Vijnaptimatrata and the Abhidharma

·期刊原文
Vijnaptimatrata and the Abhidharma context of early Yogacara

by King, Richard
Asian Philosophy

Vol. 8 No. 1 Mar.1998

Pp.5-18

Copyright by Asian Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary accounts of early Mahayana Buddhist schools like the
Madhyamaka and the Yogacara tend to portray them as generally antithetical
to the Abhidharma of non-Mahayana schools such as the Theravada and the
Sarvastivada. This paper attempts to locate early Yogacara philosophical
speculation firmly within the broader context of Abhidharma debates.
Certain key Yogacara concepts such as alayavijnana, vijnapti-matrata and
citta-matra are discussed insofar as they relate to pre-existing concepts
and issues found in the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika schools, with specific
reference to the Abhidharmakosa and the corresponding bhasya of Vasubandhu.
Finally, some remarks are made about the benefits of approaching the
history of religious ideas without the benefits and distortions of
hindsight, particularly as this relates to the attribution of an idealistic
position to the early Yogacara literature.

Preliminary Remarks

Contemporary accounts of Mahayana Buddhist schools like the Madhyamaka and
the Yogacara tend to portray them as generally antithetical to the
Abhidharma of non-Mahayana schools such as the Theravada and the
Sarvastivada. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it often
reflects the tendency to conceive of internal Buddhist doctrinal
controversies as the source of schisms in a manner akin to the disputations
of Christian history. As Heinz Bechert has pointed out, the principle of
schism (sanghabheda) in Indian Buddhism was based upon disputes over
monastic code (vinaya) and not differences in doctrinal position [1].
Secondly, increasing examination of Tibetan commentarial materials has
allowed Buddhist scholars to provide a much fuller account of the history
of Mahayana thought. However, one consequence of this has been the tendency
to accept interpretations of Buddhist scholastic thought which often derive
from the work of authors with allegiances to other perspectives. In the
case of the Yogacara school, for instance, scholars have generally tended
to accept the accounts provided in Sankara's Brahmasutrabhasya or in the
commentarial works of Tibetan Madyamaka schools like the dGe lugs pa
without questioning the status of these accounts.

Working with the benefits of hindsight, it is sometimes difficult to see
the wood for the trees and it often proves fruitful to return to the early
stages of a tradition and its literature in order to gain a fresh
perspective upon the material. Indeed it would seem that the search for new
conceptualisations and understandings of original teachings is precisely
what the history of religious doctrine has been about. In the case of the
Yogacara school it is easy to follow established commentarial traditions in
interpreting this school's distinctive philosophy. In most cases this would
seem to be both the most pertinent, fruitful and humble course of action to
take. However, the danger of hindsight and allegiance to specific
hermeneutic traditions is that they quickly tend to become
institutionalized. As I have argued elsewhere, we should avoid projecting
later debates and controversies between Buddhist schools of thought (for
example between the Madyamaka and Yogacara trends of Mahayana Buddhism)
into the early literature of such movements [2].

One way to redress the balance in the study of Buddhist thought in India is
to make a simple point that is so often overlooked. Buddhist philosophical
debate in India took place within an Abhidharmic context. After all, in
what other theoretical and literary context could such debate have
occurred? Once one acknowledges that the differentiation between Buddhist
schools of thought was not a crucial factor in the schismatic development
of sanghas (sanghabbeda) one realises the sense in which this must indeed
be the case. When doctrinal disputations bring forth issues relating to
Buddhist monastic ethics and practice, schism, of course' may very well
result. However, in the history of Buddhist thought it seems that in most
cases philosophical disputations between rival schools left fundamental
issues of religious practice largely intact. For this reason, in India at
least, Mahayana and non-Mahayana adherents could remain members of the same
sangha without any fundamental conflict of interest or danger of schism.

It is clear that the portrayal of Mahayana Buddhists as generally
antithetical to the Abhidharma of non-Mahayana schools such as the
Theravada and the Sarvastivada remains something of an overstatement in an
Indian context. Abhidharma, broadly speaking, is Buddhist philosophy.
Madhyamika and Yogacara thinkers both established and contested their
theories from within a theoretical framework which was unquestionably
Abhidharmic in style, content and presentation [3]. This should not be a
surprise, particularly once one realises the sense in which the
group-identity of a given sangha is established by the Pratimoksa and the
rules of the Vinaya rather than any particular philosophical doctrine or
position.

Simplistically speaking, the history of religious ideas can be approached
from two basic directions: backwards and forwards. The former approach
involves interpreting a particular movement or school of thought utilising
subsequent elaborations and commentarial expositions of it. The latter
approach involves beginning before the movement has even arisen and
examining the antecedent conditions, movements and potential influences
upon that movement as a way of contextualising its earliest stages. This
paper is a brief attempt to approach early Yogacara philosophy from the
latter perspective. In taking this approach to the material I wish to place
much greater emphasis upon the Abhidharma context of Mahayana philosophy by
suggesting a number of ways in which the Sautrantika analysis of perception
may have functioned as an important precursor of the Yogacara's own
position. I will attempt to demonstrate this by discussing certain
Abhidharma antecedents to the Yogacara notions of alayavijnana and
vijnaptimatrata.

