Anthropic web of the universe: atom and aatman

•期刊原文

Anthropic web of the universe: atom and aatman

By Gradinarov, Plamen

Philosophy East & West

Vol.39 No.1(January 1989)

pp.27-46

Copyright by University of Hawaii Press

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The main arguments of Vai`se.sika in favor of the all-pervasiveness of aatmon[1] can, in the final analysis. be boiled down to a number of cosmological and even physical grounds. If aatman lacked the characteristic of all-pervasion, the cosmo-evolutionary process would not have been started at all, for there would be no simultaneous conjunction with atoms from other regions of space. This claim deserves our close examination because it illuminates some questions of moment in the cosmogony of Vai`se.sika. First of all, it turns out that atoms do not conjoin successively, as may wrongly be supposed, proceeding from their infinitesimality as well as from the infinity of the cosmos. The simultaneous conj unction of atoms is necessary for putting the great vehicle of the Universe into motion. The unwarranted postulation of Mahe`svara, when taken as transcendental entity irrelevant to man, cannot explain the simultaneity of the initial cosmo-synthetic process; nor should one rely upon ad.r.s.ta (unseen force) as the possible explanation of it. In spite of the nominal reference to them in a later period, neither the great Lord of the Universe nor the unseen force can be counted as legitimate categories forming part of the metaphysical system precisely conceived by the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika; there is no place for them among the seven officially recognized categories of the school. Therefore, taking into consideration the rigorous categorial logic of evolution as presented by the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, one should concede that the role of ultimate cosmological regulator is to be assigned to aatman, keeping in mind that its theological modus is a result of much later interpolation.[2]

The Vai`se.sikas, in the interpretation of `Srii Malli.se.na-suuri, are said to main-tain that if aatman was not all-pervading there would be no simultaneous conjunction of atoms. This means that the rise of more complex material aggregates would be substantially hampered, if not rendered totally impossible. And if the formation of the complex aggregates could not take place, then all organic bodies, man's body included, would also not appear. So, the negation of the all-pervasiveness of aatman actually predicates the absence of man and the empirical negation of aatman itself. The very fact of human existence now does, in one way or another, indicate some sort of logical prerequisites concerning the initial stage in the evolution of the Universe. Besides, the existence of man now implies an isotropic and homogeneous Universe so that the atoms of all regions of space could come into a simultaneous action; the isotropy and homogeneity of the Universe depend, though not in a material sense, on the all-pervasiveness of aatman. This kind of reasoning brings us closely to the type of argumentation proper to the so-called anthropic cosmological principle developed within the framework of contemporary cosmological theories.[3]

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Just like the other orthodox schools, the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika reshapes some of the traditional conceptions of aatman presented in the Vedas. It gingerly puts to doubt the central Vedic assumption, tat tvam asi ("That thou art"), according to which there is an ultimate coincidence of the minutest, atom-like Self and the greatest being (sat). The profound dialectics contained in this injunction has been taken over by the Vai`se.sikas only in its nominal, superficial form and correspondingly turned into occasion for interpreting aatman as an all-pervading substance. However, according to Uddaalaka, the concept of atom-aatman falls together with the notion of supreme reality because, for all its substantiality, the aatmic atom is dimensionless and rather amorphous. In its turn, Jaina defines the atoms as possessing no particular form, while aatman is said to occupy the place inhabited by the animate body.[4] Nyaaya-Vai`se.sikas carry out the splitting of the original unity of atom and aatman in another direction: atoms become lacking in magnitude, while aatman attains allpervasiveness. This line of conceptual development and transformation of the original Vedic notion of atom, aatman, and sat (or Brahman), has been quite correctly expressed by Paul Masson-Oursel in his famous article on Indian atomism.[5]

Having once surpassed the primitive dialectical comprehension of atom, aatman, and Brahman, Indian thought, captured by the feeling of the immensity and structural infinity of their actual being, has always been searching for the exact ratio of these three categories. Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika has also greatly contributed to balancing the two main types of infinity: the minutest infinity (that is, the infinitesimality) of atom, and the all-pervading infinity of aatman. It should be noted, however, that whereas the original teaching of Ka.naada stressed the logical and ontological aspects of the dialectical interaction between the already mentioned ab^lmes (abysses) of infinity, the late interpretations of Pra`sastapaada, Udayana, and `Sriidhara should, to a great extent, be regarded as a result of compromising between atomism and monism. Instead of investigating the material relationships which may subsist between atoms and aatman, they focused their attention on the elucidation of the possible role of Brahman, conceived as the theological prime mover of the world, in his creating and destroying hypostasis of II`svara. It is a more than curious coincidence that the concept of atom has undergone similar modifications in the Yoga-bhaa.sya of Vyaasa, where the atom is also taken to denote the supreme reality, as well as in `Sa^nkara's commentary on the Brahma-suutra. `Sa^nkara, the greatest thinker of Vedaanta, transforms the atom-aatman into supreme aatman (paramaatman) and is bound to call Brahman supreme atom (paramaa.nu) because of his unity and indivisibility.[6]

One of the crucial problems for the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika ontology, cosmology, and "aatmalogy" 7 is the establishment of aatman 's identity. The problem here is that aatmans, being innumerable and all-pervasive, should permeate each other. Is there any evidence at all that my consciousness as a metaphysical

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quality of aatman should be attributed precisely to my aatman and not to the aatman of my neighbors facing the same problem? According to Jaina and Uddaalaka, the size of aatman does not contradict its eternality, for, in the first case, it is as large as the body occupied by it and capable of changing its size following the extensive modulation of the body. As for Uddaalaka, he does not even put up the problem because there is no distinctive discrimination between atom-aatman and sat (= Brahman), which are considered to be an example of coincidentia oppositorum.

