The Silence of the Buddha

·期刊原文
The Silence of the Buddha

TROY WILSON ORGAN
Philosophy East and West 4, no. 2, JULY 1954.
(c) by The University Press of Hawaii
p.125-140

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p.125

THE SIXTH CENTURY B.C. marks the beginning of
an intellectual renaissance in lndia. Radhakrishnan
has said of this period, "There are many indications
to show that it was an age keenly alive to
intellectual interest, a period of immense
philosophic activity and many-sided development....
It was an age full of strange anomalies and
contrasts. With the intellectual fervour and moral
seriousness were also found united a lack of mental
balance and restraint of passion.... When the
surging energies of life assert their rights, it is
not unnatural that many yield to unbridled
imagination."(1) Another authority on Indian
philosophy has written, "Speculation was almost
rampant in the period just preceding the time of the
Buddha and an excessive discussion of theoretical
questions was leading to anarchy of thought."(2)
One restraining influence in this period of
speculation was Siddhaartha Gautama, the Buddha, who
by counsel and example discouraged abstract
theorizing. When asked to express his view on a
number of metaphysica1 problems, he remained silent.
Thus, there come to be in Buddhism a group of
problems which are known as the
avyaak.rtavastuuni--the undetermined, or
unelucidated, or unprofitable questions. The most
comprehensive list of forbidden speculations is found
in the Brahma Jaala Sutta of the Diigba Nikaaya. Here
are listed sixty-two ways in which "recluses and
Brahmans... reconstruct the past, and arrange the
future." The Buddha says they "are entrapped in the
net of these sixty-two modes; this way and that the
plunge about, but they are in it; this way and that
the flounder, but they are included in it,caught in
it." (3) Buddhists are warned to avoid the net
altogether.
Only ten of the questiom raised in the Brabma
Jaala Sutta appear in the Lesser Maalu~nkyaaputta
Sermon which is Sutta 63 of the Majjhima Nikaaya, yet
these are especially important, for with some
alterations they constitute the avyak.rtavastuuni,
The Sutta opens as follows:
_____________________________________________________

(1) S.Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1927),
p.272.

(2) M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 1932),
p.136.

(3) T.W. Rhys Davids, trans, Dialogues of the Buddha.
Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol.II (London:
Oxford University Press, 1899), p.54.

p.126

Thus have I heard. On a certain occasion The
Blessed One was dwelling at Saavatthi in Jetavana
monastery in Anaathapi.n.dika's Park. Now it happened
to the venerable Maalu~nkyaaputta, being in seclusion
and plunged in meditation that a consideration
presented itself to his mind a follows: "These
theories which The Blessed One has left unelucidated,
has set aside and rejected-that the world is eternal,
that the world is not eternal, that the world is
finite,that the world is infinitte, that the soul and
the body are identical, that the soul is one thing
and the body another, that the saint exists after
death, that the saint does not exist after death,that
the saint both exists and does not exist after death,
that the saint neither exists nor does not exist
after death, --these The Blessed One does not
elucidate to me. And the fact that The Blessed One
does not elucidate them to me does at please me not
suit me.Therefore I will draw near to The Blessed One
and inquire of him concerning this matter."(4)

Maalu~nkyaaputta adds that if the Buddha will solve
these problems he will lead the religious life under
him; but if the Buddha will not solve them, he will
abandon religions training and return to the lower
life of a layman. By adding the pairs,
eternal-non-eternal and infinite--finite, which are
found in other lists of the avyaak.rtavastuuni, we
have fourteen questions to which no reply is
given:(5)

1. Is the universe eternal?(6)
2. Is the universe non-eternall
3. Is the universe at one and the same time
eternal and non eternal?
4. Is the universe neither eternal nor
non-eternal?
5. Is the universe infinite?(7)
6. Is the universe finite?
7. Is the universe at one and the same time
infinite and finite?
8. Is the universe neither infinite nor
finite?
9. Are the vital principle (jiiva) and the
body identical?
10. Are the vital principle and the body
non-identical?
11. Does the Tathaagata(8) survive death?
12. Does the Tathaagata not survive death?
13. Does the Tathaagata both survive death and
not survive death?
14. Does the Tathaagata neither survive death
nor not survive death?
_____________________________________________________

(4) Henry Clarke Warren, trans., Buddhism in
Translations. Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. III
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1896), p.117.

(5) Other lists of the avyaak.rtavastuuni may be
found in the following works: Majjbima Nikaaya,
Sutta 72; Mebaali Sutta; Paasaadika Sutta;
Po.t.tapaada Sutta; Dharmasa^mgraha.

(6) I.e., without begining.

(7) Sankrit authorities define "infinite" as having
no end in time; whereas in Paali it connotes
having no end in space, e.g., in the Brahma Jaala
Sutta "finite", according to the translation of
T.W. Rhys Davids, means "that a path could be
traced round it."

