Tsung-mis questions regarding the Confucian absolute

·期刊原文
Tsung-mi's questions regarding the Confucian absolute

By Yun-hua Jan
Philosophy East and West
vol. 30, no.4(October, 1980)
P495-504

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P495

When one studies the interaction of Chinese
religions, the problems can be approached from two
different angles: One angle may be called positive,
that means one looks for similar concepts,
terminology, and precepts from the different but
related religions, hence to determine the possible
influence of one to the other. The other may be
called negative in which one looks, not for similar
concepts or terminology, but searches for the
criticisms and counter-criticisms, to see the
actions and counter-actions of the traditions.

The search for similar concepts and terminology
often clarifies the points of continuity in a
tradition in spite of differences. The continuity of
philosophical concepts and practical precepts takes
different forms, whether it is a straightforward
borrowing or a modified takeover, a transformation
through assimilation or a new formulation from its
own context but under a degree of influence from the
other. The approach also has its limitations. This
is so because when the relation between two hostile
religions becomes too antagonistic and emotional, or
when there is a great risk, some of the principal
thinkers or leaders cannot recognize the influence
of the opponents, but rather try their best to deny
it.

A negative approach does not look for similarities
between different religions, but tries to see their
differences. It is aimed at the questions that had
been raised by one school and the reactions to
questions by the other. Sometimes, such reactions
are explicit and direct and sometimes they are not.
Whatever the situation might be, a reaction is a
reaction whether or not the reactor(s) acknowledged
it. By examining the past experiences of many
inter-religious relationships, one would find that
the influence from antagonistic debates are often
stronger than friendly dialogues.

The approach of this article is from a negative
angle. It attempts to enquire into a Buddhist's
questions and criticisms regarding the Confucian
concept of absolute, and Neo-Confucian reactions to
the questions during the centuries after the issue
was raised by the Buddhist. Some researches have
pointed out that while most Neo-Confucian thinkers
have strongly attacked Buddhism, these thinkers had
an inadequate or unsystematic knowledge of
Buddhism.(1) Under the circumstances, a contextual
study becomes necessary, because the participants
could not acknowledge what had actually happened in
their lifetime because of the hostile relationship.

One important Buddhist critic of Confucianism was
Tsung-mi(a) (780-841) , a systematic thinker of
Ch'an(b) and Hua-yen(c) Buddhism. As we now have
quite a few studies on this monk's life, works, and
thought,(2) there is no need to repeat them. What is
necessary is to point out Tsung-mi's knowledge of
Confucianism and some other classical Chinese
philosophies. As far as the Confucian
========================
Jan Yun-hua is Professor in the Department of
Religious Studies at McMaster University, Ontario,
Chanada.

P496

tradition is concerned, Tsung-mi studied it for a
period of years and his works reflect his knowledge
of the tradition quite well. However, Confucianism
in his day was not as we know it during a later
period, and Tsung-mi found the tradition highly
unsatisfactory. What was the reason for his
unhappiness? Tsung-mi explained it in his
autobiographical statements. In one place he says,
"although I studied Confucian Classics as my texts,
yet I often lamented that I had no place to return
to." In another place he declared that once he had
some knowledge of Buddhism, he "knows that worldly
affairs and skills from the beginning were
irrelevant to [spiritual life and destiny],"(3) so
he renounced the household life.

Years later, Tsung-mi had critical comments on the
Classical tradition of China. As for Confucianism,
Tsung-mi questioned its concept of the absolute from
two points of view, its cosmological concept of Tao
and its moralistic ontology of Heaven or the
'Mandate of Heaven'.

Tsung-mi relies heavily and correctly on the Book
of Change for the cosmological absolute of Confuci-
anism. He first quoted from the Appendix III/11:

Therefore in the I(d) there is the Great Ultimate
(t'ai-chi(e)), which produced the two Forms (i(f)).
The two Forms produced the four Emblems (hsiang(g)).
The four Emblems produced the eight Trigrams. And,
the eight Trigrams determining good or bad luck, and
from this determination the great businesses were
produced.(4)

Following the text of the Book of Change, he quoted
from a commentary on the book written by Han K'ang-ph(h)
(Han Po, 332-380) to explain further:

That beings (yu(i) or the two Forms) most certainly
begin from Non-being (wu(j) or the Great Ultimate),
this is the reason for stating the Great Ultimate
produced the two Forms. The Great Ultimate is the
name of the unnamable. As it is unnamable it is
called the Great Ultimate to refer to its ultimate
nature.(5)

