Vasubandhus Treatise on the Three Natures translated from

·期刊原文
Vasubandhu's 'Treatise on the Three Natures' translated from
the Tibetan edition with a commentary
by Garfield, Jay L.
Asian Philosophy

Vol.6 No.2
July 1997
Pp.133-154
COPYRIGHT 1997 Journals Oxford Ltd. (UK)

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1. Introduction
The present text Trisvabhavanirdesac (Rang bzhin gsum nges par bstan
pa) is one
of Vasubandhu's short treatises (the others being the Treatise in
Twenty Stanzas
[Vimsatika] and the Treatise in Thirty Stanzas [Trimsatika])
expounding his
cittamatra,
or mind-only philosophy. Vasubandhu and his older brother Asanga are
regarded
as the
Fourth or Fifth century CE as the major philosophical rival within
the Mahayana
Buddhist tradition to the older Madhyamaka tradition. The latter
school,
founded by
Nagarjuna, urges the emptiness -- the lack of essence or
substantial,
independent
reality -- of all things, including both external phenomena and
mind.(2)
Vasubandhu,
however, reinterprets the emptiness of the object as being its lack
of external
reality, and
its purely mind-dependent, or ideal status.(3) At the same time,
however, he
argues that the foundational mind is non-empty since it truly exists
as the
substratum of the
apparent reality represented in our experience. The position is
hence akin to
the idealisms defended by such Western philosophers as Berkeley,
Kant and
Schopenhauer.(4)
While Trisvabhavanirdesa is arguably the most philosophically
detailed and
comprehensive of the three short works on this topic composed by
Vasubandhu, as
well as
the clearest, it is almost never read or taught in contemporary
traditional
Buddhist
cultures or centres of learning. The reason for this is simple: this
is the
only one of
Vasubandhu's root texts for which no auto-commentary exists.(5) For
this
reason,
none of Vasubandhu's students composed commentaries on the text and
there is
hence
no recognized lineage of transmission for the text. So nobody within
the
Tibetan
tradition (the only extant Mahayana monastic scholarly tradition)
could
consider
him/herself authorized to teach the text. So it is simply not
studied. This is
a great pity.
It is a beautiful and deep philosophical essay and an unparalleled
introduction
to the
cittamatra system.
The text introduces the fundamental doctrine of Buddhist idealism,
and
clarifies in
remarkably short compass its relations to the other principal
doctrines of that
school -- that all external appearances are merely ideal and
originate from
potentials for
experience carried in the mind. The central topic of the text is the
exposition
of how this view
entails the cittamatra theory of the three natures -- the view that
every
object of
experience is characterized by three distinct but interdependent
natures.
Vasubandhu's
idealism is distinctive in its insistence that a coherent idealism
requires the
positing of
these three natures, and in its subtle analysis of the complex
relations
between the
natures themselves, involving the thesis of their surface diversity
but deep
unity.(6)
This text also presents a creative union of ontology and
phenomenology.
Vasubandhu's characterization of the status of the objects of
experience is at
the same
time self-consciously a characterization of the character of
subjectivity
itself. Not only
will Vasubandhu argue that we can only make sense of objects if we
ascribe to
them
these three triune natures, but he will argue that a complete
account of
experience -- especially of the experience of a sophisticated and
accomplished
philosopher or
meditator -- requires an account of three distinct kinds of
subjectivity, which
are related to
one another as are the three natures themselves. This phenomenology
is crucial
to the
soteriological purport of the system. For this is not speculative
philosophy
for its own
sake, but a philosophical system designed to guide a practitioner to
buddhahood
in order that s/he can work to alleviate the suffering of all
sentient beings.
Trisvabhavanirdesa is unique in its exposition of idealism as
involving the
doctrine of
the three natures, in its detailed analysis of the natures
themselves and in
its exploration
of their relations to one another. In Vimsatika-karika Vasubandhu
clearly
defends
idealism against a series of objections, but does not explicitly
articulate the
roles of the
three natures in his idealistic theory or expound its structure. In
Trimsika-karika
Vasubandhu explores the relation between the three natures and the
three
naturelessnesses (naturelessness with respect to characteristic
[laksana-nihsvabhavata, mtshan
nyid ngo bo nyid med], naturelessness with respect to production
[utpatti-nihsvabhavata,
skye ba ngo bo niyd med] and ultimate naturelessness
[paramartha-nihsvabhavata,
don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid med]) adumbrated in the
Samdhinirmocana-sutra, but does
not explore their relation to idealism, per se, or their relations
to one
another. It is only in
the present text that he explicitly analyses idealism as implicating
the three
natures, and
explains in detail how they are interconnected.
Sthiramati, in his commentary on Trimsika-karika, argues that the
three
natures and three naturelessnesses are equivalent. His understanding
of the
three natures
as equivalent to the three naturelessnessess of the
Samdhinirmocana-sutra is
adopted
uncritically by such Tibetan doxographers as Tsong Khapa(7) and
mKhas grub.(8)
The adoption of this commentarial tradition, which emphasises the
homogeneity
of the Samdhinirmocana-sutra with Vasubandhu's and Asanga's thought,
along with
the exposition of the three natures as presented in Trimsatika and
Vimsatika
reinforces the
elision of this more mature and explicit articulation of
Vasubandhu's theory
from subsequent developments of Yogacara. The emphasis of the
dominant
Madhyamaka school on naturelessness as a fundamental metaphysical
tenet, and
its need to see Yogacara as the penultimate step to its own
standpoint lends
further impetus to this tendency to assimilate these two doctrines.
Of all of
the Madhyamika, only Candrakirti
really takes the trisvabhava doctrine itself seriously as a target
for critique
(dBu ma la jugs pa/Madhyamakavatara).(10)
The thirty-eight verses of the text divide neatly into six sections.
In the
first six verses
Vasubandhu introduces the three natures and provides a preliminary
characterization
of each. In verses 7-9 he sketches two schemata for thinking about
the
character of
mind from the standpoint of three nature theory. Verses 10-21
develop a
dialectically
complex and elegant discussion of how to view the polar pairs of
existence/non-existence, duality/unity and affliction/non-affliction
in
relation to each of the three
natures, culminating in a discussion of the senses in which the
natures are
identical to
one another and the senses in which they are different. Verses 22-25
present
the natures hierarchically from the standpoint of pedagogy and
soteriology.
Vasubandhu
presents the famous simile of the hallucinatory elephant conjured by
the stage
magician
in verses 26-34. This is probably the most famous and oft-cited
moment in this
text.
In a vivid and simple image Vasubandhu presents a way of
understanding the
three
natures, their relation to one another, to idealism, and of the
phenomenology
they
suggest to Buddhist soteriology. The concluding four verses are
devoted to the
soteriological implications of the text.
