The Ultimate Ground of Buddhist Purification

·期刊原文
The Ultimate Ground of Buddhist Purification
By Kenneth K. Inada
Philosophy East & West
V. 18 No. 1-2 (1968)
pp. 41-53
Copyright 1968 by University of Hawaii Press

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Kenneth K. Inada is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii.

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THIS ESSAY WILL NOT touch upon the ceremonies and rituals of Buddhist purification. It will rather attempt an objective analysis of the common ground upon which the Buddhist purification process is based. In essence, it is an attempt to have a second look at what the process really is from a more philosophic standpoint so that the process and the elements involved therein will be rendered more plausible and intelligible.

On every encounter of the Buddhist truth recorded in the bulky texts, the descriptions are invariably clothed in pithy, abstract, cryptic, and paradoxical terms. This situation results in all kinds of distortions and misinterpretations, and also leads to simple blind acceptance of the translated terms. The Buddha was mindful of this when he cautioned thus: "Profound, O Vaccha, is this doctrine, recondite, and difficult of comprehension, good, excellent, and not to be reached by mere reasoning, subtle and intelligent only to the wise; and it is a hard doctrine for you to learn, who belong to another sect, to another faith, to another persuasion, to another discipline, and sit at the feet of another teacher."[1] The Buddha allegedly also said: "Hard is it to realize the essential, the truth is not easily perceived, desire is mastered by him who knows to him who sees (aright) all things are naught."[2] And he very paradoxically concludes: "There is, O Bhikkhus, an unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed. Were there not, O Bhikkhus, this unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, unformed, there would be no escape from the world of the born, originated, created, formed."[3]

An explication of the above statements is in order. Although the three characteristics (trilak.sa.na) of Buddhism are late crystallizations, they help to set up the Buddhist Weltanschauung in the sense that they define what Buddhism

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is and at once distinguish it from all other systems of thought. The characteristics are suffering (du.hkha), impermanence (anitya), and non-self (anaatman). They are not principles of some objective metaphysical order which dictate the manner in which things are manifested, but only descriptions of the "existential" state of things. Du.hkha is the first aspect of the well-known Noble Fourfold Truth and reveals that suffering is a universal fact in the world. The universality of du.hkha means that the human being in his full and comprehensive dimension, in terms of his dynamic relational structures, usually cannot keep up orderly and consistently with the flow of its own ontological being. In this sense, suffering or du.hkha is not limited strictly to the physical or the mental or the psychological. If this were so, how could we delineate our own being with respect to the strictly physical, mental, and psychological without involving ourselves in inequities in their individual or several accountings? This is where Buddhism focused on the only natural basis for suffering, the ontological basis. It is only in and by ontology that a common basis, a common ground of discourse on all forms of du.hkha is possible.

It has been said repeatedly that the cause of suffering is "thirst for existence," "passions or desires for life," "bondage to the passions," "blinded by lust," "entangled in the garments of desires," "flooded by desires," "clinging to existence," etc. But these phraseologies are couched far too much in generalities or in prejudiced understanding, so that the reader still remains in doubt concerning the real meaning of du.hkha. Surely the original Buddhist teaching could not have been that simple and commonplace, because any other non-Buddhist system could just as well have expounded on the weaknesses or pitfalls of succumbing to one's passions and desires. The truth is that we live by our passions and we want to keep them as they are. The key technical term here is t.r.s.naa which literally means thirst (for life or existence). It means that each being born into this world is bound up in the natural process of sustaining itself and thus expresses itself in the basic desires or passions for life. Each being exerts its own sphere of activity and guards every element which comes into play. This guarding action is technically known as upadhi (a Paali term which has no Sanskrit equivalent). In a more precise sense, upadhi is the foundation, the ground of attachment and of the momentary rebirth series. Or, to put it in another way, it is the clinging to repetitive existence, and therefore causes a bond in existence itself. The act of attachment or clinging is understood better with the aid of a cognate term, upaadaana. This concept of upaadaana explains the presence of a "fuel" for the grasping, holding, or gripping action involved in the upadhi. And, in this sense, it is the cause or the basis of the static nature, the repetitive character which hampers the smooth ontological flow. Upaadaana is usually spoken of in four categories: kaama, di.t.thi, siila, and

