Time and Emptiness in the Chao-Lun

·期刊原文
Time and Emptiness in the Chao-Lun

MICHAEL BERMAN
JOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
Vol.24 1997
pp.43-58
COPYRIGHT @1997 BY DIALOGUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, HONOLULU.
HAWAII, U.S.A.

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INTRODUCTION

The Chao Lun(a) (Book of Chao) was written in the early
fifth century, c.e., by the Buddho-Taoist monk Seng-chao(b)
(378-414)(1). The book itself contains four essays, the most
purely philosophical one is entitled "On Time."(2) This paper
will focus on this essay in order to explain Seng-chao's
conception of time and its relation to Buddhist emptiness.
Before this critical analysis can begin, it will be necessary
to explain some of the structural aspects of the Chao Lun.
Seng-chao often quotes directly from the ancient
classics, the Tao-te-ching(c) and the Chuang Tzu.(d) Taoist
technical terms are often cited and used as euphemisms for
Buddhist concepts.(3) There are two important terms of which
we should be aware: one, "emptiness" or sunyata is often
equated with pen-wu(e) or "original non-being" (this is
further associated with Lao Tzu's "Void filled to the brim,"
that is, the Void that carries all existence within it) and
two, the Way or the tao(f) can stand for marga or path.This
latter term is extremely important to Seng-chao.
Seng-chao's book can be understood as his attempt to
explain how he views the Buddha's doctrine of the Middle
Path. We can further say that Seng-chao is definitely a
Madhyamika Buddhist because he understood some of the basic
Buddhist concepts, such as, sunyata, the Middle Path, and
Nagarjuna's tetralemma (of which his understanding progressed
throughout the period of his writings). The Middle Path which
is classic to all Buddhism explains how to avoid the
extremist positions of eternalism and nihilism. Seng-chao's
writings were not intended to argue the truth or validity of
the Middle Path; rather much of the Chao Lun was

p.44

written to explain how an Enlightened Being (the Sage, the
Holy Man,or the Buddha) experiences reality. Seng-chao was
not necessarily attempting to prove any ontological or
epistemological claims about reality.
The structure of the Chao Lun which itself was compiled
after Seng-chao's death by his disciples, is in a reversed
chronological order, with the exception of the fourth
chapter. In other words, the first chapter, "On Time," was
written after chapter two, "On Sunyata," and chapter three,
"On Prajna Not Cognizant." The latter was the first written
essay of the Chao Lun. An interesting aspect of chapter three
is that it includes a set of correspondences between
Seng-chao and a fellow monk, Liu I-Min. These letters shed
much light on what Seng-chao thought prajna or enlightenment
meant for the Sage. The last chapter which is of dubious
authorship(4) is entitled "Nirvana Is Unnameable." Another
aspect of the Chao Lun is that Seng-chao attempted to use the
logic of the tetralemma, though he was not always
successful.(5) There is also a heavy reliance on the language
of paradoxes. This latter will be discussed below for it
plays a role in Seng-chao's conception of time.
The goal here will be to explicate the argument in the
first chapter regarding the nature of time by paying special
attention to the implications of the second chapter's
discussion of sunyata. In order to proceed properly,
Seng-chao's understanding of the limitations of language's
ability to express his docttine on time will be discussed.
Our overall treatment of his project will be concerned with
the content rather than the actual logical (tetralemmical)
structure of Seng-chao's ideas.

LANGUAGE and LIMITS

Seng-chao understood that language has certain inherent
limitations. He considered language to be an artificial
application of names to things. "Normal language is unable to
describe [Seng-chao's or the Sage's] vision of the cosmos and
that therefore contradictions are unavoidable."(6) Absolute
Existence or "Reality belongs to an order that is
fundamentally incommensurable with symbolic systems such as
language. Nevertheless,

p.45

language performs a function in establishing this very
truth."(7) Seng-chao knew that he had to use language to make
himself understood, but at the same time he realized that
language could only establish conventional truths which are,
at best, the complementary aspects to the Absolute Truth of
the Middle Path. He was therefore aware of the limited
conventional means he had access to in describing Absolute
Truth. He also " seems to have been aware that even an ideal
language(8) would correspond only to a conventional
interpretation of reality, and not [absolute reality]
itself."(9) The "ideal" language which most concerned
Seng-chao was the "doctrine of names."

