A Pre-Buddhist Meditation System and its Early Modifications

·期刊原文

A Pre-Buddhist Meditation System and its Early Modifications by Gotama the Bodhisattva ( I )

Biswadeb Mukherjee
Visiting professor Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies
(p455~p480)

---

455 页

Summary

The present paper is the first part of the article

dealing with the modifications wrought by Gotama the

Bodhisattva in the Sramana system of meditation which

had gained prominence even before the rise of the

Buddhism.The problem has been dealt with reference to

the 4 rupa jhanas created by the Parama-ditt

hadhamma-nibbanavadins long before the advent of the

Buddha.In this paper an attempt has been made to form a

clear idea about the 4 rupa jhanas.

The formulas of the 4 jhanas contain informations

not only about the mental states in different stages

of meditation but also about the process leading to

such states.The interpretations of these formulas

given in the Buddhist commentaries are of a much later

date, and are more a reflection of the current

Buddhist thoughts than that of the Parama-ditthadhamma-

nibbanavada.

It is, however, imperative that to understand truly

the import of the 4 jhanas we must understand the

philosophy of the Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavada of

which these jhanas originally formed a part.An attempt

has, therefore, been made to reconstruct this

philosophy.It has been shown that the sole purpose for

which the Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbana-vadins led a

religious life was not to gain enlightment but to

experience an agreeable feeling like pitisukha, sukha

etc.Nibbana merely stood for an unhindered enjoyment of

an agreeable feeling. The meditative technique, the

modes of formulation of the 4 jhana states are but the

products of this philosophy.And it is in the light of

this philosophy that we have tried to understand the

import of the jhana formulas, comprehend the true

meaning of the technical terms like upekkha, sukha,

vitakka, vicara etc. and to reconstruct the meditative

technique employed by the Parama-dittadhamma-

456 页

nibbanavadins.

The present paper thus prepares the ground for the

proper understanding of the extent and nature of the

modifications made by Gotama the Bodhisattva in the

Sramana system of meditation. This contribution of

the Bodhisattva will be discussed in the second part

of the article.

457 页

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION

It is well known that the Buddhists in its process

of growth incorporated and modified many non-Buddhist

ideas and practices. This process seems to have

started with Gotama still faring on his journey

towards enlightment.( 注 1) The ideas modified by

Gotama the Bodhisttva remained a part and parcel of

the Way later preached by the Buddha.This process can

be fruitfully studied with reference to what is

generally known as the system of four rupa meditations

(jhana).

The Brahmajala-sutta mentions the four jhanas as a

part of the spiritual practice of the religious sect

of the Parama-dittha-dhamma-nibbanavadins. （注 2) It

appears that this was the earliest of the religious

sects to be associated with the four jhanas.Again the

Buddhist suttas speak of a system of meditation where

the four jhanas are followed by the four a 

rupya-samapattis.( 注 3) These eight stages of

meditation are jointly called attha-samapattis in the

Nikayas.It appears that the followers of the a 

rupya meditation also practised the four jhanas but

did not accept these stages as final attainments, as

the Nirvana in this very world, and proceeded further

upto the stage of neither-perception-

nor-not-perception.We will later see that both these

groups of meditators followed the same technique of

negating the undesiarable mental factor only for

attaining a higher state of meditation.

This view may be objected on the ground that the

account in which the four jhanas precede the four

arupya samapattis is a creation of the Buddhists

and does not reflect the original tradition of the a-

rupya meditators.In support of this

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(1) The Dvedhavitakkasutta (Majjhima Nikaya. Vol. I.

P. 114ff. Ed. V. Trencker, P.T.S. 1979) bears

testimony to the fact of Gotama's practising and

modifying the system of four rupa jhanas which

appears to have been originally developed by

the pre-Buddhist Sramans sect of the

Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins.

(2) Digha Nikaya, Vol. I. pp. 36 ～ 38

(3) See,ibid.pp.34 ～ 35, pp.183ff.Majjhima Nikaya,Vol.

I.pp.33,410,454～55;Dhammasangani (PTS.ED.E.Muller,

19) pp.55ff.etc.

(4) See pp.476～477of the present article, also note no.

31.

458 页

opinion we may point out that even a cursory glance at

the four jhanas recorded in the Buddhist suttas in a

gradually ascending order, will immediately show that

the higher states of meditation invariably reject a

mental factor of the immediately preceding lower

jhanas.The formulations of two such states of

meditation even use identical expression for the

mental factor valued in the lower state but rejected

in the higher state of meditation.On the contrary the

first arupya samapatti which immediately follows the

fourth rupa jhana, does not reject any of the mental

factors attained in the fourth rupa jhana.The first

arupya meditation does not, therefore, appear to have

been necessarily preceded by the fourth rupa jhana.

This objection could be negotiated if we pay

attention to the technical terms characterising the

fourth rupa jhana, viz. adukkhamasukham and purified

sati (sati-parisuddhi).(注 5) None of these jhanic

traits could be given up by any meditator who is

striving to advance further than the forth

jhana.Purified sati constitutes the very essence of

the mental state of an advanced meditator.Its presence

in the first arupya meditation is to be taken for

granted even though it is not mentioned by name in the

jhanic formula.Moreover the feeling (vedana  )

adukkhamasukham being a neutral feeling, is not an

impediment to spiritual growth, and so need not be

given up.(注 6) We may even insist that this neutral

feeling must be preserved, for the absence of this

feeling would automatically give rise to some other

feeling which would agitate the mind.The point to be

taken note of in this respect is that none of the mental

factors in the fourth jhana is dispensable, or should

be given up.

On the basis of the above discussion we may

conclude that the mere absence of rejection of a

characteristic of the fourth jhana in the description

of the first arupya meditation cannot be construed as

an evidence against the tradition that the first a 

rupya meditation immediately follows the fourth

jhana.Moreover this

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(5) See page 463 of the present article.

（6) Also see vasubandhu on manopavicara,

dharmopavicara （Abhidharma-kosabhasya,

ED.P.Pradhan, Patna, 1967, pp.146 ～ 49)

in their relation to the Arupyadhatu;

H.Guna-ratana, The Path of Serenity and Insight

(Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1985) p. 119.

459 页

tradition is confirmed by the statement that the first

arupya meditation is attained by transcending the

sphere of rupa.( 注 7)The system of four jhanas

practised by the Buddhists as well as by two

influential groups of pre-Buddhist sramanas may be

regarded as one of the important contributions made by

the s'ramanas to the religious culture of India.

