Zen And Taoism Common And Uncommon Grounds

·期刊原文

Zen And Taoism Common And Uncommon Grounds of Discourse

Kenneth Inada

Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Vol.15 1988 P.51-65

Copyright @ 1988 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu

Hawaii, U.S.A.

P.51

This ambitious paper should be taken as merely
preliminary and exploratory in nature. I cannot obviously do
justice to such a multi- faceted subject in a single essay. I
should therefore like to present in basic outline a framework
in which Zen and Taoism can be seen under a better light so
as to foster proper perspectives on each and thereby their
ultimate relationship. Though scholars in the field recognize
basic differences in the two systems, still, in discussing
either one or both, the analysis invariably concludes with
certain common elements that give rise to a false impression
that the two are identical or nearly so. On the surface, both
layman and expert may not see any differences at all. But
beneath it there are certain differences that must be
perceived and acknowledged, i.e., the format of the systems
in terms of the quest for reality may manifest an illusion of
sameness. We must always be on guard against being misled by
the unique forms that adduce similar contents of
experience.(1)
D. T. Suzuki tells us that there are eight chief
characteristics of satori or enlightenment: irrationality,
intuitive insight, authoritarianism, affirmation, sense of
the beyond, impersonal tone, feeling of exaltation and
momentariness.(2) The Taoist would be very much at home with
all of them, each amplifying in great detail the Taoist
experience without stirring up any controversy between the
two systems. Yet the differences are there for both the
Taoist and the Zennist, although not in clearly definable and
analyzable terms. Still, there are common grounds of
discourse that point at "something universal," the "finality
of existence, " a "suprarelative or transcendental aspect, "
the "infinite expansion of the individual" and "a new vista
of existence."(3)
Our initial mission then is to seek a common focus, a
common ground upon which we may treat the two systems. I will
employ Suzuki s

P.52

eighth characteristic, momentariness, to show us the way. In
both systems, the momentary nature of our experience is taken
to be the basis of all existential modes as well as of
valuation. It is the fountainhead of everything human and
humanly possible; to ignore it and to regard experience as
static is not only naive but to indulge in a falsehood and
abstraction that veers away from reality itself. The great
non-Asiatic metaphysician Alfred N. Whitehead, in one of his
rare insightful moments concerning religion, stated that
"that-religion will conquer which can render clear to popular
understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage
of temporal fact."(4) Both Zen and Taoism have already con-
quered the minds of Asians (and many non-Asians, too, for
that matter) by simply rendering clear "some eternal
greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact." Had
Whitehead fully known the message of both Zen and Taoism, he
most certainly would have attached a footnote to that
statement. We today can stand witness to his propriety,
albeit from a purely Western point of view.
In Buddhism, Zen being a crystallized version of Buddhist
thought, the point of departure in understanding the nature
of the experiencing self is its impermanent character
(anitya). Thus understood, the self no longer assumes an
abstract static nature but, paradoxically enough, the
non-substantive, non-self (anaatman) nature. The foregoing
statement, to be sure, is extremely difficult for the layman
to accept, much less grasp, because his understanding begins
and ends within the self-created prison walls of alleged
entities, such entities as the logical entities which have
nothing to do with realities,as Wittgenstein has rightly
stated(5) Not only does the layman live in a Certesian world
but he also does not know that that world owes its very
existence to the initial impulse to grasp or frame every-
thing within the substantive nature of things. Dichotomies of
all kinds abound, but they are non-existent in the real
world; they are strictly manmade, as the Zennist and Taoist
will aver. In this regard, we may even state further that,
strictly speaking, the correspondence theory that we so
heavily rely on in our daily activities is really impotent
and non-existent as well.
Reality or experiential reality, for in the strictest
sense no reality is divorced from experience, is a moving,
phenomenon. We have never-

