Three approaches to authentic existence

·期刊原文
Three approaches to authentic existence: Christian, Confucian, and Buddhist

Frederick J. Streng
Philosophy East and West 32, no. 4(October, 1982).
(c) by the University of Hawaii Press.
p.371-392

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P.371

To live authentically human beings must know and
actualize "the nature of things." This is the
centuries-long claim of religious seers and
philosophers in Eastern and Western cultures. For
people to live out their fullest potential they need
to awaken to the deepest reality in existence. All
human beings can and should pursue quality living
through an insight into the nature of existence. This
call to perceive the most comprehensive reality of
life has two interrelated aspects: the first is that
the object of this knowledge is the reality which is
prior to, and will remain after, one's existence and
which is also the basis for all forms of existence.
The second is the recognition that living in, or in
relation to, that reality requires a change--a
deepening, an enlightening, a revelation--in the way
one usually apprehends the world.
The philosophical implication of this two-sided
concern to live authentically is that religious
notions about the nature of ultimate reality have two
connotations. The first is that the ontological claim
intends to account for all existence; the second is
that the nature of reality is a criterion for
determining the difference between a lesser and
greater quality of "being in the world." Thus, while
an understanding of the nature of things applies to
all existence, it also expresses the claim that some
moments and forms of existence are better than--not
just different from--others.
By focussing on these bipolar aspects of
religious ontologies, we are calling attention to the
existential character of such ontological
formulations. By reminding ourselves that these
formulations are not just abstractions, but forces in
the formation of perception and self-awareness, we
can become sensitive to some elements in the dynamics
of religious awareness. By accenting the dynamic
character of ontological claims in a religious
context we are led to raise questions about the
intentionality of these formulations as exposed in
the ontological terms used, the relation of subject
and object in knowing reality, and general
definitions of religion.
We will examine these aspects of the writings of
three contemporary religious philosophers: Paul
Tillich, a Christian; Ch乶-i T'ang, a Confucian; and
Keiji Nishitani, a Buddhist. They are twentieth
century thinkers who are well-read in scientific
thought, aware of the modern malaise of human
self-alienation, and recognize that they live in a
religiously plural world. They are sensitive to the
limitations in the formulations given in their
respective religious traditions, but wish to expose
the vitality and insight of "true spirituality" as
they have reformulated the best from their religious
and cultural backgrounds. What is most crucial for
this analysis, however, is that they attempt to
provide an understanding of existence in light of the
general human situation, and give their prescriptions
for authentic living in the context of cross-cultural
human experience.
_____________________________________________________

Frederick J. Streng is Professor of Religious Studies
at Southern Methodist University. Dallas. Texas.
This paper was first presented at the XIVth
Congress of the International Association for the
History of Religions, University of Monitoba,
Winnipeg (Canada). August 18. 1980. Portions of it
are included in P. Slater and D. Wiebe, eds.,
Traditions in Contact and Change (Waterloo. Canada:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 1982).

P.372

Nevertheless, each philosopher expresses the
"true nature of things" differently, and gives a
different prescription for living authentically.
Tillich asserts that all existence depends on
unconditional "being-itself," and that the anxiety
produced by the dialectical nature of nonbeing and
being in existence is overcome by individual acts of
creating meaning. Ch乶-i T'ang holds that the very
nature of existence is a harmonious rhythm of
"nothingness within somethingness," and that conflict
can be creative ly reformed when people fulfil their
true humanity in relation to their position in the
cosmic process. Keiji Nishitani, deriving his
formulation from the background of Zen Buddhism,
states that the deepest reality that human beings can
know is "the field of emptiness, " and the solution
to self-destroying delusions is to transform the
quality of one's consciousness.
We will compare three aspects in the writings of
each of these men that indicate a relationship
between an ontological claim and a prescription for
authentic living. The three aspects are: [1] the
different uses of positive and negative ontological
terms, [2] the various understandings of the relation
between the subjective awareness and objects of
knowledge for knowing reality, and [3] the
differences in a general conception of religion
expressed within the framework of an ontology. By
comparing these aspects of the three ontologies, we
hope to show that there are not only interestingly
different formulations of ultimate reality, but that
each of these formulations correlates with a
particular "manner" or "way" of achieving authentic
living. This manner of expressing the deepest sense
of life is conditioned by a "mode of valuing," that
is, by an axiological process. The axiological
process is defined by a deep structure for assessing
value as part of a person's experience of "being in
the world." We hope to show that these three
spokespersons give different weight to aspects of the
human experience: Tillich gives greatest weight to
creative meaning, T'ang to social harmony, and
Nishitani to the quality of consciousness. The
different axiological processes, we suggest, are at
the heart of both the ontology and religious life in
the case of each religious philosopher.
The importance of specifying different
axiological processes is to allow for variation in
deep perceptions of reality within a phenomenological
study of religion. To reduce any two of the processes
to the other mode of grasping reality would represent
a distortion of the intentionality of the alternate
processes. To the extent that we can accurately
describe three different experiential structures that
are based on their respective axiological processes,
we call into question the assumption found in those
philosophies of religion that define all religious
phenomena as a single type of inner experience. We
will note how the structure of valuing--indicated by
each philosopher's use of positive and negative
ontological terms, his understanding of subject and
object, and his general definition of religion--is
both a process and mode of valuing which molds the
character of an experience of ultimate reality. In
this way we hope to show that there are differences
in the primary experiences of these men when they
evaluate the

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quality of life in relation to an ultimate context.
Conceptions of reality, notions of the self, and
definitions of religion are like "the tip of the
iceberg", for they expose different mechanisms of
apprehending and then actualizing "the nature of
things."

THE RELATION OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ONTOLOGICAL
TERMS

This section will analyze the use of positive and
negative ontological terms in Tillich, T'ang, and
Nishitani in an attempt to understand different ways
that they have integrated the actual positive and
negative impact of common human experience. Most
people affirm that there is both continuity and
change in the world; there is the world directly
perceived as "being there" while at the same time
nothing particular seems to last--whether it is a
concrete thing, emotion, or idea. This is complicated
by the fact that the experience of "our presence in
the world" is determined by giving more value to one
thing rather than to another. Thus, reflective human
beings often recognize that what is seen as real is
connected to the act of giving value, which takes
place within a process of valorization.
Paul Tillich, in his Systematic Theology, states
that "being-itself" is the ground of all existence,
and that finitude is the expression of the
interaction between nonbeing and being. He asserts:

The power of infinite self-transcendence is an
expression of man belonging to that which is beyond
nonbeing, namely, to being-itself....
.... [T]he dialectical problem of nonbeing is
inescapable. It is the problem of finitude. Finitude
unites being with dialectical nonbeing. Man's
finitude, or creatureliness, is unintelligible
without the concept of dialectical nonbeing.(1)

