Primitive Buddhist Texts

·期刊原文
I. Primitive Buddhist Texts. Theragatha, Therigatha, Dhammapada,
Suttanipata (5th-3rd Centuries BC)
The most ancient and basic Buddhist texts were composed in verse or
in short sentences so as to be easily memorised. They communicate
the vivid and practical teaching of the Buddha, whose aim was above
all to help the salvation of men, by avoiding time-consuming
metaphysical reflections.
These texts state firstly that men cling to what they consider as
"I" or "mine", and are troubled by the attachments that the Buddha
advises them to abandon. The Suttanipata (collection of sutras) 756
observes that men take for self what is not self and cling to "name
and form" (namarupa). According to the Theragatha 575 (The Older
Monks' verses), "Stupid men consider their body as theirs". The
"name and form" and the "body" mentioned here designate a person, an
individual being composed of five aggregates: rupa (material form,
four elements: earth, water, fire, air, and six organs), vedana
(physical and mental sensations), samjna (perceptions), samskara
(mental formations) and vijnama (consciousness).
In the Samyutta-nikaya I (the grouped short sutras) the nun Vajra
refuses to answer ontological questions, as coming from Mara (the
Devil) about "being" (sattva), such as: who made him, where his
maker is, from where he emerged, where he is going to after his
death.
'Being'! Why do you harp upon that word? Among
false opinions, Mara, have you strayed. Mere bundle
of conditioned factors, this!
No 'being' can be here discerned to be. For just as,
when the parts are rightly set, The word 'chariot'
arises, So does our usage agree to say: " 'A being'!
when the aggregates are there." [3]
Other verses of the Samyutta-nikaya say:
Knowing that each of these elements is neither "me", nor "mine", Man
detaches himself from the clinging. He obtains peace of heart And
freedom
from bondage. [4]
The Therigatha (the verses of older nuns) 101 says:
Considering as not Self the formed things, which emerge from a cause
and perish,
I abandoned all desires, and I became pure and calm. [5]
The primitive Buddhist texts dissuade men from confusing the self
and the phenomenal person. The Buddha himself did not answer the
question of Vacchagotta as to whether the atman exists. [6] The
primitive Theravada schools interpreted this question in various
ways. Some of them (Sautrantikas, Vatsiputriyas and others), in
order to explain transmigration (samsara), supposed a temporal
existence of pudgala, which they consider as the self. Others, such
as the Sautrantikas, denied the existence of the self or atman and
at the present time the Theravadins of Sri Lanka follow this
traditional line. [7]
According to Rahula Walpola, a monk of Sri Lanka and author of
L'Enseignement du Bouddha (Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1961), behind the
five aggregates composing an individual there is no substance such
as "I", "atman" or the "self". Following the doctrine of "dependent
origination", everything is conditioned, relative and
interdependent. The famous three verses of the Dhammapada say:
All compounded things are impermanent. (Sabbe sankhara anicca.)
All compounded things are dukkha. (Sabbe sankhara dukkha.)
All dharmas are without Self. (Sabbe dhamma anatta) (in Pali) [8]
"That is to say, following the teaching of the Theravada," writes
Walpola, "there is no self, either in the individual (puggala), or
in the dhamma (things conditioned or not)". [9] For him attan (atta
in nominative) in early Buddhist texts means only "oneself" and has
no metaphysical meaning of the self.
Hajime Nakamura, in his Jiga to muga (The Self and without Self)
[10] quotes two groups of verses concerning "oneself". The first
group concerns a positive oneself.
The Dhammapada advises man to defend and govern himself well (157),
to make himself his own master (160) or his "refuge" (236, 238), and
to take care of his own duty (166). The Samyutta-nikaya and the
Udana claim:
By looking around in all directions with my thought,
I did not find anything dearer than attan (piyataram attand).
Also atta is dear for others.
Therefore who loves attan (attana) must not harm others. [11]
In the second group the Buddha is said to have controlled, trained
and conquered himself. [12] So Nakamura supposes that there are two
sorts of selves: the ideal self that the saints realise and the
ordinary man's egotistic self, subject to desires and to torments.