Trisvabhavanirdesa is not only a philosophically subtle text. It is
also a
considerable
literary and poetic achievement. (Much of the elegance of
Vasubandhu's
Sanskrit is preserved in the Tibetan translation. I have found it
difficult
to produce a translation
that does proper justice to the poetic value of the text while
remaining
faithful to the
philosophical ideas and rhetorical structure.) The doctrine it
expounds is
packed with
dynamic tension born of constantly impending paradox and of the need

continuously
to balance several levels of discourse. The poetic text that
develops this
doctrine mirrors
that tension in its constant shifting of level; in its frequent
double entendre
allowing
claims to be made at two or more levels simultaneously; and in its
multi-leveled
discourse in which claims that appear contradictory are reconcile,
albeit
often in startling and revealing ways. The poem is full of
unexpected
rhetorical and philosophical turns, and is structured so as to
reflect the
ontological and phenomenological
theory it articulates. The language is as spare and vibrant as the
radiant
mind-only
ontology it presents.
2. The Text of Trisvabhavanirdesa(11)
1. The imagined, the other-dependent and
The consummate.
These are the three natures
Which should be deeply understood.
2. Arising through dependence on conditions and
Existing through being imagined,
It is therefore called other-dependent
And is said to be merely imaginary.
3. The external non-existence
Of what appears in the way it appears,
Since it is never otherwise,
Is known as the nature of the consummate.
4. If anything appears, it is imagined.
The way it appears is as duality.
What is the consequence of its non-existence?
The fact of non-duality!
5. What is the imagination of the non-existent?
Since what is imagined absolutely never
Exists in the way it is imagined,
It is mind that constructs that illusion.
6. Because it is a cause and an effect,
The mind has two aspects.
As the foundation consciousness it creates thought;
Known as the emerged consciousness it has seven aspects.
7. The first, because it collects the seeds
Of suffering is called `mind'.
The second, because of the constant emergence
Of the various aspects of things is so called.
8. One should think of the illusory non-existent
As threefold:
Completely ripened, grasped as other,
And as appearance.
9. The first, because it itself ripens,
Is the root consciousness.
The others are emergent consciousness,
Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen.
10. Existence and non-existence, duality and unity;
Freedom from affliction and afflicted;
Through characteristics, and through distinctions,
These natures are known to be profound.
11. Since it appears as existent
Though it is non-existent,
The imagined nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
12. Since it exists as an illusory entity
And is non-existent in the way it appears
The other-dependent nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
13. Since it is the non-existence of duality
And exists as non-duality
The consummate nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
14. Moreover, since as imagined there are two aspects,
But existence and non-existence are unitary,
The nature imagined by the ignorant
Is said to be both dual and unitary.
15. Since as an object of thought it is dual,
But as a mere appearance it is unitary,
The other-dependent nature
Is said to be both dual and unitary.
16. Since it is the essence of dual entities
And is a unitary non-duality,
The consummate nature
Is said to be both dual and unitary.
17. The imagined and the other-dependent
Are said to be characterized by misery (due to ignorant craving).
The consummate is free of
The characteristic of desire.
18. Since the former has the nature of a false duality
And the latter is the non-existence of that nature,
The imagined and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
19. Since the former has the nature of non-duality,
And the latter has the nature of non-existent duality,
The consummate and the imagined
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
20. Since the former is deceptive in the way it appears,
And the latter has the nature of its not being that way,
The other-dependent and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
21. Since the former has the nature of a non-existent duality,
And the latter is its non-existence in the way it appears,
The other-dependent and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
22. But conventionally,
The natures are explained in order and
Based on that one enters them
In a particular order, it is said.
23. The imagined is entirely conventional.
The other-dependent is attached to convention.
The consummate, cutting convention,
Is said to be of a different nature.
24. Having first entered into the non-existence of duality
Which is the dependent, one understands
The non-existent duality
Which is the imagined.
25. Then one enters the consummate.
Its nature is the non-existence of duality.
Therefore it is explained
To be both existent and non-existent.
26. These three natures
Have the characteristics of being non-cognizable and non-dual.
One is completely non-existent; the second is therefore
non-existent.
The third has the nature of that non-existence.
27. Like an elephant that appears
Through the power of a magician's mantra --
Only the percept appears,
The elephant is completely non-existent.
28. The imagined nature is the elephant;
The other-dependent nature is the visual percept;
The non-existence of the elephant therein
Is explained to be the consummate.
29. Through the root consciousness
The nonexistent duality appears.
But since the duality is completely non-existent,
There is only a percept.
30. The root consciousness is like the mantra.
Reality can be compared to the wood.
Imagination is like the perception of the elephant.
Duality can be seen as the elephant.
31. When one understands how things are,
Perfect knowledge, abandonment,
And accomplishment --
These three characteristics are simultaneously achieved.
32. Knowledge is non-perception;
Abandonment is non-appearance;
Attainment is accomplished through non-dual perception.
That is direct manifestation.
33. Through the non-perception of the elephant,
The vanishing of its percept occurs;
And so does the perception of the piece of wood.
This is how it is in the magic show.
34. In the same way through the non-perception of duality
There is the vanishing of duality.
When it vanishes completely,
Non-dual awareness arises.
35. Through perceiving correctly,
Through seeing the non-referentiality of mental states,
Through following the three wisdoms,
One will effortlessly attain liberation.
36. Through the perception of mind-only
One achieves the non-perception of objects;
Through the non-perception of objects
There is also the non-perception of mind.
37. Through the non-duality of perception,
Arises the perception of the fundamental nature of reality.
Through the perception of the fundamental nature of reality
Arises the perception of the radiant.
38. Through the perception of the radiant,
And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies,
And through possessing bodhi:
Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him/herself and others.
3. The Text With Commentary
1. The imagined, the other-dependent and
The consummate.
These are the three natures.
Which should be deeply understood.
Every phenomenon, according to cittamatra metaphysics has all three
of these
natures -- three ways of being. It is not the case that some have
one nature
and some have
others; nor that phenomena appear to have one or another of the
three, but in
fact have
another. The three are necessarily copresent in every phenomenon,
and are,
though
distinct, mutually implicative.
Let us pause for a moment over the three terms themselves, whose
translation into
English is no straightforward matter. Each is a nature (Tib: rang
bzhin, Skt:
svabhava). So each is part of what it is to be a thing -- not an
accidental
attribute that a
thing might have. But each of the three qualifiers added to this
term to
denote one
of the three natures creates a subtly ambiguous compound, and plays
on this
ambiguity form part of the structure of Vasubandhu's ingenious verse
treatise.
On the
one hand, each characterizes the nature itself -- part of what it is
to be a
phenomenon.
On the other hand, each characterizes the relation of the subject to
the
phenomenon,
or the character of the subjectivity that constitutes the
representation of the
phenomenon. This duality is not surprising, for this is an
idealistic
treatise. As far as
Vasubandhu is concerned, what it is to be a phenomenon is to be an
object of a
mind,
and this treatise is an exploration of what it is to be an object so

conceived. So
questions about subjectivity and questions concerning the ontology
of the
object are
closely intertwined.
"Imagined" translates the Tibetan brtags or Sanskrit parikalpita.
