Two Chinese Philosophers

·期刊原文
Two Chinese Philosophers, By A. C. Graham
Reviewed by Mark Berkson
Philosophy East & West
V. 45 (April 1995)
pp. 292-297
Copyright 1995 by University of Hawaii Press

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A. C. Graham's Two Chinese Philosophers is a lucid and thorough presentation of the thought of two of the most important Neo-Confucian figures, the brothers Ch'eng Yi-ch'uan (Ch'eng Yi, 1033-1107) and Ch'eng Ming-tao (Ch'eng Hao, 1032-1085). Because they can be considered among the earliest Neo-Confucians, and because they had a profound influence on the overall direction of Neo-Confucian philosophy, this book serves as an excellent introduction to Neo-Confucian thought in general.

The Open Court edition is a re-release of A. C. Graham's first book, which was originally presented as a doctoral dissertation to the University of London in 1953 and published in 1958. The new text includes a foreword by Irene Bloom that discusses the importance of this book to the field of Neo-Confucian studies, and a helpful new index compiled by P. J. Ivanhoe and Jon W. Schofer.

The book serves its topic well through its effective organization. It is first divided into two sections, each focusing on the thought of one of the Ch'eng brothers; each section is further subdivided by concept, with Graham providing in-depth discussions of all of the major ideas that the reader must understand in order to become oriented in the Neo-Confucian world. Presenting separate sections on each brother works well, for it illustrates the unique contribution and personality of each without allowing the two to become mixed together (as they sometimes are by those who refer simply to the thought of the "Ch'eng brothers"), and

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allows both the similarities and differences in their positions to emerge. Graham takes Ch'eng Yi as the focus (in the sense that the bulk of the book is devoted to Ch'eng Yi, who acts as the "representative" of the brothers' common positions) and begins the book with a discussion of Ch'eng Yi's thought. Following this discussion, Graham shows how Ch'eng Hao departed from him and provided his own unique vision. It seems as if Graham's sympathy lies more with Ch'eng Yi, and he provides arguments as to why he believes this brother was, in a sense, the better thinker (pp. 20-21). Nevertheless, he does give a powerful and sympathetic account of Ch'eng Hao's position, and his admiration for Ch'eng Hao's contribution is clear.

This method of organization begins by giving the reader a sense of the deep similarities, shared approaches, and common concerns of the brothers, concerns which will run like a unifying strand through the later divisions of Neo-Confucian thought. The separate presentation of Ch'eng Hao throws their differences into sharp relief. In doing this, Graham shows how each brother is related (if not as an "original source," then as a general representative) to the two most important currents of Neo-Confucian philosophy, the so-called "Ch'eng-Chu school" and the "Lu-Wang school" (the latter of which might also have a "Ch'eng" added). The differences in the approaches of the two brothers, Graham argues, prefigures the eventual division of the two major "schools." While sometimes the case is made a little too strongly, his claim is generally convincing.

The further subdivision of these sections into chapters on concepts works extremely well. Instead of trying to introduce the whole array of difficult concepts at once and then weave them through a narrative, Graham provides a thorough discussion of each one, beginning with the most important (li, or principle). Each section is dominated by translated passages, primarily from the works of the Ch'eng brothers themselves, so that the reader can see how the concept is used in a variety of situations. Graham acts as our guide and interpreter through this complicated system of interrelated ideas, but shows excellent judgment by stepping back and letting the thinkers speak for themselves. This gives the reader a sense of the concept that can be more reliable than (and even throw into question) Graham's own interpretation. This approach makes up for the times when Graham would have been better off leaving a term untranslated rather than giving it a potentially confusing or misleading name like "ether" (for ch'i) or "psychic" (for shen). Arguably, each of the eleven key terms in the book could have remained untranslated with no cost to Graham's presentation, but his use of numerous examples from primary texts acts as a good corrective.

As the reader moves from concept to concept, and encounters numerous specific examples, he or she begins to see how all of these

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concepts are tightly interrelated. In the process, an overall picture begins to emerge. It is only after the reader acquires a grasp of this broader, unifying picture that the individual pieces really begin to make sense. I discovered that after finishing the book, I could return to earlier chapters and begin to understand the concepts even more clearly. In a way, this process mirrors the recommended approach to learning of Ch'eng Yi himself: by "investigating" the individual concepts that we encounter (in this case, through learning the text and studying individual examples), we become less obscured and see the broader pattern emerging. Apprehending the whole enables us to understand the interrelationship of all of the parts. It seems as if Graham has taken a page out of the book of the master.