According to the commentary by K'ung Ying-ta(k)
(574-648) , the Great Ultimate is the
undifferentiated One, before Heaven and Earth were
differentiated. This is the reason it is called the
'Great Origin' (t'ai-ch'u(l)) or the Great One'
(t'ai-i(m)), The "Tao produced the One" mentioned in
the Lao-tzu means this Great Ultimate.(6)

During the later period, Neo-Confucian thinkers
gave a lot of ethical interpretation to Confucian
cosmology; but during the period from the Wei-Chin
dynasties until the end of the T'ang dynasty (that
is, 220-906 A.D.) , Confucian scholars often
understood their cosmology in conjunction with
Taoist texts. This syncretic tendency in Chinese
cosmology begins from Han Confucian thought,
systematized in Neo-Taoist philosophy and
predominant in the Sui-T'ang period (589-906) .
Tsung-mi's understanding of Confucian cosmology
exactly demonstrates and testifies to this tendency.

P497

Following the aforementioned text, Tsung-mi further
quoted from the I kou-ming chueh(n) to define the
concept of Absolute as stated in the Book of Change:

I means 'changeability (kai-i(o) ) . When the
Primordial Breath' (yuan-ch'i(p) ) remains
undifferentiated, it is called the 'Great
Changeability' (t'ai-i(q) ) . When it starts to
differentiate, it is called the 'Great Origin'
(t'ai-ch'u). When the Breath begins to form signs,
it is called the 'Great Beginning' (t'ai-shih(r)).
When the signs of Change are with material substance
(chih(s)), it is called the 'Great Simplicity'
(t'ai-su(t)). When the formation of signs and the
material substance are all completed, it is called
the 'Great Ultimate' (t'ai-chi). Although there are
insignificant similarities and differences on the
subject mentioned in various texts, all of these
statements agreed that the 'Primordial Breath had
produced Heaven and Earth'.(7)

From the quoted statement, it is clear that the
concept of Ultimate in classical Chinese philosophy,
both Confucian and Taoist, has been defined as
eternal (ch'ang(u) ) , capable of producing
(sheng(v)), universal (pien(w)), and worthy for
esteem (tsun(x)).

The Buddhist thinker then took up the four
definitions and criticized them. He pointed out "If
a thing is capable of producing, the thing itself is
certainly noneternal."(8) He gives a Buddhist
example that "the four great physical elements
(ssu-ta(y)/catu-mahaabhuuta) of earth, water, fire,
and air are capable of producing all things, but are
impermanent in themselves."(9) From this conclusion
a criterion is established that the great Tao is
noneternal, because it is capable of producing
things.

The claim of Tao as eternal can also be refuted
from logical points of view: First, if "Tao produced
the One, and the One produced the two"(10) or "the
Great Ultimate produced the two Forms,"(11) this
means "the cause is one, the effects are many;
hence, the theory cannot be established."(12) The
failure of such a claim is obvious, it means that a
peach seed could produce all kinds of fruit trees.
Second, even if the capability of producing is taken
for granted, the claim would lead to further
difficulties, because if the eternal Tao is the
cause of producing, all things would be produced
everywhere and anywhere, hence capable of
transcending space. This is not the case, as only
certain things were produced at certain places.
Third, if the Ultimate is eternal and universal,
there should be no differentiation between the
productive time (sheng-shih(z) ) and the
nonproductive time (pu-sheng-shih(aa)). If that is
the case, "all things in ten thousand categories
should be born simultaneously every day and every
moment."(13) In other words, time is no longer a
condition for production. However, certain things
are only productive at a given time. By this logical
argument, Tsung-Mi pushes the classical Chinese
concept of the Absolute into a logical dilemma: if
they insisted on the productive power without cause
and conditions, they would be unable to explain the
producer and its productions, and the cosmological
process that it had claimed. If they accepted cause
and

P498

conditions as factors to the process of production,
it would lead to other difficulties: neither is it
absolute as it is subject to cause and conditions:
nor has it given up its original position, namely,
the acceptance of the causal philosophy.

Once the claim of the Tao as eternal and productive
had been disproved, Tsung-mi took up the second
definition made by the Confucian text. He states
that "once the capability of production has
disqualified [the claim of] eternality, the
noneternality itself becomes the cause of the
nonuniversality."(14) From this conclusion, another
criterion is established that the great Tao is
nonuniversal because it is noneternal.