Here we see that the dialectical relationship between
nonbeing and being is inescapable for anyone or
anything in existence. Tillich points out that within
Christian understanding there are two ways that
nonbeing is related to being. First, nonbeing is
expressed through the notion of the Greek phrase ouk
on. This is the recognition that humanity is created
out of nothing and must return to nothing. He points
out: "The nihil out of which God creates is ouk on,
the undialectical negation of being."(2) This leads
human beings to a sense of radical negation, a sense
of "being not."
The other understanding of nonbeing that was
integrated into Christian theology, according to
Tillich, is one that is called "the dialectical form
of nonbeing" in relation to being. This is expressed
in the Greek phrase m(-+e) 攏.(3) The dialectical
form of nonbeing is experienced existentially in the
anxiety about the transience of life. For Tillich,
this anxiety is rooted in the very structure of
being-in-the-world; it is not a distortion of this
structure.(4) The direct experience of nonbeing is
the anxiety that every person has in having to die;
it is an automatic direct experience that every
person has of the dialectical relationship between
nonbeing and being.
Nonbeing, according to this position, is entirely
dependent on being for any ontological value. Unlike
the subsequent examples that we are going to
consider,

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Tillich insists that "nonbeing is literally nothing
except in relation to being."(5) Even in the direct
experience of human finitude people must look at
themselves and experience nonbeing from the viewpoint
of "a potential infinity."(6) The power of being as
being-itself cannot have a beginning or an end; it is
simply the basic presupposition for anything to be.
This power of being as experienced in the individual
is the power of infinite self-transcendence. We
should note, however, that infinity is not being-
itself, because being-itself lies beyond "the
polarity of finitude and infinite
self-transcendence."(7) The power of infinite
selftranscendence as it is related to being-itself is
a very important notion in that one's reality is
manifested by an activity of self-transcendence. (See
below, the section on the definition of religion,
which describes the manner by which value is
actualized.) The infinite self-transcendence is a
negation of the finitude experienced in life. Thus,
while being-itself precedes both finitude and the
infinite self-transcendence, infinite
self-transcendence is the expression of being-itself
within finitude.
While Tillich holds that "Being is essentially
related to nonbeing, "(8) being-itself is not
essentially related to nonbeing. (In contrast, as we
will note below, T'ang's position is that
"nothingness" is inherent in "somethingness" as a
principle of change, and Nishitani says that "being"
becomes possible only within "a field of emptiness.")
In a view asserting that being-itself is ultimate
reality, a relation between being and nonbeing leads
to disruption and chaos. Being-itself is the primal a
priori. Continuity in life is therefore credited to
the presence of "being," and any change is understood
to be real where it is identified substantially as a
causal force that arises from the being or "what is"
from one moment to another. The "courage to be" is an
act of a finite self-transcendence through dependence
on being-itself manifested in the infinite drive to
seek self-transcendence.
In contrast to Tillich's affirmation of the
unconditional being-itself, the NeoConfucian
philosopher Ch乶-i T'ang stresses that Chinese
cosmologies affirm an immanent order of change that
involves "nothingness within somethingness." Change,
in the Chinese world view, is not a finite order of
reality that depends on being-itself. Rather the
essence of things, in T'ang's words, "is exhibited in
the capacity for adaptation and creation through
interaction with the changing environment."(9) He
argues that instead of conceiving the essence of an
object as a permanent energy, the dominant Chinese
view is that "the nature of an object lies in its
capacity [the Chinese original implies the meaning of
tolerance,-translator] for interaction with other
objects."(10) The process of change cannot be
avoided, as in some assumed eternal world or abstract
infinity; the only options are a harmonious or
disharmonious change. The latter is inappropriate
change, such as growth taking place where dissolution
should prevail--for example, a cancerous growth. The
immanent natural order has an observable regularity.
This regularity is not a predetermined force from the
outside. Rather,

p.375

it is a spontaneous and natural development, and
inner tendency that brings about abundance and
renewal.(11)
According to T'ang the principle of regularity is
also a principle of freedom. This is because the life
principle (that is, the Tao) which makes any event
possible does not determine the form of a specific
event. Since the appearance of concrete objects or
events arises through interaction with other objects,
its nature is one of (regulated) freedom to
interrelate with other things. The life force is not
an external divine fate or unchanging essence, but
the capacity to adapt or modify a particular object
within a set of relationships. This capacity to
change is inherent in both material and moral
development. Thus, human moral development is
intrinsically a part of the nature of things. T'ang
emphasizes the creative responsibility of humanity by
saying:

... Heaven endows every man with an ability to free
himself from the control of his own mechanical habits
and external forces, and thus he is able to create
along with the change of his enviroment. An object or
event needs interaction with other objects in order
that its freedom in the process of creative evolution
can be fully manifested.(12)

The basic ontological concept that places change
in the center of the life principle is that there is
"nothingness within somethingness." Both
"nothingness" and "somethingness" are important
aspects of change whereby existence can be seen to
have regular change without predetermined control and
individual freedom in every occasion of existence
without chaos. Every event or entity in existence has
in its nature the capacity to "prehend other objects.
Its ability to prehend lies in its nothingness
[hs乚."(13) He elaborates the importance of
"nothingness" by commenting:

The prehensive nature of an object is its Yin aspect.
The essence of matter is its Yin nature. This Yin or
prehensive nature lies in its nothingness, which not
only takes external forces as somethingness but also
renders them recessed.... The externalization of the
power of an object is what we call shih
[somethingness or substantiveness]. This externalized
power depends on the power's being prehended by other
objects and thus being dissipated and transformed
into nothingness.(14)

At the same time, the openness for relatedness,
or prehension, is not sufficient to account for the
manifestation of things. The ability to relate
results in the actual formation of a particular thing
or event. Thus, it is the interaction of nothingness
and somethingness in all existing things that exposes
the life principle. Because of the prehensive
capacity, or nothingness, self-realization and
self-fulfillment of something are possible. In
describing the importance of the hexagrams in the I
Ching for symbolizing the interaction of nothingness
(hs? and somethingness (shih) T'ang states:

The sixty-four hexagrams symbolically characterize
that all existences interact with one another through
their virtues or power, so that they give rise to new

p.376

events or objects. The fundamental principle of
giving birth to new events or new objects lies in the
occasion that the firm matches the receptive and the
moving matches the rest, so that there is
interprehension between "somethingness" and
"nothingness." This is why the concept chung ho
[comprehensive and dynamic harmony] is an ultimate
value.(15)