As already noted the Parama-ditthadhamma-

nibbanavadins appears to be the earliest religious

group to practise the four jhanas, and thus they

should be credited with the original formulation of

the four jhanic states.It is, therefore, obvious that

to understand the transformation the system of four

rupa meditations underwent at the hand of Gotama the

Bodhisattva we must first be clear about the exact

implication of these jhanic fourmulas and other

aspects of the Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavada

philosophy.

Our study of the Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavada

philosophy, however, is bound to suffer greatly from

the scarcity of materials, as no literature of this

group has come down to us. Our only source consists

of the fragments of informations preserved in the

Buddhist scripture about this group.The available

translations of such materials are generally based on

later Buddhist commentaries by Buddhaghosa and

others, whereas the Parama-dittha-nibbanavadins

flourished long before the Buddha.Thus there is a gap

of more than 1000 years between the later Buddhist

commentaries and the original formulation of the

non-Buddhist materials preserved in the Buddhist

scriptures.Moreover much of such materials became a

part of Buddhism even during the lifetime of the

Buddha. Consequently the Buddhists in course of time

came to interpret the four jhanas and other materials

in the light of their own philosophy. This situation

warns us against blind acceptance of the explanations

given in the later Buddhist texts.

The philosophy and the four jhanic formulations

are but a reflection of their jhanic experience and

the method of meditation followed by them.All these

aspects form an integrated whole.A proper

understanding of any part of this system of

meditation is, therefore, dependent on the

understanding of other parts.

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(7) Note the following expression in the first Arupya

meditation : ayam atta sabbaso rupasannanam

samatikkama patighasannanam atthagamana

nattasannanam amanasikara "Ananto akaso"ti"

akasanancayatanu pago".(Digha Nikaya, I, p. 34).

460 页

For the sake of convenience we may start with a

translation of the relevant materials as given in the

Brahmajala-sutta of the Digha Nikaya.The deviations

from the current translations will be justified later

in course of our discussion.

Ⅱ. TRANSLATION

a)Preparatory stage

The relevant passages of the Brahmajalasutta

giving a short sketch of the philosophy and the

religious practices of the Parama-ditthadhamma-

nibbanavadins may be translated as follows:

Bhikkhus, there are some samanas and brahmanas,

advocates of the supreme Nibbana in the visible

world, who declare in five ways the supreme

Nibbana for the existing beings. On what

authoritative tradition, on what basis do these

honourable samanas and brahmanas declare the

supreme Nibbana through 5 objects in the

visible world for an existing being?Here some

monk and brahmana speak thus and hold such a

false view (ditthi): "Sir, as the soul (atta )

which is supplied with the five objects of

desire, is in complete possession of them,

enjoys himself, Sir, the soul thus has attained

the supreme Nibbana in the visible world."(注 8)

Thus do some proclaim the supreme Nibbana in

the visible world for an existing being.

b)Final stage

To him someone else says:

"Sir there is indeed this atta of which you

speak. I do not say that this

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(8) Yato......ayam atta pancahi kamagunehi samappito

samangibhuto paricareti ettavata......ayam atta

parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanappatto hoti (D. Nikaya I,

p.36 ).

461 页

does not exist, but this atta thus has not

attained the supreme Nibbana in the visible

world.Why? Sir, the desirable objects (kama)

are impermanent, painful, and naturally subject

to change; as they become transformed grief,

lamentation, pain, melancholy and despair

(soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upayasa) arise.

Since this atta  having separated itself from

desirable objects and unwholesome mental states

attains the first jhana and abides therein

which is born of separation (vivekajam),

characterised by rapturous happiness

(pitisukham) and accompanied by thoughts of

enquiry and judgemental decision (savitakkam

savicaram),( 注 9) to that extent it has

attained the supreme nibbana in the visible

world."

Thus do some declare the supreme nibbana in the

visible world of an existing being.

To him someone else says:

"Sir, there is indeed this atta of which you

speak.I do not say that this does not exist,

but the atta has not thus attained the supreme

nibbana in the visible world. Why? Since in

this case (the mind) is invloved with vitakka

and vicara, it is called gross (olarikam).Since

the atta due to calming down of the vitakka and

vicara ( vitakka-vicaranam vupasama) attains

and abides in the second jhana which is

characterised by internal clarity, a state of

mind directed towards one object, （注

10)absence of vitakka and vicara, born of

concentration (sama-dhijam), of rapturous

happiness(pitisukham), so the atta has attained

the supreme nibbana in the visible world."

Thus do some declare the supreme nibbana in

the visible world. To him...... Why? ─

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(9) kama hi bho anicca dukkha viparinamadhamma,

tesam viparinamannatha-bhava upapajjanti

soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upayasa.Yato ...

...ayam atta vivicc'eva kamehi vivicca

akusaladhammehi...... pathamajjhanam upasamajja

viharati....(D. Nikaya Vol. I. pp. 36 ～ 37 ).

462 页

"Indeed the atta has not thus attained the

supreme Nibbana in the visible world. Since in

that case (the mental state) is merged in joy

(pitigatam), and is a state of agitation of

mind (cetaso ubbilla-vitattam),( 注 11)so this

is called gross. Since this atta due to its

detachment (viraga)

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(10 ） Ekodi of ekodibhava was first explained by

S.Levi as ekoti (W.Geiger, A Pali Grammar, PTS

1994, 38. 3). The Nibandhana of the

Arthavini'scaya-sutra supports this

explanation (see, N.H.Samtani (ed.)

Arthaviniscaya-sutra and Its Commentary

Nibandhana, patna, 1971, p. 182). The relevant

passage runs as follows: ekasabdo nanyavaci,

utir gatih, eka sa utisceti ekotih, ekoter

bhavah ekotibhavah, cetasa eka gatir

alambanety arthah ...... The word "eka",

one, single, means "not anything else".uti

Signifies movement, the act of going.' One

movement (ekoti) means the movement (sagati)

is unidirectional (eka  ). The state of

unidirectional movement is "ekotibhavah."

The implication (artha) of one-movement is one

object of attention (alambana). So "cetaso

ekodibhava" means a state of mind directed

towards one single object.(The ekodibhave of

the third jhana develops into perfect

mindfulness of the fourth jhana) As A.