The self-contradictory Vai`se.sika characteristic of aatman as possessing all-pervasiveness (vibhutvavat) and nonuniqueness (anaikaantika) produces a number of conceptual difficulties. For example, what are the ultimate criteria for defining an all-pervading substance as something separate (p.rthak), that is, as an individual entity? Are the many mutually permeating substances capable of self-differentiation?-and so on. These questions cannot arise regarding the equally all-pervading substances of aakaa`sa, space and time, because their identity is warranted by their substantial singularity. The situation with aatman, however, is radically different because the variety (naanaa) of aatmans follows from the "circumstantial variety" underlying it.[8]

Before proceeding with the analysis of the commentary of `Sa.nkara Mi`sra on the above-mentioned suutra of Ka.naada, let us consider the relations between atom and aatman in the light of their mutual theoretical determinacy. It has been said that the notion of atom has been arrived at in Indian philosophy by trying to define rationally the nature of that intimate fine substance which supports man's conscious, emotional, retributive, and volitional activity. Now, conversely, it is demonstrated that the definition of aatman should necessarily be related to the definition of the material substances. In doing so, there are two possibilities for defining aatman as something "own-natural" (svabhaavika):

(a) By analogy: "Its substantiality and eternality are explained by air.[9] This aphorism is elucidated by `Sa.nkara Mi`sra in the following way: "As there is no criterion [for the establishment] of the imaginary parts of aerial atomhence [its] eternality--so of manas also. The meaning is that as atom of air is substance because of [its] possessing qualities, so aatman.[10]

(b) By transcendental apophansis, which is a kind of phenomenological epoch`e combined with a demonstration from the impossibility of the opposite. Considering aatman as the possible Transcendental Ego, metaphysically supporting the emotional life of the empirical individual, `Srii Vallabhaacaarya makes it clear that "the cause of pleasure differs from the other [things] because of the 'material causality' (upaadaanatva) of pleasure. In this or that way it [the material cause] is not the earth. Here the material cause is not the earth and the other five objects [of the sense organsl because of the external noncausation of the internal objects. Otherwise, even [the cause] of knowl-

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edge would have to be [explained as] due to some fact born from the body etc. Nor is it the very knowledge for, otherwise, even [the originl of sound would be due to a similar fact."

In his Upaskaara, `Sa.nkara Mi`sra develops an externalist approach to the interpretation of VS Ⅲ.1.20. According to him, the variety of our life circumstances should be regarded as the main reason for the actual variety of the aatmans. There are men both rich and poor, happy and disappointed, and so forth. Variety of aatmans is to be explained from the variety of conditions in which we live and from our differences in social status.[12]

Despite this seemingly materialist explanation[l3] of the origin of conscious life and the substantial differences between the particular aatmans, the inter-pretation of `Sa.nkara Mi`sra can hardly be called consistently materialistic. If we concede that my aatman does ultimately depend upon the external circumstances only, then I should recognize that at different stages of my life I must possess different aatmans and have them modified with every successive turn in my material development. If it is said that the modifications of my aatman depend not on the different social conditions I am running through, but on my being a temporal entity, then it could be held that there are people living in comparatively one and the same condition; hence, they should possess one and the same aatman. This assumption, however, runs counter to the metaphysical individuality of aatmans. And lastly, if aatmans were to be connected to particular places and circumstances, they would not be: (1) all-pervading, and (2) possessing the qualities of conjunction and disjunction which are of universal application.

Considerably more consistent, from a logical point of view, is the explanation of `Sriidhara. In his opinion, the plurality of aatmans can by no means be doubted. Yet, it should be established what precisely is the sense of the word plurality, or variety of conditions. The specific peculiarity of `Sriidhara's conception is that plurality means nonrecognition of the cognitions, pleasures, pains, and so forth belonging to other people. When, for instance, we experience pleasure, the corresponding feelings are to be related to my own person and not to that of the others; "and if the experience were one and the same in all bodies, then we would have a similar idea with reference to the experience of other persons: as a matter of fact, however, we have no such recognition; and from this we infer that there is a distinct self in each body.[14]

In order to substantiate the existence of Alter Ego (the aatman of the other), we perform, at the first stage, a kind of analytical reduction. The main goal of it is to clear off all those elements of experience that impede the process of realization of my own subjectivity. In other words, we expose the psychological experiences that constitute the vertical (temporal) axis of our personal identity. If the cognitions and experiences were common to all living bodies, then we would discriminate only what has been equally discerned by every-

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body. As a natural consequence, consciousness would be one for all because of the diffusion of ideas. As far as this does not happen, we are forced to assume the separate existence of aatman in every individual body. Here, non-recognition means the absence of falsifying instances. Without a doubt, it is of an apophalic nature, for the existence of my own aatman comes to be established by the impossibility of discovering it in the experiences of the others. The opponent may reply that aatman should be one in all bodies because having different experiences is not indicative of the existence of many aatmans. As in the case with aakaa`sa, which is only one, we have different sounds produced as to the differences in the ear cavities; similarly, in the case of the one aatman, we can explain the differences of experience as due to the diversity of body limitations. `Sriidhara rejects this by introducing the categories of dharma and adharma (merit and demerit). If we take body to be the boundary condition giving rise to individual consciousness, then we should recognize that aatman is one and there is only one kind of dharma and adharma, which renders totally inexplicable the different fates of people. They would experience equal pleasure and pain, which would result in enormous moral disturbances due to the absence of retributive distinctions.