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atta (in Paali), which are, respectively, (grasping arising from sensual) "desires," (from holding certain) "viewpoints," (from squeamish belief in and carrying out of) "precepts," and (from maintaining the egotistical or) "self" (-conscious view).[4] All of these upaadaanas are outward manifestations of the more basic ontological basis for the roots of sorrow, the upadhi itself.

But whether it is upadhi or upaadaana, one thing is certain; the fact that one's being is not properly functioning as indeed a being in a strict sense must be in proper order at all times. This brings us to the next characteristic of Buddhism, which is anitya or impermanence. Examined closely, anitya is the antithesis of upadhi or upaadaana, which describes or creates, as mentioned above, the static nature of being. Or, taken in another sense, anitya spells out the impossibility of the acts derived from upadhi or upaadaana ; for, if being is in a perpetual flux, what justification is there for the staticity which results from those acts? In this conjunction, the Sa^myutta Nikaaya says:

Not to seek for anything, O priests, is to be free; to seek for anything is not to be free.

If consciousness abide, O priests, it is because of a seeking for form that it abides, and supported by form, and resting in form and taking delight therein, it attains to growth, increase, and development.... If passion for form, O priests, is abandoned, then through the abandonment of passion the support is cut off, and there is no resting-place for consciousness.... When that consciousness has no resting-place, does not increase, and no longer accumulates karma, it becomes free; and when it is free, it becomes quiet; and when it is quiet, it is blissful; and when it is blissful, it is not agitated; and when it is not agitated, it attains Nirvaa.na in its own person; and it knows that rebirth is exhausted, that it has lived the holy life, and that it has done what it behooved it to do, and that it is no more for this world.[5]

Again, suffering by way of upadhi or upaadaana is inadmissible in the light of the third and final characteristic, which is anaatman or "non-self." If upadhi or upaadaana were to be taken as basic to true being, then aatman, self or selfhood, would certainly result because of the static identifying element in the moment to moment existence. But aatman is used neither in the ordinary nor Vedaantic absolute sense in Buddhism. Anaatman, in the Buddhist sense, means that there are no upadhis or upaadaanas which hamper the true becomingness of man's nature.

We have thus far given a rather rough picture of the Buddhist view by way of the three characteristics, showing the impossibility of staticizing the momentary existence. But the truth of our empirical existence is that the static nature

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always bears up, always takes hold of us, so to speak, and indeed we seem to be guided by the grasped static nature; for that seems to be the only way a perspective or an understanding of our very nature of existence arises out of empirical grounds. In short, we tend to remember and be remembered by the existential monuments we build, i.e., the clearly structured experiences occurring by way of upadhi or upaadaana expended at past momentary existences.[6]

Thus it is that our rationalization or conceptualization is always behind momentary times, a writing of a series of obituaries about our already non-existent selves, or a pointing at existential structures expended in a serial momentary past. In this connection, the Brahmajaala Sutta says:

For whosoever, brethren, whether recluses or Brahmans, are thus reconstructors of the past or arrangers of the future, or who are both, whose speculations are concerned with both, who put forward various propositions with regard to the past and to the future, they, all of them are entrapped in the net of these sixty-two modes; this way and that they plunge about, but they are in it; this way and that they may flounder, but they are included in it, caught in it.[7]

The trouble with us is that we are forever catching up with the Achilles' heel of reality and never successful at that. All this reminds us so poignantly of the Western admission to the hedonistic paradox where pleasure as a goal (objectified) is aimed at but is nowhere to be found. Aristotle long ago said that men rarely pursue pleasure directly or consciously. It is only a state of feeling that arises when the organism is functioning smoothly, or it is merely incidental to the activity involved. If Aristotle had gone further into the analysis of the individual's more concrete ontological activity, he would probably have ended up in the Buddhist reference.