Wayman points out, the Sravakabhumi while

speaking of nine grades of mental

concentration makes it clear that samadhi

marks the highest state of mental

concentration and is immediately preceded by

ekotbhava.From the point of view of mental

concentration ekotibhava is less developed than

samadhi (Kamaleshwar Nath Mishra (ed.).Aspects

of Buddhist Sanskrit, Central Institute of

Higher Tibetan Studies, 1993.p. 478).It may be

noted here that both the Dhammasangani

(Ed.Edward Muller, PTS , 1978, p. 21) and the

Abhidharma- Koshabhasya of Vsubandhu

(Ed. P. Pradhan, K. P. Jayaswal Research

Institute, Patna, 1967, p. 54) equate sama

dhi with "cittasya ekagrata".

(11) The expression "ubbilla vitattam" should mean

a "state of agitation".It is an abstract noun

made out of the causative past participle

"ubbillavita" of the verbal root vell with the

prefix "ud".The following rules should be taken

into consideration in understanding the term:

1) Frequently "e" is shortened to "i" before

double consonants (Geiger, Pali Grammar,15.1);

2) Voicing of "p" to "v" is common in Pali

(Geiger, ibid. 38.5).So ubbillapita seems to be

the original form of ubbillavita.3) Dv becomes

bb through vv by progressive assimilation.

463 页

from rapture (piti), is equanimous

(upekkhako), mindful (sato) and understanding

(sampajanno) and experiences happiness

(sukha) ─ whom (i.e.the atta)the aryans call

"equanimous, mindful, and dwelling in happiness

’─ dwells having attained the third jhana,

thus the atta  has attained the supreme

nibbana in the visible world." Thus do some

declare the supreme nibbana in the visible

world.

c) The fourth jhana

To him...... Why?

"Since in that case sukha (happiness) means the

enjoyment throught attention (abhoga)( 注 12)

of mind, due to this it is called gross

(olarika).Since, sir, due to the abandoning

(pahana) of happiness, due to the abandoning of

pain (dukkha) due to the previous disappearance

of gladness and sadness (somanassa-domanassanam

atthagama) tihs atta attains and abides in the

fourth jhana of neither-pain-nor-happiness

(adukkhamasukham) and purity of mindfulness due

to indifference (upekkha-sati-parisuddhim), (

注 13) this atta  has attained the supreme

nibbana in this world."

Thus do some declare the supreme Nibbana in

the visible world of an existing being.

Ⅲ. PHILOSOPHY

The core of the Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbana

philosophy mainly deals with the three types of

feelings dukkha, sukha and adukkhamasukham.It is,

therefore, necessary to know clearly what these

concepts stand for before we commence our study of the

philosophy of this religious group.

These three feelings together with piti are all

mental reactions to physical

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(12) See p. 474 of the present article for the

discussion of the term abhoga; also note that

Vasubandhu (ibid. p. 54) explains the act of

paying attention as enjoyment of mind:

manaskarascetasa abhogah.

(13) See pp. 474 ～ 475 of the present article.

464 页

sensations.They are all associated with the body and

thus differ from somanassa and domanassa which are

purely mental in origin.The connection of piti with

the body is clear from a statement in the Digha Nikaya

I, 73:

Gladness (pamojja) arises within him; thus

gladdened rapture (piti) arises in him; and

when he is rapturous his body becomes tranquil.

Tranquility in turn leads to sukha (physical

happiness) on the basis of which mind becomes

concentrated.Buddhaghosa's description of the five

types of piti( 注 14)also supports this view.According

to him khuddika-piti (minor rapture) is first to

appear and can cause the hairs of the body to

stand.Khanika piti (momentary rapture) is like

lighting, but cannot be sustained for long.Okkantika

piti (showering rapture) runs through the body in

waves, producing a thrill but not a lasting impact;

Ubbegapiti (uplifting rapture) causes leviation while

pharanapiti (all-pervading rapture) suffuses the whole

body.Again Buddhaghosa states that piti annihilates

dukkha which suggests the physical association of

dukkha (bodily pain).The Parama-dittha-dhamma-nibbana

-vadins also believed in the physical association of

piti and the three feelings for they also

differentiated between the three types of feelings and

somanassa- domanassa.Moreover piti is inseparably

connected with sukha, and sukha is explicitly stated

to be experienced through the kaya( 注 15)in the

description of the third jhana.

The Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbannavadins were

divided into four groups.Each of these groups

identified the experience of one of the four jhanas

with the attainment of Nibbana in this visible

world.The fourth jhana represents the highest peak of

agreeable experience that can be attained by this

religious sect.

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(14) Heneploa Gunaratana, ibid. pp. 61 ～ 62;

Visuddhimagga (Ed. Henry Clarke Warren.Revised

by Dhammananda Kosambi, Harvard University

press, 1950) p.117.

(15) kaya means both body and the mental states in

Buddhist scriptures.Perhaps both these meanings

are implied in the present context.The

Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins most

probably used the expression"kayena"in order to

show the association of sukha with body.

465 页

It can be reasonably assumed that like the different

religious groups of that time the Parama-ditt-

hadhamma-nibbanavadins also strove for the cessation

of dukkha, the painful feeling.

The end of dukkha may either merely mean the

absence of dukkha, or it may indicate the presence of

an agreeable feeling which prevents the rise of dukkha

in mind, and thus marks the cessation of any further

experience of the painful feeling.As we have already

pointed out, dukkha, being a feeling ( vedana ), is

like the other two feelings, invariably connected with

the body, and the notion of " I ".( 注 16)So long a

meditator possesses a body, he is bound to experience

one feeling or the other, and in accordance with his

spiritual development, will either appreciate it as

the final goal or be dissatisfied with any of the

feelings other than the feeling of adukkhamasukham

(neither-pain-nor-happiness).Such a feeling is

regarded as the highest, the best (parama) Nibbana

in the world.The use of the attribute "parama" shows

that the feeling recognised as Nibbana can only

stand for one type of agreeable feeling, and not refer

to agreeable feelings of different types.The

eradication of the false reality of "I" is neither

attempted nor aspired for, as the sole aim of

spiritual life is the personal enjoyment of an

agreeable feeling.