The terms
connote
construction by the mind, more than they do non-existence -- more
akin to
hallucination than fiction. But this simile can be misleading. To be
imagined
in this senses is not
to be hallucinatory as opposed to being real -- it is to be
constructed as the
object that
it is by the operation of the mind. "Other-dependent" translates
gzhan gyi
dbang or
paratantra. Something that is other-dependent in this sense exists
only in and
through
dependence on another thing. In this case, the emphasis will be that
phenomena
exist
in dependence upon the mind and its process.(12)
I use "consummate" to translate yongs su grub pa or parinispanna.
This is
the most
difficult of these three terms to translate. Others have used
"perfect",
"perfected",
"thoroughly established", "thoroughly existent", "completed" and
"ultimate".(13)
Each of these choices has merit, and the variety of options
illustrates the
range of
associations the term has in Tibetan or Sanskrit. When affixed to
"nature" it
connotes
on the objective side the nature an object has when it is thoroughly

understood. On the
subjective side, it connotes the nature apparent to one who is fully

accomplished
intellectually and meditatively. It represents the highest and most
complete
understanding of a phenomenon. It is important, however, not to
misinterpret
this term to connote
the real nature as opposed to the unreal natures denoted by the
terms
"imaginary" and
"other-dependent", or the ultimate, as opposed to the conventional
nature of
things.
Ultimately, all phenomena have all three natures. Each is real; each
must be
understood
in order to understand the nature of things; each subjective
relation to
things is present
in a full understanding of a phenomenon.(14)
2. Arising through dependence on conditions and
Existing through being imagined,
It is therefore called other-dependent
And is said to be merely imaginary.
Vasubandhu begins by sketching in the second and third verses the
outlines of
the
relation between the three natures. In the second verse he focuses
on the
relation
between the first two. Any phenomenon comes into existence in
dependence upon
various causes and conditions. But Vasubandhu here calls attention
to a special
dimension of this dependence. For anything to exist as an object,
its objective
existence
is dependent upon mental causes and conditions. This is a
straightforwardly
Kantian
point -- that there are conditions on the side of the subject that
make it
possible for
anything to exist as an object.
But whatever is so dependent, and hence, when seen from this
standpoint, the
content of a mental act, is nonetheless represented as an
independent existent.
Let us
consider for example my perceptual representation of the screen on
which these
words appear as I type. I see it not as my representation, but
rather as
something that
exists independent of, external to, and standing against my mind and
perceptual
faculties. No matter how thoroughgoing an idealist I may be in my
philosophical
moods, ordinary perception delivers me not imaginary objects seen as
imaginary,
but
rather objects seen as external. But they do not, from this
philosophical
standpoint,
exist in that way. In fact they are merely dependent on and,
transcendentally,
internal
to, my mind. For this reason we can say that the content of my
mental acts,
seen as
content, is other-dependent, in virtue of its dependence on my mind,
but seen
as it is
experienced, it is imaginary, since considered in the way it appears
to exist,
it is in fact
non-existent.
3. The external non-existence
Of what appears in the way it appears,
Since it is never otherwise,
Is know as the nature of the consummate.
The third verse emphasizes this last point and uses it to connect
these first
two
natures to the consummate nature: things appear to us as
independently
existent.
They do so in virtue of their dependence upon other such things and
upon our
minds
(which -- in an important sense to be discussed later -- do share
these three
natures).
But the fact is that given their actual mind-dependent status, of
which we can
be aware through careful philosophical reflection or through
extensive
meditative accomplishment, we can say that these apparent
things -- independently existent computers, camels and coffee cups
-- are always
non-existent. What exists in their place
are states of mind masquerading as independent phenomena. That
non-existence -- the non existence of the apparent reality -- is the
consummate
nature that all
phenomena have.
The next two verses examine two consequences of this negative
characterisation of
the consummate nature: the co-existence of subject-object duality in
the first
two natures with non-duality in the consummate, and the
mind-dependence of the
imagined nature:
4. If anything appears, it is imagined.
The way it appears is as duality.
What is the consequence of its non-existence?
The fact of non-duality!
Whatever appears to us as an object, we have seen, does so in its
imagined
nature. In
any such appearance, the fact that the object is presented to us as
independent
entails
the fact that it is presented as wholly other than the mind that
apprehends it.
This is
the point that Kant makes against Berkeley when he urges in the
Refutation of
Idealism
that even though in a transcendental sense all appearances are in
us, in an
empirical
sense, for anything to appear to us in space, it appears to us as
outside
us.(15)
Schopenhauer hones this point and wields it against Kant himself
when he points
out
that any account of the genesis of representation that harmonizes
with a
coherent
transcendental idealist account of the ontology of representation
must grant
phenomena a genuine independent empirical reality in order to
account for their
causal
impact upon us that is responsible for our cognitive apprehension of
them.(16)
But,
he argues, such an idealism must also grant them a status as mere
representations
when we consider them as they appear to us. Interestingly, this
point is made
on the
way to an account of a third nature of which Schopenhauer(17)
charges Kant of
being unaware -- their status as noumena, or will, in which all
subject-object
duality
disappears.(18)
5. What is the imagination of the non-existent?
Since what is imagined absolutely never
Exists in the way it is imagined,
It is mind that constructs that illusion.
Vasubandhu here simply repeats the tight connection between the
account
offered of
the status of phenomena as imagined and their mind-dependence. Since
the
imagined
nature is in fact totally imaginary, it does not arise from the side
of the
thing which
appears. Rather it is an artifact of the operation of the mind.
The next four verses sketch two alternative ways of presenting the
nature of
mind in
Vasubandhu's idealistic system. In verses 6 and 7 he presents a
division that
distinguishes the mind in its role as subject from the mind in its
role as
object:
6. Because it is a cause and an effect,
The mind has two aspects.
As the foundation consciousness it creates thought;
Known as the emerged consciousness it has seven aspects.
Vasubandhu, in another move prescient of Kant,(19) distinguishes the
mind in
its role
as transcendental subject from its role as object, as it appears to
itself. In
the first aspect,
to which Vasubandhu refers as the "foundation consciousness", (Tib:
kun gzhi,
Skt:
alaya-vijnana) the mind functions as the condition of the appearance
of
phenomena,
and hence as the ground of the possibility of the imagined and
other-dependent
natures. But in its second aspect -- the "emerged consciousness"
(Tib: `jug pa,
Skt:
pavrttivijnana) -- the mind exists as the object of introspection,
and is
conditioned both
by external phenomena that appear in perception and by its own
phenomena. Hence
it
constantly evolves, and emerges in new states as a consequence of
experience.
The
"seven aspects" to which Vasubandhu alludes are the five sensory
consciousnesses, the
introspective consciousness apprehending the self as object, and the
reflective
consciousness of the transcendental subject of experience. These
aspects are
hence
distinguished by their proper objects or spheres of operation.
7. The first, because it collects the seeds
Of suffering is called "mind".
The second, because of the constant emergence
Of the various aspects of things is so called.
Vasubandhu is making a tendentious etymological claim about the
Sanskrit term
translated here as "mind", citta. On one etymology, he claims, the
term is
derived from
cita, which means piled up or accumulated. Hence, he argues, "mind"
can be
thought of
as indicating a storehouse of seeds of experience or mental
potentials. In this
sense the
mind can be thought of as the location of the seeds of future
experiences. The
second
etymology, Vasubandhu contends, connects citta to the Sanskrit term
citra
meaning
various or manifold. This suggests the role of mind as a constantly
emerging
developing
phenomenon. Hence, Vasubandhu suggests, the very etymology of the
term connotes
its two parallel roles.(20)
The next two verses develop a three-fold account of the aspectual
character
of mind.