Similar to his criticism of Confucian cosmology,
Tsung-mi's critique of the concept of Heaven or the
Mandate of Heaven begins with both Taoist as well as
Confucian classics. He first quoted from the
Chuang-tzu which states that "Heaven and earth are
the father and mother of the ten thousand things.
United they become a body; parted they return to
[the undifferentiated] beginning."(15) The next two
quotations are from the Chuang-tzu and the Lieh-tzu
on the same topic.(16) Once the relationship between
the ten thousand things of Heaven and earth was
established, Tsung-mi turned to the Confucianist
interpretation of the relationship. He quoted from
the Analects that "Life and death are the Mandate of
Heaven; wealth and honor depend on Heaven."(17)

The Buddhist critic then asked a number of
questions: If wealth and honor depend on Heaven, why
did Heaven make more people poor and fewer rich?
More base and fewer noble? What is the reason for
the different treatments? Does this not show that
Heaven is unequitable? The critic then quotes from
the Book of Change: "Rejoice in Heaven and
understand destiny; therefore, there is no
worry."(18) If this is the case, the critic asks,
why then do those who misbehave become noble and the
well-behaved remain humble? And, similarly, the
virtuous poor and the unvirtuous rich? The humane
die prematurely and the inhumane live long? The
righteous unlucky and the unrighteous lucky? Those
who were with Tao declined and those who were
against Tao prospered? Doesn't this show that Heaven
is unjust?(19)

It has been declared in the Book of Historical
Documents that "The Way of Heaven is to bless the
good and to punish the bad."(20) The Book of Change
states:

It is the way of heaven to send down its beneficial
influence below, where they are brilliantly
displayed. It is the way of earth, lying low, to
send its influence upwards and there to act. It is
the way of heaven to diminish the full and augment
the humble. It is the way of earth to overthrow the
full and replenish the humble....(21)

Again, if these statements are taken for granted,
then problems and contradictions within the argument
would arise. For example, one may ask: if all things
are produced by Heaven, why then do animals and
birds kill and eat each other? Does this mean that
Heaven is the most inhumane and unrigh-

P499

teous? Where is the blessing to the good and the
punishment to the bad as the classic has
claimed?(22)

He further quotes from the Book of Change, that
"The great characteristic of Heaven and Earth is to
produce."(23) This means producing is regarded as
virtuous; and this implies death is vicious. Should
this be the case, why should everyone die
irrespective of whether one is virtuous or
unvirtuous? Another Confucian classic, the Doctrine
of the Mean, states that "What Heaven imparts to man
is called human nature."(24) If that is so, the
critic asks, is the cruel nature of tigers and
leopards also imparted from Heaven? If it comes from
Heaven, it cannot be called inhumane; if it is not
from Heaven, and it has not been said so, then
Heaven is unvirtuous itself. This is a refutation of
the other Confucian definition of their absolute,
the 'worthy for esteem'.

Consequently, when the root of nature is applied
to man, one finds that there are deeds that are
unfilial, disorderly, inhumane, and unrighteous. As
the sage Confucius taught people to strive against
these deeds, and as these are what Heaven imparts to
man, does this not indicate that moral teaching
conflicts with Heaven? This is a problem because it
is well known that the Book of Historical Documents
has praised the kingly way; and the Book of Odes has
criticized disorderly politics.

Although Tsung-mi's criticism of the Confucian
concept of Heaven may be overly simple in some
aspects, and some of the questions he raised do have
their answers from the Confucian side, yet the basic
tenets of his criticism are clear. The principal
tenet is this, if Heaven is regarded as the
transcendental absolute, hence the foundation of all
phenomena, then it would be difficult to explain the
evil and cruel actions of the world. This put the
Confucian concept into another dilemma, that if
these phenomena are not imparted by Heaven, Heaven
would not be absolute; if they are imparted by
Heaven, Heaven itself would not be moral. The former
conclusion negates the claim of Heaven as ultimate;
the latter would rule out Heaven as virtuous.

These criticisms lead to other soteriological
questions, that if the Mandate of Heaven exists,
what can man do but wait, unable to attain it by his
own will or cultivation. Moral qualifications
provide a condition for a person to receive the
Mandate of Heaven, yet not every virtuous person
would receive it. Should that be the case, then the
relationship between morality and the mandate
becomes a very tricky business in Buddhist eyes. The
failure of Confucius and some of his most virtuous
disciples reenforced the Buddhist view. When this
problem is looked at from a philosophical angle, the
lack of a causal philosophy in the Confucian theory
of the absolute is a problem. Unless there is a
cause, no evil can be stopped nor can the highest
virtue be attainable. If an absolute remains
uncertain and unattainable, the Buddhist would not
only question the Confucian ontology, but also its
soteriology.