Each of the four jhanic states contains two types

of mental factors.The first type (e.g.sati,

sampajanna etc.) represents the knower aspect of mind

while the second type deals with that aspect which is

to be known.The second type includes pitisukha, sukha,

and adukkhamasukham which not only negate dukkha, the

painful feeling, but also constitute positive,

agreeable elements to be felt. Thus of all the factors

in the jhanic states only these three types of

feelings can be equated with the supreme Nibbana

in the visible world.

As the three feelings are co-existent with the

body, one can only try not to be overwhelmed by a

feeling which is either painful or unsatisfactory to

him.One can even so exert oneself that these

undesirable feelings do not arise in the mind.This

situation finds its reflection in the use of such

terms as viraga (detachment), pahana (giving up) and

upekkha  (indifference).( 注 17) All these terms

can be used.

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(16) See p. 463 of the present article; Digha Nikaya

, Voll. II, p. 67 (PTS, London 1982); Chung Hwa

Fo Hsueh Hsueh Pao (No.6, July, 1993) p.416～17

466 页

only with reference to something which has not been

destroyed, which may manifest itself under suitable

circumstances. One can only give up what one

possesses.One cannot be indifferent to or detached

from what is non-existent.All these terms refer to

feelings associated with the body and possessed by the

atta.It is, however, possible to have full control

over the moods of happiness and depression (somanassa

and domanassa), and to cause their disappearance, for

the factors responsible for their origin are

exclusively mental.According to the Milinda Panha:

"Since the ground and condition for the

arising of the feelings of bodily pain are

not yet removed, therefore he may yet

experience the feeling of bodily pain.Since

however, the ground and condition for the

arising of the feeling of mental pain are

removed, therefore he can no longer experience

the feeling of mental pain."( 注 18)

This state of things is indicated by the use of the

term "atthagama " with reference to somanassa and

domanassa.( 注 19)

They believed that the agreeable feelings

associated with the body could be made stable through

meditation.This conclusion is based on the

observation that they criticise kama and the

agreeable feelings in different ways.Kama or five

objects of desire are criticised on the ground that

they are subject to change and destruction, and thus

cause grief, depression etc.Here the criticism is

based on the impermanancy of the outside objects of

desire.But the internal, agreeable feelings connected

with the body are not criticised on the ground of

impermanency; these are criticised because these are

gross.( 注 20) The meditator

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(17) Digha Nikaya, Vol.I, p.37; also see pp. 460 ～ 463

of the present article.

(18) See p. 463 of the present article; Dgha Nikaya,

I, P. 37

(19) See pp. 460 ～ 463 of the present article; also

note the following statements in the text: kama

hi bho anicca, or yad eva tattha vitakkitam.

vicaritam etena etam olarikam, or yad eva

tattha pitigatam cetaso ubbilla-vitattam etena

etam olarikam, or yad eva tattha pitigatam cetaso

ubbilla-vitattam etena etam olarikam, or yad eva

tattha sukham iti cetaso abhogo etena etam

olarikam ( Digha Nikaya, Vol. I. pp.36 ～ 37).

467 页

is attached to the enjoyment of agreeable feelings

and he wants to have more intense and higher type of

enjoyment through subtler feelings.But he is not

worried about the possibility of the absence of a

feeling which is agreeable to him.This shows that he

is confident that the feeling is stable and not

subject to involuntary changes.A feeling is

considered gross if it adversely affects the quality

of enjoyment as well as the power of the mind to

enjoy.For grosser the feeling is, the greater is the

agitation it causes and thus diminishes the

concentration and the intensity of awareness of an

object.The feeling of adukkhamasukham in the fourth

jhana is, therefore, most suitable for the enjoyment

because the nature of the agreeable feeling is so

neutral and subtle that it does not affect at all the

mindfulness and awareness of the meditator.

The grossness of feeling, as it will be shown

later, is due to the presence of vicara and vitakka in

the first jhana, due to its being ubbillavitattam in

the second jhana, and due to the abhoga of mind in the

third jhana.( 注 21)

The Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins believed

in the notion of atta  and were actually striving

for the enjoyment of ego-centric pleasure.So their

mindfulness and awareness were not perfect, and they

failed to understand the true nature of vedana  .It

is also for the same reason that they failed to

appreciate the role of mindfulness and awareness as a

means to realise the truth.To them these mental

faculties were for perfecting the quality of

experience of vedana .Moreover this led to imperfect

development of morality, as is evident from their

concept of akusala- dhamma.

From the above discussion it follows that the

Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbana-vada is a kind of Sakka

ya-ditthi according to which the atta has vedana 

.This religious sect was not concerned with the

eternity or destructibility of atta.Their nibbana

was the attainment by the atta  of an agreeable

feeling which is extremely subtle, neutral,

unchangeable (i.e.not subject to involuntary change)

and absolutely free from dukkha.Every human being

possessed a number of souls (atta ), and each of

these souls enjoyed a particular type of agreeable

feeling; the most subtle of such feelings

(i.e.adukkhamasukham) was worthy of being

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(20) See pp. 478 ～ 480 of the present article; see

note no.19

(21) Vekhanassasutta (Majjhima Nikaya), II, pp. 42 ～

43.

468 页

accepted by all the groups of the Parma-ditt

hadhamma-nibbanavadins as the supreme nibbanana in

the visible world.

Ⅳ. Comments on the jhanic formula

a) On the progression from lower to higher jhana

In the preparatory stage an individual tries to be

free from suffering (dukkha) through the enjoyment of

five types of kama (panca vatthuhi).When he has

complete mastery over the kamas with which he is

abundantly provided (samappitam samangibhutam), he

thinks that he has attained Nibbana, the very

opposite of dukkha.Now what is meant by kame in the

present context?

Kama may mean either "desire" or "object of

desire".In the present context kama should be

understood in the sense of "object of desire", for it

is stated that when kama undergoes change or

destruction, one suffers grief, lamentation etc.Here

kama cannot mean "desire", for destruction of desire

is always considered desirable as a spiritual

attainment, and an asket would surely not grieve for

it.So kama means five types of desirable

sense-objects.Objects of mind or dhammas are not

included in the category of kama.The Buddhists also

used the term kama in the sense of sense-objects in

some suttas.( 注 22)

It is to be noted that the agreeable mental state

arising out of the enjoyment of five types of external

objects is not called "sukha".It is not given any

particular name, and is simply equated with the

supreme Nibbana as it keeps in abeyance the

disagreeable mental states.Sukha is a technical term

which stands for a particular type of feeling of

happiness to be experienced only in meditation of the

rupa sphere.