(8) Etymologically this term means "he who has gone
(or come) thus."

p.127

Questions about the origin and end of the cosmos,
about the relationship of soul and body,and about
human immortality are questions which positivists
from Comte to Carnap would reject as insoluble by
scientific methods, as unverifiable, as
super-empirical, as metaphysical, as meaningless.
There are many other incidents in the life and
teachings of Gautama in which he avoids metaphysical
speculation. On on occasion he engages in delicate
ridicule of the gods.(9) A monk goes to each of the
gods and asks, "Where do the four great
elements-earth, water, fire, and wind-cease, leaving
no trace behind?" But the gods do not know. Finally,
the monk asks the question of the Great Brahma.
Brahma does not answer until he has led the monk
aside. Then he explains, "These gods the retinue of
Brahmaa, hold me,brother, to be such that there is
nothing I cannot see, nothing I have not understood,
nothing I have not realized. Therefore I gave no
answer in their presence." Then he, too, confesses
his ignorance and suggests that the monk put his
question to the Buddha. When the question finally
reaches the Buddha, the Buddha informs the monk the
he asks the wrong sort of question. Again in a number
of passages in the Paali texts the Buddha refuses to
give information as to the workings of Karma.(10) In
the Saama~n~na Pbala Sutta, King Ajaatasattu asks the
Buddha what are the fruits of the life of the
religious recluse. The Buddha's answer is that the
recluse is treated with respect and reverence; he
enjoys freedom from the hindrances of household life;
he develops compassion and kindness for all
creatures; he is content; he attains self-possession,
etc. In other words, the returns of the religious
life are all terrestrial in character. Finally, there
is the record that the last words of the Buddha were
not on immortality or annihilation, as might have
been expected; instead, they were advice to his
disciples to work out their own salvation with
diligence: "Decay is inherent in all component
things! Work out your salvation with diligence!"(11)
Gautama's avoidance of there metaphysical
subtleties has been called "the silence of the
Buddha" His silence has been as fruitful as his
utterances in the production of philosophies and
theologies. Sometimes it is far more interesting to
conjecture what a prophet might have meant if he had
spoken than to listen to what be actually said. In
this paper, however, we are concerned with the more
prosaic question: Why was the Buddha silent on these
metaphysical issues? There are several possible
answers:
_____________________________________________________

(9) Kevaddha Sutta. T.W. Rhya Davids, trans., Sacred
Books of the Buddhist, Vol. II, pp.280-284.

(10) Anguttara Nikaaya ii.80; Diigha Nikaaya iii.
138; Sa^myutta Nikaaya iii. 103.

(11) Mahaa Parinibaana Sutta vi. 10. T.W. Rhys
Davids, trans., Buddhist Suttas. The Sacred
Books of the East, Vol. XI (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1881), p.114.

p.128

1. He accepted the current views. One reason the
Buddha did not answer the questions about the
termination of the universe, the extent of the
universe, the relation of soul and body, and the
state of the saint after death may have been that he
accepted the conclusions of the Brahmanism of his
day. He had nothing new to offer. Many students of
Buddhism have pointed out that the Buddha did not
break away from the religious and philosophical
thought of his culture. E. G. A. Holmes contends,
The teachings of Buddha can in no wise be
dissociated from the master current of ancient Indian
thought. The dominant philosophy of ancient India was
a spirtual idealism of a singularly pure and exalted
type, which found its truest expression in those
Vedic treatises known as the Upanishads. The great
teacher is always are former as well as an innovator
and his work is,in put at least, an attempt to,
return to a high level which had been won and then
lost. Whether Buddha did or did not lead men back (by
a path of his own) from the camparatively low levels
of ceremonialism and asceticism to the sublimely high
level of thought and aspiration which had been
reached in the Upanishads is, perhaps, an open
question. But that he had been deeply influenced by
the ideas of the ancient seen can scarcely be
doubted; and the serious and sympathetic study of
their teaching should therefore be the first stage in
the attempt to lift the veil of his silence and
interpret his unformulated creed.(12)
Coomaraswamy observes, the more profound our study,
the more difficult it becomes to distinguish Buddhism
from Brahmanism."(13) Keith thinks that the Buddha
and the early disciples believed in the existence of
the gods. This conviction, according to, Keith, must
be held "in the absence of a single hint to the
contrary in the texts of early Buddhism and in face
of the belief of pious Buddhists throughout the
ages."(14) Radhakrishnan writes,''Early Buddhism is
not an absolutely original doctrine.... Buddha
himself admits that the dharma which he has
discovered by an effort of self-culture is the
ancient way, the Aryan path, the eternal dharma
Buddha is not so much creating a new dharma as
rediscovering an old norm. To develop his theory
Buddha had only to rid the Upanisads of their
inconsistent compromises with Vedic polytheism and
religion, set aside the transcendental aspect as
being indemonstrable to thought and unnecessary to
morals, and emphasize the ethical universalism of the
Upanisads. Early Buddhism, we venture to hazard a
conjecture, is only a re-statement of the thought of
the Upnisads from a new standpoint."(15) Even the
Paali scholar T. By. Rhys Davids admits, "Gautama was
born,and brought up, and lived, and died a Hindu..
There
_____________________________________________________

(12) E.G.A. Holmes, The Creed of Buddha (New York:
John Lane Company, 1908), p. x.

(13) Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Hinduism and Buddhism
(New York: The Philosophical Library, 1943), p.
45.

(14) A. Berriedale Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in
India and Ceylon (London: Oxford University
Press, 1923), p.94. But doesn't the Kevaddha
Sutta contain "a single hint to the contrary"?