The Abhidharmakosabhasya and Early Yogacara

The Sautrantika and Yogacara epistemologies are similar despite the
through-going realism of the former and the apparent idealism of the
latter. The Sautrantika accept that it is only the form (akara) or
representation (vijnapti) of an object which is perceived. Where the
schools differ is in the Yogacara refusal to accept the validity of
discussing external objects as causes (nimitta) given that an external
object is never (directly) perceived.

The thesis of the similarity between the two schools can be illustrated if
we examine the views of the two Vasubandhus, the author of the
Abhidharmakosa and its commentary (Abhidharmakosa-bhasya), and the author
of various early Yogacara works such as the Twenty Verses (Vimsatika) and
the Thirty Verses (Trimsika). These two thinkers may or may not be one and
the same person as tradition suggests [4], but given the similarity between
the Sautrantika and Yogacara epistemologies, movement from the former
position to the latter is not totally incomprehensible. In discussing the
doctrinal position of the author of the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, Thomas
Dowling suggests that

Vasubandhu occupies a unique doctrinal position vis a vis the question of
what constitutes a dharma. On the one hand, he is unwilling to accept the
over inflated dharma list of the Vaibhasikas, and on the other, he is not
committed to the radical perspective of the ultimate voidness of all
dharmas (in the Kosa, at any rate.) His lack of recourse to such terms as
paramartha satya/samvrti satya in their specifically Mahayana sense is
evidence that the Kosa is a straightforward text grounded in the tacit
assumption that in some sense there 'are' dharmas [5].

In the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya Vasubandhu criticises the Sarvastivada notion
of `possession' (prapti) arguing that the difference between possession and
non-possession (aprapti) is merely the state of having destroyed or not
destroyed the defilements. This is a classic example of the Sautrantika
critique of the Vaibhasika position, curtailing the Vaibhasika tendency to
postulate theoretical and unexperienced entities (this is seen for example
in the Sautrantika denial of the category of
citta-rupa-viprayukta-samskaras, that is `formations neither associated
with consciousness nor form').

The Sautrantikas criticised the postulation of such entities as prapti and
avijnaptirupa, replacing this scheme with a causal model based upon the
notions of karmic seeds (bija) and the transformation of particular streams
of consciousness (samrana-parinamavisesa) [6]. This suggests another strand
of continuity between Vasubandhu qua Sautrantika and Vasubandhu qua
Yogacarin in the emphasis both place upon the transformation of
consciousness as a means of explaining the fluctuating nature of samsara.
Again, such notions as shape (samsthana), taken to be substantial and real
(dravya-sat) by the Vaibhasikas, are purely mental conceptions (parikalpam
kurvanti) arising from visual perception according to Vasubandhu in the
Abbidharmakosa-bhasya [7]. This account may prove to be a precursor of the
attack upon the notion of a six-sided atom in Vasubandhu's Twenty Verses
(Vimsatika), verses 12-14.

In the critique of 'possession' (prapti) in the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya
Vasubandhu qua Sautrantika seems to utilise a notion which becomes of
crucial importance in the subsequent Yogacara elaboration of the path to
liberation, viz. asraya-paravrtti, the conversion of the basis. He states
that

Verily, the physical basis of the Noble One has undergone transformation by
virtue of the path of vision and the path of cultivation such that those
defilements that are allayed no longer have the ability to shoot forth. As
rice seeds that are in a non-germinal (or impotent) state, just so one is
called a 'destroyer of the defilements' with reference to the defilements
of the physical basis (bhutasaraydh). (my italics) [8]

Thus, through the 'conversion of the basis' one may be called a `destroyer
of defilements' (prahinaklesa). Vasubandhu also goes on to argue that upon
realisation of the supreme goal of yogic attainment (nirodha-samapatti), an
untainted stream of consciousness (nirmala santati) is produced:

For the one who has returned from the Path of Vision (darsana-marga), as a
result of destroying all of the defilements that can be destroyed by
Vision, without remainder, there occurs a fresh stream [of consciousness]
that is without blemish and characterized by revulsion of the physical
basis [9].

The idea of a `conversion of the basis' asraya-paravrtti), that is a
purification of consciousness through the eradication of all defilement
(klesa), becomes an important theme in the subsequent development of the
Yogacara school. The classical formulations of Asanga and Vasubandhu tend
to portray this conversion as a destruction of an essentially phenomenal
store-consciousness (alayavijnana), the repository of karmic seeds (bija).
However, later interpretations within the Yogacara (for example the work of
Paramartha) envisaged this transformation as an eradication of defilements
which leaves behind an essentially undefiled consciousness (amala-vijnana).
This pure consciousness was seen as the foundation or support (asraya)
which originally formed the basis for the activities of the now defunct
defilements. On this view, the conversion of the basis no longer means the
cessation of the store-consciousness, but rather its transformation and
re-turn (paravrtti) to its former pristine condition. This 'pure mind'
tradition within Yogacara Buddhism has clear antecedents in early Buddhism
[10] and is perhaps best represented in the early Yogacara literature by
such texts as the Mahayanasutralamkara. As such it reflects not only the
open-endedness (ambivalence?) of many Yogacara terms, but also the
assimilation of ideas usually associated with the Mahayana notion of
tathagatagarbha [11]. The Abbidharmakosa-bhasya thus provides interesting
source-material for all of these subsequent Yogacara developments.