Seng-chao explicitly discusses language and the "doctrine
of names" in part II, "On Sunyata" (whereas in part I, he
treats language as a necessary limitation). In regard to
names and reality he states,

A thing called up by a name may not appear (as what is
expected to appear) a name calling up a thing may not
lead to the real (thing). Therefore the sphere of
[absolute] Truth is beyond the noise of verbal teaching.
How then can it be made a subject of discussion [without
paradox and contradiction]?(10)

An example of this type of paradox is in Seng-chao's
discussion of permanence (rest) and impermanence (motion).

What people call permanence I [Seng-chao] call
impermanence and vice versa. But then impermanence and
permanence, though seemingly different, are ultimately
the same. That is why it is said in a classic
[Tao-te-ching chapter 78]: 'True words seem
contradictory. Who dares trust them?' These words are
fraught with meaning.(11)

We see in this context Seng-chao drawing upon his Taoist
cultural heritage in order to explain the concepts of
Buddhism. Ordinary language is simply

p.46

unable to describe the ontological truth of reality, of
sunyata. Therefore even an "ideal" language could not
accomplish this, for it is only a more "precise" form of
conventional language insofar that it describes the
conventional world with possibly more exactness. However, an
"ideal" language still functions in an artificial manner:

The 'doctrine of names' is that names [linguistic
entities] match things [phenomenal entities] and things
match actuals [noumenal entities? ]. Seng-chao, like
Kumarajiva and Nagarjuna, denies this, and asserts that
names are 'borrowed' to designate things and actuals.
Thus they are counterfeit, and do not succeed in
designating what is true. Things(phenomena) are the
appearances of actuals, but like a phantom are not what
they seem, and are thus not real or absolute things.(12)

Language then, no matter how accurate or exact, cannot
provide a description or designate absolute truth, for this
truth

-is outside the sphere of the 'doctrine of names',
-is referred to by the statement that the dharmas are
not existent and not inexistent,
-is asserted to explain 'not inexistent',
-is realized without blanking out images of the myriad
things from the mind,
-and in it there is no achieving and no attaining.

It coincides with popular truth in the essential nature
(emptiness) of its referents.(13) Seng-chao's conception of
the Middle Path includes the limits of language, sunyata
("not existent and not inexistent") , prajna ("without
blanking out images" from part III), enlightenment ("no
achieving and no attaining" through sunyata and prajna), and
the TwoFold Truth(both "conventional" and "absolute"). The
Two-Fold Truth incorporates the limited knowledge (vijnana)
which is provided by language

p.47

and the penetrating insight of enlightened wisdom (prajna)
that is independent of language (i.e. alinguistic).
At this point a disclaimer is necessary in regard to the
role that sunyata plays in Seng-chao's doctrine on time. "It
is noteworthy that the term does not occur in Chao Lun part
I. [Also] there are very few references to the Holy One, and
little attention is paid to the soteriological themes that
are so prominent"(l4) in the rest of the book. Exactly why
Seng-chao neglected to include these aspects throughout the
essay can only be a matter for conjecture. But it is obvious
that these ideas are his basic presuppositions. He did not
consider "On Time" to present its ideas in an intellectual
and experiential vacuum, that is, without a background of
complementary Buddhist ideas and experiences. In other words,
the essay is Madhyamikan, and its tenets are the essay's
philosophical foundations, even though they are not
explicitly presented in this way.
So we can see how important language's limits are for
Seng-chao. These limits have ramifications for his doctrines
and beliefs. Language shapes his ideas and he recognizes its
effects on his thinking. Language forces his theory of time
into paradoxes and contradictions because of its inherent
inability to describe true reality. The truth of the world is
necessarily hidden from language, for language divides and
discriminates that which, when seen from the enlightened
point of view, is essentially interdependent and empty. The
limitations of language prevent it from adequately describing
time and sunyata in their undifferentiated and relationally
originated fullness of existence.

