The Whole Body, not Heart, as Seat of Consciousness

·期刊原文

The Whole Body, not Heart, as Seat of Consciousness: The Buddha's View
By Suwands H. J. Sugunasiri
Philosophy East and West
Volume 45, Number 3
July 1995
P.409-430
(C) by University of Hawai'i Press

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P.409

What is the 'seat of consciousness' in Buddhism?
This is the question that this essay seeks to
answer, understanding the term 'seat', however, as a
mere 'concealing'(1) (sammuti) term, to denote not a
static entity but a dynamic process, like every
other dhamma 'phenomenon'(2)--human, animal, plant,
or otherwise. In answering the question, we shall
explore three sources: the Nikaayas, the Abhidhamma,
and the works of two commentators, Buddhaghosa's
Vissuddhimagga (fifth century C.E.) and Kassapa's
Mohavicchedanii (twelfth century C.E.). While the
former is the "oldest non-canonical authority of the
Theravada" (~Naa.namoli 1956, p. x), the latter
represents "the final stage of development of the
Theravaada Abhidhamma system in India and Ceylon"
(Buddhadatta and Warder 1961, p. xv). No attempt,
however, has been made here to explore traditions
other than the Theravaada.

The Traditional View

The most pervasive traditional answer to our
question is captured in the Pali Text Society's
Pali-English Dictionary, under the entry hadaya:
"the heart as seat of thought and feeling, esp.
strong emotion... which shows itself in the action
of the heart" (Davids and Stede 1979, p. 728). A
similar strain of thought runs through another entry
under citta: "citta = hadaya, the heart as
incorporating man's personality" (p. 266). This view
is echoed by modern scholars. Reviewing the
literature in his Buddhist Analysis of Matter,
Karunadasa, for example, says that "what is called
hadaya-vatthu is not absolutely identical with heart
as such" (1967, pp. 62 ff.). Yet, in the very next
sentence, he says: "like the senseorgans, it is a
very subtle and delicate species of matter, and is
located inside the heart" (p. 65).

Commentaries. Going back in history for an answer to
our question, however, we begin with Buddhaghosa,
because it is in the Visuddhimagga that we seem to
find the issue specifically developed, even though,
as we shall see, the seeds of the concept can be
found earlier. The Visuddhimagga clearly posits the
mind, the Paali term used being mano, specifically
in the heart, in the materiality (ruupa) aggregate:
in the htu-manovi~n~naa.nadhaatuuna.m-nissayalakkha.na.m
hadayavatthu 'The heart-basis has the characteristic
of being the [material] support for the mind-element
and for the mind-consciousness element' (chap. XIV,
no. 60; Warren 1950, p. 378; ~Naa.namoli 1956, pp.
496-497).(3) The characteristics of the mind are
then shown, with its function (rasa) being to
'subserve' (aadhaara.na) and the 'manifestation'
(paccupa.t.th^ana) being 'the carrying of them'
(ubbahana).

P.410

What is interesting, however, is that no
'proximate cause' is offered, the fourth type of
characterization given in relation to each of the
other items in both the materiality and the
mentality aggregates (chap. XIV). But, there is a
sentence which seems to suggest such a proximate
cause: "it is assisted by the primaries with their
function of upholding" (sandhaara.naadikiccehi
bhuutehi katuupakaara.m) (chap. XIV, no. 60; N, p.
497; W, p. 379) --primaries being, of course,
earthness, waterness, fireness, and airness.
Buddhaghosa further confirms that "it [heart] serves
as physical basis for the mind-element and
mind-consciousness element, and for the states
associated with them"
(manodhaatu-manovi~n~naa.nadhaatuuna~n c'eva
ta.msampayuttadhammaana~n ca vatthubhaava.m
saadhayamaana.m ti.t.thati)(ibid.)

We are now told that it (hadayavatthu) is to be
found "in dependence of the blood" (lohitam
nissaaya) (ibid.), as in relation to the heart
itself elsewhere (in the
anussati-kamma.t.thaananiddeso 'description of
concentration-on-other-recollections as meditation
subjects' [W, pp. 189 ff.; N, pp. 247 ff.]), where
it is described in relation to color, shape,
direction, location, and delimitation.(4)

Elsewhere in the Visuddhimagga, the heart-basis
is given as an example in explaining a 'prenascence
condition' (puurejaatapaccayo) , a "state that
assists by being present, having arisen previously"
(pa.thamatara.m uppajjitvaa vattamaanabhaavena
upakaarako) (no. 85; N, p. 617, W, p. 457) and a
'conascence condition' (sahajaatapaccayo), a "state
that, while arising, assists [another state] by
making it arise together with itself" (uppajjamaano
va saha uppaadanabhaavena upakaarako dhammo) (no.
77; N, p. 615, W, p. 455). The heart-basis is
further associated with the mind at
'rebirth-linking' (no. 215, N, p. 651)
(pa.tisandhiya.m), `in the course of existence' (no.
130; N, p. 630) (pavatte), and 'human death' (no.
163; N, p. 638) (manussacuti). Finally, hadayavatthu
is linked with the three major cognates appearing in
the literature: citta, mano, and vi~n~naa.na (see
below).

Nothing substantial seems to have changed in the
commentarial thinking on the subject between the
fifth and the twelfth centuries. Kassapa, in his
Mohavicchedanii, covers the same ground as
Buddhaghosa does, outlining the characteristics of
the heart, and linking it to the mind, without again
showing a 'proximate cause' (Buddhadatta and Warder
1961, p. 64). The connection between the mind and
blood is also made (ibid.) as is the role of the
heart at birth, in life, and at death (ibid.; nos.
43, 48, etc.). Continuing the Buddhaghosa tradition,
he links the heart with all three terms, citta,
mano, and vi~n~naa.na, as well.

But Kassapa makes a significant addition to
Buddhaghosa. Even though the latter had associated
the heart with the mind, he did not specifically
name a 'dhamma' in the mentality domain to parallel
hadaya in the materiality domain. But this Kassapa
does, drawing obviously from

P.411

tradition itself, by actually listing citta as one
of thirty-nine dhammas in the 'mentality domain'
(cittuppaadaka.n.do) (Buddhadatta and Warder, p. 8),
equating it with vi~n~naa.na and manas. It is now
given a description as in the case of hadayavattu,
the characteristic being shown as 'knowing'
(vijaanana,) the function as 'forerunning'
(pubba^ngama) , the manifestation as 'continuous
existence in consciousness' (nirantarappavattito
santaana), and, unlike in relation to hadayavatthu,
the proximate cause as `mentality-materiality'
(naamaruupa) (ibid., p. 12). It is as if Kassapa saw
a hiatus in Buddhaghosa's systematization and felt
compelled to fill it!

Judging by the Visuddhimagga and the
Mohavicchedanii, then, what we find in the
commentaries is that the mind, using the term citta
in particular, is associated, firmly and
irrevocably, with the heart.(5)

The Abhidhamma. In his notes to hadayavatthu, in
editing Abhidhamma.t.thasa.ngaha (see note 5) ,
contemporary Sri Lankan scholar Narada (1968, p.
293) says that "the Buddha refers to the basis of
consciousness in such indirect terms as ya.m ruupa.m
nissaaya 'depending on that material thing'," a
point made by Aung (1910) and ~Naa.namoli (pp. 498,
502) as well.