P.53

theless been distracted from this moving phenomenon by
deliberately seeking and justifying a causal connection or
relationship in the passage of events. The strict empiricist,
David Hume, was not fooled by the feigned concept of
causality working in our experience, but even he could not in
the end hit upon its solution;being a child of the Western
tradition, he had to solace himself in the end with the game
of backgammon.
A different picture is seen in Taoism, especially in
Chuang Tzu's brilliant analysis. The ordinary person,
according to Chuang Tzu, waits to observe the scales of the
snake or the wings of the cicada but perceives only the
molted snake or the demised cicada.(6) He is unable to be in
tune with the lives of the snake and the cicada, indeed with
his own life process, for he spends countless hours catching
up with thore entities which are already distanced from the
reality of things. He seeks for certainty of perception and
understanding, but they are not forthcoming for the simple
reason that certainty can never be realized by following the
entities or elements involved in them. He has, in short, done
a disservice to himself by demanding a steady,
one-dimensional perception of things. This is the great hoax
or ontological fraud that man wantonly perpetuates. Both
Taoism and Zen recognize the inanity of this pursuit and
vehemently condemn it.
In several passages in the Chuang-tzu(a) we find
statements to the effect that experiential reality cannot be
expressed at all except in terms of bits or pieces. For
example, due to man's obsession with routine and mundane
matters, he has only a few days in a month, if any, in which
he may be able to have a good laugh at himself, the laugh
being an expression of a genuine encounter with the reality
of things, an instant perception of the incongruity between
what is and what is not the truth of existence. A laugh is,
of course, spontaneous, and lasts but for a split second;
beyond that it turns into amusement, and then reality is no
longer the central focus: The experience of reality is of the
same dimension as the laugh. Or, put another way,
experiential reality is seen "as quickly as the passing of a
swift horse glimpsed through a crack in the wall."(7)
Extending the metaphor further, it can be said that although
the galloping horse is seen through the crack in many bits or
fragments, the whole horse is actually seen. It is not
truncated or left dangling through the crack. The upshot

P.54

is that experiential reality, like the swift horse, is felt
(seen) entirely, but the bit by bit perception seems to belie
it --due mainly to our overriding epistemological emphasis
and bias. As we can see, the moving phenomena of reality is
nothing but the glimpses of the Whiteheadian "eternal
greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact." To see
it otherwise is simply to ignore the presence of reality in
the making, a continuous stream that flows and carries along
even our blunted consciousness in its wake. Furthermore as
things are normally perceived in chunks, they quickly
sediment into passive entities and become fodder for the
manipulating mind. In this way, the moving phenomenon of
reality are lost, or take a backseat,and hopelessly hang on.
This fragmentary perception is precisely the movement
expressed in the yin-yang(b) where the yin and the yang
alternate and seem to exhibit themselves independently. In
actuality, there is no separation between the two into
clearly defined roles or realms. Both require each other
for.their respective so-called substance (ti(c)) and function
(yung)(d). Yet to describe the phenomena of yin-yang movement
into substance and function, as done by Wang Pi and other
later Taoists, is a blatant travesty of the reality of
things, a deviation which merely serves our insatiable
epistemic desires. This last statement is not to be taken as
an outright rejection of epistemology as such but a critique
of the wrongly or falsely contrived epistemic elements which
go into the ruminating mill without due regard for (heir
originating natures. Clearly then aspects of neither the yin
nor the yang are epistemic elements, but are rather moving
shades of the reality of things in inviolable mutuality. A
shadow, afterall, does not wait for the body to move, though
its prominence is only accentuated by the latter's movement.
The whole second chapter of the Chuang-tzu (Ch'i-wu-lun(e),
"On the Equality of Things") is an exercise in the grasp of
the moving reality, and perhaps the most important but
puzzling chapter in the entire work. It ends with the famous
enigmatic dream of a butterfly by Chuang Tzu himself. There
is clearly an epistemic distinction between dreamer, dream
and dream-content. But no solution is forthcoming to the
episode (i.e., whether it was Chuang Tzu dreaming of the
butterfly or the butterfly dreaming of Chuang Tzu) if the
analysis is limited to epistemic distinctions. Scholars are
quite correct in rejecting the