This ontological activity in Buddhism has been one of the greatest psychological (in the widest possible use of the term) explorations by the early Buddhists. They, after the historical Buddha, began to seek a better understanding of what is the true nature of man, not in any idealized or idealistic sense but in terms of what is really the psychological foundation of man qua man. In many ways the Buddhists left no stone unturned in getting at the many facets in man, either internally and externally or psychologically and physically. But

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what is most important is that they never tried to cut up the human being into mutually exclusive realms of existence, such as the mental and the physical. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to understand Buddhist doctrines when pitted against Western terms or when easy correspondences are made, because the rational-structural representation almost always takes over in the comparison.

The early Buddhists began to observe the nature of man empirically and naturalistically. No one could deny the deep and solid basis for the Buddhist concepts in use. For example, the structural analysis of man in terms of the 5 skandhas ("aggregates"), 12 aayatanas ("bases"), and 18 dhaatus ("realms") is only intelligible when these sets of terms describe the ongoing ontological activity. It means, in other words, that the structural concept we get from these sets of terms is only expressive of the easy references made with respect to only an intellectual understanding of the various facets of man's functional being This is the reason why the consciousness we ordinarily speak of is such a complex phenomenon and that there is no breaking it up into component parts or into the inner or outer sections, such as is done by those who follow Freudian psychology. Thus even the great Buddhaghosa, speaking for all Buddhists, had to say that consciousness is "whatever has the characteristics of cognizing,"[8] which is a tautology, an inevitable circular description; but in spite of this, it is an attempt to preserve the continuity of being.

The best Buddhist concept, and indeed the most essential and central concept which expresses the continuity of being, is pratiitya-samutpaada (Paali: pa.ticca-samuppaada) , popularly known as dependent or relational origination, or simply the Wheel of Life. With the concept of the Middle Path (madhyamaa pratipad) of the historical Buddha, this particular concept commands the greatest philosophical and religious attention from all Buddhists. And in a larger sense or perhaps in a particular sense, both concepts are ultimately collapsible or mutually identifiable.[9]

Buddhaghosa as well as all Mahaayaanists speak of the 12 structural spokes in the Wheel of Life (pa.ticca-samuppaada) as being only links in the continuity of life, but in order to emphasize the structural aspect, and the non-enslavement thereof, the wheel is variously said to spin clockwise, counterclockwise, from mid-point clockwise, from mid-point counterclockwise, etc.[10] And it is inherently difficult to comment on dependent origination, as the ancients have said:

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The truth, a being, rebirth-linking,
And the structure of conditions (pa.ticca-samuppaada)
Are four things very hard to see.
And likewise difficult to teach.[11]

Although the Wheel of Life is almost always said to begin spinning from the fact of ignorance (avidyaa) and ends in old age and death (jaraa-mara.na), there is absolutely no foundation, empirically or ontologically, to support this view. Probably the only support there is is the one from a more general psychological understanding of the nature of being, i.e., that the wheel keeps on spinning by virtue of ordinary ignorance and only ends in the biological death of the organism. But there is no such corroboration for this process in the strictest sense in any of the canons. Ignorance or avidyaa is not rational ignorance, although it is not ruled out completely in the Buddhist understanding of ignorance. In the strictest as well as widest sense, ignorance means ontological ignorance, and only in this more basic sense does the concept of pratiitya-samutpaada take on significance as a structural analysis of the elements at play in the ontological flow of man's nature. Thus it also makes sense to analyze the pratiitya-samutpaada in terms of the three temporal moments,[l2] not in terms of absolutely distinct temporal periods relative to these concepts that we ordinarily assign them, but in terms of understanding the ontological continuity that could be intimated with the aid of these concepts. The concepts are, in reality, depictive of certain high or distinct points in the empirical flow of man's being. In this manner we can also make sense of the general formula for pratiitya-samutpaada: "This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises; this not becoming, that does not become; from the ceasing of this, that ceases."[13]