When the shortcomings of the Confucian tradition
were questioned and criticized, Tsung-mi was, of
course, fully aware that the Buddhist philosophy

P500

had its own concept of the absolute. Under the
circumstances, how does the Buddhist concept differ
from the Confucian one, and how did the Buddhist do
away with the difficulty? Tsung-mi explains:

If that be the case, the Buddhist concept of True
Suchness (bhuutatathataa) should also be impermanent
because it is said to be capable of producing all
things. The answer is that it is different, because
[Buddhists regard] Ignorance (avidyaa) as the cause,
from which all defilements were produced;
Enlightenment-cultivation is the cause, from which
all purities were produced. Ignorance like a dream,
is nonexistent once the dreamer is awakened.
Cultivation-realization makes one realize that all
the differences he felt at the awakening are
impermanent. Is not the True Suchness capable of
[direct] producing; the capability of producing has
to follow causal conditions, hence to manifest what
should be manifested. Defilement and purity are
empty from the beginning to the end, the True
Suchness originally unchanging, henceforth, is
permanent.(25)

From this argument, Tsung-mi pointed out that
"since the teaching of Tao has no such explanation,
it is incomparable with this example" (that is,
explanation).(26)

Tsung-mi's criticism of the Confucian concept of
the absolute and its lack of soteriological means
for cultivation is further illustrated by his scheme
of religious cultivation. The "Charter of the
Unenlightened and Enlightened" has clearly shown the
dialectical interactions between absolute and
phenomenal aspects of Mind.(27) There he divided the
spiritual scheme into four positions: the position
of faith, of virtue, of the sage, and the fruit of
enlightenment. These four positions are all
attainable gradually through prescribed
cultivations. As the scheme and its religious
significance have been discussed by others in the
past including me, we shall not repeat it.(28)

To put Tsung-mi's critique of the Confucian
absolute into a historical context, it is the
contention of this article that the critic pushed
the Confucianists into a tight corner, forcing them
to defend their positions by making counterproposals
and actions. Keeping this view in mind, it is no
surprise to find that in comparison with classical
Confucianism the Neo-Confucian development improved
its positions from these two angles, namely a new
cosmology and new formulas for cultivation.

As far as Neo-Confucian cosmology is concerned,
various studies have been published. Although there
are fundamental differences between Neo-Confucianism
and Buddhist/Taoist philosophy as these philosophies
are starting from a different parameter and for a
different purpose, yet there seems no doubt about
Neo-Confucian borrowing and assimilation of ideas
and terminologies from the two schools. Studies on
Neo-Confucian methods of cultivation have been done
here and there, but rarely were they connected to
the Buddhist pressure on this subject. Nevertheless
de Bary saw the Buddhist influence on Neo-Confucian
teachings of self-cultivation when he wrote on Ming
Neo-Confucianism. He says:

P501

Just as Ch'an Buddhism, the dominant form among
intellectuals, was a system of practice rather than
a system of metaphysics, so Neo-Confucianism was, I
believe, unconsciously emulating the spiritual
training and character formation of the Ch'an monk
at his best--but, of course, domesticating and
secularizing it.(29)

It is true that by the seventeenth century, the
Buddhist pressure on Neo-Confucian cultivation
likely became unconscious as the teaching of
self-cultivation was already a long and accepted
practice within the Confucian tradition. But when
one reviews the early development, the Neo-Confucian
practice seems more likely a conscious reaction to
Buddhist pressure rather than an unconscious
emulation.

The Buddhist critique of Confucian philosophy and
practice led Neo-Confucianists to search for their
own identity, source, and inspiration. In the
process of the search, they found some new light
from their classics, especially from those which
were not yet fully noted by them and their
opponents. The well-known classics such as the Book
of Change or the Analects are still important and
influential, but a few other texts emerged into
prominence from their comparatively insignificant
past. The Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean
and the Mencius are the best illustrations of this
Confucian rediscovery.