Anyway, it is not the body that makes different the experiences of aatman but rather manas. The internal sense organ should be counted as the veritable principle of diversification. It is its conjunction with aatman that provides the individual characteristics of consciousness.Yet the perplexing difficulty remains of just how to combine two so contradictory assertions, which simultaneously maintain (1) the all-pervasiveness of aatman, and (2) its separateness (p.rthaktva) with reference to the conscious life of the individual. `Sriidhara supplies a rather unsatisfactory solution consisting in the superficial union of the two previous theses, supported by the moral function of karman. Though the particular cognitions are common to all bodies, the all-pervading aatmans are present in each of them. Every aatman experiences such pleasure and pain, which depend on the concrete body and the foregoing karman of the Self. Consequently, the body restrictions on aatman should eventually be attributed to the limitations produced by karman.

The lines of reasoning above are of exceedingly great importance in the constitution of the anthropic explanation of the universe; for this reason they should be given special attention. Continuing the preceding analysis, the other Selves are eventually differentiated not by themselves but rather through the action of the Law of Karman, leaving aside the action of the ultimate particularities (antyavi`se.sa)--the central place among which is taken up by the atoms. Such methods and mechanisms of differentiating between aatmans, as stated before, cannot be a radical solution to the question of the own-nature of consciousness. The ever-growing clash between individual Self and supreme reality or universal nature cannot be overcome as simply as that. `Sriidhara supposes that material manas should be taken as the main cause for

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the differentiation process of the many Selves. If this standpoint is assumed, one cannot readily answer the question as to why there is a plurality of aatmans; for, from this position, it is much easier to postulate the existence of one aatman only, which, under the influence of the material manas and the action of existential karman, would be differentiated into many Selves, enjoying and suffering a great number of individual lives. This, however, is not compatible with the theoretical constructions of `Sriidhara. For him, human Selves, or aatmans, are not simply reflections of the pure and intelligible Brah

man; nor are they his empirical modifications, for this would contradict the true nature of the supreme reality.

Anyhow, the question of the size of aatman is crucial for Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika. It is given central place, too, in the Syaad-vaada-mannjarii of the outstanding Jaina logician and dialectician, Malli.se.na. The whole chapter nine of the work is dedicated to critical examination of the Vai`se.sika theory of the size of aatman. This analysis is very important because Jaina criticism is carried out in close connection with the elaboration of the atomistic theories of the schools.Following the general rules of disputation, Malli.se.na exposes, to begin with, the views of the opponents, that is, Ka.naada and Pra`sastapaada, and gives then a brief account of the Jaina position on the question. The arguments of Vai`se.sika, as presented by Malli.se.na, are in general terms the same as the ones dealt with above. The main stress, however, is placed not upon the moral issues of the doctrine, but rather on its physical and cosmological implications. We shall try to reconstruct them by adding some missing conceptual links and original fragments from other authors writing in the tradition of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika.

As stated in the very beginning, if aatman was not all-pervading, the cosmological process of creation would not be initiated at all for the simple reason that there would be no simultaneous conjunction--which here is to be understood as a kind of dialectical principle of universal connection of atomsfrom all various regions of the Universe. The simultaneous conjunction of atoms plays, as it seems, an extraordinary role in the cosmology of Vai`se.sika. It is an indispensable prerequisite and a sort of efficient cause, putting into motion the whole kingdom of matter. And what should be specially emphasized is that the followers of Kanaada are said to maintain that if aatman was not all-pervading, there would be no conjunction whatsoever between the atoms--which means that the constitution of aatman's body will be prevented. Thus, it has been stressed, the all-pervading size of aatman is a fact of great anthropogenic importance.

This conception of Vai`se.sika deserves more attentive examination. It makes possible the reconstruction of a thoroughgoing representation of the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika type of atomism or, at least, fosters the elaboration of those physical and metaphysical problems which have been touched, but, unfortu-

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nately, not explicitly developed, by the scholars pertaining to the tradition. First of all, the question should be set forth about the source of motion of atoms. It is clear, from a general look at the categorial system of NyaayaVai`se.sika, that matter and its source of motion are two different categories, for the simple reason that motion cannot subsist in itself; it is always a motion, or action, inherent in some particular substance. Instead of source of motion we can use the more exact expression incentive of motion, for it is known from the latter conceptions of Vai`se.sika that atoms are in perpetual rotary motion (parispanda). So the question here is not about the category of motion [l5] as a regular category of the Vai`se.sika metaphysics, but rather about that particular form of motion which renders the atoms operative: that is, the cosmologically relevant cause opening the process of combination and recombination.