Shwe Zan Aung is quite right when he says: "Pa.ticca-samuppaada is a Va.t.ta-kathaa (discourse on evil) . . . not a theory of the evolution of the world from primordial matter. Even as a theory of the origin of evil, it does not at-

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tempt to show the absolute origin of evil; it only shows how evils originate. And so life is taken as it is."[14] This remark by Aung is in line with our discussion of the basis of suffering, that in the turning of the wheel the strained conditions of both the physical and mental aspects must be overcome. But the overcoming action or process is not alien or totally foreign to any individual who takes up the Buddhist faith. There is nothing supernatural or transcendent in the whole process. Consequently, even Buddhaghosa, in the final discussion of pa.ticca-samuppaada, says rather cryptically:

Becoming's Wheel reveals no known beginning;
No maker, no experiencer there;
Void with a twelvefold voidness, and nowhere
It ever halts; for ever it is spinning.[15]

As Buddhaghosa so skillfully incorporates the three learnings of `siila, samaadhi, and praj~naa into the ultimate quest of all Buddhists, i.e., nirvaa.na, the Mahaayaana likewise uses the same approach in the realization of the ultimate goal. It must be pointed out that the approach used is not new nor original with Buddhaghosa but was common to all Buddhist traditions. But the concept of praj~naa will be fully developed as the key to the unlocking of the truth of phenomenal things or manifestations. Or, more correctly, praj~naa as the principle of ultimate purification is the eye of wisdom, the tool with which man could perceive the merging, if not the absolute identity, between the empirical and the non-empirical worlds, or between the impure (strained) and the pure (unstrained) realms. This concentration on the concept of praj~naa, which eventually is used as an inclusive concept covering the other five virtues of daana, `siila, k.saanti, viirya, and dhyaana, sparks the beginnings of true Mahaayaana and the production of a mass of works known as the Praj~naapaaramitaa literature[16]

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for the length of Buddhist life in India. And thenceforth, no school within the Mahaayaana is immune to the influence of this concept.

What, then, is the essence or philosophy of praj~naa as it has bearings on the subject of purification? It is here that we derive the most clear and systematic picture of the Bodhisattva concept. In developing this concept, the Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras focus attention on two things. (1) the Bodhisattva in terms of its nature or self ("ego"), and (2) the Bodhisattva in terms of the dharmas or its perceptual characteristics. The first question is on being or ontology and the second on the factors of that ontology. In other words, the suutras now project the world as it should be in the idealized realm of Bodhisattvas and in so doing the Mahaayaana stresses Mankind or Man in the abstract. This is the beginning of Mahaayaana metaphysics.

So if the Bodhisattvahood is the ultimate goal for men, there must be some discourse on it, or some characterization of it must be permitted.' However, this characterization essentially takes on a negative aspect in order to show up the positive content. One of the commentary suutras says of the Bodhisattvas thus:

They are also possessed of wisdom, because they have cut off any assumption as regards the substantiality of dharmas as well as of any metaphysical entity in the beings. This assumption is eightfold because its objects are eightfold. viz.,... four assumptions concerning the metaphysical entity in beings: aatman, sattva, jiiva, pudgala; and four assumptions concerning dharmas: dharma, adharma, sa.mj~naa, asa.mj~naa.[17]

The suutra continues:

The assumption of a metaphysical entity in the beings is fourfold: in fact it can be considered a) as something existing apart from the five constituents of a person (aatman);b) as a continuity of existence (sattva); c) as a duration up to the end of life (jiiva) ; d) as a clinging to a new form of existence (pudgala).[18]