According to the informations preserved in the

Brahmajalasutta, the medi-tator understands the

disadvantages of kama because of its impermanency and

the resultant unwholesome mental states of grief

etc.Consequently he separates himself from the

desirable sense- objects and unwholesome mental states

(kamehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi vivicca).This

sequence of happenings in the life of a meditator is

instructive.It is obvious that the meditator's

separation from

──────────────

(22) Majjhima Nikaya, Vol. I, pp. 114ff.

469 页

kama and akusala-dhamma is the result of his

judgemental deliberations showing the disadvantages of

kama.Such deliberations, as we shall see later, are

comparable to vitakka referred to in the Dvedha 

vitakkasutta.These deliberations are based on the

direct experience of the meditator regarding the

impermanency of sense-objects, and they create

aversion for the sense-objects and thus enable the

meditator to get separated from them.

As already noted in the prepartory stage, the

meditator experiences kamas and the resultant painful

mental states of grief etc.This is immediately

followed by the statement that the meditator enters

the first jhana, the description of which includes

such expressions as savitakkam and savicaram and the

information about the giving up of the kamas and the

akusala-dhammas.On the basis of the account given in

the preparatory stage( 注 23)we can conclude that

kama means the five desirable sense-objects, and the

akusala-dhammas refer to the unwholesome mental states

(e.g.grief, lamentation etc.) one experiences due to

the involuntary separation from or destruction of the

kamas.The vicara and the vitakka, on the other hand,

refer to judgemental deliberations concerning only the

experience of the impermanency of the kamas and the

resultant painful mental states.The vitakka and

vicara, as we shall see later, come to an end before

the attainment of the second jhana.But it does not

mean that the meditator has got rid of all types of

deliberations.There are judgemental deliberations

between any two states of meditation.The judgemental

deliberations prefacing the attainments of the second,

third and fourth jhanas are, however, not

concerned with kama, and so no longer called vitakka

and vicara.( 注 24) Both the vitakka and vicara, and

the akusala-dhammas fall within the range of

experience of an ordinary person.

These mental states are called "not

good"(akusala) for they represent a situation which is

just the opposite of nibbana, the ideal agreeable

feeling.The term akusala is not moral in its

implication; it merely indicates the undesirableness

of a mental state that experientially runs counter to

Nibbana.

In order to critically understand the

implications of the jhana formulas it is necessary to

pay attention to the following principles relevant to

a jhanic state:

──────────────

(23) See pp. 458 of the present article; Digha Nika 

ya, I, P. 36

(24) Such mental deliberations are called "adhicitta",

higher thoughts.

470 页

1) Mind in concentration can know only one

object at a time.

2) The description of four jhanas stands for four

different types of mental states and include

not only the characteristics connected with

the act of knowing but alos characteristics

indicating the object to be known.For

example the terms sato, sampajanno etc.

refer to the knowing aspect of mind while

ptisukha, sukha etc. to the objects to be

known.

3) The characteristics of jhanic experience

state are simultaneously present.It is

obvious that there can be only one knowable

element in the jhanic state that the

meditator can be aware of during the series

of moments that constitutes the duration of

a jhana.The other elements in the jhanic

state belong to the aspect of knowing.

We may start with the discussion of the terms of

vitakka and vicara in the expression "savitakkam

savicaram", the practice or non-practice of which is

related to the attainments of the first jhana and the

second jhana respectively.Vasubandhu( 注 25 ) takes

"vitakka" and "vicara" as two types of thoughts and

defines "vitakka" as a mental conversation (manojalpa)

of enquiry (paryesako) which is characterised by

either volition ( cetana ) or discernment (prajna),

and constitutes the grossness of mind.Vicara,

according to him, is a mental conversation of

judgement (pratyaveksaka) characterised by either

volition or discernment.This view of Vasubandhu is

similar to that of the ancient masters.( 注 26)

Thus vitakka and vicara can appear only successively

and not simultaneously. Vasubandhu, therefore, pointed

out that the first jhana has only four parts and not

five parts, viz. piti, sukha, samadhi plus vitakka or

vicara.(注 27)

From the point of view of the Parama-ditthadhamma

-nibbanavadins samadhi is not of primary importance,

so it is not explicitly mentioned in the jhana

formula.And we cannot simply drop either the vitakka

or the vicara; both these

──────────

(25) Vasubandhu in the Prakaranapada states: vitarkah

katamah / paryes ako manojalpas' cetanaprajna- 

visesah/ya cittsyauda rikata // vicarah katamah

/pratyaveksako manojalpas cetanaprajnavisesah /

ya cittsyasuksmata //Abhidharmakosabhasyam,

Louis de La Valle poussin, English tranaslation

Vol. 1, by Leo M. Pruden (California, 1968)

pp. 339 ～ 40, Note no. 171.

471 页

terms are well-grounded in the tradition as a pert of

the jhanic formula which not only originated with the

parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins but also was

followed by the followers of the Arupya sama 

pattis, the Buddha and the later Buddhists.Moreover if

we accept the view of the vaibhasikas, it would follw

that the first jhana is attainable with the help of

the gross vitakka only, and the comparatively subtle

vicara is not indispensable.

We have, therefore, to accept both the vitakka

and vicara as being associated with the first jhana,

and at the same time we have to admit that they, being

successive, cannot be simultaneously present in the

jhanic state.In other words they cannot be regarded as

the features of the first jhana experienced by the

meditator in concentration at any given monent.So it

follows that the expression "savitakkam savicaram" has

to be interpreted in a way that only shows their

relatedness to the first jhana without making them an

integral part of the jhana experienced.This is

possible if we take them as belonging to process

leading to the jhana, but not to the jhanic state.This

suggestion is strengthened if we pay attention to the

drift of the discussion on the Parama-ditt-

hadhamma-nibbanavadins as recorded in the Brahmaja

 lasutta.Here we see that the vitakka and vicara give

rise to the separation (viveka) from kama and

akusaladhammas and this separation in its turn gives

rise to first jhana (vivekajam......pathamajjhanam)

.This shows that the vitakka and vicara become non-

functional before the attainment of the first jhana;

they are not integrated into the jhanic experience,

but only are related to the first jhana through the

intermediary state

──────────────

(26) The ancient masters say: "What is vitarka? A

mental conversation (manojalpa) of enquiry

(paryesaka) wich has for its support volition

(centana) or the speculative consciousness

depending on whether it does or does not contain

deduction (abhyuha).This is the grosser state of

mind.What is vicara? A mental conversation of

appreciation,of judgement (paryaveksaka) which

has for its support volition......."Acoording to

this theory vitarka and vicara constitute two

almost identical psychological complexes:they

differ in that the first includes "inquiry" and

the second "judgement".(Leo M.Pruden, ibid.

p.339, Note no. 171. )

(27) Abhidharmakosabhasyam (P.Pradhan (ed.), pp.60～61

under the sutra "vitarka-caravaudayasuksmate".