The immanent interaction of "nothingness" and
"somethingness" is at the base also of T'ang's
understanding that there is a natural harmony in
life; even conflicts lead to harmony. The process of
natural development is an extension of any
identifiable entity while at the same time the entity
is open to interaction. What appears to be a conflict
in the short-term view is a development and
reintegration in a long-term view. He describes the
resolution by pointing out that it

lies in the two interacting objects' conscious
expansion of their interactive perspectives through
their own exploration of a broader path, so that they
can form two broader evolutionary processes and these
two processes interact with two each other again....
Only because of this, all existence can continue to
be born and to grow, and the universe thus can
perpetuate its existence.(16)

This understanding of the inner bipolar
interaction of prehending "nothingness" and
actualization of "somethingness" is quite different
from that found in Tillich's understanding of the
nature of things as unconditional "being-itself"
which is only partially experienced in conditioned
existence, where nonbeing is in conflict with
being-itself. From T'ang's perspective, the
dissolution of entities or events is in the nature of
things; to become anxious about it is to be ignorant
of the "nothingness" which is one necessary pole of
the creative life principle. Inherent in any positive
, or firm, aspect of life there is a force that
simultaneously pushes toward the negative, or
yielding. Similarly the yielding process, or
"nothingness," becomes eventually an expression of
the firm, or "somethingness."
The last expression of "the nature of things"
which we will examine is the affirmation made by
Keiji Nishitani, a philosopher speaking out of the
background of Zen Buddhism. He claims that the most
comprehensive understanding of "being" in relation to
the experience of change and disappearance is found
in the standpoint of "emptiness." He summarizes his
position by saying,"It is only in a field where the
'being' of all things is a being at one with
emptiness that it is possible for all things to
gather into One, even while each is a reality as an
absolutely unique being."(17) This notion of
emptiness is not the negative principle that calls
into question the reality of life, as we saw in
Tillich's ontology, nor is it a negative pole in the
bipolar rhythm of change, as in T'ang's understanding.
Rather it is the root, or basic, field in which the
affirmative and negative are possible at all. In
emphasizing the relativity and temporality of the
basic character of "being" he writes:

....[A] system of "being" becomes really possible,
not on a field where the system of "being" is seen
only as a system of "being," but on the field of

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emptiness where being is seen as being-nothingness as
well as nothingness-being; namely, in a place where
the reality of beings, at the same time, takes on a
temporary and so far basically "illusory" character;
in a place where the mode of being becomes possible
whereby things precisely in their true reality are
temporary appearance, and precisely as
things-in-themselves are phenomena.(18)

At this point we should already note that the
"field of emptiness" is not a substantive reality,
but much more a state of consciousness which gives a
certain quality or character to the arising and
dissipation of existence. The emptiness which
Nishitani talks about is not a nihilum as in the
notion of nihilism. Rather it is a continual emptying
of the self-centered grasp of personality and
attachments to things.(19) The interplay between the
affirmative and negative aspects in emptiness,
however, is perceived only when one realizes that it
requires a complete negation of any abstraction of
emptiness or being-in-itself. Thus, this is a radical
kind of negativity which seeks to plumb the very
depths of a notion of emptiness by negating even
"emptiness" as a notion. Only by negating the
particular forms of one's experience can one get
beyond the negation it self to a sense that there is
an intrinsic relatedness between all things. One must
pass through the nihilism of nihilistic
existentialism, which, in simply negating essences,
judges life to be absurd. Nishitani claims that once
a person passes through the claim of absolute
negativity as the opposite to a universal essence
(that is, "being-itself"), then one does not perceive
life as absurd when confronted with nonbeing; nor
need a person develop his or her ego strength as a
superman or wonder woman. Rather, a new "mode of
being" (nonattaching to being-itself) takes form as
one moves through the depth of nihilism.
The deep realization of the emptiness of
everything makes it possible to penetrate the
ontological reality of all particular things while at
the same time affirming the relative reality of
particular things in existence. Emptiness, as
understood here, is not a reality as being-itself,
nor as a part of the intrinsic rhythm of all change;
there is no reality outside the language system that
correlates with the notion of emptiness. This is
affirmed not because there is nothing whatsoever
outside the language system, but because words are
seen to be powerful, but inaccurate, constructors of
experienced reality. Ontological terms should not be
seen primarily as indicators of some thing outside of
the language system in a one-to-one correlation with
any concept. Thus, to perceive the nature of
emptiness--in distinction to the notion of
"emptinees"--is to avoid identifying this term with
some presumed substance or principle. As soon as
emptiness is taken as a reality either in the subject
or as a-reality outside of the self, it is no longer
the root source for both the subjective and objective
experience.
The effort to avoid both an absolute nihilism and
a simply negative pole of an essentialism is matched
only by the intensity with which Nishitani affirms
that one must perceive the relationships between
particular things while at the same

p.378

time maintaining their particularity. He says that
from the standpoint of emptiness,

each thing is itself while not being itself, is not
itself while being itself; its 'being' is unreal in
its truth and true in its unreality. This may sound
queer at first but, in fact, through such a view, we
are enabled for the first time to conceive a 'force'
by virtue of which all things are gathered and
brought into relationship to one another--a 'force'
which, since ancient times, has been called nature
(physis, natura).(20)

If one were not to assume this intrinsic
relatedness through the "ground of emptiness, "
Nishitani is ready to admit, something would exist
"in-itself, " namely, when it is separate from
everything outside of itself. In the everyday
conventional subject-object awareness, the
identification of something-in-itself is significant
because it excludes what is not-itself. This results
in a total lack of being able to perceive the nature
of anything outside of oneself, and finally ends up
in a chaotic awareness. " Only on the field of
emptiness, " Nishitani continues, "where being is
being-nothingness as well as nothingness-being, is it
possible that each being is itself in the face of all
the others, and thus, at the same time, is not itself
to all the others."(21)
The result of perceiving the world from this
standpoint is that the uniqueness of a thing requires
that it is situated as the root center of all other
things. The relationship that particular unique
things have with each other while being essentially
interrelated is called "circuminsessional'' by
Nishitani. When a particular thing recognizes its
basic character as "no-self nature" it recognizes
that its being is one with emptiness; by letting go
of its own "self" it becomes a participant in the
center of all other unique particulars. From the
standpoint of emptiness, then, a thing "is" in terms
of its own "selfhood" when it both is subordinate to
all other things and at the same time becomes the
center for all other things.
Since the field of emptiness is also identified
as the field of the "circuminsessional relationship,"
all things manifest their own reality when they have
let go of grasping after some unique essence of
themselves and found their own absolute selfhood in
complete interrelatedness. The mode of being which is
the genuine "suchness" of a thing is that it is
inaccessible to identifying it simply with either the
subject or the object; rather something really "is"
when it is identical with itself and at the same
time with other things. All things in the world,
then, are seen to be interrelated. To be interrelated
means being both the center and the supportive aspect
of, or subordinate to, another thing at the same
time. The absolute interdependency that one thing has
with another for its own unique selfhood is expressed
by the term "circuminsessional," in which "all things
in their 'being' thus enter into another home-ground,
are not themselves and, nevertheless precisely as
such (i.e., on the field of emptiness) are themselves
to the very end."(22) This web of circuminsessional
interpenetration is called by

p.379

Nishitani a "mode of being"; it is "the thing's
in-itself mode of being, its nonobjective mode of
being as 'middle,' its selfness."(23)