[13] Candrakirti explained this, in his Prasannapada, by saying that
the teaching of the Buddha is gradual and adapted to his audience.
That is why the Buddha spoke of "oneself" as a conventional notion
to simple men and taught non-existence of the self to men clinging
to their ego, and the Middle Way (the truth is between self and
non-self) to those capable of penetrating his teaching. [14]
II. Dissection of the Person in the Prose Part of Some Sutras:
Samyutta-nikaya, Majjhima-nikaya, Milindapanha, Agama and
Abhidharma-koshabhasya (3rd Century BC-4th Century AD)
The prose part of the Buddhist sutras (composed later to explain the
primitive verses) repeats, in order to deliver men from their
attachment to any phenomenon, that all things and acts are composed
of the five aggregates which emerge and perish and that none of them
is the self. [15]
To show the inexistence of a phenomenal self (person), they used an
analytical method, called "zheqiongguan" in Chinese or "shakukugan"
in Japanese, [16] which consists in dissecting a thing into its
components, then in showing its lack of identity with each component
and in concluding its nominal and unreal existence (vacuity).
We can see some examples of this method in some Pali texts. The
first set of examples of a lute as well as of an oil lamp and of a
Pithy tree are in the Samyutta-nikaya (Grouped short sutras). The
example of a cow is in the Majjhima-nikaya (Collection of middle
length sutras). The third set of examples are in the Milindapanha
(Milinda's questions): the chariot, the flame of an oil-lamp and
milk which turns into curds.
1. In the Samyutta-nikaya IV (Section 165) the Buddha advises a monk
to see the person as impermanent. [17] Then he takes an example of a
rajan (raja, nominative, king) who, charmed by the sound of a lute,
breaks it into its parts to find it and is disappointed. In the same
way a monk who investigates the body, feelings, perceptions, mental
formations and the consciousness will not find anything of "I", "I
am" or "mine". [18]
2. In the chapter Nandakovadasutta of the Majjhima-nikaya [19], the
master Nandaka asks nuns if the five senses and the mental organ,
their six objects and six corresponding states of consciousness are
permanent, as well as the oil, the wick, the flame and the light of
an oil-lamp, and the root, the trunk, the branches and the foliage
of a Pithy tree. Their answer is in the negative. Finally he quotes
a case of a clever cattle butcher who dissects a cow with a sharp
knife, without spoiling the flesh inside and the outer hide, and
takes out the tendons, sinews and ligaments. He compares the knife
to a noble intuitive wisdom which analyses the six internal and the
six external sense fields to take away defilements, fetters and
bonds.
3. In the Milindapanha [20] (Milinda's questions), Nagasena, a
Buddhist master, says to the Bactrian king Menandros who reigned
during the 2nd century BC, in the North-West of India: "Nagasena is
only a name, since no person is found". [21] The king asks him who
the agent of actions is. The master asks him if the hair, the head,
the hairs of the body, the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh,
the sinews, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the
liver, the membranes, the spleen, the lungs, the intestines, the
mesentary, the stomach, the excrement, the bile, the phlegm, the
pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat, the tears, the serum, the
saliva, the mucus, the synovic fluid, the urine or the brain in the
head are Nagasena. Is Nagasena material shape, feeling, perception,
the habitual tendencies, or is he separate from these five
aggregates? The king says no, but cannot believe that Nagasena does
not exist and wonders if he is telling a lie.
Then Nagasena asks the king about the chariot in which he came. Is
each of its components, the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body,
the flag pole, the yoke, the reins, the goad, the chariot? Are all
of these parts the chariot? Is the chariot apart from these parts?
The king says no. Then Nagasena says: "the chariot is only a sound"
and wonders if the king lies. So the king is obliged to admit that
"the chariot exists (merely) as a name". Then Nagasena concludes
that "according to the highest meaning, the person is not found
here" and quotes the verses of the nun Vajra that we have seen
already:
Just as when the parts are rightly set,
The word "chariot" is spoken.
So when there are the aggregates,
It is the convention to say 'being'. [22]
Next day Nagasena refutes the Greek concept of person presented by
three Greeks (Antiochos etc.) as the life principle (jiva) or the
breath (vata, wind), atman (Skt) or attan (Pali) corresponding to
the Greek atmos breath or wind giving life to the body. [23] He
refuses also to consider the consciousness (vijnama, Skt) as a
unifying principle of the human being, because for him it is only a
mental organ which discerns phenomena experimentally.