These passages attempt to show the invariable enslavement to the form, to the static objectified notions in understanding the Bodhisattva concept, and therefore they must be relinquished. As regards the dharmas or factors of experience:

The assumption of dharmas is also fourfold (though no assumption of dharmas, dharmasa.mj~naa, is really possible), because a) all dharmas are not existent (the

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notion of perceiver and perceived being untenable), b) because there exists this non-existence (as voidness, `suunya; nor assumption, sa.mj~naa, is possible), c) because there is nothing of which something can be postulated (but non-assumption is also impossible), d) because there is the conventional use of predicating something of something.[19]

Consequently the characterization of the Bodhisattva by means of the concept of dharma is permissible but it can never be adhered to in the absolute sense. Thus it is said of all aspirants of the Bodhisattvahood that: "If in a Bodhisattva the notion of a 'being' should take place, he should not be called a 'Bodhi-being'. And likewise if the notion of a soul, or a person should take place in him. And why? He who has set out in the Bodhisattva-vehicle . . . he is not one of the dharmas."[20] Moreover, even with respect to the final state of the enlightened self, the suutra says: "Though the absolute (tathataa) is always and everywhere, still it cannot be realized by those who, on account of ignorance, have their mind reposing somewhere (prati.s.thita) but, on the contrary, it is realized by the others whose mind, on account of right knowledge, reposes no-where (aprati.s.thita)."[21]

All of this shows that the Mahaayaana cannot admit any form of objectification to arise since that would only cause erroneous perception by the phenomenon of a freeze or a static state to cloud the otherwise dynamic nature of true being. So the Mahaayaana now goes to the bottom of the problem by questioning the very foundation of the objectifying process and the objectified content. It comes up with the novel notion, a term also used by the Theravaada but not in the same sense, that both the process and the content are truly of the nature of void or `suunya. This means that a non-objectified (aprati.s.thita) perception must be devoid of any characterization, though it does not mean devoid of any content.

In this connection, Edward Conze, tracing the whole Praj~naapaaramitaa literature, concludes that the emptiness of dharmas (dharma-`suunyataa) will be better understood by examining them from three standpoints: the ontological status of separate dharmas, the psychological attitudes we adopt toward them, and the logical structure of any statements made about them.[22]

These three standpoints are convenient references to a better perspective of the intriguing and elusive concept of dharma and its "empty" status. But all three are, in essence, different ways in which the ontological status of man

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is best presented. Thus, the ontological, psychological, and logical only define or amplify certain aspects which must be understood and transcended in order to arrive at the ultimate `suunyataa of things. As a matter of fact, the discussion of the three standpoints is reducible to the three marks of Buddhism discussed earlier, namely, du.hkha, anitya, and anaatman. An incorrect or improper view of the dharmas, i.e., involvement in the empirical, metaphysical, or rational speculations, would only issue forth suffering or delusive existence grounded in ontological transgressions. For dharmas are indeed essentially "non-existent," "have only nominal existence," "without marks," "non-produced," "non-apprehended," "non-possessed," and "unsupported."

Perhaps the most significant message derivable from the Praj~naapaaramitaa philosophy, aside from the spiritual elevation of all beings by means of the six paaramitaas, is the status or the identity of absolute and relative reality. This is where the limitations of ordinary rational understanding are exhibited and which become the source of the alleged contradictions and confusions which are ascribed to one who affirms this identity. The later and more concise Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras, for example, the H.rdaya Suutra, immediately delve into the identity of ruupa (corporeality or tangible form of things) and `suunyataa (non-characterizable content of perception or experience).[23] This identity describes the final or absolute status of being, the Bodhisattva, whose body is so pure and perfect that there is nothing attributive of nor appropriative from it. There is no action nor reaction with static elements in the final analysis.