These are not intended as competitors to one another, but rather as
alternate,
compossible, ways to understand the multiple roles played by mind in

experience.
8. One should think of the illusory non-existent
As threefold:
Completely ripened, grasped as other,
And as appearance.
Here Vasubandhu notes three prima facie characteristics of the mind
in our
experience,
all on the side of its role as object of inner sense. First, insofar
as mind is
an object, and
hence an empirical phenomenon, it is a ripened potential -- the
fruit of a seed
of experience heretofore dormant in the foundation consciousness.
Secondly, and
perhaps
most paradoxically, since it appears as an object, it appears as
other than the
self to
which it appears. Here Vasubandhu is calling attention to the fact
that even in
apperception there is a duality between subject and object; a self
that appears
to us
appears as distinct from the ego to which it appears. Finally, the
self is an
appearance -- not a continuing, stable or independent phenomenon,
but rather as
a series of moments
of awareness, each an evanescent ripening of a potential for
consciousness, and
so like
all external objects, its apparent unity is a matter of
construction, not of
discovery in
some independently given noumenon.(21)
9. The first, because it itself ripens,
Is the root consciousness.
The others are emergent consciousness,
Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen.
Nonetheless, Vasubandhu argues, the first of these three aspects has
a
particular
connection to the subject side of the self, as per the first
division, while
the second and
third aspects of this threefold division are better aligned with the
second
side of the first
division. The root (Tib: rtsa ba, Skt: mula), consciousness (the
same as the
foundation
consciousness) is not only the subject of all experience, it is also
the
repository of all of
the latencies, or potentials -- more often called the "seeds" --
which, when
actualized, or
"ripened" become actual phenomena -- objects of experience. On the
other hand,
when
the self is represented as an object of experience in introspection,
it stands
over and
against the root consciousness of which it is an object. It is hence
in this
sense emergent
from the root consciousness and is "grasped as other than the self".
Finally in
being so
grasped, it is grasped as a series of evanescent moments of
experience. These
latter two
aspects hence emerge as aspects of the self considered as object;
the first as
an aspect
of self considered as subject, or as storehouse of latencies.
The next eleven verses develop a delicate and logically acrobatic
dialectic
concerning
the interplay of three pairs of contradictories and their relation
to the three
natures:
existence and non-existence; duality and unity; freedom from
afflictions and
affliction.
Vasubandhu will argue that each of the three natures is
characterised by both
members
of each of these contraries. He then argues that these natures are
each both
identical to
and distinct from one another. While it might be tempting and facile
to think
that here
Vasubandhu is simply trading in paradox or irony this would be a
mistake. This
important section of the treatise is centrally concerned with the
alternation
in voices
and perspectives represented by the three natures. They have a
phenomenological
side
to them, representing not only the tripartite ontological dimension
Vasubandhu sees in
all phenomena, but also the three phenomenological perspectives that
together
constitute the complex subjectivity Vasubandhu envisions.
10. Existence and non-existence, duality and unity;
Freedom from affliction and afflicted;
Through characteristics, and through distinctions,
These natures are known to be profound.
"Existence" and "non-existence" are understood here in a perfectly
ordinary
sense,
though of course a sense ordinary within the framework of idealism
generally.
Given
this context, of course, it will always be possible to ask about the
standpoint
from which
an assertion regarding existence is made. Is it from the standpoint
of
subjectivity -- that
is, an empirical, objective claim? Or is it from a transcendental
standpoint?
Moreover,
we can always ask whether when a thing is asserted to exist we mean
that it
exists in the
way in which it is apprehended, or whether it exists simpliciter.
So, for
instance, if I ask
whether the "water" I see on a hot highway on a December day exists,
one must
be careful: the mirage exists, no water does. The percept to which I
refer as
"water" exists,
but not in the manner in which it is apprehended. (And, of course,
if I am an
idealist,
from a transcendental perspective neither the water nor the mirage
can be said
to exist at all. Both are merely appearances.)
The duality/unity pair concerns subject/object duality. To assert
that
there is, from a
specific standpoint, a duality in this sense is to assert that from
that
standpoint there is
a real distinction between subject and object. To assert a unity or
a
non-duality is to
deny such a duality. The important thing to bear in mind regarding
this pair
as one
approaches Vasubandhu is that questions about duality and
non-duality can
always be
posed in both a metaphysical and a phenomenological voice. So, we
can ask of
each of
the natures in what sense it implicates such a duality as part of
the structure
of the
object of experience. But we can also ask the question regarding the
nature of
the
corresponding aspect of subjectivity itself. So in each case we can
ask
whether, or in
what sense, in a subject considering things as other-dependent, etc.
there is
such a duality,
as well as asking whether, or in what sense, each nature implicates
such a
duality in the
structure of the object.
The third pair -- affliction/freedom from affliction -- introduces
specifically Buddhist
soteriological concerns. Again, the concerns in play are both
ontological and
phenomenological. The afflictions are those associated with the
suffering of
samsara or
cyclic existence. Those include not only physical and psychological
suffering
themselves
but also the craving and grasping which are their proximal causes
and, most
importantly in this context, the primal ignorance regarding the
nature of
things that takes the
phenomena of experience and the self to be inherently, or
substantially
existent, as
opposed to being empty of substance. So we can say either that a
mind
apprehending
an object is afflicted in virtue of regarding that object as
inherently
existent or that the
object as perceived is an afflicted object. In the latter case we
are saying
that the object
itself in virtue of one or more of its natures is constituted in a
manner
essentially
implicating the afflictions. (22) Vasubandhu begins by arguing that
the
imagined nature
involves both existence and non-existence.
11. Since it appears as existent
Though it is non-existent,
The imagined nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
Let us work through these verses with an ordinary example in mind.
Let us
consider
a teacup on your desk. Consider its imagined nature. As imagined, it
is an
existent -- indeed independently, substantially existent -- teacup
entirely
distinct from and
independent from your mind and mental processes. It endures through
time, and
has a
nature all its own. Hence existence, in a very strong sense, is part
of its
imagined nature.
On the other hand, when we move up one level in the dialectic, and
see that
this is
merely an imagined nature -- merely the way the cup appears to a
consciousness,
we see
that the cup that so appears -- the imagined cup itself -- does not
exist at
all, just as no
water exists in the mirage. In this sense, the very fact that the
cup-as-imagined is only
imagined means that though it is imagined as existent, in fact it is

non-existent. Insofar as
we simply imagine the cup, we imagine an existent cup. Insofar as we
become
reflexively aware of that act of imagination, the cup we imagine
disappears.
12. Since it exists as an illusory entity
And is non-existent in the way it appears
The other-dependent nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
Now, consider the same teacup from the standpoint of its
other-dependent
nature:
from this standpoint, the cup exists as an entity dependent upon the
mind. The
cup
so-considered certainly exists: it exists as a mental phenomenon --
as a
representation.