P.55

distinction between subject and object, between reality and
unreality.(8) These scholars, however, do not go far enough
in examining the final statement: "This is called the
transformation of things (tu hua)(f)"(9) The statement taxes
our imagination, to be sure, but it is quite consistent with
the whole message of Chuang-tzu, i.e., that reality can only
be grasped in the swift changes ("galloping horse") of
things. In both Chuang Tzu dreaming of the butterfly and the
butterfly dreaming of Chuang Tzu himself, the distinction of
both phenomena pales into indistinction as one realizes the
non-epistemic content of reality on the move. This is the
transformation, the non-epistemic process, that inexorably
goes on regardless of the dream or dreamless state we are in.
The transformation is beckoning us to realize "something
universal, " "final, " "suprarelative, " an "infinite
expansion," a "new vista of existence," etc., but we are, for
the most part, dulled into believing that we are awake are at
all times not dreaming, not knowing that we wallow in the
quicksands of epistemology.(10) And so Chuang Tzu is able to
say cryptically: "After ten thousand generations, a great
sage may appear who will know their meaning, and it will
still be as though he appeared with astonishing speed."(11)
On the Zen or Buddhist side, a different analysis on the
glimpse of reality is found. Since Zen practice is usually
characterized by minimal scriptural reliance, it gives rise
to a false impression that scriptures are secondary or even
unnecessary in the pursuit of enlightenment (as noted, for
example, in the Zen master's seemingly idolatrous cries of
"Burn the Sutras! Kill the Buddha!"). But these cries must be
interpreted within the context of the disciple's ready and
ripe state of being for the eventual satori or wu(g), and not
to be interpreted in isolation or within the context of mere
pedagogy. Furthermore, there must be a clear understanding
between the use and study of the scriptures, including
listening to lectures, and the understanding and
concretization of the ideas thus gained. The disciple
naturally is expected to accomplish both and to prepare
himself diligently, pliably and holistically, for the
climatic hint that might come at any moment to open his mind.
The crucial hint may come in several forms: the koan, the
shout, the kick, the slap, silence, etc., of which Zen
literature is replete.

P.56

But let us return to the fundamental concepts of Buddhism
since Zen history unmistakably records the understanding of
these concepts in training and nourishment. Belonging to the
Mahayana tradition, Zen utilizes many scriptures within that
tradition, such as, the Diamond Suutra, La^nkaavataara
Suutra, Madhyamaka 'Saastra, Trim'sikaa, Mahaayaa-
na'sraddhotpaada 'Saastra, etc., but any Buddhist would
quickly remind us that these works have, as their basis, the
early teachings of the Buddha. In this sense, there is a
continuity in the whole Buddhist tradition and some scholars
have even stated that Zen is a rightful return to the early
Buddhist practice of seeking enlightenment as exemplified by
the historical Buddha. Be that as it may, it behooves the
devotee to learn and understand what is in store for him in
the training for enlightenment, such training entailing a
complete mastery of the psychological foundations of man. I
will not go into the nature of man in any exhaustive way, but
present it in the broadest of outlines.
The psychological nature of man is comprised of the basic
aggregates of being and the five skandhas (ruupa, vedanaa,
samjnnaa, samskaara, vijnnaana). In brief, these skandhas,as
the term itself reveals, are 'aggregating' pheonomena, i.e.,
they are 'groupings' or 'heapings' that spell out what we
call individuality (pudgala) but, more specifically, are more
like individualizing phenomenon. Or, looked at from the
other side, the enlightened side, the non-aggregating,
non-grouping, non-grasping nature reveal a totally different
dimension to a 'being' where there is no hint of individua-
lity, hence the non-self(anaatman) . Ordinary life is
characterized always in terms of the aggregating pheomena due
to the inherent grasping and clinging to the elements of
being. The nature of being, as we normally know it, is
essentially involved in the establishment of something
permanent and, coupled with this, there is the inability to
ride out the impermanent rhythm of life.
The five skandhas completely describe man from his
corporeal (ruupa) to the highly complex conscious (viijjanan)
realm of existence. The description is even analyzed into
realms of being (12 aayatanas) which specify the nature of
contact between the inner ('subjective') and outer
('objective') realsm of man and, still further, into the
finer complexes of consciousness (18 dhaatus) whereby each
contact of inner and outer realms