All of subsequent Mahaayaana development can be seen as amplifications, in one way or another, of this basic identity factor. It may be referred to as the ontological identity because it is only by way of existential purity that the identity is revealed or realized. Or, perhaps in another sense it could be called the ontological paradox, because it remains a paradox so long as man's rational understanding is involved, and of course it would be a mystery to the delusively ignorant.

Naagaarjuna (ca. 150-250 A.D.) crystallizes the thoughts expressed in the Praj~naapaaramitaa in the following celebrated verses: "There is no distinction between nirvaa.na and sa.msaara"[24] and "The limits of nirvaa.na are the limits of sa.msaara."[25] He never affirmed nor asserted the transcendent or supernatural

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realm of existence and he was cautious to say that, "Without relying on common everyday practices (i.e., relative empirical truths), the absolute truth can not be expressed."[26] This verse reveals the identity of worldly truth (sa^mv.rti-satya) and absolute truth (paramaartha-satya). He also advances a wedge in the understanding of reality by asserting another form of identity which brings four concepts together thus: "We declare that whatever is relational origination is `sunyataa. `Suunyataa is a provisional name for the mutuality and indeed it is the middle path."[27] This verse accordingly shows the following identity: pratiitya-samutpaada= `suunyataa=prapa~nca=madhyamaa-pratipad Thus Naagaarjuna asserts that the Enlightened One (the Buddha) taught the doctrine of pratiitya-samutpaada in order to end all play of words, i.e., that reality is negatively characterized by:

Non-destruction, non-origination, non-interruption, non-continuity
Non-identity, non-differentiation, non-appearance (coming into being), non-disappearance (going out of being).[28]

The Yogaacaara tradition or Vij~naanavaada, starting with Maitreyanaatha, Asa^nga, and Vasubandhu, also stressed the identity theme. For example, the initial stanza of the Madhyaanta-vibha^nga reads:

The non-real phenomenon exists;
Duality does not exist therein;
`Suunyataa, on the other hand, is in the phenomenon
And the phenomenon is in `Suunyataa.[29]

In further explaining the phenomenal creation and the `Suunyataa of things, the Vij~naanavaada goes further by developing the theory of three self-natures (trisvabhaava), namely, imaginary (parikalpita), causal or empirical (paratantra), and absolute (parini.spanna). In a sense, the first two correspond with the worldly truth (sa^mv.rti-satya) and the third with the absolute truth (paramaartha-satya). But just as it starts off with the phenomenal and the emptiness as being mutually penetrative and identifiable, it ends with the three self-natures as having no self-nature (ni.hsvabhaava).

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Again, we find the Vij~naanavaada developing the theory of eight consciousnesses (vij~naana) in order to elaborate on the three-self-nature theory, and the concentration is now on the mental aspect or realm. Despite the complicated nature of the process of consciousness, the ultimate task is to bring all consciousnesses to a tranquil state. This process involves a turning, a revulsion (paraav.rtti) of all the consciousnesses with the eighth being the receptacle (aalaya) containing all the rest of the seven vij~naanas. Herein, again, the phenomenal and empirical order of all the vij~naanas is granted, but at the same time the absolute nature is contained within them and thus the revulsion is the Key to the uncovering or unveiling of true reality. But the crucial question is, what more is involved in the process of enlightenment? For indeed, the revulsion, the identity-revealing factor, still remains to be revealed in order to bring into the open the full dimension of the elevative process toward nirvaa.na. That this elevative process (which, by the way, is the "last" step in the ground of purification) involves wisdom of a sort is undeniable.

Here, two distinctions of the concept of wisdom must be laid bare. The first is the wisdom which is an outgrowth of reason, and this is the ordinary sense of the concept. The second, which belongs to Buddhism and which is more subtle, is wisdom as the basis of reason itself or what issues forth from the rational process itself. But the rational process is not the only process issuing from it, since it is the ground of all other sense functions. It must be cautioned here that being the ground of all other sense functions does not mean the simple manifestation of wisdom in every sensual or biological urge. Buddhist wisdom still functions within the realm of rational intelligence, where discrimination of all kinds is initial but never final, where duality must be transcended not in terms of rejecting the subject-object relationship but by including both without setting up either of the polarities.