(15) Op.cit, Vol. I, pp. 360,361.

p.129

was not much in the metaphysics and psychology of
Gautama which cannot be found in one or another of
the orthodox system, and a great deal of his morality
could be matched from earlier or later Hindu
books"(16)
While it is obvious that the Buddha cannot be
understood save in his Hindu background, one cannot
but feel that some critics have deprived the Buddha
of the uniqueness commonly associated with his
doctrine. Takakusu goes to the opposite extreme in
his emphasis on the originahty of the Buddha. He
makes the Buddha stand alone-much too alone "It is
difficult to determine how such a man as the Buddha,
who is so different from the other philosophers and
religious men of India, could have appeared there,
for he denied entirely the traditional gods,
religious beliefs, institutions and customs."(17)
While Takakusu's generalization may seem to be too
broad, since the Buddha took for granted such basic
doctrines as rebirth, karma, and nirvaana, consider
the fact that, whereas in the Upani.sada ultimate
reality (Brabman) is characterized by being (sat),
thought (cit) and joy (aananda), in original Buddhism
these attributes are displaced by
impermanence(anitya), ignorance(avidyaa) , and
suffering(du.hkba).
2. He rejected the current views. Perhaps the
Buddha's silence was a formal denial of the views of
Brahmanism. On at least one occasion he was silent
because he rejected the current views. According to
the Sa^myutta Nikaaya a wandering monk, Vacchagotta,
once asked the Buddha if there was an ego (aatman,
aattaa). When Gautama made no reply, the monk asked,
(How then... is there not the ego?" But to this also
Gautama gave no response. When Vacchagotta had left
the company, AAnanda asked Gautama why he had not
answered the questions put to him by the monk.
Gautama replied, "If I... had answered:'the ego is,'
then that, AAnanda, would have confirmed the
doctrine of the Samanas and Brahmanas who believe in
permanence. If I... had answered: 'the ego is not;
then that, AAnanda, would have confirmed the doctrine
of the Samanas and Brahmanas, who believe in
annihilation."(18) The obvious interpretation of this
conversation is that the Buddha did not agree with
the Samanas and the Brahmanas; he believed that any
answer to Vacchagotta's question would give an
impression contrary to his convictions Oldenberg
finds more than this in the incident. He writes, "We
see: the person who has framed this
_____________________________________________________

(16) T.W. Rhya Davids, Buddhism (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1894), pp. 83,84.

(17) Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist
Philosophy, W.T. Chan and Charles A. Moore, eds.
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1947), p.20.

(18) Sa^myutta Nikaaya. Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha:
His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, Translated
from the German by William Hoey (London:
Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1882), pp.272,273.

p.130

dialogue, has in his thought very nearly approached
the consequence, which leads to the negation of the
ego. It may almost be said that, though probably
he did not wish to express this consequence with
overt consciousness, yet he has in fact expressed
it.... Through the shirking of the question as to the
existence or non-existence of the ego, is heard the
answer, to which the premises of the Buddhist
teaching tended: The ego is not. Or, what is
equivalent: The Nirvana is annihilation."(19)
Oldenberg may be charged with reading into the
document an idea which became a fundamental one in
the later development of Buddhism. Keith in his
discussion of this passage warns that even if we feel
the idea is hinted at, the author is teaching the
doctrine of non-ego, "it is perfectly obvious that we
have no right to go beyond the plain assertion of the
text as to the doctrine of the Buddha."(20)
Yet Oldenberg's position may be supported by
appeal to other Paali texts in which the assertion of
the non-existence of the ego indisputable, e.g. in
the Visuddbi Magga we find the following: "the words
'living entity' and 'ego' are but a mode of
expression for the presence of the five attachment
groups,(21) but when we come to examine the elements
of being one by one, we discover that in the absolute
sense then is living entity there to form a basis for
such figments as I 'am,' or 'I'; in other words, that
in the absolute sense there is only name and
form."(22) Again,in the Sa^myutta Nikaaya the priest
Yamaka, who held the view that "on the dissolution of
the body the priest who has lost a11 depravity is
annihilated, persishes, and does not exist after
death, " has his heresy corrected by the venerable
Saariputta, who reveals to him that according to the
teachings of the Buddha theren is no ego to be
annihilated.(23)
La Vall俥 Poussin says that the record of
Gautama's refusal to discuss metaphysical topics is a
technique by which he denied the existence of the
ego, God, and the Tathaagara is the view which must be
taken by modern Buddhists but it need not be taken by
scientific-minded students of Buddhist
_____________________________________________________

(19) Ibid., p.273.

(20) Op. cit., p.62.

(21) According to Buddhism the individual being
consists of a combination of five skandhas
(groups), viz., ruupa (body, form), vedanaa
(sensation, feeling) , sa^mj~naa (conception,
thought), sa^mskaara (conformation, action), and
vij~naana (consciousness).

(22) Warren, op.cit., pp.133,134.