TIME and EMPTINESS

Seng-chao is said to have known the Madhyamika doctrine
on time(15) and that his Mahayana philosophical views were
the first indigenous Chinese Buddhist system of its kind.(16)
We will thus proceed to explore Seng-chao's understanding of
time. Perhaps it may have been an idea that be culled from
Nagarjuna's Middle Stanzas:

p.48

If present and future depend on the past, then present
and future should exist in past time if present and
future do not exist in it how can present and future
exist in dependence on it? The establishment of the two
does not occur without dependence on the past, therefore,
present and future time do not exist. By this method the
remaining two [times] are to be treated mutatis mutandis.
One should examine the top, bottom, and middle, etc., and
the oneness, etc. Non-abiding time is not perceived, and
abiding time does not occur; how can imperceptible time
be designated? If time depends on an entity, where is
there time without an entity? No entity exists, so where
would time exist?(17)

Nagarjuna's text demonstrates that it is absurd to think of
time as three isolated self-existent entities (svabhava) The
underlying assumption here of sunyata or emptiness is
evidenced by the phrase "no entity exists." The same
assumption occurs in Seng-chao's essay, but unlike Nagarjuna,
his temporal terms do not always follow one meaning. He
shifts positions sometimes, and takes extreme positions in
order to explicate how absolute truth appears to the Sage.
This shifting of thought is exemplified in one of
Seng-chao's commentaries on the Great Perfection of Wisdom
Treatise. He states,

Present dharmas flow quickly and do not abide. What do
you consider as arising? If arising and ceasing are at
one time, then the two marks [or two actions of arising
and ceasing] are both destroyed. If arising and ceasing
are at different times, then at the time of arising there
is no ceasing, then dharmas do not have the three marks
[arising, ceasing and destruction]. If dharmas do not
have the three marks, then they are not conditioned. if
they have all three marks, then there is the error of
infinite regression. This statement of no-arising is also
furnished in the [Middle] Treatises... The

p.49

three times are inexistent...(18)

This commentary was Seng-chao's early explanation of time. It
was written before the first chapter of the Chao Lun. Let us
turn then our attention to his compiled work.
The statement, "Present dharmas flow quickly and do not
abide," is almost completely at odds with his opening tenet
in "On Time." He begins that latter essay by declaring that
it is wrong to say that things glide along and
move;literally, "things cannot alter their positions in the
temporal order."(19) He continues in this vein, further
developing what he said in his previous commentary in regard
to arising and destruction. "There is rest (ching(g)) with
motion (tung(h)) going on; therefore, though (things) move
they are forever at rest. Motion need not cease in order to
produce rest, therefore, though (things) are at rest they do
not cease moving."(20) Motion and rest, just like arising and
destruction, are considered to be simultaneous. These Taoist
terms and paradoxical structures exemplify how Seng-chao
draws upon his own intellectual background in order to
explain Buddhist ideas, which in this case are the permanent
and impermanent aspects of emptiness. in other words, rest or
"stillness is the mode of things in essential voidness
. Since everything is void [or empty]
nothing is incompatible with stillness, not even motion.
Motion is compatible with stillness, and the more profound
the stillness of essence, the more powerful the action of the
function,"(21) or motion. Seng-chao is thus adhering to
Taoist "original non-being" or more precisely, Buddhist
emptiness, when he states paradoxical or contradictory
postulates regarding motion and rest.
Additionally there is a spatial metaphor which Seng-chao
has in mind when he says that "things cannot alter their
temporal position." Dharmas are arranged in short sequences,
santanas; the totality of these form the phenomenal world of
experience (samsara). Samsara is the realm of suffering and
self-ignorance where the unenlightened being develops
attachments to the elements of desire and passion, and
therefore cannot escape the interminable cycles of the wheel
of life-death; it is not true

p.50

reality. In absolute reality (nirvana) nothing happens,
nothing moves, all is empty, dharmas have no "self-existence"
and therefore cannot move among the time periods. Only an
Enlightened Being would experience this "suchness" of
existence for what it absolutely is, wherein samsra is
nirvana.(22) Thus reality is motionless and "motion-full."
However, this is not a completely correct formulation of
Seng-chao's Middle Path. Fung Yu-Lan states this more
accurately according to the Buddhist tetralemma:

What are popularly spoken of as movement and quiescence
[rest] do not basically involve an antithesis. The true
aspect of things (dharmas) is that they are neither in
movement nor quiescence. Or, to put the matter another
way, they are both in movement and quiescence. To use the
formulation of the Buddhist theory of the Middle Path: By
saying that there is either movement or quiescence, we
fall into the two 'border' or extremes. By saying that
there is neither movement nor quiescence we follow the
Middle Path.(23)