Thus, the hypothesis in which we are engaged takes the many aatmans as substantial metaphysical sources of intentional energy,[16] constantly emitting impulses which transform the internal and inherent rotary motion of atoms into a kind of universal synthetic motion, bringing about the progressive line of cosmological evolution. This circumstance is of great significance, for Ka.naada has not offered an exhaustive explanation of the causes for the "stirring up" of the atoms and their successive combination--except for that of the mysterious role of ad.r.s.ta, which, however, is without any scientific im-portance when related to the realm of transcendental phenomena.

On the other hand, it can be objected that the proposed explanation of aatman as noninherent cause acting along the reprocessing of the atomistic Universe likewise reveals no trace of scientific significance. This, however, is not the case. In contemporary cosmology, there are many explanatory models taking into account the possible role of a conscious factor in the development of the Universe. For instance, according to the participatory formulation of the anthropic cosmological principle, no elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is a registered phenomenon. Thus, the act of measurement, says J. A. Wheeler, has an inescapable effect on the future of the electron. The observer finds himself willy-nilly a participator. In some strange sense, this is a participatory Universe. "Beginning with the Big Bang, the universe expands and cools. After eons of dynamic development, it gives rise to observership. Acts of observer-participancy-via the mechanism of the delayedchoice experiment--in turn give tangible reality to the universe not only now but back to the beginning. To speak of the universe as a self-excited circuit is to imply once more a participatory universe.[17]

The notion of a participatory universe can be said to be fundamental within the framework of the metaphysical teaching of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, It is widely discussed by the commentators of Nyaaya-suutra and especially by Uddyotakara and Vaacaspati Mi`sra. To begin with, we shall introduce the corresponding problems through a very characteristic text of Paa`supataacaarya:

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Which is the immediate material cause of the world since the live II`svara is efficient [cause]? It is said that these are the suprasubtle (paramasuuk.sma) atoms making up the [manifested] substances....Which is the doctrine on the causality of the founding IIsvara (punarii`svara)? This doctrine is explained--Pradhaana, Atom and Karman, regulated by the previous activity of an intelligent cause, come to be activated (pravartante) because of the un-consciousness [of the atoms, etc.]; as the existing, etc. intelligent [man] puts into operation an axe [that is] present there, because of its unconsciousness (acetanatva), so Pradhaana [ultimate substance], Atom and Karma, which ale unconscious, come to be stimulated; therefore they are also regulated by an intelligent cause.[18]

This is only part of the long commentary on NS IV.1.21, which runs as follows: "Not a reason because of the facsimilarity.[19] These words of Gautama have deeply touched the metaphysical imagination of the later scholars. The most modest interpretation of them is that of Vaatsyaayana, pointing out that "ll`svara takes care of man as a doer; lI`svara creates the fruit of whatever action of man. When ll`svara does not create there is also no result of human karman. Therefore it is not a reason because of the facsimilarity of ll`svara. By the absence of human action the result is not produced.[20] In spite of their purely anthropological accent, the ideas developed by Vaatsyaayana have also a deep physical relevance. Their meaning is that karman, or the action of man, cannot be a reason substantiating the activity of atoms taken as the material cause of the manifested world--and all this because of the facsimilarity of the results of the good or evil actions of man in relation to the actions, or wishes, of ll`svara. In his Nyaaya-vaarttika-taatparya.tiikaa, Vaacaspati Mi`sra has pointed out on this account that "the activity of atoms as material cause (upaadaana) is with regard to the actions of man; ll`svara is the stimulating cause (nimitta). Through him [comes about] the observed action of man, although ll`svara is only the stimulating cause.[21]

It should be noted that nimitta, apart from the previous meaning of instrumental or stimulating cause, is also a kind of teleological cause, judging from the semantics of the word. Atoms are activated with the ultimate aim of giving rise to aatman's body, that is, to the body of aatman possessing noneternal cognitions. This immanent aatman is, however, indiscernible in its essence from the essence of ll`svara because of the dialectical coincidence of the opposites promulgated yet by Uddaalaka. In the history of Indian philosophy, the dialectical coincidence of atom and aatman has persisted for many centuries and can be met, notwithstanding the apparent contradictoriness of it and stubborn opposition to the special rule of the all-pervasiveness of aatman, even in the works of the Naiyaayikas and Vai`se.sikas, from Udayanaacaarya to Ke`sava Mi`sra. According to the latter, aatman has the size of an atom and is situated in the heart of the sage (sic: Uddaalaka), while Udayana is arguing that aatman is not bigger than an atom, though capable of pervading the whole body (sic: Jaina). Therefore, we cannot agree with the contention of G. Sundara Ramayah, holding that the aatman is permanent, while its quality buddhi

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is nonpermanent,[22] because this contradicts the fundamental assumption of aatman as being ever-intelligent, quite independently of its size and actual body conformity. Nor can we agree that this is the proper opinion of Vaacaspati Mi`sra as fixed in his NVTT I.1.10, because it is said quite explicitly that "although the internal aatmans are the bearers of the connections with noneternal cognition, nevertheless it is just aatman in general that is connected with an eternal buddhi, etc., due to its being the bearer of connections with the quality of buddhi, etc.[23]

Commenting on the words of Vaatsyaayana to the effect that consciousness should be attributed to the bearer of relations with the rough material substances,24 Vaacaspati Mi`sra produces a comparatively long explanation which is worth quoting:

The sense is--because of [its] being the bearer of conjunction. In the same way, there is no deviation (vyabhicaara) by means of color, etc. So great is the teaching of the long gone preceptor! It is because of this that being moves and there are developing (bhavanti) commonly known conscious factors, like the creeper on the walls of the palace. These are widely known contradictions, as for instance, the 'atoms of aakaa`sa'. Conscious factors are dubious [in the same manner] as that the weaker is the master of the stronger. And so, either because of the 'epistemological objectness' (prameyatva), or due to illusion [rooted] in the absence of verifying and falsifying arguments, [there appears] a doubt in the conscious 'doer-ness' (kartrtva). And the 'perceptual non-apprehension' (pratyak.saanupalabdhi) is not intended to be here only a disproving [instance]. The existence (sataa) [sie] of properly naturalistic defects [viprakar.sa here can be translated also as alontanation, as opposed to approximation, and as difference] is present even in the perceptual non-apprehension of the atoms etc.[25]

Let us now try to produce a sort of subcommentary on what Vaacaspati Mi`sra has said. The sense of it is that the atoms, albeit a substrate of the activity, cannot be taken to be the subject of conscious activity. Being is in a perpetual motion, indeed, but from this it does not follow that consciousness should be developed from the atoms and rise like the clinging plant on the walls of the king's palace. It is said that the consciousness of atoms is rather dubious, for the weaker cannot overpower the stronger one--the small atoms cannot impose their will on the infinitely great II`svara at least because they are devoid of the quality termed "volition" (prayatna). Doubts in the consciousness of the substrate of activity, that is, the general notion of the doer, appear owing to three main types of causes: (a) There is insufficient articulation of it as an object of the correct knowledge; that is, there is the impossibility of being immediately perceived--save in the acts of yogic insight--and there is the apparent incompleteness of the logical procedures with the help of which one infers its existence. The architectonics of the syllogism demonstrating the atoms' being has some definite shortcomings because (b) the probans can never be perceptually verified, and (c) there is a demonstrative lack of falsifying arguments. This is precisely the meaning of the phrase that the perceptual

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nonapprehension of the atoms is not intended to be only an instance rejecting their existence. Moreover, the perceptual nonapprehension of the atoms depends, to a great extent, on the own-nature of the cognitive subject attempting to prove their existence. On the strength of their own-nature, most of the people do not actually perceive the atoms, yet there exist specially trained men capable of contemplating the atom and even penetrating into its most intimate structure.

Anyway, even the yogic perception cannot substantiate the search for universal validity (prasiddhi), because of the required universality-both subjective and objective--of all veridical statements. This is especially important in knowing the material cause of the manifested world. Vaacaspati Mi`sra writes:

Material cause is known in one and the same way both to ourselves and to yourselves. It is said that the distinctions of atom as object of knowledge, subject of inherence, and unchangeable [unique, nonalternative] substratum of action should be known on the strength of a canon from the similar ll`svara, but in no way as something empirically manifested. It is said that dharma and adharma should be postulated as connected with the paramount puru.sa on the strength of [the fact that there is a] connection, therefore, evidently, conjunction and inherence are two [different types of] connections, due to the impossibility of the rise of inherence between the conjoined and the subject of conjunction. As for the atoms or the comprehension of the own dharma, even ll`svara should create [his] objectivation [reflections, emanations] as his own effect, just like the one actually searching for knowledge [does mentally reconstruct] the actual piece [of the pot, and so forth] as a reflection of the activity [on its] production. Thereby the intelligent material cause is also explained.[26]

As a matter of fact, there should have been, in the history of the Indian philosophy of atomism, a great deal of controversial opinions concerning the ultimate causes stimulating the cosmo-creative motion of the atoms. Apart from dharma and adharma, the action (karman) of man seems to have performed an important role in the metaphysical play directed on the stage of the Universe. Unfortunately, we do not have any corroborating textual evidence; but, judging from the logic of the disputation proper to medieval Naiyaayikas, it can be supposed, with a high degree of certainty, that such a conception did not lack the support of the scientific community. Having in mind the views of `Sriidhara represented above, we shall now turn to the criticism of Uddyotakara, violently rejecting the very possibility of such views:

With the help of causality (kaara.natva) [some] depict atoms as directed by the active karman of man in regard to which it is said that atoms as acting should permanently be in action (pravrtti). [Objection:] But, aren't they acting as "related to the peculiarities of time" (kaalavi`se.saapek.saa.h)? [Answer:] Time is explained by atoms--as atoms are relevant to the direction (adhi.s.thaa) of an intelligent subject, so time [also]; for it is said that the unconsciousness there cannot be suspended (nivartata). [Objection:] But, isn't it said that the action even of the unconscious subject of milk, etc. is volitional (cet, intentional), that as the activity of the unconscious milk, etc. is "for the sake of nourishing the children" (apatyabhara.naartha), so, in the same way, even the unconscious

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atoms "will have to be activated for the sake of man'' (puru.saartham pravarti.syanta)? [Answer:j This is not relevant (na yukta), due to the uniformity of probandum (saadhya): just like the autonomous (svatantra) atoms are acting[and] this is the propandum, so autonomous, unconscious milk, etc. must be acting-[it] should act even in dead [cows], yet [it] does not act; therefore it should be understood that it is directed by an intelligent cause. And this ground therefore is not working; similarly, in the final analysis, [it turns out that] it acts unconsciously; [while] all that is directed by consciousness (cetanaa).[27]