(23) Ibid., pp.138-145. In time the doctrine of the
non-ego became the orthodox view in Buddhism.
Suzuki says, "What distinguishes Buddhism most
characteristically and emphatically from all
other religions is the doctrine of non-atman or
non-ego." (Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Outlines of
Mahaayaana Buddhism. London: Luzac and Company,
1907, p.32.) Yet some Buddhists refuse to deny
the reality of a self. They use the term
"pudgala" (an individual) which seems to serve
for all parctical purpose as a self. L. de la
Vall俥 Poussin surmises that the word "pudgala"
is used rather than the word "aatman" to avoid
the suspicion of heresy. See the article by
Poussin, "Agnosticism (Buddhist) " in James
Hasting, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics (New York: Charles Scriner's Sons, 1928),
Vol. I, pp.220-225, See also Keith, op. cit.,
p.81.

p.131

religion and philosophy.(24) And Geden it of the
opinion that, although the Buddha consistently refused
to teach about the supernatural, the
"inference...that he intended to imply personal
disbelief in the supernatural and in the existence of
God, and to urge or enjoin this upon his disciples,
is certainly mistaken."(25)
My conclusion is that neither of these first two
reasons for the Buddha's silence is adequate,
although this opinion may he explained by the
inevitable difficultics a modern Westerner has in
trying to understand the dialectics of ancient
Eastern minds. It it patent, a least to the
disinterested student, that the teachings of the
Buddha were in part a continuation of and in part a
revolt against Brahmanism.
3. He bad no views of his own. A third possible
solution to the problem as to why Gaurama gave no
answers to the avyraak.rtavastuuni is that he had no
answers to give. He could not accept the Upani.sadic
solutions; he could not offer alternatives. He was
agnostic. Agnorticism is a word of many meanings. For
our purposes only two general meanings need to be
dirtinguished. One may be agnostic in the tense that
one believes that the mind of man is congenitally
unable to arrive at a cognitive grarp of the real
world; or one may be agnostic in the sense that one
believes that the real world is of such a nature that
it forever lies beyond the cognitive grasp of the
human mind. Perhaps these should be described as two
emphases in agnosticism rather than a two types of
agnosticism. Some agnostics emphasize the inadequacy
of the mind and its operations, e.g. Hume and Kant;
others emphasize the unknowable character of the
world, e.g., Herbert Spencer. In Buddhism both
emphases are found. The limited capacity of the human
mind is implied in the Buddha's reply when he was
asked to reconcile anaatman and karma "Shall one who
is under the dominion of derire think to go beyond
the mind of the master?"(26) The unknowabihty of
ultimate reality is stressed in Maadhyamika and
Zen.(27) But such paaages cannot be interpreted as
suggesting that the Buddha mind was agnostic in any
sense.
We should note that the doctrine that Gaautama
had no views of his own on these metaphysical
questions, that he was ignorant, is possible only in
Hiinayaana Buddhism, although it is never to stated
In the Paali texts he is portrayad generally as a
teacher, considerate, kindly, fatherly. Even though
_____________________________________________________

(24) Op. cit., I, p. 225.

(25) Alfred Shenington Geden in his article, "God
(Buddhist)" in James Hastings, ed., Encyclopedia
of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VI, p.270.

(26) Sa^myutta Nikaaya iii. 103, Keith, op.cit.,
p.78.

(27) See my article, "Reason and Experience in
Mahaayaana Buddhism, " The Journal of Bible and
Religion, XX, No.2 (April, 1952),77-83.

p.132

he was said to have changed his heritage by reason of
his enlightenment, he still remained subject to the
physical limitations of all flesh: he became weary,
he hungered and thirsted, he died as the result of
food poisoning. In the Sanskrit texts, on the other
hand, the Buddha is a celestial, transcendental
figure. He is worshipped by animals, men, demons,
bodbisattvas and other buddhas. He speaks not as a
man who has found salvation and who willingly shares
what he has discovered, but as a supernatural being
who condescends to reveal some of his truth to man
The earthly Gautama is a Docetic messianic
incarnation of the Eternal Buddha. The Vetulyakas
believe that the Buddha dwelt in the Tu.sita heaven
while a magic form acted out a life on earth. Some
Mahaayaanists describe the earthly life of the Buddha
as a "skillful device" (upaaya-kausaalya) to lead
creatures in the Buddha way. The Suvarna Prabhaa
Suutra teaches that the Buddha did not die; he gave
the appearance of death for the sake of sentient
beings.(28) Suzuki says that "the Buddha in the
Mahaayaana scriptures is not an ordinary human being
walking in a sensuous world; he is altogether
dissimilar to that son of Suddhodana who resigned the
royal life, wandered in the wildernms, and after six
years' profound meditation and penance discovered the
Fourfold Noble Truth and the Twelve Chains of
Dependence and we cannot but think that the
Mahaayaana Buddha is the fictitious creation of in
intensely poetic mind."(29) Much of the confusion as
to the nature of the Buddha would be avoided if it
were always clear whether references were being made
to the Hiinayaana Buddha or to the Mahaayaana Buddha.
Keith is one of the few students of Buddhism who
explains the silence of the Buddha on the grounds
that the Buddha did not have answer to certain fair
and reasonable questions put to him. Keith writes,'To
deny that the teaching of the Buddha himself stopped
at this attitude of agnosticism appears contrary to
every sound principle of criticism. It is true that
it has been suggested that it is impossible to
conceive that the master would be contented with
offering nothing more positive in the way of a hope
for the future, but this is obviously to beg the
question [Keith has been discussing the nuture of
nirvaa.na.] By leaving the matter unexplained the
Buddha allowed men to frame their own conceptions of
the future of the enlightened man after death.... It
has, however, been urged that we cannot suppose that
so, able a thinker as the Buddha was without personal
convictions on such a vital issue, even though he may
have deemed on good grounds that it was neither
advantageous nor necessary to explain his opin-
_____________________________________________________

(28) See Keith, op. cit., pp.221, 271, 272. Also
Suzuki, op. cit., pp.242-256.