On the other hand, we can ask what the objective character(23) of
that
representation
is. Then the answer is simple, and takes us back to the imagined
nature: the
cup
considered objectively is the old, real, independent cup, which,
when we
understand it
from the standpoint of the dependent nature, does not exist at all,
just in
virtue of the
fact that from this standpoint it is dependent. So, from the
perspective of the
dependent
nature, the cup -- the dependent mental phenomenon we mistake for a
real
cup -- like
the refraction pattern we mistake for water -- exists. But that
putative real
cup which is the content of that mental episode does not.
13. Since it is the non-existence of duality
And exists as non-duality
The consummate nature
Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
Now we come to the consummate nature of our cup. The cup we have
been
considering all along whether from the standpoint of the imagined or
the
dependent nature, is, in an important and common sense, dual in
nature. In its
imagined nature it is an independent object of mind, and so is
distinct from the
subject which apprehends it. But in its dependent nature, as an
episode of mind,
it is still, as a mere episode or mental act, distinct from the mind
which is
its agent or subject. In the consummate nature, this duality
vanishes. For the
consummate nature of the cup is the very fact of its illusory status
-- that it
is nothing other than aspect of mind. Hence the apparent, dual, cup
is, in its
consummate nature (or, equivalently -- from the point of view of one
of
consummate attainment) utterly non-existence. But that non-duality
really exists
That is the final nature of the cup.(24) And in this sense, the
consummate
nature embraces both existence and non-existence -- the
non-existence of the cup
as dual is its true existence as non-dually related to the mind
apprehending it.
This consideration of duality and non-duality as the mediators of
existence and
non-existence in the consummate forms the bridge to the
consideration of duality
and non-duality per se in the three natures.
14. Moreover, since as imagined there are two aspects,
But existence and non-existence are unitary,
The nature imagined by the ignorant
Is said to the both dual and unitary.
For a thing to exist as imagined, and for it not to exist in the way
it appears,
are both diametrically opposed and identical, depending on how one
conceives
them. For on the one hand, they represent existence and
non-existence, the most
opposed of properties. In that sense, the imagined nature is
thoroughly dual,
encompassing both of these in virtue of the more fundamental
subject-object
duality it represents. That more fundamental duality gives rise both
to the
imagined existence of the object experience, and, when seen for what
it is -- a
mere illusion, the non-existence of that object in the way that it
appears. On
the other hand, to exist as imagined just is not to exist in the way
a thing
appears. In this sense the mode of existence and the mode of
non-existence
of the imagined nature -- of a thing as it is imagined -- are the
same, and are
non-dually related. And this non-duality is rooted in the more
fundamental
non-duality that emerges when we see from a higher standpoint that a
thing as
imagined is merely mental, and hence not distinct from mind. Hence
the imagined
nature is both dual and
unitary, depending on how it is conceived. And the object as
imagined is
experienced dually in a non-reflective consciousness, but non-dually
by more
accomplished consciousness reflecting on that experience.
15. Since as an object of thought it is dual,
But as a mere appearance it is unitary,
The other-dependent nature
Is said to be both dual unitary.
We can say pretty much the same thing about the other-dependent
nature. A
phenomenon understood as other-dependent is both dependent upon the
mind that
represents it and is also a mere appearance of, an content of, that
consciousness In that sense the object is no different from that
consciousness. Hence this nature, too, is both dual and unitary,
depending on
how it is conceived.
16. Since it is the essence of dual entities
And is unitary non-duality,
The consummate nature
Is said to be both dual and unitary.
The unity of duality and non-duality is perhaps a bit less
compelling in the
consummate nature, For the consummate nature is virtually defined by
its
non-duality and by the fact that from its perspective all duality is
erased.
But Vasubandhu is concerned to argue that it, too, in a sense,
participates in
duality, and this for two reasons. The first, and least interesting,
is his
obvious drive for poetic symmetry in the exposition. The second
reason is a bit
more philosophically interesting: the pair duality/unity is itself a
duality and
so should, from the standpoint of the consummate, be overcome. So to
say that
the consummate nature is non-dual, or unitary as opposed to being
dual would be
self defeating. So Vasubandhu needs to achieve a kind of sublation
of duality
and non duality in the consummate. And he achieves this by noting
that while the
consummate nature itself may be non-dual, it is nonetheless the
nature of dual
entities -- entities that appear in their imagined nature, in virtue
of their
other-dependent nature. Inasmuch as it is nature of dual entities,
then, the
consummate nature can be said to be dual.
17. The imagined and the other-dependent
Are said to be characterized by misery (due to ignorant carving).
The consummate is free of
The characteristic of desire.
This verse introduces the discussion in 17-21 of the sense in which
the three
natures are identical to one another despite their apparent
differences in
characteristic. Vasubandhu begins by emphasizing the prima facie
ontological
and ontological and soteriological gulf separating the imagined and
the
other-dependent from the consummate: the former are on the side of
samsara;
the latter is on the side of nirvana. The former two represent the
aspects of
phenomena apparent to a mind beset by primal ignorance, and hence by
the
suffering it engenders; therefore also the aspects responsible for
the
perpetuation of that ignorance and craving on the vicious circle of
ignorance,
grasping and suffering that constitutes cylic existence. The third,
on the other
hand, represents that aspect of phenomena apparent to a mind that
has
transcended all of that, and the aspect that conduces to the
alleviation of
suffering.(25) But, as we shall see, this prima facie ontological,
epistemological gulf will be obliterated in the final union of the
three
natures.
18. Since the former has the nature of a false duality
And the latter is the non-existence of that nature,
The imagined and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
Vasubandhu now begins the task of unifying the three natures as
three mutually
implicative aspects of a single reality. He begins with the relation
between the
imagined and the consummate: the imagined nature is essentially
dualistic, in
that it involves an ontic distinction between subject and object;
but seen as
imagined that duality is in fact seen to be non-existent. But the
non-existence
of that duality is exactly what the consummate nature is. The
imagined nature
and the consummate nature are hence, from an ontological
perspective, not
different from one another. The difference is only apparent,
representing a
difference in perspective, rather than one of reality. The next
verse makes the
same point in the converse direction.
19. Since the former has the nature of non-duality,
And the latter has the nature of non-existent duality,
The consummate and the imagined
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
20. Since the former is deceptive in the way it appears,
And the latter has the nature of its not being that way,
The other-dependent and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
Verses 20 and 21 are devoted to establishing the identity of the
consummate and
the other-dependent natures. The point in verse 20 is parallel to
that made with
respect to the imagined nature. The dependent nature is deceptive,
in that
phenomena that are so dependent appear to be distinct from --
although dependent
upon -- the subject. But when that natures is seen, from a higher
perspective,
to be only dependent, but to be the fact of being merely mental, and
hence
non-different from the mind on which the phenomena depend. that
understanding
is the understanding of the consummate nature of things. Again, the
difference
between the natures is revealed to be not ontological in character,
but merely
perspectival.