P.57

produces what we normally refer to as awareness or
consciousness which becomes the basis of a full blown account
of ordinary cognitive and intel- lectual activity. Thus, just
to understand the psychological aspect of man in the total
sense is an extremely difficult task that intimidates all,
but a task which cannot be glossed over or neglected. The
relatively short Diamond Suutra, for example, expands on the
five skandhas, 12 aayatanas and 18 dhaatus but, alas, few
scholars take heart in them, ignoring or glossing over
their discussion as being inconsequential. We must remind
ourselves that the 6th patriach, Hui-neng, was enlightened by
reading this Sutra. Even the formidable La^nkaavataara Suutra
and the Madhyamaka 'Saastra of Naagaarjuna treat these
psychological foundations of man, reminding us of their
import and continuous presence in Buddhism. But what has all
this to do with our quest for experiential reality? The
answer is, very much!
The purpose of demonstrating the psychological phenomena,
in a word, is to counter-demonstrate that something is
lacking, something is peculiar or irregular in the whole
affair, that a cul-de-sac will be reached if people go on as
they do. When the irregularity is sensed, for example, it
will show that there is more than the psychological factors
involved in ordinary experience, although this is not so
obvious at the beginning, due to our overdependence on the
conventionally empirical orientation taken for our
perceptions. The effect of counter-demonstration will show
up ?lements of being that only hamper, restrict, and defile
the experiential process (such as, the rise of and adherence
to certain biases which block the development of a truly free
and easy nature of the being in question). Such a being
becomes a proper candidate for the realization of the real
nature of things (tattvam, yathaabhuutam, literally, "truth
of existence," "thatness of being..). These conceptions are,
to be sure, quite esoteric to the non-Buddhist, but Buddhism
is here, once again, exploring yet another rendition of "some
eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact."
But Buddhism,this time, goes further with its own unique
doctrine for that "passage of temporal fact," the so-called
dependent or relational origination (yuan-ch'i(h) ,
pratiitya-samutpaada.
I have written elsewhere(12) that the doctrine of relational
origination issues forth in two strains, one with an
empirical nature and the other

P.58

without. In the former, the empirical, ordinary conventional
language and conceptualization function as usual and we are
at home with them except that, unfortunately, they are in the
realm of the unenlightened because of the insatiable, though
unconscious, grasping of and adherence to the elements of
being (an activity which I have referred to as the
ontological imperative). In the latter,that without epirical
nature, there is no action prompted by the ontological
imperative and thus no empirical elements at play to
implicate a vision of reality based on those element. Again,
the former or empirical realm is referred to by the Buddhists
as belonging to the sammsaaric realm, whereas the latter or
non-empirical, is nirvaannic. Now, the Zennist knows all about
this dual nature in the experiential process, but he is still
in a bind in that he does not know how to extricate himself
from it. He has been told, ad nauseam, of the dictum:
"Everyday-mindedness is the Way" (attributed to Pai-chang and
also to Matsu), but there is something paradoxical about it.
That is, participation in everyday activities comes naturally
for all of us, fast and easy, and yet there is no end to the
so-called self-feeding discriminative process, the perpetual
turning of the sammsaaric wheel due to the ontological
imperative. How can the Zennist solve the paradox?
The Zennist must, first of all, acknowledge the fact that
the experiential process in the nature of relational
origination is all that he has got and that he must seriously
address himself to its understanding. To ignore it is to
remain in the samsaaric realm. He must thus concentrate on
the rise of experiential events in terms of perceiving the
nature of experiential events in terms of perceiving the
nature of dependency (yuan(i), pratyaya) and relationality
(yin-yuan(j) , yuan-ch'i(h) , pratiitya-samutpaada,
pratiitya-samutpanna) of those events and attendant elements
in the total context of being. This is where meditation
enters to pacify or calm down the grasping nature of the mind
(chih-cho(k), upaadaana, abhinive'sa). This grasping nature
belongs to the unsettled mind which has not as yet captured
the middle ground (way) of existence by hovering between
substantive nature and non-substantive (the extremes of which
are self- destruction and nihilism). But the middle ground of
existence is captured only when one perceives rightly the
rise and fall of experiential events, or, more precisely,
when one is not attached to the elements of the process