But Narada's quotation, though attributed to the
Buddha, is in fact, not from the Nikaayas but from
the Abhiddhamma work, Pa.t.thaana (Mrs. Davids
1921), a later systematization. It is said, for
example, that the mind-element and the
mind-consciousness element sometimes occur as a
'prenascence condition' (as, e.g., in the course of
an existence) and sometimes do not (as, e.g., at
rebirth linking).(6) And in the explanation of a
'prenascence condition', the 'heart basis'
(hadayavatthu) is listed as one of eleven physical
conditions (along with the five physical bases of
eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body and objects in the
five doors) for the mind-element and
mind-consciousness element and for the states
associated with it.

Interestingly, however, hadayavatthu does not
occur in the Dhammasa^nga.nii, the first book of
Abhidhamma (nor does it occur in Atthasaalinii,
Buddhaghosa's commentary to it). What does occur is
hadaya, which, unlike in the Pa.t.thaana, is equated
with the mind. In answer to the question, katamo
tasmin samaye vi~n~naa.nakkhandho hoti 'what then
constitutes vi~n~naa.na?' for example, we see the
following statement: Ya.m tasmin samaye citta.m mano
maanasa.m hadaya.m pa.n.daara.m mano manaayatana.m
manindriya.m vi~n~naa.na.m vi~n~naa.nakkhandho
tajjaa manovi~n~naa.na- dhaatu-aya.m tasmin samaye
vi~n~naa.nakkhandho hoti (Muller 1885, p. 18). Here
hadaya 'heart' is equated with, among other things,
the three major terms for the mind (supra), citta,
mano, and vi~n~naa.na. As if further evidence were
needed, we find the same stock answer repeated for
the same question again, replacing vi~n~naa.na with
manaayatana and manovi~n~naa.nadhaatu(ibid.) . In
like manner, we find in the Vibha^nga that hadaya

P.412

is defined "in a purely mental and not physical
sense" (~Naa.namoli, p. 498 n. 26) , in its
definition of mind-element and mind-consciousness
element.(7)

Like the Commentaries, then, we find the
Abhidhamma making a definite link of the mind with
the heart, even though not all the Abhidhamma
authors seem to have been sure whether to put it in
the mentality domain or the materiality domain, or
whether to use hadaya or hadayavatthu!

The Nikaayas. Since both the Abhidhamma and the
Commentaries always quote the Nikaayas as their
source and authority, we need to look at what
evidence we get from the Nikaayas for a link between
the mind and the heart. The first of the two
dictionary entries quoted in the subsection above
gives its source as Sa.myutta I.199. In examining
this source, we find the Buddha's chief disciple
AAnanda being addressed by "a deva, indigenous to
that [Kosalese] forest, moved with compassion [for
AAnanda!], desiring his welfare, and wishing to
agitate him" (Mrs. Davids 1950, 254); in verse:

Rukkhamuulagahana.m pasakkiya
nibbaana.m hadayasmin opiya....(Feer 1884,p. 198)

meaning, 'Having gone forth to the thicket at the
foot of a tree, and having experienced nibbaana in
the heart....'(8) Given that none of the classical
cognates for the mind (e.g., citta, mano, or
vi~n~naa.na) appears in the verse, the association
of the mind with the heart can only be made here by
extension, understanding that the experiencing of
nibbaana is through the mind, or, put another way,
that it is the mind that experiences nibbaana. So it
is only through a great license as taken by Mrs.
Davids (see note 8) that we can agree with the
Dictionary entry, "the heart as the seat of thought
and feeling."

Elsewhere in the Sa.myutta, there occurs a line
where both citta and hadaya occur: citta.m vaa
khipeyya hadaya.m vaa phaleyya... 'derange the mind
or split the heart' (Sa.myutta I.207). While the two
clearly have nothing to do with each other here,
their occurrence together may be interpreted as
suggesting an implicit connection. Even in such an
event, the words are not the Buddha's, even though
the utterance falls off his lips; he is only
repeating the words of Suciloma, the Yakkha, who has
threatend him: "Friar, I will ask thee a question.
If thou answerest me not, I will either derange thy
mind or split thy heart" (Mrs. Davids 1950, p.
265).(9) The words that follow, "I will take you by
the feet and throw thee over the Ganges," clearly
indicate that Suciloma was speaking literally, and
in no fancy language.(10)

A similar association between the mind and the
heart is contained elsewhere, in the words hadaya.m
vaassa phaleyya... cittavikkhepa.m

P.413

vaa... (Sa.myutta I.125-126). Again, it is the
daughters of Mara that are speaking, having tried in
vain to seduce the Buddha. The full text makes this
clear:

For if we had approached after this fashion any
recluse or brahmin who had not extirpated lust,
either his heart would be cleft asunder, or hot
blood had flowed from his mouth, or he had
become crazy, or have lost his mental balance...
. (Mrs. Davids 1950, p. 157)(11)

So it is not the Buddha that is speaking!

As can be seen, then, the only three references
in the Sa.myutta that seem to suggest an association
between the mind and the heart are contained in the
"Sagaatha" section, dealing as they do "with
legends, fairies, gods and devils, with royal and
priestly interviewers of the sublime teacher"
(ibid., p. vi), or of his disciples. So the only
evidence we have from the Sa.myutta comes not
through the words of the Buddha but from
unenlightened puthujjanas 'average people', or
rather puthussattas 'average beings'--to coin a term
that includes humans, yakkhas, and devas!

What the Nikaayas then encourage us to conclude
is that whatever else the Buddha may or may not have
understood as the seat of consciousness (see
discussion below), it certainly wasn't the heart. In
fact, the only sense in which the term hadaya occurs
in the Nikaayas is in the sense of an organ, as, for
example, the eleventh part of the body in a list of
thirty-two upon which to meditate(12)--this in the
Pa.tisambhidaamagga (Taylor 1905, vol. 1, p. 6), a
book of the Khuddaka Nikaaya.(13) The term
hadayavatthu, which appears in the Abhidhamma and
the Commentarial literature with roughly the same
semantic distribution as hadaya, never once appears
in the Nikaayas!

Discussion. Given that the Buddha himself has not
linked the mind to the heart, or at least not made a
statement to that effect, what is readily evident is
that the localization of the mind in the heart seems
to have taken root among the ranks of the Buddha's
discipleship during the time of the systematization
of the Abhidhamma. But during this stage, the
conceptualization still seems fluid: sometimes not
appearing at all, as, for example, in the
Dhammasa^nga.nii, where it appears sometimes as
hadaya alone, sometimes as hadayavatthu, and
sometimes with one or the other appearing in either
of or both the material and the mentality domains.
The fact that the term does not appear in the
Atthasaalinii, Buddhaghosa's commentary on the
Dhammasa^nga.nii, in which he sought to be authentic
to tradition, provides further evidence of the
ambivalence during this early period.