(29) Ibid., p.245.

p.133

ions to his disciples. Here again we are confronted
with bare possibilities; it is quite legitimate to
hold that the Buddha was a genuine agnostic, that he
had studied the various systems of ideas prevalent in
his day without deriving any greater satisfaction
from them than any of us to-day do from the study of
modern systems, and that he had no reasoned or other
conviction on the matter. From the general poverty of
philosophical constructive power exhibited by such
parts of the system as appear essentially Buddha's,
one is inclined to prefer this explanation."(30) On
the other hand, Poussin says that the agnostic
position has nothing to support it other than a few
texts and "the sympathy of several European
scholars."(31) And Radhakrishnan advises, "To believe
that Buddha himself did not know the truths and
covered up his confusion and non-knowledge by
silence, is hardly consistent with his claim to have
attained enlightenment or bodhi."(32)
None of the texts which may be interpreted as
implying agnosticism present the Buddha as saying, "I
do not know." Rather, they affirm that the
information requested is not necessary for
salvation;(33) or that men hold a variety of opinions
on the issue in question;(34) or that men have only a
limited view of the world. For example, in the
Udaana, Gautama tells the story of a king who,
wishing to stop a long discussion in his court,
called in all the blind men of the city and asked
them to describe an elephant. The blind men were soon
quarreling among themselves because they could not
agree as to the physical characteristics of an
elephant. The king observed:

In such points Brahmans and recluses stick.
Wrangling on them, they violently discuss-
Poor folk! they see but one side of the shield.
(35)

Thus, one ought to maintain an attitude of
intellectual indecision until evidence sufficient for
a well-founded opinion has been acquired. One ought a
see both sides of the shield--and all parts of the
elephant. We must not fail to note, however, that the
Buddha is not speaking directly here about his own
knowledge or lack of knowledge. Buddhists insist that
the Buddha was the one who saw all sides.
The conclusion that the Buddha was all-knowing is
a much more defensible conclusion to be drawn from
the text of the Buddhist than the conclusion
_____________________________________________________

(30) Op. cit., pp.62,63.

(31) Op. cit., p.224.

(32) S. Radhakrishnan, "The Teaching of the Buddha by
Speech and Silence, "The Hibbert Journal, XXXII,
No. 3 (April,1934), 353.

(33) See section 6 below.

(34) Sa^myutta Nikaaya v.437; Diigha Nikaaya i.179.

(35) Quoted from the Udaana by T.W. Rhys Davids,
trans., Sacred Books of the the Buddhists,
Vol.II, p.188.

p.134

that the Buddha was agnostic. He is the Enlightened
One, the one possessing perfect enlightenment
(bodhi), Not only is he said to be omniscient
(sarvaj~na) in the sense that he possessed all the
knowledge one needs for salvation, but he is also
said to be universally omniscient
(sarvaakaarsj~nasva), that is, he knew everything
past, present, and future. Poussin says that the only
work he knows which denies that the Buddha was
universally omniscient is that of the Brahmin
Kumaarila, in which the author admits that the Buddha
did not know the number of the insects!(36)
Thomas holds that Gautama may be said to, be an
agnostic "in excluding from investigation certain
definite problems which were useless to the practica1
aim of the seeker after freedom from pain."(37) But
merely refraining from investigating problems on the
ground of their failure to contribuce to a practical
end does not make one an agnostic.
4. He would not tell his own views. Gautama's
silence may be accounted. for by the hypothesis that,
while he had solutions for all speculative problems,
he did not reveal them because he believed men would
not understand them. It would be better do let men
work out their own answers than to give them
doctrines which they would corrupt. Like St. Paul he
gave milk to babes and reserved the solid nourishment
for the spiritually mature. In other words, the
Buddha had an esoteric doctrine besides the exoteric
doctrine of the Fourfold Noble Truth and the
Twelvefold Wheel of Causation Several passages from
the Paali scriptures lend themselves to this
interpretation. One is this story from the Sa^myutta
Nikaaya: "At one time the Lord dwelt at Kosambi in
the sisu-grove. Then the Lord took a few sisu leaves
in his hand and addressed the monks: 'What do you
think, monks, which are the more, the few sisu leaves
I have taken in my hand, or those that are in the
sisu-grove?' 'Small in number, Lard, and few are the
leaves that the Lord has taken in his hand: those are
far more that are in the sisu-grove' 'Even so, monks
that is much more which I have realized and have not
declared to you; and but little have I declared.'"
(38) In the Mahaayaana scriptures may be found
passages such as the following which support the
theory of an esoteric doctrine: "My original vows are
fulfilled, the Dharma (or Truth) I have attained is
too deep for the understanding. A Buddha alone
_____________________________________________________

(36)Op. cit., p.223. How this doctrine of full
Omniscience can be reconciled with the Buddha's
obviously false prediction that his teachings
would last but five hundred years I cannot
imagine. E.g.,"Not a long time, AAnanda, will
holy living remain preserved; five hundred years,
AAnanda, will the Doctrine of the truth abide."
(Oldenberg, op. cit., p.387. Text not given.)

(37)Edward J.Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend and
History (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tr乥ner and
Company, 1927), p.202.