Thus the term praj~naa as used in the Praj~naapaaramitaa Suutras, and subsequently by all other Mahaayaana schools, takes on the meaning "wisdom." This is perfected, completed, consummated wisdom. It is usually contrasted with the term vij~naana, where the latter usually means clear conscious activity.[30] Where the prefix "vi" of uij~naana connotes a division, a cut, etc., in the sense of perceptual clarity by way of symbolic discrimination, the "pra" in praj~naa must be taken in the sense of going beyond, i.e., immanently transcending the symbolic discrimination taking place in the function of vij~naana, and in this sense there is no wholesale rejection of the uij~naana function. This is why D. T. Suzuki says that praj~naa is a double-edged sword that cuts two ways,

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namely, (1) into consciousness and (2) into unconsciousness.[31] Praj~naa is consequently the awakening or the realization of the non-bifurcated states from the initial and primitive involvement of the human organism in its surroundings to the highly sophisticated symbolic representations that take place in the conscious mind. Thus, "From the standpoint of the Absolute all elements of existence, Matter, etc. on one side and the Ultimate Monistic Principle ... [`suunyataa], on the other, are mutually identical."[32] And since praj~naa is not to be taken as another entity, "the (ultimate) unreality of the Climax of Wisdom as a separate entity, inasmuch as the knowledge which perfectly analyses the elements of existence, brings about the non-perception of all the separate realities."[33]

Thus praj~naa (wisdom) is the perception of things as they are. This is possible only as there is a strict continuity in being, a continuity which expresses the most thoroughgoing naturalistic basis for man's existence. Every element or aspect of nature, in this sense, is honored. Highest wisdom issues out of this context and returns ultimately to it for confirmation. Praj~naa, in this respect, can be said to be a kind of principle of perception which exhibits the continuity (both lateral and horizontal extensiveness in time) and the comprehensiveness of existence. The single order of individual being within nature is thereby kept intact. Praj~naa is then the "last" key to the unlocking of this single order of existence from within man himself as he rightly perceives the nature of things. It is what makes it possible for him to see all things and yet keep his mind free from stain (or strain) and attachment.

NOTES
1. Majjhimo Nikaaya, Sutta 63, in Henry Clarke Warren, Buddhism in Translations (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 126.

2. Udaana, VIII, 2; in D. M. Strong, trans., The Udaana or The Solemn Utterances of the Buddha (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1902), p. 112.

3. Ibid., VIII, 3.

4. The Path of Purification, Bhikkhu ~Naa.namoli, trans. (Colombo, Ceylon: R. Semage, 1956), pp. 657-660 (Visuddhimagga, Part III, Chap. XVII, sec. 239-248).

5. Warren, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

6. Buddhism speaks of an existential moment as being only 1/17 of a thought moment. Or, conversely speaking, a thought moment, i.e., the clear and distinct idea we get in a single conscious moment, is some 17 temporal dimensions behind the expiration of the existential moment. The matter of fraction is not so important as the reference made to the infinitesimal dimension of being.

7. Brahmajaala Suttanta, 45; in T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., Dialogues of the Buddha (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1956), Part I, p. 54.

8. The Path of Purification, p. 506 (Part III, Chap. XIV, sec. 81).

9. Ibid., p. 598. "Dependent origination (pa.ticca-samuppaada) represents the middle way."

10. Ibid., pp. 600-601 (Part III, Chap. XVII, sec. 28-32).

11. Ibid., p. 599.

12. The following temporal divisions are made with respect to the twelve elements:

past: avijjaa, sa^nkhaara
present: vi~n~naa.na, naamaruupa, salaayatana, phassa, vedanaa, ta.nhaa, upaadaana, bhava
future: jaati, jaraamara.na.