Since, however, we find such fluidity giving way
to solidity by Buddhaghosa's time (fifth century
C.E.), it may encourage one to view the entrenchment
as a result of a boldness on the part of
Buddhaghosa, given

P.414

that, as ~Naa.namoli points out, he did not hesitate
to take liberties in his creative work, the
Visuddhimagga, as he was equally careful to be true
to tradition in his other works (e.g., the
Atthasaalinii). But we cannot ignore the words of
Mrs. Rhys Davids: "Of his [Buddhaghosa's] talent
there can be no doubt.... But of originality, of
independent thought, there is at present no
evidence" (Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and
Ethics, vol. 2, p. 887; quoted in Adikaram 1946, p.
4). Further, in none of the relevant sections in the
Visuddhimagga that refer to hadayavatthu or hadaya
for the first time (XIII.99 and VII.111,
respectively) or deal with them extensively (XIV.60,
VIII.111), do we have Buddhaghosa making the claim
aya.m pana me attano mati 'this indeed is my own
view', as seen, for example, in the Papa~ncasuudanii
(see Adikaram, p. 3, for the reference).

Now we come to the possibility that Buddhaghosa
was simply following tradition. There is much
evidence to support this. Buddhaghosa's task "was
not to write a series of original books on Buddhism
but to put into Pali in a coherent and intelligent
form the matter that already existed in the various
Sinhalese Commentaries" (Adikaram, p. 2) . His
description of his own methodology in the
Samantapaasaadikaa (Introduction) bears witness to
this:

In commencing this commentary--having embodied
therein the Mahaa A.t.thakathaa, without
excluding any proper meaning from the decisions
contained in the Mahaapaccarii, as also in the
famous Kurundii and other commentaries, and
including the opinions of the Elders.... From
these commentaries, after casting off the
language, condensing detailed accounts,
including authoritative decisions, without
overstepping any Paali idiom.... (quoted in
Adikaram, p. 2)

If Buddhaghosa is thus being authentic to
tradition, it can be reasonably assumed that the
notion of hadayavatthu as the seat of consciousness
was already in the Sinhalese commentaries as well
(in addition to the Abhidhamma) . Since the
Visuddhimagga was the "test" by which Buddhaghosa
was judged by the Sinhalese Elders to be allowed to
translate the commentaries into pali, it cannot but
be the case that he had to be accurate in his
understanding and analysis of so central a concept
as the dhammas. It is indeed entirely possible as
well that Buddhaghosa noted the presence of the
noncanonical material in the Sinhalese commentaries,
but, as Adikaram points out (p. 4), his task was
"not to rectify," particularly given his lack of
originality (supra) and the striving for
authenticity to scripture. There are, of course,
unfortunately no Sinhalese commentaries to check out
this claim.

So if we assume a role for Buddhaghosa, the
authors of Sinhalese commentaries, and the authors
of the Abhidhamma in the evolving localization of
the mind in the heart, they all seemed to have had a
fur-

P.415

ther source--ironically, the Nikaayas
themselves--and this, as we shall see, almost by
default!

Writing the words, "The heart-basis... the
support for the mind-element and for the
mindconsciousness-element," Buddhaghosa asks, "How
is that to be known? " He answers, "[1] From
scriptures and [2] from logical reasoning" (no. 60;
N, pp. 497-498 n. 26). He then goes on to quote the
Pa.t.thaana (I.10, as above)(14) as his evidence.
But why is it not (as noted above) in the
Dhammasa^nga.nii (the first book of the Abhidhamma),
he asks, if it is in the Pa.t.thaana? Buddhaghosa
explains that the reason is the "non-inconsistency
of the teaching," to ensure "unity" (ibid.).(15)

What seems ironic is that even though he seeks
to make the Buddha's teaching consistent, it is the
very inconsistency in the Nikaayas(16) (and
presumably of the Buddha himself?)(17) that has led
to the inconsistency between the Nikaayas and the
later works on the issue of the localization of the
mind!

It is evident, for example, that more than one
term has been used by the Buddha to denote the
concept of consciousness, along with its associated
states. The three principal ones are citta, mano,
and vi~n~naa.na, as contained, for example, in the
classic statement, citta.m iti pi mano iti pi
vi~n~naa.na.m (Sa.myutta II.95), or in ya~n ca
vuccati citta.m vaa mano ti vaa vi~n~naa.na.m vaa
(Diigha I.21). It is "as if to say, choose which you
will" (Mrs. Rhys Davids 1936, p. 237)!(18)

Each term, further, has variant renderings:
citta as ceto, cetanaa, cetayita (ibid., p. 239),
and even cetasika; mane as manindriya, manodhaatu,
manaayatana, manovi~n~naa.na, manovi~n~na.nadhaatu,
and so on; and vi~n~naa.na as vi~n~naa.nadhaatu,
cakkhu-, sota-, ghaana-; jivhaa-, kaaya-,
mano-vi~n~naa.na, and so on (see Davids and Stede
1979 for the entries). This, of course, is not to
mention naama 'mentality', as in naamaruupa
'psychophysique' (this being my translation of the
term, in Sugunasiri 1978).

Again, grammatically speaking, of the three
terms, citta alone appears in the plural (though
only "3 of 150 times in the Nikaayas" [Davids and
Stede, p. 266]), while mano and vi~n~naa.na never
do.

The apparent semantic inconsistency of the three
major terms seems to complicate matters further. If,
as we have seen in the Sa.myutta and the Diigha
statements above, that the terms are used
synonymously, they are also used with different
shades of meaning. "Mano represents the intellectual
functioning of consciousness, while vi~n~naa.na
represents the field of sense and sense-reaction
('perception'), and citta the subjective aspect of
consciousness" (Davids and Stede, p. 520). Or "In
mano we have the man valuing, measuring, appraising,
and also purposing, intending.... In citta, we more
usually have the man as affective and affected, as
experiencing. In vi~n~naa.na, we have the man as not
of this world only" (Mrs. Rhys Davids 1936, p. 237).

P.416

Further, while citta means "inquisitiveness,
instability, impulsiveness" (combining the
intellectual and the affective), or "thinking or
thought" (intellectual), it is on the one hand
contrasted with kaaya 'body' (as, e.g., in the
series, cakkhu, sota, ghaana, jivhaa, kaaya, and
mano), and on the other hand with ruupa 'matter'
(ibid., p. 239). It is also both compared and
contrasted with 'will' (Davids and Stede, p. 267).
Mano is, again, used with "prefixes of sentiment,"
as, for example, in sumana and dummana (ibid., p.
238), but not citta.