Taking the argument one step further one might wish to argue that the
notion of the alayavijnana, as utilised by Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, is
little more than an elaboration of concepts already expounded in the
Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, which of course expounds the Dharma from a
Sautrantika perspective. This view, in fact, is propounded by Asanga in
Mahayanasamgraha I. 11 where he argues that the notion of the alayavijnana
far from being a Mahayana innovation 'is mentioned in the sravakayana by
means of various synonyms (paryaya)'. It is tempting to point to the
Theravada notion of bhavanga-citta as influential in this regard, though
Lambert Schmithausen argues that this is unlikely precisely because it is
not mentioned by Asanga at this point [12]. Nevertheless, Rupert Gethin is
surely right to suggest that 'these two concepts are to be understood as
having a certain affinity and that they belong to the same complex of ideas
within the history of Buddhist thought' [13].

In the Abbidharmakosabhasya Vasubandhu asks,

ko 'yam bijabhavo nama atmabhavasya klesaja klesotpadanasaktih

And what is called the seed state? It is the power to originate defilement,
produced by the defilement of one who has attained existence [14].

This characterisation conforms to the early Yogacara conception of the
alayavijnana as sarva-bijaka-vijnana, the store of (defiled) karmic seeds.
Schmithausen offers a list of twenty uses which the concept of alayavijnana
provided (14 'philosophical' and 6 exegetical) for the early Yogacarins
[15]. Most of these cluster around the explanation of personal continuity
given the absence of an abiding-self, and providing a link between karmic
action and subsequent fruition. The Sautrantika metaphor of the seed (bija)
became central in the case of the latter issue once the Vaibhasika
conception of the existence of dharmas in past, present and future (the
sarvastivada position) was rejected. However, as Schmithausen points out,
although the Sautrantika postulated the notion of a karmic seed to
establish causal continuity over time, the Yogacara seems to have felt that
this required the further postulation of a store (alaya) consciousness as
the repository of these seeds. Nevertheless, it is important to note at
this point that the store-consciousness is by no means considered to be an
ultimate reality in the works of either Vasubandhu the Yogacarin or Asanga,
as has sometimes been suggested. In the Viniscayasamgrahani section of the
Yogacarabhumi, Asanga describes the alayavijnana as the root of defilements
(samklesamula) which ceases through the cultivation of wholesome dharmas
[16]. Equally, in Trimsika v.18 Vasubandhu suggests that the alayavijnana
is nothing more than a collective term for the seeds themselves. For the
Sautrantika author of the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya the notion of the seed
(bija) is equally nothing more than a power (sakti) within the five
aggregates--specifically it is a designation (prajnapti) for an uncognised
process (asamjnayamanah) within the skandhas [17]. This also appears to be
the view put forward in Vasubandhu the Yogacarin's other major works [18].
For the Sautrantika author of the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, this means that
the adoption of conceptual categories other than the analysis of the
pudgala in terms of the five skandhas is both scripturally and logically
questionable. This is pure Sautrantika (the name 'Sautrantika' itself
designating those who believe that the Sutra-pitaka alone contains the
actual words of the Buddha). Thus, upon closer examination we find that
many of the most important 'new' Yogacara concepts (such as
vijnana-parinama and alaya-vijnana) as utilised in the various Mahayana
sastras attributed to Vasubandhu, seem to be philosophical elaborations or
extensions of concepts and themes already found in the
Abbidharmakosa-bhasya.

Abhidharma Antecedents of Vijnaptimatrata

Let us consider, for instance, another notion which is central to the
Yogacara school--that of Vijnaptimatrata or `Cognitive-Representation
Only'. It is no surprise, given our previous discussion, to note that the
term `vijnapti' also has a historical background in Abhidharma
scholasticism. Vijnapti is a technical term of Abhidharma Buddhist
philosophy, often translated as `intimation' or `information'. `Avijnapti',
as its negation, would therefore be rendered as `non-intimation' or
`non-indication'. The Vaibhasika Abhidharma distinguishes between two forms
of 'intimation' (vijnapti) [19].

(1) vagvijnapti (or vacika-vijnapti)--verbal intimation or expression, and

(2) kayavijnapti (or kayikavijnapti)--corporeal intimation or
gesticulation.

In early Mahayana literature `vijnapti' came to designate any cognitive act
which is carried out by the mind (manas). In the Yogacara school all
experience is claimed to be fundamentally 'mental' in nature. More
specifically, an individual's experience is constituted by a series of
projections externally intimated from the store-consciousness
(alayavijnana) of karmic impressions (vasana). There appears to be no
explicit distinction here between types of vinapti as we find in the
Vaibhasika texts.