P.59

of relational origination. Naagaarjuna and Prajnnaapaaramita
thinkers have introduced the concept of emptiness (k'ung(l),
'Suunyataa) to check the grasping nature, the ontological
force, and thereby reveal at once the nongrasping nature that
opens up a new vista of existence. So that when the
enlightened person (bodhisavttva) perceives things under the
aegis of emptiness, his perception is characterized by an
initial epistemic control, i.e., prevention of the rise of
ontological entities, which then discloses the wondrous realm
of the thatness of being (chen-ju(m), yathaabhuutam). However
tempting it may be, the concept of emptiness must never be
lifted to a metaphysical level or reduced to an ontology. In
the statement, "perception under the aegis of
emptiness,"there is no metaphysicizing nor ontologizing for
the aim is toward the sameness or equality of the nature of
things (p'ing teng(n), samataa).(13) Hui-neng captured this
undifferentiable realm when, in his famous poem, he referred
to the "non-ex- istence of things from the
beginning"(pen-lai-wu-i-wu(o)) and set the stage for the
rapid growth and dissemination of Zen thought in China.
In the Yogaacaara-vij~naanavaada tradition, the concept
of emptiness is applied uniquely to the Eight Consciousness
(vij~naana) theory. This theory is yet another development in
understanding the psychological foundations of man, carrying
over much from the early Buddhist knowledge of the
psychological elements (skandhas, aayatanas, dhaatus)
discussed earlier,but going further into the subtle nature of
the discriminative faculty (manas the 7th consciousness) and
the all-containing receptacle of the mind (aalaya-vij~naana,
the 8th consciousness). The Zennist, again, must be familiar
with all of this but, as in the case of early Buddhist
psychology he acknowledges the samsaaric nature which now
refers to all activities relative to the eight
consciousnesses and seeks a way out of it. This system
premises three aspects of man's nature of being, i.e., the
imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhaava), the dependent nature
(paratantra-sabhava) and the pure nature
(parinisspanna-svabhaava), the first two being samsaric and
the last nirvaanic.(14) The samsaaric nature goes on because
the first two natures are characterized by a perpetuation of
the clinging to unrealities (i.e., things, objects, elements,
etc.) which forces the turbulent irning of the mind function
(prav.rtti). But the trubulence will stop by the removal of
all dichotomies, such as, the basic division into outer and
inner realsm

P.60

of existence, the removal of which will happen with the right
understanding of the psychological play of all
consciousnesses aided by emptiness ('suunyataa) to block any
entrance or acceptance of those unrealities. This is why,
rather than mere correction of conceptualization, the very
foundation of conceptualization is turned upside down, so to
speak, to make one realize the pure realm. This process is
known as the ultimate turning over (paraav.rtti) of the
turbulence (prav.rtti) ; the result of turning over is
referred to as consciousness-only (wei shih(P) ,
vij~naptimaatra), which is another way of describing
perception under the aegis of emptiness. This is then the
basis upon which the Zennist will speak of the mind-only (wei
hsin(q), citta-maatra) doctrine. As we can now see, the
consciousness-only or mind-only doctrine lodges in the
natural everyday function of our senses, including the
mind,but the whole experiential process has been cleansed by
meditative discipline (yogaacaara).
In this connection, it ought to be mentioned that it was
Naagaarjuna who best captured the Buddh's spirit of the
existential parity of samsaara and nirvaanna which gave the
Mahaayaana tradition the necessary ingredient for its
eventual development and spread, although the
Praj~naapaaramitaa literature that preceded Naagaarjuna who
first laid the foundation of the parity concept in his
formulation of the Four-fold Noble Truth which starts with
suffering (duhkha) and ends with non-suffering within the
selfsame ground of existence. Put in a more metaphorical
sense, the realization of the rise of suffering, its cause,
is at once the realization of the roots of its ultimate
cessation. All other elements or conceptions toward the
enlightened realm are nothing but footnotes to this great
insight of the total parity of existence. Based on this
insight, where nothing extraneous exists, I have always
referred to Buddhism as the most thorought going naturalistic
system. Zen or the Zennist surely exemplifies the
crystallized version of this naturalism.
In sum, then, Naagaarjuna's genius permitts us to see
clearly that, shorn of fragmentation by the imposition of
substantive natures or elements (savbhaava), the realm of
reality is before our very eyes! The relational origination
is always the ground of suffering as well as the selfsame
ground of non-suffering or liberation, the connection of the
two can only be 'experienced' by the introduction of the
concept of emptiness to hold