According to the Samyutta-nikaya II, 94-95, [24] the Buddha prefers
his disciples to consider the body as himself rather than the mind,
because the body persists for one years or a hundred years, but what
we call thought, mind or consciousness "arises as one thing, ceases
as another, by night or by day" as a monkey seizes one bough after
another. This is a viewpoint radically different from the Cartesian
cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I exist.)
The Majjhima-nikaya I notes that the Buddha considered as "lacking
in reason" the viewpoint supposing the existence of the atman,
because it cannot be found. [25]
Concerning the identity of a man whose rebirth takes place after his
death, Nagasena says: "he is not the same and he is not another".
[26] He is as a baby grown up into an adult, as a flame of an oil
lamp in each moment, and as milk turned into curds, then into butter
and into ghee. [27]
And finally appeared the anatta or anatman thesis, the thesis of the
non-existence of the self in Agama in Sanskrit [28], which
Vasubandhu will quote later in the Chapter against the thesis of the
Self (Atmavadapratisedhaprakarana Skt, Powopin, in Chinese Hagahin,
in Japanese) of his Abhidharmakosha bhasya. (ca. AD 4th century).
[29]
The Buddha is said to have preached as follows for Brahman Badari:
Neither sentient being nor atman do exist (nastiha sattva atma ca),
Only
exists the Law of dependent origination, that is to say the twelve
links. When I think in detail of all the world of aggregates, the
person
doesn't exist. (pudgalo nopalabhyate.) I consider already that their
inside is void. Their outside is also void. [30]
Let us note that Mahayana Buddhists consider that this Law of
dependent origination is void of substance, i.e. has no actual
existence in itself, even though phenomena take place in accordance
with it.
III. Mahayana Texts: Vajracchedika prajnaparamita sutra,
Madhyamakashastra, Mahaparinirvana sutra (in the South edition in
Chinese)
The Vajracchedika prajnaparamita sutra (sutra of perfect wisdom
which cuts as a thunderbolt or a diamond), called the Diamond sutra,
belongs to the group of about forty Prajnaparamita sutras. It
insists on the vacuity of all phenomena and is one of the most
ancient Mahayana texts.
Starting from the orthodox doctrine of anatta, "the sutra develops
the consequence of saying all things are void of self". [31] In this
sutra it is said:
He is not to be called a Bodhisattva in whom the perception of a see
or a
being would take place, or the perception of living principle or a
person.
[32]
According to Edward Conze, the "self" (atman) is "the supposed
centre around which our own belongings are organised." A "being"
(sattva) is a separate individual. The living principle or soul
(jiva) is the "vivifying and unifying force within each organism". A
"person" (pudgala) is a "being", that is "looked at from the
outside, as a social entity". [33]
The sutra says also:
The Tathagata teaches, "selfless are all dharmas, insubstantial,
without
a living principle, without personality". [34]
Nagarjuna (ca. 150-250 AD [35], who gave a theoretical foundation to
Mahayana Buddhism, treated this problem in chapter XVIII Examination
of the self(Atmapariksha) and in some other chapters of his
Madhyamaka-karika] (The Stanzas of the Middle). [36]
At the beginning of the 7th century, Candrakirti comments on it in
his Prasannapada Madhyamakavritti (Commentary on the Treatise of the
Middle in Clear Terms), [37] quoting the Aryathatagataguhyasutra as
words of the Buddha.
Not to give birth to the self, the "being", the soul, the individual
(pudgala) and the false viewpoint, is to understand the false
viewpoint on
the personality, and this is the vacuity. [38]
And he demonstrates, in his commentary to Chapter XXII, The
Examination of the Tathagata, that pudgala (person) does not exist
even if one examines it in five ways. [39]
The theories of atman and anatman are both "skilful ways" (upayah)
to save ordinary men from errors. Neither atman nor anatman are the
truth. This is the point of view of Kumarajiva, translator of the
Madhyamaka-shastra into Chinese, and of Candrakirti, commentator on
the Madhyamaka-karika.
