in
line in a most sweeping manner. His emphasis on the
traditional concept of emptiness was climactic in
the sense that the whole realm of human experience
could now be glimpsed from both the unenlightened
and enlightened nature of things. We saw earlier in
Buddhaghosa's analysis of dependent origination a
verse depicting the voidness of the wheel of
becoming. I take this verse to be also a
confirmation of the Mahaayaanistic employment of the
concept of emptiness in the experiential dynamics of
becoming. To this extent, the concept was given a
new meaning and heralded the possibility of further
developments in Buddhism. Perhaps Naagaarjuna should
not be accorded excessive credit for his
contributions since there is strong suspicion that
there may have been an unknown author or authors of
the earliest praj~naapaaramitaa thought or other
seminal works who had originally spawned the idea of
the uniqueness and power of emptiness.