P.61

all elements in check and simultaneously permit the new
ground to rear itself. If emptiness is to exhibit the
dependent nature or mutual reference of elements at play
(praj~napti upaadaaya), then it is also the concept to
exhibit the limits of this dependency or mutuality. Being
ever faithful to the teachings of the Buddha, Naagaarjuna
concludes that relational origination, as seen under the
aegis of emptiness, is also the middle way.(15) We have thus
made a full circle, as Naagaarjuna has succinctly stated-
but, ironically, the circle of existence, i.e., roots of the
mannddala, has been present all along. The middle way which
avoids the extremes must be nascently present in our everyday
ways (activities) of existence; to say otherwise would not
only complicate matters abstractly but would introduce alien
elements into our very existence.
Buddhist reality, then, functions in a total sense
regardless of the sammsaaric or nirvaannic realm. It can only
be realized by a highly disciplined training which
consummates in enlightenment, the uprooting of suffering from
its very basis. Nothing short will suffice or succeed.
Suffering, in other words, is a total ontologized phenomenon
in the sense that the basis of a single element of suffering
is related to the whole being and that, when the uprooting
occurs, the result will be a total phenomenon. In this way,
we may say with all Buddhists that ignorance (wu-ming(r),
avidyaa) and enlightenment(wu(g),bodhi) are two poles of the
selfsame phenomenon, one of-which is bound and the other
unbound, ontologically speaking.
As experiential reality is taking place within the
context of impermanence,the grasp of it must necessarily come
about drastically and abruptly. The Zen method of
enlightenment carries these drastic and abrupt means which
dare the devotee to act and respond in uncommon ways, all the
while keeping his senses, including the mind, wide open,
resilient, total and full. He is unruffled by the paradoxical
nature of
sa.msaara and nirvaa.na, and encouraged and motivated to
explore its depth by avoiding entanglement with things
logical and conceptual. The Japanese Zen master, Dogen
(1200-53), gave a graphic description of the sammsaaric bound
life as katto(s) (vines), a life depicted as wisteria vines
entwining among themselves in which the condition gets worse
and worse.(l6) So beneath all the simplicity and artless
antics of the devotee, the ground is prepared for the
ultimate event. The method is gradual in the sense that

P.62

step by step analysis, understanding and concretion of the
facts of existence are brought together, but the final
enlightenment must come abruptly or suddenly.(17)
In contrast to the Zen abrupt method of
enlightenment,there is the Taoist quietistic method. But
these two methods are not really contradictory since Zen, for
example, incorporates the quietistic nature in its meditative
process. There is actually no difference in the Taoist
"forgetting himself" and the Zennist concept of losing his
self. Any devotee, eiher Taoist or Zennist, may spend hours
"honing up" for the final grasp of reality, but he must not
waste his time in futile "brick grinding" to produce a
mirror, or in squeamish rituals upholding Confucian virtues.
The leading philosophic doctrine in Taoist quietism is
action-in-nonaction (wei wu-wei(t)). Many interpretations
have been offered on this important doctrine, from
laissez-faire to do-nothing, but its significance will be
missed if there is no focus on the glimpses of reality as
discussed earlier. Action (wei) does not take place in a
vacuum but requires a 'filler' to function properly. That
'filler' is provided by the concept of non-being (wu(u)),
which is part and parcel of non-action (wu-wei) or vice
versa, and which is also the reality glimpsed in the manner
of the galloping horse. It(wu) is like the interstices of a
net and yet more, since it also inludes the warp and woof of
the net itself - the whole reality. Thus, wu or the Tao are
primitives,the uncarved block (su p'o(v)), which presences
itself in the actions taken by man but does not force its
manifestation. Through action the nature of non-action is
known, but non-action is always the foundation of action.
There is a parity of process involved here but not identical
with the Buddhist kind, though similar strains run through
both. Chapter 42 of the Tao Te Ching exhibits how the Tao,
One,Two, Three and Ten Thousand Things implicate one another.
It is an affirmation of the cosmological, atemporal analysis
of the phenomena of existence. Chapter 1 of the same work, a
capsule presentation of Taoism, also spells out the nature of
parity in subtle ways, where non-being is in the realm of
heaven and earth, and being in the realm of all things. In
sum, both being and non-being are the cosmological twins -
always co-existent and co-functioning.
Our discussion of certain common grounds of discourse
has also