21. Since the former has the nature of a non-existent duality,
And the latter is its non-existence in the way it appears,
The other-dependent and the consummate
Are said not to be different in characteristic.
The parallel to the relation between the imagined and the consummate
natures is
emphasized in verse 21. The other-dependent, like the imagined, is
dualistic in
character. But when things experienced in their other-dependent
nature are seen
to be so experienced, the duality vanishes, and the non-existence of
that
duality is the consummate nature itself. The apparent difference
between the
natures is hence, for Vasubandhu, a difference not in the object --
in the
ontological character of phenomena, but rather in the subject -- and
hence not
a difference in nature, but a difference in experience of a single
triune
nature.
22. But conventionally,
The natures are explained in order and
Based on that one enters them
In a particular order, it is said.
Nonetheless, though the three natures are at a deeper level a unity,

pedagogically they
from a hierarchy. There is an order in which they must be presented
for the
sake of clarity and soteriological efficacy. This is the topic of
verse 22-25.
23. The imagined is entirely conventional.
The other-dependent is attached to convention.
The consummate, cutting convention,
Is said to be a different nature.
The imagined nature is the easiest to present first. Is is the way
that
ordinary, unreflective persons represent things. The
other-dependent, while
constituting a more sophisticated view of things, remain at a
conventional
level. It, however, has real soteriological use, starting the
process of
freeing the mind the tyranny of convention and fundamental
ignorance, and
providing a bridge to a more transcendent view. Finally, awareness
of the
consummate nature allows the move to a fully awakened view of
reality.
24. Having first entered into the non-existence of duality
Which is the dependent, one understands
The non-existent duality
Which is the imagined.
On the other hand, Vasubandhu claims, the order of understanding the
non-dual
characters of the two conventional natures is reversed. It is easier
to see
that the dependent nature is non-dual. For once one has ascended to
an awareness
of this nature, and hence of the multiplicity of the natures of
phenomena and
of their mind-dependence, it is possible to see phenomena as
non-dually related
to mind. One can then reflect on the imagined nature -- initially
experienced as
a dualistic relation to appearances -- and see it, too, as non-dual
in character
in virtue of the identity in ontic status between subject and object
in that
nature. One must bear in mind that the point being made in this and
the
surrounding verses is a pedagogical point: as long as one only
experiences the
imagined nature, it is hard to see things non-dualistically. That
ability is
made possible by the understanding represented by awareness of the
other-dependent nature, and then reflectively applies to the
other-dependent.
25. Then one enters the consummate.
Its nature is the non-existence of duality.
Therefore it is explained
To be both existent and non-existent.
Finally, once one has thoroughly understood both of the merely
conventional
natures, including their apparent dualities, but the unreality of
each duality,
one sees that all phenomena are both apparently dual, and ultimately
non-dual.
That is their consummate nature. Realizing this nature is the
consequence of a
complete understanding of the other two.
26. These three natures.
Have the characteristics of being non-cognizable and non-dual.
One is completely non-existent; the second is therefore
non-existent.
The third has the nature of that non-existence.
This verse sums up the result of the previous two discussions. Going
"from top
to bottom", the consummate nature is non-cognizable because all
cognition, as
discursive, is inescapably dualistic; the other two natures are
non-dual when
seen from that perspective, despite the duality engendered from
within the
perspective from any higher perspective. Therefore, the
other-dependent nature,
being the dependence of a non-existent entity on the mind, is also
non-existent
when seen from the standpoint of the consummate. And the consummate
is just the
fact of the non-existence of the first two. Thus, Vasubandhu
concludes, despite
the vast difference in the phenomenological character of the three
perspectives
from which phenomena have these three natures, the natures
themselves are
identical, joined in the object in virtue of its ideality.
The next section of the text develops the famous simile of the
illusory
elephant conjured by the stage magician. This is in fact the only
portion of
this text regularly cited in later polemical and hermeneutic
discussions of
cittamatra philosophy by Tibetan commentators:(26)
27. Like an elephant that appears
Through the power of magician's
mantra -- Only the percept appears,
The elephant is completely non-existent.
The magician, allegedly using a mantra, caused the astonished
audience to see
an apparition of an elephant. But, we are assured, there really is
no elephant.
The illusion is engendered purely by the skill of the magician and
the
gullibility of the audience.
28. The imagined nature is the elephant;
The other-dependent nature is the visual percept;
The non-existence of the elephant therein
Is explained to be the consummate.
Now we can see the diverse aspects of subjectivity marked by the
three natures
as well as the ontological unity of the natures in the object (or
putative
object) they characterize. The non-existent elephant -- the apparent
object of
perception -- is the elephant. The deluded audience believes it to
exist, in
virtue of decidedly non-pachidermic causes and their own deluded
ignorance. But
nothing in fact exists in the way the elephant appears. But there is
indeed a
percept -- not a living, breathing elephant -- but a psychological
episode
brought into an sustained in existence in dependence on numerous
conditions.
This corresponds to the dependent nature. And the fact that there is
no
elephant in this percept -- that the elephant is completely
non-existent and
the percept is purely mental -- is the consummate nature.
Note that this is a simile, and not a literal model of perception.
What is
crucial here is that to a naive observer, the hallucinated elephant
appears as
real and independent. To one "in the know" there is a real percept,
but one
which is decidedly not an independent elephant, and whose existence
is entirely
dependent on the state of mind of the member of the audience. And
finally, the
full story is that there simply is no elephant at all -- not even
one in
perception -- only hallucination which is purely mental and entirely
in the mind
of the audience member. Just as the imagined nature of my teacup is
that it is
an independent object; the dependent nature is that is is my mental
representation and not an independent external object; and its
consummate
nature is its complete non-existence from a transcendent point of
view.
29. Through the root consciousness
The nonexistent duality appears.
But since the duality is completely non-existent,
There is only a percept.
Just a through the force of the magician's incantations and
manipulations the
illusory elephant appears, through the force of our own mental
predispoditions
the percept appears. But just as the elephant is purely
hallucinatory, the
percept is purely mental.
30. The root consciousness is like the mantra.
Reality can be compared to the wood.
Imagination is like the perception of the elephant.
Duality can be seen as the elephant.
The psychological basis of appearances, for Vasubandhu and his
cittamatra
followers, is the root consciousness, and the potentials it contains
for
experiences. The mantra -- the magician, in this analogy, has a prop
-- a
piece of wood. (How this trick is actually performed is utterly
mysterious at
this point.) So, what appears to be an elephant is actually a piece
of wood,
transformed by the magician into an apparitional elephant. Likewise,
in
experience, what appears to be an independent object is in fact a
merely
mental episode, caused by the actualization of latencies in the root

consciousness to appear as independent nature, since that nature
gives us the
perceived object as a mere percept as opposed to as the object it
appears to be.
The imagined nature, on the other hand, is analogous to the
hallucinated
elephant, and the non-existent duality is like the intentional
object of that
hallucination -- the non-existent elephant.