Given thee sometimes overlapping, sometimes
complementary usage, it now seems a simple step for
Buddhaghosa, the Sinhalese commentators, or the
AAbhidhammikas to extend the association of nibbaana
to the heart in the Sa.myutta (supra), made by a
deva, first, to all three terms, citta, mane, and
vi~n~naa.na, and second, to put it in the mouth of
the Buddha! Not even the fact that the connection
was being made in the other two contexts in the
Sa.myutta by a yakkha and Mara's daughters seems to
have entered anybody's mind!(19)

If, then, inconsistency in the Nikaayas served
as one condition for the view to prevail that the
mind was located in the heart, it is equally likely
that the notion was influenced by an external source
as well: the Upani.sads. For one thing, at least
some of the Upani.sads (other than the earliest
five)(20) were not much older in time, some in fact
being written afterwards.(21) For another, at least
some of the Sinhalese elders who wrote down the
first Commentaries, if not Buddhaghosa himself,(22)
were "conversant with the Sanskrit language"
(Adikaram, p. 4).(23)

What, then, is this Upani.sadic view? The
Sanskrit term jiiva(.h) , which means 'life'
(Monier-Williams 1957, p. 452), literally means
'that which breathes', from the root jiv 'to
breathe'. According to the B.rhad-aara.nyaka
Upani.sad, the aatman 'soul' is based on the praa.na
'life-breath', also called 'in-breath'
(Radhakrishnan 1953).(24) Death, too, is associated
with breathing, in both the physical and the
nonphysical senses.(25)

If breath is associated with 'soul' and 'death'
in the Upani.sads, we also find it associated with
the heart as well, in life and at death. In sleep,
for example, "When this being fell asleep... then
[he] rests in that place which is the space within
the heart" (yatrai.sa etat supto 'bhuut... ya
eso'ntar-h.rdaya aakaa`s.h tasmi~n chete) (BU
II.1.17; R, p. 189). At death, "the point of his
heart becomes lighted up and by that light the self
departs" (tasya haitasya h.rdayasyaagra.m
pradyotate, tena pradyotenai.sa aatmaa ni.skraamati)
(BU IV.4.2; R, p. 270).

Nor is that all. Jiiva, which, as we have seen,
referred originally to the biological aspect of
human nature throughout one's life (awake, in a
dream state, or asleep), has a cognate, puru.sa,
meaning 'man' (both gender-neutral and male). But
the term has a literal sense as well, namely
puri-`saya 'that which dwells in the citadel of
heart' (R, p. 90). In the Ka.tha Upani.sad of
several centuries later, we in fact find the soul
(or self)

P.417

directly linked with the heart: aatmaasya jantor
nihito guhaaya.m 'the self is set in the heart of
every creature' (KU I.2.20; R, p. 617). If in the
later Ka.tha this secret place is "the chief seat of
the Supreme" (guhaam.... parame paraardhe) (KU
I.3.1; R, p. 621), in the earlier B.rhad-aara.nyaka,
Brahman itself comes to be equated with the heart:
e.sa prajaa-patir yad h.rdayam, etad brahma 'This is
Prajaa-pati [literally, 'Lord of People'] [the same
as] this heart. It is Brahman' (BU V.3.1; R, p.
291). When the line continues with the words etat
sarvam. tad etat try-ak.saram; h.r-da-yam iti 'It is
all. It has three syllables, h.r, da, yam..., we
find even a ritual quality accorded the heart.(26)

If the understanding of the heart that we get
from what is given above is captured in the
Chaandogya phrase aatmaa h.rdi 'the self is in the
heart' (CU VIII.3.3; R, p. 496) , the
Kau.siitakii-Braahma.na captures its extended
concept in the phrase praa.no brahmeti 'the
breathing [living] spirit is Brahma' (II.1; R, p.
761).

But what about the heart as the seat of the
'mind'? For this we have to turn to the CHaandogya
Upani.sad, where we find a specific reference to two
cognates of the mind, mano and citta, captured in
the parallel phrases mano brahmeti `mind as Brahman'
(CU III.18.1; R, p. 397) and citta.m brahmeti
'thought as Brahman' (CU VII.5.3; R, pp. 474-475).

So we find in the Upani.sads, both early and
late, the mind associated with the heart,
definitively and irrevocably. But how is the heart
itself described in terms of its physical make-up?
Here is the Chaandogya description: atha yad idam
asmin brahmapure dahara.m pu.n.dariika.m ve`sma,
daharo'sminn antaraakaa`sa.h.... 'Now, here in this
city of Brahman is an abode, a small lotus flower;
within it is a small place' (CU VIII.1.1; R, p.
491). The term h.rdaya itself occurs two verses
later: yaavaan vaa ayam aakaa`sa.h, taavaan
e.so'ntarh.rdaya aakaa`sa.h.... 'as far, verily, as
this [world] space extends, so far extends the space
within the heart' (CU VIII.1.3; R, p. 492).(27)

It may now be instructive to recall that the
heart was characterized in the Visuddhimagga (see
above), too, in terms of a lotus, in relation to
both its shape and color. And, reminiscent of
aakaa`sa in the Upani.sads, Buddhaghosa writes,
"inside it there is a hollow," too (see note 4).

No doubt the much more detailed characterization
of the heart in the Visuddhimagga speaks to the
creative genius of Buddhaghosa that ~Naa.namoli
(supra) talks about. But the parallel between the
specific characterization of the heart in relation
to the lotus and the placing of 'the mind-element
and the mind-consciousness element' in the blood
that is in the hollow of the heart are too close to
be dismissed as being merely coincidental or
accidental. The inevitable conclusion, then, has to
be that the origin of the view of the seat of
consciousness as being in the heart is at least
partly Upani.sadic.

Now it may be ironic that the early disciples of
the Buddha would

P.418

want to accept something from Vedism out of a
critique of which Buddhism arose. But, of course, it
needs to be remembered that the Buddha himself had
continued to use some of the Vedic terminology
(e.g., naamaruupa, vi~n~naa.na, manas, citta, etc.;
see Mrs. Rhys Davids 1936, chap. 10, for a
discussion), though with changed meaning, and had
not categorically rejected the mind-heart
association as he had, for example, the caste
system, or the existence of a soul. There is the
possibility, further, that Vedism would have been in
the country (Lanka) prior to the advent, of
Buddhism, making it no alien thought to the educated
Sinhalese. So it may be conjectured, in the absence
of a better alternative, that the disciples hung on
to what was helping to make the intellectual circles
at the time. There was, after all, no reason to
think that the Brahminical tradition was wrong in
everything!

On the basis of the discussion above, then, we
must conclude that in associating the mind (using
whatever term) with the heart--basing oneslef in the
Upani.sads (and the Vedas) or the
Nikaayas--Buddhaghosa, the Sinhalese commentators,
and the AAbhidhammikas all erred!

The Buddha's View as Reconstructed from the Nikaayas

Having outlined the possible reasons for the
erroneous localization of the mind in the heart
during the post-Buddhian period, we are still left
with the task of identifying what the Buddha's view
indeed was on the matter. Did he in fact simply "not
commit himself" to a particular view, as Narada
(supra p. 199) claims:

It was [the] cardiac theory [the view that the
heart is the seat of consciousness] that
prevailed in the Buddha's time.... The Buddha
could have adopted this popular theory, but He
did not commit Himself.

Was he being silent on the matter, as Aung argues?