RELATION OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN KNOWING REALITY

Related to the use of positive and negative
ontological terms is the understanding of the
relation between subjective awareness and the object
of knowledge. Two issues in the development of
authentic living that arise in the three philosophers
under consideration are [1] the degree of difference
and identity between the subject who knows and the
object known, and [2] the assumed capacity of the
subject "to know" the nature of reality in concrete
experience.
Paul Tillich affirms a radical difference between
the subject who knows and the object known. This is
consistent with his ontology whereby an existing
being is only partially manifesting being-itself, and
is under the threat of nonbeing. Human beings seek
self-transcendence in knowing unconditional
being-itself (as will be discussed in the subsection
on his definition of religion). An epistemological
presupposition for the effort to create meaning is
that the object of the deepest human awareness is
something other than one's self. Humanity is seen,
by Tillich, as a kind of being who is immediately
aware of a subject-object bipolarity in the structure
of being.(24) To ask the question about
"being"'presupposes two actualities: (I)an asking
subject, and [2] an object about which the question
is asked.
The experience of self-centeredness in an
objective world is the basic dialectical ontological
structure of life. This structure is something which,
says Tillich, cannot be derived; it must be
accepted.(25) While "self" and "the environment in
which the self exists" determine each other, Tillich
insists that selfhood "is an original phenomenon
which logically precedes all questions of existence."
(26) Human beings have an immediate experience of the
polar structure of vitality and intentionality. Human
vitality requires intentionality in order to relate
meaningful structures to the dynamic that is inherent
in the nature of being. This becomes crucial in the
expression of human selfhood since it is through the
shaping of reality in meaningful structures that
human beings can formulate their sense of selfhood.
It is, as a matter of fact, the aspect of self in
relation to the world as expressed in subjective
reason and objective reason which makes the self and
the world a structured whole. As Tillich says,
"Without reason, without the logos of being, being
would be chaos, that is, it would not be being but
only the possibility of it (me on)."(27) The
experienced world is regarded as having "reality"
when it is looked on by the mind. And a segment of
this reality is used as a symbol when one wants to
express the notion of God. When God is seen as the
ground of being, he transcends the subject-object
bipolar sensibility. If he is brought into this
subject-object structure of being he ceases to be the
ground of being and becomes one being among others.
Any concrete assertion about God must be symbolic.

p.380

Nevertheless, Tillich says, the statement that God is
being-itself is a nonsymbolic statement.(28) This is,
in part, because the very act of thinking must start
with being. Thought, he says, "cannot go behind it as
the form of the question itself shows. If one asks
why there is not nothing, one attributes being even
to nothing."(29)
Similarly the dialectical experience of being and
nonbeing in existence leaves human beings in a
constant tension about whether they have perceived
and properly formulated a symbolic grasp of the
nature of life. The notion of causality to account
for the continuity and changes of life is, according
to Tillich, an expression of the abyss of nonbeing in
everything.(30) It shows the inability of anything to
rest on itself and its need for other things as a
condition for its own survival. This is a very
important assumption that Tillich expresses in his
understanding of how the reality of being is related
to change, since change is here understood to result
automatically in anxiety over the threat of nonbeing.
Any change assumes two things: [1] that there should
be an unchanging being, and [2] that change is the
threat to that basic reality. Thus, the essential
condition of existence that there is finitude,
anxiety, and the threat of nonbeing.
As I pointed out earlier, Tillich's account of
human existential anxiety due to the threat of
nonbeing in conflict with being is not in agreement
with T'ang's understanding of change in existence.
Since T'ang's ontology requires both "nothingness"
and "somethingness" as a natural expression of any
existing entity, it is not surprising that knowledge
of the rhythm of life is also a combination of an
intuition arising from within the person and a
specific mentalperceptual creation which depends on
identifying perceptions in the immediate moment. In
T'ang's understanding of the dynamic nature of
existence, an entity is not conceived as an
independent thing nor held as an abstract object of
thought. An entity is defined according to its
position in relation to other things. He elaborates
the notion that entities are always in a continuum
and in a succession in the following way:

[I]n Chinese thought an object is not conceived
merely as something occupying specific space and
time; therefore an abstract concept of infinite space
and time has never existed in Chinese philosophy. The
I Ching speaks of wei [position or location] rather
than space; [it] speaks of hs?[successive order or
occurring order] instead of time. Every object has
its position, and its rise and development are in
accordance with occurring or successive order....
[E]vents or objects are not separate from their posi-
tion and succession.(31)

The location of any object, then, is a
designation of a perspective in a field of
relationships; similarly, an object is defined by its
function in relation to a set of activities. An
object is partially defined by the subjective
apprehension, which itself is conditioned by the
field of activities in which objects are defined. The
interaction of a prehending force and an extending
force in the arising of objects and subjects, for
T'ang, does not lead to a radical relativity whose
expression of

p.381

reality ultimately resides in a quality of
consciousness--as we will see in Nishitani's
identification of all things in the "field of
emptiness." For T'ang, the principle of life requires
the "somethingness" of the immediate situation as
well as the "nothingness" inherent in change; there
is, in his words, "the unfailing process of evolution
in which there are infinite varieties of interaction
among the myriad beings."(32)
Just as the knowledge of objects of perception
are intrinsically connected to perspective and to
their functions in relation to their respective
fields of activities, T'ang holds that the knowledge
of the deepest religious reality is a combination of
the intrinsic "human nature-human heart" that
permeates the whole order of existence and the
effort-filled cultivation of a rich embodiment of
"human nature-human heart" in actual life. He
describes the actualization of the "human
nature-human heart," which is the "subject of
infinity and transcendence"(33) when he says:

At their early stage;infinity and transcendence are
like a bud--a bud of"the will to create," a bud of
creativity which spontaneously permeates our "human
heart" in its immediacy. This is called "the seed of
earnest jen" [human naturehuman heart].... It is
embodied directly in our natural life and physical
constitution, as a master of them, transforming our
physical constitution into a subject of morality
sustained and beautified by its creativity.... [I]t
awakens the "human heart"-"human nature" from sl-
umber and transforms and nurtures the "human
heart"-"human nature" and helps it grow. Here lies
the genuine and genial path life to the real
establishment of our actual life and also to making
ourselves and our "fate" established.(34)