From the Han period to that of the T'ang
dynasty, both the Great Learning and the Doctrine of
the Mean were chapters of the Book of Rites. The
Book of Rites had the status of ching(ab) (classic
or scripture). It was important only as a manual for
practical reference, and not a philosophical
authority. Taking the Great Learning as an example,
no independent commentary on it has been recorded in
the bibliographical chapters of the Han Shu(ac), the
Sui Shu(ad), nor the Old and New T'ang Shu(ae).
Although there is an independent title on the
Doctrine of the Mean called Chung-yung shuo(af), in
two chapters mentioned in Hou Han Shu(ag), there is
a note added to the title. The note states that
"According to Yen Shih-ku(ah) (581-645), (30) the
chapter of Chung-yung(ai) in the present version of
Li Chi(aj) is not the original text of Li scripture,
but belongs to the class of works under this
title."(31) Two more commentaries on the Doctrine of
the Mean were recorded in the bibliography of Sui
Shu, namely, Chung-yung chuan(ak) and Chung-yung
chiang-shu(al),(32) but their respective authors,
Tai Yu(am) (378-441) and Emperor Wu of the Liang
dynasty (reign 502-549) are known for their Taoist
or Buddhist inclinations.(33) The Mencius was
regarded by the compilers of these bibliographies as
the book of a philosopher (tzu(an)), but not a
scripture or a classic (ching), and hence had no
authority. This situation continued even at the time
when the official histories of the T'ang dynasty
were compiled during the tenth and the eleventh
centuries.

In contrast with the pre-Sung bibliographical
records on these Confucian books, the bibliography
in the History of Sung Dynasty and that of the Ming
dynasty has recorded abundant commentaries on these
works, especially on

P502

the Doctrine of the Mean and the Great Learning. The
Sung Shih(ao) contains twenty-two commentaries on
the Doctrine of the Mean; seven on the Great
Learning, and two more as combined commentaries of
both works.(34) The Ming Shih(ap) had recorded a
more dramatic development on these texts as it gives
a new category, the "Four Books" to the
aforementioned titles along with Confucius' Analects
and Mencius, and places the category under the
section of 'Scripture' (ching).(35) The Ming Shih
also added more titles to the commentaries. It
mentions twenty commentaries on the Four Books,
another seven independent commentaries on the Great
Learning, eight on the Doctrine of the Mean, and
another five combined commentaries on the last two
titles.

Although the Ming Shih is not the work bestowed the
title of the Four Books, it is the first official
history that gave recognition to the Four Books as
'scriptures'. It was Northern Sung Neo-Confucian
thinkers, the Ch'eng(aq) brothers, who "attached so
much importance to the Great Learning and the
Doctrine of the Mean that they took them out of the
Book of Rites, in which they are chapters."(36) It
was Chu Hsi(ar) "who grouped the Great Learning and
the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects and the Book
of Mencius as the Four Books."(37) The new edition
and esteem of these texts has gained more ground
during subsequent centuries, and was ultimately
recognized by the compilers of the Ming Shih.

It may be asked why the Neo-Confucian thinkers
gave so much attention to these less noted works.
The cultivability of sagehood as mentioned in these
texts is certainly one of the central attractions.
To substantiate this point, one can easily point out
the 'eight steps' from the Great Learning,(38) the
opening statement of the Doctrine of the Mean,(39)
and the popularity of these passages among
Neo-Confucianists. The attainability of sagehood as
expounded by Mencius and the practical advice in the
Analects have all focused on the goal which is
achievable through cultivation.

It should be noted that although Neo-Confucianists
did give much importance to the Four Books, their
sources for the revitalization of their tradition
were not limited to the Four Books. Other classics
also provided them with abundant statements to
reinterpret the central concepts of Confucianism.
Taking the concept of 'seriousness' (ching(as)) as
an example, this important concept for
self-cultivation originated in the Book of
Change,(40) but the Neo-Confucian interpretation and
emphasis on it made the idea far different from the
original context.

To recapitulate, this article considers Tsung-mi's
criticism on Confucian concepts of the absolute as
the most pointed attack on the orthodox tradition.
The criticism focuses on the lack of causation in
Confucian and Taoist cosmology and the disregard of
soteriological means in cultivation which made
Confucianism religiously meaningless. It is the
contention of this article that sharp criticism
forced Neo-Confucianists to respond to the critique
by examining their classical sources and offering
reinterpretations of them. The

P503

Neo-Confucianists consequently did improve their
teaching on self-cultivation and reinterpreted their
tenets on cosmology. This period of criticism and
reaction marks one of the most important turning
points in the history of Chinese religion and
philosophy.