472 页

of viveka.This aspects is more explicit in the

Dvedhavitakkasutta.

The immediate cause of pitisukha in the first jhana

is viveka from kama and akusaladhamma.Concentration of

mind cannot be the cause, fot the first jhana is

accompanied by vitakka-vicara.The preparatory stage is

also dominated by deliberations, and not by

samadhi. Therefore this jhana is called "born of

viveka" (vivekajam).

But how are we to understand the meaning of

pitisukha? The term pitisukha is a Bahuvrihi compound

qualifying the expression "pathamam jhanam".But what

is the relationship between its component parts "piti"

and "sukha"?Should it be interpreted as a dvanda

meaning piti and sukha? Or should it be taken to mean

rapturous happiness , a karmadharaya compound?We

should take note of the fact that the religious

strivings of the Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins

were solely directed towards the realisation of an

agreeable feeling which to them was the same as the

supreme Nibbana. Every formula of jhanas is a record

of important spiritual achievements and the jhanic

formulas are so arranged as to show the gradual

progression from grosser feeling to subtler

feeling. Seen from this point of view it is reasonable

to conclude that the term pitisukha should represent

only one kind of feeling; the piti which is not a

feeling, is not an important spiritual achievement.It

is, therefore, better to take pitisukha as a karmadha

raya compound which expresses clearly the quality

of sukha to be felt.The dvanda compound would be a

generalised statement about sukha and would not throw

any light on the precise quality of sukha.Moreover,

only one knowable can be known at a time.Ptisukha as a

dvanda compound would mean the simultaneous presence

of two knowables implying thereby the ability of mind

in concentration to know two objects at one and the

same time.But this is not possible. Hence pitisukha

should be taken as a karmadharaya compound meaning

"repturous happiness".

We have seen in our discussion of "savitakka" and

"savicara" that the jhana formula not only describes

the jhanic state actually experienced but also the

process leading to it.Thus it is possible to interpret

the compound "pitisukha" as piti and sukha if we could

have related it to the process leading to the first

jhana.As a part of the process, the awarenesses of piti

and sukha can occur successively. But this interpretation

excludes the possibility of mentioning any

473 页

agreeable feeling as the ultimate goal of the

spiritual life.Hence this interpretation is not

acceptable.So we have to interpret the compound

"pitisukha" as indicating a type of sukha, the quality

of which has been influenced adversely by piit.The

expression "pitiya viraga" will mean the removal the

influence of piti over sukha.

Some meditators felt dissatisfied with the

experience in first jhana.Due to the presence of

vitakka-vicara this jhana is considered to be olarika

(gross).So the meditator calms down the vitakka-vicara

(vitakka- vicaranam vyupasama). Consequently his mind

becomes more concentrated and he attains the second

jhana which is characterised by the absence of

vitakka-vicara, internal clarity (ajjhattam

sampasadanam) and a state of mind directed towards one

object (cataso ekodibha vam).All these characteristics

reveal the nature of the mental state born of

concentration (samadhijam).The samadhi is incidental,

and the main factor in this jhana for the meditator is

what is to be felt, viz. pitisukha or rapturous

happiness.Due to the influence of samadhi, the second

jhana is more calm compared to the first jhana, so the

pitisukha causes comparatively less agitation, and

should be regarded as less gross than the pitisukha of

the first jhana.

The type of sukha one experiences in the second

jhana is still mixed with piti.The piti, we have seen,

agitates 0the body strongly, and consequently disturbes

the mental calmness. It is because of this piti that

the mental state in the second meditation becomes

merged in piti and consequently suffers from

agitation; this state is therebore called olarika

(gross).So the meditator now gives up "piti" (rapture)

and enters the third jhana and abides therein.

In the formula of the third jhana as given in the

Brahmajalasutta and other places the term "upekkhako"

referring to the atta  who has attained the third

jhana has been mentioned twice."Upekkhako" means that

the atta  has attained upekkha.Now why has the term

upekkhako been mentioned twice? Does it mean that

"upekkhako" refers to the possession of two different

mental states? Or can "upekkha" mean feeling here?

In the first place we read that the atta due to

detachment from rapture (piti) dwells indifferent,

mindful and discerning (pitiya ca viraga upekkhako

ca viharati sato sampajano).Detachment from piti is

the cause of upekkha, and upekkha is

474 页

surely linked to piti. Upekkha merely implies one who

is indifferent to piti.It is not a feeling, it is a

mental action by which no attention is paid to piti.

Upekkha here appears to be similar to amanasikara, a

term used by the arupyavadins in their jhana formula.

(注 28)

The jhana formula mentions for the socond time

the term "upekkhako" while quoting the statement made

by the Noble Ones in confirmation of the mental state

in the third jhana referred to above(yan tam ariya

acikkhanti "upekkhako satima sukhavihari").In both

the places upekkhako means the same thing.This

conclusion is supported by the use of almost

identical language in both the cases.Moreover, as the

feeling of "sukha" is experienced by the atta in this

jhana, upekkha  cannot be taken as a feeling here.

The sukha is free from the influence of piti,

and, therefore, more developed and subtle in the third

jhana.Sukha is regarded as the supreme Nibbana in

the visible world by the meditator.

But the meditator does not remain satisfied for

long with this experience in the third jhana his

mental concentration, mindfulness, and power of

discernment have alos become quite developed.These

mental faculties at first enables him to enjoy the

feeling of sukha more intensely, but gradually leads

him to the discernment of grossness in sukha.Sukha is

no longer the supreme Nibbana for him.