The concluding verses of the text are devoted to its soteriological
implications. For cittamatra philosophy, like any Buddhist system,
is
soteriological in intent. The point of the system is to gain
liberation from
the delusions, attachments and suffering of samsara in order to be
able to
assist other sentient beings in accomplishing the same. From the
cittamatra
point of view, the root delusion is the taking the imagined nature
of things to
be their reality, and to fail to appreciate the other two natures,
the identity
of the three natures, and hence to fail to achieve the viewpoint
represented
by the consummate which reveals the world as it is.
31. When one understand how things are,
Perfect knowledge, abandonment,
And accomplishment --
These three characteristics are simultaneously achieved.
To understand how things are is to understand all three natures
simultaneously
and in their correct relations to one another. This amounts to
perfect knowledge
of the ontology of the world and of the character of one's own
subjectivity.
That is to abandon attachment to the imagined phenomena craved by
one who
believes them to be real as they appear in imagination, and that is
to
accomplish the goal of perfect insight into the nature of things and
consequent
freedom from the craving which is the necessary condition of
ignorance and
afflicted action.
32. Knowledge is non-perception;
Abandonment is non-appearance;
Attainment is accomplished through non-dual perception.
That is direct manifestation.
Perfect knowledge of this kind is non-perception in the sense that
it is
objectless, for
the objects of ordinary perception are seen to be illusory, and the
duality of
perceiver
and perceived that structures perception is transcended. Abandonment
of
commitment
and attachment to imagined phenomena is achieved through the
transcendence of
instinctive assent to the imagined nature. The attainment of freedom
is
accomplished
through the direct, immediate understanding of the unity of the
three
natures, and hence the non-dual awareness of all phenomena in their
consummate nature. For one who has attained this kind of knowledge,
Vasubandhu claims, this cognitive relation to things is direct,
intuitive,
and immediate -- not the consequence of constant philosophical
analysis -- but the primary way of taking up with the world, albeit
achieved
through long analysis and practice.
33. Through the non-perception of the elephant,
The vanishing of its percept occurs;
And so does the perception of the piece of wood.
This is how it is in the magic show.
Here Vasubandhu returns to the analogy in order to explain the
structure of this
accomplishment. When one sees through the trick -- when one stops
being taken
in by the show -- one stops seeing the elephant, and the percept
vanishes.
One no longer sees
the piece of wood as an elephant at all. All of the illusion ceases.

34. In the same way through the non-perception of duality
There is the vanishing of duality.
When it vanishes completely,
Non-dual awareness arises.
Similarly, through an accomplished perception of things in accord
with the
three-nature
theory one stops seeing the dualistically represented phenomena.
Those
things, as they are seen by an ordinary, deluded consciousness,
completely
disappear. One sees through the
show of ordinary experience, and the illusion ceases. One sees
things simply as
they are,
without duality, without ascribing them independent reality, as
having the
triune three
natures, each understood fully from the standpoint of the
consummate.
35. Through perceiving correctly,
Through seeing the non-referentiality of mental states,
Through following the three wisdoms,
One will effortlessly attain liberation.
This understanding has, Vasubandhu here announces, soteriological
consequences. In virtue of coming to understand that one's mental
states do
not represent an independent reality, and through understanding
fully the
three natures and their relations to
one another, attachment to objects as genuinely real, and as
legitimate
objects of craving, ceases. The are only dream-objects, nothing to
take
seriously, including both
objects perceived as external, and one's self as it appears to
oneself. The
attendant
cessation of grasping and of attachment is precisely the cessation
denominated
by the
term "nirvana".
36. Through the perception of mind-only
One achieves the non-perception of objects;
Through the non-perception of objects
There is also the non-perception of mind.
This verse emphasizes the connection between the release from
attachment to
external objects and the release from attachment of self. One begins
the
cittamatra
analysis by seeing all phenomena as purely mental. This dissipates
the view that
external phenomena are real. But with this realization comes the
realization
that the
mind we experience -- the self we cherish -- is every bit as much an
object for
us (albeit
of inner and not outer sense) and so is every bit as unreal as the
outer objects
to which
it is so easy to become attached. Our self-attachment is hence
revealed by this
analysis
to be every bit as much the product of ontological delusion as is
out
attachment to
external phenomena.
37. Through the non-duality of perception,
Arises the perception of the fundamental nature of reality.
Through the perception of the fundamental nature of reality
Arises the perception of the radiant.
This realization is the full understanding of the three nature
theory and its
implications.
The fundamental nature of reality is its threefold character, and
the unity of
this threefold character in the ultimate non-duality of all that
appears as
dual. The experience of the world in this way is, Vasubandhu claims,
a
radiant, or totally illuminating gnosis.
38. Through the perception of the radiant,
And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies,
And through possessing bodhi:
Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him/herself and others.
The deep insight embodied in this gnosis, coupled with the
altruistic aspiration
to attain
liberation for the sake of other sentient beings enables the
practitioner,
through physical
acts (the use of the form-body), through the blissful detachment
from suffering
that
enables one to take the welfare of others fully into account (the
fruits of the
enjoyment-body) and through thorough understanding (the truth-body)
to be
maximally
efficacious on behalf of others.
This brief text hence articulates all of the principal features of
cittamatra
philosophy:
its thoroughgoing idealism; the three nature theory of the ontology
of
representation
and of the phenomenology entailed by that idealism; the
understanding of
non-duality
and emptiness in which that theory issues; and the soteriological
consequences
both of
the three nature ontology and of the full understanding of the
theory
itself.(27) There
certainly are briefer expositions, more detailed expositions of this
system in
the classical
literature, but perhaps none so elegant and perspicuous.
NOTES
(1) My reading of this text has developed as a result of many
conversation with
and instruction from
teachers, students and colleagues. I thank in particular Janet
Gyatso for
extended discussion of
cittamatra philosophy in general and this text in particular, the
Ven. Geshe
Yeshes Thap-khas for
several teaching sessions, the Ven. Gen Lobsang Gyatso for several
useful
conversations and Ms
Karen Meyers for a number of spirited discussions of this text and
of cittamatra
philosophy in
general. Dr Moira Nicholls read an earlier version and made a number
of useful
suggestions. Mr
Jens Schleiter has made many very helpful suggestions regarding both
the
translation and
commentary. Both are much improved as a consequence. I also an
anonymous
reviewer for
Asian Philosophy for pointing out lacunae in an earlier version.
Thanks also to
Sri Yeshi Tashi
Shastri and Mr Jamyang Norbu Gurung for research assistance.
(2) See, e.g. Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarika [Garfield, J. (1995)
Fundamental
Wisdom of the
Middle way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (New York, Oxford
University Press)
or Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara [Huntington, C. & Wangchen, Geshe
N. (1989)
The Emptiness of Emptiness: Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara].
(3) See also Vasubandhu's Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya and
Trimsikakarika in
Kochumuttom, T.
(1982) A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and
Interpretation
of the Works of
Vasubandhu the Yogacarin (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidaas), and Anacker,
S. (1984)
Seven Works of
Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor (Delhi, Motilal
Banarsidass) for
further expositions
of this view.