In other words, the "positive'' affirmation or negation of
two opposing extremes does not really capture the meaning of
the Middle Path. The two extremes must also be avoided. This
is meant to prevent a person,specifically the Sage, from
establishing a point of view.(24) The attainment of no point
of view is one aspect of enlightenment (nirvana).
Seng-chao next takes up what he believes to be the common
conception of time. His views here describe the nature of the
moment in time. "From the fact that what once has been cannot
join what is now, [ordinary people] infer that things move.
So they say: they move and are not at rest. From the same
fact, namely, that what is past cannot join the present, I
[Seng-chao] infer they [things] are at rest"(25) in the
past.The phrase "cannot join the present" assumes that each
dharma fills its moment (ksana) completely, there is no room
or space left for another to come and occupy it
simultaneously.(26) This can be said in another way:

p.51

People know that what is past cannot come back to the
present, and they think that what is now can pass over to the
past, whereas Seng-chao says that what is in the past must
occupy its position, just like what is nowfor where would the
"now" go to if it did pass over to the past that is "filled"?
"Each event pertains to one moment of occurrence, with which
it is inalienably associated. Seng-chao [and Nagarjuna take]
it as an unexpressed axiom that no [singular] event occurs at
two different moments."(27)
Within the purview of Seng-chao's view of the moment, we
shall turn to his ideas regarding cause and effect.
Liebenthal claims that these ideas are the core teachings of
Seng-chao's thought; so, in order to discuss tbese ideas, a
full citation of the text will be necessary.

Premises:
-In the following it is proved that causes are unable to
produce a result and therefore are always still able to
produce one. Two moments, the cause-moment and the
result-moment, must be distinguished. Then two
propositions [A and B] are possible.
-A: The result does not exist simultaneously with the
cause.
-B: The result is produced by the cause (existing simul-
taneously with it).

Conclusions:
-From B: If the result is produced by the cause, then
the cause has not died in the first (past) moment. (This
means that it is present in the second and takes all the
space which should be reserved for the result. Thus the
result cannot be produced.)
-From A: If the result does not exist simultaneously with
the cause, then the cause (must have died in the first,
past moment. Thus it) cannot come forward to the second
(present) moment (in order to produce the result, and
thus

p.52

this cannot be produced.)
-(The impossibility of causation is proved for both
cases.)
-Thus, because (the cause) neither dies (in the first or
past moment,...B), nor comes (forward to the second or
present moment,...A), it is proved that it does not move
(from its position in the karmic [or temporal]
sequence). (emphases added)(28)

With respect to the very first claim about production of
results by causes, both Robinson and Liebenthal agree that
Seng-chao misunderstood Nagarjuna on this point. Robinson
claims that Nagarjuna maintained a consistent point of view
that "non-abiding time is not perceived and abiding time does
not occur... If time depends on an entity, where is there
time without an entity? No entity exists, so where would time
exist?" (cited above) Whereas Seng-chao "films the same scene
with two different cameras,"(29) insofar that causes can and
cannot produce results which Nagarjuna understands as not
existing.
Liebenthal, on the other hand, believes that "while
Nagarjuna concludes from the immutability of the causes that
they cannot produce a result, Seng-chao believes that
Nagarjuna wishes to prove their immutability. He silently
infers: causes are immutable, therefore not yet exhausted [in
the result-moment], therefore still effectability" means to
Seng-chao,(31) for Seng-chao denies the movement of dharmas
from one moment (ksana) to another. Therefore, in saying that
a cause is still effective Liebenthal implies that it endures
or abides beyond its temporal position so as to exist in
another position. This is not, according to Robinson,what
Seng-chao means. For Seng-chao,

ordinary causation does not operate through a shift of
entity from one point to another. In modern terms, he
considers causation as a relation between events rather
than as an event. The Tathagata, the Holy One, idehtifies
with the self-voidness -the nature-of all the dharmas.
Thus he is all-pervasive,

p.53

all knowing, and able to exert influence without acting,
that is,wihtout shifting from one point to another.(32)

In considering "causation as a relation" in modern terms,
a comparison between the conception of causality of
empiricist and sceptic, David Hume, and Seng-chao's doctines
will aptly illustrate this point. Hume comes from a different
background than Seng-chao, therefore his premises and
philosophical goals are quite distinct from those of the
Buddho-Taoist monk.At most points their views are
oppositional, but, suprisingly enough, they arrive at very
similar conclusions.
Hume considers causality to be only an assumed idea that
is inferred from our experiences of real objects which can
either be of an internal or external nature. Cause and effect
are on this basis seen as products of our understanding.He
states.