Guy Bugault explains clearly Nagarjuna's work in his L'Inde
pense-t-elle?:
Everything that comes into existence results from a combination of
conditions and this rule suffers no exception.... Nagarjuna asks
only to
be shown 'what comes to existence (ch. 1), what transmigrates (ch.
16),
in short the subject which becomes'. But such an identity, when one
searches for it in living beings (sattva) or in things (bhaba and
also
dharma), is unthinkable or cannot be found. The being in question
vanishes under the acuteness of the look. In a sense, is nirvana
anything else? His dialectical virtuosity is itself merely
upaya-kaushalya, a therapeutic skillfulness. [40]
After the Madhyamaka school (Madhyamika), those practicing Yoga
(Yogacara, formed the "doctrine of consciousness only'
(vijnapti-matrata). [41] Following their experience during
concentration (samadhi), their consciousness perceived images
without senses. They thought that all experiences came from the
inner consciousness which they call alaya-vijnana, receptacle (or
grain) which conserves and carries karman, heritage, memory and
character, and which are nevertheless void of substance.
Vasubandhu accepted this doctrine, and developed the theory of
Tathagatagarbha (the womb or embryo of Tathagata = the Buddha) which
means the possibility of becoming a "Buddha" (p.p. of budh = to wake
up, to understand, therefore the enlightened one) [42] and the
theory of the Buddha Nature. (He wrote the Treatise on the Buddha
Nature in the 4th century AD.)
The Tathagatagarbha theory was developed in the Mahayana Parinirvana
sutra relating the death of the Buddha. [43] The South edition of
its Chinese translation insists on the permanent and imperishable
nature of Tathagata and calls it "the self' causing some confusion
with the atman.
One preaches that all the dharmas are without Self, but it doesn't
mean no
existence of the Self Who is the Self? If a dharma is substantial,
true,
constant, a chief, a support and if its nature does not change, one
names it
the Self. [44]
"The self" in the heart of living beings is called Tathagatagarbha:
The Self is the Tathagata and garbha. All beings have the Buddha
Nature. It is
the Self This Self is hidden originally, covered always by
innumerable
desires. That is why they cannot see it. [45]
It is the Buddha Nature or Nirvana, "Nirvana being without self and
free, one names it the Great Self". In China they call it also "the
True Self' and distinguish it from an "illusory self'. [46]
It seems to be a return to the atman (or Brahman), but this Great
Self, for
Mahayana Buddhists, is only a conventional name, given to reality
void of
substance, which is Vacuity and Nirvana.
IV. Confrontation with practice
The exercise of Zen consists in sitting as Buddha to discover the
Buddha Nature in us, in realising the enlightenment and in deepening
this experience. While studying the Shobogenzo zuimonki (notes taken
by Ejo while listening to the oral teaching of Dogen) (written in
1234/5-8), the Gakudo yojin shu (Pieces of advice for the study of
the Way) (1234) and the Shobogenzo of the Zen master Dogen, who read
all these Buddhist texts and founded a Zen monks' community, we
notice that he practiced and taught to his disciples the fundamental
teachings of the Buddha as well as the developed theory of the Self.
Ejo notes in his Shobogenzo zuimonki that his master repeatedly
recommended to disciples to free themselves from their attachment to
the idea of "I", "me" or "mine", by contemplating the impermanence
of phenomena. [47] Dogen writes in his Gakudoyojinshiu:
If this idea of "I" emerges, sit down calmly and observe. Among what
we
possess inside and outside of our body, what can be considered as
originally
ours? We receive our body, hair and skin from our parents. Their red
and
white drops [48] are, from beginning to the end, void of substance.
So they
are not us. The heart, the volition, the consciousness, the wisdom,
the
breath which we breathe in and out and which maintains our life,
what are
they finally? They are not us. [49]
He applies thus the method of dissection as in other Buddhist texts.
In the tome Genjokoan (The truth accomplished now) (1233) of the
Shobogenzo, Dogen sums up his teaching in the famous formula:
Learning the Buddha's way is learning who is the Self.
Learning who is the Self is to forget ourselves. [50]
To forget ourselves is to be enlightened by ten thousand dharmas.