Despite the strengths of the book, there are some problems that run through the text and could confuse or mislead the reader, especially the beginning student of Chinese thought. The first problem comes with Graham's treatment of li. At times, he makes it seem as if there were different individual li for different things, making li sound too much like Platonic forms. He writes, "there are different li wherever there are differences, just as there is the same li wherever there are similarities" (p. 13). But this is not what the Neo-Confucians meant by li. For them, all of the li is present in every single thing; and for this reason, individual things are not merely related, but in a deep sense identical.

Perhaps the reason Graham does not give this reading is that he was, as he himself admits, not well versed in Buddhist thought. The book as a whole suffers because Graham does not connect the Ch'eng brothers'' thought with elements of Buddhism that preceded and influenced it. A greater appreciation of the Buddhist notion of emptiness, as ultimately shaped into the notion of a transpersonal Buddha nature, and the Hua-yen picture of interpenetration (which sees the whole world contained in each one of its elements), would help solve some of the problems. In these schools of Buddhism, since all things just are the intersection of causes and conditions, which constitute their appearance at any given moment, and since these causes and conditions extend infinitely both backward in time and outward in relation, then all things are ultimately the same set of causes and conditions, simply with a different spatio-temporal order and structure to them (this is why some Buddhists say that things are conventionally different but, in the ultimate sense, all identical).

A better understanding of Buddhist metaphysics would have prevented Graham from making the aforementioned errors, as well as those in which he states "there are assumed to be individual as well as general li" (p. 15). It also would have led him away from asking questions like, "IF all principles are complete in each thing, what becomes of the idea that each thing has its own principle?" (p. 57). (He is only able to answer

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this question with a discussion of differences in Chinese and English philosophical terms; in fact, no such problem would have arisen if he had had a correct interpretation from the start. He would have seen that each thing does not, in fact, have its "own principle.") While the Neo-Confucians do not have the notion of karma to explain why things are "conventionally" different, their notion of things having different endowments of ch'i does much of the work. Graham would have made things clearer by alluding to the later discussion of ch'i in the text, for it is extremely difficult for the reader, while reading the earlier chapter on li, to understand why individual things appear to be different. Although, as I mentioned above, the separation of concepts into chapters works very well, there are times when Graham should at least indicate to the reader that the explanation for a phenomenon under discussion lies largely in a concept, such as ch'i, which is discussed later.[1]

The problems with Graham's presentation of Buddhism continue throughout the book. Normally, when Graham presents a position that one of the thinkers holds, he gives a descriptive account, in which he often conveys an appreciation for the depth and power of the idea. When he finds a position problematic, he will follow this account with critical, evaluative comments. In discussions of Buddhism, however, he seems to take the Ch'eng's criticisms of Buddhism at face value, never correcting their erroneous interpretations. This failure on Graham's part could lead the reader who is unacquainted with Buddhism far astray. For example, Graham writes, "Buddhism sought individual salvation by renunciation of the world; this fundamental opposition (with Confucianism) had never been obscured by the long intertraffic in ideas..." (p. 84). If this describes any Buddhist picture, it is one which the Mahaayaana tradition criticizes in what it calls the "Hiinayaana" tradition. Mahaayaana, and certainly schools like Madhyamaka and Hua-yen, are characterized by the Bodhisattva ideal, one in which compassionate involvement in the world, and an acceptance of this "conventional" world as the very same as the ultimate realm, are central themes.