(38)Sa^myutta Nikaaya v.437. Edward J.Thomas, Early
Buddhist Scriptures (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Tr乥ner and Company, 1935), pp.117,118.

p.135

is able to understand what is in the mind of another
Buddha."(39) Radhakrishnan is one of the modern
interpreters who accepts the esoteric doctrine
theory. He concludes that the "hypothesis remains
that Buddha knew all about the ultimate problems, but
did not announce them to the multitudes who came to
him for fear that he might disturb their minds. This
view seems to us to be the most saticfactory."(40)
The theory of an esoteric doctrine easily
explains the conversation between Gautarma and
Vacchagotta. Gautama, according to this theory, had
answers to Vacchagotta's questions about the
existence of the ego but, knowing that th impetuous
and bargaining monk was not ready to grasp his full
doctrine, he gave no answer to the questions. But the
theory of an esoteric doctrine can be refuted by
quoting the Buddha himself: "I have preached the
truth without making any distinction between exoteric
and esoteric doctrines, for in respect of the truths,
AAnanda the Tathaagata has no such thing as the
closed fist of a teacher who keeps something
back."(41) In Tbr Questions of King Milinda, one of
the twenty-five virtues of a good teacher is: "He
should be zealous, he should teach nothing
partially, keep nothing secret and hold nothing
back."(42) In the same writings the Buddha is quoted
has having said, ' The Dhamma and the Vinaya
proclainmed by the Tathaagata shine forth when the me
displayed, and not when they are concealed."(43)
Davids in footnotes to the above two passages
writes: "So that, in the author's opinion, there is
no 'Esoteric Doctrine' in true Buddhism";(44) and
'The fact is that there never has been any such thing
a esoteric teaching in Buddhism, and that the modern
so-called esoteric Buddhism is neither esoteric nor
Buddhism."(45) In a literature as large as the
Buddhist scriptures it is not surprising that
conflicting statements can be found on many
issues.(46) La Vall俥 Poussin is the author of the
following discouraging observation: "Cependant,
prenons-y garde, si on peut parfois affirmer quelque
chose du Bouddhisme, il est rare qu'on no puisse af-
_____________________________________________________

(39) Suutra on the Cause and Effect in the Past and
Present, Quoted by D.T. Suzuki, in Eassays in
Zen Buddhism, First Series (London: Rider and
Company, 1927), p.47, footnote 1.

(40) Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp.466. See also
Oldenberg, op. cit., p.273.

(41) Mahaa Parinibbaana Sutta, Diigha Nikaaya ii.
100. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans.,
Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II, Sacred Books
of the Buddhists, Vol. III (London: Oxford
University Press, 1910). p.107.

(42) T.W. Rhys Davids, trans., The Question of King
Milinda iv. 1. 8. The Sacred Books of the East,
Vol.XXXV (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1890),
p.142.

(43) The Questions of King Milinda iv. 4. 4, ibid.,
p.264.

(44) Ibid., p.142, footnote 3.

(45) Ibid., p.268, footnote 3 (footnote begins on
p.267)

(46) According to Dwight Goddard there are over one
thousand titles in the Buddhist Scriptures. He
adds, "In the Sung Dynasty about 972 A.D. a
Chinese version of these scriptures was pulished
consisting of 1521 works in more than 5000
volumes, covering 130000 pages." Dwight Goddard,
A Buddhist

p.136

firmer et demontrer le contraire."(47) ("Yet let us
take care, if one is sometimes able to affirm
anything at all of Buddhism, it is seldom that one is
not able to affrim and to prove the contrary.") Here
is a fertile field for a second Abelard to write
another Sic et Non, The esoteric doctrine has not
proved to be a fully satisfactory explanation of
early Buddhism's avoidance of metaphysics.
5. He could not tell his own views. A fifth
reason for the unwillingness of Gautama to answer
metaphysical questions is found in the inadequacies
of language. Some questions put to him carried
implications which he could not accept. To answer them
would have confirmed the implications. They were
weighted questions like the well-known logic-textbook
illustrations: "Have you stopped beating your
mother-in-law?"; "Has your home town sold in horse
yet?" In the Vacchagotta incident mentioned above,
Gautama told Ananda that whether he had answered
Vacchagotta's questions in the affirmative or in the
negative he would have confirmed the doctrine of a
substantial. Therefore, silence was the proper answer
to the questions.
There are other instances in which Gautama
corrected a question, so he could answer it. In the
parable which forms a put of the Kevaddha Sutta a man
asks the gods, "Where do the elements pass away?" But
Gautama changed the question to "Where do the
elements find no footing?" Then he answered it. He
changed the question, so that it become an
epistemological rather than a metaphysical question.
And in the framework of an idealistic epistemology
the answer is obvious: the existence of the elements
depends upon intellection; intellection has ceased in
"the intellect of arahat-ship"; therefore, in the
mind of the arabat the elements find no footing
Again, in the Mahaavagga, when Siha, a disciple of the
Nigantha sect, asks the Buddha if he teaches the
doctrine of annihilation after death, the Buddha's
_____________________________________________________

Bible (rev. ed.; New York: E.P. Dutton and Company,
Inc., 1952), p.v. When one considers the difficulty
Christianity has had with the problem of establishing
consistency among the sisty-six books of its Bible,
the problem of consistency in the Buddhist scriptures
seems ridiculously impossible. There are other
factors which have made for diversity in the Buddhist
sciptures, viz., there have been no councils to
determine the canonicity of the books (although there
was at least one council to determine the orthdox
doctrine of Buddhism) , and--most confusing of
all--the Buddists have an open canon. New works are
constantly being added. Furthermore, the figure of
the Buddha in the later scriptures, if not in the
earlier--and the earlist were were wirtten centuries
after the life of Gautama--is a vehicle for other
men's words and ideas.