On a surface level, the answer to both questions
has to be in the affirmative, for the issue does not
seem to have warranted his attention qua issue.(28)
We find no elucidation of it in the discourses where
one should legitimately expect one, namely in the
Mahaanidaana Sutta (Diigha Nikaaya 15), one of two
suttas mentioned by name at the First Council (the
other being the Mahaaparinibbaana Sutta) and thus
likely to be among the oldest and most reflective of
the Buddha's own teachings, (29) or in the
Mahaapadaana Sutta (Diigha 14) (see Warder 1970, pp.
107-117 for a discussion).

The absence of a specific answer to our question
in the Nikaayas is on the one hand understandable,
since from the Buddha's point of view, all he was
doing was refraining from answering abstract,
philosophical, or psychological questions merely for
the sake of answering them, and seeking rather to
help human beings achieve liberation from sa.msaara.
Not that he did not have any complex explanations;
but he would offer these only to the extent that
they were relevant to the liberative process.

P.419

But it is precisely for this reason that the lack of
an answer is difficult to understand--because of the
singularly important position held by the concept of
consciousness in his teachings.

Such an absence may also suggest that the Buddha
was specifically seeking to avoid answering a
'wrong' question of the type "What would the hair
color of an offspring of a barren woman
be?"--knowing fully well that any answer given would
be wrong! Thus, for example, talking about a 'seat'
could suggest (a) a permanence or tangibility where
none exits, or (b) a linear causality that
contradicts the reality of relationality
(reciprocal, circular, and multicausal) as contained
in the pa.ticcasamuppaada, a fundamental pillar of
his teaching.

Despite the absence of a definitive answer to
our question in our terms, I want to argue that the
Buddha did indeed identify 'the seat of
consciousness' without calling it such, however, and
that the evidence is right there in the Nikaayas,
waiting to be discovered and continuing to appear in
the Abhidhamma, the Commentaries from the
Visuddhimagga to the Mohavicchedanii, and in all the
Buddhist writings of all schools to date.

In our explorations for a home for
consciousness, we can find the teacher talking to
AAnanda, explaining to him his teaching of
pa.ticcasamuppaada 'Conditioned Origination'
(Mahaanidaana Sutta). In explaining the cycle of
causation, the Buddha comes to the words
vi~n~naa.napaccayaa naamaruupa.m 'conditioned by
consciousness is the psychophysique'. Then he
summarizes the sequence backwards,
naamaruupapaccayaa vi~n~naa.na.m, showing the
reciprocal relationship between the two, a point in
fact made by Saariputta, too, to a learned Brahmin
Kotthita (Sa.myutta II.80).

The Buddha continues his explanation to AAnanda:
"If consciousness did not descend into the mother's
womb there would be no formation ('coagulation',
sam-murcch) of a sentient body in the mother's womb.
Or, if, after descending into the womb,
consciousness were to pass away, the sentient body
would not be produced for this world" (Warder,
p.110).

Since the Mahanidaana Sutta is one of two
discourses mentioned by name at the First Council,
and the fact that it is also shared by other schools
(Warder, p. 108),(30) We can assume that this was,
if not actually the Buddha's very own thinking, the
closest we can get to it.

The Mahaapadaana Sutta (supra) speaks to the
same reciprocal relationship: "this consciousness
turns back again from the sentient body. It goes no
further. To this extent one may be born, grow old,
die and be reborn, namely [to the extent that]
consciousness exists through the condition of a
sentient body, a sentient body through the condition
of consciousness" (ibid., p. 117).

A further addition is significant; it makes
conditioned origination

P.420

"the content of a Buddha's Enlightenment" (ibid., p.
116). Given that the Buddha (our's or any other,
since all Buddhas are supposed to have similar paths
to Enlightenment) would not be born again, the
suggested reciprocal relationship between
vi~n~naa.na and naamaruupa holds not only in the
rebirth process but even in the process of a given
lifetime, a point made by Buddhaghosa, too (supra).

There are, of course, many other places where
the sequence showing the reciprocal relationship
between vi~n~naa.na and naamaruupa occurs throughout
the Nikaayas. But of specific relevance is another
Diigha text (III.211), repeated in the Sa.myutta and
also found in the Chinese tradition (Warder, p.
118), where vi~n~naa.na is shown as one of four
'foods' (aahaara): "All beings (sattvas) persist
through food" (ibid). Elsewhere (Diigha III.247; M
III.31, 247), vi~n~naa.na occurs as one of six
dhaatus 'bases', along with the four elements (aapo,
tejo, vaayo, pa.thavii) , and space (aakaasa) ,
suggesting even a material quality.

As the evidence above indicates, the view in the
Nikaayas is that the mind, instead of being
localized in a single organ, is, rather,
nonlocalized, that is, spread throughout, or is
coterminous with, the whole of naamaruupa. This,
captured also, incidentally, by Kassapa in his
Mohavicchedanii (supra), is confirmed from another
function of vi~n~naa.na--as the 'coordinator' of the
senses. Such coordination may be aspectual
('localized' if you like) in relation to each of the
cakkhu-, sota-, ghaana-, and jivhaa-vi~n~naa.nas
when the data (aaramma.na) is input through the eye,
ear, nose, and tongue, respectively. But in the case
of kaaya of this same series, meaning the rest of
the body other than the eye, ear, nose, and tongue,(31)
it is evident that vi~n~naa.na, by definition, is in
the whole body and not in any one particular locale.

The same is the case when it comes to the mind
as sense (in the series cakkhu-, sota-, ghaana-,
jivhaa-, kaaya-, and mano-vi~n~naa.na) ; it is
logical to conclude that the mind-consciousness
(mano-vi~n~naa.na) is not 'localized' in any one
part of the body as in the case of the other
four--cakkhu, sota, ghaana, and jivhaa.

If, indeed, in the Buddha's mind, consciousness
was localized in the heart even as, for example, in
the eye and ear, one would expect to see him use a
term such as *hadaya-vi~n~naa.na(32) to capture the
notion, giving Buddhaghosa his fare. But, of course,
no such term occurs anywhere in the Nikaaya
literature.

In anwser to our question, I can now hear the
Buddha speaking to us as follows: "While there is no
'seat' as such of consciousness, as an unchanging
entity, or as a 'first cause', there is a process in
the mental domain that coarises with the process of
the totality of the physical domain." Indeed, there
are two terms in the Nikaayas that we can point to
as having precisely these functions in the
respective domains. They are jiivita 'life' and
jiivitindriya 'life faculty'. Of the two, jiivita
appears in the

P.421

Nikaayas extensively (V II.191; S I.42, IV.169, 213;
M II.173; A I.155; etc.), but unlike the case of
hadaya/hadayavatthu, the extended term jiivitindriya
also occurs at least twice (V III.73; S V.204).(33)
Both also occur in the context of 'depriving'
(jiivita.m voropeti) or 'destruction' (jivita.m
upacchindati).

The most fundamental justification for our
reconstruction, then, is that unlike hadayavatthu,
jiivitindriya is authentic to the tradition, and not
a later concoction of the AAbhidhammikas or
Poraa.naachariyas or Buddhaghosa, even though it
certainly received further elucidation at their
hands.