The actualization of the transcendental ideal is
the true spiritual goal for T'ang. The deepest
religious realization is not a symbolic grasp of the
unconditional object of knowledge, God, as suggested
by Tillich, nor the empty mode of consciousness that
is totally unattached to any form-as we will see in
Nishitani's insight into the nature of things. For
T'ang the demand of spiritual knowledge is a
self-awareness that arises from humanity's
transcendent nature. In true self-awareness a person
grasps the highest values rooted in human nature
itself. He points to a reality of human life that
transcends any formal claims by the major religious
tradition, and comments as follows:

The moment in which [man] is engaged in the
"authentic" self-awareness is the moment in which he
transcends his own religious spirit, confirming and
intuitively apprehending man's spirit of
self-confidence which comprehends and is on and above
the religious spirit.(35)

The actualization of transcendent knowledge,
however, does not mean that one can leave the
interaction of concrete form and universal ideals;
this knowledge does not eliminate the ordered rhythm
of change or transport one to a divine or
unconditioned realm. Rather, it leads to a
self-confidence in the capacity of human nature which
is always extending beyond the fulfillment of any
given moment. He elaborates:

p.382

.... [W]e must be self-confident that the "human
heart" and "human nature" that can produce and be
responsible for that faith or belief also possesses,
or is identical with, or is the passage to, the
transcendent existence or the transcendental state of
mind and source of all the grave, holy values in
faith as well. However, this means that our mind
cannot extend merely in its line of infinity and
transcendence to form all kinds of religious belief;
and we must also have a great spiritual leap back or
retrospection and come to be self-aware of the
beliefs; then in the retrospection we suddenly
discover that all grave and holy values in faith are
rooted in our "human heart" and "human nature"
itself.(36)

For T'ang, then, the subject and object merge without
ever becoming identical; and the human subject has
the innate capacity to know "human nature," but
always through the continuing creative act of
incarnating "transcendent existence" in particular
forms.
Like T'ang, Nishitani asserts that subject and
object are not separate entities; however, he takes
the interaction farther by insisting that the basic
"empty" (or radically related) character of a
particular form makes it identical (in a negative
way) to all other forms. In the "field of emptiness"
a thing is "itself" when it is "not-itself" (without
ceasing to be itself). While both T'ang and Nishitani
recognize that existence is basically a process of
interrelations, rather than materializations of esse-
nces, T'ang insists that "somethingness" (substance,
materiality) as it appears in naive perception is an
essential part of the rhythm of change, while
Nishitani holds that in the most profound level of
awareness there is only codependent arising of
changing forms. Nishitani thus rejects the notion
that there is anything essentially real external to
us; there is only that reality that emerges in
relation to certain processes of awareness, some of
which include more attachment to external things than
others. There is no entity or principle, such as the
"rhythm of change," that maintains itself in an
unchanging way. The standpoint of emptiness requires
that a person penetrate directly to the precise point
of what makes something what it is; otherwise it
cannot really be known. In order to "penetrate
directly" one has to let go of the assumption that
the reality of what is perceived is composed of
something other than what the perceiver is. The
common reality in both, according to Nishitani, is
that both of them are empty of any substantial
essential being. No essence or anything else can
stand ontologically independent of anything else.
Nishitani summarizes this by saying, "That a thing is
itself means that all other things, without ceasing
to be in themselves, are in the home-ground of that
thing; that precisely in the point where it is in its
own home-ground all other things are present too and
that all other things plunge their roots into its
base."(37) He distinguishes this view from
existential nihilism, which is a doubting mode of
sensitivity that calls into question both substantial
and subjective reality; the standpoint of emptiness
of which Nishitani talks here is one in which a
person foregoes the substantial and subjective
realities while at the same time affirming the close
essential interrelationship between all things.
The mode of being called "emptiness" is also
regarded by Nishitani as a

p.383

standpoint or perspective. To perceive emptiness
requires converting one's consciousness to the place
of emptiness, and thereby stopping the
ego-identification with the particular forms of
things as if they had independent essential being. It
is to accept that while one is thinking, perceiving,
and feeling, one recognizes the lack of selfhood in
oneself and in all other things. To let go of either
absolute subjectivity or absolute objectivity is to
transcend the conventional standpoint. Therefore, in
emptiness nonbeing is not a threat-producing anxiety
of an egocentered consciousness. Nor is it a threat
to a person trying to transcend the limitations of a
finite self.
In converting to the standpoint of emptiness
there is a release from the assumption that the
self-transcendence is a particular act or a series of
acts to become something--as suggested by Tillich. It
is the recognition that one already is a particular
entity while at the same time transcending that
particularity. The shift to a process of knowing
designated as the "standpoint of emptiness" is a
shift from a mode of constructive consciousness that
is fundamentally an "act of designation"-designating,
or separating, one thing from another--to the
negation of substantiation and specification of one
thing over against another. This is to know that the
true selfness of fire, for example, is nonfire, or
that the selfness of a tree is "non-tree." What we
perceive, then, is that the selfhood of any
particular thing is known by its context, and that
there is no self-identifying essence that separates
it from all other things.
The immediate realization of "emptiness as-a mode
of being" is also becoming conscious of the field of
emptiness in a certain way. Nishitani states this
explicitly when he says that the field of emptiness
"opens up, as it were, still nearer to ourselves than
the ourselves we are ordinarily thinking of. In other
words by converting from what is ordinarily called
'self' to the field of emptiness, we become truly
ourselves."(38) In such a field of emptiness, the
experience is not as in other fields of experience
that the mind is reflective or that the awareness
within this consciousness is an intellectual
intuition. Nishitani makes this clear when he says,

Ordinarily, our self is conceived as something
knowing itself, being conscious of itself or
intellectually intuiting itself. But what I term
self-awareness here does not mean a field where in
any sense the self knows itself. On the contrary this
is just where such a "self" and such "knowledge" are
emptied.(39)

For the same reason, the base of all
consciousness from the standpoint of emptiness is not
the unconscious or the subconscious. The original
selfawareness is then not-being-a-self while
being-a-self. This means, says Nishitani, that

our self-in-itself, on the field of emptiness, stays
at the home of all other things. On the field of
emptiness, the center is everywhere: all things--each
in its nonobjective and "middle" in-itself-ness--are
an absolute center. On that field, therefore, it is
impossible for our self to be self-centered like the
"self" as ego or

p.384

subject. Rather, it is precisely in the absolute
negation of that self-centeredness that the field of
emptiness can ever open up.(40)

The field of emptiness ultimately appears as a field
of wisdom which is called the "knowing of unknowing."
(41) When the self has a field of emptiness as its
home ground, it is free from the attachment to
things-in-themselves or to abstract principles. Then
"selves" can truly be.

