Apropos of Feigls Critique of Intuition

•期刊原文

Apropos of Feigl's Critique of Intuition

By Kumataro Kawada

Philosophy East & West

V. 12 (1962)

pp. 163-173

Copyright 1962 by University of Hawaii Press

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　p.163

I.INTRODUCTION
APROPOS OF Professor Herbert Feigl's "Critique of Intuition According to Scientific Empiricism,"[1] it may be helpful to make some remarks from the standpoint of Buddhism--which, by the way, should be called "Buddhism," if one is to be strictly accurate. So-called "Buddhism," from its very beginning down to the present time, has laid more stress upon bodhi, the realization of the truth, than upon the person of Gautama, the Buddha, whose sole purpose was to make others also realize the truth as he had.

Feigl's article is divided into two main parts, one in which various meanings of the term "intuition" are analyzed, and the other in which the role of intuition is almost excluded from the field of knowledge. And he has done this by criticizing, especially, "trans-empirical intuition." Summing up, he says that "intuition in the sense of direct experience is never the finished product of knowledge" and that "It is, rather, either the raw material of knowledge, i.e., the confirmation basis of genuine knowledge- claims, or it is a way of arriving at hypotheses which may or may not be found tenable on the basis of further evidence" (p. 16). His standpoint has its origins in that of the Vienna Circle,[2] "neo-empiricism," "Einheitswissenschaft," ('neo-positivism," "logical positivism," etc.

As is well known, the Vienna Circle itself belongs to the past, because it was crushed in Vienna by political pressure. But some members of it were invited to America, where they found a suitable ground to strike root. This was possible because pragmatism, especially that of C. S. Peirce, was prominent in America, and pragmatism was compatible with the views of the Vienna Circle. And so, they co-operated with indigenous American thinkers and developed, together, a philosophy almost peculiar to America,

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which may be called the philosophy of the common people. Of course, scientific empiricism is not the one and only vigorous philosophy in America, but Feigl's article itself seems to suggest this. Perhaps it reflects the present situation of American philosophy in general, or at least the spiritual atmosphere of Hawaii at the time when the paper was presented there as a lecture.

II.BREADTH AND DEPTH OF INTUITION
Feigl's analysis of the meanings of the ambiguous term "intuition" is admirable, especially his clarification of "hunch." The purpose of his analysis of intuition consists, first, in this, that he rejects the knowledge-claims of intuition, especially those of trans-empirical intuitive knowledge; second, in this, that he wishes to make the role of intuition in the field of knowledge as insignificant as possible. And his scientific empiricism has the natural human organisms, which are homo sapiens (p. 3), as its own regulative principle.

The author mentions mystical or trans-empirical intuition as the seventh meaning of the term "intuition." And he rejects its knowledge-claims. His point is well taken, if the object of trans-empirical intuition is transcendent in the strict sense of the word: the object is beyond our experiences, and we cannot even approach it. If God or the Absolute is such an object, it is non-sensical even to speak of the intuitive apprehension of him or of it. Therefore, Feigl is sound in not admitting a knowledge of the Absolute or of God by intuition. But why does he make an exception and say, "I am not talking about these philosophers" (p. 7) who try to construct rational proofs for the existence of one or the other? Who are these philosophers? Or, presumably, it makes no sense to put such a question, because he is content with this, that a personal God is explained by Freud and other thinkers in a perfectly natural way and because he makes much of such an explanation through ordinary channels (p. 7), i.e., the usual empirical way or in terms of the natural condition of man or in a purely naturalistic way.

Thus far, Feigl's position is cogent. But there are apprehensions that such a way of thinking might lead us to the arbitrary limitation of the sphere of human knowledge to that of ordinary or common people, who make themselves the measure of all things. For example, such a thing as the experience of the Holy Spirit, about which the Bible tells us,[3] would be nonsensical for

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ordinary people, who would be content with this, that such an experience can be explained in a purely naturalistic way. But why are those people who are mentioned in the Bible able to work so hard with the experience (Erleben) of the Holy Spirit (to pneuma hagion) ?[4] Is it not that for them the experience of the Holy Spirit was not extraordinary? Is it not for the common people alone that such an experience seems to be extraordinary? Therefore, on the one hand, the experience of the Holy Spirit or being addressed by God may be explained in a purely naturalistic way, but, on the other hand, such an experience might have a core which cannot be explained away in such a way. One should examine human experiences more deeply and carefully before one says the last word about them. There is room for this examination because Jews and Christians cannot be rejected as possessed by mere illusory experiences.