Though not understood as we have used them here,
what is of interest is that we find the two terms
(and concepts) appearing in the Visuddhimagga,
too--jiivita as the seventh of twenty seven
'constant states' associated with the first
sense-sphere of (profitable) conasciousness (chap.
XIV; 133 [395]) and jiivitindriya, its corollary, as
a 'derived materiality' (upaadaaya ruupa) (chap.
XIV; 36 [375]) . In outlining the features of
jiivita, Buddhaghosa says, for example:
lakkha.naadiini pan'assa ruupajiivite vuttanayen'eva
veditabbaani. Tan hi ruupadhammaana~n jiivita.m,
ida.m aruupadhammaana.m ti idam ev'ettha
naanaakaara.na.m 'its characteristics, etc. should
be understood in the way stated under material life.
For that is life of material things and this is life
of immaterial things. This is the only difference
here' (no. 138, W, p. 392; N, p. 523). The fourfold
description of jiivitindriya is given as follows:
Sahajaruupaanupaalanalakkha.na~n jiivitindriya.m,
tesan pavattanarasa.m, tesa.m yeva
.thapanapaccupa.t.thaana.m,
yaapayitabbabhuutapada.t.thaana.m 'The life faculty
has the characteristic of maintaining conascent
kinds of matter. Its function is to make them occur.
It is manifested in the establishing of their
presence. Its proximate cause is primary elements
that are to be sustained' (no. 59; W, p. 378; N, p.
496).

Further, in rebirth-linking (pa.tisandhiya.m) as
well as in the course of an existence (pavatte), the
'material life [faculty]' (ruupajiivita.m) is a
condition (in three ways: as presence,
nondisappearance, and faculty
(atthiavigata-indriyavasena... tidhaa) (chap. XVII,
217). But what about at death? Here is Buddhaghosa's
explanation:

It [i.e., jiivitindriya] does not prolong
presence at the moment of dissolution because it
is itself dissolving, like the flame of a lamp
when the wick and the oil are getting used up.
But it must not be regarded as destitute of
power, to maintain, make occur, and make
present, because it does accomplish each of
these functions at the moment stated." (No. 59;
N, p. 496)(34)

Elsewhere, jiivitindriya is characterized as being
one of eleven components that make up materiality,
the others being the four primaries and the six
physical bases (chap. XVII, no. 204). Noteworthy is
the fact that hadayavatthu is not included here.
Further, while 'life faculty' is listed by

P.422

Buddhaghosa as an indriya 'faculty/organ' (i.e.,
jiivitindriya) [chap. XVI, no. 1]), the 'heart-base'
is not, (35) with no such term as
*hadayavatthvindriya appearing anywhere in the
Visuddhimagga, just as it appears nowhere else in
the canonical literature either!(36)

Finally, Buddhaghosa seems to recognize the
primacy of the life-faculty over the heart-basis
when he says that the latter "is maintained by life"
(aayunaa anupaaliyamaana.m) (chap. XIV, no. 60).

If, then,'life faculty' (1) is an indriya, (2)
has, as is to be expected for an indriya, the
primary elements as the 'proximate cause', (3) is a
condition for rebirth, (4) is not destitute of power
for continuing life, and (5) dissolves at death, it
is immediately evident that it is coextensive with
the whole psychophysique. This conclusion is further
confirmed by its being listed (chap. XIV, no. 1)
along with itthindriya 'femininity faculty' and
purisindriya 'masculinity faculty', both of which,
of course, must be understood as being coextensive
with the whole body.

This indeed is what we found the Buddha telling
us in the Nikaayas: the reciprocal relationship
between naamaruupa and vi~n~naa.na (supra). In the
lamp/wick analogy above, one is reminded of the
characterization of vi~n~naa.na in relation to
naamaruupa elsewhere: "A state that, while arising,
assists [another state] by making it arise together
with itself [as] a conscence condition, as a lamp is
for illumination" (no. 77; ~Na.namoli, p. 614). It
is thus that Saariputta talks of the two as reeds
supporting each other.

As would be evident from our discussion, then,
it can be established, with seeming authority from
the Buddha and even the later tradition, that
jiivitindriya can lay a more legitimate claim as the
'seat of consciousness' in the materiality domain.
This, interestingly enough, was a possibility
considered by the author of Visuddhimagga
A.t.thakathaa, but passed up in favor of
hadayavatthu on the flimsiest of arguments, and
without any evidential base! To quote: "And in the
case of the life faculty, that would have to have
another function, so to make it the support would be
illogical, too" (~Naa.namoli, p. 497 n. 26). But why
it must have "another function" or what this
function would be is never explained. Nor is it
explained why it is illogical!(37) But he concludes:
"So it is the heart-basis that remains to be
recognized as their support" (ibid.)! The author
certainly seems to have been eager to be faithful to
Buddhaghosa, or perhaps trying to cover up,
or justify, an error!

Now jiivitindriya, though in the 'materiality'
domain, needs to be understood as a process like
citta and not hadaya. Jiivita, also a process,
listed as a dhamma, both kusala 'moral' and akusala
'immoral'--and presumably avyaakata 'indeterminate',
too--and thus present in all the states of mind,
would be its legitimate sibling in the mentality
domain. Jiivita and jiivitindriya are, then, both
coextensive with the whole body, and with each
other.

P.423

Concluding Remarks

If our analysis is correct, then we must see the
identification of the heart-base as the seat of
consciousness during the post-Buddhian period as a
gross misrepresentation of the Buddha, in violation
of the Buddha's advice not to be led by "tradition"
or "the authority of religious texts" (Kaalaama
Sutta) . The tradition here for the Sinhalese
Poraa.naacariyas appears to be Brahminism and the
associated worldview, with the Vedas, Puraanas,
AAgamas, and Upani.sads collectively being the texts.
For Buddhaghosa, Kassapa, and all others later, the
Sinhalese Poraa.naacariyas and their A.t.thakathaas
(see Adikaram 1946 for an overview) serve as
tradition and text, respectively. What we then have,
it appears, is an example of how the violation of a
scholarly principle of objectivity, as called for by
the Buddha, can blind an inquirer to the obvious.
For after all, as we have seen, the reciprocal
relationship between vi~n~naa.na and naamaruupa is
no stranger to the AAbhidhammikas, Poraa.naacariyas,
or Buddhaghosa, since it appears in their own
analyses. Yet they slide over it as if it was
irrelevant to the question at hand!(38)

While a comprehensive treatment of the
epistemological and pragmatic implications of our
new understanding is beyond the scope of this essay,
we may suggest some productive lines of comparative
inquiry. An obvious one would be our current
scientific understanding of the nature of the mind.
Writing in Psychology Today, John (1976) pointed
out, for example, how the mind is extended
throughout the body, through its neuroskeletal
system. Chopra (1989), "exploring the frontiers of
mindbody medicine" in his Quantum Healing, refers to
a 'thinking body', positing the mind
('intelligence') in the whole body.(39) Buddha's own
understanding, of course, goes beyond John's
neuroskeletal system to the very boundaries--skin,
hair, nails, and teeth, included as part of the
thirty-two body parts (supra). Putting the Buddha's
understanding in terms of contemporary terminology,
should we say that the mind is in every one of over
several trillion cells in each one of us, residing
in each DNA molecule and in instantaneous
communication with every other DNA molecule, with
research assigning this function of communication to
'neuropeptides' or "information molecules" (see note
39)? Since the blueprint for every subsequent DNA
molecule is provided by the very first DNA molecule
that comes into existence at the point of
conception, before the embryo starts dividing up the
second day or begins to make a nervous system on day
eighteen (Chopra 1989), it is obvious that the mind
must then be in the very first DNA molecule as well.
That is to say, it is precortical. Isn't this, then,
what the Buddha says when he posits a reciprocal
relationship between naamaruupa and vi~n~naa.na?