[51]
To be enlightened by ten thousand dharmas means to let our own
body and heart and the other's own body and heart get rid of the
attachments. [52]
His words describe the ethical evolution of the Buddha Nature in us
working progressively to realise itself not only for itself but also
for others.
V. Conclusion
We have seen how the self and the person have been treated in some
Buddhist texts of different periods and how the notions concerning
them have evolved. But we notice two constant tendencies: men's
attachment to the individual and egotistic self is always
discouraged, while their effort to find out their true self (the
Buddha Nature) and to realise it (Nirvana) is encouraged, this self
being considered, nevertheless, void of substance.
This distinction between two selves is merely a skilful way of
leading people to Nirvana. For fifteen centuries innumerable
Buddhists have practiced samadhi in this spirit and have realised
enlightenment, by sitting as calmly and concentrated as the Buddha.
The Buddhists consider the phenomenal and individual person as an
illusion and they would have many difficulties in understanding the
Platonic and Christian notions of "person".
Mitchiko Ishigami-Iagolnitzer, Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire
des Textes, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Section de
L'Humanisme-40, Avenue d'Iena 75116, Paris, France.
NOTES
[1] An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Second
Conference of the European Society for Asian Philosophy, held at
Exeter University, U.K. in August 1995.
[2] Tedesci, P. (1947) Journal of the American Oriental Society, 67,
pp. 172-177.
[3] Pali Text Society (Eds) (1950) Samyutta-nikaya I, p. 135,
Davids, Rhys (Transl.) P.T.S. partly modernised. Series: The Book of
the Kindred Sayings. SN I, p. 170. For Pali texts quoted in this
article, references are to texts edited and translated by the Pali
Text Society of London.
[4] SN I, p.112,G.
[5] Oldenberg, Hermann and Pischel, Richard (Eds) (1966) The Thera-
and Therigatha London, P.T.S.) p. 133.
[6] SN IV, pp. 400-401.
[7] Nakamura, Hajime Jiga to muga (see below note 10) pp. 1 16 117.
Other schools deriving from Vatsiputriya are Dharmottaria,
Bhadrataniya, Sammatiya and Sannagarika.
[8] P.T.S., Ddhammapada 277, 278, 279 (No. 5, 6, 7 of the ch. XX
Maggavaggo), edited by Suriyagoda Sumangala Thera 1914, p. 40.
Majjhima-nikaya, I, p. 228. SN II, III, p. 132, XXII, Section 90.
Translation, SN III, p. 112, sankhara = all things which have been
made by pre-existing causes. Pali Text Society (1979) Pali-English
Dictionary (London) P.T.S. p. 665.
[9] Walpola R., p. 85, translated here from the French edition.
[10] Nakamura, H. (Ed.) (1986) Introduction, The Idea of Anattan,
(Kyoto, Heiraku-Shoteru).
[11] SN I, text edited by Feer, Leon (1960) t. I, III, 1-8, p. 75
G./Udana, text edited by Woodward, F. L. (1977), Vol. 1, p. 275.
[12] Dhammapada, 80, 145, 305, 322; Digha-nikaya, III, p. 275,
Theragatha, 1098, Thera and Therigatha, p. 98, Dhammapada, 103, 104,
105.
[13] Nakamura, p. 34.
[14] Candrakirti: Prasannapada, ch. XVIII, 11. Jong, J. W. (Transl.)
(1949) Cinq chapitre de la Prasannapada (Paris, Lib. Orientale Paul
Geuthner), pp. 15-21.
[15] For example the Vinayapitaka des Theravadin, Siamese edition,
Vol. IV, p. 28; A. Bareau, Bouddha, p. 114; Majjhima-nikaya I.
135-136; BUGAULT, G. (1994) L'Inde pense-t-elle; ch. IX; Logique et
dialectique chez Aristotie et chez Nagarjuna (Paris, PUF) p. 266.
[16] Nakamura, p. 76.
[17] SN IV, Section 165. Translation (series: The Books of the
Kindred Sayings) SN IV, p. 93.
[18] IV, 195, XXXV, iv, 5, Section 205 (9). Translation by P. L.