In direct contrast to the notion of vijnapti is the Vaibhasika notion of
avijnapti-rupa [20]. avijnapti-rupa, or 'matter which is not-manifested in
consciousness', is matter (rupa) of the highest subtlety [21]. It offers no
resistance to the sense organs and does not even allow itself to be
`touched' (sparsariyate) by consciousness (vijnana-dharma). Thus the
postulation of its existence remains purely inferential. It is the subtle
residue left over by the physical vijnaptis. avijnapti-rupa retains the
moral quality of the vijnaptis from which it originates in terms of the
passively accumulated seeds (bijas) or perfumes (vasana) which later reach
fruition in the form of future karmic retribution. This residue is
described as material since it is compounded by the four basic elements
(mahabhuta) [22]. Takakusu thus describes the avijnapti-rupa in the
following terms:

Of the eleven [rupa dharmas], the first five are sense-organs and the next
five are sense-objects. The four gross elements--Earth, Water, Fire,
Air--are represented by the sense-objects. In addition to these, there is a
peculiar one. That is the 'form-element not manifested' outwardly
(avijnapti-rupa). When we will to act the mental function itself is called
will (cetana). Inis called will-action. This is usually expressed in words
or in body, and is called word-action or body-action respectively. These
two actions manifested outwardly, whether they are good or bad, present a
corresponding and similar action in mind, and form an abiding impression or
image. They are then called unmanifested action (avijnapti-karma). These
actions being taken as form-elements are considered to be sense-objects
though not manifested (avijnapti-rupa) [23].

`Avijnapti' as a category therefore represents the result of (karmic)
actions which has yet to manifest. As such it is the notion of a latent
impression caused by karmic activity. For the Vaibhasikas this 'entity' was
postulated to account for the temporal discrepancy between an action and
its subsequent (karmic) fruition. Here again we see that vijnapti denotes
the manifested result of karman. One hardly need point out that this is
also a fundamental aspect of the Yogacara usage of the term and may be said
to illustrate further the continuity of thought between the
Vaihasika/Sautrantika complex of Abhidharma notions under discussion in the
Abhidharmakosa-bhasya of Vasubandhu and the Yogacara philosophy expounded
by the author of the same name in various Mahayana sastras.

Vijnapti in the Yogacara context is the manifested fruition (vipaka) of
traces of past karmic activity (vasana) in the constructed form
(parikalpita) of an apparently new experience. Thus our entire network of
perceptions is perpetually conditioned by our own past choices and actions.
The responses that we make to these 'new' experiences themselves condition
the nature of future experiences through the establishment of karmic traits
(vasana) deposited in the store-consciousness (alayavijnana). Vijnapti for
the Yogacara then is not simply the `cognitive-representation of
sense-objects' (vijnaptir visayasya, Trimsika v.2), as is usually
understood by the term, but is more fundamentally a representation of the
agent's own subliminal karmic predispositions (anusaya). In other words, in
the Yogacara system vijnapti comes to be seen as a direct reflection of
one's own state of mind [24].

This point can be further illustrated by an examination of the cognitive
process as outlined in Asanga's Bodhisttva-bhumi. Asanga attempts to
explain in this text the manner in which our cognition of samsara is
perpetuated. Accordingly, Asanga argues that the 'pure given-ness'
(vastu-matra) of perception is conceptualised (vikaltyate) in sensory
apprehension resulting in the construction of an objective-support
(alambana) for consciousness. Attachment to these objective-supports (as
independently existing entities) perpetuates our experience of samsara
through the appropriation of karman in the form of habitual, subconscious
forces (samskaras). This position is not as unique doctrinally as some have
suggested. In a Buddhist context the doctrine of karman necessitates an
acceptance of the view that experience is conditioned in some fundamental
sense by the seeds of past actions. What is distinctive about the Yogacara
account of the dynamics of karman is the refusal to extend the discussion
beyond a purely phenomenological account of karmic appropriation.

Whether Asanga's explanation of the processes of cognition leads to a form
of idealism is certainly an interesting question. However, for the
Buddhist, as for the believer in karman in general, the important point is
the realisation that the objective world which confronts us is, or at least
was at some stage in its manifestation, a product of our own intentional
actions (karman). This is a central Buddhist idea, expounded for instance
in Abhidharmakosa-bhasya IV.1:

It is said that the world in its variety arises from action (karma). It is
because of the latent dispositions (anusaya) that actions accumulate
(upacita), but without the latent dispositions [they] are not capable of
giving rise to a new existence. Thus, the latent dispositions should be
known as the root of existence (mulam bhava) [25].

The Yogacara notion of vijnaptimatrata is an attempt to reformulate this
basic Buddhist insight through a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of
the activities of the mind. Vijnapti therefore refers, not just to the
immediate cognitive-representation of an object in one's mind, but also,
more fundamentally, to the representation of those subliminal forces
(samskara) which have caused such an object to be presented to
consciousness in the first place. In taking this stance the Yogacarin is
not thereby committed to a form of subjective idealism since it is
abundantly clear that we do not simply imagine the world of external
objects that confronts us here and now. Nevertheless, the Yogacarin argues,
our experiences are still causally dependent upon the traces (vasana) of
past karmic activity.