NOTES

1. G. E. Sargent, Tchou Hi contre le bouddhisme
(Paris, 1955), 1-10, esp., 9-10, W. T. Chan, A
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press 1963), p. 653.
2. Jan, "Tsung-mi and His Analysis of Ch'an
Buddhism," T'oung Pao LVIII (1972), 1-54. The
most comprehensive study is Shigeo Kamata(at),
Shumitsu Kyogaku no shisoshi teki kenkyu(au)
(Tokyo, 1975).
3. This is quoted from Tsung-mi's letter to his teacher,
Ch'eng-kuan(av) (737-838), in Taisho shinshu daizokyo(aw)
(hereafter cited as T.), no.1795, p.576c.
4. Confer I Ching: Book of Changes, trans. James
legge, ed. C. Chai (New York, 1964), pp. 373.
5. From the Yuan-chueh ching Ta-shu ch'ao(ax)
(hereafter, cited as TSC) in Hsu Tsang-ching(ay)
(Taiwan reprint), vol. 14, p. 352c. Unless it is
noted, the translations of quoted statements are
all mine.
6. Ibid., the quotation from Lao Tzu is found in
chapter 42, W. T. Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (New
York, 1963), p. 176.
7. From TSC, p. 352c-d.
8. Ibid., p. 352d.
9. Ibid.
10. See note 6.
11. See note 6.
12. See note 4.
13. From TSC, p. 353a.
14. Ibid.
15. Chapter XIX, the translation is from B, Watson,
The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu(New York,
1968), p. 198 with minor modifications.
16. Confer ibid., p. 69 and A. C. Graham, The Book
of Lieh Tzu (London, 1960), chapter 1, p. 23.
17. Analects 12: 5. Translation with slight
modification is from W. T. Chan, Source Book, p.
39.
18. Chan's translation ibid., p. 265.
19. TSC, p. 415b.
20. From James Legge's The Chinese Classics
(Hongkong reprint, 1960), III, p. 186.
21. From the Appendix 1, xv: 1-2, James Legge's
translation, I Ching (note 4) p. 226.
22. TSC, p. 416a.
23. From Chan, Source Book, p. 268.
24. Ibid., p. 98.
25. TSC, p. 352-353a.
26. Ibid., p. 353a.
27. The charter is contained in the Ch'an-yuan
chu-ch'uan-chi Tu-hsu(az), T.2015, pp. 410-413;
and has been rendered into English by Alfonso
Verdu, Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought
(Kansas, 1974), pp. 79ff.
28. Confer Jan, "The Chinese Buddhist Wheel of
Existence and Deliverance, " International
Congress of Orientalists, Mexico City
Conference, 1976.

For a more elaborate treatment on Tsung-mi's
criticism, see my "A Buddhist Critique to the
Classical Chinese Philosophy," XIII Congress of the
International Association for the History of
Religions (Lancastep, U.K.), 1975, and forthcoming
in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy.

P504

29. de Bary, "Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the
seventeenth century Enlightenment", in his The
Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism (New York, 1975),
pp. 161-162.
30. Yen was respected as the most eminent and
authoritative classicist of his time. See T'ang
Shu, ch. 73 (Erh-shih-wu shih(ba) ed., Shanghai,
1935. Hereafter cited as ESWS), p. 3325b. Hsin
T'ang-shu,(bb) ch. 198, 4090b. His opinions are
still respected by modern Chinese scholarship.
See Ku Chieh-kang,(bc) ed., Ku-chi k'ao-pien
ts'ung-k'ai(bd) (Shanghai, 1955), p. 14.
31. Han Shu, ch. 30 (ESWS), p. 433b, line 7.
32. Sui Shu, (ESWS), ch. 32, p. 2443b.
33. For Tai, see Sung Shu(be), ch. 93, (ESWS), p.
1644a. For Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty, see
Kennth Ch'en, Buddhism in China (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp.
124ff.
34. Sung Shih, ch. 202 (ESWS), p. 4987b-c.
35. Ming Shih, ch. 96, (ESWS), p. 7309d.
36. From W. T. Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand
(New York, 1967), p. xix.
37. Ibid., p. xxxviii.
38. The Great Learning, chs. 5-10. See W. T. Chan's
Source Book, pp. 89-94.
39. Ibid., p. 98.
40. See Chan, Reflections on Things at Hand, p.
xxiii; for the early reference of the term, see
Chan, Source Book, pp. 264-265.