These divisions might seem to represent quite an arbitrary analysis, but on close examination they exhibit the deep ontological movement, i.e., from the unique combination of passive and active existential flow, the upapatti-bhava and kamma-bhava. For a good analysis see Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium of Philosophy, a translation of the Abhidhammaattha-sangaha by Anuruddha (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1955), pp. 259-264.

13. This general formula for pa.ticca-samuppaada occurs many times in the canons, such as Majjhima Nikaaya, II, 32; Sa^myutta Nikaaya, II, 28, etc. Needless to say, it is also a fundamental concept in the Mahaayaana.

14. Shwe Zan Aung, op. cit., pp. 262-263.

15. The Path of Purification, p. 666 (Part III, Chap. XVII, sec. 273). Buddhaghosa goes on to explain the twelvefold voidness thus: "However, ignorance--and likewise the factors consisting of formations, etc.--is void of lastingness since its nature is to rise and fall, and it is void of beauty since it is defiled and causes defilement, and it is void of pleasure since it is oppressed by rise and fall, and it is void of any selfhood susceptible to the wielding of power since it exists in dependence on conditions. Or ignorance-and likewise the factors consisting of formations, etc.--is neither self nor self's nor in self nor possessed of self. That is why this Wheel of Becoming should be understood thus 'Void with a twelvefold voidness.' " Ibid., p. 668 (Part III, Chap. XVII, sec. 283).

16. Edward Conze has done the most extensive work in the Praj~nsspaaramitaa. A comprehensive analysis appears in the volume, The Praj~naapaaramitaa Literature ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co., 1960). Cf. also the concise article, "The Development of Praj~naapaarmitaa Thought," in S. Yamaguchi, ed., Buddhism and Culture (Kyoto: Nakano Press, 1960). For a compact philosophic treatment. consult his "The Ontology of the Praj~naapaaramitaa," Philosophy East and West, III, No. 2 (July, 1953), 117-129.

17. Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts; Part I, translation of the Tri`satikaayaa.h Praj~naapaaramitaayaa.h Kaarikaasaptati.h by Asa^nga. Serie Orientale Roma, Vol. IX (Roma: Istituto Italiano Per 11 Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1956), p. 97.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., p. 98.

20. The Diamond Sutra (Vajracchedikaa Praj~naapaaramitaa), in Edward Conze, trans., Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: George Alien & Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 57 f.

21. Tucci, op. cit., p. 110.

22. Conze, "The Ontology of the Praj~naapaaramitaa," p. 121.

23. "Here, O `Saariputra, form (ruupa) is emptiness (`Suunyataa) and the very emptiness is form; emptiness does not differ from form, form does not differ from emptiness; whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, that is form, the same is true of feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness." The Heart Sutra, in Conze's Buddhist Wisdom Books, p. 81.

24. Muulamaadhyamaka Kaarikaa, XXV, 19.

25. Ibid., XXV, 20.

26. Ibid., XXIV, 10.

27. Ibid., XXIV, 18.

28. Prasannapadaa, p. 3. Muulamaadhyamakakaarikaas (Maadhyamikasuutras) de Naagaarjuna, avec la Prasannapadaa, Commentaire de Candrakiirti. Publie par Louis de la Vallee Poussin (St. Petersbourgh: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1903-1913).

29. Madhyaanta-vibha^nga, Discourse on Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes, ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, Th. Stcherbatsky, trans. (Moscow and Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of USSR Press, 1936), p. 16.

30. Comparable to Cartesian function of the mind in its clarity and distinctness. The Vij~naanavaada tradition later develops the so-called uij~naptimaatrataa doctrine which is more than the ordinary concept of uij~naana and more in line with the praj~naa doctrine.

31. D. T. Suzuki, "The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind," in William Barrett, ed., Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 211-212.

32. E. Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamayaala.mkaara (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1933), p. 68.

33. Ibid., P. 70.