Woodward (series: The Book of the Kindred Sayings) SN IV, The
Salayatana Book, pp. 128-130.
[19] MN III, No. 146, Nandakovadasutta, pp. 272-275. Horner, I. B.
(Transl.) (1954) An Exhortation from Nandaka, pp. 324-327.
[20] In Pali, Milindapanha (feminine), title adopted in Burma and
Thailand. In Sri Lanka it is in the masculine: Milindapanho, cf.
Hayashima, Kyosei, Discussed points on Self and non-Self in
Milindapanha in Nakamura: Jiga to muga, p. 425. The Pali text was
edited by V. Trenckner in London in 1880. This dialogue was composed
roughly between 1st century BC and 1st. century AD in the North-West
of India, in the region governed by King Menandros in cat 2nd
century BC then was translated later into Pali.
[21] Milinda I (25). Translation of the Trenckner edition by Horner,
I. B. (1963) is available in the series Sacred Books of the
Buddhists, (London Luzac) "na h'ettha puggalo upalabhatiti."
Upalabhati = upa + labh = obtain to find. Passive, upalabhati = to
be found or got = to exist (see Pali Test Society, English
Dictionary, p. 146).
[22] Milinda I, (25-28), Translation I, p. 34-38.
[23] Milinda I, (30 31), Translation I, p. 41.
[24] SN II, pp. 94, XII, 7, Section 61, (1); Translation, SN II, pp.
65-66, cf SN II, 62. Nidana Section 37 (7). Translation, SN II, p.
44.
[25] The Alagaddupamasutta quoted in the Majjhima-nikaya I. P.T.S.
p. 138. "Oh, monks, when neither atman nor anything belonging to the
atman can be truly and really found, this speculative viewpoint:
'this universe is the atman; after dying I will become what is
permanent, staying, lasting, not liable to change, and I will exist
like that for eternity', isn't it, oh, monks, purely and simply
lacking in reason?" cf G. Bugault, p. 299. P.T.S., (1954) The Middle
Length Sayings. I I. B. Horner (Transl.) p. 177.
[26] Milinda, I, (40), Translation, I, p. 54.
[27] Milinda, I, (40 41), Translation, I, pp. 55-56.
[28] Agama (Skt) means text or scripture and is a collective name
given to all the sayings about the acts and teachings of Buddha,
summed up in short sentences, memorised and transmitted orally by
many primitive Buddhist scholars in either Sanskrit, Prakrit (Indian
dialect) or Pali. The five nikayas of Theravfida in Pali are well
conserved. Others, translated in Chinese or in Tibetan, are
partially conserved. Maeda, Keigaku (1985) in Butten kaidai jiten
(2nd edn) (Tokyo, Shunjusha) pp. 60-62.
[29] Vasubandhu et Yacomitra, IIIe chapitre de l'Abhidharma
koca-karika, bhasya et vyakhya, texte etabli par Louis de la Vallee
Poussin. London. Kegan. Trench. Trubner, 1914-1918, p. 137. Abhi,
ch. III, 18, pp. 137-138 Valleee Poussin, L. de la (Transl.) (1926)
L'Abhidharmakosha de Vasubandhu IIIe chapitre (Paris, P. Geuthner)
18a, pp. 56 57. "L'atman auquel vous croyez, une entite qui
abandonne les skandhas d'une existence et prend les skandhas d'une
autre existence, un agent interieur, un Purusa, cet atman n'existe
pas. Bhagavat a dit en effet: "L'acte est (8a), le fruit est; mais
il n'est pas d'agent...", Abhidharmakosha-bhasya = Jushilun (in
Chinese), Kusharon (in Japanese).
[30] Nakumura, pp. 79-80, Sphutartha Abhidharmakoshavyakhya, edited
by U. Wogihara, p. 704 (Chinese edition). Kando Abhidharma kusharon
Japanese), t. 29, 15 left. The translation is from Chinese text. The
lines quoted here are not in the Pali text.
[31] Conze, Edward (Ed. and Transl.) (1974) Vajrachedika
prajnaparamita. Serie Orientale Roma XIII, (Rome, Istituto Italiano
per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente), p. 11.
[32] Ibid., 3, pp. 66-67, text in Sanskrit, p. 29.