All this (the opponent's views) granted, the following scheme of the cosmic evolutionary process may be outlined. The impulses emanating from the aatman substances transform the potential parispandic energy of atomic motion into kinetic energy, integrating--and at the same time differentiating--atoms into aggregates. Vai`se.sika is universally recognized as having laid the foundations of Indian mechanics by analyzing the main types of motion. Therefore, it is quite natural for a Vai`se.sika to analyze precisely the world mechanism, as well as the laws governing the relationships between the parts of the world, taken in their various forms of endless motion. In doing so, the main attention has been shifted from the whole to the particular characteristics, from the evolutionary nature of the things to their mechanical disposition in the world. Aspects of the "natural science" grasping the holistic or the evolutionary nature of reality do not find any systematic reflection in the philosophy of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika. They are chiefly elaborated by Vedaanta, which lays the main emphasis on the organic totality of the world while disregarding the mechanics of its parts, and by Saa^nkhya, with its refined doctrine of the integral evolution of the world-whole and its organic parts.

On the whole, Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika keeps confidently to the general mechanistic tendency prevailing in the teachings of the early school, following, at the same time, the metaphysical doctrine of the eternality and substantiality of aatman. The characteristic features of this doctrine should be explained as being the result of attempts to counterbalance the thoroughgoing mechanistic tendency of the school by developing the idea of the many substanceswhose sum total can be compared to a special kind of metaphysical mechanism--warranting the wholeness of the individual objects. In that particular case, aatman should be taken as the metaphysical pluralistic equivalent and universal substitute for the organic totality and differential evolution of the world.

Thus, the representatives of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika remain, in the final analysis, faithful to the mechanistic disposition of the early Vai`se.sika, combining the pluralism of the substances (the great elements, space, time, and manas) with the pluralism of the system-building principle. This pluralistic attitude constitutes the most substantial connection between the atomistic theory and the doctrine of aatman within the framework of the classical NyaayaVai`se.sika.

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In trying to substantiate this, we shall once again have a look at the critical work of Malli.se.na, presenting yet another corroborative evidence of the close ties existing between the Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika theory-of atoms and the teaching of the aatman's all-pervading nature. "Through the pervasiveness of aatman," says Mallisena, "all atoms are in conjunction with it.[28] The, sense of these words is that ail atoms of the material Universe may with one accord approach for the constitution of the aatman's body. Thus, aatman is comprehended as the unique principle of the universal connection. With regard to manas, which had to perform this function in relation to the cognitive process, aatman transcends the boundaries of cognition and should be defined as the cosmological substance of universal connection, that is, the principal of integral organic totality. It widens the actual horizons of material relationships between man and nature, supporting the feeling of integrity and wholeness.

As a matter of fact, Syaad-vaada-ma~njarii raises some other questions of import which can be related to the philosophy of Indian atomism. Conceding together with the opponents of Vai`se.sika that aatman does not have the character of all-pervading substance, and trying to relate this assertion to the problem of body-constitution, we would have to agree that in actual fact aatman does not affect the whole quantity of atoms present in the Universe, but only a small portion of it-if not only one. Thus, the formation of body is left to the play of accident. We may admit, this time together with Ajita Ke`sakambalin and Lokaayata, that atoms, quite independently of any external forces or substances, possess some kind of spontaneously manifested powers of attraction and repulsion which should be conceived of as the ultimate causa efficiens of the atomic conjunction and disjunction. Malli.se.na does not conceal the fact that any adherent of Jaina would willingly accept this kind of alternative, for, ultimately, it corresponds to the physicalistic bearing of Jaina philosophic doctrine.

Vai`se.sika, however, is searching for the exact criterion of combination which will be able to represent not only the proper ratio of the conjoining atoms, but also their comparative number. Willful attraction and repulsion, for all their conceptual advantages, do not allow for construing a consistently monistic theory because of the nonpredictability and asymmetrical nature of any one of the concrete atomic syntheses; no one can tell you when and what number of atoms in the Universe will spontaneously collide to form the body of [aat]man. Yet, as a matter of fact, people have a size that is comparatively one and the same which can be placed somewhere in the golden mean of the cosmic scale. So the process of body-constitution is, as may be inferred, not of an arbitrary-accidental nature. According to Vai`se.sika, this event is directed by the category of aatman. In the initial period of the development of the Universe, or rather prior to the beginning, the metaphysical substance of aatman arranges the atoms in such a way that the future rise of a detinite set of human bodies is guaranteed in which the realization of the Law of Karman will eventually take place.