RELIGION AS A MEANS FOR ACTUALIZING THE HIGHEST VALUE

If the manner of expressing one's deepest sense of
being-in-existence is indeed interdependent with a
process and mode of evaluating events and
experiences, one's conception of the nature of
reality will reflect the most significant general
procedures wherby one can experience fulfillment.
These procedures are indeed reflected in the
ontologies of Tillich, T'ang, and Nishitani. Even
more directly, these procedures are articulated in
the discussion of each of these philosophers as they
consider the question: What is religion? Each has
answered that question in terms of his understanding
of the general human situation. In the last two
sections we have outlined a few key elements in each
of their ontological and epistemological statements
about the general human situation. In this section we
will point out the definition of religion of each
thinker as a reflection of a particular ontology,
since each intends with his definition to describe
how it is the appropriate procedure to actualize the
ultimate reality in everyday living.
For Tillich human existence is that sort of
reality whose fulfillment is in or through meaning.
He makes this clear when he defends his
analytic-intuitive philosophical method--which he
calls "metalogic"--for understanding the core of
religious life; this method, he says,

must assume that the principles of meaning to which
consciousness submits itself in the spiritual act are
at the same time the principles of meaning to which
being is subjected. It must assume that the meaning
of being comes to expression in the consciousness
informed by meaning.(42)

In this way Tillich justifies his contention that it
is possible to know something; the self can truly be
aware of the nature of existence in which it already
is ensconced.
Human consciousness strives for a fulfillment of
meaning; to be human means that a person tries to
unify all the elements of one's consciousness, both
the ideal or theoretical aspects and the material or
practical aspects of one's experience. Reality is not
exterior to the act of the human spirit that seeks
either to receive or to bestow a unifying awareness
of all facets of life. He makes clear that meaning is
the core of conscious existence. He says:

Meaning is the common characteristic and the ultimate
unity of the theoretical and the practical sphere of
spirit, of scientific and aesthetic, of legal and
social structures. The spiritual reality in which the
spirit-bearing forces (Gestalt) lives and creates, is
a meaning-reality [Sinnwirklichkeit].(43)

p.385

There are three elements in every expression of
meaning: [1] an awareness of the interconnection of
the separate aspects of meaning, [2] the awareness
that every particular meaing is related to an
unconditioned and ultimate meaningfulness, and [3]
that while there is no complete unity of meaning in
any existing (and, thus, conditioned) meaning there
is "the demand to fulfill the unconditioned meaning."
(44) Here is the basis for Tillich's claim that every
cultural form has as its basis an ontological charac-
ter; any cultural form can be a medium for the
spirit-bearing forces. Indeed, not all cultural
expression has an intention to express the
unconditioned meaning; in fact, there are demonic
expressions when the unconditional meaning is denied.
However, it is the demand for the attempt to present
the unity of all meaning that makes the unconditional
meaning actual in form.(45)
The consciousness of meaning, then, is the place
where the spirit takes form. It is an act of
ego-consciousness whereby human beings manifest
infinite selftranscendence; it expresses the
ontological negation of nonbeing. This makes the
highest value in human life an act which depends on
being-itself, and which at the same time is a
positive action within finite existence. The role of
the personality in exposing both the partially
unified cultural meaning and the unconditional ground
for all meaning is made clear when Tillich states:

A real meaning-fulfillment is one in which bestowal
of meaning takes place in the sphere of individual
reality bound to nature; and ideal fulfillment is one
in which the giving of meaning involves no
transformation in the material sphere, but rather a
fulfillment of the existent thing in its immediate
formation.... [P]ersonality is the place of
meaning-fulfillment, both real and ideal.(46)

At the same time Tillich makes clear that there is a
distinction between the expression of (partially)
unified meaning in culture and the self-conscious
awareness of the unconditioned meaning of religious
life. In this context, religion is the attempt to
grasp the unity of meaning which is directed toward
what exists unconditionally (das unbedingt
Seiende).(47) The definition of religion is: "the sum
total of all spiritual acts directed toward grasping
the unconditional import of meaning through the
fulfillment of the unity of meaning."(48) The basic
form for the synthesis of form, content, and the
Unconditional is a symbol. This symbol of unity can
never be regarded as absolute; otherwise, it is
demonic. It is, rather, "a symbol of the plumb line
by which all [syntheses] are measured and found
wanting; it is the plumb line that symbolizes
authentic fulfillment of meaning."(49) In sum, the
true spiritual consciousness for Tillich is the
creation of a reality through meaning which stands
under the demand of Unconditioned reality; the
purest form of this is a symbol which paradoxically
unifies and judges all symbols.
For Ch乶-i T'ang "god" is not the central issue
of spiritual life. Similarly, myths and symbol
systems--while always found in religious
institutions-are peripheral to the core of the
immanent religious spirit in all humanity. He insists
that Confucianism shares with all major religions the

p.386

central demand of religious life, namely, "man lives
to find a sure place to establish himself and his
'fate.'"(50) Human beings "establish" themselves
within the order of the universe by realizing that
their well-being is inseparable from that of all
other beings. A person's "fate" (ming) is not--as
pointed out above-an unchangeable predestination; it
is the ultimate context in which particular
actualizations of one's of obligations as a moral
agent are set. T'ang explains how a religious spirit
and activity is needed beyond philosophic,
scientific, or aesthetic interests in order to
"establish" oneself in an ultimate context:

.... [M]an can acquire the place for such
establishment only when his mind of infinity and
transcendence, as much as his life and existence, are
established or settled. This establishment depends on
man's possession of the following things: religious
belief or faith, the demand of the religious spirit
through which the infinity and transcendence of the
mind are manifested, religious morality, and moral
deeds. This establishment can be found in most
religions and the Confucionist religion.(51)

The basic human spiritual act, then, is any
appropriate emotional, intellectual, and physical
expression of oneself in relation to the natural
rhythm of change in the universe.
By doing an appropriate moral-spiritual action a
person expresses the inherent value in the
"human-heart." The highest expression of value in the
universe is self-confidence arising from the
intuitive participation in the rhythm of change.
T'ang says:

.... [T]he final stage of the development of man's
religious spirit ends in approaching the spirit of
self-confidence.... Since Confucius and Mencius, the
Confucianist has emphasized the spirit of
self-reflection, self-awareness, and self-confidence.
This spirit will become the convergence of all
religions in the long run.(52)

This manifestation of the highest human value is not
separate from values inherent within all nature.
Ultimately, all existence is an expression of value,
which, however, cannot be measured in mathematical
units of measure. Changes in existence can sometimes
be measured mathematically when the existing objects
are externally related to each other. However,
changes in external relations can also cause
qualitative changes because of shifts in the manner
or mode of relationships. T'ang explains:

Among the higher levels of existences, the change of
quantity often alters modes of interaction and thus
produces qualitative differences. The value of an
object is exhibited in its capacity for promoting the
growth, development, or realization of human or other
kinds of beings. Therefore, value is found in the sum
total of relations between the object and the subject
rather than in a mathematical formula.(53)