There is another related line of inquiry. In
maintaining that the heart is not the seat of
consciousness, the Buddha obviously joins
contemporary medicine in rejecting cardiac arrest as
constituting (clinical) death.

P.424

But whether the current medical understanding that
"brain death" constitutes death matches with the
Buddha's understanding can only be determined
through an examination of the concept of cuti-citta
'exit consciousness' and associated teachings. For a
start, it may be noted that, as mentioned in this
section, the mind exists from day (i.e., moment)
one, eighteen days before the neuronal system
evolves. Would it not then make sense to consider
the theoretical possibility that consciousness
(another term for mind) could still be present after
'brain death', for however brief a moment, even
though we may not have instruments" sophisticated
enough to measure it?

On a more pragmatic level, one of the obvious
concerns relates to organ transplantation (see
Sugunasiri 1990). For example, if the seat of
consciousness is not the heart, would it be easier
for Tibetan Buddhists, for example, to emulate the
Bodhisattva ideal of donating organs (jaatakas)
without being troubled by their traditional
understanding that a dead body should not be moved
for seven days, since life continues in the heart
for that long? This, however, is not to say that
life does not indeed continue to exist in the whole
body, "postcortically" as we have suggested, after
being declared clinically dead. If so, what are the
implications for the treatment of cadavers,
autopsies, burials, cremations, and so on--or,
indeed, for Buddhist postdeath customs of
transferring merit and offering alms at the end of
three, seven, or thirty days, at the end of the
first year, and so on?

NOTES

My thanks go to Professors A. K. Warder and Leonard
Priestley of the University of Toronto for comments
on an earlier version of this essay, and to the
anonymous reviewers for their critical evaluation.

1 - This is Warder's (1970, p. 150) translation of
the Sanskrit term, sa.mv.rti (Paali sammuti),
and I use it here since it captures best the
notion I am seeking to convey.

2 - The term dhamma has different meanings (see
Watanabe 1983, chap. 2, for a discussion). Thus
it will be rendered differently elsewhere in
this essay, and sometimes it will be retained
without translation.

3 - Unless otherwise indicated, the references to
the Visuddhimagga in this discussion are to
Warren 1950 (cited as "W") when in Paali and to
~Naa.namoli 1952 (cited as "N") when in
translation.

4 - The full description here is as follows:

P.425

This is the heart flesh. As to colour, it is the
colour of the back of a red-lotus petal. As to
shape, it is the shape of a lotus bud with the
outer petals removed and turned upside down; it
is smooth outside, and inside it is like the
interior of a kosaatakii(loofah gourd). In those
who possess understanding it is a little
expanded; in those without understanding it is
still only a bud. Inside it there is a hollow
the size of a punnaaga seed's bed where half a
pasata measure of blood is kept, with which as
their support the mind element and
mind-consciousness element occur. That in one of
greedy temperament is red; that in one of,hating
temperament is black; that in one of deluded
temperament is like the water that meat has been
washed in; that in one of speculative
temperament is like lentil soup in colour; that
in one of faithful temperament is the colour of
(yellow) ka.nikaara flowers; that in one of
understanding temperament is limpid, clear,
unturbid, bright, pure, like a washed gem of
pure water, and it seems to shine. As to
direction, it lies in the upper direction. As to
location, it is to be found in the middle
between the two breasts, inside the body. As to
delimitation, it is bounded by what appertains
to heart. (~Naa.namoli, p. 275)

See Warren 1950, p. 211, for the Paali version.

5 - See Anuruddha's Abhidhamma.t.thasa^ngaha
(Narada 1968), for a similar view.

6 - The relevant quotation in full is as follows:
Ya.m ruupa.m nissaaya manodhaatu ca
manovi~n~naa.nadhaatu ca vattanti, ta.m ruupa.m
manodhaatuyaa ta.msampayuttakaana~n ca
dhammaana.m puurejaatapaccayena paccayo;
manovi~n~naa.nadhaatuyaa ta.msampayuttakaana~n
ca dhammaana.m ka~nci kaala.m puurejaata...
ka~nci kaala.m na puurejaatapaccayena paccayo
(Mrs. Davids 1921, p. 5; quoted, with minor
variations, in Warren, p. 457) 'The materiality
with which as their support the mind element and
mind-consciousness element occur is a condition,
and it is sometimes [as in the course of an
existence] a condition, as prenascence
condition, sometimes [as at rebirth-linking] not
a condition as prenascence condition, for the
mind-consciousness element and for the states
associated therewith' (no. 85; ~Naa.namoli 1956,
p. 617).

7 - ... hadaya.m pa.n.daara.m mano manaayatana.m
manindriya.m vi~n~naa.na.m vi~n~naa.nakhando
tajjaa manodhaatu (Mrs. Davids 1904, p. 88).

8 - This is my literal translation. Mrs. Davids'
rendering of it (1950, p. 254), "Thou who hast
plunged in leafy lair of trees / Suffering
nibbaana in thy heart to sink," is certainly
more poetic, but is clearly a free translation.
It is thanks to her great license as well that,
as we shall see, the misleading entry has found
its way into the PTS dictionary (p. 728, under
hadaya) in the following words: "the heart as
seat of thought and feeling, esp. of strong
emotion (as in Vedas!) which shows itself in the
action of the heart."

P.426

9 - Here Mrs. Davids, basing herself on Commentarial
authority, states in a footnote: "Either by
making an appalling sight of himself before the
Buddha, or by uttering fearful sounds" (p. 265).

10 - The Buddha's words in full in this section are
as follows: Na khvaaha.m ta.m aavuso passaami
sadevake loke samaarake sabrahmake
sassama.na-brahmaniyaa pajaaya so
devamanussaaya yo me citta.m vaa khipeyya
hadaya.m vaa phaleyya padesu vaa gahetvaa
paraga^ngaaya khipeyya. api ca tva.m aavuso
puccha yad akankhaasi ti (Sa.myutta I. 207). "I
see no one, friend, in the whole world, be he
Mara or Brahma, nor among gods or men with all
the recluses and the brahmins, who is able to
derange my mind, or split my heart, or take me
by the feet and throw me over the Ganges;
nevertheless, friend, ask according to thy
desire" (Mrs. Davids 1950, p. 265).