One should note then that the early Yogacara position at least seems to
involve an acceptance that our experience has a certain pre-determined
aspect to it. The world that we perceive is not simply `imagined' since we
can neither wish it away arbitrarily nor transform it into something else
at the slightest whim. Nevertheless, for the Yogacarin the world that we
experience is fundamentally the product of our past karmic actions and our
reactions to it will determine whether future circumstances will continue
to confront us in a similar manner. The world then is not `real' in the
sense of containing objective and independent entities (parikalpita), but
is real in the limited sense of being a really existing (though causally
inter-dependent) flow of perceptions (paratantrastita). This realm is
`dependent' insofar as our experiences are dependent upon past karman.

So, the Yogacarin might wish to say something like the following. The world
of our experience is actually `there,' if not in the form of a
subject-object dichotomy which exists independently of our experience of
it. We experience a certain pre-given reality (vastu-matra) in sensory
experiences but these are in actual fact a stream of interdependent sensory
impressions dependent for their appearance upon the consciousness which is
perceiving them. The manifestation of these sensory impressions is
ultimately dependent upon the defiled nature of the mind (klista manas). As
a result of this we tend to attribute independent existence
(parikalpita-svabhava) to what we believe to be the subjective and
objective correlates of our experience. The stream of perceptions that we
actually perceive, however, is `just mind' (citta-matra), being the
conceptualisation (vikalpa/vijnapti) of the pre-given (vastu) into an
objective support of consciousness (alambana). Despite this, it must be
stressed that for the Yogacarin there is `something' there (viz. the
paratantric flow of dharmas) which constitutes the `raw material' of our
experience, although in the final analysis this is merely a fruition of
seeds caused by past conscious activity (karman).

Thus, it is possible to interpret the Yogacara discussion of the
perpetuation of samsara through the appropriation of karman not so much as
a denial of the external world but rather as a restriction upon the
parameters of legitimate discourse to a phenomenological context (that is a
context which does not attempt to postulate entities beyond the pure
givenness (vastu-matra) of experience).

It is important to bear in mind that the Yogacara conception of
citta/vijnana denotes a whole complex of events and processes which cannot
be adequately rendered by English terms such as `consciousness' or `mind'.
The `citta' of cittamatra includes within it the conscious apprehension of
sensory objects (six in all including the mano-vijnana). This is a crucial
point to acknowledge since, for the Yogacara school, the sensory
apprehension of objects cannot be divorced from one's consciousness of it
(though it is possible to make a purely abstract and theoretical
distinction between vedana on the one hand and vijnana, samjna and samskara
on the other when discussing the skandhas). In a sense the Yogacara
position offers the flipside to the standard Abhidharma position that citta
is intentional, that is, that to be conscious is to be conscious of an
object. For the Yogacara, to postulate an object requires that it is first
apprehended by a citta. The emphasis here is no longer on the suggestion
that citta is intentional but rather on the fact that objects of
consciousness are just that. Thus, the thesis of the intentionality of
citta becomes displaced in the emerging Yogicara philosophy by an emphasis
upon the `phenomenalistic' nature of objects. Objects are really
dharma-constructs and representations (vijnapti), dependent upon the
complex processes of citta for their appearance. Thus, one can talk of
apprehending a sensory object only after one has become conscious of it.
Sensory apprehension is thereby subsumed by the Yogacara analysis under the
broader domain of `citta,' which, now more clearly than ever, remains too
rich and all-embracing a term to be rendered by `mind' or `consciousness'.
As well as an awareness of sensory objects, citta also denotes the
organising faculty of the manas, the affective distortion of that process
by the defiled mind (klista manas) as well as the subliminal karmic seeds
(samskaras) and latent dispositions (anusaya) that are collectively known
as the alayavijnana. The complexity of terms like citta, therefore, when
combined with the Yogacara endorsement of the category of rupa-dharma and
the acknowledgment that vijnana remains only one of five skandhas suggests
that it is problematic to interpret the early Yogacara literature as
propounding a form of idealism at least in the sense in which this has
commonly been understood in the West.

For the Yogacara school any discussion which transgresses the experiential
boundaries of citta leads to the utilisation of conceptual distinctions
(vikalpa), idle speculation and conceptual-proliferation (prapanca). It
should be noted, however, that this view of the limitations of language and
appropriate dialogue is again not without its precedent. The Sautrantika
analysis of perception denied that external objects were given in
perception; only the images (akara) of the external world are actually
perceived by consciousness. The Sautrantika of course did not take this to
mean that one could not thereby make veridical statements about an external
world. Indeed, by stating that external objects (nimitta) can be inferred
from the experience of mental images (akara), the Sautrantika were
explicitly accepting that such discussion was appropriate. Although clearly
in conflict with the Yogacara position one can see that Sautrantika
epistemology is only one step away (albeit a significant one!) from the
more radical `phenomenalism' of the Yogacara school. As we have seen, for
the early Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu discourse about the nature of
an external world is inappropriate precisely insofar as it goes beyond the
realm of that which is empirically (in this context experientially) given.