What is the reason for his perception of

grossness in sukha? It is connected with the "abhoga"

of mind, the mental enjoyment. The word "abhoga" is

derived from the root √bhuj which can mean "to

bend" or "to enjoy".Thus "abhoga" implies some

actiivity of mind in the form of paying attention in

order to enjoy the feeling of sukha.( 注 29)This

disturbs the mental calmness and adversely affects

the enjoyment of an agreeable feeling.Hence the

grossness of sukha.

The first part of the fourth jhanic formula

appears to summarise the spiritual

──────────────

(28) For reference, see Note nos 3.

(29) Cf. Manaskara is the modification (abhoga)of

mind; in other words, "to bend" or "to apply" the

mind towards an object.(Manaskara is explanined

as manasah karah or manah karoty avarjayati),

see, Leo M.Pruden, ibid.p. 190.

475 页

gains achieved so far.The meditator had been able to

remain free from the influence of dukkha, otherwise he

would not be able to enjoy pitisukha in the first

jhana. Again it is by giving up the pure feeling of

sukha he was able to experience the more subtle

feeling of adukkhamasukham in the fourth jhana. The

purely mental feelings of somanassa and domanassa have

disappeared even before (pubbebbha) the giving up of

sukha, and the mind need not react to these mental

feelings any more. So upekkha of upekkha-satiparisuddhi

in the fourth jhana should not be realated to

somanassa and domanassa.But the feeling of sukha being

associated with body cannot be totally destroyed,

though the meditator does not identify himself anymore

with sukha and dukkha, and can disassociate himself

from them.So the ability of mind to know a thing

perfectly is no longer affected by the experience of

dukkha and sukha.The phrase upekkha-satiparisuddhi

should thus mean either "purity of mindfulness due to

equanimity" or "equanimity and purity of

mindfulness."Equanimity is here with reference to

dukkha and sukha, and is not associated with somanassa

and domanassa.

I have accepted the first interpretation, as it

tallies with the explanation given in the Vibhanga.

( 注 30) Upekkha in this case can in no way be

understood as feeing. The only feeling to be

experienced in the fourth jhana is adukkhamasukham

for the sake of which the comparatively grosser

feeling of sukha of the third jhana had to be given

up. This is the most subtle bodily feeling that a

meditator can experience.It does not hamper at all the

perfect execution of the activity of mindfulness.The

concept of adukkhamasukham as the supreme Nibbana 

na was not rejected by any group of the

Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins.

We are now able to critically comment on the

contents of a jhana formula.The jhana formula appears

to be mnemonic statement not only about mental

elements determining the quality of the mind that

experineces and a mental element as an object of

experience but also about the meditative technique and

process leading to the attainment of a jhana.

──────────────

(30) Vibhanga (Rangoon, Burma, Buddhasasana Samiti,

1961) p. 271; H. Gunaratana, ibid. p. 99.

476 页

b)Meditative technique

The Parama-ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins followed an

identical method of meditation before and after the

attainment of t first jhana.In both the cases we read

about the rejection of undesirable mental elements

(e.gkusaladhamma, pitisukha etc. ) but not abou the

wilful and direct cultivation of the desireble

element.This will be clear when we analyse the

spiritual exertions of the followers of this sect.They

suffer from soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upayasa 

when they lose the desirable objects which they were

so long enjoying.This entire series of undesirable

mental elements can be for the sake of convenience put

under the category of the feeling of dukkha.In order

to get rid of the feeling of dukkha from which they

were suffering and to attain the first jhana they only

put forth efforts to get separated from the desirable

objects and the resultant feeling of dukkha, but do

not at all strive for the direct cultivation of the

agreeable feeling of pitisukha to be enjoyed in the

first jhana.Due to the conscious rejection of kama and

akusaladhamma the feeling of pitisukha automatically

arises in the mind.It appears that the expulsion of

the undesirable feeling and the appearance of the

desirable feeling happen almost simultaneously, for so

long the body exists one must experience one or the

other feeling.

But how does one get rid of the undesirable mental

elements of kama and akusaladhammas? In the Brahmaja-

lasutta account of the Parama-dittha-nibbanavadins

we read that an undesiarable mental factor gets

eliminated when the meditator becomes aware of the

disadvantages associated with this factor and mentally

expresses them. This account seems to be incomplete.

Such adverse criticism will creat aversion for the

said mental element.But the cultivation of the

aversion only will not be able to negate the

undesirable element.Intense cultivation of aversion

for an element would cause the element to be

constantly present in the toughts of the

meditator.Consequently the undesirable element will

not recede into the background; on the contrary it

would get strengthened and adversely affect the entire

mental state.What is necessary is not to pay any

attention to it.When the adverse criticism has

weakened the attachment for the undesirable element

and generated aversion for it, criticism of it should

be stopped, so that thoughts are no longer directed

towards it.This process, though

477 页

not expressly stated, must have been followed by the

Prama-dittha-nibbana-navadins, as it is evident from

their success in eliminating the harmful element.Our

conclusion gains support when we take note of the fact

that sramana Gotama as a Bodhisattva and the other

sramana sects of the arupyavadins and the

ucchedavadins are explicitly stated to have followed

the same method of not paying attention to the

undesirable element, as is evident form the use of the

term "amanasikara " etc. in the formulas of the 

arupyasama pattis.( 注 31)

We may conclude that the same method of

eliminating the undesirable element by first creating

aversion leading to the destruction of attachment for

it, and then paying no attention to it was also

followed in getting rid of piti and sukha in the

higher stages of meditation. Partial confirmation of

our interpretation of the four jhanas can be found in

the writing of the early Buddhist masters. That the

confirmation is partial is to be expected. For our

interpretation of the jhanic formulas is based on the

philosophy of the Parama-dittha-dhamma-nibbanavadins

, the original formulators of these formulas.

Sanghabhadra states that the vitakka and vicara are

two types of thought and cannot occur at the same

time.The Sautrantika teachers also point out that as

the vitakka and vicara belong to the same species,

they must arise successively and not simultaneously.

They further state that vedana and samjna belonging

to different species can exist simultaneously.It is

to be noted that priti has not been mentioned in this

connection.( 注 32)The non-mention of priti might

show that the Sautrantikas did not accept priti as an

independent characteristic of the jhana experienced.