P.63

touched on certain uncommon grounds, but the parity of
existence demands the common and uncommon grounds be treated
within the selfsame reality in the quest for the dynamic
truth of existence. Metaphysically and cosmologically,
similiar grounds are covered in both systems and they seem to
collapse at some points; however, real and alledged
identities must be sifted and never pushed too far. It was no
accident, historically, that those Chinese who took up
Buddhism seriously, like Hui-yuan and Seng-chao, were former
Taoists. It is impossible to find out how much of Taoism was
abandoned and how much of Buddhism was incorporated in to
their final philosophies. It is enough for all of us today to
embark on the road in search of "the true man of no-rank."

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

NOTES

1. It is easy to speak in terms of the form and content of
experience, but we must not lose sight of the fact that
these are merely abstract terms. They describe certain
aspects of experience but never experience-as-such, with
which both Zen and Taoism are profoundly concerned. As
'subsequent discussion will attempt to show, both systems
are interested in the grasp of the true reality of
experience and not its peripheral indirect elements which
are only beclouding and disparaging.
2. William Barrett, ed., Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of
D.T. Suzuki. New York: Doubleday& Company, Inc., 1956. pp.
103-108.
3. Ibid.
4. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. New York:
MacMillan Company, 1933. p.41.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949. He saw the
mission of philosophy to be analysis of thought and not
about reality as such. The real world, so-called, is left
to the sciences.
6. Burton Watson, tr., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1968. p. 49.

P64

7. Ibid.;p.330.
8. Wing-tsit Chan, tr. & compiled, A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy, Princton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
pp. 190-91, especially his comments. Also, A.C. Graham,
"Chuang-tzu's Essay on Seeing Things as Equal," in Hist
-ory of of Religions, Vol. 9. Nos. 2 & 5. p. 149.
9. The Complete Works of Chuang Tru,p.49.
10. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. p.189. See also The
Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. p. 47.
11. The Comp Works of Chuang Tzu. p. 48. Italics mine as
mine.
12. "Two Strains in Buddhist Causality, " Journal of Chinese
Philosophy; Vol. 12, 1 (March 1985), 49-56.
13. The obvious question here is, how close is the Buddhist
concept of sameness (samataa, p'ing-teng(n) ) to the
Taoist equality of things (ch'i-wu(e))? This is surely a
point of contact between the two systems. The Buddhist
concept refers to the ultimate nature of reality, i.e.,
the enlightened state where everything is seen without
a discriminating eye. In this sense, it is relative to the
Buddhas' and Bodhisattvas' way,of having regard for all
creatures, hence the wisdom of sameness (smataaj~naana).
In Taoism, the monkeys being fed 3 or 4 nuts in the
morning and 4 or 3 nuts in the afternoon certainly show a
difference in the feedings but the nuts in combination
add up to the same numerical figure, seven. Still, the
numerical figure must be transcended in order to arrive
at the ch'i-wu conception of things. It is more
cosmological than temporal.
14. Vasubandhu, Tri.m'slkaa, Verses 20-23; see also Source
Book in Chinese Philosophy,pp 374-395.
15. Naagaarjuna, Muulamadhyamakakaarikaa, XXIV, 18.
16. Doogen Zenji,Shooboogenzoo,Chapter 38,Kattoo.
17. For example, it would be difficult to speak of a person
becoming gradually good or gradually evil for that
matter, although on the surface such descriptions of
human traits are always quite attractive, welcomed, and
easily believed in. Goodness and evilness, however, are
more apparent than real, and there are no shades in
either one.

P.65