At the risk of labouring the point, we should note that for the Yogacarin
it is not the case that we simply `imagine' our experiences. They are
`real' to the extent that they are `given' without our conscious
intervention. The pure given-ness (vastu-matra) of our experiences is thus
beyond our conscious control. The question of `externality,' however, is
prevented from entering the Yogacara account since it is a quality which
cannot be a veridical aspect of our experience (since if x is really
external to our consciousness then it cannot be within its perceptive
range). There may or may not be an external world beyond our perception,
but this will have nothing to do with our actual experience which can only
be `internal' and subjective. Such, according to the Yogacarin, is the
nature of conscious experience. Attachment to the objects of experience
(alambana) as if they were independent and external to the subject is the
primary cause of the perpetuation of one's cognition of samsara. Ignorance
and attachment (based upon past karman) thereby cause the bifurcation of
consciousness into subjective and internal and objective and external. This
is the `myth of the transcendent object'--that is the fallacious belief
that one is having a veridical experience of an external world; the myth
(maya) under which all unenlightened beings are labouring.

In the final analysis one can say that the main philosophical difference
between Vasubandhu qua Sautrantika (as exemplified in the
Abhidharma-kosa-bhasya) and Vasubandhu qua Yogacarin (as exemplified in
many Mahayana works) is that in the former case the inference from
experience to external cause (nimitta) is accepted, whilst in the latter
this is seen to be logically unestablished (asiddha), a source of suffering
(dukha) and delusion, and philosophically superfluous.

The Yogacara Path and the Abhidharma of Non-Mahayana Schools

As stated at the outset of this paper, the context of Mahayana philosophy
in India was provided by the Abhidharma conceptual framework and modus
operandi. This is not to say that the Mahayana had no critical responses to
make to established Abhidharma theories, only that the context remained
unquestionably Abhidharmic in both form and orientation [26].

Mahayana attitudes towards the Abhidharma of the Hmayana schools can be
determined if we consider Mahayana conceptions of the Buddhist path
(marga). The cultivation of the practice of yoga in the emerging Yogacara
school leads at its highest levels to the cessation of the notions of
`subject' and `object' (i.e. prapanca). The meditative path is hierarchical
and progressive and each new stage involves the renunciation or cessation
(nirodha) of what came before. From a Mahayana perspective this eventually
came to mean that the Abhidharma analysis of the Hmayana schools remains
appropriate for as long as one is proceeding along the mundane path
(laukika) but that it should be relinquished once one enters the
supramundane (lokottara) stages of the path. To rid oneself of the
obscurations of knowledge (jneyavarana) as well as the obscurations of
afflictions (klesavarana) that are overcome on the mundane (i.e.
non-Mahayana) path, some of the techniques, doctrines and concepts of the
Hinayana Abhidharma must eventually be relinquished. Equally, progress in
yogic practice and the Mahayana path (marga) eventually leads to a
cessation of notions of an `objective' dimension to experience since this
type of realism is deemed inappropriate as soon as one realises
`object-less concentrations' (niralambana samadhi). Progression along the
path leads to an increasingly analytical scrutiny (prajna) of the images or
representations (vijnapu) which occur in samadhi. This is the realisation
of vijnaptimatrata in the meditative sphere--namely that that which is
manifested (vijnapti) in perception is merely an image (akara) and not an
independently-existing object. Finally, even these images (akara) must be
relinquished as one realises the full import of sunyata and
dharma-nairatyma. This final step amounts to the realisation that all
dharmas are the same (sama), quiescent (santa) and indistinguishable from
one another.

The notion of a progressively deconstructive path would seem to be the
import of such verses as Trisvabhavanirdesa 36:

Through the perception that there is mind-only (citta-matra), there arises
the non-perception of knowable things, through the non-perception of
knowable things, there arise the non-perception of mind also [27].

This may prove to be a brief allusion to the progressive nature of the path
and the gradual mastery and cessation of different levels of yogic
attainment (and their concomitant conceptual frameworks). Note, for
instance, that in the same way as the Madhyamaka interpretation of
dependent-co-origination subverts the notion of a substantially originated
entity, the insight into the fact that all perceptions are representations
(vijnaptimatra/cittamatra) eventually subverts the notion of
`representation' itself, since one realises that no truly external object
can be presented to consciousness. Thus, Madhayanta-vibhaga I.6 states
that,

Depending upon perception, there arises non-perception, and depending upon
non-perception, there arises non-perception [28].

To which Vasubandhu explains,

Depending upon the apprehension that there are only
cognitive-representations (vijnaptimatra), there arises the
non-apprehension of things. Depending upon the non-apprehension of things,
there arises the non-apprehension of cognitive-representation-only as well.

So even the notion of vijnaptimatrata is to be relinquished at the highest
levels of attainment. This statement alone suggests that it would be
extremely misleading to take either `vijnapti' or `vijnana' as designations
of an ultimate reality in the early Yogacara literature (as enshrined in
the doctrinal epithets `Vijnaptimatrata' and `Vijnanavada' which are often
used by scholars as alternative nomenclatures for the Yogacara school)
since both notions are relinquished in nirvikalpa-jnana. One cannot even
rely upon the notion of alayavijnana for solace in this regard. In the
Yogacarabhumisastra Asanga discusses the cessation of the alayavijnana
[29]. Again in Mahayanasamgraha I.61.3, Asanga declares that the
alayavijnana is `like maya, like a mirage, like a dream and an optical
illusion'; as such, it is `the seed for the imagination of the non-existent
(abhutaparikalpa)' [30]. As we have already noted Vasubandhu (the
Yogacarin) also seems to have accepted that the alayavijnana is little more
than a metaphorical concept (upacara) [31]. This in itself follows on from
the Sautrantika designation of the `seed' (bija) metaphor as a nominal
existent (prajnapti-sat) [32]. The Madhayanta-vibhaga also seems to argue
that consciousness is something which is eventually relinquished. Thus, I.3
states that,

Consciousness arises with the appearance of objects, sentient beings, self
and Cognitive-Representations. Nothing exists as its object, therefore that
[object] being absent that [consciousness] too is non-existent [33].