This is in conformity with the philosophy of the

Parama-dittha-dhamma-nibbanavadins,

──────────────

(31) The non-Buddhist sramana sects were following a

method of comprehending the demerits of the

object of attraction in order to get rid of the

attachment for it, and paying no attention to it

anymore. None of these sects have, however,

explicitly mentioned both these steps of the

meditative process.While the Parama-ditthandhamma

-nibbanavadins give details only about the

deliberations regarding the demerits of the said

object, others are explicit about the next step

viz. withdrawal of attention from the object no

longer desired (note such expressions as

amanasikara, samatikkama, and atthagama  in the

meditation formulas of the arupya-samapattis. )

478 页

that an agreeable vedana is the ultimate goal of the

spiritual life.In this connection we may note the

statement of Vasubandhu that the four dhyanas are

dominated by vedana (vedana-prabhavitani dhyanani).

By rejecting the different lower types of

feelings, and by mentioning adukkhamasukham as the

highest type of feeling that has been attained, the

fourth jhana again emphasises the vedana to be the

supreme Nibbana in this world.

Moreover some confirmation of our interpretation

of the non-Buddhist sramana thoughts, specially

regarding the meditative techniques, will be found in

the Dvedha-vitakka-sutta which we will discuss

next.The spiritual journey of a Parama-ditthadhamma-

nibbanavadin in quest of an ideal happiness starting

from the ordinary plain of sensual enjoyment of

outside objects to the attainment of the fourth jhana

may be described as follows:

An ordinary person experiences utmost happiness

while fully enjoying an abundant supply of desirable

objects (kama).But his happiness gives place to the

feeling of pain when the objects undergo change and

destruction.So he deliberates and comes to the

decision (Vitakka and vicara) that these objects are

impermanent and ultimately lead to painful mental

states (akusaladhamma) of grief, lamentation etc.Thus

the meditator frees himself from the attraction of

these desirable objects and stops paying any further

attention to them. Consequently he gets separated from

desirable objects and their painful effects, viz. the

unwholesome mental states of grief etc.

(akusaladhamma) and attains the first jhana

characterised by rapturous happiness (pitisukha) born

of seperation (viveka).( 注 33) It is obvious that at

this moment he is no longer aware of vitakka and

vicara.When he emerges from the first jhana he again

becomes aware of vitakka and vicara and understands

that they act as hindrances to the development of

mental concentration and the proper enjoyment of

ptisukha.So it is vitakka and vicara that make the

first jhana gross (olarika). This judgemental

deliberation which is no longer termed vitakka-vicara,

creates

──────────────

(32) For the discussion in this para, see note no. 170

(p.339) of the English translation of the

Abhidharmakosabhasya,Vol.I;also see the reference

given in the note no.27 of the present article.

479 页

aversion for vitakka and vicara, takes his mind away

from them, and calms down the vitakka and

vicara.Consequently his concentration develops and he

attains the second jhana of pitisukha of a subtler type

born of concentration (samadhijam pitisukham

dutiyyajhanam) which is to him the highest nibbana

attainable in this world.In his case the development

of samadhi is incidental, and it finds mention in

the formula only because it gives rise to a subtler

type of pitisukha.

Arising from the second jhana he perceives the

grossness of the mental state due to the existence of

piti which agitates the mind.So he again practices

judgemental deliberations the contents of which deal

with the grossness of the second jhana due to the

existence of piti. As in the case of judgemental

deliberation regarding vitakka-vicara, here also the

existence of deliberations is not explicitly

acknowledged in the formula, but the role it plays can

be inferred from the phrase "pitiya viraga" which

draws our attention to the meditative process leading

to the detachment from piti.Consequently in the third

jhana he experinces pure sukha undisturbed by the

influence of piti.In this state sukha stands for

Nibbana.

Emerging from the third jhana the meditator,

however, notices the grossness

──────────────

(33) The accounts given about the meditative

techniques followed by the non-Buddhist sramana

sects make it clear that any agreeable mental

element automatically arieses when one

eliminates the disagreeable mental element.This

method was successfully followed by these sects

in order to get rid of any disagreeably vedana

 or sanna . But such accounts run counter to the

Law of Pratitya-samutpada which teaches that

"A" existing "B" come into existence.The

becoming of "B" is dependent on the prior

existence of "A".With the disappearance of "A"

"B" will also cease to exist.The non-existence

of anything ─ actual or nctional ─ cannot be

the determining cause for the becoming of

something. For example, the creation of a type

of pitisukha has been made to be dependent on the

disappearance of kama and akusaladhammas while

a more subtle type of pitisukha is generated by

the calming down of vitakka and vicara.Again

the arising of pure sukha and the feeling of

adukkhamasukham are dependent on the detachment

from piti and the giving up of sukha

respectively.It is obvious that the formulas of

the four rupa jhanas were created by those who

had no idea of the Law of Pratitya samudpada.

480 页

of mind due to the influence of sukha on mind which

bends towards and intensely enjoys the feeling of

sukha.So Sukha is also given up by following the same

method of first generating aversion for sukha through

deliberations and then withdrawing attention from

it.The contents of judgemental deliberations in this

case comprise the grossness of jhana due to the

adverse effects of sukha.

It is to be noted that the undesirable mental

elements are without exception discarded in a state of

non-absorption in between the two meditative

states.For example the vitakka and vicara are given up

in between the first jhana and the second jhana,piti

in between the second jhana and the third jhana, and

sukha in between the third jhana and the fourth jhana.

481 页

提要

佛教创立之前，印度的沙门早已用了修行法门。乔达摩

菩萨如何改定其中至上现法涅盘说所提出的四色禅论，乃是

本文探讨的主题。此所刊上篇，旨在清楚地说明何为四色禅。

固定描述四禅的文字中，不仅谈到不同境界的心所，且

更论及如何达到禅的境界。佛典给这些文字的诠释，年代都

相当晚，而且反映当时的佛教思想，并不是代表至上现法涅

盘说的见解。

不过，要真正了解四禅的定义，则必须首先明了传出四

禅论的至上现法涅盘说，其思想究竟为何。因此，本文尝试

此方面的拟构，指出至上现法涅盘说修行的唯一目的不在觉

悟，而在经历「喜」、「乐」等愉快的感受。「涅盘」所指

的只是自在地享受快乐；提出四禅的修持法，也只不过是这

种思想的结果。因此本文试就其思想了解固定描述四禅的文

字和「舍」、「乐」、「寻」、「伺」等名相的真正意义，

并期拟构至上现法涅盘说的修行法门。

如此，本篇为下篇的主题──乔达摩菩萨如何改定沙门

的法门──而打基础。