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The heuristic advantages of this kind of reasoning are quite evident in the late cosmology of Vai`se.sika and particularly in that of Ke`sava Mi`sra. Discussing the process of production and destruction of the world, the author of Tarka-bhaa.Saa depicts one of the possible variants in the destroying of the empirical entities which is highly relevant to some problems raised within the contemporary poly-universalist cosmologies.Sometimes the destruction of the substances is through destruction of the inherent cause. When the said time of the earth, etc. elapses, there appears an intention of Mahe`svara to destroy them. Then an activity is generated in the atoms. Thus, because of the disjunction [of the two atoms forming the molecule] the destruction of the conjunction [between them takes place]. The destruction of the earth, etc. proceeds by means of destruction of triad, etc., due to the destruction of the Substratum [occurring] 'in the destroyed own substrata-the molecules' (dvya.nuke.su svaa`sraye.su na.s.te.su).[29]

This is a unique picture indeed, for the process of destruction proceeds in the same order as the foregoing process of creation, which involves the postulation of a large number of hidden variables regulating the final destruction of the atomic aggregates. Ke`sava Mi`sra makes it clear that these variables are definitely put into action by the intentional will of God, that is, of paramaatman. There is, however, no God mentioned in the original doctrine of Ka.naada, and, for that reason, it should be supposed that the cosmological functions of the paramaatman should have been taken over by the purely metaphysical category of aatman. Following the same line of reasoning, a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that so far as there are many aatmans, a multitude of universes should also exist. Each aatman arranges the atoms of a corresponding universe in its own way, because of its all-pervasiveness and individuality. Thus the Universe we are living in is only a cross-section of an endless ensemble of worlds.

In the current cosmology, there are at least three possibilities for developing one or another kind of "poly-universalism," It is an accepted fact that the isotropy of the Universe depends on the escape velocity of the galaxies. So, according to Collins and Hawking, there is not only one universe, but a set of universes--an endless ensemble of worlds characterized by all possible initial conditions. Almost all of them are highly anisotropic. "On this view, the fact that we observe the universe to be isotropic would be simply a reflection of our own existence," and "there will be life only in those universes which tend toward isotropy at large times. The fact that we have observed the universe to be isotropic is therefore only a consequence of our own existence.[30]

Secondly, according to the so-called realistic interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,[31] there is no reduction of the wave function. This implies the substantiation of an ensemble of many really existing universes, which, however, are not in the empirical space-time, but in the continuum of the quantum-mechanical superposition. The realist openly holds that the entirety of parallelly existing, superpositional quantum-mechanical states should

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never be reduced to one definite state delimited by the act of measurement, but is always a real variety. What is more, Everett, Graham, and Wheeler claim that the real variety of states corresponds to a real variety of universes. The view of the latter differs from Bruno's notion of many worlds in one substantial respect: the many universes of the quantum-mechanical cosmology are not subject to the action of one and the same set of physical laws. As a matter of fact, to be theoretically possible, they must rely upon different fundamental constants of different concrete value.

The third possibility arises from the recent inflation theories which involve the existence of many universes developing in different "bubbles" of material space-time. The last two alternatives come to be combined in the so-called final anthropic principle, proposed by Barrow and Tripler:

Life evolves in all of these universes in a quantum cosmology, and if life continues to exist in all of these universes, then all of these universes, which include all possible histories among them: will approach the Omega Point [a kind of final singularity which teleologically integrates the manifestations of life in all universes--borrowed from Teilhard de Chardin]. At the instant the Omega Point is reached, life will have gained control of all matter and forces not only in a single universe, but in all universes whose existence is logically possible.[32]

Let us now return to the anthropic argumentation of the Vai`se.sikas as represented by Mallisena. So, to begin with, they concede that the body may

have some other origin differing from what is depicted in the orthodox suutras. Then the question should be asked as to how aatman comes into contact with its body, since the former is not the efficient cause of the latter. In solving this case, there are two logical alternatives: (1) the contact between them comes about at once, and (2) the contact occurs part by part.

The first alternative is but a particular corollary to Vai`se.sika doctrine. The body obviously does consist of many parts and, respectively, of a great many atoms. Since the said conjunction takes place at one time, then the aatman should be all-pervading. The analysis of the second alternative is much more interesting: if aatman entered the body part by part, this would mean that aatman itself consists of many parts. This, however, is against the fundamental assumption stating the unity and indivisibility of aatman. Let us assume that aatman does actually consist of many parts and that to every atom of the body there is a corresponding particle of the aatman. Being composed of parts, aatman should be regarded as a kind of aggregate. The aggregates, however, cannot be causa sui, for they are caused at least by their component parts.

Now, there arise two additional alternatives: (1) the parts and the aggregate can be heterogeneous, and (2) they can be homogeneous. The first alternative is highly improbable, for the heterogeneous parts cannot be constructive elements of the whole, as, for example, threads do not constitute a pot. Such component elements can be the atoms of earth, and so forth, but, in

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this case. the aggregate composed of them is called body, and not aatman. Otherwise. we should be forced to admit the existence of atoms possessing consciousness; this, however, is not compatible with the suutras of Ka.naada.[33] On the other hand, Jaina authorities recognize, too, that there cannot be conscious atoms, in spite of the fact that aatman may occupy an atom of space.

The second alternative is also untenable, for the component parts should possess consciousness in order to produce it in the effect. This demonstration is but regressus ad infinitum and, what is more, turns the argumentation back to its very beginning. Supposing that the separate part has the characteristics of the effect-aatman (which is eternal and therefore cannot be an effect), we shall be obliged to see whether it is conjoined with the other parts of the body simultaneously and without any exception possible, or rather does it part by part. In this case, the result will be a neverending petitio principii. Otherwise, aatman would have to be constituted by some other selves. This is illogical, because of the impossibility of a plurality of aatmans being constitutive of a Self in a single body. Summarizing the views of the Vai`se.sikas, Malli.se.na-suuri concludes that "only a pervasive Self is logical; because, if it has the size of the body. the stated faults exist.[34]

The Jaina position on this question is based upon the specific understanding of aatman, namely, jiivaatman, as a kind of pulsating atom which may be found both in an ordinary atom and in an innumerable number of space atoms (prade`sas).[35] As for the controversy-between Jaina and Vai`se.sika on the size of aatman, it should be noted that the most important issue arising from its critical analysis concerns the possibility of going deeper in the articulation of the cognitive functions of aatman with reference to the atomistic structure of the world. This may impart a new, anthropic sense to the metaphysical and cosmological tradition present in the philosophy of Indian atomism.