Thus, value is a reality expressing internal
relationships; this reality is measured by its
capacity to actualize a goal which fulfills the
self-awareness and self-confidence of a conscious
being. It is important to note here that the deepest
sense

p.387

of such self-awareness is the avoidance of
self-centeredness, which is the expression of
"human-heart" (jen). Even craving for survival or
conflict between individuals are not morally neutral
or without implications of value; they must be seen
within the ultimate context of the harmony or
internal order as a facet of the growth of things.
Without an implicit internal order, T'ang insists,
the struggle or conflict between individual entities
is "totally impossible."(54)
The realization of the "human-heart" by
continuing and completing the inherent harmony of all
things is most clearly expressed for T'ang in the
three "sacrificial worships" of heaven-and-earth, a
person's ancestors, and the great Teacher
(Confucius). The multiple objects of reverence are,
for T'ang, expressive of the deepest spiritual
reality. Having multiple and particular personal
experiences of a universal abstract spirit is
important in actualizing the most profound kind of
self-awareness. He describes how Confucian worship
integrates the general experiences of multiplicity
and unity:

In our view, religious spirit not only must have
one place of concentration [that is, as a universal
pure spirit], but also a place of expansion. The
religion of absolute faith in the uniqueness or "one"
of God never in fact exists.... [A]ncestors and sages
represent the "principle of many"; the universe as a
whole and, inside it, the whole of reality of all
beings, lives, spirit, and values represent the
"principle of one."(55)

The importance of these "worships" is in the
"transcendental contemplation" of the virtues of
heaven-and-earth. This sort of contemplation is
itself an act of creation and preservation of the
virtues symbolically recalled through worship. The
act of worship is an embodiment of those ideals at
just that moment.(56) Thus, it is partially the
creation of the worshipper. This "transcendental
contemplation" expresses a relationship to inner
truths of life; it is a conscious process in which
one grasps the nature and movement of life. It is
also a process whereby a person embodies values which
apply to all moments of one's life. Through a deep
inner participation in the awareness of the origins
and most fulfilling values of one's particular
existence a person can make appropriate decisions for
applying this organic grasp of life to his or her
individual situation. Only after one has perceived
the constellation of interacting forces of one's
present situation can a person make the right moral
choice in action. The result of this kind of
intuition is not basically an act of individual
"being"; it is a decision to manifest the appropriate
function of one's being as related to the moment in
the rhythm of change. This is the establishment of
one's self and one's 'fate,' the actualization of
integrity. T'ang summarizes the core of religious
life as follows:

.... [T]he root of religious spirit lies in the
transcendental completion and eternity of the demand
for preservation and emergence of values. In the
universe, growth of natural things, cultivation of
human culture, the achievement of the realm of human
integrity--all are activities of creating and
actualizing values.(57)

Like Tillich and T'ang, Nishitani sees the self
in its conventional cultural form as an expression of
the nature of things. At the same time they all point
out that

p.388

without a deeper awareness than is commonly
experienced, a person will be caught in the
overwhelming sense of transience and meaninglessness.
However, for Nishitani, the key to gaining a
fulfilling perspective is not the personal creation
of symbolic meaning that stands under the demand of
the Unconditional; nor is it the establishment of a
person in his or her proper position in the eternal
rhythm of change; rather, it is full awareness of the
manner of our existence. Full awareness requires a
break-through in the field of consciousness so that
one no longer is aware of a separate ego which is
presumably to be fulfilled. To see the world in
representations, or through a subject-object
awareness, is only one--and a limited--way of
being-in-existence. It is a self-centered way of
being. Nishitani explains the peculiarity of this way
of being by commenting: "What is called the 'ego'
consists of the procedure that the self-consciousness
endlessly reflects only itself."(58) To recognize
that we participate in different modes of becoming
by means of different modes of consciousness is a
basic step in seeing the self within the horizon of
"fundamental nothingness." Thus, his brief, but
revealing, statement on the power of knowing is not
surprising: "Knowing always contains a sort of
transcendence over what is known."(59)
For Nishitani religion is defined as "an
existential exposure of the problematical which is
contained in the usual mode of self-being."(60) While
all of life is transient, and human beings encounter
the reality of non-being at each step, it is only in
religion that human beings reach a deepening of the
perception of their transience so that they see
nothingness manifest in their own being. In Zen this
awareness is called "coming to oneself." Nishitani
explains such a moment of awareness when he writes:

The opening up of the horizon of nothingness out of
the ground of our life is the occasion of the radical
about-face in our life itself. This turn-about is no
other than the transformation from the self-centered
(or man-centered) attitude which asks concerning all
things, what is their use to us (or to man), to that
of asking, for what purpose do we ourselves
exist.(61)

This awareness must be more than an intellectual
comprehension of reality; it has to be a total
realization in spirit, soul and body. As Tillich
spoke of "meaning-reality"--that is, of the reality
of our being known through meaning--and T'ang called
for the actualization of one's "human-heart" to make
oneself "a 'real' man," so Nishitani says that
placing our self in the "horizon of nothingness" is
the moment when "reality itself comes to its own
realization."(62) He elaborates this notion by
commenting:

This real awareness of Reality is our real being
itself and constitutes the true reality of our
existence. And this is because that awareness
actualizes itself as one with the self-realization of
Reality itself.(63)

In this context he proposes to answer the question of
"What is Religion?" by "tracing the oath through
which the quest for what is truly real is really
pursued."(64)

p.389

The key activity in this quest is the shift out
of everyday consciousness to an intuitive identity
with the nothingness that is at the root of the field
of "being." In the everyday consciousness which
objectifies our experience, we rarely are in contact
with ourselves, only with images of ourselves.
Similarly we are not in contact with things in the
world, but our ego-based response to them. While all
things, self, and feelings are relatively real, he
continues, "it cannot be said that they are present
in their true reality in the field of consciousness,
where they are always present only in the form of
representation."(65)
To shift out of everyday consciousness a person
must experience "Great Doubt." This kind of deep
probing of the empty-self is quite different from a
common awareness of the transience and uncertainty of
existence experienced by many people. Nishitani
describes the uncovering of the nothingness as the
foundation of oneself and all things as the "Great
Doubt"; it is a self-awareness more fundamental than
ego-consciousness:

... [W]hen the self breaks through the field of
"being" only, that is, the field of consciousness,
and reaches the nothingness lying at the base, it is
able for the first time to attain a subjectivity that
can not be objectified in any way. This is a
selfawareness more basic than self-consciousness.(66)

Such an awareness of nothingness appears as
inevitable; and the person becomes a mass of doubt.
Here Nishitani is cautious to warn the reader that
this realization of the nothingness at the foundation
of both subjectivity and objectivity is not the
annihilation of them; it is, however, the death of
the "ego" understood as the illusory, self-centered
attachment to the self-image.