(4) While such comparisons will prove useful, and while the
affinities are real,
one must be
very careful not to push the comparisons too far. There is a
specifically
Buddhist context to
Vasubandhu's idealism, and the different philosophical milieus of
medieval India
and modern
Europe generate distinct philosophical positions and moves. It is
well beyond
the scope of this
commentary to address all of the relevant similarities and
differences, or even
to spell out all of
Vasubandhu's arguments or system. See Garfield, J. (forthcoming)
Western
idealism through
Indian eyes: Reading Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer through
Vasubandhu, Sophia,
for more
on comparison between Vasubandhu's idealism and Western versions of
that
doctrine.
(5) This may be due to the fact that this text was written when
Vasubandhu was
quite advanced in
years. It was probably composed at Ayodhya during the last year or
two of his
life.
(6) Compare, for instance, the presentation of the three natures in
the
Samdhinirmocana-sutra in
which these ontological claims are completely absent.
(7) See Legs bshad snyings po, translated in Thurman, R. (1984)
Tsong Khapa's
Speech of Gold in the
Essence of True Eloquence (Princeton, Princeton University Press),
esp. pp.
223-230.
(8) See sTong thun chen mo, translated in Cabezon, J. (1992) A Dose
of Emptiness
(Albany, State
University of New York Press), esp. pp. 39-43.
(9) See Garfield, J. (1997) Three natures and three
naturelessnesses: comments
on cittamatra
conceptual categories, Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion,
for more on
Cittamatra
doxography and on the relations between the three natures and three
naturelessnesses.
(10) Translated in Huntingdon (1989), see esp. pp. 162-168.
(11) The present translation is from the Tibetan text. The principal
version
used is that in the Peking
edition of the Tibetan canon (Si 12a-14a). The Sde dge edition was
used for
comparison, and is
in complete concordance. Anacker, op. cit., and Wood (1991) Mind
Only: A
Philosophical and
Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijnanavada (Honolulu, University of
Hawaii Press),
each reprint the
original Sanskrit text.
(12) Again, it is interesting to contrast this presentation with
that of the
Samdhinirmocana-sutra where
this dependence is explicitly characterized as dependence on other
non-mental
causes and
conditions. Vasubandhu is clearly developing an idealistic position
that
contrasts with the
strikingly non-idealistic ontology of the Samdhinirmocana-sutra. It
is in large
part due to
doxographic imperatives to unify the Yogacara corpus theoretically
that so many
Tibetans read the
Samdhinirmocana-sutra as idealistic and that so many contemporary
Western
scholars have lately
argued that Vasubandhu is not an idealist. (See Garfield
[forthcoming], op.
cit., for more on
this.) Both imperatives should be resisted, as the tradition is
internally
quite diverse.
(13) Kochumuttom, op. cit., Thurman, op. cit., Wood, op. cit.,
Powers, J. (1995)
Wisdom of the
Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Mahayana Sotra (Berkeley, Dharma Press),
Anacker,
op. cit.,
Nagao, G. (1991) Madhyamaka and Yogacara (Albany, State University
of New York
Press) and
Cabezon, op. cit., respectively.
(14) Contrast this with the standard presentation of cittamatra
metaphysics in
Geluk-pa doxography,
following Sthiramati, according to which the second and third are
real, but the
first -- the imagined
nature -- is completely unreal. See Tsong Khapa in Thurman, op.
cit., pp.
223-230 and mKhas
grub in Cabezon, op. cit., pp. 47-61. See also Meyers, K. (1995)
Empty talk:
Tsong Khapa's
elucidation of the Buddha's intention as a matter of semantics,
Amherst,
Hampshire College
Division III thesis, ch. 2.
(15) See Kant, I. (1965) Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp-Smith
(transl.) (New
York, St Martin's
Press), b275-276 and Berkeley, G. (1954) Three Dialogues Between
Hylas and
Philonous,
C. Turbayne (Ed.) (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill).
(16) Schopenhauer, A. (1974) The Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Sufficient
Reason, E. F. J. Payne
(Transl.) (LaSalle, Open Court), pp. 273, ff, Schopenhauer, A.
(1969) The World
as Will and
Representation, E. F. J. Payne (Transl.) (New York, Dover), Section
4. See also
"Criticism of the
Kantian Philosophy".
(17) Schopenhauer, (1969) Sections 19, 23-24.
(18) This is not to say that Schopenhauer charges Kant with the
failure to
postulate a
nouemenon -- only that he charges Kant with the failure to see that
this
noumenal character is a third nature of
the object, one which is knowable immediately, without
subject-object duality.
Again, in this
respect Vasubandhu's idealism is far closer to Schopenhauer's than
it is to
Kant's. I thank Dr
Moira Nicholls for pointing out the need for clarity on this point.
(19) See the analysis of time as the form of inner sense and hence
of the
empirical character of
self-knowledge in the transcendental Aesthetic, Critique of Pure
Reason,
b155-159.
(20) It is not, however -- to put it mildly -- at all obvious that
these
etymological claims are at all
accurate.
(21) Again, the anticipation of Kant's account o empirical
self-knowledge is
striking.
(22) This gets complex and leads to an analysis of samsara itself,
and the sense
in which everything in
samsara can be said to be afflicted -- to be caused by and to be a
cause of
suffering, and in a deeper
sense to have suffering and primal ignorance as part of its very
ontological
structure; and then to
an analysis of a specifically Yogacara understanding of samsara. But
that is
beyond the scope of
this commentary.
(23) In the scholastic or Cartesian sense -- the character of the
mental object
itself.
(24) Note how this account of the ultimate nature of a phenomenon
contrasts with
that given by
Madhyamika philosophers such as Nagarjuna or Candrakirti, according
to whom not
even the
emptiness of the cup can be said to exist in this sense. It is at
this crucial
point in ontology that
Cittamatra and Madhyamaka are utterly discontinuous. See SIDERITS,
M. (1996) On
the
continuity thesis, Australia-New Zealand Joint Religious Studies
Conference,
Christchurch, Garfield,
op. cit., note 2, but see Nagao, op. cit., note 13, for a contrary
view.
(25) This contrasts once again with the standard Geluk-pa view
according to
which the important
ontological divide is between the imagined nature and the other two.
On this
view, the imagined
nature is wholly false, while the other-dependent and consummate
natures are
both truly existent.
(26) See, for instance, mKhas grub in Cabezon, op. cit., note 13, p.
50.
(27) The one significant ontological doctrine associated with
cittamatra
philosophy that does not make
an appearance here is the theory of the three naturelessnesses
(trinihsvabhava/ngo bo nyid med gsum)
that takes centre stage in the Samdhinirmocana-sutra. In
Trimsika-karika
Vasubandhu connects
this doctrine to trisvabhava theory, arguing that each nature is
natureless in
one of these senses.
Sthiramati, in his commentary on this text, argues that in fact the
three
natures and the three
naturelessnesses are the same -- a view adopted by such Tibetan
exegetes as
Tsong Khapa and
mKhas grub. This is not a view that Vasubandhu ever articulates,
however, and
while he makes
use of the trinihsvabhava in explicating emptiness in
Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya
it is not, on his
view, a doctrine specifically connected to idealism, and so has no
role in the
present text. See
Garfield, op. cit., note 9, for more on the relation between the
three natures
and the three
naturelessnesses.