NOTES

1. According to Ka.naada, "breathing, swallowing, opening and closing [of the eyes], life, motions of the manas, gffections of the other sense organs, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition and [other] are the marks of aatman"(vai^se.sika-suutra Ⅲ2.4, in The Vai`se.sika Dar`Sana, with Upaskaara of `Sa^nkara Mi^sra and Viv.rtti of Jayanaaraaya.na, ed. Jayanaaraaya.na Tarkapanchaana, Bibliotheca Indica, New Series, Nos. 4-6, 8, 10 (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1861); hereafter cited as Vai`se.sika-suutra, VS, and Upaskaara). The Sanskrit particle "ca" (the latter "and") here implies some other qualities which are enumerated, for instance, in the Tarkakaumudii of Laugaak.si Bhaaskara:

AAtman is what possesses the general class of aatmanity. It is two-fold because of the division into soul (jiiva) and I`svara. Soul is the subject of non-eternal knowledge etc., and the substratum of fourteen qualities--number, measure [or size], separateness, conjunction, disjunction, intellect , pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, dhanna, adharma, Pisposition. It is diversified according to the body, due to the variety of pleasure, pain, etc. Ii`svara is the subject of the eternal knowledge. etc., and the bearer of eight qualities-number, measure, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, intellect, desire, volition. He is only one and devoid of body, due to the lack of the unseen (ad.r.s.ta) cause of the body [i.e., due to the absence of ad.r.s.ta comprehended as the instrumental cause in the process of body-constitution]. Or, it might`t;e objected, he has body due

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to the rise, that is, the generation of that body by means of our ad.r.s.ta. Through our ad.r.s.ta there can be no rise of body, even of a liberated [onel [from the cycle of transmigration)-such is the established tenet. [Further,] because of the absence of desire, etc., as the cause for [the rise of! the body. . . [the characteristic of] atman is also two-fold-all-pervading and eternal. (Laugaak.si Bhaaskara, Tarka-kaumudi, ed. M. N. Dvivedi, Bombay Sansitrit Series, N 32 (Bombay: The Department of Public Instruction, 1886), pp. 3-4)

This comparatively long quotation may serve as a good introduction to the problems we are going to discuss. The most crucial of them is who is responsible for the constitution of arman's body? Apparently it is not Ii`svara, because it is said that he does not need any body at all. If we deny to the intimate aatman the capability of creating its own body, then the distinction between the immanent and paramount atman would be thoroughly useless, because it is the immanent ritman whose differentia specifica is to possess body, and not the paramdtman. On the other hand, Laugaak.si Bhaaskara seems to have represented the views of some old adherents of the anthropic explanation of the Universe, claiming that even the body of God, if we concede that there is such a thing like divine body, should be produced by means of human ad.r.s.ra. Or, if we assume thepanentheistic point of view, man and God, being in mutual dependence, take care of each other-the task of man being to restore the body of God, that is, cosmos, by means of the results of his good or bad actions, i.e., karman. One cannot help noting that this is indeed a participatory universe we are living in.

2. Critically analyzing Vyoma`siva's Vyomavati, Chandramati's Da`sa-padaartha-sa^mgraha, and many other canonical works in the tradition of Nyaaya-Vai`se.sika, Erich Frauwallner, in his paper "Der ursprungliche Anfang der Vai`se.sika-Suutren," has convincingly demonstrated that the original, but unfortunately lost, three aphorisms of the Vai`se.sika-suutra "kennen den Gottesbegriff noch nicht." Yet, the VS I.1.1-4, in their present form, represent the Vai`se.sika System as a kind of orthodox soteriology. "Es ist aber klar, dass dies dem Geist des Systems widerspricht. Denn das Vai`se.sikam ist eine reine Naturphilosophie, welche die Erscheinungswelt zu verstehen und zu erklären sucht, und hat mit einer ErlOsungslehre nichts zu run. . . . Das legt aber die Vermutung nahe, dass die angeführte Beginn der Vai`se.sik-Suutren eine spätere Zutat ist, die unter dem Einfluss der religibsen Striimungen einen anderen älteren Anfang verdrängt hat" (Erich Frauwallner, Nachgelassene Werke. Bd.l: Aufstze, Beitrge, Skizzen, Herausgegeben von Ernst Steinkellner, terreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, Ed. 438 (Wien: Verlag der ster. Ak. d. Wiss., 1984), S. 36-40). However, it cannot be denied that the category of atman has been present even in the most ancient layers of the Vai`se.sika, forming thus the peculiar counterpart of the structural category of atom. And, therefore, when we try to explain the activation of atoms, there being no God, we should rely exclusively on the cosmo-initiating functions of dtman. Then the latter must be defined as an example of transcendental naturalistic category.