Next, there is the question of "depersonalization (demythologization)" (p. 8), of which Feigl says nothing clear and definite. He says, ". . . it is not implausible that Brahman or the Absolute represents a final stage in the successive depersonalization (demythologization) of historically antecedent highly anthropomorphic deities" (p. 8). He seems to be counting the knowledge of the highly depersonalized Brahman, coveted by the Vedaantins, among the Eastern mystical visions. Is it certain that the knowledge and the experience of Brahman, which is obtained by the way of negation (prati.sedha), of "neti neti,"[5] is a mystical vision? Is it not that such knowledge cannot be obtained by ordinary people, who do not have the will and capacity which the Vedaanta tradition requires?[6] However, in this case, also, there is no need to press the point.

From the Buddhist standpoint attention should be directed to the following point concerning depersonalization. As regards the Vedaanta philosophy, the term is suitable, for the Vedaanta has in its prehistory many anthropomorphic and anthropopathic deities. And so, the term "demythologization'' also is suitable. But, On the contrary, what the Buddhist philosophy expounds is dehypostatization or desubstantiation. And this is expressed with the concept of `suunyataa (voidness), which refutes and corrects the natural bias of man to hypostatize and substantiate everything. That is, Buddhism expounds the transiency (anityataa) of all phenomenal things (sa^mskaaras) and the permanency of the law of pratiityasamutpaada (dependent origination), which governs all phenomenal things. Therefore, Buddhist philosophy knows and sees permanency in the transient. It is not a mystical vision to

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see (erleben) and know (erkennen) permanency and impermanency. Anyone can realize this fact, if he makes use of the logic of the middle way. The point may be affirmed, if one reads carefully Naagaarjuna's Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaas[7] With Candrakiirti's Commentary. Therefore, it is a rash and false generalization to encompass all Oriental thought with such concepts as eastern mystical visions and Oriental mysticisms: this is too misty and hazy. To be sure, various deities and fairy-like beings are written about in Buddhist texts, but this is mere adaptation to the cultural environment of various places and times, in order to lead men into the truth (avataaraya). It does not hit the mark to call Buddhism a type of mysticism.

Be that as it may, Feigl analyzes the ambiguous term "intuition" and rejects mysticism by critical analysis. In so doing he arrives at two meanings of intuition and thereby negates its knowledge-claims. The two meanings are clearly stated in the conclusion of the article, and they are closely related to the first among seven meanings of intuition as previously analyzed. In the conclusion, Feigl says, "Intuition in the sense of direct experience is never the finished product of knowledge," as quoted above. Thus, he approves intuition only in the role of "the raw material of knowledge" and as "a way of arriving at hypotheses." His contention consists in this, that he does not completely reject intuition in its relation to knowledge, but does make the role of intuition as insignificant as possible. This reminds us of his first meaning of "intuition" (p. 2), which he explains as "awareness (and awareness of awareness)." And, in mentioning various cases of it, he puts forward "the direct experience" as its essential feature. He tells us that this should not be confused with propositionally formulated knowledge-claims about it. He puts it otherwise, and says, "The private, direct experiences of various persons have a place in the nomological net of science. They can be triangulated from various, and often quite heterogeneous, areas of evidence" (p* 11).