To which Vasubandhu adds in his commentary,

As material form etc. [consciousness] appears as objects, and as the five
sense-organs, it appears as sentient beings. These five senses refer to
one's own as well as other consciousness-streams. The appearance as a self
is the defiled mind (klistam manah), since it is associated with
self-delusion. Cognitive-representations (vijnapti) appear as the sixfold
consciousness. 'Nothing exists as its object' because the appearances of
objects and sentient beings are without a fixed image; and because the
appearances of self and cognitive-representations are false appearances.
Thus, 'because of that [object] being absent, that [consciousness] also is
non-existent'. That is the four kinds of graspables--form, etc., the five
sense-organs, mind, and the sixfold consciousness, are absent. On account
of the graspables being absent, the grasping consciousness also is
non-existent [34].

Thus, upon closer analysis, there is much evidence which questions some of
the central assumptions of a straightforwardly idealistic interpretation of
Asanga and Vasubandhu. Certainly one cannot hope to cling onto the concept
of consciousness-only (citta-matra) or representation-only (vijnapti-matra)
as evidence of subjective idealism in the early Yogacara. In the highest
states of attainment both the mind and cognitive-representations (vijnapti)
are to be relinquished, 'external objects' being relinquished at a much
earlier stage.

Perhaps by drawing attention to the continuities of thought between
pre-Mahayana and early Mahayana Abhidharma thought in India one can gain a
much greater appreciation of the philosophical context of early Yogacara
thought. Clearly, interpreting early Yogacara through the eyes of later
commentators can greatly enhance the comprehension of Indian Mahayana
thought. At times, however, ignoring later controversies and focusing upon
the philosophical and conceptual continuities to be found in the incipient
stages of a particular school of thought can bring to light new insights in
our understanding of that school. If we examine the early literature of the
Yogacara the possibility emerges that long established interpretations of
the school by Buddhist and non-Buddhist commentators and even subsequent
developments within the school itself do not exhaust the hermeneutical
options, ambiguities and alternate avenues that could have been followed as
the school evolved. The early Yogacara literature provides many interesting
avenues for future exploration and development and these have by no means
been fully explored or exhausted by contemporary western scholarship on the
subject. It may yet prove to be the case that many of the long cherished
and well established interpretations of the Yogacara school (for instance
that it expounds an uncompromisingly idealistic position) are founded upon
more ambiguous philosophical beginnings than is generally acknowledged. By
approaching the history of ideas from the rear, as it were, a different
picture emerges of the early Yogacara position. It is a picture which
suggests a great deal more in the way of philosophical continuity between
Yogacara and mainstream Abhidharma thought than is often suggested and
points to a doctrinal situation which is decidedly more complex than the
stereotypical representation of citta-matra in the works of later
Yogacarins and their opponents might at first suggest.

Richard King, Department of Religious Studies, University of Stirling,
Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland, UK; e-mail.

NOTES

[1] BECHERT, H. (1982) `The importance of Asokas so-called schism edict in
Indological and Buddhist Studies, Volume in honour of Professor J. W. de
Jong, Canberra, pp. 61-68.

[2] KING, R. (1994) Early Yogacara and its relationship with the Madhyamaka
school, Philosophy, East and West, 44(4), pp. 659-686.

[3] A recent example of the contextualisation of the Yogacara concept of
alayavijnana in terms of its prevailing Abhidharma background is WALDRON,
W. (1994, 1995) How Innovative is the Alayavijnana? The alayavijnana in the
context of canonical and Abhidharma vijnana theory, journal of Indian
Philosophy, 22, pp. 199-258 and 23, pp. 9-51.

[4] FRAUWALLNER, E. (1951) On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law
Vasubandhu (eerie Orientale Roma m). See also FRAUWALLNER, E. (1961)
Landmarks in the history of Indian logic in Wiener Zeitschrift fur die
Kunde Sud-Ostasiens, Vol. v, p. 131.

[5] DOWLING, T. (1976) Vasubandhu on the Avijnapti-Rupa: a study in
fifth-century Abhidharma Buddhism, unpublished Ph.D thesis, Columbia
University, p. 52.

[6] Ibid., p. 73.

[7] Ibid., p. 85.

[8] asrayo hi sa aryanam darsanabhavanamargasamarthyat tatha paravrtto
bhavati yatha na punas tatpraheyanam klesanam prarohasamartho bhavati ato
`gnidagdhavrivad abijibhuta asrayah klesanam prahinklesa ityucyate. Ibid.,
p. 59, and esp. p. 94.