ONTOLOGIES AS EXPRESSIONS OF AXIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES

The conclusion of this comparison is that there are
three different axiological structures, or processes
of evaluating human experience, represented in the
three ontologies examined. By analyzing three aspects
in the religious philosophies of Paul Tillich, Chun-i
T'ang, and Keiji Nishitani we see that there are
pervading processes of evaluation which inform their
basic orientations. By examining the positive and
negative ontological terms, the relation of subject
and object, and the general definitions of r eligion
we can see three basically different approaches to
authentic living. These different approaches organize
their understanding of authenticity in relation to
different modes of experiencing life: through the
creation of meaning under the demand of being-itself,
establishment of one's place in the cosmic rhythm of
change through moral choice, and full awareness of
the transience and interrelated arising of existence.
The differences of the three axiological
structures can be summarized as follows. Tillich
advocates the actualization of authentic living
through the individual creation of meaning. The
source for the reality of meaning is the
unconditional "being-itself"; it is basic to, but
distinct from, existence which is defined by the
threat of nonbeing. A basic structure of experience
in existence, according to Tillich, is the bipolar
distinction between subject and object. To

p.390

know the nature of things requires an act of
ego-consciousness whereby a person transcends the
tension of being and nonbeing through symbols.
Symbols give the reality of meaning to life. This
sense of reality assumes ideal essences which provide
life with value. Therefore, life has a reason and
meaning through a categorization of what "is," and
through symbolic meaning that partially reflects the
unconditional source of all events.
T'ang advocates the actualization of authentic
living through establishing one's "self" within the
transcendent order of change. This order of change
(or life-principle) is expressed as "nothingness
within somethingness." It is the basis for any
existing form; however, any form has the freedom to
manifest its basic character in an individual way.
The knowledge of oneself in the order (rhythm) of
change is possible because "human-nature" is
essentially transcendent and infinite. Through
actualizing human-nature in everyday affairs a
person becomes a "true" person, thereby fulfilling
one's cosmic moral obligations. The fulfillment of
moral obligations is the manifestation of one's
nature in relation to the order of change.
Nishitani advocates the actualization of
authentic living through developing full awareness of
the habitual self-constricting force of conventional
egoconsciousness. For him, authentic "being" is
becoming fully aware that the "field of emptiness" is
the basic nature of all being. The emptiness of all
things is directly perceived by dropping attachment
to a subject-object dualism. This perception is
possible through the Great Doubt. Authentic living,
according to Nishitani, does not come about through
the activity of ego-consciousness to create meaning,
nor through an intuitive grasp of the transcendent
order of change; rather, it comes from a quality of
consciousness known as "no-self" or "empty mind."
By examining the differences in these structures
of valuing life experiences, we can see that the
communication of a sense of reality is an expression
of a process of evaluation (which can be defined by
its axiological structure). Where ontologies are
given to help people understand the nature of
authentic living, they expose not only conceptual
systems but also processes of valuing whereby that
reality is given form and content. Thus, an
understanding of religious ontologies requires a
concern for "modes of valuing" which are implicit in
different ontological expressions.

NOTES

1. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp.
191 and 189.

2. Ibid., p. 188.

3. Ibid., p. 179.

4. Ibid., p. 191.

p.391

5. Ibid., p. 189.

6. Ibid., p. 190.

7. Ibid., p. 191.

8. Ibid., p. 202.

9. Ch乶-i Tang, "Cosmologies in Ancient Chinese
Philosophy," Chinese Studies in Philosophy 5, no.
1 (Fall 1973): 17.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 12.

12. Ibid., p. 16.

13. Ibid., p. 17.

14. Ibid., p. 24.

15. Ibid., p. 22.

16. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

17. Nishitani Keiji, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa,"
trans. Jan van Bragt, Eastern Buddhist, New
Series 6, no. 2 (October 1973): 66.

18. Ibid., p. 64.

19. See Nishitani Keiji, "Nihilism and 'Suunyataa,"
trans. Yamamoto Seisaku, Eastern Buddhist, New
Series 4, no. 2 (October, 1971): 30-49; 5, no. I
(May, 1972): 55-69; and 5, no. 2 (October, 1972):
95-106. For another useful examination of
negativity in certain Buddhist and Western
formulations see Masao Abe. "Non-being and Mu:
the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East
and the West," Religious Studies 11,no. 2 (June,
1975): 181-192.

20. Nishitani, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa, "
Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 2: 66.

21. Ibid., p. 67.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 68.

24. Systematic Theology, vol 1,p. 164.

25. Ibid., p. 174.

26. Ibid., p. 169.

27. Ibid., p. 171.

28. Ibid., p. 238.

29. Ibid., p. 163.

30. Ibid., p. 196.

31. Ch乶-i T'ang, "Cosmologies in Ancient Chinese
Philosophy," Chinese Studies in Philosophy 5, no.
1 (Fall, 1973): 59.

32. Ibid., p. 28.

33. "Religious Beliefs and Modern Chinese Culture,
Part II: The Religious Spirit of Confucianism,"
Chinese Studies in Philosophy 5, no. 1 (Fall,
1973), p. 59.

34. Ibid., p. 60.

35. Ibid., p. 56.

36. Ibid., p. 55.

37. Nishitani, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa, "
Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 2 (October 1973): 66-67.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 70.

40. Ibid., p. 77.

41. Nishitani, "The Standpoint of 'Suunyataa, "
Eastern Buddhist 6, no. 1 (May, 1973): 70.

42. Paul Tillich, What Is Religion?, ed. and with
Introduction by James Luther Adams (New York:
Harper & Row, 1969), p. 42.

43. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

44. Ibid., p. 57.

45. Ibid., p. 59.

46. Ibid., p. 64.

47. Ibid., p. 66.

48. Ibid., p. 60.

49. Ibid., p. 22, This is a formulation of James
Luther Adams, who wrote the introduction to
Tillich's What Is Religion?

p.392

50. Chun-i T'ang, "Religious Beliefs," p. 51.

51. Ibid., p. 52.

52. Ibid., p. 56.

53. T'ang, "Cosmologies," p. 36.

54. Ibid., p. 41.

55. T'ang, "Religious Beliefs," pp. 71-72.

56. Ibid., p. 80.

57. Ibid., p. 79.

58. Keiji Nishitani, "What Is Religion? " in
Philosophical Studies of Japan, vol. 2 (Tokyo:
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science,
1960), p. 34.

59. Ibid., p. 33.

60. Ibid., p. 35.

61. Ibid., p. 24.

62. Ibid., p. 25.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 26.

65. Ibid., p. 30.

66. Ibid., p. 36.