If it is of utmost importance to distinguish direct experience from the knowing about it (p. 9), it is impossible to deprive intuition utterly of its role in regard to knowledge, because, if one did that, one would not be a true rationalist. On the contrary, one cannot reject the knowledge derived from intuition if he is a true empiricist. However, is the role of intuition in regard to knowledge restricted to only the raw material of knowledge and to a way of arriving at hypotheses? If one has no direct experience, one cannot know about it. Feigl would retort by putting forward the example of the

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blind man who can study color-perception in another person's mind (p. 10). But can the blind man, by himself alone, construct the "devices" with which he can study color-perception in the other person's mind? Our knowledge of ultraviolet rays is founded upon the experience and knowledge of a man who has the ordinary faculty of eyesight. The necessary "devices" are constructed by men with ordinary eyesight. Otherwise, how can a man get a "foothold" (p. 10) from which one can step further? The calculating machine is constructed by men who can calculate. It does not construct itself automatically and naturally. And, even if it did so, we could not make use of it, if we had no calculating faculty.

If this is the case, intuition is not only the raw material or confirmation basis of knowledge--it is that, to be sure, but it also has a knowledge-generating role. In this role, intuition can be a way of arriving at hypotheses. And "the basis of further evidence," by which the hypotheses arrived at can be tested, is twofold: intuition, or Erleben, which makes the hypothesis certain, and the logical consistency or coherence within a hypothesis itself. The wider and deeper the intuition, the wider and deeper the knowledge. Thus, presumably, the role of intuition as regards knowledge is more important than the role which Feigl assigns to it. If one makes the role of intuition as insignificant as possible, one precipitates oneself into the sufficiency of empty concepts (leere Begriffe).[8]

If it is possible to distinguish pre-scientific intuition from conceptual or intrinsic scientific knowledge, an ultima-scientific intuition also must be distinguished which defies the mastery of scientific knowledge. Of course, science strives to master it. But a new ultima-scientific intuition emerges out of the mastery process, And so on. Thus, science transforms itself successively. In this case, intuition, though not a finished product of knowledge, challenges and generates science, which cannot, therefore, force intuition into a Procrustean bed. The rise of empiricism in the modern age against the old rationalism may prove this. It is to be hoped that scientific empiricism does not in a new manner repeat the blunder of traditional rationalism. Therefore, I say, the breadth and depth of intuition are the important considerations.

As already said, we must agree with Feigl when he distinguishes direct experience from scientific and propositionally formulated knowledge. But, presumably, he defines the meaning of "knowledge" too strictly or too narrowly, because, when "intuitive" knowledge, "intimate" knowledge, etc.,

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are mentioned, "knowledge" has a wider meaning. That is why such modifying words as "discursive," "symbolic," etc., must be prefixed to "knowledge." Thus, it is not necessarily erroneous to say "intuitive" knowledge, etc. In ordinary life we say, "I have seen it," therefore "I have known it." In this case, what matters is both how I have seen it and how I have known it, and not merely that I have known it. For all that, we must not belittle scientific empiricism. But an ominous problem arises, whether or not the development and success of modern science to date should lead to the omnipotency of science, i.e., positivistic movements, reminding us of the cultural and spiritual situation in Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century.

III.SCIENTIFIC EMPIRICISM AND THE HUMAN ORGANISM
Feigl has emphatically rejected trans-empirical intuition and mysticism based upon it. As said above, if trans-empirical intuition means that the object of the intuition completely transcends experience, such an intuition cannot be admitted, and mysticism, also, must be rejected. But we cannot reject or ignore the breadth and depth of the intuition; the intuition as such should be distinguished from knowledge about it. And, if the breadth and depth of the intuition is admitted, an intuition which seems to one as trans-empirical is to another an intra-empirical intuition. Therefore, knowledge which is confirmed by such an experience can be established. For example, the knowledge that all phenomenal things (sa^mskaaras) are devoid of their own nature (ida^m sarvam `suunyam)[9] would seem to almost all ordinary men mystical and lacking the intuition which confirms it. But this is a knowledge which has as its basis the experience of the transiency and impermanency of all phenomenal things. This view does not entail or support any type of mysticism--Buddhism is not mysticism.