One event follows another; but we never observe any tie
between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.
And as we can have no idea of anything, which never
appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the
necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of
connexion or power at all, and that these words are
absolutely without meaning, when employed either in
philosophical reasonings, or common life.(33)

In other words,

Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other, we
should never have entertained any notion of cause and
effect; this regular conjunction produces that inference
of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that
we can have any comprehension of.(34)

Hume wishes to deny that there are any necessity, a priori
powers, or

p.54

reasons, which produce causes and effects. Rather causes and
effects are what we infer through our observations of the
uniformity of experiences over time, and so we establish
customs or habits based on empirical experimentation and
evidence. These provide us with an understanding of how
causality functions in the world. We can conclude that
because we cannot dirrectly experience or observe the causes
that we infer between objects or events then causality does
not (necessarily) exist in reality. It is only a customary
assumption which our understanding leads us to create and
follow.
In comparison to Seng-chao, Hume adheres to the
self-existence (svabhava) of entites and objects, whereas
Seng-chao understands them to be empty and non-self-existent.
Where Hume refers to the uniformity of experience, Seng-chao
sees, oppositionally, the constant impermanence of things in
experience, and only uniformity is the permanence of sunyata.
Possibly, Seng-chao might agree that cause and effect as
inferred by the understanding (or cognizing mind) would be
the common or ordinary people's conception, but he would
maintain that this is not how the Sage or the Enlightened
Being would experience reality. In sum Hume's claim that
there is no necessary or a priori connection between events
and objects would indeed agree with Seng-chao's conclusion of
the "impossibility of causation." However, we still need to
explicate the relation between causality and sunyata.
Seng-chao's understanding of the experiential notion of
sunyata, a key concept in Buddhist thought,(35) grounds his
doctrine on time. Sunyata indicates the relational nature of
the experiential world. The Sanskrit term pratitya-samutpada
("relational origination") describes the mutual
interdependence and interpenetration of all the elements of
experience; its realization was the core of the historical
Buddha's enlightenment. No particular thing existed, exists,
or comes to exist in isolation from the rest of the world.
Any "isolation of a thing" is an abstraction which can be
reified into an "absolute or self existence" by the cognizing
mind. (Such abstractions are, in part, the product of
language.) The cognizing mind treats the isolated and
individual thing as

p.55

if it had svabhava or "Self-existence." So the mind can grasp
after or desire the self-existent entity. Attachments to
these desires are the sources of suffering (duhkha) and
ignorance. It was the nature of the Buddha's enlightenment to
pierce this veil of "absolute" (self) ignorance of
existence,thereby obtaining the experiential state wherein no
thing has a self-nature (svabhava) or independent existence.
Without self-existence, everything must be considered empty
and void, for artificially isolated and abstracted entities
(via the cognizing mind and language) must depend on other
entities for their very (own) existence. An isolated thing
does not exist absolutely,for things only exist relatively in
the general flux of reality. The enlightening experience of
pratitya-samutpada cannot be fully explained in linguistic
terms because it is an existential or (pure) ontological
truth of the world, and can therefore only be found in the
truth of sunyata, in experience which is relational and
impermanent.
The limits of language, time, emptiness, and the Middle
Path are all inextricably bound together for Seng-chao. To
analyze his doctrine of time in any other manner would
inevitably lose sight of his more fundmental philosophy and
Buddhistic understanding of experience reality