Graham's uncritical acceptance of the Neo-Confucian presentation of Buddhism (unfortunate because the Neo-Confucians themselves did not realize how profoundly influenced by Buddhism they were) leads him to miss the deep similarities between the Bodhisattva ideal and the picture of the perfected Neo-Confucian sage. He contrasts Neo-Confucian practice with Buddhist by writing that only in the case of the former does one discover that the phenomenal world is not illusion and that only within it can we "see principles and act in accordance with them" (p. 84). In fact, this is quite similar to the Buddhist saying from Praj~naapaaramitaa literature that "form is emptiness, emptiness is form," whereby the "ultimate" (emptiness, nirvaa.na, true wisdom) is not to be found "somewhere else," but is found in seeing this world in the right way. The

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enlightened individual discovers not that the world of form (the phenomenal world) is "illusion," but rather that the fact that things are just as they are (i.e., interconnected, lacking independent, inherent nature, composed of transient causes and conditions) is the ultimate reality. (This is not to say that the Neo-Confucian and Buddhist pictures are the same; there are significant differences. It is only to say that the pictures are much closer than Graham makes them out to be. Noting the significant historical and conceptual connections would have helped shed light on the Ch'eng brothers' thought.)

In the entire chapter titled "Criticism of Buddhism," Graham presents a litany of attacks on Buddhism with no clarifying commentary. If Graham had had a deeper appreciation for the Buddhist tradition, he would have realized that a statement he himself makes on behalf of the Neo-Confucian picture--"Besides being selfish, the wish to escape from the world implies an unrealistic refusal to accept the conditions of existence" (p. 86)--could just as easily have been made by a Buddhist like Vimalakiirti. A better understanding of Buddhism would have especially helped Graham out in his discussion of Ch'eng Hao, because Ch'eng Hao's ideas that "we are aware of ... our unity with others ... we are one 'body' with all things" and that we share suffering with others, and his emphasis on "stillness" or "calmness," all owe a great debt to Mahaayaana schools such as Hua-yen and Ch'an. Also, Graham's discussion of spontaneity (p. 102) and the use of metaphors like that of the mirror and water (p. 105) should have included a recognition of the influence that Chuang Tzu and the Chinese Buddhist tradition (which was itself influenced by Chuang Tzu) had on these ideas. In general, while Graham is very successful in locating the Ch'eng brothers within the Neo-Confucian tradition, he does not always effectively bring in other parts of the Chinese tradition that would have helped shed light on and give broader perspective to the Ch'eng brothers' thought.

The other sections of the book, particularly the discussions of ch'i and ke-wu, are overall very solid. Graham is only occasionally hindered by an unfortunate translation of terms that leads him into difficulty. For example, his translation of ch'ing as "passion" (p. 51), rather than "emotion," is misleading given the modern connotations of that word (it makes more sense if one takes it in its medieval sense, which may have been Graham's approach, although it is never made clear to the reader). He also uses misleading English categories to discuss Chinese ideas, a move which often distorts or confuses the argument. Examples include his use of the dichotomy of "good" and "evil," the latter of which connotes an active force, rather than the sense of disharmony or being unnatural, which is what the Ch'engs are referring to; and the dichotomy of "monism" and "dualism," the latter of which may be interpreted

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morally, bringing up unfortunate associations with systems of thought like Manicheanism.

Despite these shortcomings, Graham's book is one of the best available works both on the Ch'eng brothers in particular and on Neo-Confucian thought in general. He succeeds not only in presenting their picture and demonstrating their influence on other thinkers, but also in conveying why this picture was so compelling as to shape the direction of Neo-Confucian thought up to the present day.

In Two Chinese Philosophers, his first book, A. C. Graham already showed the intellectual rigor and insight that were to characterize him throughout his career as one of the most important twentieth-century Sinologists and contributors to the field of Chinese philosophy. This new edition of Graham's work will ensure that his contributions continue to reach the wide audience that they deserve. The student of Neo-Confucian thought should begin where Graham began: with this indispensable volume on the thinkers and ideas that shaped the tradition.

Notes

1 - Another problem with Graham's discussion of li is his presentation of what appear to be two kinds of li, one of which he capitalizes and one of which he does not (see p. 29). Graham's analysis of li as determining both the possibilities in the world and the best way to be sometimes becomes confused. He would have been better off stating that there is one li that sets out the way everything is, and this both makes some things impossible (e.g., I cannot fly From my apartment to campus) and makes some things better, in the sense of according with the way the "lines" of li are laid out (e.g., if I want to go to campus, it is better for me to take the direct route rather than one that goes far out of the way and then circles back). By speaking of "li" and "Li," Graham is confusing the matter.