[9] darsana marga vyutthitasyavisesa darsana prahata vyaprahanat
pratyagrasraya parivrtti nirmala santati vartate. Translation by Dowling,
ibid., p. 106.

[10] HARVEY, PETER (1995) The Selfless Mind: personality, consciousness and
Nirvana in early Buddhism (London, Curzon Press) pp. 155-179, 217-226.

[11] KEENAN, JOHN, P. (1982) Original purity and the focus of early
Yogacara, journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 5,
pp. 7-18.

[12] SCHMITHAUSEN, L. (1987) Alayavijnana: on the origin and the early
development of a central concept of Yogacara philosophy (Tokyo,
International Institute of Buddhist Studies) pp. 7-8.

[13] GETHIN, RUPERT (1994), Bhavanga and rebirth according to the
Abhidhamma, in: The Buddhist Forum, Vol. III (London, School of Oriental
and African Studies) p. 35.

[14] DOWLING, T. op. cit., note 4, p. 64.

[15] SCHMITHAUSEN, op. cit., note 11, pp. 4-7.

[16] For details and full references see WALDRON, W. (1995), How Innovative
is the Alayavijnana ? The alayavijnana in the context of canonical and
Abhidharma vijnana theory, journal of Indian Philosophy, 23, pp. 38-39,
notes 177 and 178.

[17] Glossed by Yasomitra as `duravabodha, 'difficult to understand'. See
Abhidharma-Kosa-bhasyavyakhya IV.4.

[18] ANACKER, S. (1984) (Seven Works of Vasubhandhu, p. 159n) (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass) argues that Vasubhandhu accepts the necessity of
external stimuli in his Mahaydnasamgraha-bhasya (Peking/Tokyo ed. Tibetan
canon, vol. 112, p. 275,4,3). Anacker also suggests that Vadavidhi 32
understands alaya to be little more than a metaphor for the idea of karmic
seeds as a collective (ibid., p. 183n). In Mahayanasamgraha-bhasya (vol.
112. p. 277,5,1) 'seeds' are a metaphor for 'a special force within the
consciousness series'. See also ANAKER, ibid., p. 71, where he argues that
in the Pancaskandhaka-prakarana 'series' is nothing other than a metaphor
for the genetic relationship between aggregate moments.

[19] See AUNG DAVIDS & RHYS-DAVIDS, trans., Points of Controversy, passim.,
Dowling, op. cit., note 4, pp. 68-70. MCGOVERN (1923) Manual of Buddhist
Philosophy, I, pp. 128-129, translates avijnapti as 'not-manifested', and
its opposite `vijnapti' as 'manifested'. Following this one might want to
render the Yogacara term `vijnaptimatra' as 'manifestation-only' or
'appearance-only'.

[20] See VERDU, A. (1985) Early Buddhist Philosophy in the Light of the
Four Noble Truths (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass), pp. 35-37.

[21] mid., p.36.

[22] Ibid., p. 37.

[23] TAKAKUSU, J. Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 69.

[24] Note that Vasubhandhu places 'subject' before 'object' in the scheme
of things in his Trimsika. Vasubhandu suggests that there are three types
of vijnana-parinama, which occur upon the fruition of karman. They are: (i)
vipaka--different fruition; (ii) manas--deliberating fruition; (iii)
visaya-vijnapti--object-manifestation see Yamada Isshi (1977)
Vijnaptimctrata of Vasubhandhu in Journal of Royal Asiatic Studies, pp.
162-163.

[25] quoted in Waldron, (1994), op. cit., note 2, p. 211.

[26] For a discussion of this Abhidharma context, see for instance KING, R.
(1995) Early Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism: the Mahayana context of the
Gaudapadiya-Karika (Albany, State University Of New York Press), pp.
108-118.

[27] citta-matropalambbena jneyarthanupalambhata, jneyarthanupalambbena
syac cittanupalambhata.

[28] upalabdhim samastitya nopalabdhih prajayate, nopalabdhim samasrit a
nopalabdhih prajayate.

[29] See OSAKI, A. (1977-1978) What is meant by destroying the
alayavijnana?, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 26, pp. 1064-1069.
In Mahayana-samgraha III.9, Asanga points put that one enters the perfected
nature (parinispanna-svabhava) upon the complete cessation (nirakarana) of
the notion of 'Cognitive-Representation-Only' vijnaptimtrasamjna), there
being no object to be so represented.

[30] LAMOTTE, E. (1938) Mahayana-samgraha: la Somme du Grand Vehicule
d'Asanga (Louvain, Bibliotheque du Museon), tome II, p. 85.

[31] See Anacker, (1984), ibid., p. 183n.

[32] Abbidharmakosa-vyakhya ad. II. 36c d. See Waldron, op. cit., note 2,
p. 213 and p. 252, note 147.

[33] artha-sattvatma-vinapti-pratibhasam prajayate, vijnanam nasti
casyarthas tad abhavat tad apy asat.

[34] For the basis of this view in the Pali canon see RAHULA, W. (1974),
p.28. For the Abhidharma version see Basubandhu's Abbidharmakosa-bhasya
5.25.

~~~~~~~~

By RICHARD KING
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