CONCLUSION
We have seen how the idea of emptiness is a component of
Seng-chao's doctrine of time. His ideas are not completely
Buddhistic, but we can definitely see the Madhyamikan strain
in his thought. His doctrine of time can also be seen as an
elaboration of Nagarjuna's idea of time. Nagarjuna concluded
that time was non-existent, but by following some of the
ideas of Seng-chao, a further development of the concept of
time is possible. Since all three periods of time (past
,present,and future) are dependent on each other, to consider
any isolated time period as having independent existence is
an erronenous position. The interdependence of time periods
points to the idea that these aspects of time are empty.
Since time itself iss the source of change, the very
non-abidingness that

p.56

we experience (which cannot be explicated with language). an
ontological and necessary relation between emptiness and
change is obvious.Thus, if we were to take the phrase
'"sunyatam sunyata" which means to "empty emptiness (of
self-nature)-that is, to understand that emptiness is not an
entity-and apply this phrase to time, we can empty time
itself, not only of its existence, but its non-existence as
well. This would expand on Nagarjuna's original conclusion by
using some of Seng-chao's ideas. But such an argument would
take us too far afield and will have to be addressed at
another time.

NOTES

1. Liu, Ming-wood, "Seng-chao and the Madhyamika Way of
Refutation," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, (March 1987),
97, as opposed to Fung YuLan's A History of Chinese
Philosophy, D.Bodde, trans., (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1953)which claims the dates as 384-414
(p. 258).
2. Robinson, Richard H., Early Madhyamika in India and
China(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967)
p.146.
3. Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy p.258, and
Conze, Edward, A Short History of Buddhism (London:
George Allan and Unwin,Publishers, Ltd., 1980), p.67.
4. Liebenthal, Walter, translator,Chao-Lun, (Book of Chao),
(Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong 1968
second edition), p.39 and footnote 668 on p.126. This
boot will be considered as the standard translation of
the Chao-Lun.
5. See Robinson Early Madhyamika, ch. VI. He spends a great
deal of his effort in analyzing the logical structures of
Seng-chao's arguments. I cannot help but feel that
Robinson has missed some crucial aspects of Seng-chao's
writings because to a great extent they are more
qualitatively mystical than quantatively logical.
6. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun. p.60, footnote 224.

p.57

7. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.120.
8. Possibly a modern equivalent to what might have been an
'ideal language' for Seng-chao might be found in the
writings of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein's
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, or the logical
positivists-like Herbert Feigl.
9. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.111.
10. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.56.
11. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.51.
12. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.144.
13. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.143 slightly modified.
14. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.146.
15. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.138.
16. Conze,A Short History of Buddhism,p.69.
17. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.150.
18. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.138.
19. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.45.and footnote 128.
20. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.46.
21. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.129.
22. Liebenthal,Early Madhyamika,p.46.
23. Fung Yu-Lan,A History of Chinese Philosophy,p.263.
24. This ancient Buddhist ideal of "no point of view" was
given a more structured treatment in Fa-tsang s Hua-Yen
Buddhism three hundred years later.See Cook
Francis, H., Hua-Yen Buddhism (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977, third
edition),particularly chapters 1,4,5, 6,and8.It should
also be noted that this ideal is also an aspect of other
mystic traditions which attempt to describe similiar
transcendental experiences.So Buddhist prajna and
Augustine's Love will have similar characteristics.
25. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.47.
26. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.47, footnote 141.
27. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.149.
28. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.52-53.I have slightly restructured
the argument as translated by Liebenthal in order that it
may be more acessible for analysis.
29. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.150.
30. Liebenthal,Chao-Lun,p.52 and footnote 165.
31. "What Seng-chao calls 'immutability'(pu-ch'ien(i)) is a
mystical concept that

p.58

transcends both quiescence(ching(g) ) and movement
(tung(h) ) as ordinarily conceived.According to his
theory,each event and thing is forever fixed in the
particular flash of time to which it belongs.Yet the
succession of these flashes creates the illusion that a
process of movement is taking place, just as the
successive images on a strip of moving picture film give
the illustration of movement,even though each of these
images is in itself static and remains forever distinct
from the other images." Fung Yu-lan,A History of Chinese
Philosophy,p.264,footnote 1.
32. Robinson,Early Madhyamika,p.150
33. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
Eric Seinberg, editory, (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc,
Indianapolis 1977), p.49.
34. Hume,An Enquirly,p.64
35. Nagao, G. M. Madhyamika and Yogacara, L. S. Kawamura,
trans., (State University of New York Press, Albany
1991),p.64 specifically,as well as other cited references
in the book's index for more particulars