Feigl's scientific empiricism seemingly has its own characteristic which manifests power in its own sphere; but, paradoxically, because of this characteristic, it loses power. He qualifies his empiricism, not only with the modifier "scientific," but also with "naturalistic" (p. 12), "humanistic" (p.16), and "rational" (p. 16).Where do these modifiers originate? They come from nowhere other than from "human organisms" (p. 14). His words, "a perfectly natural, all-too-obvious human basis" (p. 13), mean quite the same thing. This, apparently, is that which regulates his scientific empiricism from within or from behind; this is the nerve of his scientific

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empiricism. Therefore, he sides with Freud and others, and is content with the explanation of a personal God by the experience of a human father.

His thought here needs clarification. Thus, when he says "our psychology" (p. 13) he means naturalistic psychology. Such a way of thinking is for use by the natural human organisms in order to know their physical environment (p. 14) and to live in it. Therefore, such a way of thinking is regulated by the natural life of men as individuals and as a species. And life in this sense is affirmed in almost all cases unconditionally and endows scientific empiricism with universal acceptability, even apart from its logical cogency, for scientific empiricism serves the inborn natural tendency of ordinary people to live as natural organisms. But ordinary people cannot be completely resolved into the natural tendency. If natural human organisms are allowed to go their own way, they run the risk of becoming more bestial than the beasts by dint of their knowledge faculty. Therefore, the natural tendency of human organisms should be checked and regulated or, rather, converted and reversed. And this striving for the conversion and reversal of their natural tendency is latent and dormant in human organisms. This latent and dormant tendency may be called an ultima-natural tendency, which does not necessarily reject or kill and destroy the intra-natural tendency, but, on the contrary, perfects it. In this direction goes praj~naa intelligence purged of its natural and downward tendency.

As far as can be gathered from Feigl's article, what regulates and governs his scientific empiricism from within or from behind is the natural tendency of human organisms which have not yet had the experience of conversion and reversal. Therefore, Feigl is content that all things are explained or explained away from the viewpoint of intra-naturalism.

In order to clarify this objection, it may be interesting to note, for example, the encompassing being[10] (das umgreifende Sein) of Karl Jaspers. He contends that there are seven encompassing beings: life (das Dasein), consciousness in general (das Bewusstsein ueberhaupt), spirit (der Geist), existence (die Existenz), the reason of existence (die Vernunft der Existenz), the world (die Welt),and transcendence (die Transzendenz). The first five result from the interpretation of human phenomena. And each of the seven has its own peculiarity, but they can all be connected by the reason of existence. If Feigl's scientific empiricism is examined from their viewpoint, its essence is consciousness in general (das Bewusstsein ueberhaupt) regulated by life (das Dasein) from within or from behind. And scientific empiricism explains the other five encompassing beings as in consciousness

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in general regulated by life or it explains away the other five and abnegates their individual peculiarities. Indeed, the philosophy of Jaspers has as its heart and core the religion of the Holy Scriptures and could not be accepted by Feigl. But the trend of our objection may be clear from the illustration above, The same may be clarified by one more illustration. The fundamental text of Martin Buber's dialogical philosophy is "Ich und Du" (I and Thou), in which he says that the fundamental words[11] (die Grundworte) are "Ich-Du" (I-Thou) and "Ich-Es" (I-It). From this point of view, Feigl's scientific empiricism is a philosophy merely of Es (It), which reduces Du (Thou) to Es or explains away Du by Es. Indeed, Buber's philosophy is that of the Old Testament, and Feigl will not accept it. Perhaps this illustration may help to clarify our meaning.

Feigl's scientific empiricism belongs to a tradition of naturalistic and hylicistic thought which has its origin in ancient Greek philosophy. But ancient Greek philosophy is not necessarily naturalistic and hylicistic, though it is determinedly physicism, concerning which physis (Nature) should be accepted in its original Greek meaning. Indeed, Feigl speaks of "my Western bias and 'scientism' " (p. 1), and names his philosophy "scientific humanism and empiricism" (p. 16). There are in the Western area and tradition, however, ways of thinking that cannot be reduced to hylicistic naturalism or be explained away by it. These ways of thinking, including that of Feigl, differ much from Oriental ways of thinking, insofar as they concern fundamental concepts or conceptions. And, as Feigl seems to admit at the outset of his article, there are Eastern ways of thinking which differ from those of the West. If one may call the Greek way of thinking that of "physis" (Nature) thinking and the Christian way of thinking that of "ho ^on" (I am that I am) thinking, the Upani.sadic way of thinking may be called that of "puru.sa" (man)-thinking, and the Buddhist way of thinking that of "citta" (mind)-thinking. And, if one studies these ways of thinking carefully and directly from their original texts, one finds that no one of them can, at the present time, be reduced to or derived from any other. Each of them ought to respect and strive to understand the other at first hand.