11 - Even if we were to understand the two threats
here as clearly referring to the physical and
the mental, respectively, the association made
is evident.

12 - It is possible that this list was arrived at by
the Buddha through personal observation of his
own mindbody through meditation, and/or by
reference to the Indian medical texts of the
time.

13 - It may be noted here that the material of this
later work, as Warder points out (p. 203), is
of "doubtful authenticity" as well.

14 - Even though ~Naa.namoli gives the reference as
I.4, it should, in fact, be I.10. Incidentally,
the reference on the next page (p. 498) to the
Pa.tisambhidaa should be I.6 and not I.7 as
given.

15 - See ~Naa.namoli, p. 497, for Buddhaghosa's
complex argument, which need not detain us
here.

16 - "Let the reader not expect to find a
thorough-going consistency in the Suttas" (Mrs.
Davids 1936, p. 235).

17 - The apparent inconsistent usage by the Buddha
need not mean that he was unsure of himself,
given the extremely comprehensive ways in which
he has explained complex phenomena (e.g.,
naamaruupa, pa.ticcasamuppaada). It may rather
be that he used the concepts and terms that
best befitted the task at hand, the type of
listener (from the wise to the ignorant), the
context (a congregation of his disciples vs,
the battlefield, in which he advised kings),
etc. In this connection, it is worthy to note,
e.g., how we, too, in contemporary times, use
terms such as mind, thought, and consciousness
with both semantic overlap and mutual
exclusivity.

18 - But see later in the third section below for
another synonym used by the Buddha that is more
relevant to the case being made.

P.427

19 - I have, of course, not checked out every
reference to citta, mano, and vi~n~naa.na in a
reference work like the Pali Concordance. Such
a task, well beyond the needs of this essay,
might indeed be a fruitful endeavor for someone
who wishes to pursue the matter.

20 - Warder (p. 23) determines that the Chaandogya,
B.rhad-aara.nyaka, Aitareya, Kau.siitakii; and
Taittiriiya Upani.sads "alone are strictly
canonical Veda."

21 - Evidence for this is that some of the
Upani.sads themselves were influenced by
Buddhist teachings. For example, we find that
the later Upani.sads "dispense with
supernatural gods or a God and explain the
universe out of itself" (Warder, p. 32).

22 - Even though Buddhaghosa himself "nowhere shows
his knowledge of Upanishads" (Law 1946, p. 33),
the Buddhaghosuppatti records a tradition of
Buddhaghosa's knowledge of Sanskrit being
tested on the eve of his departure from Sri
Lanka (back to his homeland in India). It even
preserves a specimen of the Sanskrit verses he
was able to compose impromptu (ibid. p. 41).

23 - Buddhaghosa, e.g., tells us that a certain
Va^ngiisa and Punna, disciples of the Buddha of
his time, were born of Brahmin parents, and
that at least the former was versed in the
three Vedas (Law, p. 97). Many from this same
background and persuasion engaged the Buddha in
dialogue as well, as challengers or inquirers,
Va^ngiisa and Punna being examples of those who
eventually came under his tutelage.

24 - kasmin nu tva~n caatmaa ca prati.s.thitau stha
iti. praa.na iti (Radhakrishnan 1953, p. 243)
'On what are you and [your] soul based? On the
in-breath'.

25 - In the physical sense: praa.no vaa a^ngaana.m
rasa.h 'life-breath is the essence of the
limbs' (BU I.3.19; Radhakrishnan, p. 160). In
the nonphysical sense: [m.rtyu.h]... naapnot
yo'ya.m madhyama.h praa.na.h 'death did not
take possession of him who was the middle
breath' (BU I.5.21; R, p. 181).

26 - I have here in mind the parallel case of the
letters a, u, and m (akaara, ukaara,
makaara)--making up aum--being afforded such a
ritual quality, as, e.g., in the Maa.n.dukya
Upani.sad (699, 8).

27 - See Karunadasa 1967, p. 66, for additional
Vedic and other sources.

28 - E.g., Warder's extensive work, Indian Buddhism
(1970), based on a critical study of the
literature of the different schools of
Buddhism, in Paali, Sanskrit, and Chinese, does
not even have a reference in the index to this
topic, or even to h.rdaya (the terminology
being given by Warder in Sanskrit).

P.428

29 - While the question of just what the Buddha's
actual words were will likely never be
resolved, I agree with Warder's view (chap. 7)
that the mention by name at the First Council
is at least indicative of a Sutta's antiquity.

30 - Professor Leonard Priestley of the University
of Toronto, however, observes (in personal
communication) that the material is not
identical in all the versions.

31 - Here kaaya is used in the sense of 'body'
(ruupa) and not as a collective term for
phassa, vedanaa, and sa~n~naa (supra).

32 - The asterisk here means, 'does not occur in the
literature'.

33 - See Davids and Stede, p. 285, for the complete
entry.

34 - na bhangakkha.ne .thapeti saya.m
bhijjamaanattaa, khiiyamaano viya va.t.tisneho
diipasikha.m; na ca anupaalanapavattana.t.thapa
naanubhavavirahita.m, yathaavuttakkha.ne tassa
tassa saadhanato ti da.t.thabba.m (W, p. 378).

35 - Others in the list of twenty-two faculties
(indriya) are as follows: eye, ear, nose,
tongue, body, mind, [bodily] pleasure, [bodily]
pain, [mental] joy, [mental] grief, equanimity,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration,
understanding,
I-shall-come-to-know-the-unknown,
final-knowledge, and final-knower (chap. XVI,
no. 1; ~Naa.namoli, p. 559). It should be
noted, however, that the eye, ear, nose, and
tongue, unlike the rest in the list, seem to be
localized.

36 - Note also Buddhaghosa pointing out that the
'life faculty' serves as the only materiality
of 'non-percipient' beings: Asa~n~niina.m
ruupato jiivitindriyanavaka.m evaa ti (chap.
XVII; N, p. 478; W, p. 192). Again, there is no
reference to a 'heart faculty'.

37 - The full argument in support of hadayavatthu,
given prior to the lines quoted, goes as
follows: "But the logical reasoning should be
understood in this way In the
five-constituent becoming, [that is, in the
sense sphere and fine material sphere,] these
two elements have as their support produced
(nipphanna) derived matter. Herein, since
visible-data base, etc., and nutritive-essence,
are found to occur apart from what is bound up
with faculties, to make them the support would
be illogical. And since these two elements are
found in a continuity that is devoid of the
femininity and masculinity faculties [i.e., in
the Brahma world], to make them the support
would be illogical too. And in the case of the
life-faculty..." (ibid.).

38 - It may also be noted here that because the
misrepresentation of the Buddha appears in the
Abhidhamma, it provides further evidence to the
scholarly claim that the Abhidhamma is of later
origin.

P.429

39 - See Barasch 1993, pp. 58 ff., for an update of
the literature, which has now come to identify
neuropeptides--"stars scattered through the
bodily firmament" as he puts it, as the
"information molecules."

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