[33] Ibid., p. 10, Conze translates jiva as "living soul".
[34] Ibid., 17 f, translation p. 84, p. 49. "Tathagato bhasate:
niratmanah sarvbo- dharma nih sattvah nirjiva nispudgalah sarva
dharma iti."
[35] See Uryuzu, Ryoshin (1985) Nagurjuna kenkyu (Study on
Nagarjuna). (Tokyo, Shunjusha) Bugault, Guy L'Inde pense- t-elle?
(ch. VIII Nagarjuna pp. 213-236).
[36] The short pieces of verse of Nagarjuna: (Mula)
Madhyamaka-karika was edited and commented by Pingala in the 4th
Century AD under the title of Madhyamika'shastra. It was translated
into Chinese by Kumaraj in 149 An. Zhongguanlun (in Chinese),
Chukanron (in Japanese). (karika = concise statements in verse of
doctrines).
[37] May, Jacques (Ed. and Transl.) (1959) Candrakirti, Prasannapada
Madhyamakavritti (Paris, A. Maisonneuve), pp. 5-22.
[38] Translated into English by de Jong, J. W. (1949) Cinq chapitres
de la Prasannapada (Pans, P. Geuthner) ch. XVIII, pp. 20-21.
[39] de Jong, pp. 73 - 85.
[40] G. Bugault, ch. IX, pp. 317, 302 and 318.
[41] Madhyamika and Yogacara were two main schools of Mahayana
Buddhism.
[42] Introduction of Akira Hirakawa. Buttenkaidai jiten, pp. 20-21.
cf. Takasaki, Jikido, (1974) The Formation of the Theory of
Tathagatagarbha. A Study on the Indian Buddhist Thought of Mahayana.
(in Japanese). Tokyo, Shjunjusha, (Doctorate Thesis).
[43] The text in Sanskrit was translated into Chinese by Tanwushi.
The North edition consists of forty volumes and the South edition of
thirty six volumes. It is the equivalent of the
Mahaparinibbanasuttanta in Pali of Theravfida, but is not the same.
[44] South edition in Chinese, II chapter of Lamentation.
[45] Ibid. South edition. VIII on The Nature of Tathagata.
[46] Quoted in Chinese by Nakamura p. 141, note 2.
[47] Koun, Ejo (1995) Shobgenzo zuimonki, Choenji edition, Mizuno
Yahoko (Ed.), Series Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei 81, (Tokyo,
Iwanami-shoten), II, 12, 16; III, 8, 12; IV 2, 3; VI, 10, 21.
[48] "The drops of their inseminating liquid", according to Toshio
Shinohara's commentary on Gakudo yojinshu; Tokyo, Daito shuppansha,
1990, p. 41.
[49] Dogen zenji zenshu (The Whole Works of Zen Master Dogen), Okubo
Doshu (Ed.) Tokyo, Chikumashobo, 1970, p. 254.
[50] Dogen uses the Japanese word "ware" to mean Self and oneself
[51] In Bendowa (A Talk on Practising the Way) of his Shobogenzo,
Dogen describes a man's enlightenment as a symphony with all the
elements of nature. When a man practicing zazen has discovered the
Buddha Nature in him and is awakened to the truth (enlightened), all
the elements of the Universe (dharma) realise the enlightenment
communicate and become one with him. Dogenzenji zenshu, pp.731-732.
Nishio, M., Kagamijima, G., Sakai, J. (Eds) Shobogenzo.
Nihonkotenbungaku taikei 81. Tokyo. Iwanami- shoten, pp. 74-76.
Shosuru Japanese) = satoru Japanese) = badh (Skt) = to wake up, to
understand.
[52] Dogenzenji zenshu, pp. 7-8. N.K.S. edition mentioned p. 102.
Dogen in Hokyoki, recounts his Chinese Zen master Rujing's answer to
his question on "shinjin datsuraku" (the heart and body being
detached): "It means zazen. When you sit down only for its self, you
detach yourself from the five desires (of fortune, lust, eating,
renown and sleep) and eliminate the five obstacles (avidity, anger,
massive indolence, arrogance evil-doing or repentance and doubt)."