IV.HOMO SAPIENS AND BUDDHISM
Some additional interesting and significant points of the Buddhist way of thinking are:

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1.Buddhist philosophy is not merely a dar`sana (direct-seeing view), but a j~naanadar`sana[12] (knowledge-view), which means knowledge that is confirmed and appropriated by experience (seeing). Thus, one very often meets in the Paali texts the expression "he knows and sees"[13] (~naanati passati). This view of knowledge is very clearly expressed in the following passage: "The deep truths which the Tathaagata has known by himself and has experienced he makes others know."[14] And the praj~naa (supreme wisdom) that achieves this is intelligence purged by and founded upon morality (`siila) and concentration (samaadhi).

2.Naagaarjuna calls dependent origination (pratiityasamutpaada) voidness (`suunyataa), manifestation on the basis of (upaadaayapraj~napti) and the middle way[15] (pratipan madhyamaa), and says that this is the basic truth. He resorts to the reduction to absurdity (prasa^nga) in order to make the truth clearly known and experienced. And in so doing he says that the teaching of buddhas (enlightened ones) is based upon two truths,[16] the truth according to common sense (lokasa^mv.rtisatya) and the ultimate truth (paramaarthasatya), and holds that the latter cannot be achieved without the former. So far, there is some ambiguity regarding the two truths. But it is overcome by the philosophers of the Yogaacaara school, who followed Naagaarjuna and developed the concept of citta-thinking. And they expressed their thought relevant to the point by the excellent phrase "conversion of the basis of citta" (cittaa`srayaparaav.rtti).[17] This was mentioned above: conversion or reversal of the natural tendency of human organisms, because, according to the Buddhist view, human organisms, which are sa^mskaaras, are cittas, in its original and traditional sense, that is, the accumulation of bodily, lingual, and mental deeds regulated by the law of dependent origination. And the sa^mskaaras, which are cittas, have innate natural tendencies, which are the basis of all deeds of the nescient cittas. The truth which is established by the cittas not yet converted or reversed is accepted, but it is called the truth according to common sense and is distinguished from the ultimate

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truth, because the former contains insufficiency, which comes from hypostatization and substantiation. By refuting the truth according to common sense one arrives at the ultimate truth purged of insufficient elements. Therefore, the distinction between the one truth and the other hinges on the conversion and reversal of the natural tendency of human organisms. Thus, the Buddhist theory of two truths is quite different from that of Rene Descartes.[18] It is the one and same praj~naa which refutes the truth according to common sense and arrives at the ultimate truth. The phases of praj~naa are three: knowledge without false discrimination in the phase of exerting itself (praj~naa in the phase of exertion, prayoga), knowledge without false discrimination itself, and the purified common-sense knowledge achieved after the knowledge without false discrimination. Knowledge without false discrimination (nirvikalpa-j~naanam) and praj~naa ate one and same thing. Praj~naa, which knows the ultimate truth, is not merely an intuition, because it (praj~naa) knows the ultimate truth and experiences (confirms) it and makes others know it.

3.To illustrate this point, we shall make use of the term "homo sapiens" (Feigl, p. 3). The term is, indeed, a technical term of biology or anthropology, and its opposite is "homo faber." But here and now we take it purposely to mean "homo quaerens sapientiam," that is, man seeking to obtain wisdom. Then four cases can be distinguished as regards the man seeking to obtain wisdom: (1) the man who is seeking to obtain wisdom but who is nescient; (2) the man who is seeking to obtain true wisdom; (3) the man who has true wisdom; (4) the man who, having obtained true wisdom, has wisdom which corrects and directs nescience.[19] Praj~naa covers the range of the latter three, and the conversion or reversal referred to above intervenes between the first and the latter three, because praj~naa is conditioned by morality (`siila) and concentration (samaadhi), i.e., by the conversion and reversal of the natural tendency of human organisms.