(47) L. de la Vall俥 Poussin, Bouddhisme (Paris:
Gabriel Beauchesne and Company, 1909), p.139.

(48) In some schools of Mahaayaana Buddhism silence
is regarded as the only fitting manner in which
to describe ultimate reality (Bhuutatatbaataa).
D.T. Suzuki has written, "Bodhi-Dharma... was
fully convinced of the insufficiency of the
human tongue to express the highest truth which
is revealed only intuitively to the religious
consciousness." And again Suzuki writes,
"Another interesting utterance by a Chinese
Buddhist, who, earnestly pondering over the
absoluteness of Suchness for several years,
understood it one day all of a sudden, is: "The
very instant you say it is something (or a
nothing) , you miss the mark.'"(Outlines of
Mahaayaana Buddhism, p.105, footnote 1.)

p.137

answer involved a rephrasing of the question, for he
answered "I proclaim, Siiha, the annihilation of
lust."(49) At another time we are told explicitly
that the Buddha was unable a answer certain questions
because they had a frame of reference which made an
answer impossible for him. I refer to the occasion in
which King Pasenda asked the nun Khemaa why the Buddha
had not revealed whether the Enlightened One exists
after death The nun replied that the question assumes
that the axistence of the Buddha can be measured in
arms of the physical, but this is not the Me: "these
predicates of the corporeal form are abolished in the
Perfect One, their root is severed, they we hewn away
like a palm-tree, and laid aside, so that they cannot
germinate in the future. Released, O great king, is
the Perfect One from this, that his being should be
gauged by the measure of the corporeal world: he is
deep, immeasurable,.unfarhomable as the great ocean
'The Perfect One exists after death this is not
apposite;'the Perfect One does not exist after
death,' this also is not apposite;'the Perfect One at
once exists and does not exist after death,' this
also is not apposite; 'the Perfect One neither does
nor does not exist after death' this also is not
apposite."(50) Thus, in typically labored fashion we
are informed that axistence is not a predicate which
can be applied to the being who has entered into the
state of pariuirvana. Existence becomes a meaningless
word when used in this context.
Gautama, like all religious reformers, faced the
problem of pouring the new wine of his teachings into
old bottles the verbal patterns which were familiar
to those to whom he preached. Mahaayaanists believe
that some of his doctrines would not fit the language
patterns of his day. According to the Zen school his
doctrine will not fit the language patterns of any
day. The Mahaayaana texts warn over and over again
against the dangers that lurk in the use of words.
They are fingers which point to the moon One must
beware lest one concentrate on the word and miss the
reality to, which the word points. "But neither words
nor sentences can exactly express meanings, for words
are only sweet sounds that are arbitrarily chosen a
represent things, they are not the things themselves,
which in turn are only manifestations of mind."(51)
Zen masters, beginning with Bodhidharma are fully
convinced of the insufficiency of human language to
express the fundamental nature of reality. Even to
say "I do not know" is inadequate, sinc confession of
not knowing implies a measure of knowledge. Silence
is the best expression of reality. "What I think may
be stated thus: That which it in
_____________________________________________________

(49) Mahaavagga vi. 31.7. T.W. Rhys Davids and
Hermann Oldenberg, trans., Vinaya Texts, Part
II, The Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XVII
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1882), p.112.

(50) Sa.myutta Nikaaya. Oldenberg, op.cit.,
pp.279,280.

(51) La^nkaavataara Suutra. Goddard, op.cit., p.286.

p.138

all beings wordless speechless, shows no signs, is
not possible of cognisance, and is above all
questioning and answering."(52) Man should live in
reality, not discourse about it. But this silence is
not the silence of the misologist; it is the silence
of a "higher affirmation."
6. He would not be distracted from his main
purpose. We noted at the opening of this paper Sutta
63 of the Majjhima Nikaaya in which is found an
important listing of the undetermined questions.
After Maalu~nkyaaputta had put his questions to the
Buddha with the threat that unless they were answered
he would desert the order, the Buddha gives one of
his most elaborate refusals to answer speculative
questions. He reminds Malunkyaputta that he had never
promised to give such teachings to his followers, nor
had Maalu~nkyaaputta set this as a condition of his
becoming a disciple. Further more, adds the Buddha to
set up such a condition for joining or remaining in
the order would be acting a foolishly as a wounded
man who refused to have a poisoned arrow removed from
his body until he learned the caste of man who shot
the arrow. The religious life..., " continues the
Buddha, "does not depend on the dogma that the world
is eternal; nor does the religious life... depend on
the dogma that the world is not eternal. Whether the
dogma obtain... that the world is eternal or that the
world is not eternal there still remain birth, old
age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grid, and
despair, for the extinction of which in the present
life I am prescribing." The Buddha then reiterates
the other issues on which Maalu~nkyaaputta is seeking
information, viz., the finitude or infinitude of the
world, the identity of soul and body, and the
existential status of the saint after death. The
consideration of these problems, he contends, is not
profitable, and does not touch the fundamentals of
religion. "And what, Maalu~nkyaaputta, have I
elucidated? Misery... the origin of misery...the
cessation of misery... and the path leading to the
cessation of misery have I elucidated. And why...
have I elucidated this, Because... this does profit,
has to, do with the fundamentals of religion, and
tends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation,
quiescence. knowledge, supreme wisdom, and
Nirvaa.na."(53) The Buddha's reply is a pragmatic
reply. He is a religious teacher, not a philosopher.
He has come to show men how to overcome the
sufferings inevitably involved in living. Anything
which does not contribute to that end is extraneous.
Similar responses me found in other suttas. For
example, in the Paasaadika Sutta the Buddha tells
Cunda that when men ask why the Buddha has not
revealed whether a Tathagata exists after death, they
are to be told: "Because,
_____________________________________________________

(52) Vimalakiirti Suutra. Quoted by D.T. Suzuki, in
Outlines of Mahaayaana, p.107.