V.CONCLUSION
Here Feigl would disapprove and say that Buddhist thinking is based upon communality (p.11). But the conversion or reversal (die Umkehr) of the natural tendency of human organisms is a universal phenomenon,though it is latent and dormant in ordinary life. And, if scientific empiricism does not acknowledge its own strength and weakness but reduces all human

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knowledge to a kind of naturalism or explains it away, it is feared that it will lose the cause which it advocates and be driven back into its own sphere, so that it will not meddle with knowledge which lies outside its sphere. In a word, the tenets of "scientific empiricism" or "scientism" are sound in their own sphere, but their functions must be limited within their proper sphere. Human organisms, which are sa^mskaaras in the Buddhist sense, have much more breadth and depth and therefore must be treated and interpreted accordingly.

NOTES
1. Philosophy East and West, VIII, Nos. 1 and 2 (April-July, 1959), 1-16.

2.Cf. Victor Kraft, Der Wiener Kreis (Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1950), pp. iii-v, 1-10.

3.The Holy Bible (rev. version, London: Cambridge University Press, for the British and Foreign Bible Society, 1903). First Corinthians 12:3; in The Holy Bible, p. 181.

4.Exodus 3:4; in ibid., p. 57.

5. B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad, IV, v. 15.

6. `Sa^mkara, Vivekacuu.daama.ni, 14.

7. Madhyamakav.rtti.h, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaas (Maadhyamika Suutras) de Naagaarjuna, avec la Prasannapadaa, Commentaire de Candrakiirti. Publie par Louis de La Vallee-Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV. (St. Petersbourg: Imprimeric de 1'Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1913)*

8.Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, neu herausgegeben von Theodor Valentiner, mit Sachregister. Der Philosophischen Bibliothek, Band 37 (Zwoelfte Auflage, Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1922), Seite 107.

9. Naagaarjuna: Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaas, XXIV. 19. Cf. Prasannapadaa, cited in note 7, above, page 505.

10.Karl Jaspers, Von der Wahrheit (Munchen: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1947), erster Teil, zweites Kapitel, SS. 53-122. Cf. the first chapter of the same work, pp. 48 and 50.

11.Martin Buber, Ich und Du, und ein Nachwort (vermehrte Neuausgabe, Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1958),p. 9.

12.Dhamma-cakka-ppavattana-suttam. Junjiro Takakusu, ed., Paligo Bukkyo Bungaku Kohon (Selections from Buddhist Texts in Paali) (4th ed., Tokyo: Meiji-Shoin, 1935), p. 10. Nalinaksha Dutt, ed., Saddharma-pu.n.dariika Suutra. Bibliotheca Indica, No. 276 (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1953), p. 32.

13. Sa^myutta-nikaaya, "Nidaana-vagga," No. 17.

14.T. W. Rhys Davids and Estlin Carpenter, eds., Diigha-nikaaya (London: Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, for Pali Text Society, 1889), Brahmajaala Sutta, 29. Vol. I, pp. 30, et passim.

15. Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaas, XXIV. 18. Also, ibid., XXIV. 9.

16.Ibid., XXIV. 8, 10.

17. Vasubandhu, Tri^m`sikaauij~napti-kaarikaas, XXIX. Cf. Sthiramati, Bhaa.syam (Paris: Sylvain Levi Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1925), pp. 43-44. Sylvain Levi, ed., Asa^nga, Mahaayaanasuutraala^mkaara, IX. 12. (Paris: Librairie Honore Champion, 1907), pp. 35-36.

18.Rene Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, Part I, LXXVI Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris: Adam & Tannery, 1905),Vol. VIII, p. 39.

19.Cf. Mahaayaanasuutraala^mkaara, XI. 31; op cit., pp. 62-63.