(53) Majihima Nikaaya. Warren, op. cit., pp.118-122.

p.139

brother,it is not conducive to good, not to true
doctrine, nor to the fundamentals of religion, nor a
unworldliness, nor to passionlessness, nor to
tranquillity, nor to peace, not to insight, nor to
enlightenment, nor to Nibbaana Therefore, it is not
revealed by the Exalted One."(54) And in the
Sa^myutta Nikaaya the Buddha, admitting that there is
much that he knows which he has not revealed,
explains, "And why, monks have I not declared it?
Became it is not profitable, does not belong to the
beginning of the religious life, and does not and to
revulsion, absence of passion, cessation, calm,
higher knowledge, enlightenment, Nirvaa.na. Therefore
have I not declared it."(55) A slightly different
answer is given in the Kevaddha Sutta. Kevaddha, a
young householder, asks the Buddha to perform, or to
have one of his monks perform a miracle in the town
of Naalandaa In his reply the Buddha says nothing
about his disbelief in miracles. Instead, he says
that he abhors the practice of miracles: "It is
because I perceive danger in the practice of mystic
wonders, that I loath, and abhor, and am ashamed
there of."(56) Then he adds that if Kevaddha really
wants to, see a miracle he ought to, study the
selftraining of a monk.
If one must choose only one of the six hypotheses
a the reason Gautama the Buddha avoided speculative
questions, the pragmatic hypothesis seems to me to be
the best explanation. The picture we get of the
Buddha is that of a remarkably single-minded man.
Speculation was not only useless but harmful, for it
would sidetrack him from his main goal. He had no
disinterested love for truth. He admitted that he had
more truths which he might disclose, but he refrained
and limited himself to the revelation of only those
truths which he considered to be religiously
significant. Truth was a value for him only when it
was a means a man's release from suffering. For
Gautama, all knowledge was ideology, that is, all
knowledge was held and expressed for certain reasons.
His dharma was revealed only because it contributed
to man's salvation.
What do the avyaak.rtavastuuna reveal about
Gautama himself? First, they reveal the greatness of
Gautama the religionist. He saw clearly that religion
is first and foremost a way of life. Religion need
not have a fully developed philosophy. Many of its
foundation stones may remain unexamined. The Buddha
did not argue for the truth of his Fourfold Noble
Truth. Men were expected to see its truth intuitively
and to test to in the logic of life.
_____________________________________________________

(54) Paasaadika Sutta, Diigha Hikaaya iii.136 T.W.
and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, trans., Dialogues of the
Buddha, Part III, Sacred Books of the Buddhists,
Vol.IV (London: Oxford University Press, 1921),
p.128.

(55) Sa^myutta Nikaaya v.437. Thomas, Early Buddhist
Scriptures, p.118.

(56) Kevaddha Sutta, op. cit., Vol. II, p.278.

p.140

The avyaak.rtavastuuni also reveal a weakness of
Gautama the philosopher. Did Gautama think that a way
of life could be established without a metaphysical
substructure? Or did he believe that the substructure
was already established and was in such sound
condition that it need not be examined? Even though
he refrained from certain metaphysical speculation
and asked that his followers likewise reffrain, it is
manifest that his final evaluation of life, "To live
is to suffer" or "All is suffering" (sarvam du.hkham)
rests upon the following metaphysical conceptions:
All thing are the effects of causes and the causes of
effects (pratiityasamutpaada) ; all things are
transitory (anitya); all things are devoid of a
substantial self (anaatma); all animate beings pass
through many existences (sa^msaara); all existences
of an animate being are conditioned by its past
existences (karma); all existences can terminate
(nirvaa.na).
And, finally, did Gautama believe that he could
dissuade his followers from engaging in speculation
on the deepest mysteries of Life? If he did, I submit
that he misjudged human nature. The unanswerable
problems remain problems still. Any person, early
Buddhist or contemporary logical positivist, who
believes that man can refrain from raising questions
about the ultimate nature of the universe and man's
place in it has made a superficial observation of
human behavior. No restraints, no warnings are strong
enough to stop man from wondering.
Buddhism might have remained a religion "pure and
undefiled" if the Fourfold Noble Truth could have
been kept free from metaphysics; but a metaphysical
view was implicit in the Fourfold Noble Truth and so,
from the teachings of this man who refused to, engage
in metaphysical thinking and who warned others of the
dangers which lurk in theorizing have emerged some of
the most speculative philosophical systems the world
has yet seen. The history of Buddhism is evidence of
the inevitability and necesssity of metaphysics, in
spite of the insistent silence of the Buddha.